

European Commission
Seventh Framework Programme
Project ATLAS
Armed Conflicts, Peacekeeping,
Transitional Justice: Law as Solution
*Vulnerable groups in the conflict trap:
Results of a field trip to Haiti*

Jean-Louis ARCAND
Professor of International Economics and
Professor of Development Studies
The Graduate Institute | Geneva
email: jean-louis.arcand@graduateinstitute.ch

June 30, 2009

Abstract

This report is based on evidence from the field gathered in Haiti in July-August 2008, as well as original analysis of recent household survey data on violence against women. Based on a combination of the heuristic and statistical evidence, it proposes a series of policy responses that are sometimes at odds with existing approaches.

For children, I propose: (i) strengthening NGO-based programs designed to get young offenders back to their families, back to school and, if possible, back to the countryside; (ii) this should be part and parcel of a concerted focus on rural development designed to stem the flood of rural migrants to the urban slums; (iii) target programs at the individual level while by-passing government authorities; while this may be contrary to the Paris Declaration in terms of the form taken by development assistance, it is the only realistic manner of getting things done in Haiti; (iv) ensure that adequate local capacity in terms of community-based organizers is developed; the binding constraint is not just funds but the lack of slum-based social workers who enjoy the trust of the local population.

For women, I propose that priority should be given to: (i) improving the access by women to legal infrastructure (such as functioning courts) and to NGO-run public

health facilities; (ii) focusing additional resources *outside* of the Port-au-Prince region (on the *Artibonite* and *Centre* regions in particular) since this is where the greatest payoff are likely to obtain; (iii) fostering generalized public information campaigns since violence against women does not appear to be confined to any particular social stratum of Haitian society; (iv) largely by-passing the Haitian state: NGOs appear to have had what little success there is to be seen in dealing with violence against women.

Contents

1	Introduction	4
2	The role of the state: theory <i>versus</i> evidence on the ground	4
2.1	The state is absent	5
2.2	The state, NGOs and the international community	5
2.3	Laws exist but are not applied	5
2.4	The role of the press is circumscribed	6
3	Violence by and against children	6
3.1	DDR and "child soldiers"	6
3.2	State actors: the IBESR	7
3.3	Children and the Haitian judiciary	8
3.4	Formal structures for dealing with the children are lacking	9
3.5	The role of NGOs	9
3.5.1	Lack of continuity in the funding of NGO activities	9
3.5.2	Dealing with the gangs	10
3.6	Children and the culture of violence	10
3.6.1	Get the children out of the slums	10
3.6.2	Getting the children back to school	11
3.6.3	Programs that <i>don't</i> work	11
3.7	NGOs <i>versus</i> the state	11
3.8	Policy priorities for violence by and against children	12
4	Violence against women	13
4.1	Violence against women is commonplace	13
4.2	Actors	13
4.3	Rape and the legal system	14
4.4	Rape as a political weapon	14
4.5	Responses	15
4.6	Marshalling the available statistical evidence	15
4.6.1	Data sources, specification and interpretation	15
4.6.2	The determinants of domestic violence: results	19
4.7	Policy priorities for violence against women	21
A	Principal contacts in Haiti	29

List of Tables

1	Summary statistics for the DHS couples sample; 1,300 observations (couples).	18
2	The determinants of overall violence (both physical and sexual) against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.	22
3	The determinants of physical violence against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.	24
4	The determinants of sexual violence against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.	26

List of Figures

1	Haiti's regions.	16
---	--------------------------	----

1 Introduction

This report presents findings of a fact-finding mission to Haiti that took place in July-August 2008. In the report, I combine the results of my field visits in Haiti with statistical evidence based on recent household survey work in order to paint a picture of the violence faced by women and children in Haiti, as well (as far as possible) as their proximate determinants. Each section concludes with a summary of policy recommendations in terms of potential EU support for Haiti.

Human rights violations in Haiti, and in particular the violation of the rights of women and children, has recently come into stark international view because of a highly publicized study published in the *The Lancet* in 2006 (Kolbe and Hutson 2006). The paper, which has however been widely criticized in Haiti as constituting an exaggeration, claims that:

8000 individuals were murdered in the greater Port-au-Prince area during the 22-month period assessed [after the departure of President Aristide in 2004]. Almost half of the identified perpetrators were government forces or outside political actors. Sexual assault of women and girls was common, with findings suggesting that 35 000 women were victimised in the area; more than half of all female victims were younger than 18 years. Criminals were the most identified perpetrators, but officers from the Haitian National Police accounted for 13.8% and armed anti-Lavalas groups accounted for 10.6% of identified perpetrators of sexual assault. Kidnappings and extrajudicial detentions, physical assaults, death threats, physical threats, and threats of sexual violence were also common.... Our results indicate that crime and systematic abuse of human rights were common in Port-au-Prince. Although criminals were the most identified perpetrators of violations, political actors and UN soldiers were also frequently identified. These findings suggest the need for a systematic response from the newly elected Haitian government, the UN, and social service organisations to address the legal, medical, psychological, and economic consequences of widespread human rights abuses and crime.

Whether the numbers gleaned from the random survey used by Kolbe and Hutson (2006) are accurate or not, what is beyond doubt is that human rights violations in Haiti are rampant, and that the response, both of the Haitian state and of the international community, is woefully inadequate.

2 The role of the state: theory *versus* evidence on the ground

A recurrent theme that I encountered during my fieldtrip was that a substantial fraction of the Haitian judiciary is corrupt and that the justice system has lost most of its credibility. Judges have become completely instrumentalized by politicians.¹ I will return to this issue

¹The recent case of Senator Jean Dominique being a typical example. See for example <http://www.haitianalysis.com/politics/investigation-into-the-assassination-of-jean-dominique-senator-rudolph-boulos-will-only-cooperate-through-attorney>.

at several points in the report as it constitutes one of the key institutional constraints that might be productively addressed by EU funding.

2.1 The state is absent

The disfunctionality of the judicial system has in part contributed to the highly polarized nature of Haitian society (various measures of economic and social inequality attain what is near their worldwide maximum in Haiti). This is reflected in all aspects of the usual role of the state, such as education or public health: in Haiti, the state is, more often than not, absent and invisible.

A typical example is constituted by the Ministry of Social Affairs (*Ministère des Affaires Sociales* —MAS) which is not at all present in poor neighborhoods, the very areas where state intervention to help women and children who are victims of violence would be the most needed.

2.2 The state, NGOs and the international community

While the Haitian state is guilty of gross negligence, the same is largely true of the large-scale international institutions, such as the UNDP. As a result, it is civil society, through a number of NGOs, that have attempted to pick up a portion of the slack, though their activities are often cosmetic in comparison with the actual needs of the population.

One common theme in this report will be the tensions that exist between civil society, the state, and international actors, and how these tensions by and large paralyze substantive action in the field. A key aspect of any constructive policy recommendations in the Haitian context is to correctly identify those actors that are most likely to achieve tangible results. And, as with many aspects of Haitian life, theory is often at great variance with actual practice.

