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Settler colonial studies: a historical analysis

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ABSTRACT

This text is a historical analysis of Settler Colonial Studies (SCS). Partly because most SCS scholars in principle only see those polities as settler colonies whose settlers eventually became a majority and gained independence—i.e. principally the United States, Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand—some historians have critiqued it. At the same time, historians have used it to revisit their research. Throughout, though, they have engaged SCS in area- and period-specific journals, without bundling their insights. This historical analysis of SCS addresses that issue. It has two parts. As shorter first part unpacks the historical-political background for SCS's Anglo-bias: the similar and linked domestic political trajectories of Canada, the United States, Aotearoa/New Zealand, and Australia's indigenous peoples from the 1950s and their centrality in the internationalization of indigenous politics from the late 1960s to the 1990s. A longer second part analyzes three issues both central to SCS and relevant to historians: structuralism, colonialism versus settler colonialism, and the settler-native binary.

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Soon after Settler Colonial Studies (SCS) began, in the early 2010s, to influence multiple humanities disciplines concerned with colonialism and settler colonialism, going 'global ... as a scholarly field and as paradigm for analysis', a good number of historians started to see it as a useful 'opportunity' to revisit their research.¹ At the same time, most of those historians criticized SCS in some way, too – but did so, and have since continued to do so, within their specific subfields.²

This is where this text comes in. Its basic objective is to offer a historical analysis of SCS from around 2000 to the early 2020s that synthesizes and builds on these separate subfield-specific insights. Acknowledging SCS's heterogeneity and written at a juncture in SCS' trajectory – in spring 2023 the field's flagship journal, led by a new editorial team, vowed to 'steer the journal toward exciting and more inclusive futures'³ – this text has two parts.

Part I concerns SCS's central historical-political background: the similarities and transnational linkages between US, Canadian, Aotearoa/New Zealander, and Australian (US/CAN/NZ/AUS) Indigenous peoples' domestic political trajectories from the 1950s and

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their centrality, from the late 1960s to the 1990s, in the internationalization of Indigenous politics. Part II turns to SCS itself. It will analyze three issues that both have been central to SCS and are relevant to historians: structuralism, colonialism versus settler colonialism, and the settler-native binary. (I outline my basic arguments at the end of this Introduction.) Finally, the conclusion will reflect on possible upshots. Before I begin, let me make a few introductory points.

Important differences notwithstanding, SCS scholars have shared key stakes, arguments, and definitions. They have held that colonialism and settler colonialism possess distinctive logics: the labor exploitation of Indigenous people, and the conquest of their lands and their attempted elimination and replacement by settlers.⁴ Hence, SCS scholars have said, the two need to be studied separately, and SCS needs to be its own scholarly field. They have also maintained that in principle only those polities are settler colonies where settlers eventually became a majority and gained independence. As a result, SCS has had a presentist Anglo-bias (which is rooted in its historical-political background, treated in Part I). SCS scholars have seen those polities basically as the United States, Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand, and arguably the Yishuv/Israel, which in 1918–1948 was British-governed, too.⁵ By contrast—and this is critical—most historians have included polities with a settler minority enjoying varied privileges.⁶ Moreover, many SCS scholars have discerned a persisting settler-Indigenous binary. And they have seen settler colonialism as a lasting structure. Sure, they agree that settler colonial ‘strategies’ have shifted.⁷ But all are types of Indigenous ‘transfer’ until this very day.⁸ Hence, the scholarly approach of Postcolonial Studies, like the study of colonialism, cannot analyze this *not*-post-colonial reality.⁹

The most influential and certainly most cited¹⁰ SCS scholars are Patrick Wolfe (1949–2016) and Lorenzo Veracini. Many see Wolfe as the formally most recognized intellectual founder of SCS in the 1990s.¹¹ As for Veracini, besides being an institution-builder¹² – a crucial point per se – he since the mid-2000s has penned key introductory book-length texts on SCS.¹³ British – and Italian-born, respectively, both scholars work(ed) in Australia. Both are trained historians, too¹⁴—though both work multi-disciplinarily. Wolfe’s first monograph concerned anthropology, and ‘the structuralist anthropological Marxisms in which he was trained at the LSE’, where he took a MSc in Social Anthropology, ‘are key to understanding his approach’.¹⁵

The above being said, SCS is heterogeneous and has multiple genealogies,¹⁶ a fact fundamental to this text. In 1979 the British-born and South-African-raised Donald Denoon posited settler colonialism as a distinct category of analysis in a key SCS predecessor text written under the influence of questions about Australia by students at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG), where he taught in 1971–1982. In 1983 appeared his *Settler Capitalism*, an important precursor to SCS; it compared settler societies in Argentine, Uruguay, Chile, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. However, Denoon’s attention to how economic dependence on Britain, among other factors, helped shaped a settler capitalist mode of production in sync with global economic trends, and his comparative study of both British Dominions and areas of so-called informal British influence in South America, meant that he did not become as influential as Wolfe (and Veracini’s) interventions when a more Anglo – and settler-centric SCS began to take off.¹⁷ Meanwhile, Indigenous Studies scholars have emphasized that interventions in their field reaching back to the 1980s have constituted key building blocks for SCS.¹⁸ In turn, however, they

downplay that the term settler colonialism first crystallized during postwar decolonization struggles,¹⁹ not the least in Israel/Palestine.²⁰

SCS's main interlocutors are Indigenous Studies scholars, including some who are historians. Many basically share SCS's white majority-*cum*-eventual sovereignty definition of settler colonialism; also, at first especially US Indigenous Studies scholars hoped SCS would help to mainstream Indigenous history. However, by the mid-2010s some became concerned.²¹ (So did some scholars of Palestine.²²) With some SCS scholars, they have argued that SCS underplays Indigenous agency and tends to mistake settler intentions for outcomes.²³ Moreover, they have criticized '[t]he conception of settler colonial studies as an apparently distinct 'field' of scholarly inquiry ... typically equated with the individual scholarship of Patrick Wolfe' and, more broadly, with 'a succession of white men living on Indigenous lands'.²⁴ Further, many Indigenous Studies scholars have worried that SCS is usurping the study of Indigenous people.²⁵ Not all have agreed.²⁶ But many have emphasized that Indigenous Studies scholars' works constitute intellectual genealogies of SCS, too.²⁷

Turning now to my introductory outline of Part II, let me first note that all three issue-sections of that part—as noted, structuralism, colonialism versus settler colonialism, and the settler-native binary—will share the same structure. I first present the thinking of Wolfe and Veracini, whom I call 'classical' SCS authors. (I use the term classical because many SCS scholars and almost all non-SCS scholars who reference SCS *do* cite Wolfe and Veracini; and I use quotation marks – 'classical' – to reflect and acknowledge many scholars' critique of this preferential referencing. I focus on Wolfe and Veracini for two afore-noted reasons. Quantitatively, they are the by far most-cited SCS authors. And content-wise, Wolfe is seen as the formally most recognized intellectual founder of SCS; Veracini, while contested, co-founded and led the journal *Settler Colonial Studies* until recently, and since the mid-2000s has written key introductory book-length texts to SCS.) After presenting those 'classical' texts, each of the three sections identifies openings in them that are relevant for historians. Next, I reference key texts by both SCS and Indigenous Studies scholars that differ from the 'classics' – while also showing where they agree with Wolfe and/or Veracini. Finally, I offer my own analysis.

My basic arguments about the three issues covered in Part II are as follows. First, regarding SCS's structuralism, it has empirically underplayed and undertheorized the constitutive role of events in making, remaking, and shifting structures. Structuralism also has made SCS scholars define settler colonies teleologically, seeing them as polities – and at least conceptually *only* as the polities – that pursued the twin aims of native replacement and white sovereignty with success. This has caused an Anglo-bias and, in many texts, a single-country focus: a methodological settler-nationalism of sorts. Second, concerning colonialism versus settler colonialism, SCS scholars' simultaneous assertion of a principal difference *and* admission of wide empirical overlaps has a crucial methodological upshot. Any given single settler-colonial event or phase may look like a presumed colonial situation, and vice versa. Moreover, crucially, violence against non-white subjects, too, undercuts the distinction between colonialism versus settler colonialism. And third, regarding the settler-native binary, it is qualified by three themes that many scholars, including historians, have empirically and conceptually treated in separation: settlers' heterogeneity, natives' heterogeneity, and third groups, i.e. groups other than settlers and natives, which together create inherently complex and unstable interaction patterns.

Let me now turn to Part I. My argument here is that the central historical-political background to SCS's rise, which helps explain its presentist Anglo-bias, is the similarities and transnational linkages between US, Canadian, Aotearoa/New Zealander, and Australian (US/CAN/NZ/AUS) Indigenous peoples' domestic political trajectories from the 1950s and their centrality, from the late 1960s to the 1990s, in the internationalization of Indigenous politics.

In the Cold War, extractive capitalist companies, globally expanding consumerism, and the geopolitical interests especially of the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies 'broke the final barriers between [Indigenous] peoples and surplus-producing populations'. Also hitherto relatively untouched lands, e.g. in the Arctic and Amazon, were now targeted; and industrialized countries intensified oil exploitation, mining, fishing, and dam building, and some conducted nuclear tests.²⁸

Indigenous responses to these land issues varied in the 1940s-60s. Compared with Soviet Siberia, Latin America, the Pacific, and Scandinavia, they were loudest in US/CAN/NZ/AUS and decried also discrimination and assimilationism, like boarding schools separating children from their families and culture. Eventually, one result of those protests was new state-Indigenous agreements like the 1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Canada's 1975 James Bay Agreement, and Aotearoa/New Zealand's 1975 Treaty of Waitangi Act. Another result was policy and institutional changes. For example, Aotearoa/New Zealand established the Waitangi Tribunal, a permanent commission investigating violations of the 1840 Maori-crown Waitangi Treaty. The US government by the mid-1960s ended the assimilationist Indian reservations termination policy that had begun in 1940, peaked with a House resolution in 1953, and helped trigger the foundation of the National Congress of American Indians in 1944; related, in 1975 Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. And Australia's 1967 Aborigines Act *de jure* ended assimilationism and initiated the involvement of the federal—rather than simply states'—government in Aboriginal affairs. Moreover, Aboriginal communities became more self-governing from 1975, which formed part of a wider US/CAN/NZ/AUS trend toward self-determination from the later 1960s.²⁹

Those Indigenous successes stood on three legs. First, a root cause was US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous peoples' changing demographic and socioeconomic situation. From the 1930s/40s, mortality rates dropped and birth rates grew. Also, for various reasons including economic changes and government measures like the 1952 US Urban Indian Relocation Program, Indigenous people increasingly moved to cities. Although urbanization created social problems, in cities members of different communities drew closer to each other, and in the United States also to African Americans. More Indigenous workers entered trade unions, too, and the number of Indigenous professionals and students grew steadily.³⁰

Second, Indigenous activists used changing demographic and socioeconomic realities to intensify and refashion political organization and mobilization.³¹ Thus, it was in the city of Minneapolis that the American Indian Movement (AIM) was founded in 1968, and Sidney's university was the birthplace of Student Action for Aborigines (SAFA). (The 1970 creation of Canada's National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) was due more to increasing linkages between extant regional councils.) Students and professionals helped establish other organizations, too, like the Maori Organisation on Human Rights, in 1968. Trade

unionists were active in the Federal Council for Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (FCAATSI), a federal-state-supported body born in 1958 that by 1963 convinced Australia's Trade Union Congress to de jure end wage discrimination, and in 1966 trade unions helped a landmark Gurindji stockmen's strike for equal pay in the Northern Territory succeed. Other mobilizational tactics included highly mediated tours, for example SAFA's Freedom Ride around apartheid-style towns in 1965, sit-ins like the 1972 Aboriginal Tent Embassy facing the parliament in Canberra, and marches like the 1975 Maori Land March to parliament in Wellington. The United States witnessed also a few armed confrontations with government forces, most famously at the Pine Ridge Reservation in 1973.³²

