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Displacement and resistance induced by the Merowe Dam: the influence of international norms and justice

Azza Dirar, Asim el Moghraby,
Mohammad Jalal Hashim,
Mark Zeitoun

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Executive Summary

Over 60,000 people were displaced from their homes during the construction of the Merowe hydro-electric dam and its reservoir from 2006 – 2009. The plight of the Manasir, Hamdab, and Amri people generated resistance at the riverside and well beyond, leading to solidarity protests by students in Khartoum, declarations of support from the UN, international media campaigns, and lawsuits against the Government of Sudan and German companies in African and European courts. Much of the resistance appears borne from a sense of injustice. Many of the displaced voluntarily initially accepted the Government of Sudan's compensation and resettlement plan, and a large fraction remains satisfied with it. A larger proportion has grown dissatisfied with their new situation, however, and tends now to side with the smaller fraction of people who refused the government's plans from the outset of the project.


The Merowe case is one of three which compose the *Rethinking Environment and Development in the Era of Global Norms* (REDEGN) research programme, supported by DfID and the UK Economic and Social Research Council. This report investigates the extent to which the struggles against displacement have drawn upon, or been assisted by, external actors and international environmental norms. The primarily analytical framework is one of 'justice', both social and environmental, though theory from trans-national mobilisation and development-induced-displacement is also employed. Data was collected throughout 2013 and 2014 by an international research team through a comprehensive review of literature, two hundred questionnaires undertaken in four villages, and seventeen individual and group interviews. The analysis generates numerous findings relevant both to the Merowe struggle and to theory on justice, international norms, and transnational activism.

The study has revealed, for instance, the influence of social tensions between the local people that promoted the government's compensation and resettlement plan (referred to as 'Karazayat'), and those who rejected it. Dissatisfaction with the compensation package is found to be generally very high amongst those queried, and this seems to stem from a number of events, such as the unannounced and rapid filling of the reservoir in 2009, unfulfilled or betrayed promises by local and national government, feelings of misrepresentation in the national media, and – especially – the Dam Implementation Unit's violent response to peaceful demonstrations. Residents of a particular relocated village responded generally very much more satisfied than the others, possibly reflecting the relatively advantaged location of the new village (being much closer to the river, to roads and to markets than the others), and/or a potential response bias driven by the social cleavages.

A number of lessons can also be drawn about the limits of resistance and influence of international norms, as indicated in the cursory application of the programme's analytical framework shown below. International NGOs, for instance, relied upon norms stemming from human rights and from the World Commission on Dams 2000 report. Their primary audience were European citizens and courts, where private European companies involved in the construction of the dam are somewhat accountable. Much more connected to the local

people’s struggle are the national activists, who employ both international norms and local conceptions of justice, and who facilitate interaction between the people active at the reservoir and at the international levels. The local activists appear to have been the most influential over their own outcome, even if this remains considerably circumscribed. They have formed into committees to represent common interests, staged protests, and forced negotiations with the authorities. There is no evidence that international norms informed their struggle, though the multi-level activism does suggest formation of trans-national coalitions (which fall short of trans-national movements).

Indicative application of the REDEGN Analytical Frame to the case of the Merowe dam.



The study’s design and analysis also yields contributions to theory, much of which stems from the particularities of the oppressive and authoritarian nature of the Government of Sudan, and of the country’s position in the world. The tri-partite approach of environmental justice (representation, process, distribution), for instance, has served to interpret a number of the features of local dissatisfaction (e.g. lack of transparency in the construction process, dissatisfaction with monetary compensation for date palms). The environmental justice approach was wholly incapable of interpreting, however, neither the sentiments and actions driven by the violence and humiliation imposed by the authorities, nor the betrayal by both the authorities and neighbours. Broader social justice theory, on the other hand, is found to be a much more useful analytical tool to interpret social mobilisations around environmental issues in this case.

Other features of the local context which serve to interpret the findings include the sanctions imposed upon the Government of Sudan by most of the international community, and the sustained access to companies and funders not obliged to follow international standards. Local actions are thus best understood within the context of global economic forces and

processes, though this remains an area requiring further research. Indeed, the local struggles arise due to such forces (especially trans-national capital from funders such as China and the World Bank), and are both inspired by and inspiring to similar movements elsewhere. Accountability is also found to mediate the influence of international norms, particularly 'upwards' from the local to the international, suggesting that this feature may be the most fertile future research area.

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1 Introduction

The water rose quickly when the Merowe floodgates were closed, in August 2009. To varying degrees, the tribal communities of the Amri, Hamdab, and Manasir people living in dozens of villages along the banks of the Nile were caught off-guard. Those least prepared fled the rising waters with the few possessions they could gather, to make-shift shelter further inland from the river. Just over one month later, the dam's reservoir had tamed the river's famous fourth cataract, and submerged 900 villages – displacing over 60,000 people. Today, roughly 20,000 of them live in designated villages, distant both from their original homes and the life-sustaining river. Protests began immediately and continue today, in local community theatres, on university campuses in Khartoum, and in web-based campaigns of international NGOs.

This report investigates the various struggles against the displacement, and the extent to which they have drawn upon, or been assisted by, external actors and international environmental norms. The primarily analytical framework is one of 'justice', both social and environmental, though theory from development-induced-displacement is also employed. It is the authors' hope that the analysis will provide the basis upon which the on-going conflicts may be resolved, and future similar conflicts avoided.

1.1 Objective of the research and research questions

The displacement of the Amri, Hamdab, and Manasir people is one of three cases of the *Rethinking Environment and Development in the Era of Global Norms* (REDEGN) research programme, led by Thomas Sikor and supported by DFID and the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK. The original research objective of the Nepal-Uganda-Sudan research programme is to “radically change our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of environment and development by examining when and how local claims and higher-level mobilisations of environmental justice lead to improvements in marginalized people's access to natural resources and poverty alleviation”. The programme's original impact objective is to “generate insights on the reach and poverty impacts of global environmental norms”.

The objective of the Merowe research project is to generate contributions along these lines from the Sudanese context. Its eight specific research questions correspond to the six of the broader programme, and along with corresponding hypotheses are presented following.

RQ1. How do the Amri, Hamdab, and Manasir people see and apply 'justice' (in relation to changes due to construction of the Merowe dam)? H1. Notions of justice centre around compensation, and honouring of commitment. Use of justice is informed by cultural factors such as religion, and attachment to the land and river ('justice' as call to action).

RQ2. How are the conceptions of justice in RQ 1 interpreted in relation to control over/ use of the river for farming livelihoods, for other livelihoods, and for cultural purposes? H2. The river's importance to people's livelihoods informs views and use of 'justice' more

than other resources – in unknown ways. There is a distinction between those people resettled along the river and those who have settled away from the river.

RQ3. To what extent does 'justice' inform the on-going and past struggle related to the Merowe Dam. H3. The struggle is more against the distribution of benefits and risks of the dam, than against construction / existence of the dam. Different actors frame the struggle in different ways.