Another theme that permeates this report is that achieving results may sometimes come from *bypassing* those actors usually associated with a given role in society. A case in point is again the judiciary: if it cannot be rendered operational, an alternative would be at least to make the police functional —at present it is largely absent, especially when it comes to dealing with violence against women and children. If the penalties associated with sentencing are absent, perhaps those associated with preventive incarceration will have the desired incentive effects on behavior. As things stand, neither deterrents are operational when it comes to perpetrating violence against women or children.

2.3 Laws exist but are not applied

From the legislative point of view something must be done in parliament to adapt existing legislation to the actual facts on the ground. The basic problem is how to render existing legislation applicable. Financial concerns are paramount in this respect.

For example, from a purely monetary perspective, judges are very poorly paid (which encourages corruption) and judicial careers carry little prestige given the overall disrepute into which the profession has fallen. Moreover, the police, while poorly paid, are often

better paid than judges, leading to what one commentator referred to as an "inversion of the natural hierarchy of things" in economic terms.

2.4 The role of the press is circumscribed

Press freedom is essential in terms of supporting the fight for the respect of human rights. In Haiti journalists are routinely subject to death threats, leading for example to the BBC correspondent in Port-au-Prince (who is Haitian) to have to leave the country for substantial periods of time due to the risk of kidnapping (and this is not kidnapping of the economically-motivated kind, which is another problem that Haiti has to deal with). The usual policing role played by the press is thus absent in Haiti, compounding the problems induced by the lack of functioning legal institutions.

3 Violence by and against children

Many of my interlocutors during my stay in Haiti (this was my fourth visit to the country in two years) stressed that, in Haitian popular culture, children are not considered to have any rights, while women are almost considered to be *de facto* "minors" and thus to have no rights as well. Though this vision of society was paradoxically changed by the First Lady under the Baby Doc regime, it still heavily permeates everyday Haitian life.

Médecins du monde has been working to stem violence against women and children using TV and radio ads, but apart from this example there are very few systematic campaigns to change mentalities and the underlying cultural mores. These structural constraints should be kept in mind when considering policy responses to the problems highlighted in this report.

3.1 DDR and "child soldiers"

The issue of DDR and ex-combattants is eminently political in Haiti (this issue is formally handled by the Commission for National Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration –CNDDR). One of my interlocutors saw the re-integration phenomenon as being a cyclical process in which young men participated in one of the various available programs (training programs involving the raising of small livestock and capacity building in terms of setting up one's own small business are relatively common examples) are relocated to rural areas, and then return to Port-au-Prince with the whole cycle starting over again. Other NGO leaders that I talked to felt that DDR has been a complete failure in Port-au-Prince, and that there are as many weapons on the street today as when the programs started.

This return to the city is part and parcel of the overall rural-to-urban migration problem, and a paradox of many programs (and not only those targetted at women and children who have been either the victims or the authors of violence) currently being implemented in various urban slums is that they exacerbate it: the better the living conditions and the opportunities available in the slums, the greater the incentives to leave the abject poverty of rural areas to try out one's luck in the city.²

²There is an enormous Economics literature that stresses this point beginning with the seminal work of Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970).

This highlights the generalized urban bias of most interventions geared at women and children in Haiti (with the notable exception of some NGO program described below, as well as a pilot program set up by the MINUSTAH): rural areas are by a large being left out.³

Jails for minors are essentially non-existent and minors are commonly placed in standard jails along with adult offenders. As is the case in most countries, jail thereby constitutes a criminal form of graduate school for these minors, who usually emerge with enhanced criminal skills.

The *Restavèk* phenomenon is a typical example of the fate that awaits children from poor rural households.⁴ A law does technically forbid giving up children and sending them into what amounts to bonded servitude in richer households. But it is, of course, never applied. The *Institut du Bien-Etre Social et de Recherches* (IBESR) has dealt with a total of 369 cases (over the 2001-2006 period) of children in domestic servitude on whose behalf complaints were lodged. This obviously is not even the tip of the iceberg.

3.2 State actors: the IBESR

Pregnant girls who are minors are also a responsibility of the IBESR, but the binding constraint in this case is that there is no structure in which they can be housed. For this clientèle there would be a need for effective psycho-social counselling to be carried out by trained social workers. But given Haitian government salary scales, all qualified social workers in the country are taken up by NGOs, where salaries are significantly higher. This is yet another example of the tensions that exist between the state, NGOs and the international community.

Prostitution, and especially prostitution by minors is also a huge issue. Incredibly, there is not even a legal framework designed to regulate prostitution in Haiti (even if a law existed, there would be no means, as with existing legislation in other areas, to enforce it), and there is no presence in the field by police forces in terms of regulating the phenomenon.

One problem of the IBESR is that its institutional framework is outdated. The underlying institutional structure is 50 years old, while the problems that the Institute has to deal with have dramatically evolved in the past decades. As such international actors such as UNICEF or the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are operating in the field that should be covered by the IBESR. The IBESR's *Service de Protection des Mineurs* deals with orphanages and crèches. The *Oeuvres Sociales* directorate theoretically ensures inspection services, delivers various authorizations and certificates, and attempts to make sure that various norms are observed. There is also a Social Penitentiary service that is dysfunctional in the absence of adequate structures to house offenders who are minors.

The second best solution that has been pieced together involves holding offenders who are minors in the Pétionville penitentiary, and to attempt to furnish them with a minimum level of psycho-social counselling, as well as to attempt to reestablish contact with their families. The successful re-insertion of delinquent minors back into their families is saddening by its insignificance: 28 cases have been recorded so far.

³The MINUSTAH is the French acronym for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, whose presence in the country is as ubiquitous as its impact is (often) marginal in terms of the everyday life of ordinary Haitians.

⁴On the *Restavèk* phenomenon, see http://www.nchr.org/hrp/restavek/report_es.htm.

The international adoption phenomenon has by and large swamped the IBESR's resources, given that they are technically responsible for this area, and that international adoption of Haitian children has increased exponentially in recent years. This means that an organized "trade" in Haitian children given up for adoption exists, but that the IBESR can do nothing about it.

The IBESR also attempts to enquire concerning the conditions of detentions of minors in other areas of the country outside the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, by seeking out detained children, attempting to place them in families (often their families of origin refuse to take them back), or at least finding (with the help of the police) their families of origin.

3.3 Children and the Haitian judiciary

According to two judges that I met with, the Haitian judicial system is structurally dysfunctional. This is particularly apparent when it comes to crimes committed by minors. There are only 2 *Juges pour Enfants* in Port-au-Prince. In theory there should be 5 courts dealing with minors in the country. In practice, there is one single judge who has been delegated to deal with young offenders (whom I met with on two occasions) and one functional court.

Procedures are extremely complex and drawn out. The judges have almost no means at their disposal (basic transportation is a key problem, as is the simple lack of electrical power—the office of one of these judges has no electrical power generator, a serious constraint in a country in which power outages are more the norm than the exception), and they are afforded no police protection whatsoever in the face of the numerous death threats that they are confronted with on an almost daily basis because of their activities.

