@article{Choi:318991,
      recid = {318991},
      author = {Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu and Panizza, Ugo and  Scott, Robert E. and Weidemaier, W. Mark C.},
      title = {Obscure contract terms an inadvertent pricing experiment},
      address = {2024},
      number = {ARTICLE},
      abstract = {Contract terms that improve or reduce the likelihood of  repayment of a debt should impact its price. That is basic  economics. But what about a contract that is hundreds of  pages long and has lengthy and complex terms that even the  lawyers are unwilling to read? Believers in efficient  markets might predict that variations that affect the  likelihood of repayment in such obscure contract terms will  be priced at the outset if there are profits to be made by  exploiting these variations. An alternate view is that  little attention is paid to the fine print in highly  standardized contracts until the likelihood of default  becomes sufficiently salient to make reading the fine print  worthwhile. Using several inadvertent real-world  experiments, we examine the question of how and when  variations that are assumed to be standardized in obscure  contract terms are priced.},
      url = {http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/318991},
      doi = {https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmae011},
}