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Abstract
Globalization has dramatically reduced the cost of moving goods, people, and ideas across borders. Yet, it has also exposed countries to external shocks and volatility. As the institutional foundations of the post-WWII economic order unravel, international trade, in particular, has been at the centre of rising uncertainty. Against this backdrop, this dissertation investigates how firms and governments navigate an increasingly unstable global landscape. How does uncertainty shape their preferences? And how do they strategically respond? To address these questions, the dissertation examines how actors’ preferences are influenced by various types of uncertainty. First, how the risk associated with operating in global markets shapes firms’ preferences for regulatory protection. Second, how uncertainty surrounding treaty ratification influences governments’ choices when adopting preferential trade agreements. And third, how exogenous shocks during trade negotiations affect the institutional design preferences of governments and firms. Drawing on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and novel datasets, the findings suggest that firms and governments respond to uncertainty by seeking rules and arrangements that provide stability and continuity.