000318991 001__ 318991
000318991 005__ 20250213115745.0
000318991 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1093/cmlj/kmae011
000318991 037__ $$aARTICLE
000318991 245__ $$aObscure contract terms$$ban inadvertent pricing experiment
000318991 269__ $$a2024
000318991 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000318991 520__ $$aContract terms that improve or reduce the likelihood of repayment of a debt should impact its price. That is basic economics. But what about a contract that is hundreds of pages long and has lengthy and complex terms that even the lawyers are unwilling to read? Believers in efficient markets might predict that variations that affect the likelihood of repayment in such obscure contract terms will be priced at the outset if there are profits to be made by exploiting these variations. An alternate view is that little attention is paid to the fine print in highly standardized contracts until the likelihood of default becomes sufficiently salient to make reading the fine print worthwhile. Using several inadvertent real-world experiments, we examine the question of how and when variations that are assumed to be standardized in obscure contract terms are priced.
000318991 580__ $$aIn: Capital Markets Law Journal. - Volume 19(2024), Issue 3, pages 230–241
000318991 6531_ $$aFinance and Investment$$0319126
000318991 700__ $$aChoi, Stephen J.
000318991 700__ $$aGulati, Mitu
000318991 700__ $$aPanizza, Ugo
000318991 700__ $$aScott, Robert E.
000318991 700__ $$aWeidemaier, W. Mark C.
000318991 8564_ $$96835e75e-006c-4a9e-b416-97d0d6629332$$s731062$$uhttps://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/318991/files/kmae011.pdf
000318991 901__ $$uInternational Economics Department$$0319285
000318991 909CO $$ooai:repository.graduateinstitute.ch:318991$$pGLOBAL_SET$$pIHEID:Explore
000318991 981__ $$aoverwrite