CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROJECT

MARKUS THIEL AND ELISABETH PRÜGL

European integration efforts have long envisioned the creation of unity out of diversity. The preamble to the Treaty of Rome famously set out the determination of the signatories "to establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European peoples." The creation of unity has entailed the building of common policies, but increasingly also of a common culture and identity. Thus, since the end of the Cold War, moves to create a European market also have become attempts to construct a European society, and efforts toward unity have been accompanied by a new valuing of diversity. Since the 1990s, mobilizations against the ratification of various treaties have raised sensitivity among politicians toward the opinions of diverse interest groups in the European Union (EU) and have led politicians to address a perceived "democratic deficit" in European decision-making processes. In addition, the enlargement of the Union to 27 member states gave rise to unprecedented societal and political diversity and new demands for rights and recognition.

But acknowledging diversity has not come easy to Europeans. The "war on terror" and the discourse on the "clash of civilizations" have framed those who wanted to enter the EU—whether as citizens of applicant states or immigrants—as security and "sociocultural" risks.[1] Questions

about further enlargement, immigration, and the EU's democratic deficit have generated a profound crisis in the European integration project that not only has affected the effectiveness of European institutions but also has raised larger questions of European identity and the nature of the European polity.

Diversity, at the fulcrum of these debates, is ironically framed as both threatened and a threat. On the one hand, some fear that the technocratic thrust of European integration (and the role it has played in economic globalization) homogenizes national cultures and traditions. On the other hand, some fear that enlargement has brought unwanted elements into the EU and that any further enlargement, in particular the potential inclusion of Turkey, threatens the very core of European identity. Some are seeking to identify Europe on the basis of a Christian heritage that needs to be defended against political Islam and are marginalizing Muslim citizens, thus redefining groups of immigrants as essentially un-European. Others are rejecting such exclusionary impulses and define Europeanness around values of human rights. They run up against fears of diversity evident not only in xenophobia but also in bigotry against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals and other social minorities such as the Roma.

In the context of these debates, the EU itself has clearly embraced diversity as a value. Initially, this valuing focused on the preservation of national cultures. In 1973 a European Council summit in Copenhagen first broached the issue and adopted a Declaration of European Identity, which specified as its main ingredients the rule of law, social justice, and human rights, while emphasizing in addition the desire to protect national diversity among member states.[2] Such language has since reemerged with regularity, culminating in the EU constitutional treaty's motto, "united in diversity."

While the common term employed in these efforts is diversity, the meaning of diversity in EU discourse has changed over time in conjunction with increasing freedom of movement and EU enlargement. Enlargement brought into view subnational minorities, such as the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia and the Russians in the Baltic states, raising the issue of the protection of minority cultures and languages. The claims for recognition of these minorities met and helped strengthen those of groups in Western Europe, including Catalans and the Welsh, who have long fought to preserve their distinctive cultures and languages. Diversity discourse has also begun to encompass questions of individual rights, linking up to the EU's stated commitment to human rights and to its tradition of fighting discrimination based on gender. EU directives now prohibit discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, religion

or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation, in this way marking "a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."[3]

While diversity has become a pressing topic in political practice, in the literature on the EU the issue is under-analyzed and theoretically underdeveloped. Research has been conducted on the impact of European institutional and national diversity on the decision-making processes in Brussels,[4] but there has been a dearth of investigation of the different ways that minorities have used identity politics as rights attainment strategy within the ever-changing conditions of European integration and the politicization of a European polity.[5] Our departure from institution-heavy analyses stems from the realization that the debate over demos and legitimacy increasingly has moved to the forefront of public discourses and political-legal interpretations within the Union, brought about by economic globalization, immigration pressures (from in- and outside the Union), contested enlargement perspectives, and, finally, the Union's legislative and regulatory action itself.