RQ4. How have national and international actors taken up the struggle? H4. University students, IRN, African Commission on HR have each taken up the struggle partly out of solidarity (stemming from justice concerns) and partly to advance their own interests. There are issues of real and claimed representation.

RQ5. How have national and international actors interpreted and made use of existing international/global environmental norms? H5. The different actors employ norms related to Human Rights, Indigenous Rights, unspecified conceptions of environmental justice, the World Commission on Dams, etc.

RQ6. How have historic use and notions of the river and features of the Merowe dam influenced the uptake of the struggle, at the international level? H6. Built on an iconic international river, the Merowe Dam struggle has attracted international actors such as IRN and EAWAG. At the end of a river linking 11 African states, the Merowe Dam struggle has attracted the African Commission on HR, but otherwise very little support outside of Sudan.

RQ7. How have global environmental norms, and the wider political economy influenced the uptake of the struggle, at the international level? H7. The national development agenda (especially for electricity) over-rides environmental and social concerns. Changes in international financing of large infrastructure projects (e.g. more from China and GCC countries) render established norms (even those taken on board by World Bank and IUCN) less relevant.

RQ8. To what extents have the national/international components of the struggle influenced its outcome? H8. The national/international components of the struggle have resulted in very minor improvements in compensation, and possibly more 'just' treatment and outcome for future Sudanese dams.

1.2 Why the research is important

The displacement and resistance induced by the construction of the Merowe Dam has relevance for the local communities, the international donor and diplomatic community, and the academic community. There are a number of findings, for the latter: further empirical evidence of the impact of and ideology behind national development projects (large water infrastructure particular, (e.g. Molle and Floch 2008, Molle, *et al.* 2009)); insight into the relationship between fiercely independent societies and an autocratic state; the limits of the

utility of an environmental justice approach; the merits of a pluralistic (and locally-driven) conception of justice; and the limited 'in-reach' of global environmental norms.

The international community will find here reason to question the limits of their significant financial and diplomatic interventions into the River Nile and its riparian states, primarily through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) – which was at its height when the Merowe Dam was completed. The NBI had intended to coordinate major infrastructure affecting the river and livelihoods of people dependent upon it, but had next to no influence over the design, construction or management of the dam. Studies carried out by the Eastern Regional Technical Office (ENTRO) of the NBI recommended that dams should not be built in the Sudan (not least of all because of the high rate of evaporation from the reservoirs in Sudan - seven fold higher than in Ethiopia), for instance, though such studies had much less effect than the people's protests.

Most importantly, the findings may serve the Amri, Hamdab, and Manasir people affected by the dam. At the very least, the research contributes to existing documentation of the displacement, and may bring further attention to it both inside and outside of Sudan. The analysis reveals a particular form of justice important to the communities, which may be of use both to sustain and sharpen on-going struggles, and informs authorities responsible for compensation (notably the Dams Implementation Unit (DIU), created by the President and invested with authority above the traditional line ministries). Furthermore, the understanding provided on the limits of the government's actions and the communities' struggles will be of use to people currently facing the same threat, notably the Nubian people living in the area of the planned Kajbar, Dal, Al Shreik, Mugrat, and Dagash dams.

1.3 Methodology

The research was led by Prof Asim el Moghraby (University of Khartoum), coordinated by Dr Mark Zeitoun (University of East Anglia), and executed by Dr Mohammad Jalal Hashim (University of Khartoum), Azza Dirar (University of East Anglia), and Zaher Moussa Akkash (the Environmentalist Society). Research assistants came from each of the four communities, and included Mohamed Al Hourri, Tariq Awad, Omar Hammad, and Walid Mohamed.

1.3.1. Data collection and research design

Most background data was collected through a comprehensive review of English and Arabic-language academic literature, policy and activist documents, and media articles. Conducted from October 2013 to January 2014, topics reviewed included: a) issues related to the Merowe Dam itself (construction, technical facts (planned and actual electricity production, management regime, etc.); b) international norms relevant to dams (e.g. from the World Commission on Dams, emerging 'good dams' guidelines, international law); c) dam activism (lessons learned in particular from Southeast Asia and Latin America); and d) justice, both theory (social, environmental), and local traditions (i.e. Islamic, Sudanese, Nubian). This forms

the basis of Section 3 of this report. Background data also relied on the team members' insight on the project from previous anthropological and archaeological research.


Empirical evidence was collected through questionnaires and interviews. The questionnaires served to establish the baseline required to evaluate impact and to crosscheck facts. Two hundred questionnaires were completed by the research assistants in January and February 2014, with roughly 50 at each of four locations: relocated Hamdab (referred to locally and henceforth in this report as 'New Hamdab'), relocated Amri ('New Amri'), relocated Manasir ('Makabrab') and the Manasir who refused resettlement to remain at the reservoir shore ('local option Manasir'). Respondents were roughly 50% men and 50% women. The questionnaire was developed and agreed by the team (including the research assistants). As shown in Annex C, the twenty questions relate to four topics: compensation; livelihoods before and after the flooding; housing and basic services; and social unrest. The research team agreed that questions about justice were best avoided through this largely impersonal method of data collection.

Interviews were then conducted primarily by Azza Dirar and to a lesser extent by Mark Zeitoun. These were semi-structured, loosely following the structure of a) recollection of events; b) thoughts on justice; and c) relevance of external actors and norms. At least 17 groups or individuals were interviewed in Khartoum or in the relocated or original villages, and consisted of school teachers, farmers, businessmen, women, activists, former water ministry officials, academics, students, and engineers

Data was also collected during a workshop held in Khartoum on 6 March 2014. The workshop brought together roughly fifty academics and people affected by the dam (known locally and henceforth in this report as 'dam-affected people' or DAP, not all of whom are activists). One representative of the Dams Implementation Unit was also present. The opinions, thoughts and knowledge of all of these were sought following a presentation by the research team of the preliminary results. Roughly fifteen people took the opportunity, including activists, and otherwise non-affected historians, biologists, archaeologists, etc.

The guiding framework used throughout the data collection and research design was that developed in the theoretical note for the REDEGN programme's inception workshop, as shown in Figure 1.1. The data collection leaned more towards 'justice' as the limited reach of global environmental norms and 'higher-level mobilizations' became more clear.

Figure 1.1. Theoretical framework developed for the REDEGN programme inception workshop, which served to guide the design of the Merowe research project.



1.3.2. Data analysis

The findings of the literature review were presented at the REDEGN inception workshop at the University of East Anglia, UK in December 2013. Input at the inception workshop from the Ugandan and Nepalese cases served to shape the design of the field research, in particular the research questions listed above. The literature review also served to draft the questionnaire. An initial analysis of the questionnaire served to guide the themes and direction of the semi-structured interviews. A more thorough analysis of the questionnaire (basic quantitative and qualitative) and initial interpretation of the results were presented and discussed at the REDEGN mid-term workshop in Lamjung, Nepal, early April 2014. Feedback received from progress on the Ugandan and Nepalese research teams helped shape the direction of the analysis presented in this report. Opportunities for cross-comparison with the other cases were identified, but no programme-level template was forced upon any of the cases. A near-final cut of the analysis was presented at the REDEGN final workshop, at UEA in June 2014. Feedback received from participants there – and in particular from Dr Michael Mason, who commented on the draft – has been incorporated here.

