This thesis critically examines the dynamics of political violence and order formation, focusing on the transformation from a monopoly of violence to an oligopoly of violence. It challenges the Weberian model of state formation, arguing that it is insufficient to explain the complexities of post-colonial contexts and conflict zones. Instead, it introduces the oligopoly of violence as an alternative analytical framework to understand the coexistence and overlapping of multiple violent actors shaping political order. Thus, it argues that political violence, rather than merely destructive, can act as a force for violent reordering, giving rise to new forms of stability. Grounded in the Syrian conflict, the thesis employs historical sociology to investigate the emergence of oligopolies of violence through mechanisms such as the demonopolization of violence, reaccumulation by non-state actors, and the emergence of heterarchical orders. Building on fieldwork in northern Syria, covering four localities—Azaz, Afrin, Al-Bab, and Jarablus, and a detailed analysis of novel Security Events Datasets, the thesis identifies distinct forms of oligopolies of violence: dominated, contestable, and dynamic. The findings reveal that while oligopolies of violence may reduce macro-level violence, they generate varying levels of perceived and objective insecurity, and thus, differences in ordering and stability. Dominated oligopolies tend to foster greater stability; however, the resulting political order under oligopoly of violence remains socially rooted, fragmented, and uneven. This work calls for reimagining post-conflict political orders, moving beyond the binary of state failure versus Weberian monopoly to unlock new pathways for understanding political reordering and state reformation