Third, from the 1950s US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous peoples' political opportunities improved. Sure, the central opportunity, postwar Afro-Asian decolonization, concerned Indigenous peoples all around the world: in principle, all could claim that they should enjoy self-determination, too, like Asians and Africans. But in practice US/CAN/NZ/AUS and Scandinavian Indigenous peoples were best positioned. Once liberal democracies in the 1960s began shifting their interactions with Indigenous peoples, their political structures—which were more open than in socialist states and Latin American states, many of which were authoritarian or military dictatorships in the 1950s-80s—somewhat benefited US/CAN/NZ/AUS and Scandinavian Indigenous actors, who alone had at least some 'government support and recognition' at the time. Relatedly, Western Cold War liberal democracies were not insensitive to NGOs' and socialist states' critiques, and did not want to look too bad on the international scene, also regarding human and minority rights. Thus, two Aboriginal petitions to the UN rather rattled Canberra in 1970; by contrast, Latin American military dictatorships were barely bothered when international NGOs founded in the late 1960s like Survival International lobbied for Indigenous rights.³³

Besides US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous actors' similar domestic politics, they led the internationalization of Indigenous politics from the late 1960s to the 1990s. Scandinavians entered the fray around 1975/76, and remained less central. The Soviet Union allowed Siberian Indigenous representatives to get in contact with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference only from 1988. And Indigenous Latin Americans 'were not at the *forefront* of [Indigenous] internationalization' from the 1960s to around 1990.³⁴

Sure, in many Latin American countries Indigenous social movements emerged from the later 1960s.³⁵ Also, Latin American Indigenous peoples were the addressee of the first, still assimilationist United Nations (UN) Indigenous measures, the International Labor Office's Andean Indian Program of 1954 and Convention 107 of 1957, and of the first advocacy NGOs like the afore-mentioned Survival International. And Indigenous Latin Americans self-organized regionally, e.g. in the 1974 First Indian Parliament of the Southern Cone. In fact, they were internationalizing actors in their own right: in separate bodies like the 1977 Regional Coordinator for Indigenous Peoples and the 1980 South American Indian Council; in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP); and increasingly from the 1980s at the UN. From the earliest UN Indigenous affairs report, begun in 1971 by the Sub-Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, they were included in the UN definition of Indigenous peoples as 'a minority population facing a majority created by colonial migration, the paradigm of the Americas, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand'.³⁶

All the above being said, Latin American Indigenous peoples fully ‘organized, mobilized, and participated in national and international political processes to demand cultural recognition and political rights’ in the 1990s ‘only’.³⁷ In fact, it was US/CAN/NZ/AUS-only ties that initiated internationalization. From the 1960s African American activism and tactics including marches and tours influenced US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous actors—who also were aware of each other’s novel activism, exchanged tactics and views, and sometimes met. Until the early 1970s they did not do so with Scandinavians and only infrequently with Latin Americans.³⁸ Also, it was AIM in 1974 and NIB in 1975 that founded the two foremost international Indigenous organizations, the International Indian Treaty Council (IITC) and the afore-noted WCIP, in which Australians played a key role, too. And ‘the key Indigenous lobbyists at the United Nations in the 1970s were connected to the IITC;’ in 1982, they helped birth the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva; and by 1985 still, ‘the participants at the UN working group were predominantly from North America and Australia’.³⁹

In sum, Indigenous Latin Americans *did* organize nationally, in the Americas, and in a minor role also internationally before the 1990s, and some US/CAN/NZ/AUS-Latin American Indigenous contacts and similarities *did* exist before the 1990s. But it seems that those realities were not internationally visible enough for SCS founders to pay attention in the 1990s – doubly because US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous actions were much more visible internationally and, more importantly, much more present in their respective countries, where SCS was born. Thus, Wolfe developed the notion of a persistent eliminatory settler colonial logic in direct response to landmark developments in *Australia*: specifically, the 1992 Australian High Court decision in *Mabo v Queensland* and the resultant 1993 Native Title Legislation that accepted contemporary land title claims by those Aboriginal people who can prove continuous presence on their land. Besides being partial, this ruling, Wolfe argued, tied Aboriginal people and how they could claim land title more strongly into a persistently white-settler structure, paralleling the effects of Australia’s 1991–2001 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.⁴⁰

In sum, SCS’s presentist Anglo-bias seems to reflect, and have grown out of a political-historical context of, US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous peoples’ domestic similarities and international centrality through the 1990s. SCS has not really factored non-US/CAN/NZ/AUS Indigenous peoples or US/CAN/NZ/AUS relationships with the latter or other cases into its conceptualization of settler colonialism. A case in point is Veracini’s statement that the ‘settler colonial paradigm remains inapplicable to Latin America’.⁴¹

What SCS in fact reflects, then, is the many deep-rooted ties and commonalities through the 1960s between late British-imperial Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand, these ties’ and commonalities’ post-imperial persistence, and these countries’ close relationship with the United States. Put differently, it seems that US/CAN/NZ/AUS settler colonies’ centrality in SCS does not reflect their ‘real’ paradigmatic centrality to all things settler colonial. Rather, SCS’s scholarly approach mirrors the postwar world political role of the late British Empire, of late British-imperial and post-imperial Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand, and of US power.

One question remains: why ‘classical’ SCS was born in the 1990s. Our answer needs to start in the 1960s, when full CAN/NZ/AUS decolonization spawned ‘a new, nationalist historiography that emphasized internal themes and minimized the importance previously attached to imperial connections’.⁴² Then, following the Cold War, SCS introduced a

new dimension, in which CAN/NZ/AUS cases mattered not only individually but in their linkages, including with the US. Put differently, SCS very selectively, i.e. 'Anglo'-, globalized how US/CAN/NZ/AUS citizens were to understand their individual settler colonial present and past in the 1990s and beyond. This was not surprising. While rooted in the 1970s, contemporary globalization took off in the 1990s, exciting many scholars. SCS's definition of settler colonialism suggests it is a distinct—a progressive, political-intellectual, post-British-imperial⁴³—variant of this development.

Having analyzed SCS's historical-political background, let me now turn to Part II: an analysis of three issues that both have been central to SCS and are relevant to historians, i.e. structuralism, the settler-native binary, and colonialism versus settler colonialism. As noted in the Introduction, each issue begins with a baseline: I present 'classical' SCS texts' own thinking, identify openings relevant for historians, and reference diverging Indigenous Studies and SCS texts while also showing where they agree with the 'classics'. Then, I offer my analysis.

Let me begin with structuralism. SCS has emphasized a structural continuity from when settler colonies were European colonies via independence to today. 'Settler colonialism as a mode of domination ... has typically resisted formal decolonization', Veracini has recently held.⁴⁴ 'There is little different about the structures of invasion or the dominance of a majority over time', Edward Cavanagh posited.⁴⁵ 'Past is Present', titled a *Settler Colonial Studies* issue on Palestine.⁴⁶ And Wolfe's perhaps most oft-cited words are: 'the colonizer came to stay – invasion is a structure not an event'.⁴⁷

In 'classical' SCS texts the meaning of that structure of 'elimination' has shifted, though. In the words of a critic, Australian historian Tim Rowse, 'since 1994 [Wolfe] has been refining his formulation of the 'central concept/project of settler colonialism ... as primarily governed by a logic of elimination'. ... [B]y 'eliminate', 'destroy', 'replace', he does not necessarily mean physically exterminate. ... Similarly, Veracini writes of the 'progressive disappear[ance] in a variety of ways: extermination, expulsion, incarceration, containment, and assimilation'⁴⁸ – for which he uses the overall term 'transfer', distinguishing between 26 kinds.⁴⁹

Veracini has emphasized different transfer types' similar upshots. Let me highlight two components. One concerns settlers' claim that Indigenous lands formed *terra nullius* – an uncultivated no man's land that can be lawfully settled; related, 'settler colonial temporality constructs a foundational timeline that annuls the prior and ongoing presence of Indigenous peoples and locates the settler-state in a past that is prior to all'.⁵⁰ The other component concerns settlers' transformative appropriation of native landscapes, symbols, names, and histories. Here, Indigenous Studies scholars and SCS case studies often agree with 'classical' SCS texts, especially the former often presaging 'classical' statements.

However, many Indigenous Studies and some SCS scholars accuse the 'classics' of downplaying Indigenous agency. Already in 1994, some Australian scholars made this critique in response to Wolfe's initial texts.⁵¹ In 1995, Donald Denoon argued that 'his earlier work in *Settler Capitalism* had underplayed the agency of Indigenous peoples in the history of settler colonialism. The struggle was unequal but not one-sided'.⁵² And more recently, critics have argued that the 'classics' tend to mistake settlers' eliminationist fantasies and intentions for outcomes, and emphasize that Indigenous people have always

retained some agency, however varied, creating physical and social spaces alongside settler colonial structures, subverting or simply bypassing the latter.⁵³ As Jean O'Brien has incisively shown, Wolfe rarely unpacked Indigenous agency empirically, though he explicitly accepted it, which creates an opening for scholars, including historians.⁵⁴

As crucial as the above disagreement, though, is an overlap between SCS 'classics' and Indigenous Studies and SCS critics. They focus on Australia, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Canada, and the United States; Israel/Palestine is another key interest.⁵⁵ The journal *Settler Colonial Studies* illustrates this well. In its first eleven years, 23% of its articles covered Palestine/Israel, 22% the United States, 18% Canada, 9% Australia, 6% Aotearoa/New Zealand, and another 6% various combination of these five countries, for a total of 84% (see Table 1 for details).⁵⁶

This table documents not only an Anglo-bias but also a single-country focus—a methodological settler-nationalism underlying SCS's concentration on US/CAN/NZ/AUS. Sure, SCS scholars, especially the 'classics', have emphasized that single-country studies of successful Anglo-settler colonies form part of a broader phenomenon.⁵⁷ Also, edited volumes bring together multiple single-country studies.⁵⁸ But SCS scholars have explicitly treated

Table 1. The geographical coverage of articles in the journal *Settler Colonial Studies* (2011–2021).

Category	Subcategory	Number	Subcategory percentage	Category percentage
Palestine/Israel	Only Palestine/Israel	56	23.0	26.3
	Palestine/Israel & British Empire	1	.4	
	Palestine/Israel & Algeria	1	.4	
	Palestine/Israel & USA	2	.8	
	Palestine/Israel & Canada	3	1.2	
	Palestine/Israel & Australia	1	.4	
	United States	54	22.2	
Anglo-settler (ex)-colonies	Canada	45	18.5	60.1
	Australia	21	8.6	
	New Zealand	14	5.8	
	South Africa	5	2.1	
	US-Australia	3	1.2	
	US-Canada	2	.8	
	South Africa-Australia-Canada	1	.4	
	US-Canada-Australia	1	.4	
		1	.4	
		1	.4	
Metro Britain				.4
(ex)-British Africa	Uganda	1	.4	2.1
	South Rhodesia/Zimbabwe	3	1.2	
	Kenya/Zimbabwe/Botswana	1	.4	
French (ex)-colonies	Algeria	9	3.7	4.5
	New Caledonia	2	.8	
Japan	Japan only	4	1.6	2.1
	Japan and USA	1	.4	
Other	Chile	1	.4	4.5
	Germany	1	.4	
	Libya (Italian)	1	.4	
	Latin America	2	.8	
	Mexico	1	.4	
	Northern Cyprus	1	.4	
	Norway-Finland	1	.4	
	Philippines	1	.4	
	Russia	1	.4	
	Taiwan	1	.4	
Total		243	100% (rounded)	100% (rounded)

Anglo-settlers' transnational linkages less often than historians and historical geographers.⁵⁹ (And studies linking an Anglo-settler colony with another polity are authored 'from the outside in', i.e. by scholars whose main field is not Anglo-settler colonialism or the British Empire.⁶⁰) Moreover, SCS's Anglo-focus has paralleled SCS scholars' considerable focus on present times. In SCS, from 2011 to 2021 the contemporary period (defined as c. 1990-2021) was better covered (62%) than the less recent past (38%).⁶¹