With this book we seek to broaden the understanding of diversity and European integration beyond institutional approaches by introducing views from law and geography in addition to those from political science and international relations. Our contributors utilize the concepts of identity, activism, and citizenship highlighted below in order to provide a complex understanding of the relationships between diversity and the European integration project. We add to a growing literature on European integration that brings into view the social dimension of integration.[6] Thus, we conceptualize the European project not simply as a political one but as one that changes what it means to be European, changes how diverse groups and individuals appeal to new European institutions, and changes how rights and obligations are being defined through European politics.

THE STATUS OF DIVERSITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Diversity is a contested concept whose meaning is established in concrete situations and in actual struggles in the context of integration. In this book we focus on three political fields where contestations over diversity and European integration are particularly virulent. The first such area centers on migration, both from poorer to richer member states and from countries outside the Union into the Union. The second field involves questions of the regulation of gender and sexuality and focuses on LGBT people. Both migrants and LGBT people are benefiting from the expansion of EU rules of nondiscrimination. The third field involves

subnational minorities that have asserted themselves in parallel with the formulation of group rights in the EU during the Eastern enlargement, and who are benefiting from the EU's regional policies. We review each of these subjects of contestation in turn.

MIGRANTS

Migration into the EU has a long history, but formulating common policies on migration has been a difficult process with governments loath to cede authority on the matter. Accordingly, very different citizenship regimes continue to exist in the EU, with former colonial powers typically more open to immigration than other states. While less than 4 percent of the EU population consisted of third-country nationals in 2006, the number of foreign-born citizens is higher in countries such as France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where many third-country nationals have acquired citizenship. In 2006, most registered migrants into the EU came from Turkey (2.3 million), Morocco (1.7 million), Albania (0.8 million), and Algeria (0.6 million)—all Muslim-majority countries.[7] Policy debates have focused on the integration of migrants who are often ethnically different and increasingly defined by their religion. Because most immigrants into the EU are Muslims, there has been an progressive conflation of immigration with Islamization, raising questions about the identity of Europe.

The EU's nondiscrimination directives provide legal rights to those EU citizens who are racially, ethnically, or religiously "different," often placed in a minority position because of their history of migration. But the EU has few instruments for securing the rights of noncitizen, third-country migrants;[8] member states retain primary competence on the matter. Despite very different policies toward the integration of migrants, and despite difficulties in creating a common policy, there seems to have been some de facto convergence toward a European approach that combines multiculturalism with a requirement that migrants assimilate to some extent.[9] Like national minorities or LGBT communities, the Muslim constituency can be classified as a new interest group that has only recently begun to take on the challenge of equitable self-representation in European member states.[10] Foreign-born citizens and their descendants have organized and connected in European networks interacting with the EU (such as the European Network against Racism) to fight racism, xenophobia, and "Islamophobia." Migrant struggles have brought to the fore intersecting identities of gender, race, ethnicity, and religion.[11]

LGBT and Gender

Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender is deeply rooted in European societies but attitudes vary considerably across member states. For example, according to a Eurobarometer survey in 2006, most people in the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark (from 82 to 69 percent) favored same-sex marriage while only a small minority did so in Romania, Latvia, and Cyprus (from 11 to 14 percent). In addition, in the Netherlands 91 percent were comfortable with having a homosexual as a neighbor as opposed to only 36 percent in Romania.[12] Discrimination is evident (though rarely documented) in the labor market, education, the media, and health services and shows itself in the form of hate crimes and hate speech.

