TY  - GEN
AB  - Analyse: Partisans cycles in inflation and output growth typically occurs in a two-party system with rational voters, as a result of polarization between alternating policymakers.
AB  - In addition, elections in such a bipolar system may induce in policymaker expecting to be defeated to use public debt in order to constrain the policy of the future government.
AB  - This thesis shows that in a three-party system which requires a two-party coalition for a government to form, the ideal point of the party with intermediate preferences is the unique equilibrium of the legislative bargaining game, except under a particular distribution of votes.
AB  - Only in that case does the economy exhibit a partisan shock and the pivotal party agrees upon a strategic level of public debt.
AB  - However, the magnitude of both political bias, which depends upon parties' relative motivations for seeking office, is not larger than those resulting from a two-party competition.
AU  - Gultas, Mehmet
CN  - HEITH 519
CY  - Genève
DA  - 1994
DA  - 1994
ID  - 898
N2  - Analyse: Partisans cycles in inflation and output growth typically occurs in a two-party system with rational voters, as a result of polarization between alternating policymakers.
N2  - In addition, elections in such a bipolar system may induce in policymaker expecting to be defeated to use public debt in order to constrain the policy of the future government.
N2  - This thesis shows that in a three-party system which requires a two-party coalition for a government to form, the ideal point of the party with intermediate preferences is the unique equilibrium of the legislative bargaining game, except under a particular distribution of votes.
N2  - Only in that case does the economy exhibit a partisan shock and the pivotal party agrees upon a strategic level of public debt.
N2  - However, the magnitude of both political bias, which depends upon parties' relative motivations for seeking office, is not larger than those resulting from a two-party competition.
PB  - Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales
PP  - Genève
PY  - 1994
PY  - 1994
T1  - Macroeconomic policy and politics in a three-party systema noncooperative bargaining approach
TI  - Macroeconomic policy and politics in a three-party systema noncooperative bargaining approach
Y1  - 1994
ER  -