Judicial salaries are ridiculously low: the judge that I interviewed is herself the target of almost daily attempts at corruption. Training of magistrates is also lacking, with most judges being at least partially unaware of legislation that applies to minors. The basics of the penal code date back to 1825, and recent decrees are essentially a patchwork. In this case, and the view comes from someone in the thick of the action, the perception is not only that the law is not applied, it is that the basic laws designed to deal with minors do not exist. The view of the judge is that while the situation is desperate in Port-au-Prince, it is even worse outside of the capital. She herself conducts two audiences per week, but the *parquet* does not move cases involving minors forward. Incredibly, periods of up to 3-4 months go by without any sittings of the courts, and even when they do occur, only 1 to 2 cases are heard per day. No wonder that the system is paralyzed.

Another common thread that emerges when discussing the issue of violence committed by and against children is that there is insufficient economic and especially social development in Haiti, bringing us back to the initial point of widely-held social perceptions that penalize women and children. NGOs and international organizations such as UNICEF are seen as playing a positive stopgap role, but they are also perceived as being unable to contribute to long-term development. The principal manifestation of this lack of development is that the Haitian state grants a shockingly low level of importance to children, in practical terms.

3.4 Formal structures for dealing with the children are lacking

There is in theory a national plan for the protection of vulnerable children (put forward by the *Ministère des Affaires Sociales* (MAS) with the support of UNICEF), but it has yet to be adopted by the government. Similarly, there is in theory a *Centre d'accueil* where children in conflict with the law (to paraphrase the French legal term) should be housed, but it has been closed, due to lack of funding, since 1996. There are plans for a *Centre de réinsertion d'enfants en conflit avec la loi* (sponsored by the MAS, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Education), but it is still under construction. This is the sort of initiative that the EU could profitably support. For lack of means, there is also no state-sponsored structure to deal with children who have been the victims of sexual violence (this applies in large part to *Restavèk* and other children of rural origin working as unpaid servants in urban households). Again, the Haitian state is completely absent in the field (there are essentially no social workers) when it comes to dealing with children who have been victims of violence, and it is NGOs who maintain a presence on the ground (in what are commonly known as the *bases*).

3.5 The role of NGOs

3.5.1 Lack of continuity in the funding of NGO activities

NGOs are present in most poor neighborhoods (with a particular focus on the slums of Port-au-Prince) with programs designed to reinsert young offenders (so-called "child soldiers") who have been involved in gang violence. An example is a program run by the Italian NGO AVSI which the EU funds, and which provides professional training to such young people. There are also a number of conflict resolution and mediation programs geared towards reducing violence. I, for one, attended a *Tambou la Pé* (literally, "Drum for peace") party in Bel Air, one of the worst neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince, which essentially consisted of an enormous block party designed to allow residents, and especially young people, to blow off steam. Though no formal statistics are available, the feeling of most people that I talked to was that violence was significantly reduced by these "parties", with an ensuing sawtooth pattern of violent crimes (with the dips corresponding to the timing of the parties). As with many NGO initiatives, one problem with these programs is funding, which is rarely ensured for more than two years at a time.

When such programs designed to curb violence exist, they only function when funds are available to pay the mediators. The population willingly participates in such programs, but a minimum of resources are needed in order to provide incentives for them to attend. But the problem remains that violence has become so much the norm that many young children see gang membership as a childhood dream. In Bel Air, I met two 8 year olds wearing ski masks and sporting pistols who were evidently high on narcotics—in the eyes of many of their contemporaries, they had "made it", and the two children in question were evidently proud of their status as "soldiers".

3.5.2 Dealing with the gangs

Several NGOs are actively working in Cité Soleil, one of the worst slums in Port-au-Prince (indeed, in all of the Caribbean region), on programs designed for armed youths, alongside UNICEF. These programs are also helping young victims of violence. A particular difficulty of reaching both the young offenders and the young victims is the structure of the gangs. Young girls are seen as easy prey for gang members and a code of silence prevails (in terms of reporting rape and other forms of aggression) which is only now starting to be broken. One NGO leader whom I spoke to referred to an effective *droit de seigneur* of gang members in terms of having sex with young girls. The vulnerability of children is enhanced by their exposure to many other sorts of violence, ranging from confrontations with the UN troops stationed in Haiti to drug trafficking (in which they are often involved in some form or another).

An estimate by an Italian NGO working in Cité Soleil is that 80% of young people in the neighborhood have been involved in some way or another with gangs. Sometimes, perhaps paradoxically, gang leaders turn into social workers, given their role as neighborhood chiefs. I was told of one example in which a gang leader provided food and funding for the schooling of several children. But this is obviously more the exception than the rule, and gangs obviously play little if any positive social and economic role in poor neighborhoods, concentrating instead on their criminal activities.

The rather sobering bottom line from one social worker (working for an NGO) that I spoke with was that adults involved in gang violence are a lost cause, but that one may be able to save *some* of the children. Similarly, the general feeling is that gang leaders cannot be saved. Their "child soldiers" can, sometimes, be. Gang leaders are usually killed once they lose their aura of power.

3.6 Children and the culture of violence

3.6.1 Get the children out of the slums

One fundamental problem that will have to be resolved in the slums of Port-au-Prince is that firearms (as mentioned earlier in the context of DDR) are ubiquitous. One possible solution to turning around at least a few of the children being exposed to violence is to get them out of these neighborhoods for at least a short time so that they realize that there are indeed alternatives to the gang life.

One obvious lesson that has been drawn by NGOs working in these areas is that the personnel involved in successful projects must come from the neighborhoods themselves and must maintain a constant physical presence (this is indeed what differentiates NGO operations from those of government ministries, who are entirely absent from these urban areas). A key ingredient is capacity building, at the neighborhood level, of individuals who will continue working within the communities themselves. Residents are particularly sensitive—and this is what distinguishes successful interventions from unsuccessful ones—to social workers becoming part of the community, and facing the same problems as the inhabitants: their credibility depends upon them being seen as "one of them".

Saving children from the culture of violence involves getting them away from their gang "families" and back to their biological or at least extended families. This can be particularly

effective for *Restavèk* and children who come from rural families —getting them back to the countryside is one manner of stopping the vicious cycle of gang violence.

3.6.2 Getting the children back to school

Getting the kids involved in gangs off the streets and back into school is another possible route to follow. Child gang members need psycho-social counselling, and schools (be they public or private) need a massive injection of funding so as to improve their facilities (which in most cases are basic, at best) or to lower their fees, which are the principal barrier to poor children attending. The Ministry of Education is also sorely lacking in capacity. One problem is that most interventions in the educational sector currently being funded are short-term, with no continuity.

3.6.3 Programs that *don't* work

Initiatives that have been tried, and that have failed, include conditional cash transfers (the Brazilian *Bolsa Escola* program is a highly publicized example that springs to mind, and that has, by and large, been successful in poor neighborhoods in urban Brazil) and furnishing the tools for young people to start some sort of income-generating activity. All conditional cash transfer programs attempted in urban Haiti have failed, and when it comes to providing the means to start a small business, the young people simply sell the tools that they have been furnished with. This is because these programs have seldom combined furnishing the tools themselves with the skills needed to make use of them productively. When such a combination has been achieved, moderate degrees of success have been achieved.