This reflects another point: SCS has been thinking in outcomes.⁶² Methodologically, this means that because 'settler colonialism is an ongoing phenomenon ... writing its history is charged with a presentist preoccupation'.⁶³ And empirically, SCS scholars have held that a 'key characteristic of settler colonialism is not Europeaness but the dual *outcome*' – i.e. *not* the process – 'of destruction and replacement' of natives.⁶⁴ This trait has run in parallel to another one. 'Whereas colonialism reinforces the distinction between colony and metropole, settler colonialism erases it.'⁶⁵ its very nature is to seek sovereignty and independence. Aim (*telos*) has been key to these parallel framings of settlers' relationship with natives and the metropole; together, they have defined settler colonies teleologically. That is, they have seen them as polities – and at least conceptually *only* as the polities – that pursued those twin aims, native replacement and white sovereignty, *with success*. Hence, polities like French Algeria or Portuguese Angola, which knew vast settler populations, can be the subject of an empirical study. But they do not matter *conceptually*. The same holds for Apartheid South Africa. It does not really matter conceptually because whites there never became the majority and because, on top, white rule ended. Wolfe explicitly framed it as a colony with settlers, not a settler colony—a reasoning challenged by specialist historians.⁶⁶

More broadly, for historians' study of the past, SCS' *telos* means two complementary things. It has simplified Anglo-settler cases; and it has marginalized all others. For one thing, any empirical aspect of Anglo-settler life that is outside the SCS model has remained conceptually secondary at best – and, vice versa, the SCS model has marginalized various empirical aspects of Anglo-settler life. Thus, many aspects of the past have become mere historical noise – a noise that is irrelevant because it is not directly related to the settler colonial logic. Yes: settler colonialism *was* a key force shaping Anglo-settler colonies. But our understanding of them will remain conceptually and empirically partial if we disregard the '*multiple perspectives*' that characterized it.⁶⁷

For another thing, as already noted, any settler colonial project that failed – i.e. that did not turn demographic majority *and* eventually became sovereign – has not really *conceptually* mattered to SCS. Hence, Wolfe's view of South Africa; and hence, Veracini's introduction to the *Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, which did not revise the SCS model although many volume contributors explicitly questioned it. This insistence makes little sense. After all, millions of settlers in Algeria and hundreds of thousands of settlers in Angola, to take two examples, worked, lived lives, and pursued political goals similar to those of many pre-independence Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians.

Another issue with teleology is that it can't properly explain turning points and unpack movement between phases in a structure, which may greatly affect that structure's form and functioning.⁶⁸ In the words of historians Jeffrey Ostler and Nancy Shoemaker, 'Wolfe's famous summary of settler colonialism as 'a structure not an event' mires the concept in stasis and might be better reworded as 'a process, not a structure or an event'.⁶⁹

As questions of continuity versus change and, related, the issue of events⁷⁰ are central for historians, let me elaborate with an example. A recent SCS special issue on French Algeria deplored that that polity's downfall 'has often limited the interest of scholars who seek to understand settler colonialism as an *enduring structure* of oppression'—and underlined that since its occupation in 1830 it was 'never a static object'. Rather, it knew distinct 'phases'.⁷¹ This argument can be expounded by a look at its final phase: the war of 1954–1962. Its core determinant was physical violence. To be more precise: not only was the ultimate *cause* of the war an entrenched structure of multi-dimensional, physical and non-physical French settler violence, including resistance against timid improvements in Muslims' political representation initiated by the metropolitan government in Paris. But also, an explosion of violence *resulted* from the war.

This development had a distinct effect: it polarized settlers and Muslims' relations more than ever – though certainly not everywhere equally, as some political Franco-Muslim relations continued in some ways and places – and it led to French withdrawal and Algerian independence. Concretely, violence against Muslims included not only an ever-involving gamut of counterinsurgency operations by the French army and settler militias, but also many more lynchings than before, systematic torture, and the imprisonment of two million peasants in hunger-plagued concentration camps, among other things. Meanwhile, settlers more than ever feared and expected Algerian violence. Indeed, pro-independence graffiti gave them the choice of 'the suitcase or the coffin'. Also, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) often targeted individual settlers, especially in the countryside. And it several times organized intentionally brutal mass attacks to deepen distrust between Muslims and settlers.

Together, these events of unbridled violence formed a string of political-military crystallization points in the last structural phase of settler Algeria. Thus, the FLN-initiated massacre on 20 August 1955 of settlers in and near Philippeville – including in 'El-Halia, a small pyrite mining centre ... [w]here thirty-seven Europeans were killed, including ten children, by Algerian workers they had known for years'⁷² – and its massive media coverage galvanized settlers. Among many, it accentuated the fatalistic belief that all are sitting in the same boat, opposing Muslims. Moreover, 'Philippeville' affected Algerians, too. Not only was it delayed revenge for the horrible *Sétif* repression of 1945, in which the French army and settler militias had killed thousands of Muslims. But also, French soldiers and settler militias massacred thousands in revenge following 'Philippeville', further uniting Muslims' ranks and further complicating 'moderate' Muslim positions *vis-à-vis* France.⁷³ In sum, even the last phase of French Algeria was not simply a single eight-year-long structural stretch, from 1954 to 1962, but knew key waymarks.

I now turn to a second issue that is both central to SCS and relevant to historians: the question of settler-native relations. Let me begin by noting that Wolfe posited a strict binary: every not-Indigenous person is a settler, even if there are 'major differentiations within settler (and, for that matter, within Native) societies'.⁷⁴ He strongly defended this approach against critique. His logic was structuralist. Even people who are used against their will, like slaves, in effect are settlers because they are caught in a settler-dominated structure:

The opposition between Native and settler is a structural relationship rather than an effect of the will. ... The fact that enslaved people immigrated against their will – to cite the most compelling case for voluntarism – does not alter the structural fact that their presence, however involuntary, was part of the process of Native dispossession.⁷⁵

On this point, Veracini has disagreed. In a moving obituary of Wolfe, he noted that 'in my thinking, settler colonialism was like a waltz, a three-step dance involving settlers, Indigenous peoples and exogenous others; for [Wolfe] it was like a salsa involving Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples'.⁷⁶ One such exogenous other relates to 'Black formations. Perhaps we do not need a dialogue' between students of settlers and of natives, but a 'triad', Veracini has noted recently.⁷⁷ Earlier, he posited 'a fundamentally triangular system of relationships, a system comprising metropolitan, settler, and Indigenous agencies'.⁷⁸ Still, his priority are settlers. It is other SCS, Indigenous Studies, and African American Studies scholars who have pushed beyond that binary approach. Moreover, some historians who were students of Wolfe have forcefully nuanced said approach, too.⁷⁹

Wolfe's binary view had Australian roots. 'As a scholarly approach, settler colonial studies originated in Australia'⁸⁰—and Australia became SCS's 'benchmark' in the words of the late Canadian historian of Africa Chris Youé, or 'a key paradigm' according to Australian historians Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey. They note that '[T]he rapacious tenor of settler invasion and aggressively administered systems of assimilation have contributed to the Australian case being frequently presented as the premier exemplar for settler colonialism, the model against which other racialized settler-colonial enterprises are measured'.⁸¹

Two combined factors seem truly particular about Australia. One indeed is exceptionally intense if not genocidal violence – war – in the 1800s, which it shared with the United States.⁸² (Canada and Aotearoa/New Zealand saw less [but not no!] war-violence, though other forms of settler colonial dominance were very present.) The other factor, which Australia shared with Aotearoa/New Zealand deep into the twentieth century, is a very predominantly British immigrant population, dwarfing anybody else, including other Europeans.⁸³ To be sure, this homogeneity had its limits. The English, Irish, and Scots differed; and 'as a specific term, 'settler colonialism' was first used in the 1920s to indicate a particular type of British colonialism in an Australian context, to distinguish it from convict colonialism and to differentiate between South Australia and New South Wales'.⁸⁴ Still, compared to other cases, the Australian experience was both very violent and very British. This distinct double reality was conceptually generalized, becoming the bedrock for Wolfe's clear binary.

Various issues undermine binarism. Two issues, studied mostly by historians, are settlers' and natives' heterogeneity.⁸⁵ Another one, analyzed mainly by Indigenous Studies and SCS scholars, concerns what we may call third groups intersecting with settlers and natives. While scholars mostly focus on one issue, i.e. do not see the three doing critical work together, one can treat them as a bundle.

Some historians have focused on heterogeneity to critique binarism.⁸⁶ Others argue that this underplays the force of non-'classical' SCS views.⁸⁷ Most often, though, historians do not think of 'their' empirical cases of heterogeneity as critiquing binarism, though they in effect do exactly that work.

Regarding Indigenous actors, one category of heterogeneity concerns socio-professional groups mediating between their 'own' and settler and/or colonial authorities.⁸⁸

(Other categories would concern ethnic, religious, or other group differences.) Thus, US policies toward native Indians included tools like trust funds—an early-nineteenth-century ‘fiduciary colonialism’ that partly relied on intermediaries—and in the late 1800s ‘colonial management’ of native Americans included tools like a Native police force.⁸⁹ Parts of late-nineteenth-century Australia knew a small ‘Native Police Force’.⁹⁰ In Kenya, some Kikuyu and other African leaders forced their own people to provide labor to the British settler colonial state from before World War I to after World War II.⁹¹ In Algeria, Muslim medical auxiliaries helped administer the countryside from the early twentieth century; some Muslims played a role in French-led Oriental Studies; and especially after World War II there were Muslim municipal and state representatives.⁹² In South Africa, the Native Administration Act of 1927, the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 led to the appointment of ‘chiefs’ and eventually to the creation of subordinate statelets.⁹³ And in Rhodesia from the early twentieth century ‘chieftaincies’ were ‘generally used as agents of colonial dictatorship’—a pattern persisting under settler rule.⁹⁴

Concerning settlers, one type of heterogeneity regards ethnic diversity.⁹⁵ In Algeria, French-speaking settlers were politically, economically, and socioculturally dominant, looking down on a mix – majoritarian from the late 1800s – of Italians, Spanish, and Catholic Maltese speaking an Arabic dialect. ‘This internal diversity created complex hierarchies of power and ambivalent forms of settler identification’.⁹⁶ It also means that not all settlers simply brought sovereignty with them, as SCS ‘classics’ argue.⁹⁷ Heterogeneity can also take the form of socio-economic and political contestations. Thus, in the *Yishuv* in late Ottoman and Mandate Palestine, labor Zionist settlers criticized other settlers – most important, large agricultural producers – who employed tens of thousands of Palestinians, who were cheaper than Jews.⁹⁸ In Australia, ‘appropriation of Aboriginal lands coincided with the humanitarian turn in British imperial politics. There were increased calls by abolitionist and evangelical humanitarians for a ‘humane’ or Christian colonization and the protection and civilization of Aboriginal peoples, especially in the 1830s and 1840s’.⁹⁹ Australia also saw tensions between land-based so-called ‘squatters’ dominant into the 1850s and a then rising urban commercial class, and between them and white labor—whose approaches to Aborigines differed.¹⁰⁰

Historians have studied many third groups, but often without referencing binarism. One category is native groups that the metropolitan state and/or settlers saw, and/or that saw themselves, as different from other natives. Thus, in 1870 Algeria’s Jews became French citizens; some began identifying with France. Settlers were infuriated, believing Paris might next grant citizenship to Muslims—a fear aggravated by anti-Semitism.¹⁰¹ Another category regards what one may call a multi-settler reality encompassing different settler populations with diverging interests. Thus, from the late 1700s, Mexican-ruled Texas invited in some Anglo-Americans to help develop the territory; and after the United States conquered Texas, some Spaniard Mexicans stayed, as they did in California.¹⁰² In the late 1800s, Ottoman Palestine saw both early Zionists and German Templers, who sometimes interacted.¹⁰³ And around the same time, in the Americas state-supported Japanese migrants entered diverse settler realities, facing discrimination in North America, behaving rather like colonial settlers in Peru and Brazil, and informing Japanese settler policies in Asia with their insights especially into US settler colonialism.¹⁰⁴

