This thesis consists of three stand-alone articles that contribute to the literature on digital development, focusing on telecom infrastructure, provision of credit by market place platforms, and the welfare impacts of ride sharing. The first chapter, Electricity Constraints and Mobile Service Prices in Sub-Saharan Africa, examines how poor electricity infrastructure contributes to the high prices of mobile services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using cross-country data and a structural model of entry and Cournot competition, I quantify how electricity constraints shape costs and market structure. The findings show that unreliable electricity increases both fixed and marginal costs, discourages entry, and weakens competition. Counterfactual simulations suggest that universal electricity access could reduce mobile prices by 42\% on average, more than improvements in ICT regulation or market size. The second chapter, Marketplace Platforms’ Seller Credit and Financial Inclusion, explores why digital platforms offer credit to small sellers. I develop a theoretical framework focusing on commission-based incentives and the use of platform access as intangible collateral. These features are especially effective in settings with weak legal enforcement and high borrowing costs, conditions common in developing economies. The third chapter, Money on the Way, studies the effects of a ride-sharing platform in Iran on labor, income, and expenditure variables. Using variation in platform roll out across cities, this study finds that ride-sharing increases employment and income only in large cities, while also raising informality and reducing access to social protections.