Similarly, cooperatives geared towards income-generating activities simply do not work in urban Haiti, while supporting associations can work, as long as the associations in question existed *before* NGO support materialized (otherwise they are seen as an artificial creation within the community and simply lead to rent-seeking by the inhabitants). The basic explanation for the failure of cooperatives and associations created *ex novo* to work is the abysmally low level of trust in most Haitian urban neighborhoods (this is why such structures only work if they existed before the intervention of the NGOs). Some success has been achieved in rural areas, but the highly individualistic nature of the Haitian peasant has led to the failure of most such initiatives in the countryside as well.

3.7 NGOs *versus* the state

A common feeling that I encountered during the fieldtrip was that it is impossible for NGOs to work with the government. As with the cooperatives and associations mentioned above, this is essentially a question of trust by the inhabitants. Given the state's almost total absence on the ground, even minimal involvement by state structures such as the various line ministries usually discredits an intervention and condemns a project to failure. A typical example is given by involvement with the Ministry of Social Affairs, which does have any physical presence whatsoever in Cité Soleil.

A fascinating documentary on child soldiers involved in gangs is provided by *Les enfants perdus de Cité Soleil*, which reveals the various manners (from drug running, to kidnapping,

to acting as scouts when the MINUSTAH intervenes) in which gangs use children. Having met a number of these children in Bel Air, I can confirm the veracity of what is shown in the documentary. One particularity of the documentary, which is freely available from MINUSTAH sources, is the total absence of any mention of the Haitian state.

3.8 Policy priorities for violence by and against children

Policy recommendations for dealing with violence by and against children include:

- Securing financing for a substantial agricultural development program designed to get youths who have participated in violence in urban slums back to rural areas with a realistic means of survival. Supporting such programs would also stem the urban-to-rural migration phenomenon that lies at the heart of many of Haiti's problems.
- Reinforce the capacity of government. While this may be almost pointless at the central level in Port-au-Prince, there is some scope for improvement at the decentralized / local level.
- Programs must be targetted at the individual beneficiary level, not the level of the responsible ministry. This is because the hiring process in Haitian ministries is often completely political, with the side-effect that a substantial portion of the funds will be syphoned off into patronage appointments. Of course, this is contrary to the general principles of the Paris Declaration concerning the form that should be taken by development aid (namely, Generalized Budgetary Support), but in a country such as Haiti in which the state is essentially non-existent, only programs that operate at the individual beneficiary level have a chance of working.
- Training programs aimed at re-integrating former gang members and ex-combattants will have to operate not only through the ex-combattants themselves, but also through their families, whose support is essential in terms of the re-insertion process. The use of "converted" gang members in such community-based programs can be extremely effective, as I was able to witness myself during a visit to such a center in Bel Air, one of the worst (and most violent) slums in Port-au-Prince (and which even the heavily armed soldiers of MINUSTAH are forbidden to enter).
- Scaling up of NGO-led initiatives is possible, but the key constraint is not only funding *per se* but finding an adequate supply of local personnel to man the programs in question.
- Support civil society or state actors such as the police and the justice system. This is easier said than done, but a modicum of support for the judges dealing with young offenders would probably go a long way.

4 Violence against women

4.1 Violence against women is commonplace

Random violence perpetrated against women outside of the household occurs during public events such as Carnaval, although, as in most countries, the most violent environment is usually the household itself. There is no public public conscience concerning violence against women and children (indeed, many people I spoke with saw the hand of the police itself behind many acts of savagery against women and children). These forms of violence have now become part of daily life and are seen as being "normal". Indeed, it is now the case that, whatever acts of violence obtain, no protests result. There is thus no social revulsion at such acts.

A more serious problem, at least in terms of trying to get to grips with the problem, is that many of the NGOs dealing with women (and with whom I met) are seen by the population as having ulterior political motives, often lack credibility with the general population (and are seen as simply "milking" international donors for money) and are felt to have adopted what amount to stereotypical positions which are not in tune with the realities of everyday life. Some of the people I spoke with saw the activities of some of these NGOs as being frankly counterproductive.

4.2 Actors

Feminist NGOs such as *Solidarite Fanm Ayisyen* (SOFA) and *Kay Fanm* helped spur the creation in 1994 of the *Ministère de la Condition Féminine*. On the basis of heuristic evidence, organized rapes such as those that were frequent during and immediately following the Aristide years, appear to be down. But the problem remains and is intimately linked with the HIV-AIDS pandemic. One problem in this context is the lack of the required medical infrastructure (the necessary kits used for treating rape victims are not accessible, as I was able to see for myself when I visited one of the main centers that deals with rape victims). If minors are involved, and if the sexual violence has taken place within the household, there is a *de facto* legislative vacuum when it comes to separating the minor from his or her family. This is particularly problematic for the numerous under-age girls who remain pregnant as a result of rape.

The policy response for such girls should be to strengthen the juvenile court system, and to systematically link it with health services. The legislative vacuum exists because, though the required legislation exists, it is not translated into the appropriate structures on the ground. Once again, the problem is one of translating theory into reality in terms of social services.

There is a need for proximity services in the form of social centers located in poor neighborhoods and which must be open on a regular basis (for lack of funds, this is usually not the case). SOFA has been active on this front, and has trained 300 women in feminist approaches geared towards (i) greeting rape victims and victims of violence, (ii) counselling them and setting up self-help networks at the neighborhood level, (iii) furnishing legal aid, and (iv) lobbying with authorities. The latter two points should also be the responsibility of the *Office de Protection des Citoyens*, a sort of ombudsman organization, but which remains

marginally effective, again because of a lack of funds.

4.3 Rape and the legal system

The legal system is also paralyzed by a lack of means. For rape to diminish, there must be (i) more reporting of it by the victims and (ii) more perpetrators brought to trial. The difficulty of the second point is brought home by the statistics that were furnished to me by an NGO working in this field. In theory, a rape trial should take a maximum of 90 days; in practice, most (and that is when charges are not dropped outright) drag on for 2 to 3 years.

The first step is, obviously, an end to the *omertá* that surrounds reporting of rape.. Some legislative change has been effected, thanks in part by various *Comités de négociation* that interact with the legislative assembly, and appeals right up to the level of the Organization of American States (OAS) have been made. For example, rape was long a misdemeanor (*délit*) but has now become an outright crime (*crime*). There are also proposals currently being considered in terms of increasing the severity of sentencing for convicted rapists. But the deterrent effect of such policies depends crucially of the perpetrators being convicted, which is almost never the case today.