The by far most important category of a third group was variedly indentured laborers. Millions were from Asia, especially India and China, but there also were e.g. Mexicans in the United States and Canada. Their destinations were European colonies and white settler colonies. Together, they constituted an enormously momentous factor and actors in the modern globalizing world.¹⁰⁵ Also in settler colonies as diverse as the United States, Canada, Australia, Kenya, South Africa, or New Caledonia, they formed part of the labor force; as gifted comparative historian, Cecilia Morgan, has it:

settler economies relied on and mobilized a wide range of labour: that of the household and family; the unfree labour of slaves or convicts; the coerced and unpaid labour of Indigenous people; South Asian indentured labour; and Chinese contract labour.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, in settler colonies, indentured labor factored into native-settler relations in a wide range of often complex ways, which historians of specific settler colonies have examined in detail. To take just one example, in South Africa ‘many of the restrictions imposed upon Chinese labourers [most coming in 1904 and being sent back in 1910] were subsequently extended to the 263,000 or so “foreign native labourers” employed in the gold mines over the next decade’.¹⁰⁷

And then, there is the monstrously monumental trans-Atlantic African slave trade—a key shaper of the early modern and modern globalizing world, too.¹⁰⁸ Hence, perhaps especially in the United States, many see slavery as *the* fundamental feature of national history.¹⁰⁹ And especially US historians have been grappling with the question of how to study together slavery and settler colonialism and, for that matter, other forms of domination. This is principally because of slavery and settler colonialism’s weight in US history, but also because of overlaps including black settlers, slave-holding natives, and whites’ however distinct racial ideas about both Africans and natives.¹¹⁰ As Walter Hixson has stated,

essentially a project of dispossession, settler colonization ... over Indians complemented internal colonialism of blacks and Hispanics in the wake of the African diaspora and US expansion into territory formerly claimed by Spain and Mexico. ... Settler colonialism thus can be analyzed as a singular project, but it can also with appropriate contextualization be linked to the broader American colonial past and present.¹¹¹

It is with these linkages in mind that scholars have been critiquing ‘classical’ binarism from the perspective of African American, African diaspora, and Asian American experiences. For example, working on Asians, Iyko Day has offered a ‘theory of settler colonialism in North America that operates as a triangulation of symbolic positions that include the Native, the alien, and the settler’. However, she does not posit a distinct third group. Rather, while stressing that Asians can assume varied positions *vis-à-vis* white settler structures, they are primarily defined by their ‘subordination under a settler colonial mode of production driven by the proprietorial logics of whiteness’.¹¹² By contrast, and to take another example, Tiffany King directly challenges settler-centricity. She ‘pulls settler colonial studies offshore—and away from its position as a discursive center—to make it contend with black thought’. Her central reference is the Jamaican writer and philosopher Sylvia Wynter’s ‘triadic model’ (White-Native-Black) rather than dyadic model (White-Native) to understand the sets of relationships and conflict that would bring forth the notion of the modern human and inform conquest’ already before 1492, i.e. from 1441, when the Portuguese began operating in West Africa.¹¹³

Despite their variety, all the afore-noted works—except King’s—have something in common. They concern actors who live inside a settler colony. But crucially, outside actors, too, have interacted with settlers and natives and relationships and hence affected their relationship.

Take the model that Fiona Barclay, Charlotte Chopin, and Martin Evans developed for French Algeria. It is formed by (1) ‘the French state’, (2) ‘local authorities’, (3) ‘Arab, Berber, and Jewish populations’, the (4) ‘wider settler community’, (5) ‘metropolitan public opinion’, and (6) the ‘changing international context’.¹¹⁴ This makes much sense not only for their case, for after all, those forces existed in other settler colonies in different ways and degrees, too. Think of the afore-noted British Christian pressures on settler practices in early settler Australia, exemplifying metropolitan public opinion; or consider the importance of the United States not exerting international pressure on the settler colonies of the African-Atlantic power Portugal, a NATO founding member. To be sure, case studies do not need to treat all these forces. But one ought to keep in mind that no bilateral relationship, including the native-settler one, exists in a vacuum. Indeed, Barclay, Chopin, and Evans emphasize the ‘dynamics which played out between six interconnected forces’¹¹⁵—an approach that produces a more complex picture of the past.

I now turn to a third issue that is both central to SCS and relevant to historians: colonialism versus settler colonialism. While recognizing empirical overlaps between colonialism and settler colonialism, ‘classical’ SCS proponents have accentuated differences. Wolfe did so less categorically, Veracini more so.¹¹⁶ Crucially, Indigenous Studies and SCS critics of ‘classical’ texts do not contend this point—and the latter make it subtly. Thus, Veracini has recognized that ‘since both the permanent movement and reproduction of communities and the dominance of an exogenous agency over an Indigenous one are necessarily involved, settler colonial phenomena are intimately related to both colonialism and migration’.¹¹⁷ But he has criticized that ‘settler colonial phenomena have been generally seen as a subset, albeit a distinct one, of colonial ones’.¹¹⁸ Moreover, his distinction between the two somewhat evolved over time. An earlier stringent approach stated that ‘colonial and settler colonial *forms* actually operate in dialectical tension and in specific contradistinction’.¹¹⁹ A more recent one in effect has differentiated between colonies and settler colonies, which are polities, and colonialism and settler colonialism, which are modes of domination. The former seem quite distinct; the latter appear to be more combinable. This is the case certainly in empirically concrete situations—a wide opening for historical case studies—though less so analytically.

Colonial and settler colonial forms are ... intertwined in any actual situation, and a determination to exploit Indigenous ‘Others’ is always mixed with a will to displace them (this compatibility contributes to making the detection of their structural separation less immediate). The ‘pure settlement’ colonies, after all, are a valuable categorisation, not a specific description, and it is never a matter of appraising colonial *or* settler colonial relationships. Indeed, one often witnesses what amounts to a genuine division of colonial labour, and even if colonial and settler colonial formations should be seen as ontologically distinct, their ultimate complementarity within imperialism should not be minimised. ... And yet, ... the analytical distinction between colonial and settler colonial forms should be emphasised, because in the case of colonialism what is reproduced is a *relationship*, a fundamentally unequal one, while in the case of settler colonialism, what is reproduced is a *biopolitical entity*.¹²⁰

'Settler colonialism ... is related to colonialism but also inherently distinct'¹²¹ for two reasons, SCS scholars have held. The minor one concerns colonial-metropolitan relationship. Settlers wish to found their own independent country. (This point is of central interest neither to Indigenous Studies nor to SCS critics of 'classical' SCS texts, though.) In Veracini's words, 'whereas colonialism *reinforces* the distinction between colony and metropole, settler colonialism *erases* it. ... [T]hey are in some ways antithetical formations'.¹²² The major distinction concerns two intimately interrelated things: land and 'natives'. As Patrick Wolfe put it, '[I]n contrast to the kind of colonial formation that Cabral or Fanon confronted [i.e.: 'franchise' or 'dependent'], settler colonies were not *primarily* established to extract surplus value from Indigenous labour'.¹²³ Settlers wanted (and want) land, empty/emptied, for themselves, as much as possible; their 'logic' – a term Wolfe uses recurrently – was not exploitation but rather 'elimination'.¹²⁴

But this difference was not categorical. Empirically, as also Veracini has recognized, 'colonial and settler colonial forms are ... intertwined in any actual situation'.¹²⁵ Many historians of settler colonialism agree, some 'even' those who were Wolfe's students.¹²⁶ Regarding labor,

settler economies relied on and mobilized a wide range of labour: that of the household and family; the unfree labour of slaves or convicts; the coerced and unpaid labour of Indigenous people; South Asian indentured labour; and Chinese contract labour.¹²⁷

Vice versa, just as settlers often have exploited natives' labor rather than simply eliminating them, so colonial officials habitually used extreme deadly force to eliminate 'unruly' natives, rather than exploiting their labor.¹²⁸

This situation has a methodological upshot. If we do *not* study a settler colony teleologically and do *not* perceive it as one single-phased structure, but rather zoom in on a single event or phase, then said event or phase may look like a presumed colonial situation.¹²⁹ The reverse is true, too. A particular event or phase in a colony may look like a presumed settler-colonial situation: centered on unconditional submission which may entail large-scale elimination. Thus, genocidal violence can, but does not have to, accompany both settler colonialism and colonialism.¹³⁰ Think of the genocide of the Herero, Nama, and San in German South West Africa in 1904–1908.¹³¹ Or consider the French army's structurally (though perhaps not intentionally) genocidal 'pacification' of Algeria after 1830, which decimated the native population.¹³²

As a matter of fact, the issue of violence undercuts categorical conceptual (let alone empirical) distinctions between how colonialism and settler colonialism treat Indigenous people. From the political viewpoint and in the lived experience of Indigenous people, homicidal settlers and colonial officials are not categorically different. Related, although violence may have shaped the long-term overall life experience of an imaginary average native under settler colonialism more than his imaginary average colonial counterpart, there is a critical qualification. All settler colonies were not categorically more violent or eliminatory than all colonies. Some colonies' natives suffered much more physical violence, including death, than some settler colonies' natives (think again of the Herero versus, for instance, Indigenous peoples in Canada).

Distinctions between how colonial and settler colonial 'logics', to use Wolfe's term, see Indigenous people becomes even blurrier when we think of labor-related physical violence. Most egregious was punishment for not laboring 'enough'. This violence often

was worst in areas and enterprises run by big concessionary companies, of which there were a good number also in the nineteenth century. An extreme case was the Congo Free State. The private property of Belgium's King Leopold II from 1885 until 1908, when it became Belgian government controlled, its managers used horrific violence to coerce subjects to work; 'several hundred thousand, even millions, of people perished'.¹³³ African settler colonies, too, often developed particularly extreme economic exploitation patterns of Africans.¹³⁴

Moreover, crucially, physical punishment to maximize exploitation was not the only form of colonial labor-related violence. Labor itself was often physically punishing. Colonial bodies' resulting heightened attrition and mortality happened not only in company-run businesses but often also in government-mandated forced labor operations, where natives had to work for public sector works like road construction. Especially in Africa, such systems were current in British, French, Italian, Portuguese and other European colonies into the 1930s, surged in World War II, and in some ways continued thereafter.¹³⁵ To be sure, colonial governments also had an interest in keeping Indigenous people alive, principally for their labor, attendant policies being e.g. the fight against sleeping sickness, certainly in the twentieth century. And it doubtlessly made a big difference whether one was 'pacified'-killed on the spot, or died from labor-related physical punishment, or 'simply' died at a rather young age due to labor-related stresses and dangers. Still, the above cases of labor-related violence have something fundamental in common. That natives' bodies are to be exploited in colonial polities means they are ultimately dispensable, that is: eliminatable. In sum, colonial exploitation and settler colonial elimination of Indigenous people can be seen as two *internally heterogeneous and mutually overlapping* variants of a single general approach to natives' bodies – an approach that always has racial grounds and whose motivation is governmental and/or capitalist.

This text has argued that the key historical-political background to SCS's rise, which helps explain its presentist Anglo-bias, is the similarities and transnational linkages between US, Canadian, Aotearoa/New Zealander, and Australian (US/CAN/NZ/AUS) Indigenous peoples' domestic political trajectories from the 1950s and their centrality, from the late 1960s to the 1990s, in the internationalization of Indigenous politics. Then, building on historians' engagements with SCS and acknowledging this field's heterogeneity, I have analyzed three issues that are central to SCS as well as relevant to historians, making the following key arguments.

