The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is based on consent. However, at the same time, the ICJ has affirmed that it possesses an inherent jurisdiction, a set of powers not expressly conferred to it by its constitutive or regulatory documents but, nevertheless, available due to its intrinsic nature. Born in the context of domestic adjudication, the concept of inherent jurisdiction can raise suspicion when applied at the international level. Its contours and definition being unclear, inherent jurisdiction can be easily employed to circumnavigate State consent, giving too much flexibility to the ICJ. Departing from these premises, this contribution analyses how the ICJ has framed and used the concept of inherent jurisdiction in its case law. Does the ICJ use the concept of inherent jurisdiction to trespass on States’ consent? Or, looking closer, is the ICJ, by emphasizing the limits of inherent jurisdiction, using it to protect States’ consent?