The fact remains that, according to various feminist NGOs, 8 out of 10 Haitian women have either been direct victims or have witnessed violence against women (more on this later, these figures, given to us by various feminist organizations, do not square with those collected in the context of the 2005 Haiti DHS). Feminist organizations have attempted to work at the community level through sensitization campaigns, based on the feminist critical theory paradigm, which seek to modify the attitudes and behavior of key actors, including the health sector, the police and the judiciary, but with very limited success.

4.4 Rape as a political weapon

Rape as a political weapon is, unfortunately, a tradition in Haiti. This was particularly true after the military coup of 1992 when a systematic campaign of rape in poor neighborhoods, was perpetrated by the security forces. The "crime" of the victims: to have voted for Aristide. The perpetrators were hooded but, strangely enough, knew the names of their victims. SOFA, for one, was operational during this period and responded with international publicity, psycho-social group counselling sessions and relocation of some of the victims to other areas, but the crimes remain largely unpunished to this day.⁵

Today, SOFA's intervention strategy operates through healthcare for women, enhancing women's participation and decisionmaking roles, fighting poverty, and reducing violence at the community level (among others). In terms of income generation for women, they operate grain mills. They are also active in attempts to reduce maternal mortality, but with very limited success, if the trends evident in public health statistics are to be believed.

⁵SOFA is one of the biggest feminist organizations in Haiti, is present in 19 communes in 7 departements, and counts 5000 members.

4.5 Responses

The *Groupe Haitien d'Étude du Sarcome de Kaposi et des Infections Opportunistes* (GH-ESKIO) centers that deal with rape victims were started in 2000. They provide antiretroviral treatment for rape victims, as well as a referral service to the Kay Fann NGO for legal assistance with the police and the criminal justice system. One of their key roles is to provide, free of charge, a medical certificate to rape victims which allows them to initiate criminal proceedings.

The statistics gathered by the main center in Port-au-Prince, which I was given access to, showed that, for adolescent victims, the assailant was a known person in 64% of cases. In contrast, for adult women the assailant was a hitherto unknown individual in 85% of cases. Given the lack of corroborating statistical evidence it is impossible to know what to make of these figures, but the second number is in conformity with the tradition of rape as a political weapon mentioned earlier. The EU provides a modicum of support for the activities of these centers, which are also geared towards reproductive health in general. As I witnessed during my visit, however, the available human and material resources are strained to the breaking point.

4.6 Marshalling the available statistical evidence

In this section I complement the qualitative appraisal of the Haitian situation gleaned from the observations in the field with empirical analysis of the determinants of domestic violence to which women are subjected. As in many countries, domestic violence represents a significant proportion of the violent behavior to which women are subjected.

4.6.1 Data sources, specification and interpretation

Data sources The data that I use stem from the domestic violence component of the 2005 Haiti Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), administered by the Institut Haitien de l'Enfance (IHE). The sample comprises 1,300 couples who responded to the questionnaire on domestic violence. Previous analysis of these data is presented in Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara (2008). Other analyses of domestic violence in Haiti is given by Gage (2005)

I present simple linear probability results for a specification given by:⁶

$$Y_i = X_i\alpha + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where i indexes couples, Y_i is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the woman in the couple suffered from domestic violence during the previous 12 months and zero otherwise, and ε_i is a disturbance term assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in X_i .

The DHS data indicate that almost 12% of women have been subject to domestic violence during the previous 12 month period. This figure is almost certainly a gross underestimate. While under-reporting renders summary statistics such as this unreliable, it will in general not invalidate attempts to isolate systematic differences, attributable to various observable factors, in the prevalence of domestic violence.

⁶Using a logit or probit specification does not change the qualitative nature of the results.



Figure 1: Haiti's regions.

Specification The determinants of domestic violence considered here include:

- geographical location; these correspond to:
 - each of Haiti's regions (Sud-Est, Nord, Nord-Est, Artibonite, Centre, Sud, Grande Anse, Nord-Ouest; the excluded category is Port-au-Prince,); a map of Haiti displaying each of these regions is presented in Figure 1.
 - place of residence (the capital or a large city, a small city, a town; the excluded category is the countryside);
- household characteristics; these include:
 - household size;
 - the number of children under five years of age present in the household;
 - whether the partners share the same religious beliefs;
 - a rich description of household wealth constructed on the basis of a plethora of characteristics of the household's dwelling, including:

- * water source (piped into yard/plot, piped - public, tube well or borehole, dug well - protected, dug - well unprotected, spring water protected, spring water unprotected, rainwater, tanker truck, cart with small tank, surface water (river/dam), water sale by company, bottled water);
 - * type of toilet (flush - to septic tank, flush - to pit latrine, pit latrine - ventilated improved, pit latrine - with slab, pit latrine - without slab, no toilet facility, composting toilet, hanging toilet);
 - * type of flooring (dung, wood planks, palm / bamboo, parquet / polished wood, cement / concrete, ceramic);
 - * type of walls (cane/palm/trunks, dirt, bamboo with mud, stone with mud, paperboard, reused wood, cement, stones with lime / cement, cement blocks, covered adobe, wood plank / shingles, other,);
 - * type of roof (thatch / palm leaf, rustic mat, palm/ bamboo, wood planks, metal, cement); the coefficients associated with these variables are not presented in the interests of brevity;
- the woman's characteristics:
 - her age;
 - her education (in years of completed schooling);
 - her health status, as measured by her Body Mass Index (weight in kilograms divided by her heights in meters squared);
 - whether she is currently working;
 - her religious affiliation (Catholic, Protestant/Methodist/Adventist/Jehovah's Witness, Vaudou, No religion); the individual coefficients are not reported in the interests of brevity;
 - the man's characteristics:
 - his age;
 - his education;
 - several variables measuring the difference in partner characteristics:
 - whether the woman earns more than the man;
 - whether the woman is more educated than the man;
 - whether the woman has final say concerning spending decisions;
 - the difference in their ages, squared.

In what follows, we enter these different categories of explanatory variables sequentially in order to study how (if at all) the determinants of domestic violence change as one controls for additional sources of heterogeneity amongst couples. Summary statistics on the variables included in the empirical analysis are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary statistics for the DHS couples sample; 1,300 observations (couples).

	Mean standard deviation
GEOGRAPHIC COVARIATES	
Region (%)	
South East	8.38
North	8.69
North East	9.77
Artibonite	10.08
Centre	10.85
South	7.54
Grand-Anse	9.77
North West	8.23
Port-au-Prince and other	26.00
Type of environment (%)	
Capital, large cities	11.85
Small cities	5.77
Town	20.38
Countryside	62.00
WOMAN'S CHARACTERISTICS	
Age	32.94 8.27
Nber of years of education	3.22 3.95
Health indicator: BMI	23.51 8.21
Not currently working (%)	27.30
MAN'S CHARACTERISTICS	
Age	38.25 9.03
Number of years of education	4.14 4.37
WOMAN'S BARGAINING POWER	
Woman's earnings > man's earnings (%)	9.92
Woman's education > man's seducation (%)	15.69
Final say on spending decisions taken by woman (%)	25.23
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS	
Household size	5.53 2.14
Number of Children under 5 years of age	1.21 0.96
Man and woman share religious beliefs (%)	71

Interpretation The geographic location variables account for differences in the environment in which couples live and will reflect both heterogeneity in cultural mores that are specific to given regions (as well as the urban / rural divide) as well as differences in, for example, labor market conditions. They will also account for differences in the level of various deterrents to violent behavior such as police presence, the existence of functional courts, or the availability of counselling centers or other structures set up by the various feminist groups discussed earlier.