First, SCS's structuralism has empirically underplayed and undertheorized the constitutive role of events in making, remaking, and shifting structures. Moreover, this structuralism has made SCS scholars define settler colonies teleologically, seeing them as polities – and at least conceptually *only* as the polities – that pursued the twin aims of native replacement and white sovereignty with success. This *telos* has both simplified Anglo-settler cases and marginalized all other cases—and the Anglo-focus in effect empirically often has taken the form of methodological settler-nationalism.

While non-'classical' SCS scholars and Indigenous Studies scholars have questioned certain implications of structuralism, especially regarding agency, they have not as much critiqued a second issue: 'classical' SCS's view that settler colonialism is somewhat (Wolfe) or categorically (Veracini) distinct from colonialism. As for SCS scholars' admission of wide empirical overlaps, it has a crucial methodological upshot. Any given single

settler-colonial event or phase may look like a presumed colonial situation, and vice versa. Moreover, the issue of violence, too, in multiple ways undercuts the conceptual distinction between colonial exploitation and settler colonial elimination. In sum, the two can be seen as two overlapping variants of one single approach to natives' bodies.

Last, as for settler-native binarism, it was principally Wolfe's stance. Even Veracini has disagreed, and many non-'classical' SCS scholars are pushing far beyond. Wolfe's stance was modeled on a doubly distinct Australian reality: particularly extreme levels of genocidal violence and a very predominantly British settler community. Three issues that scholars empirically and conceptually treat in separation, together qualify binarism: settlers heterogeneity, natives' heterogeneity, and third groups, i.e. groups other than settlers and natives, which together create inherently complex and unstable interaction patterns. As Barclay, Chopin and Evans's model of settler colonial Algeria implies, such third groups include actors who are not physically inside a settler colony.

In fact, it might make sense to untie the study of settler colonialism from methodological settler-nationalism, and look to groups and spaces beyond that of the settler colony and its (erstwhile) metropole. This seems to be particularly important in the case of the United States and, relatedly, the ex-British-imperial white dominions of Canada, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand. Especially the dominions and Britain are all too easily framed as a British (settler) world—literally a 'world' onto itself.¹³⁶ Sure, this term has some empirical (demographic, economic, and cultural) justifications: consider James Belich's 'Anglo divergence'.¹³⁷ But it is also the long-term political-historiographic effect of the modern British Empire having become so expansive (and relatively strong) that it triggered what we may call an methological empire-ism. What this phenomenon—which includes historians—and SCS have in common is a considerable boundedness within (ex)-British worlds and a tendency to explain its developments in internalist ways.

But this is only one pattern. There is another: comparing and linking the British Empire, including its (ex)-dominions, to other places. Thus, Belich is explicitly comparative. John Darwin's concept of the British World-System insists that we can explain the British Empire's development only by situating it within other developments around the globe that were broadly beyond its reach. And to take a monograph, Angela Woolacott's finegrained study of nineteenth-century Australian settler families and their indigenous dependents shows 'settlers understood themselves and their world in imperial and global terms'.¹³⁸

This point is critical, not the least because, as noted earlier, millions of settlers in French Algeria and hundreds of thousands of settlers in Portuguese Angola, to just take two instances, labored, lived, and were politically active not unlike their peers in pre-independence Anglo-settler colonies. SCS's aforementioned teleological tendency downplays the comparability and relationships between many settler colonies – including Dominions¹³⁹ – until the 1960s. The problem with this approach may be shown with a thought experiment: with the hypothetical end result of the reality that as 'the struggle for Indigenous rights, recognition, sovereignty and genuine reconciliatory futures continues in the face of the settler project, [its] endpoint ... remains remote, a perpetually "vanishing endpoint"'.¹⁴⁰ If settler success is never total, it is also hypothetically possible that it weakens, and that at some future point natives again become a majority or even assume power in an Anglo-settler state or Palestine/Israel. By SCS's own outcome-centric definition of what constitutes a settler colony, such a country would become

less worth studying – which of course would make little scholarly (and for that matter political) sense.

On a related note, it should be stressed that capitalist structures have historically formed a crucial shared characteristic not only between settler colonies, but also between modern colonialism and settler colonialism. Key metropolitan actors made weighty financial investments in both colonies and settler colonies. Metropolitan markets were fed by both colonial and settler colonial mining and agricultural products. And such interdependencies helped condition the economic development of both colonies and settler colonies, and their shifts impacted both, often synchronously.¹⁴¹ Attention to those developments would also foreground a key early student of settler colonialism, the afore-mentioned Donald Denoon, whose 1983 monograph *Settler Capitalism* argued that economic developments in nineteenth-century informal British imperial areas, in South America, and in British white dominions, were both shaped by British metro-centric capitalist interests.¹⁴²

As for the afore-noted ‘open’ approaches to histories of the British Empire and its settler colonies, they in effect rub shoulders with the rising field of transimperial history. Thus, some historians of non-British settler colonies or of non-Anglo migrants to Anglo-settler colonies are studying what in effect are structured transimperial patterns of interaction and movement involving people, information, and capital. A good example are actors from Italy and Japan, nation-state-empires whose migrants abroad—often to settler colonies—related to colonial conquest in Africa and East Asia, respectively.¹⁴³

We may build on such approaches to expand the study of settler colonialism. Settler colonies were affected by outside third groups, and certainly before independence *but also thereafter*, their developments stood in tight relationship with developments elsewhere.¹⁴⁴ To open up the study of settler colonialism and link it to other worlds does not deny distinctiveness.¹⁴⁵ Instead, it will help to situate and perhaps better explain that distinctiveness and its changing shapes, and vice versa show how those features echoed beyond the borders of settler polities and their respective metropolises.

Notes

1. Two quotes: Lorenzo Veracini, ‘Introduction’, in *Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* [henceforth *RHHSC*], ed. idem and Edward Cavanagh (London, 2017), 4; Jeffrey Ostler, ‘Locating Settler Colonialism in Early American History’, *William and Mary Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2019): 450.
2. However, a very useful British-World-wide study is Cecilia Morgan, *Building Better Britains?: Settler Societies in the British World, 1783–1920* (Toronto, 2016). Critiques of SCS focusing on a single settler colony or area: Ostler, ‘Locating’; John Faragher, ‘Commentary: Settler colonial studies and the North American frontier’, *Settler Colonial Studies* [SCS] 4, no. 2 (2014): 181–91; Jeffrey Ostler and Nancy Shoemaker, ‘Settler Colonialism in Early American History’, *William and Mary Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2019): 361–8; Jennifer Spear, ‘Beyond the Native/Settler Divide in Early California’, *William and Mary Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2019): 367; Margaret Jacobs, ‘Parallel or Intersecting tracks? The History of the US West and Comparative Settler Colonialism’, *SCS* 4, no. 2 (2014): 155–61; Janne Lahti, ‘Introduction: What is Settler Colonialism and What It Has to Do with the American West?’ *Journal of the West* 56, no. 4 (2017): 8–12; Fiona Barclay, Charlotte Chopin, and Martin Evans, ‘Introduction: Settler colonialism and French Algeria’, *SCS* 8, no. 2 (2018): 115–30; Richard Gott, ‘Latin America as a White Settler Society’, *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 26, no. 2 (2007): 269–89; M. Bianet Castellanos,

- 'Introduction: Settler Colonialism in Latin America', *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (2017): 777–81; Shannon Speed, 'Structures of Settler Capitalism in Abya Yala', *American Quarterly* 69, no. 4 (2017): 783–90; Gabriel Piterberg, *The Return of Zionism* (London: Verso, 2008), 51–92; principally on Australia, see Carey and Silverstein, 'Thinking', 8–9; Carey, 'On Hope and Resignation: Conflicting Visions of Settler Colonial Studies and its Future as a Field', *Postcolonial Studies* 23, no. 1 (2020): 21–41. Also: 'CFP: Towards a "Settler Turn" in the Study of the East of Europe (18th to 21st Century)' <https://www.hsozkult.de/event/id/event-133789> (accessed February 20, 2023).
3. Janne Lahti et al., 'Editors' note', SCS (2023), DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2023.2185939 (accessed 10 April 2023). 'Although [SCS] is most usually associated with [Lorenzo] Veracini and [Edward] Cavanagh, the founding editors included Jacinta Ruru, Penny Edmonds, Jane Carey and Tracey Banivanua Mar, who were soon joined by J. Kēhaulani Kauanui and Jean M. O'Brien. All of the founding editors' – which included Indigenous Studies scholars – 'left the journal in 2017 with concerns about its direction (Cavanagh had stepped down as managing editor in 2015, moving to the journal's advisory board before also leaving in 2017)': Jane Carey and Ben Silverstein, 'Thinking with and Beyond Settler Colonial Studies', *Postcolonial Studies* 23, no. 1 (2020): 16–27.
 4. Key SCS scholars interpret this distinction in slightly varying ways, as will be shown.
 5. In the 2010s SCS became a tool to analyze Israel. Programmatic texts include Maya Mikdashi, 'What Is Settler Colonialism?', in *Jadaliyya*, July 17, 2012 (<https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/26604>, accessed June 15, 2022); Brenna Bhandar and Rafeef Ziadeh, 'Acts and Omissions: Framing Settler Colonialism in Palestine Studies', *Jadaliyya*, January 14, 2016 (<https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/32857/Acts-and-Omissions-Framing-Settler-Colonialism-in-Palestine-Studies>, accessed June 16, 2022). See also two special issues in SCS, 2:1 (2012) and 9:1 (2019); Piterberg, *Return*. Earlier studies include Fayeze Sayigh, *Zionist Colonialism in Palestine* (Beirut, 1965); Maxime Rodinson's, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?* (New York, 1973).
 6. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism* (Princeton, 1997), 11–2; Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, 'Introduction', in *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*, ed. idem (London, 2005), 4, about the 'pervasive inequalities' not only of 'settler societies', which became independent, but also of 'settler colonies'; Christoph Marx, 'Settler colonies', (2017), *European History Online* (www.ieg-ego.eu/marxch-2015-en [accessed December 16, 2022]); and Marx, 'Siedlerkolonien in Afrika', in *Rassenmischehen—Mischlinge—Rassentrennung*, ed. Frank Becker (Stuttgart, 2004), 82–96. Undoubtedly, independent white-majority settler colonial polities are distinct from settler-minority polities. Having become a minority—presently around 2.8% in Australia, 2.9% in the USA, 4.4% in Canada, 16.5% in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and 20.9% in Israel—Indigenous peoples are not economically central. Moreover, most Indigenous people seek to gain fairer representation and/or self-governed spaces and practices, not to expulse settlers and overhaul the late colonial polity, as African and Asian decolonizers did after World War II. These points, however, do not take into account past linkages between settler-majority and – minority polities. Moreover, they compare present-day settler-majority polities to past settler-minority polities—and even in this diachronic comparison, settler-majority and – minority polities evince similarities. In both, Indigenous peoples are/were marginal in government and Indigenous primordality and settler legitimacy shapes/shaped settler culture. Also, majority-settler polities' attempts to socio-culturally neutralize Indigenous people are strategies of subordination—and settler-minority polities sought socio-cultural subordination, too, though with other strategies. Last, until after World War II many African and Asian subjects in settler-minority polities often behaved rather like most Indigenous people in settler-majority polities today, seeking fairer representation and/or self-governing institutions and spaces, rather than complete sovereignty.
 7. Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London, 2016), 34 (e-book). See also Veracini, 'Introduction', to *RHHSC*, 3; Carey and Silverstein, 'Thinking', 1, 3.
 8. Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (London, 2010), 33–52.
 9. Veracini, 'Introduction' to *RHHSC*, 3; Carey and Silverstein, 'Thinking.'