Where gays, lesbians, and bisexuals have had some voice and visibility in postwar Western Europe, transgender people (i.e., those who have a gender identity that differs from that assigned at birth) are gaining recognition only recently. Both at national and European levels, a widening network of activists are challenging prejudice and discrimination. Their demands for equal treatment and nondiscrimination have yielded sometimes violent reactions from societal groups who consider heterosexuality and binary gender roles as ordained by God and nature. Attacks have been particularly virulent in new member states.[13] In some countries, administrations have obstructed Pride Parades and similar events, infringing the right of LBGT people to freedom of assembly. But in some Western member states, politicians, rights agencies, and even churches have supported such events.[14]

The EU's Framework Directive of 2000 covers a range of grounds for discrimination, including sexual orientation, but is less comprehensive than the Race Directive, implicitly establishing a hierarchy among discrimination grounds. A legal analysis by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency[15] suggests that this may not be compatible with international human rights law. At the time of writing, a new comprehensive antidiscrimination bill is moving through the EU institutions, which seeks to extend the provisions of the Race Directive to all grounds of discrimination.

National and Cultural Minorities

National and cultural minorities became an issue in EU politics with Eastern enlargement. As Will Kymlicka points out, the EU showed little interest in the rights of such minorities prior to 1989.[16] The violent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Union after the

end of the Cold War suggested that dealing with minority rights was a crucial security issue for the enlarging EU.

The EU's Copenhagen Summit in 1993 listed guaranteeing the rights of minorities as a precondition for accession to the EU. But minority rights were never codified further in the EU. Instead, the EU relied on the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1995 as a standard, including state report mechanisms and complaint procedures. In addition, it regularly consulted the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities to assess minority rights in the applicant states. But the EU has established itself as a forum in which the rights of cultural minorities are enabled a hearing, and national minorities from the old member states are now using it as well to voice their demands for recognition.[17]

Cultural minorities throughout the EU are organizing in advocacy networks that allow them leverage against resistant majority governments. Their demands run the gamut from language preservation and educational autonomy to political representation and territorial autonomy. Sometimes, as in the case of the Hungarians in Romania, they are supported in these efforts by their external kin states.[18] The framing of the rights of cultural minorities as group rights has given rise to debates about their compatibility with the rights of individuals not to be discriminated against.

In sum, contestations over diversity vary according to the political fields in which they are embedded and, as such, they have yielded different outcomes. National "old minorities" have been able to claim group rights and achieved the inclusion in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of an explicit reference to "the protection of religious, cultural and linguistic diversity."[19] But there has been a tendency in recent years to subsume group rights under individual rights of nondiscrimination.[20] "New minorities," including migrants and LGBT people, have been able to secure rights of nondiscrimination at the European level, but no positive rights of (social and legal) protection. The distinction between nondiscrimination and active protection is fundamental, as the former requires simply abstaining from certain practices whereas the latter requires affirmative action steps to advance the situation of such groups. The EU has fostered positive action with regard to gender equality, but there are no comparable policies with regard to migrants or LGBTs. The engagement of the EU with diversity based on culture, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation clearly is not a story of linear progress but of contestation that inserts the EU in highly contentious debates that have activated political interests throughout European societies.

MULTILEVEL POLITICS AND ACTIVISM, IDENTITY, AND CITIZENSHIP: THREE CONCEPTUAL LENSES

Theories of European integration look at the emerging European polity from the point of view of unity. They ask, how is this unity furthered? Questions of diversity within this unity accordingly are marginal. In seeking to understand diversity in European integration, we find it useful to draw on theories of governance, in particular those that are informed by sociological perspectives. In the following we elaborate on three theoretical approaches that we have found particularly useful to understanding the way in which diversity relates to EU politics. The first approach probes contestations over diversity as politics in a system of multilevel governance, including social activism targeting the EU, and focuses on the political engagements of civil society organizations, networks, and social movements with European states and EU institutions. It explores how minority populations articulate their interests in the multilevel European polity and how such politics shape the opportunities of these populations. The second approach conceptualizes contestations over diversity as an aspect of European identity construction. It attempts to discern what meaning of Europe and European unity is being produced by such contestations. The third approach looks at diversity through the conceptual lens of citizenship. It asks what legal entitlements EU citizens should have, and how EU citizens ought to be enabled to actively participate in political debates and decision making. We elaborate on each of these approaches in turn.