The research team did not adopt a singular academic disciplinary approach to the research, though the environmental and social justice angle was loosely approached through political ecology, with elements of political economy and other disciplines. The broad range of the team members' own academic disciplines (biology, archaeology, linguistics, international development, civil engineering and political ecology) infused the approach with interdisciplinarity.

1.3.3. Strengths and weaknesses of the research

The quality of the research derives from the individual strengths of the team members. Perhaps most importantly, the team benefitted from the excellent relationship established by one of the team members (and of course with the Research Assistants, who were from the communities concerned) with the Dam-affected peoples. This provided a level of trust and insight into a sensitive topic with potential safety concerns for all those involved, and without which very little quality data could have been collected. The research has also been assisted by the team members' good relationships with former ministerial authorities, and scientific and academic communities in Khartoum, which permitted access to people who have been directly involved in the displacement since before it occurred. The team's ability to identify and interpret Arabic documents was of course also crucial.

Perhaps the greatest weakness of the research is the lack of interviews conducted with governmental officials. While one former official at the ministerial level and one at the state level were interviewed, no officials from the current national government – or, crucially, from the Dams Implementation Unit – were interviewed. The team agreed that the sensitivity of the perspective (explicitly 'justice') would compromise the depth of the study, and suggested it be left for a later research phase. Some of the claims made against the government (and against the DIU in particular) have not been triangulated, as a result. Furthermore, the data was collected during a relatively short period and to a degree by 'outsiders'. While the excellent relationships the research team had with the DAP provided trust and insight in some communities, this was not universal. The presence of a young foreign-educated Sudanese woman, and visibly 'western' and non-Sudanese man undoubtedly influenced the interviewees. Bias has been tempered, however, by the presence of the more traditional researchers (local Sudanese men), and the numerous interviews collected.

It is also believed that some of the responses were affected by the seasonality. Additional nuance or different opinions may have been provided, for example, following a particularly bountiful or poor harvest, or harsh summer. There is furthermore the risk of 'confirmation bias' induced by the design of our research (notably the employment of Schlosberg's environmental justice frame).

1.4 Structure of the report

The report first reviews the background, events and impact of the Merowe Dam, followed by a review of the relevant literature and theory. The results of the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews are presented and analysed in the subsequent chapters, which is followed by two analytical chapters.

2 The Merowe Dam

The Merowe hydropower dam was built between the years of 2003-2009 by the National Congress Party of the Islamist Al-Injaz (The Salvation) government in Sudan, and implemented by the Dams Implementation Unit. Verhoeven (2012) reads the construction of the dam as an example of a technocratic development project motivated by domestic political and economic interests of state-building, and enabled by global political and economic constellations. The extent to which the dam has satisfied those interests is called into question by the actual amount of hydropower, and the effects on the lives of the people displaced by it, notably the Amri, Hamdab, and Manasir people. A further testament to this failure is the local and national-level resistance of the people affected by the dam's construction (referred to in this report and locally as 'dam-affected people', or DAPs).

This chapter seeks to situate the local and national movement against the Merowe dam within the wider political-economic history of dams and development in Sudan. The background serves to better interpret the domestic political opportunity structures within which the opposition movements are operating.

The chapter first provides an overview of the dam, and the national 'development' mind-set within which it was built. It first places the Merowe dam project within the historical hydro-political development of Sudan in general, and the political-economic strategy of Al-Injaz more specifically. This section then outlines the significant events leading up to and following the construction of the dam. It then discusses the main environmental, cultural and social impacts and the criticisms the dam has attracted, and the resistance by the local people against forced displacement.

2.1 Political economic history of dams and development in Sudan

There are intimate links between the history of hydro-infrastructure construction on the Nile and the consolidation of political and economic power by the ruling elites. The domestic Sudanese political economy has been analysed in a variety of ways (e.g. Mohieldeen 2008, Oestigaard 2009, Verhoeven 2011). With its emphasis on hydro-politics, Verhoeven's (2011) analysis of the domestic Sudanese political economy is particularly relevant. The body of work sees the history of hydraulic infrastructure construction on the Nile driven by ruling elites to secure the economic and political interests, primarily through top-down technocratic processes.

The historical political 'logic' of a deeply entrenched colonial legacy which prioritized political power premised on hydro-agricultural development (see e.g. Tvedt 2004) is discussed first. This is followed by a discussion on the current incarnation of this logic — in the Injaz government's dam programme, and the power consolidation interests it serves — as represented by the (unofficial) political economic strategy of regime set down by Abdelrahim Hamdi. Understanding this political dynamic helps to contextualize the institutional

manifestation of these ambitions in the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU), the processes and outcomes in the Merowe dam case, and state responses to resistance.

History of damming the Nile –Jebel Awlia, High Aswan, Rosaries and other dams – and the Jonglei Canal

The most significant colonial legacy that has remained in the primary political strategy of all post-independence regimes is, arguably, the hydro-agricultural foundation of power. The impetus behind the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1898 in Sudan was largely hydro-political, as Britain sought to extend its control of the Nile waters to feed its expanding textile industry at home (Waterbury, 1979). It achieved this through the centrally managed Gezira cotton schemes in Sudan from the 1920s onward and thus geared the entire economy towards primary commodity production for export (Barnett, 1977). Hydro-infrastructure development was the key component of this colonial project, as was exemplified in the construction of the Sennar dam in 1925 on the Blue Nile – whose main purpose was to irrigate the Gezira scheme - and the Jebel Awlia dam in 1937 on the White Nile 46 km upstream of Khartoum. These projects are shown alongside more recent hydropower projects in Figure 2.1, with the Merowe Dam photographed in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.1. Location of the Merowe Dam on the 4th cataract of the Nile River (at the centre of the figure, and in relation to existing ('H' on shaded background) and planned ('H' on white background) hydropower projects).



Source: Nile Basin: Sharing water resources vs. developing hydro potential, African Energy 2012.

Immediately after independence in 1956, the elites¹ that enjoyed great economic and political benefits during the years of the Condominium charge of the new nation, replacing the British but maintaining the status quo, albeit with considerable political economic and institutional decay (Harir, 1994). The economy remained dependent on hydro-agricultural development and primary commodity production for export through the continued prioritization of the Gezira scheme. In continuity with the Condominium, it also maintained its close bilateral relations with Egypt as typified by signing the revised Nile Water Treaty of 1929 in 1959 (Wallach, 1984).

¹ These elites were, namely, the “northern sedentarized riverain groups of, generally speaking, the northern provinces” (Harir, 1994, p. 36)

Figure 2.2. The Merowe Dam and its reservoir.