10. While metrics are to be taken with a big grain of salt, they provide a sense of how known an author is compared to others. On scopus, Lorenzo Veracini has an h-index of 15 and 1,061 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=24922368800>) and Wolfe, an h-index of 11 and 842 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=35767188700>). By comparison, one set of scholars who have been very engaged with SCS—founding members of *Settler Colonial Studies* who in 2017 left the editorial board—have the following metrics. Jacinta Ruru has an h-index of 7 and 300 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=26533492000>); Penny Edmonds has an h-index of 9 and 294 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=26121162000>); Jane Carey has an h-index of 8 and 152 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=57085847400>); J. Kēhaulani Kauanui has an h-index of 3 and 80 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=38162195000>); Jean M. O'Brien has an h-index of 6 and 87 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=56069050900>); Edward Cavanagh has an h-index of 5 and 90 citations (<https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=35106849500>). (For Tracey Banivanua Mar, who tragically deceased untimely (1974–2017), see: <https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=36499036100>.) (All wwws in this footnote were accessed on 20 April 2023.)
11. Wolfe first outlined the 'logic of elimination' and 'deep structures of the Australian colonial project' in 'Nation and Miscegenation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era', *Social Analysis* 36 (1994): 93–152 at 93. His key monograph is Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology* (London, 1999). Other critical texts include 'Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–4092; Wolfe, ed., *The Settler Complex* (Los Angeles, 2016), including 'Introduction,' 1–24; Wolfe, *Traces*.
12. In 2010, he launched the *settler colonial studies blog* with Edward Cavanagh, and as noted above, he in 2011 co-founded *Settler Colonial Studies*. See e.g. Lorenzo Veracini, 'Introducing Settler Colonial Studies', *SCS* 1, no. 1 (2011): 1–12. Cavanagh managed the blog through 2014, Veracini thereafter: <https://settlercolonialstudies.blog/about/> (accessed April 15, 2023).
13. Lorenzo Veracini, *Israel and Settler Society* (London, 2006); Veracini, *Overview*; Veracini, *The Settler Colonial Present* (London, 2015); Veracini, *The World Turned Inside Out: Settler Colonialism as a Political Idea* (London, 2021). Also: Veracini and Cavanagh, *RHHSC*.
14. Two informative obituaries of Wolfe are Cynthia Franklin, Njoroge Njoroge and Suzanna Reiss, 'Tracing the Settler's Tools: A Forum on Patrick Wolfe's Life and Legacy', *American Quarterly* 69, no. 2 (2017): 235–90; Ben Silverstein, 'Patrick Wolfe (1949–2016)', *History Workshop Journal* 82 (2016): 315–23.
15. Silverstein, 'Wolfe', 318.
16. An 'SCS-internal' account, as it were, is Lorenzo Veracini, 'Settler Colonialism: Career of a Concept', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History [JICH]* 41 (2013): 313–33.
17. Denoon, 'Understanding Settler Societies', *Historical Studies* 18 (1979): 511–27; Faragher, 'Commentary', 182, on Denoon's students. Denoon, *Settler Capitalism* (Oxford, 1983).
18. Kauanui, 'Dilemmas', 291–292, evoking mostly US works including Jean O'Brien, *Dispossession by Degrees: Indian Land and Identity in Natick, Massachusetts, 1650–1790* (Cambridge, 1997); Candice Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura, special issue: 'Whose Vision? Asian Settler Colonialism in Hawai'i', *Amerasia Journal* 26, no. 2 (2000), including Haunani-Kay Trask, 'Settlers of Color and 'Immigrant' Hegemony: 'Locals' in Hawai'i', 1–26. On Canada, see e.g. Beenash Jafri, 'Ongoing Colonial Violence in Settler States', *Lateral* 6, no. 1 (2017); Laura Ishiguro, 'Histories of Settler Colonialism', *BC Studies* 190 (2016): 6.
19. Faragher, 'Commentary', 182.
20. Rodinson, *Israel*; Sayigh, *Colonialism*, 21, invoked a 'settler-state.'
21. Frederick Hoxie, 'Retrieving the Red Continent: Settler Colonialism and the History of American Indians in the US', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 3, no. 6 (2008): 1153–1167. For an introduction specifically to historical dimensions of Indigenous Studies, see Ann McGrath and Lynette Russell, eds., *The Routledge Companion to Global Indigenous History* (London: Routledge, 2022), especially idem, "Introduction," and Ben Silverstein, "Theoretical Frontiers," 56–85.

22. Steven Salaita, *Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine* (Minneapolis, 2016); Rana Barakat, 'Writing/righting Palestine Studies', *SCS* 8:3 (2018): 343–369.
23. Subtle critiques of agency in Wolfe are Carey, 'Hope', 35; Jean O'Brien, 'Tracing Settler Colonialism's Eliminatory Logic in Traces of History', *American Quarterly* 69, no. 2 (2017): 249–55. Landmark studies like Tracey Banivanua Mar and Penelope Edmonds, ed., *Making Settler Colonial Space* (London, 2010) and like Sarah Maddison and Morgan Brigg, ed., *Unsettling the Settler State* (Alexandria, 2011), included chapters on Indigenous actors' agency. For studies of Indigenous social practices and places paralleling settler colonial structures, see Shino Konishi, 'First Nations Scholars, Settler Colonial Studies, and Indigenous History', *Australian Historical Studies* 50, no. 3 (2019): 285–304.
24. Quotes: Carey, 'Hope', 21; Carey and Silverstein, 'Thinking', 2. See also J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, 'A Structure, Not an Event': Settler Colonialism and Enduring Indigeneity', *Lateral* 5, no. 1 (2016); Manu Vimalassery, Juliana Hu Pegues, and Alyosha Goldstein, 'Introduction: On Colonial Unknowing', *Theory & Event* 19, no. 4 (2016).
25. Corey Snelgrove, Rita Kaur Dhamoon and Jeff Corntassel, 'Unsettling Settler Colonialism', *Decolonization* 3, no. 2 (2014): 1–32; Vimalassery et al., 'Unknowing'; Alice Te Punga Somerville, 'OMG settler colonial studies', *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 2 (2021): 278–82.
26. J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, 'False Dilemmas and Settler Colonial Studies', *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 2 (2021): 290–6.
27. See footnote 13.
28. Ken Coates, *A Global History of Indigenous Peoples* (Basingstoke, 2006), 203. See also Roger Moody, ed., *The Indigenous Voice* (London, 1988), 1: 130–209.
29. Coates, *History*, 240; Julian Burges, *Report from the Frontier* (London, 1987), 46–7; Josephine Flood, *Aboriginal Australians* (Crows Nest, 2006), 216, 240; Colin Calloway, *First Peoples* (Boston, 2016), 455–9, 502–71; Richard Broome, *Aboriginal People* (Crows Nest, 2019), chs. 11 and 12; Arthur Ray, *An Illustrated History of Canada's Native People* (Montréal, 2016), 313–59; Philippa Mein Smith, *A Concise History of New Zealand* (Cambridge, 2012), 237–49.
30. Calloway, *First Peoples*, 460–2, 481–2; Ray, *History*, 292–312; Broome, *Aboriginal People*, ch. 10; Mein Smith, *History*, 193–195, 238; James Belich, *Paradise Reforged. A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000* (Honolulu, 2001), 467–74.
31. Mobilization certainly existed before. It was perhaps most sturdy and complex, including changing and interacting practices of engagement and disengagement with settlers and settler institutions, in New Zealand: Belich, *Paradise*, 189–216. See also Francesca Merlan, 'Indigenous Movements in Australia', *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34 (2005): 479–480, on the influence of some urbanization already in the 1920s–30s on the 1932 foundation of the Australian Aborigines' League in Melbourne.
32. Calloway, *First Peoples*, 465–70, 502–9; Broome, *Aboriginal People*, chs. 10–12; Belich, *Paradise*, 466–87; Ray, *History*, 313–59; Troy Johnson, *Red Power: The Native American Civil Rights Movement* (New York, 2007); Peter McFarlane with Doreen Manuel, *Brotherhood to Nationhood: George Manuel and the Making of the Modern Indian Movement* 2nd ed. (Toronto, 2020). Through the 1960s most Australian pro-Aboriginal associations included many whites, though Aboriginal people played an increasing role: Ravi de Costa, *A Higher Authority: Indigenous Transnationalism and Australia* (Sydney, 2006), 77.
33. Francesca Merlan, 'Indigeneity: Global and Local', *Current Anthropology* 50, no. 3 (2009): 311. See also Coates, *History*, 234, 238; Richard, 437.
34. Merlan, 'Indigeneity', 310 (my italics). Also : ibid., 308. Organizations in postcolonial Africa and Asia had a very difficult position—their governments ignored or repressed them—and little visibility; an exception was The Philippines. On a different note, the internationalization of Indigenous activism has resulted in greater interest in global and comparative views and self-views, which, however, is critiqued by some for overshadowing cultural specificity: Mita Banerjee, 'Introduction', in *Comparative Indigenous Studies*, ed. Idem (Heidelberg, 2016), 1–17; Merlan, 'Indigeneity'.
35. Peter Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*. 2nd ed. (London, 2010).

36. Sanders, 'UN', 415. See also *Ibid.*, 413–4; Burges, *Report*, 60; Merlan, 'Indigeneity', 308. (However, by the time the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was passed in 2007, African and Asian tribal groups had become more integral.) Latin American Indigenous peoples also were mentioned in the influential 1974 book by NIB and WCIP co-founder George Manuel, *The Fourth World*: George Manuel with Michael Posluns, *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality* (New York, 1974), 11. However, 'the Fourth World is a vision of the future history of North America and of the Indian peoples:' *Ibid.*, 12 (my italics).
37. Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, 'Indigenous Movements and the Indian Question in Latin America', in *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*, ed. idem (Brighton, 2004), 1. Also: Salvador Martí i Puig, ed., *Pueblos indígenas y política en América Latina* (Barcelona, 2007); Alison Brysk, *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America* (Stanford, 2000). It was in the 1990s, too, that several Latin American countries, Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand, and Australia—but not the United States—saw truth and reconciliation commissions like Australia's 1991–2001 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Guatemala's 1997–1999 Commission for Historical Clarification, and Canada's 2008–2015 Residential School Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A good introduction to AUS/CAN is Sarah Maddison, Tom Clark, and Ravi de Costa, ed., *The Limits of Settler Colonial Reconciliation* (Singapore, 2016).
38. Merlan, 'Movements', 481; De Costa, *Authority*, 92–120; Coates, *History*, 244; Mein Smith, *History*, 238; Belich, *Paradise*, 477.
39. Quotes: Douglas Sanders, 'The UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations', *Human Rights Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (1989): 414; Merlan, 'Indigeneity', 308. See also Coates, *History*, 252–5; James Youngblood Henderson, *Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition* (Saskatoon, 2008).
40. Wolfe, 'Nation.' See also Glen Coulthard, *Red Skin White Mask: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition* (Minneapolis, 2014). For the Mabo case and reconciliation, see Robert Tickner, *Taking a Stand: Land Rights to Reconciliation* (Sydney, 2001). Related, Wolfe has stated 'I didn't invent Settler Colonial Studies. Natives have been experts in the field for centuries.' J. Kēhaulani Kauanui and Patrick Wolfe, 'Settler Colonialism Then and Now', *Politica & Società* 1, no. 2 (2012): 257.
41. Veracini, *Overview*, 30.
42. Anthony Hopkins, 'Rethinking decolonization', *Past and Present* 200 (2008): 214. See also David Fieldhouse, 'Can Humpty-Dumpty Be Put Together Again?', *JICH* 12, no. 2 (1984): 10; James Curran and Stuart Ward, *The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire* (Carlton, 2010).
43. Post-British-imperial does not mean that particularly strong ties rooted in a common past do not matter anymore.
44. Veracini, 'Introduction' to *RHHSC*, 4; for continuations, see also Veracini, *Present*.
45. Edward Cavanagh, 'History, Time and the Indigenist Critique', *Arena* 37/38 (2012): 39.
46. Omar Jabary Salamanca et al., 'Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine', *SCS* 2, no. 1 (2012): 2, argued that 'the Nakba in 1948 ... is not a singular event but is manifested today in the continuing subjection of Palestinians by Israelis. ... [T]he settler colonial structure underpinning [Israel's tactics] must be a central object of analysis.'
47. Wolfe, 'Elimination', 388. An early structuralist edited volume is Fiona Bateman and Lionel Pilkington, ed., *Studies in Settler Colonialism* (Basingstoke, 2011).
48. Tim Rowse, 'Indigenous Heterogeneity', *Australian Historical Studies* 45, no. 3 (2014): 298–9, citing Patrick Wolfe, 'New Jews for Old', *Arena Journal* 37/38 (2012): 286; Veracini, *Overview*, 16–17. For a trenchant critique of Rowse's critique of Wolfe, see Carey, 'Hope', 23–24.
49. Veracini, *Overview*, 33–52.
50. Paloma Villegas et al., 'Contesting Settler Colonial Accounts', *Studies in Social Justice* 14, no. 2 (2020): 323. See also Veracini, *Overview*; Mark Rifkin, *Beyond Settler Time* (Durham, 2017). A related point concerns the future: as 'the struggle for Indigenous rights, recognition, sovereignty and genuine reconciliatory futures continues in the face of the settler project, [its] endpoint ... remains remote, a perpetually 'vanishing endpoint': Penelope Edmonds and Jane Carey, 'Australian settler colonialism over the long nineteenth century', in *RHHSC*, 371. See