MULTILEVEL POLITICS AND ACTIVISM

According to Vivien Schmidt, the reality in Europe "has been one of a progressive development of associations, unions, and social movements creating a significant space for society in the policy process."[21] Social movements, interest groups, and other nongovernmental actors constituting civil society have become vocal elements of policy making in the EU, addressing their demands not only to the national, but increasingly to the transnational level of governance. While traditional movements such as the labor movement have found it hard to move away from their state-centric mobilization focus, newer (post-materialist) movements and those that fall into the competences of the Union (e.g., regional movements) have been more successful in making claims to the EU.[22] In their groundbreaking work, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow sketch the activities of these protagonists, from the domesticated nature of issue framing to the utilization of multilevel strategic lobbying at the various levels of

government, in dispersed EU institutions, and in public fora.[23] They note that most European protest movements directly target the EU institutions without the backing of mass national organizations. If that is the case, the overall quality of bottom-up involvement in European integration is rather thinly legitimized but nevertheless constitutes a strategic response to the challenges of European integration of a plurality of societal sectors—something that transnational European parties have found difficult to achieve.

The European women's movement was one of the first to see the EU as an arena for political claims making in the 1970s[24] and has since skillfully operated between Brussels and national capitals to advance gender equality. Like the feminist movement, LGBT groups rally around a common European standard of nondiscrimination and recognition. Brussels has responded by legislating individual rights rather than the provision of common legislative standards for same-sex couples or transgendered people.[25] Pro-migrant NGOs attempt to counter xenophobia and work toward antidiscriminatory EU legislation for non-EU citizens.[26] While they have seen limited success so far, one could argue that their progress is more determined by market considerations than genuine human rights considerations in that the regulation of migratory flows is contingent upon the need for foreign labor.

While the literature frequently has portrayed noneconomic social movements and advocacy networks as advancing norms of equality, nondiscrimination, and inclusion in the context of a liberal transnational culture, analysts of collective action in Europe are less idealistic about the altruistic goals of these actors. Many have come to "reject the naïve analysis (and self-representation) of the worlds of media, law or NGOs, as a 'mirror' of society, the embodiment of 'universal' norms or the selfless advocates of 'civil society', respectively. Rather, each is read as political sites of contestation."[27] New conservative movements challenging the diverse configuration of the European polity are emerging; indeed, the social and cultural minorities focused on in this volume sometimes pursue particularistic goals that may not resonate with liberal norms of equality and nondiscrimination. In addition, minority-rights civil society actors have difficulties gaining leverage against powerful business interest groups.

Some social movements and interest groups do not so much agitate in Brussels than utilize the legal provisions, normative standards, and funding opportunities provided by the Union to further their goals at the national level. In the multiethnic Central and Eastern European EU member states in particular, ethnic parties led by cultural minority leaders have advanced the claims of their kin or, at a minimum, acted

as legislative protectors vis-à-vis a majority government.[28] But whereas domestic parties reflect certain socioeconomic cleavages, the overall representative strength of parties for social and cultural minorities is fairly weak, and European minorities continue to organize as social movements.[29] They see the EU as an added platform for recognition and support, which sometimes helps them sideline national governments. They utilize transnational policy networks to advise EU policy-making bodies, which in turn rely on these epistemic communities as a source of insight and legitimacy.[30]

Many of the actions of civil society today are directed at the establishment or restitution of participatory rights in the EU, responding to processes of Europeanization, the pervasive impacts of European institutions and policy making on domestic societal and political conditions. Social movements and interest groups challenge top-down Europeanization through bottom-up strategic mobilization.[31] Civil society actors have begun to press for more involvement in legislative considerations and transparency of decision making by the EU institutions and have thus opened the door for more participation in the EU. Scholars have described "advocacy coalitions" and "velvet triangles" of politicians, experts, and movement actors who have come together to lobby for language on gender equality. They have described EU institutions, particularly the parliament, the advisory committees (Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions), and some functional agencies, as a political opportunity structure for activist claims making and explored the effectiveness of policy frames and strategies.[32] And they have traced the combination of strategies at national and EU levels, describing boomerang and "ping-pong" effects in advocacy efforts in addition to "pincer movements" that have caught governments between pressures from the EC and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the one hand and national courts and local feminists on the other.[33] In cooperation with outside actors such as academics or civil society and interest groups, European institutions are thus able to exploit the limited embeddedness of the Union in traditional patriarchal, nationalist, and xenophobic practices.[34]