Source: <http://english.cwe.cn/show.aspx?id=1859&cid=22>

The revised 1959 Nile Waters Treaty was a necessity to Egypt's hydro-infrastructure ambitions. Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, envisioned the construction of the Aswan High Dam (AHD) as the solution to domestic needs of increasing food production and reducing trade dependency (Waterbury, 1983; Allan and Howell, 1994). The new agreement renewed the division of the 94 bnm^3/y [billion cubic metres per year] of the Nile's flow (measured at its entrance into Egypt), allocating 55.5 bnm^3/y to Egypt and 18.5 bnm^3/y to the Sudan, with an estimated 10 bnm^3/y lost to evaporation from the AHD's reservoir (Allan and Howell, 1994; Roskar J, 2000). Egypt benefited by expanding the 48 bnm^3/y allocated under the 1929 treaty and Sudan gained an extra 14.5 bnm^3/y up from its previous allocation of 4 bnm^3/y (Waterbury, 1983; Abu-Zeid and El-Shibini, 1997; Allan, 1994).

The Aswan High Dam (AHD), completed in 1964, created the world's largest reservoir with a storage capacity of 168 km^3 and a surface area of 500 km^2 (Allan and Howell, 1994). The reservoir extended across the Egyptian-Sudanese border, from "Lake Nasser" in Egypt (310km) to "Lake Nubia" in Sudan (190km). It enabled year round irrigation in Egypt and provided hydro-electricity.

The government of Sudan did not seem to gain much from through the revised legal framework, apart from the possibility to extend its own hydro-infrastructure base. A significant negative impact of the dam was the necessary displacement of tens of thousands of Egyptian and Sudanese Nubians.

Significantly, the displacement of the Nubian people caused by the AHD was a major traumatic event which has been engrained in the historical and cultural memory of the Nubians of North Sudan (Bell, 2009; Elhassan, 1998; Murdoch, 1989; Daffala, 1975; Fernea and Rouchdy, 1991) . The evicted Nubians were resettled near Aswan in an area known as

Koum Ambo in Egypt, and Khasm al Girba in in Mid-Eastern Sudan, far from their original lands. The experience of the resettled Nubians and the discontent it cultivated among the people of this cultural identity did not concern the ruling elites in Khartoum at the time. The scars of loss and cultural tragedy of the event has informed current resistance movements to dams proposed on their lands.

In addition to the cultural and social impacts, the environmental and ecological damages resulting from AHD are significant. (Rycroft and Szyliowicz, 1980) These are not entered into detail here, but include the transformative effect on the ecology (and thus farming practices) downstream in Egypt. The sediment caught behind the dam has resulted over the decades in significant scouring of the riverbanks, loss of biodiversity, and loss of nutrients – obliging greater application of chemical fertilisers (Eldardir, 1994).

Dam construction in Sudan was revived with the construction of the Khasm al Ghirba dam in 1964 on the Atbara River and the Roseires dam in 1966 on the Blue Nile. The Roseires dam was constructed for the purposes of hydro-electricity and agricultural extension. The Khasm al Ghirba dam, built for agricultural irrigation, was accompanied by agricultural projects established for resettled Nubians. The two agricultural schemes it was constructed to irrigate (the al Ghirba and New Halfa schemes) were threatened with complete failure just a few decades after the dam's construction due to sedimentation and has forced the resettled Nubians into a second phase of dislocation (Hashim, 2009; Hashim, 2010). The reservoir also lost one third of its storage capacity in eight years after first filling.

The inflexibility that accompanies massive and uncoordinated river development becomes apparent here. The Khasm el Girba is possibly the only dam in the world that was built to alleviate the negative impacts of another dam. Of particular relevance to this study's objectives, is the lack of resistance to this dam. No campaign similar to 'Save Nubia' (when Abu Simbil and Phila were moved to higher ground) was mounted.

All dams on upstream tributaries in Ethiopia are at risk of high sedimentation due to the river's hydrology and the topography of its basin. Today both dams are on the verge of redundancy due to accumulation of sediments and the great resulting loss in reservoir capacity. The Merowe dam is destined to the same fate of redundancy and doomed to a short lifespan (Seif al-Din Hammad, 2007).

'Dams are development': domestic political economic motivation

The magnitude of the social, cultural and environmental impacts and high rate of redundancy of such dams in Sudan may be a reflection and inevitable outcome of the uncompromising discourse supported by the Chief Technical advisor to the Minister of Water and Irrigation, Dr. Seif Al-Din Hamad Abdalla: "Why do we need dams? Because dams are development" (Verhoeven 2011: 156).

The year 1989 signalled in the rise to power of Sudan's current Islamist regime known as Harrakat al Islamiyya, with its fundamental project of economic salvation or *Al-Injaz*. The Injaz

regime, initiated by the movement's original leader Hassan al Turabi, was propelled by belief that political hegemony was consolidated through economic salvation. As before, the hydro-agricultural base would be the main mobilized resource to achieving this aim. After the downfall of Turabi, President Omar al Bashir and Ali Osman Taha would take the hydro-agricultural ambitions to a new chapter through Sudan's Dam Programme and its accompanying Agricultural Revival.

The Injaz of Bashir and Taha maintained the image of an Islamist regime although it shifted the emphasis of legitimizing their seat in power from ideological—radical Islamism, to economic—business partnership. The imperative factor to continued political control of the regime was now in its delivery of economic and developmental success. This shift, termed by Verhoeven² (2012) as the new “competence agenda” was the central motivating logic behind the new “hydro-agricultural mission” which took the form of an ambitious dam program and agro-industrial boom, and found ample opportunity to realization in oil export revenues and changing global winds.

The desire of Al-Injaz to secure its ruling seat through the so-called “competence agenda” found expression in the un-official adoption of the strategy of former Minister of Finance, Abdelrahim Hamdi, which called for strategic investment into the centre of Sudan's metropolis with conscious neglect of its peripheries (Hamdi, 2005). Presented at a conference of the ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP) conference in 2005, Hamdi argued that if the NCP were to remain in power, they were to limit development and investment activities to the area between Dongula, Sennar and Kordufan — a region known as “Hamdi's triangle”. The justification for this tactic was that this is where the significant electoral population base of Sudan resided and thus it must see delivery of economic and social services if it was to continue to grant the regime the political power it sought. Furthermore, in the run-up to the secession of the South, this region would remain a viable state should other regions follow the pursuit for independence (such as Darfur). Some would credit “Hamdi's triangle” and its investment strategy as the political economic rationale behind the current wave of dam building (e.g Verhoeven, 2012)³ and in light of the high-priority and uncompromising urgency with which dam construction is being pursued (despite many environmental and ecological contradictions voiced by experts), the accreditation certainly does have merit. Others view “Hamdi's triangle” as having a malicious dimension of demographic engineering and a grand social project for maintaining the Arab-Islamic identity of Sudan at the expense of its African groups (e.g. Hashim 2009) Given the familiarity of “cultural genocide” accusations throughout Sudan's history and the historical dominance of crudely dichotomised “Arab-Islamic” centre over “African-Christian” peripheries, (Harir and Tvedt, 1994) this too has serious merit.