- also Elizabeth Strakosch and Alissa Macoun, 'The Vanishing Endpoint of Settler Colonialism', *Arena* 37/38 (2012): 40–62.
51. Francesca Merlan, 'Reply to Patrick Wolfe', *Social Analysis* 41, no. 2 (1997): 10–19; Elizabeth Povinelli, 'Reading Ruptures, Ruptured Readings', *Social Analysis* 41, no. 2 (1997): 20–28.
 52. Donald Denoon, 'Settler Capitalism Unsettled', *New Zealand Journal of History* 29 (1995): 132. Moreover, Denoon, *Settler Capitalism*, 27, saw differences between agricultural and pastoral Indigenous people, insisting that the former – e.g. in South America – affected, and were less decimated by, settlers: pre-contact Indigenous social organization mattered. Similar: Annie Coombes, 'Introduction', in *Rethinking Settler Colonialism*, ed. idem (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2006), 1–2.
 53. O'Brien, 'Tracing'; Maddison and Brigg, *Unsettling*; Konishi, 'Scholars.'
 54. O'Brien, 'Tracing'; Suzanna Reiss, 'The breakdown in 'Tracing the Settler's Tools'', *American Quarterly* 69, no. 2 (2017): 244.
 55. Kenneth Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939* (Chapel Hill, 1984); Jacob Norris, *Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905–1948* (Oxford, 2013).
 56. This is a statistic of texts, in the journal *Settler Colonial Studies*, that are tagged 'editorial', 'introduction', 'article', or 'roundtable' contribution from volumes 1 (2011) to 11 issue 2 (2021), which is the journal's last formal issue as of April 2021. I have excluded 31 truly non-geographical, conceptual texts. French settler colonies totaled 5%, Japanese ones 2%, Portuguese ones 0%.
 57. Wolfe, *Traces*; Veracini, *Overview*.
 58. Denoon, 'Understanding', 515, 517 (on migration); Coombes, *Rethinking*; Bateman and Pilkington, *Studies*.
 59. A classic is Alan Lester, 'British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire', *History Workshop Journal* 54 (2002): 25–48. For two important fields of study, migration and families, see Andrew Mcghee and Andrew Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods, and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge, 2010); Jane Errington, *Emigrant Worlds and Transatlantic Communities: Migration to Upper Canada in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Montreal, 2007); James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-world, 1783–1939* (Oxford, 2009); Laura Ishiguro, *Nothing to Write Home about: British Family Correspondence and the Settler Colonial Everyday in British Columbia* (Vancouver, 2019); Rebecca Swartz, *Education and Empire. Children, Race and Humanitarianism in the British Settler Colonies, 1833–1880* (Basingstoke, 2019); Margaret Jacobs, *White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880–1940* (Lincoln, 2009). Perhaps naturally, SCS scholars do not study ties between Anglo-settler and non-settler polities. An classic example of a monograph that did so is Tony Ballantyne, *Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire* (London, 2001).
 60. David Moon, *The American Steppes: The Unexpected Russian Roots of Great Plains Agriculture, 1870s–1930s* (Cambridge, 2020); Robert Nelson, 'A German on the Prairies: Max Sering and Settler Colonialism in Canada', *SCS* 5, no. 1 (2015): 1–19; Charlotte Ann Chopin, 'Pages Without Borders: Global Networks and the Settler Press in Algeria, 1881–1914', *SCS* 8, no. 2 (2018): 152–74.
 61. In absolute numbers: 165 versus 100 articles. I did not count ten truly conceptual non-temporal texts.
 62. Critiques of teleology: Rowse, 'Heterogeneity', 297; Ostler, 'Locating', 443.
 63. Veracini, 'Introduction' to *RHHSC*, 2; Veracini, *Present*.
 64. Wolfe, 'New Jews for Old', 289 (my italics). Veracini, 'Introducing', 3.
 65. Veracini, 'Introducing', 3.
 66. Chris Youé, 'Settler colonialism or colonies with settlers?', *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2018): 69–85; Barclay et al., 'Introduction.' Relatedly, in a "double exceptionalism" of sorts, South Africa, like Algeria, has also "long been treated as too substantively different from the rest of colonialism in Africa to be fully integrated in regional perspectives." Aidan Russell, email to author, May 6, 2022.

67. Cecilia Morgan, *Building Better Britains?: Settler Societies in the British World, 1783–1920* (Toronto, 2016), xxiii.
68. This entails a political critique of SCS. “Settler-native dichotomy has played very little if any part in debate over Northern Ireland’s peace process or conflict resolution, since it is a framework inherently better suited to explaining the intractability of conflict than its transformation or termination.” Stephen Howe, “Northern Ireland and settler colonialism,” in *RHHSC*, 66.
69. Ostler and Shoemaker, ‘Introduction’, 364.
70. Two classics are William Sewell, ‘Historical Events as Transformation of Structures’, *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 841–81; Marshall Sahlins, ‘The Return of the Event, Again’, in *Clio in Oceania*, ed. Aletta Biersack (Washington, 1991), 37–99.
71. Barclay et al., ‘Introduction’, 115 (my italics), 117.
72. Evans, *Algeria’s Undeclared War* (Oxford, 2012), 141.
73. For the war, see Evans, *Algeria*; Benjamin Stora, *Histoire de la guerre d’Algérie* (Paris, 1993); Alis-tair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace 1954–1962* (London, 1979); Sylvie Thénault, *Histoire de la guerre d’indépendance algérienne* (Paris, 2005).
74. Patrick Wolfe, ‘Recuperating Binarism’, *SCS* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 263.
75. Wolfe, ‘Recuperating’, 263. See also in Wolfe, ‘Introduction’, in *The Settler Complex: Recuperating Binarism in Colonial Studies*, ed. idem (Los Angeles, 2016), 1–24.
76. Lorenzo Veracini, ‘Patrick Wolfe’s Dialectics’, *Aboriginal History* 40 (2016): 249–50.
77. Veracini, ‘Is Settler Colonial Studies Even Useful?’ *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 2 (2021): 275.
78. Veracini, *Overview*, 6.
79. Kauanui, ‘Indigeneity’, 2; Iyko Day, *Alien Capital: Asian Racialization and the Logic of Settler Colonial Capitalism* (Durham, 2016); Tiffany King, *The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies* (Durham, 2016); Lynette Russell, *Roving Mariners: Australian Aboriginal Whalers and Sealers in the Southern Oceans, 1790–1870* (Albany, 2012); Ben Silverstein, *Governing Natives: Indirect Rule and Settler Colonialism in Australia’s North* (Manchester, 2019).
80. Veracini, ‘Is ... Useful?’, 272; for Australian origins, see also e.g. Carey and Silverstein, ‘Thinking’, 1.
81. Quotes: Chris Youé, ‘Settler’, 81; Edmonds and Carey, ‘Australia’, 371. For a critique of Australo-centrism, see Allan Greer, ‘Settler Colonialism and Empire in Early America’, *William and Mary Quarterly* 76, no. 3 (2019): 383–90.
82. On the USA, see Jeffrey Ostler, *Surviving Genocide: Native Nations and the United States from the American Revolution to Bleeding Kansas* (New Haven, 2019); Benjamin Madley, ‘Reexamining the American Genocide Debate’, *AHR* 120, no. 1 (2015): 98–139. On an exceptionally extreme case, see Lyndall Ryan, *Tasmanian Aborigines* (Sydney, 2012).
83. Janet McCalman and Rebecca Kippen, ‘Population and health’, in *The Cambridge History of Australia*, ed. Alison Bashford (Cambridge, 2013), 301. On New Zealand, see Belich, *Paradise*, 216–42.
84. Veracini, ‘Introduction’ to *RHHSC*, 4.
85. See also settler-native mixity, e.g. in Latin America (*mestizaje*). For how mestizos worked within framework that disenfranchised Indigenous people, see Castellanos, ‘Introduction’, 778; Speed, ‘Structures’, 783–90; Varner, *Raza*, 15–20; Shona Jackson, *Creole Indigeneity: Between Myth and Nation in the Caribbean* (Minneapolis, 2012).
86. Critiques: Faragher, ‘Commentary’, 186; Bianet Castellanos, ‘Introduction’, 777; Ostler and Shoemaker, ‘Introduction’, 367.
87. Carey, ‘Hope’, 23–24, critiquing Rowse.
88. Studies of colonial intermediaries seem relevant to settler situations: Ronald Robinson, ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’, in *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (London, 1972), 119–28; Henri Brunschwig, *Noirs et blancs dans l’Afrique noire française* (Paris, 1983); Benjamin Lawrance et al., *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks* (Madison, 2006).
89. Emilie Connolly, ‘Fiduciary Colonialism: Annuities and Native Dispossession in the Early United States’, *AHR* 127, no. 1 (2022): 223–53; Jeffrey Ostler, ‘Settler Colonialism’, in *Cambridge History of America in the World*, ed. Kristin Hoganson and Jay Sexton (Cambridge, 2021), vol. II, 97.

90. Edmonds and Carey, 'Australian', 376; Amanda Nettelbeck and Lyndall Ryan, 'Salutary Lessons: Native Police and the 'Civilising' Role of Legalised Violence in Colonial Australia', *JICH* 46, no. 1 (2018): 47–68.
91. Will Jackson, 'Settler Colonialism in Kenya', in *RHHSC*, 237. After World War II, increasing recruitment helped trigger a Kikuyu civil war within the Mau Mau movement: Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau Mau* (Cambridge, 2009).
92. Hannah-Louise Clark, 'Doctoring the *Bled*: Medical Auxiliaries and the Administration of Rural Life in Colonial Algeria, 1904–1954' (Princeton Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 2014); Alain Messaoudi, *Les Arabisants et La France Coloniale* (Lyon, 2015).
93. Edward Cavanagh, 'Settler Colonialism in South Africa', in *RHHSC*, 298, 300.
94. Enocent Msindo, 'Settler Rule in Southern Rhodesia', in *RHHSC*, 254.
95. Other examples include Irish and Scotts in colonial America (Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (New York, 2009), and, very different, Colin Calloway, *White People, Indians, and Highlanders: Tribal Peoples and Colonial Encounters in Scotland and America* [Oxford, 2008]); colonial New Spain (Ignacio Martinez, 'Settler colonialism in New Spain and the early Mexican Republic', in *RHHSC*, 113); tensions between Briton Southern Rhodesian and Afrikaner South Africans (Youé, 'Settler', 72; Cavanagh, 'South Africa', 296); and Italians in Australia (Catherine Dewhirst, 'Collaborating on Whiteness: Representing Italians in Early White Australia', *Journal of Australian Studies* 32, no. 1 (2008): 33–49).
96. Barclay et al., 'Introduction', 117.
97. Veracini, *Overview*.
98. Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (Cambridge, 1989); Nahum Karlinsky, *California Dreaming: Ideology, Society, and Technology in the Citrus Industry of Palestine, 1890–1939* (Albany, 2005).
99. Edmonds and Carey, 'Australian', 376. See also James Heartfield, *The Aborigines' Protection Society: Humanitarian Imperialism in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Canada, South Africa, and the Congo, 1836–1909* (New York, 2011); Alan Lester and Fae Dussart, *Colonization and the Origins of Humanitarian Governance: Protecting Aborigines Across the Nineteenth-Century British empire* (Cambridge, 2014).
100. Philip McMichael, *Settlers and the Agrarian Question: Foundations of Capitalism in Colonial Australia* (Cambridge, 1984). For nineteenth-century Aotearoa/New Zealand, see Belich, *Paradise*, foregrounding the landed gentry, and Jim McAloon, *No Idle Rich: the Wealthy in Canterbury and Otago* (Dunedin, 2002), emphasizing the role of urban capitalists.
101. Evans, *Algeria*, 85–112.
102. Margaret, 'Tracks', 157; Martinez, 'Mexico', 120.
103. Alex Carmel, *Die Siedlungen der württembergischen Templer in Palästina 1868–1918* (Stuttgart, 1973); Alexander Schölch, *Palästina im Umbruch, 1856–1882* (Stuttgart, 1986) Yossi Ben Artzi, *Mi-Germania le-Eretz ha-Kodesh* (Jerusalem, 1996); Mahmoud Yazbak, 'Templars as Proto-Zionists?', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28 (1999): 40–54.
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107. Cavanagh, 'South Africa', 295. Also: G. Kynoch, 'Controlling the Coolies: Chinese Mineworkers and the Struggle for Labor in South Africa, 1904–1910', *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no. 2 (2003): 309–29; R. Bright, *Chinese Labour in South Africa, 1902–1910*