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

The concept of identity has a long history in sociology, where it has provided an understanding of the way in which individuals become social actors, the way in which they integrate sets of roles offered by society in order to construct unique selves. The concept saw a revival with the emergence of cultural studies, including women's studies and ethnic and

race studies. The central question pursued here was to understand constructions of difference and its identity effects. Thus, what it means to be a man (rational, strong, protective) emerges as an effect of constructing feminine difference—as emotional, weak, and in need to protection. What it means to be white emerges as an effect of constructing a colored difference. Identity was understood to be an effect of discursive practices. This formulation made it possible to dissociate identity from individuals and conceptualize organizations and nations as engaged in identity construction as well. In European studies, Iver B. Neumann has perhaps most closely followed this line of argument, suggesting that discourses of "the Other" in the East (Turkey, Russia, Northern and Central Europe) have played a central role in the construction of a European self.[35] Other researchers have found elements of European identity formation not only in its boundary productions, but also in discourses of internal solidarity and participation.[36] In general the literature on European identity development proposes that a transformation of identities in the EU is occurring as a result of various factors: differentiation and ascription from outside, below, and above (e.g., how Europeans see themselves and how they distinguish other "EU" Europeans); internal homogenization (e.g., the convergence of standard of living, of law, or of culture); and inclusion (e.g., of the societal peripheries into the center).[37] These approaches are promising for an understanding of diversity in a context where the Other has become part of Europe, not only through enlargement but through the influx of migrants, and where ideas of solidarity and participation are being tested at the shoals of heterosexism, racism, and Islamophobia.

Politics of European integration then entail contestations of the extent to which religious and cultural diversity, and diversity based on sexual orientation, threaten a European self. They also involve disputes over how much difference is acceptable in the name of diversity. For example, to what extent should political Islam, sexual practices constructed as abject, and illegal migration be allowed into a project of diversity? Does enabling diverse populations to participate in the European project and showing solidarity with diverse populations need the taming of difference? A focus on the politics of identity sheds light on the contentious and contradictory politics of power and empowerment.

Issues of identity and difference have become visible most extensively in the area of European gender equality policy, and there may be lessons that can be learned from approaches developed in studying this policy. One such lesson pertains to the operations of power when difference becomes normalized and movement discourse co-opted by European state actors. For example, under the guise of gender mainstreaming the EU has turned feminist critiques of the gender division of labor in the household

into a policy of "reconciling work and family," which has been used to justify a flexibilization of European labor markets, undermining the emancipatory intent of the original critique.[38] Another lesson pertains to the recognition of the complexities of "intersectionality," that is, the fact that those identified as different often are defined by more than one signifier of difference. Intersectionality may open up diverse venues for making claims toward the EU, but it also often leads to exclusions. For example, migrant women may be marginalized both in migrant organizations and in feminist organizations. Theorists of intersectionality also warn of a potential pitfall in discourses of diversity: the assumption that categories of difference are similar and that discrimination arising from them can be dealt with the same way. But categories of difference operate differently according to the range of positions possible (i.e., gender is dichotomous, race and ethnicity are multiple), whether difference is considered natural or social, whether practices of inequality are located in the public sphere or also in the organization of intimacy, whether they are produced through material processes or mostly discursively, and what European self they enable.[39] These positions produce different patterns of subordination and discrimination that may require different types of intervention. Accordingly, the creation of unity in diversity demands sensitivity to diverse locations on the part of the EU and an alertness to mechanisms of silencing, co-optation, and normalization on the part of those valuing difference.[40]