² Verhoeven (2012) interviewed many high level officials including post-Turabi Harakat al Islamiah (HI) leadership, close aides to Bashir and Taha in Khartoum, Abdelrahim Hamdi and other economic strategist of Injaz.

³ see Verhoeven (2012) especially p. 175-178 “Hamdi triangle and the Islamist hegemony: the grand strategy behind the hydro-agricultural mission”

Domestic political economic state-building activities have historically relied on the exploitation of international political and economic resources. The current project of the Sudanese Dam Programme draws on key opportunities within the wider global political economy to enable its materialization.

Enabling global factors

If the pursuit of political power domestically can be considered the seed of the dam program, the alignment of global political and financial opportunities was its sun, soil and water.

The main global players nurturing the Sudanese 'development' and dam-building efforts are the Gulf Arab States, Egypt and China through financial investment, construction support, and political support. Foreign investment in Sudan is motivated by various global factors. The growing involvement of China in the foreign investment-banking sector is coupled with its increased role in the global dam-building industry, and is of particular significance in African states (McDonald, *et al.* 2008) (International Rivers, 2013). In Sudan, this is found in partnership between Sinohydro and other Chinese firms contracted with hundred million dollar deals for Merowe and future planned dams (People's Daily Online, 2010; Xinhua, 2008).

Arab Gulf Funds supporting Sudan's hydro-agricultural developments is understood in the global context of rising food prices, concerns with resource limitations, and the desire to secure overseas food production (Cotula et al., 2009; Shaheen, 2011; Allan et al., 2012). Hundreds of thousands of feddans of fertile lands in North Sudan is being leased to these Arab states under private business agreement (Sudan Tribune, 2008; England and Blas, 2008; Bundhun, 2011), often termed 'land-grabs' (Grain, 2008; Vidal, 2010; Tekle, 2009; Emirates 24/7, 2010). For example, in keeping with the UAE Ministry of Foreign Trade emphasis on investing in agricultural land in Africa, Abu Dhabi has acquired 30,000 hectares of land through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Agricultural Development⁴(ADFD) for the cultivation of alfalfa in June of 2010 (Shaheen, 2011). Furthermore, Arab states' investment is arguably influenced by Sudan's alliance with Egypt and the promise of an Arab-Islamic identity of the nation offered by the "competence agenda" and Hamdi's strategy. Arab political and economic interest is responsible for the financing of Merowe and ten other large hydro-infrastructure projects within the boundaries of Hamdi's triangle (Verhoeven, 2012).

Egypt's political support for Sudan's dam initiatives is driven by its perceived national benefits from these projects. Firstly, in light of the emergence of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999 which poses a serious threat to the downstream state's control over upstream use of the flows, Egypt recognizes the importance of Sudan as an ally in negotiations (see e.g. Cascão 2009). Secondly, population pressures within Egypt and resource limitations to food production have been driving forces behind cooperation with Sudan in the realm of migration, labour and agriculture (Ali, 2010; Sudan Tribune, 2011; Hashim, 2008). In a controversial agreement known as the "Four Freedoms Agreement", Egypt and Sudan have made

⁴ ADFD also contributed around US \$ 376 million for the construction of Merowe dam (Shaheen, 2011).

arrangements to allow the free flow of labour between the two nations. Although in reality, this has mainly meant an influx of Egyptian settlers on Sudan's prime irrigated riverside farmland (Hashim, 2009). Finally, the dams in Sudan promise to prolong the lifespan of the AHD by protecting it from further sedimentation (Dams Implementation Unit, Dam's Body and Structure, 2007; Dams Implementation Unit, About the Dam, 2007). Thus Egypt welcomed and cleared the path for the Injaz to embark on its "hydro-agricultural mission".

As seen, domestic consolidations of political and economic power and international political and financial support have been the sail and wind of the Sudanese Dam Programme, driving it into existence. The next section will focus on how this program has taken shape, and examines the institutional form it has taken through the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU).

The DIU (Dams Implementation Unit)

The official birth-date of Sudan's Dam Programme can be said to correspond with the establishment of the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) in 1999. Brought into existence under presidential mandate – specifically for the construction of the Merowe Dam – the DIU is unlike any other state institution in Sudan. This section first discusses the nature of the DIU and its approach to dam building and then outlines the planned and constructed dams that make up its programme, with special emphasis on Merowe dam.

The nature of the DIU as a governmental institution is unique, and the power that it yields is exceptional. Although it was founded in 1999 to implement the plans for the Merowe dam, after the authority of building this dam was removed from the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources (MIWR), it was promoted into a fully fledged presidential department in 2007 with presidential decree No. 217.⁵ Under the leadership of Osama Abdallah Mohamed El Hassan, who was appointed as state minister and executive director of the Merowe Dam Implementation Unit (MDIU), the institutions power was further manifested through Article 13 of the presidential decree entitled "exceptions". The article exempts the DIU from civil service laws that other institutions are obligated to follow, including service retirement law, national social insurance fund law, civil servants accountability law, and fiscal and accounting law. This special legal status exempts the DIU from public accountability and immunizes it from litigation auditing (Hashim, 2009: 32). Osama Abdallah's special presidential ordainment guarantees his absolute power within the organization, making him only accountable to the presidency, and granting him the legal and political space to pursue other activities not strictly within the conventional authority of dam construction.

DIU jurisdiction extends beyond the purview of dam construction and irrigation into construction works (roads, hospitals, bridges and airports), agricultural development works, electricity provision, preparations and executions of funding activities, and control over its own multi-billion dollar budgets. These expansive activities are represented in the

⁵ For list of DIU establishment's formal founding decrees see DIU website: www.diu.gov.sd/en/founding_decisions.htm

“accompanying project”⁶ which accompany dams and include such developmental and construction projects (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, 2007). In another presidential decree (No. 206, 2007),⁷ land from the River Nile State and the Northern State in North Sudan was expropriated from the respective state authorities and handed over to the authority of the DIU which was eventually leased to Arab investors for irrigated agriculture (Hashim, 2009). It is also a leading actor in Sudan’s agro-industrial sector, playing an important role in the “Agricultural Revival” (Verhoeven, 2012; Supreme Council for Agricultural Revival, 2008).⁸

Furthermore, the operational activities of the DIU do not follow standard parliamentary or administrative procedures, and its activities are not even up for discussion within the parliament. This is a matter that has sparked much resentment and discontent within other overlapping ministries responsible for tasks related to water, agriculture, electricity and public works (Hashim, 2009; Verhoeven, 2012).⁹ All this serves to warrant the description of the institution as “above the laws of the state”, (Hashim, 2009: 32) a statement further confirmed by the existence of a separate DIU security service. While the special status of the DIU certainly reflects the political urgency of dam construction in Sudan and its intertwinement with the political economic development ambitions of the “competence agenda” and Hamdi’s strategy, it also compromises the technicality and professionalism of dam-building with serious environmental and social ramifications (Verhoeven, 2012).

