Abstract
Analyse: The Strategic Defense Initiative and U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations in Geneva analyzes the efect that the Strategic Defense Initiative had exerted on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations in Geneva, from the time President Ronald Reagan first unveiled the U.S. program on March 23, 1983 until the Icelandic Summit in Reykjavik, October 11-12, 1986.
It exams the issue wether SDI had become an obstacle or an incentive for achieving real progress at U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva.
After a historical analysis of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations during this time period, examining SDI and its relationship with Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF), the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and Defense and Space Talk (DST) the author has concluded that on the one hand, SDI had pushed the Soviets to negotiate more seriously because of the much publicized capabilities such a program would have had in destroying their strategic retaliatory capability, yet, had the issue not been reintroduced in the arms control process, the possibility of achieving an INF and/or START Agreement(s) at an earlier point in time was more likely. SDI complicated the U.S.-Soviet arms control process, yet provided incentives for the Soviets to negociate more seriously at a time where U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts had become the focal point in changing the U.S.-Soviet political relationship.
It exams the issue wether SDI had become an obstacle or an incentive for achieving real progress at U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva.
After a historical analysis of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations during this time period, examining SDI and its relationship with Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Negotiations (INF), the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and Defense and Space Talk (DST) the author has concluded that on the one hand, SDI had pushed the Soviets to negotiate more seriously because of the much publicized capabilities such a program would have had in destroying their strategic retaliatory capability, yet, had the issue not been reintroduced in the arms control process, the possibility of achieving an INF and/or START Agreement(s) at an earlier point in time was more likely. SDI complicated the U.S.-Soviet arms control process, yet provided incentives for the Soviets to negociate more seriously at a time where U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts had become the focal point in changing the U.S.-Soviet political relationship.