The doctrine of superior responsibility is occasionally presented as a potential solution to the ‘responsibility gap’ allegedly created when the employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) results in violations of international humanitarian law, which would amount to war crimes. This article analyses several challenges to the applicability of the doctrine of superior responsibility in these circumstances. In fact, superior responsibility is premised on the existence of a superior–subordinate rela- tionship between individuals. The type of control required for this relationship to exist is different from the kind of control exercised over weapons, including AWS. Additionally, the doctrine requires the commission of an underlying crime in all its elements by a punishable subordinate. Nonetheless, superior responsibility remains a useful framework to demarcate the scope of the supervisory duties of the superior in relation to the prevention of war crimes. Understanding the limita- tions of this doctrine will be important in guiding the discussions concerning the level of human control that should be retained over AWS.