The influence of DIU authoritarianism on the process of dam construction is a debilitating lack of consultation, neglect of proper feasibility and impact studies procedures, and a high degree of secrecy and poor transparency—all of which translate into certain environmental, cultural and social harms¹⁰. This is exacerbated by the institution’s exclusive employment of technocratic engineers and neglect of ecologist and anthropologist expert input and opinions (Verhoeven, 2012). These constraints have been made clear in the experience with the Merowe dam on the 4th cataract, which was completed in 2009. Furthermore, repeated procedural inadequacy and high collateral damages are expected to result in other dam projects of the DIU.

Whilst the DIU announced plans to construct more than 10 dams in Sudan with at least 7 in Northern Sudan, the details of such projects are withheld from the public and only piecemeal facts have been made available through a few DIU and other publications. The maps showing

⁶ DIU (2007) see “Accompanying projects” in index <http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/index.php>

⁷ This is the Land Acquisition Act, no. 206 issued in 2005, under which land of the State of the River Nile and of North State expropriated and allocated to the authority of the DIU (cited in Hashim 2009: 8)


⁸ The Supreme Council for Agricultural Revival’s 2008 publication titled “The Executive Programme for the Agricultural Revival” renewed emphasis on large-scale capital-intensive agriculture by the Nile. The proposed strategy integrates foreign investors with domestic agro-industrial sector (of which DIU is an active participant.) (see Verhoeven 2012: 169-174)

⁹ For greater analysis of the nature of the DIU and its position within Sudan’s state institutions see Verhoeven (2012) especially pp. 183-187.

¹⁰ See Verhoeven (2012) for greater analysis of the environmental and ecological impacts of DIU projects (pp. 188-199) and for cultural and social impacts (pp.281-297).

the boundaries of the affected areas have also been kept secret, and great uncertainty shrouds the projected dangers to social and environmental well-being. Table 2.1 summarizes the available information of known future dam plans gathered from such publications, and Figure 2.3 summarises its deviation from the original Century Storage plans.

Figure 2.3. The 'Century Storage' Project (Hurst 1952), and DIU Dam-building plans (National Electrical Corporation, 2003)




The DIU plans for dam construction in Sudan published in 2006 reflected the plans of earlier studies (see Figure 2.3). Of the dams planned within the DIU’s mission, the 5 located North of Khartoum (apart from the Merowe) include 3 dams on the 5th cataract—Mugrat dam, Dagash dam and Al Shirek dam, Kajbar dam on the 3rd cataract and Dal on the 2nd cataract (Dams Implementation Unit, The Project of Kajbar Dam: an Informative Summary. The Project of Re-Building Civilization Through Resettlement, 2008; Dams Implementation Unit, Prefeasibility and Feasibility Studies of Dal Hydroproject, 2007; Dams Implementation Unit, Study of the Area of Mugrat Dam, 2007; Dams Implementation Unit, Study of the Area of Dagash Dam, 2007; Dams Implementation Unit, Study of the affected Area of Sabalouga Dam, 2007; Haidar, 2007).¹¹ These dams are consistent with the environmental shortcomings experienced at Merowe, as an estimated 1.7Bcm will be lost through evaporation at Kajbar whilst 800MCM are estimated for Dal, and the same fate of low feasibility due to high sedimentation promises to threaten their life spans (Seif al-Din Hammad, 2007). The high levels of water loss promised by dams constructed in flat, dry regions worries many national experts who warn that Sudan

¹¹All cited in Hashim 2009

may be left with no additional water for agricultural extension if these plans materialize (Hashim, 2009).

Figure 2.4. Dams plan of the Dams Implementation Unit.



*Source: DIU 2006 website—no longer online, taken from Mohieldeen (2008).

Table 2.1. Dam Projects in Sudan.

Dam	Funds/Financial Cost	Status of Project	Electric power generation potential
Merowe-4 th cataract	\$3.5--\$5billion	Completed in 2009	1,250MW—2,000MW
Kajbar cataract 3 rd	>\$700 million	Expected by 2016	300-360MW
Dal 2 nd cataract	>\$700 million	Studies on-going	340MW-600MW
Mugrat, cataract 5 th	No information	No information	No information
Dagash, cataract 5 th	No information	No information	No information
AlShirek cataract 5 th	>\$700 million	Contracts signed	315MW-420MW

<i>Roseires Dam Heightening</i>	\$316 million- \$1 billion	Expected by 2013-2014	200-275MW (and increased capacity at Merowe)
<i>Upper Atbara project- Burdana Dam and Rumela Dam</i>	>\$830 million	Expected by 2015	15MW (Burdana) & 120MW (Rumela)

Source: compiled by authors from mixed sources e.g. DIU website (2007), Hashim, M.J (2009) and Verhoeven (2012).¹²

Resistance to the Kajbar Dam

The 5th cataract dams threaten to submerge the lands of the Rubatab tribes, whilst Kabjar and Dal threaten different groups of Nubians. The exact impact however is unknown and it is rumoured and suspected that Kajbar dam will create a reservoir of 105km while Dal will submerge an area of 65km² (Hashim, 2009). The concern is that the DIU will employ a policy of forced eviction and resettlement, as in the case of the Merowe.

The Kajbar dam was initially conceived in 1995, but construction plans were abandoned due to lack of funds. In 2005 plans were re-instated and the government announced its intentions in a DIU publication (Dams Implementation Unit, The Project of Kajbar Dam: an Informative Summary, 2008). All initial studies conducted in 1995 have become property of the DIU and are inaccessible to the public. The potential impacts of the dam, both environmental and social, has not been made clear, though it is expected that the reservoir will submerge over 500 archaeological sites, and the homeland of tens of thousands of Nubians in the Kajbar region. This has been sufficient ground for the people of the region to voice their outright rejection of the dam (Gamal, 2008; Schmedinger, 2009; Committee of Anti Dal-Kajbar Dams, 2011).

Peaceful resistance at Kajbar to the proposed dams quickly turned into deadly clashes with the DIU armed forces. The people of Kajbar organized to express their opposition to a dam that promised to destroy their cultural and social lives in two large peaceful demonstrations between April and June of 2007. Both incidents ended in open fire by the DIU security forces, resulting in five injured on the first and four dead with over 15 injured on the second (Morrison, 2007). The violence of the DIU and its security apparatus in crushing resistance was characteristic in its dealings with resistance at Merowe.

Catastrophic events at Merowe and the experience of the affected people with displacement, compensation and resettlement has been an important motivating factor behind the resistance in Kajbar, Dal and other areas. It has also brought these victimized populations together in solidarity through a Unity of Dam Affected People's Committee. The next section

¹² Financial cost estimates from interviews with Abdelrahim Hamdi, high ranking civil servants and Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation officials who attest that actual funding figures were higher than publically admitted (Verhoeven 2012: 170)

provides a detailed account of the Merowe dam case, the events which transpired concerning the affected peoples and the impacts of the project.