The characteristics of the household will account for a number of socio-economic factors that may condition domestic violence. This is also the case for the woman's characteristics, the man's characteristics, and the measures of the woman's bargaining power, which are essentially proxied by intra-couple differences in earnings, education, and age, as well as in who has final decisionmaking power in terms of expenditures.

Sociological models of domestic violence, such as Macmillan and Gartner (1999), posit that "male backlash" obtains when men attempt to reverse a perceived situation of inferiority in which, for example, the woman earns more than the man in the household. If these models were to provide an explanation for the likelihood of domestic violence in Haiti, one would expect that domestic violence would be greater when the woman earns more than the man, or when she is more educated (this would correspond to a *positive* coefficient associated with these variables in the tables). The same should be the case when the woman is gainfully employed.

In contrast, bargaining-theoretic models (in the tradition of the cooperative models of John Nash) of domestic violence, such as Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) and Aizer (2007), would predict that, as the woman's relative position within the household improves (in terms of her relative earnings or education), the likelihood of domestic violence would be lower. Similarly, if the woman has the final say concerning household expenditures, this should also be seen as a proxy for the strength of her relative bargaining power. This case would yield a negative coefficient on those variables that measure the woman's relative strength within the household.⁷

Note that one should in no way give a *causal* interpretation to the results presented in the tables that follow: many of the variables are endogenous in the sense that the explanatory variables may themselves be determined by domestic violence. A case in point is whether the woman is employed: if she is subjected to domestic violence it is likely that she is less likely to be gainfully employed, as demonstrated by Lloyd (1997).

4.6.2 The determinants of domestic violence: results

Tables 2 to 4 report the empirical results. Given the linear probability nature of the specification the coefficients (which correspond to the vector α in equation (1) above) have

⁷In certain cultural contexts, in which dowries are important, the opposite may obtain. For example, Block and Rao (2002) shows that women who originate from wealthier families suffer greater domestic violence because of attempt by their spouses to extract more resources from her family of origin in terms of additional dowry payments. Note that we have no way of testing for the presence of the intergenerational transmission of violence, a theme extensively developed in e.g. Kalmuss (1994), Tauchen and Witte (1995), and Pollak (2004). Finally, note that violence against *pregnant* women has been found to have a significant negative effect on the birth weight and therefore on the subsequent health of the child. Evidence on this topic using US data is presented in Aizer (2007).

an extremely simple interpretation: they represent the percentage change induced by the variable in question on the probability of domestic violence being experienced by the woman in the household. For example, if the coefficient were equal to 0.10 on the variable which indicates that the woman is not employed, this would imply that unemployed women are 10% more likely to suffer from domestic violence. The numbers in parentheses are Student's t -statistics, which indicate the statistical significance of the coefficients. For those readers not versed in elementary statistics, I have highlighted those coefficients that are statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence: what this means is that the underlying coefficients reported in the table are estimated in a sufficiently precise manner for one to be able to make meaningful quantitative statements concerning their order of magnitude.

Table 2 presents results for the determinants of domestic violence in general (physical and sexual combined). Five aspects of the results are worth highlighting in some detail:

1. there are highly significant regional differences in the likelihood of a woman experiencing domestic violence, and this remains true whether one considers an extremely parsimonious specification such as that presented in column (2) or a much richer specification such as that presented in column (6) (remember, the results control for an increasing number of female, male and household characteristics as one moves from the left towards the right of the table). Taking the results presented in column (6) as our preferred specification implies that **women in the Artibonite region are 15.1% more likely to experience domestic violence than women in Port-au-Prince**; in decreasing order of violence, regions where women are more likely to experience domestic violence with respect to Port-au-Prince are the North West (13.6% more likely), Grand Anse (12.8%), and the South East (10.0%); in other regions, the likelihood of domestic violence is no different from what it is in Port-au-Prince, *ceteris paribus*;
2. there are significant differences in the prevalence of domestic violence between urban and rural areas; again on the basis of the richest specification presented in column (8) of Table 2, **women are less likely (9.8% less likely) to experience domestic violence in small cities than in the countryside**; on the other hand, **there are no statistically significant differences in the prevalence of domestic violence amongst the countryside, the capital and large cities, and towns**; the prevalence of domestic violence is therefore high in Port-au-Prince, but it is no lower in the countryside while it is lower in small cities; this may reflect the fact that small cities combine a modicum of social services and state presence (in comparison with towns and the countryside) with less of the social tension which is palpable in Port-au-Prince;
3. **the members of the couple sharing the same religious beliefs is associated with a 4.6% (based again on column (6)) decrease in the prevalence of domestic violence**; this indicates that common preferences may, in general, reduce domestic violence;
4. **no other household, female or male characteristics, or (with one exception, dealt with next) proxies of the woman's bargaining power are associated with statistically significant differences in the prevalence of domestic violence**; this suggests that neither the sociological ("male backlash") nor economic

(bargaining-theoretic) approaches to domestic violence have much to say concerning the determinants of this phenomenon in Haiti;

5. the one exception to the previous statement is whether the woman has the final say concerning spending decisions within the household; in conformity with the male backlash view and in contradiction with the bargaining-theoretic view, **women who have the final say in household expenditure decisions are 13.9% more likely to experience domestic violence.**

Table 3 presents evidence concerning the determinant of *physical* violence against women within the household, while Table 4 restricts attention to *sexual* violence. With respect to the results reported in Table 2, very little changes. The only noteworthy differences are that:

1. there is less regional heterogeneity in terms of physical violence, and more in terms of sexual violence; in particular, prevalence rates of sexual violence are particularly high in the Centre region;
2. there are no statistically significant differences between the countryside, towns, small cities and large cities in terms of physical violence; the heterogeneity revealed by the results reported in Table 2 are thus entirely driven by the lower prevalence of sexual violence in small cities with respect to the other categories;
3. based on the results presented in the preferred specification of column (6) in both tables, the negative association between shared religious beliefs and domestic violence is entirely driven by the differential in the prevalence of sexual violence;
4. as with shared beliefs, the positive association between the woman's decisionmaking power in terms of spending decisions is entirely driven by the sexual violence results.

4.7 Policy priorities for violence against women

In order to precedence, the statistical evidence drawn from a recent sample survey on domestic violence, as well as the heuristic evidence gathered in the field suggest that the following policy responses could be fruitfully pursued and would be worthy of increased EU funding:

- The large and statistically significant differences amongst regions in terms of the likelihood of a woman being subjected to domestic violence suggest that improvements in the access by women to legal infrastructure (such as functioning courts) should be a key priority. Counselling to rape victims is also an area that deserves further support, as does greater availability of ARVs.
- The heuristic evidence suggests that massive funding is needed to strengthen medical resources available to women who are victims of violence. A large payoff in terms of public health benefits could be expected from increasing funding to interventions such as the GHESKIO centers.