CITIZENSHIP

The last conceptual approach to understanding diversity in the EU is closely connected to the two previous ones. On the one hand, specific entitlements provided through EU citizenship such as free movement and legal protection shape the identities of citizens of the member states and of residents/denizens who do not have these privileges and as a result often feel that they are outsiders and discriminated against. On the other hand, active and participatory citizenship is an expressed objective of EU politicians; better-informed citizens may be more active in civil society but also more likely to support the aims of the Union. Here again, migrants and refugees and their (NGO) representatives feel challenged to improve the lot of noncitizens through movement activism and the creation of political networks. Accordingly, European citizenship ought to be probed in terms of both access and process.[41]

The EU has designed European citizenship as complementary to and a priori based on national citizenship, even though policy makers have also

conceived it as an instrument to build European identity.[42] Much of the discussion about citizenship has focused on the new rights that integration has afforded Europeans. In addition to market-related rights of movement and economic participation, these increasingly have been defined to encompass fundamental rights and protections as well. The expansion of these rights, including those focusing on minority protection, has been the topic of an extensive body of legal scholarship.[43]

Jürgen Habermas has suggested that the extension of citizenship from the traditional, nation centric to a European model should entail the creation of a constitutional patriotism based on contractual obligations of citizens toward a diverse European polity.[44] According to this approach, discursive practices in public spheres enable participatory modes of citizenship. Habermas's ideas, together with the contributions of political theorists advocating a similar form of transnational or supranational citizenship,[45] informed the project of writing a European constitution. They largely remained confined to academic and elite circles and lost political influence after European voters rejected the constitution that could have paved the way for a redefinition of citizenship in the European integration context. But theorists criticized these conceptualizations as well for assuming a unitary citizen identity, evoking a transnational, potentially exclusive, European nationalism.[46] Others have proposed the adoption of nonexclusionary citizenship patterns in view of processes of globalization.[47] A specifically multicultural perspective on citizenship aimed at the inclusion of Muslim migrants views the questions of citizenship as related to integration as well as to immigration.[48] The latter model, while challenging the nation-based citizenship configuration of the EU, continues to unite aspects of both judiciability and participation as outlined in current citizenship literatures.

Historically, citizenship as a supranational form of belonging in the EU derived primarily from rights associated with the free movement of labor and was only later expanded to include educational, participatory elements to advance popular support for ongoing regional integration. The increasing convergence occurring through the legislative harmonization of civil and social rights for citizens within the Union causes the development of a more diverse society made up of various ethnic, cultural, and social groups of citizens and noncitizens. As these groups claim their rights for recognition and nondiscrimination, they add to the already tense public discourses about European integration.

In this book, authors address issues of national and European citizenship as they delineate struggles over who is part of a political community: notions of citizenship determine degrees of inclusion or exclusion.[49]

Notions of citizenship also define rights though these rights may be contested.[50] The evolution of an inclusive European citizenship alongside the constitutionalization of the European polity, which provides for participatory momentum and justifiable rights, are topical issues in current academic discourse as well as in the political arena.

The theoretical approaches introduced aid in conceptualizing the politics and structuring of diversity practices in the EU. They propose three facets for understanding these practices: the activism expressed by social movements, NGOs, and civil society actors who co-constitute the changing European polity; the identities of individuals, groups, and the EU, which are renegotiated under the impact of continued harmonization and enlargement; and European citizenship, which, as a legal and social instrument, provides entitlements with different repercussions based upon the minority that one is identified with.

REVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The book is divided into four parts. The first includes, in addition to the editors' introduction of issues and literature, an overview of the range of actions the EU has taken to safeguard diversity in the Union; it is written by Joke Swiebel, a former member of the European Parliament and long-time activist on issues of nondiscrimination. Swiebel discusses the shift in EU policies from a focus on cultural diversity to a focus on nondiscrimination in conjunction with the broadening of the grounds for protection and assesses the prospects of the nondiscrimination approach in view of experiences with the EU's long-established gender equality policy. The following three parts address three groups of minorities and issues associated with their status: migrants and Muslims, the LGBT community and intersecting discrimination based on gender, and finally national and cultural minorities.

In the second section, the book explores the status of third-country migrants, in particular Muslims. Martin Schain sets the stage for this section, reminding us of the very different approaches EU member states have taken to integrating migrants. He provides data on France and Britain to illustrate Republican and multiculturalist models of integration and probes the different outcomes they have produced. While emphasizing difference, he argues that there has been a convergence of European policies toward migrants that amount to a fusion of the two models. Emek Uçarer follows by tracking the ascent of third-country national integration in EU policy discourses. She identifies key actors pushing for the mainstreaming of this portfolio and reviews and assesses

the policy output to date. Comparing the Race Directive to the Long-Term Residents Directive and the Family Unification Directive, she shows that the first provided significant new rights for third-country nationals while the others are watered down and provide only modest rights and protections.

While Schain and Uçarer focus on the activism and policy making, the following two papers problematize the unitary construction of migrants, highlighting their intersecting identities and the malleability of these identities. Helen Schwenken explores the representation of migrant women in EU policy making, finding them in both migrants' and feminist organizations. She surveys three different EU approaches to addressing the problems of women migrants—gender mainstreaming, managing diversity, and antidiscrimination legislation—assessing the benefits and pitfalls of each approach from the intersectional perspective of women migrants. Despite difficulties with implementation, she finds most promise in gender mainstreaming and is particularly critical of legal antidiscrimination approaches that treat grounds of discrimination in an additive fashion. Taking a very different approach, Murat Somer and Gönül Tol seek to destabilize the rigid opposition between Muslims and Europeans by addressing the related oppositions between secularism and Islam, democracy and religion. Suggesting that the questions of Turkish immigrant integration in EU member countries, democracy in Turkey, and Turkey's EU membership are interrelated, they first review Turkey's relative success in integrating political Islam into its secular democracy. They then describe the very different experiences of Germany and the Netherlands in dealing with political Islam, resulting in the radicalization of Islamists in Germany and their integration into the polity in the Netherlands. The chapter finally develops an alternative approach to the opposition between Europe and Islam by recasting the terms of the debate over the relationship between secular democracy and religion in light of both Turkish and European experiences.

Part 3 of the book addresses another constellation of intersecting identities, especially those based on gender and sexual orientation. While women have gained considerable protection against discrimination and have benefited from affirmative action, LGBT people in Europe have not benefited from comparable measures. Their status has emerged as particularly precarious in the new member states. Katrina Schwartz and Conor O'Dwyer ask if norms of conditionality in EU enlargement had an impact on tolerance vis-à-vis LGBT communities in Latvia and Poland. They do not find a strong effect resulting from the diffusion of EU norms or a backlash against them. Instead, they argue that extremist homophobia can assert itself on the national political stage because of weakly

institutionalized party systems and because of exclusionary constructions of national identity.

The following three chapters explore the effectiveness of EU and national law in combating LGBT and intersectional discrimination. Gabriel Toggenburg explores how LGBT rights have been framed by the ECJ and what this means for the diverse interpretation of the family concept among member state governments. He reviews four major cases detailing the legal repercussions for LGBT people in the Union and previews the increasingly difficult balancing act between expanding ECJ jurisdiction in the field and countervailing national legal standards. Amy Elman explores the limits of gender equality legislation for lesbians. Her review of legal cases before the ECJ involving gay and lesbian couples illustrates that gender equality legislation does not protect gays and lesbians. While making a strong argument for considering intersectionality in legal practice, Elman cautions against treating multiple discriminations in an additive fashion and against establishing hierarchies of discrimination. Snjezana Vasiljevic explores a different set of intersections—those involving race and gender—in two contrasting cases: the UK and the EU candidate country Croatia. She suggests that there are discernible differences in the application of EU nondiscrimination legislation and concludes with recommendations aimed at improving the effectiveness of such legislation in the context of EU enlargements.