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108. Peter Kolchin, *American Slavery, 1619–1877* (New York, 2003); David Brion Davis, *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World* (Oxford, 2006).
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 110. Early overview: James Brooks, ed. *Confounding the Color Line: The Indian-Black Experience in North America* (Lincoln, 2002). For a particularly momentous case, the Seminole Maroons in Florida, see Kevin Mulroy, *Freedom on the Border* (Lubbock, 1993). Other monographs include Tiya Miles, *Ties That Bind: The Story of an Afro-Cherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom* (Oakland, 2015); Barbara Krauthamer, *Black Slaves, Indian Masters* (Chapel Hill, 2015); Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, 2011); William Kiser, *Borderlands of Slavery: The Struggle over Captivity and Peonage in the American Southwest* (Philadelphia, 2017); Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010). Conceptually insightful on black 'settlers' is Anthony Wood, 'Colonial Erosion: Unearthing African American History in the Settler Colonial West', *SCS* 9, no. 3 (2019): 396–417.
 111. Walter Hixson, 'Adaptation, resistance and representation in the modern US settler state', in *RHHSC*, 169. See also Hixson, *American Settler Colonialism: A History* (2013). Related, see Alyosha Goldstein, 'Introduction: Toward a Genealogy of the U.S. Colonial Present', in *Formations of US Colonialism*, ed. idem (Durham, 2014), 1–30 at 2.
 112. Day, *Capital*, 23, 24. She seems to agree with scholars of Asians in Hawai'i who saw them structurally as settlers, too. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism* (Honolulu, 2008). More broadly: Dean Itsuji Saranillio, 'Why Asian Settler Colonialism Matters', *SCS* 3, no. 3–4 (2013): 280–94; Bianca Isaki, 'Asian Settler Colonialism's Histories', in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian American Studies*, ed. Cindy Cheng (London, 2016), 142–53. Beautifully attentive to Japanese laborers' own experience across the Pacific, including in Hawai'i: Martin Dusinberre, *Mooring the Global Archive: A Japanese Ship and its Migrant Histories* (Cambridge, 2023). A fascinatingly complex monograph that points beyond native-settler binaries by looking at hierarchical thinking that underpin native elite policies, echoing white settler governance, is J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Paradoxes of Hawaiian Sovereignty* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018). An again different take is Minoru Hokari, 'Globalising Aboriginal Reconciliation: Indigenous Australians and Asian (Japanese) Migrants', *Cultural Studies Review* 9, no. 3 (2003): 88: while 'non-Anglo migrants are not responsible for the British invasion of Australia, they may still be responsible for ... *their own colonisation of Australia*' (his italics). Yet another take, which looks at Asian-native-American relations within 'railroad colonialism', is Karuka, *Empire's Tracks*.
 113. King, *Shoals*, 19, 18. Related, see the category of 'arrivants' in Jodi Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis, 2011), xix.
 114. Barclay et al., 'Introduction', 117–8. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, 'Introduction', in *Settler Colonialism*, ed. idem (London, 2005), 4, see a quadrangular dynamics between 'imperial metropole', 'local administration', 'Indigenous population', and 'settler community.'
 115. Barclay et al., 'Introduction', 117; Elkins and Pedersen, 'Introduction', 4.
 116. Wolfe, *Transformation*, 2; Veracini, 'Dialectics', 249–60.

117. Veracini, *Overview*, 3.
118. *Ibid.*, 6.
119. *Ibid.*, 7, 11 ('dialectical opposition').
120. Lorenzo Veracini, *The Settler Colonial Present* (London, 2015), 26–27 (his italics).
121. Veracini, 'Introduction' to *RHHSC*, 3.
122. Veracini, 'Introducing', 3.
123. Wolfe, *Transformation*, 1 (my emphasis).
124. Wolfe, *Transformation*, 11, 27, 32; Wolfe, 'Elimination', 387.
125. Veracini, 'Introduction' to *RHHSC*, 3.
126. E.g. Silverstein, *Governing Natives*. See also Angela Woolacott, *Settler Society in the Australian Colonies: Self-government and Imperial Culture* (Oxford, 2015), on Indigenous labor in settler homes. Wolfe, *Transformation*, 29, insists that settler colonial exploitation of native labour was subordinate to land dispossession.
127. Morgan, *Building*, xxvi. See also Penelope Edmonds and Amanda Nettelbeck, eds., *Intimacies of Violence in the Settler Colony: Economies of Dispossession Around the Pacific Rim* (New York, 2018). Andrew Isenberg and Lawrence Kessler, 'Settler Colonialism and the Environmental History of the North American West', *Journal of the West* 56 (2017): 57–66, argue the habitual exploitation of Indigenous labor contradicts that the USA is a settler colonial polity.
128. Dierk Walter, *Colonial Violence: European Empires and the Use of Force* (London, 2017); Michelle Gordon, *Extreme Violence and the 'British Way': Colonial Warfare in Perak, Sierra Leone and Sudan* (London, 2020); Susanne Kuß, *German Colonial Wars and the Context of Military Violence* (Cambridge, 2017); Tom Menger, "'Press the Thumb onto the Eye': Moral Effect, Extreme Violence, and the Transimperial Notions of British, German, and Dutch Colonial Warfare, ca. 1890–1914," *Itinerario* 46 (2022): 84–108. For the link between violence and labor control, see Martin Thomas, *Violence and Colonial Order* (Cambridge, 2015).
129. A exemplarily complex case is Argentine. Here, the conquest of native labor was compatible with elimination: state actors hoped racializing natives would "make them 'disappear' as a political obstacle to settler territorial sovereignty:" Carey and Silverstein, "Thinking," 11, discussing Tamar Blickstein, "The Native Stranger: Argentine Discourses of Race and Nation in a Vanishing Settler Frontier" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2018), 39.
130. For settler colonialism, see Wolfe, 'Elimination', 387. For a direct comparison, see Daniel Karch, *Entgrenzte Gewalt in der kolonialen Peripherie. Die Kolonialkriege in "Deutsch-Südwestafrika" und die "Sioux Wars" in den nordamerikanischen Plains* (Stuttgart, 2019).
131. Jürgen Zimmerer and Joachim Zeller, ed., *Völkermord in Deutsch-Südwestafrika* (Berlin, 2003); Matthias Häussler, *Der Genozid an den Herero* (Weilerswist, 2018). Some Germans framed that war as a parallel to native Americans' so-called 'disappearance': Jens-Uwe Guettel, *German Expansionism, Imperial Liberalism, and the United States, 1776–1945* (Cambridge, 2013), 33, 117. For German settlers' role in triggering the war, see Jan-Bart Gewald, *Herero Heroes* (Athens, 1998).
132. William Gallois, 'Genocide in Nineteenth-Century Algeria', *Journal of Genocide Research* 15, no. 1 (2013): 75, 81–84, regarding intentionalist versus more recent structuralist views of genocide.
133. Guy Vanthemsche, *Belgium and the Congo, 1885–1980* (New York, 2012), 24. See also Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires, 1898–1930* (Paris, 1972 [2001]).
134. Marx, 'Settler Colonies', paragraph 31.
135. The clearest case was Portugal, which signed the 1930 International Labor Organization's Forced Labor Convention only in 1956. But other states 'simply' repackaged forced labor: Opolot Okia, *Labor in Colonial Kenya after the Forced Labor Convention, 1930–1963* (New York, 2019).
136. A historiographic discussion is Stephen Howe, 'British Worlds, Settler Worlds, World Systems, and Killing Fields', *JICH* 40, no. 4 (2012): 691–725.
137. Belich, *Earth*, including the United States as a second metropolitan pole.
138. John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge, 2009); Woolacott, *Society*, 154.

139. Hopkins, "Rethinking Decolonization."
140. Edmonds and Carey, 'Australian Settler Colonialism,' 371. Also: Strakosch and Macoun, 'End-point,' Jessica Urwin and Ben Silverstein, "Conversation," *ANU Historical Journal* II:2 (2020): 236.
141. Introductions are Richard Sutch, 'Introduction', in *Settler Economies in World History*, ed. Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzer, and Sutch (Leiden, 2013), xvii–xxiii; Lloyd and Metzer, 'Settler Colonization and Societies in World History', in *ibid.*, 1–34, on British settler colonies' embeddedness in capitalist structures. Belich, *Earth*, argues settler economies followed general capitalist rhythm of booms and busts. For a discussion of the relative weight of British settler versus metropolitan capitalists, see Jim McAloon, 'Gentlemanly capitalism and settler capitalists', *Australian Economic History Review* 42, no. 2 (2002): 204–23, and Anthony Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly capitalism in New Zealand', *Australian Economic History Review* 43, no. 3 (2003): 287–97.
142. Denoon, *Settler Capitalism*.
143. Mark Choate, *Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Catherine Dewhirst, 'Colonising Italians: Italian Imperialism and Agricultural 'Colonies' in Australia, 1881–1914', *JICH* 44, no. 1 (2016): 23–47; Azuma, *Frontier*; Hokari, 'Reconciliation.' For other cases, see e.g. Nelson, 'German'; Chopin, 'Pages'; Alexis Bergantz, 'Remembering Australasie: European Settlers and Trans-imperial Thinking in the Cosmopolitan *Le Courier Australien* (1892–1896)', in *Voices of Challenge in Australia's Migrant and Minority Press*, ed. Catherine Dewhirst and Richard Scully (London, 2021), 43–61. See also, most recently, Felicity Jensz and Rebecca Swartz, 'Children and Institutions in Settler Colonial Contexts: A Trans-Imperial Perspective', *SCS* 13 (2023): 463–83.
144. E.g. Alison Bashford, 'Immigration Restriction: Rethinking Period and Place From Settler Colonies to Postcolonial Nations', *Journal of Global History* 9 (2014): 26–48.
145. This distinctiveness includes the often acute present-day anxieties of 'successful' settler-states about how to relate to 'their' Indigenous populations, two very different cases being Australia and Israel. Veracini (and on Australia, Bain Attwood, e.g. *Telling the Truth about Aboriginal History* [London, 2005]) are particularly insightful on those continued anxieties; I thank *Settler Colonial Studies'* reviewer 1 of this article for this point. For Israel, see also e.g. Amal Jamal, *Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel. The Politics of Indigeneity* (New York, 2011).

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