2.2 Background to the Merowe Dam: events and impact

The adverse impacts of the DIU's dam project are highlighted by the case of the Merowe dam. After addressing the social impacts of displacement and resettlement, the discussion shifts from shortcomings in procedures of compensation and resettlement policy, to the resistance of affected people and the responses of the state. As will be shown, the Merowe experience and resistance movement is conditioned by the wider political rationale that pursues "development" at considerable cost for those most directly impacted. This is followed by a discussion of impacts and review of criticisms to the project. The final section focuses on the main events with regards to the affected people's displacement, compensation, resettlement and resistance.

2.2.1. Life before the Merowe Dam

The area inundated by the Merowe dam was home to over 60,000 Manasir inhabitants and 10-15,000 inhabitants from Amri and Hamdab communities. These Arab riverian tribes of Northern Sudan have long established cultural ties to the region around the river's fourth cataract as "the traditional ways of cultivation, cultural life and many traditions...are inseparably connected to the riverian landscape..." (Haberlah, 2011) This section focuses primarily on the Manasir tribes, as they have been extensively researched and documented by archaeologists and cultural anthropologists.

Life on the fourth cataract has traditionally been dominated by small-scale agriculture on the alluvial soils, which border the banks of the Nile. The most important crop to the Manasir, both economically and culturally, is date palm – see Figure 2.5. Typically, cultivation is arranged in a narrow band of palm trees lining the shore of the Nile (*ashu*), and lying between seasonally inundated land of the riverbank (*gerif*) and the traditional waterwheel irrigation land (*saqiah*). The strip of palm trees, or *ashu*, is typically 20 meters wide and its close proximity to the Nile enables the deep roots to access the water table throughout the year (Salih, 1999; Haberlah, 2005).

A number of varieties and uses make date cultivation a lucrative and significant activity in the region. A mature date tree may produce up to 2-3 sacks of 75 kg each. As families often own on average 26 date palms per household, this amounts to approximately 900kgs of produce annually (Salih, 1999; Haberlah, 2005).

Date trees are also deeply connected with cultural pride and belonging, and is a symbolic object of cultural reverence. (Näser and Lange, 2007; Leach, 1919; Haberlah, 2005; Haberlah, 2012). This is reflected in many traditions and sayings; one such tradition that has been

recorded by Salih (1999) and Haberlah (2005, 2012) is the traditional invocations voiced at the time of planting a new date tree sapling¹³.

The monetary valuation of date trees is traditionally inconceivable, and various “economic, cultural and social factors result in a practical inconceivability of selling palm trees as real assets among the Manasir” (Haberlah, 2005: 3). This is supported by the work of Leach (1919) almost a century ago—which according to Haberlah is “still very much true of today” (Haberlah, 2005: 4)—that similarly records that no matter how economically pressed for cash a family may be, the sale of trees is the last solution, to be avoided by all means possible. Mansuri 'Abdallah Ahmad al-Hassan Abu Qurun was quoted by Haberlah (2005: 5) explaining “...why you cannot put a price on a palm tree; you would not be able to sell it. Date trees do not have a price! Your palm trees and your offspring are regarded as one!”. This cultural significance of palm trees is particularly relevant to the case of the Merowe dam and the dam authority’s process of valuation and compensation for date palms lost by construction of the dam.

Prior to the construction of the Merowe dam, the implication of the dam on the life of the Manasir and the issue of displacement and resettlement has been discussed within the communities, with much controversy and differing views. The poet Abu Hureiba, has recited his disapproval “Oh our Lord, please stop the dam! Holy Men read the Fatihah aloud, Saying: Allah, please prevent the dam! ...Always reciting for the troubled souls, There is blessing here from such a long time” (Haberlah, 2005: 14).

The same source points to dissent with the sentiment, by a young person has been recorded to welcome the dam, reciting, “Oh our Lord please bring us the dam! We will mount the camels and move to prosperity, ... We will be living in Omdurman, Feeding on the liver of young sheep.”

Despite inter-community discussions and debate over Merowe, the people largely were unaware and uncertain as to the details of the extent of the damages and relocation arrangements. Many held hopes that they would not be badly affected and assumed that they would remain in the region by moving to higher grounds. As will be shown throughout the course of this report, the optimism of some was ill conceived and warnings of others, validated.

A glimpse of life before and after construction of the Merowe Dam. Figure 2.5 Date palm farming alongside the Nile in Bahiyab, immediately *downstream* of the Merowe Dam. Figure 2.6 failed date palm farming in

¹³ “... a traditional invocation; the Bismallah is followed by the sentence “The intention is white and the soil is black. The fruits of this tree are freely offered to the beggar, freely offered to the thief”. That is to say that the tree should provide alms in the name of Allah to whoever is in need of it, and therefore should be under His protection.” (Haberlah, 2005: 5). “Salih recorded a similar saying in Birti: ‘It has been planted for hungry people, passing by guests, wayfarers, thieves, good will seekers, enemies and friend’ ” (Salih 1999 quoted in Haberlah, 2005:5)

resettlement village New Amri [village no. 2](#). Figure 2.7 New irrigation from Merowe Reservoir, in ‘Local Option’ village [Birti](#). Source: Azza Dirar and Mark Zeitoun, January and February 2014.



2.2.2. Purpose and construction

The Merowe dam was the initial project of the DIU, and its conception within the NCP’s development policy corresponds with the birth of the institution, which was set up to implement it. The main purposes for Merowe are hydropower generation, with an operating capacity of 600 MW (total designed capacity 1,200MW), and irrigation – concurrent with plans for developing centralized agricultural schemes of 300,000 ha. As shown in Annex A, the DIU lists ten objectives in total, including also fish industry development; flood protection,

river transport and other vaguely related developmental objectives such as tourism attraction and others¹⁴ (see Annex A) (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007) About the Dam, 2007; Dams Implementation Unit, Dam's Body and Structure, 2007).

The electrical power generated by the dam is considered and lauded as the greatest imperative by technocratic advocates, as the country's shortages are seen as a great obstacle to development. Current electricity demand across the country greatly outstrips supply (National Electric Corporation, 2006; Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, About Sudan, 2007).¹⁵ Hydro-electricity provided 50% of electricity in the national grid in the late 1990s and is expanding through new dams and refurbishments of old dam projects (Ahmed, 2000). Expanded energy production may not lead to equal distribution as currently 70% of the available electricity is consumed by the capital while rural areas are undersupplied (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005).

The promised benefits of the dam are believed to extend beyond electricity provision and agricultural development, and its high esteem amongst the presidency and governmental ministries is a matter that is represented well in the Sudanese media. In the words of President Omar Bashir, "Merowe Dam is considered the project of poverty elimination in Sudan"¹⁶ (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Testimonials, 2007).

The dam is one aspect of the DIU development plans for Merowe and is in conjuncture with a number of accompanying projects to the region. This includes residential towns, roads and bridges, railways, an airport and a hospital (see Table 2.2). However, the Anglo-Egyptian authorities initially conceived the Merowe dam in 1946 for the sole purposes of irrigation, with a storage capacity of 10MCM ¹⁷ (Huntings et al., 1979 cited in Mohieldeen, 2007: 253). Documentation of the original site for their high dam includes Egyptian land and socio-economic survey and mapping, and more recently at least four other separate studies (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Previous Studies, 2007). The main studies listed on the DIU website include: a 1983-86 SWECO Swiss consultant pre-feasibility study and Ariel survey, a five volume report of a multi-stage feasibility study of the multi-purposes of the dam by Canadian Monenco-Agra Company study in 1993, field exploration studies on proposed location of the dam, comprehensive engineering investigations looking at geography, geology and topography of the Nile by Hydro-Project institute of Russia in 2001, and the final Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by German company Lahmeyer International in 2002.