Table 2: The determinants of overall violence (both physical and sexual) against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GEOGRAPHIC COVARIATES						
Region (excluded region is Port-au-Prince)						
South East		0.073 (1.60)	0.102 (2.17)	0.101 (2.13)	0.102 (2.15)	0.100 (2.10)
North		0.039 (0.84)	0.057 (1.19)	0.057 (1.17)	0.057 (1.18)	0.057 (1.17)
North East		0.051 (1.16)	0.075 (1.60)	0.071 (1.52)	0.069 (1.47)	0.067 (1.43)
Artibonite		0.140 (3.20)	0.141 (3.10)	0.149 (3.23)	0.150 (3.24)	0.151 (3.26)
Centre		0.121 (2.80)	0.174 (3.78)	0.177 (3.80)	0.176 (3.79)	0.173 (3.73)
South		0.010 (0.21)	0.038 (0.78)	0.036 (0.75)	0.040 (0.83)	0.042 (0.86)
Grand-Anse		0.106 (2.41)	0.129 (2.80)	0.129 (2.77)	0.131 (2.82)	0.128 (2.76)
North West		0.131 (2.87)	0.144 (3.03)	0.142 (2.98)	0.142 (2.98)	0.136 (2.84)
Type of environment (excluded category is "rural area")						
Capital, large cities		0.148 (2.57)	0.097 (1.59)	0.091 (1.48)	0.090 (1.46)	0.091 (1.48)
Small cities		-0.073 (-1.59)	-0.097 (-1.96)	-0.102 (-2.04)	-0.101 (-2.02)	-0.098 (-1.96)
Town		-0.068 (-1.60)	-0.094 (-1.85)	-0.094 (-1.83)	-0.092 (-1.79)	-0.089 (-1.74)
HOUSEHOLD COVARIATES						
Household size			-0.004 (-0.89)	-0.001 (-0.11)	-0.000 (-0.04)	0.001 (0.09)
Number of children under 5 years of age			0.005 (0.50)	-0.002 (-0.20)	-0.003 (-0.26)	-0.004 (-0.35)
Woman and man share religious beliefs			-0.044 (-2.15)	-0.046 (-2.17)	-0.048 (-2.27)	-0.046 (-2.20)
Household wealth index included			YES	YES	YES	YES

Table 2 (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WOMAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age				-0.002 (-1.26)	-0.000 (-0.09)	0.000 (0.12)
Number of years of education				0.003 (1.01)	0.002 (0.50)	0.002 (0.40)
Health indicator: Body Mass Index (BMI)				0.000 (0.29)	0.000 (0.34)	0.000 (0.08)
Not currently working				0.007 (0.33)	0.008 (0.36)	0.013 (0.59)
Religious dummies included				YES	YES	YES
MAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age					-0.002 (-1.15)	-0.003 (-1.07)
Number of years of education					0.002 (0.54)	0.001 (0.37)
WOMAN'S BARGAINING POWER						
Woman earns more than man						0.013 (0.40)
Woman more educated than man						-0.003 (-0.09)
Woman has final say on spending decisions						0.139 (2.10)
Age difference, squared						0.000 (0.36)
Constant	0.118 (13.16)	0.097 (3.80)	-0.247 (-0.92)	-0.202 (-0.73)	-0.211 (-0.76)	-0.195 (-0.70)

Table 3: The determinants of physical violence against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GEOGRAPHIC COVARIATES						
Region (excluded region is Port-au-Prince)						
South East		0.066 (1.41)	0.076 (1.60)	0.076 (1.59)	0.073 (1.53)	0.074 (1.54)
North		0.054 (1.14)	0.044 (0.89)	0.044 (0.90)	0.045 (0.91)	0.047 (0.96)
North East		0.048 (1.07)	0.075 (1.59)	0.074 (1.55)	0.071 (1.49)	0.073 (1.53)
Artibonite		0.157 (3.53)	0.144 (3.11)	0.136 (2.90)	0.140 (2.98)	0.143 (3.06)
Centre		0.041 (0.93)	0.073 (1.55)	0.079 (1.68)	0.076 (1.63)	0.077 (1.64)
South		0.019 (0.40)	0.016 (0.33)	0.021 (0.43)	0.023 (0.47)	0.022 (0.46)
Grand-Anse		0.094 (2.09)	0.103 (2.20)	0.102 (2.16)	0.103 (2.19)	0.101 (2.16)
North West		0.052 (1.11)	0.048 (0.99)	0.050 (1.03)	0.048 (0.99)	0.046 (0.95)
Type of environment (excluded category is "rural area")						
Capital, large cities		-0.045 (-0.76)	-0.037 (-0.59)	-0.032 (-0.51)	-0.034 (-0.55)	-0.036 (-0.59)
Small cities		-0.017 (-0.36)	-0.033 (-0.66)	-0.031 (-0.62)	-0.031 (-0.61)	-0.033 (-0.66)
Town		-0.076 (-1.73)	-0.074 (-1.43)	-0.068 (-1.31)	-0.069 (-1.33)	-0.075 (-1.45)
HOUSEHOLD COVARIATES						
Household size			-0.010 (-1.99)	-0.006 (-1.14)	-0.005 (-1.01)	-0.004 (-0.81)
Number of children under 5 years of age			0.016 (1.45)	0.006 (0.52)	0.005 (0.45)	0.005 (0.38)
Woman and man share religious beliefs			-0.043 (-2.11)	-0.040 (-1.91)	-0.040 (-1.89)	-0.036 (-1.69)
Household wealth index included			YES	YES	YES	YES

Table 3 (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WOMAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age				-0.002 (-1.73)	-0.001 (-0.30)	0.001 (0.51)
Number of years of education				-0.001 (-0.32)	0.001 (0.26)	0.004 (1.00)
Health indicator: Body Mass Index (BMI)				0.000 (0.74)	0.000 (0.82)	0.000 (0.74)
Not currently working				0.025 (1.18)	0.025 (1.16)	0.022 (1.02)
Religious dummies included				YES	YES	YES
MAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age					-0.002 (-1.57)	-0.005 (-1.91)
Number of years of education					-0.004 (-1.24)	-0.007 (-1.90)
WOMAN'S BARGAINING POWER						
Woman earns more than man						-0.042 (-1.35)
Woman more educated than man						-0.051 (-1.59)
Woman has final say on spending decisions						0.117 (1.76)
Age difference, squared						0.000 (1.20)
Constant	0.121 (13.36)	0.117 (4.47)	-0.038 (-0.14)	-0.002 (-0.01)	0.019 (0.07)	0.049 (0.18)