The fourth part of the book explores the status of cultural and national minorities. Politics of cultural minorities differ considerably. The goals of some are locally focused and sometimes exclusionary and chauvinistic. Others strive for a civic nationalism that retains cultural identities and languages and sees itself as part of a European citizenry. Colin Williams describes efforts to combine the preservation of minority languages and cultures through inclusionary politics. He surveys the activism of existing EU networks, provides an overview of the changing discourse on the issue, and evaluates successes and failures from the perspective of practices on the ground in the field of health, focusing in particular on experiences in Catalonia. He considers the recognition of regional minority languages and cultures a key element of a deliberative democracy that has, however, not yet been realized in the EU.

Looking to the East, EU membership and requirements for minority protection have empowered the Hungarian minority in Romania. Lavinia Bucsa argues that for this minority the EU's legal and political framework constituted an opportunity structure and provided a discursive frame that allowed it to formulate demands for territorial autonomy. Similarly, in the context of EU pressure, Lithuania has enacted strong minority legislation, but the relationship between the ethnic majority

and the Russian, Polish, and Roma minorities is highly volatile. Dovile Budryte and Vilana Pilinkaite-Sotirovic show that European expectations about nondiscrimination and minority rights have affected social and political practices in Lithuania, but that there are multiple sources of domestic resistance. Interestingly, sexual minorities have become a target of national antagonism in this context as well.

In the conclusion the editors revisit findings from the papers from the perspective of the three approaches specified: politics and activism in the multilevel polity, identity politics, and citizenship studies. We identify commonalities and differences and develop questions that arise from the studies of our contributors. We conclude by suggesting a sociologically informed program for future research.

NOTES

1. Taras 2008.
2. Kraus 2008, 43.
3. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 22; see also Chapter 2.
4. Heritier 1999; Checkel 2007.
5. Wiener 2006.
6. Checkel and Katzenstein 2009.
7. Commission of the European Communities 2007, 3.
8. Chapter 4.
9. Chapter 3.
10. Klausen 2007.
11. Chapter 5.
12. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009, 6.
13. Chapter 7.
14. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009, 7.
15. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2009, 5.
16. Kymlicka 2006.
17. Chapter 11; and McAdam 1996.
18. For example, Chapter 12.
19. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2007, Article 22.
20. Kymlicka 2006.
21. Schmidt 2006, 32.
22. Marks and McAdam 1996.
23. Imig and Tarrow 2001.
24. Hoskyns 1996.
25. Chapter 9.
26. Koopmans 2005; Geddes 2000.
27. Favell 2006, 127.
28. Chapter 12.
29. Verloo 2006.

30. Chapter 11.
31. Imig and Tarrow 2001; Greenwood 2007; Della Porta 2007.
32. Mazey 1998; Woodward 2003; Locher 2005; Helfferich and Kolb 2001.
33. van der Vleuten 2007; Sifft 2003; Zippel 2004.
34. Della Porta 2007; Bugdahn 2008.
35. Neumann 1999.
36. For example, Delanty 1995; Guerrina 2002.
37. Herrmann et al. 2004; Risse and Maier 2003.
38. Stratigaki 2004.
39. Verloo 2006.
40. Prügl 2010.
41. Maas 2007, 109.
42. Wiener 1998.
43. For an overview see Toggenburg 2009.
44. Habermas 2001.
45. Balibar 2003.
46. Karolewski 2006.
47. Delanty 2000.
48. Modood 2006.
49. Chapters 13 and 5.
50. Chapters 9 and 10.