Table 4: The determinants of sexual violence against women in Haiti; 1,300 observations (couples); t-statistics in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GEOGRAPHIC COVARIATES						
Region (excluded region is Port-au-Prince)						
South East		0.073 (1.60)	0.102 (2.17)	0.101 (2.13)	0.102 (2.15)	0.100 (2.10)
North		0.039 (0.84)	0.057 (1.19)	0.057 (1.17)	0.057 (1.18)	0.057 (1.17)
North East		0.051 (1.16)	0.075 (1.60)	0.071 (1.52)	0.069 (1.47)	0.067 (1.43)
Artibonite		0.140 (3.20)	0.141 (3.10)	0.149 (3.23)	0.150 (3.24)	0.151 (3.26)
Centre		0.121 (2.80)	0.174 (3.78)	0.177 (3.80)	0.176 (3.79)	0.173 (3.73)
South		0.010 (0.21)	0.038 (0.78)	0.036 (0.75)	0.040 (0.83)	0.042 (0.86)
Grand-Anse		0.106 (2.41)	0.129 (2.80)	0.129 (2.77)	0.131 (2.82)	0.128 (2.76)
North West		0.131 (2.87)	0.144 (3.03)	0.142 (2.98)	0.142 (2.98)	0.136 (2.84)
Type of environment (excluded category is "rural area")						
Capital, large cities		0.148 (2.57)	0.097 (1.59)	0.091 (1.48)	0.090 (1.46)	0.091 (1.48)
Small cities		-0.073 (-1.59)	-0.097 (-1.96)	-0.102 (-2.04)	-0.101 (-2.02)	-0.098 (-1.96)
Town		-0.068 (-1.60)	-0.094 (-1.85)	-0.094 (-1.83)	-0.092 (-1.79)	-0.089 (-1.74)
HOUSEHOLD COVARIATES						
Household size			-0.004 (-0.89)	-0.001 (-0.11)	-0.000 (-0.04)	0.001 (0.09)
Number of children under 5 years of age			0.005 (0.50)	-0.002 (-0.20)	-0.003 (-0.26)	-0.004 (-0.35)
Woman and man share religious beliefs			-0.044 (-2.15)	-0.046 (-2.17)	-0.048 (-2.27)	-0.046 (-2.20)
Household wealth index included			YES	YES	YES	YES

Table 4 (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
WOMAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age				-0.002 (-1.26)	-0.000 (-0.09)	0.000 (0.12)
Number of years of education				0.003 (1.01)	0.002 (0.50)	0.002 (0.40)
Health indicator: Body Mass Index: (BMI)				0.000 (0.29)	0.000 (0.34)	0.000 (0.08)
Not currently working				0.007 (0.33)	0.008 (0.36)	0.013 (0.59)
Religious dummies included				YES	YES	YES
MAN'S CHARACTERISTICS						
Age					-0.002 (-1.15)	-0.003 (-1.07)
Number of years of education					0.002 (0.54)	0.001 (0.37)
WOMAN'S BARGAINING POWER						
Woman earns more than man						0.013 (0.40)
Woman more educated than man						-0.003 (-0.09)
Woman has final say on spending decisions						0.139 (2.10)
Age difference, squared						0.000 (0.36)
Constant	0.118 (13.16)	0.097 (3.80)	-0.247 (-0.92)	-0.202 (-0.73)	-0.211 (-0.76)	-0.195 (-0.70)

- Similarly, particular attention should be paid to the strengthening of police resources and NGO activities in those regions where the prevalence of domestic violence is particularly high. Perhaps surprisingly, this implies that the emphasis placed on activities in the slums in and around Port-au-Prince may be misplaced, and that greater attention should be paid to outlying provinces such as Artibonite and Centre.
- The lack of significance of most socio-demographic variables (be they at the household, the woman's, or her spouses level) suggest that significant resources should be devoted to public information campaigns concerning domestic violence.
- The available statistical evidence does not suggest that domestic violence is confined to any particular class of the population). This is in conformity with the view sketched in the section on evidence from the field that violence against women is a widespread social phenomenon that unfortunately permeates all levels of Haitian society.
- As is the case with children, it is very difficult to see the Haitian state taking the lead in terms of fighting violence against women. Coordinated support of NGOs that have proven that their interventions can work is probably preferable in the short-run than attempting to strengthen government organizations such as the Ministry of Health.

References

- AIZER, A. (2007): "Wages, Violence and Health in the Household," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 13494.
- BLOCK, F., AND V. RAO (2002): "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case-Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," *American Economic Review*, 92(4), 1029–1043.
- FARMER, A., AND J. TIEFENTHALER (1997): "An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence," *Review of Social Economy*, 55(3), 337–358.
- GAGE, A. J. (2005): "Women's Experience of Intimate Partner Violence in Haiti," *Social Science and Medicine*, 6(2), 343–364.
- HARRIS, J. R., AND M. P. TODARO (1970): "Migration, Unemployment and Development," *American Economic Review*, 60(1), 126–142.
- HINDIN, M. J., S. KISHOR, AND D. L. ANSARA (2008): "Intimate Partner Violence Among Couples in 10 DHS Countries: Predictors and Health Outcomes," DHS Analytical Studies No. 18.
- KALMUSS, D. (1994): "The Intergenerational Transmission of Marital Aggression," *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 46(1), 11–19.
- KOLBE, A. R., AND R. A. HUTSON (2006): "Human Rights Abuse and Other Criminal Violations in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti: A Random Survey of Households," *The Lancet*, 368(9538), 864–873.

- LLOYD, S. (1997): “The Effect of Domestic Violence on Female Employment,” *Law and Policy*, 9(2), 139–167.
- MACMILLAN, R., AND R. GARTNER (1999): “When She Brings Home the Bacon: Labor Force Participation and the Risk of Spousal Violence Against Women,” *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 61(4), 947–958.
- POLLAK, R. A. (2004): “An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence,” *Journal of Population Economics*, 17(2), 311–329.
- TAUCHEN, H., AND A. D. WITTE (1995): “The Dynamics of Domestic Violence,” *American Economic Review*, 85(2), 414–418.
- TODARO, M. P. (1969): “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries,” *American Economic Review*, 59(1), 138–148.

A Principal contacts in Haiti

- Mona Jean, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- Camille Fièvre, lawyer
- Galia Volel Ngamy, Education officier, UNICEF
- Mariavittoria Ballotta, Protection officer, UNICEF
- Sterlinda Vital, UNICEF
- Jean Remarque Buteau, Monitoring and Reporting officer, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- Nathalie Mane
- Emilia John, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- Adama Ndao, Community violence reduction program, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
- Venid Guirand, Judge, *Tribunal des enfants*
- Garçon, *Ministère des affaires sociales*
- Ronaud et Douville, *Comité des avocats pour le respect des libertés individuelles* (CARLI)
- Fiammetta Cappellini, AVSI
- Melanie Leger, VIVARIO
- Yvette, *Kay Famn*

- Dienita Dieudonner, *Kay Famn*
- Olga Benoit, *Solidarite Fanm Ayisyen* (SOFA)
- Peter Holland, World Bank
- Immaculée Etienne
- Patricia Erica, Protection officer, UNICEF
- Michel Brun, UNFPA