¹⁴ The official document also cites the dam's provision of a "sediment trap, reducing sedimentation at the Aswan High Dam further down in Egypt" as serving a further purpose.

¹⁵ Electricity generating potential in Sudan as of 2003 was about 3,354 gega-watts, (of which 1,163.2 coming from hydropower stations, 1,167.8 steam power generation, 209.7 diesel power generation, 328.2 coming from gas turbine power stations, and 485.1 GW from combined power stations) 760 megawatts of thermal and 320 megawatts of hydropower. See National Electricity Corporation website at <http://www.necsudan.com/> and MDIU website <http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/about-sudan.html>

¹⁶ See DIU website testimonials <http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/testimonials.html> for what Sudanese authorities have said about the project

¹⁷ Huntings, et al (1979 in Mohieldeen (2007) The plans for the dam were revived by many post-independent rulers since Nimeri in 1979 but lack of funding and political support inhibited its construction.

After previous studies concluded the low feasibility of the dam (for example SWECO finding that the feasibility of realizing the agricultural purpose for Merowe were poor) and its significant environmental, ecological and social shortcomings, Lahmeyer International provided the project with the technical and generally positive EIA it required to signal in the project's fundraising and construction stages. The positive assessment is suspected to arise from Lahmeyer's secondary role as the primary consultant for the project — posing a clear conflict of interest – and the company has been implicated in fraud and corruption charges as will be discussed in further detail in Section 3. After many years of obstacles to Merowe in the form of discouraging studies and difficulty of finding willing financiers, in 2002 the project finally had the green light of an EIA and funding opportunities provided in the form of domestic oil-export revenue, and Gulf Arab States and Chinese interest.

Table 2.2. Summary of Merowe Dam Accompanying Projects

Accompanying Project	Details
Residential Town	Built to accommodate the resident Engineers, consultant and contractors-cost of 2.5 billion Sudanese Dinars (roughly USD2.5M)
Roads and Bridges	Infrastructure development to ease transport of equipment and materials— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Merowe Dam Road</i>, (Distance: 42 km Contractor: Higlieeg Company Consultant: The Consult House Cost: 1.4 billion Sudanese Dinnars) • <i>Karema- Dam road</i>. (Distance: 27 km) Consultant: The Consult House Cost: 724 million Dinnar.
Railway	Railway that links Kasinger to the Dam's site. Cost of 850 million SD, built to transport equipment from Port Sudan to Dams site with a capacity of 6 million tons per year.
Merowe Airport	Located in the Northern State, east of the town of Merowe, about 2 km away from the old airport. It faces the <i>Shirian El Shimal</i> highway which links Merowe town with Dam's site. The initial studies for the airport started in 1993. . The runway is about 4 km long and 60 m wide. The total area of the airport is 18 square km, with a length of 6 km, and a width of 3 km. The project costs \$61 million, and is wholly funded by the Government of Sudan.
Merowe Hospital	Located in the Northern State with an area of 100,000 square metres. The Hospital includes the general building which is composed of three floors, the Centre for Tumor Studies and Treatment (three floors), the Children Hospital (five floors), the Sisters building (two floors), the building of patients' escort parents, the Mosque, Cafeteria, medical equipment store, the morgue, the sewage system station, the security unit building. Cost of the Project: 82 billion SD.

Source: (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007)

2.2.3. Funding

External Arab funding for Merowe came from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), the national development funds of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait,

and bilateral funding from Oman and Qatar. Total funding from these sources as it is presented on the Merowe DIU website amounts to approximately \$1.2 billion USD. Chinese funding, which covered 85% of the cost for the construction of the transmission lines and substations of the dam, totalled at \$608 million USD (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Funding, 2007). Funding from the Sudanese government was close to \$1.1 billion USD, bringing the total financial investment into Merowe around \$3 billion USD. There are however indications based on a study (Verhoeven 2012) that interviewed high-level officials within the DIU and the Ministry of Finance that official funding figures and information on the cost of Merowe are underestimations and in reality the figure is closer to \$5 billion USD. Table 2.3 presents the breakdown of contributions made by each investor, as provided by the MDIU website.

Table 2.3. Investors of the Merowe Dam.

Investor	Fund (Million \$US)
Government of Sudan	1,114
Government of China	608
Arab Fund for Economical and Social Development.	477
Saudi Fund for Development	215
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development	210
Kuwaiti Fund for Economical Development	200
Sultanate of Oman	106
State of Qatar	15
Total	2,945

Source: (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007)

2.2.4. Construction

Construction began in 2003 after contracts were signed with various international companies for different sections of the dam's construction. As previously mentioned, Lahmeyer International (German) was the main company offering consultancy services throughout the dam's design and implementation phases. The Chinese multinational dam building company, Sinohydro, provided technical input in the form of a large number of highly skilled engineers for the implementation of Merowe dam (Nour, 2010: 17). Other international companies involved in Merowe were CMMD (Chinese consortium), Harben Power Engineering (China), Alstom (French) and ABB (German-Austrian).

The contract to build the dam was awarded to a major Chinese consortium CCMD, which composed of two giant companies China International Water and Electric Corporation CWE and, China National Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering Corporation CWHEC (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Funding, 2007).¹⁸ The consortium was also tasked with the construction of the accompanying dam structures and related services

¹⁸ The contract amounted at 52.73 Million Euros and completed in may 2004. 85% of funding for this was from China and 15% from Sudan (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007).

(Dams Implementation Unit, Dam's Body and Structure, 2007).¹⁹ The dam's power station lies downstream of the power intake dam and French company (Alstom) was awarded a \$300million USD contract to manufacture and install its 10 turbine units, each with a capacity of 125MW each. There are a total of five transmission lines guiding electricity generated at Merowe into the national grid, two parallel directed towards Khartoum, and the rest going to Atbara, Port Sudan, and Dongula. These lines cover a total distance of approximately 1,745 km and are accompanied by a total of seven substations in all the respective destinations combined. German-Austrian consortium (ABB) was awarded the contract for the design and installation of the transmission system and Chinese company Harben Power Engineering was contracted to build all the transmission lines and substations. It should be stressed here that no EIA studies were commissioned on the issue of the transmission line, a matter that should be kept in mind when considering the many criticisms to the dam EIA process and implementation discussed in section 2.2.6. Details regarding the main features of the dam and their contractors are summarized in Table 2.4, while Figure 2.8 depicts the power transmission lines.

Table 2.4. Design features of the Merowe Dam.


Dam structure	Main information (components, phases, time-frame)	Contracted Firm
Spillways	67m in height and accommodates 12 bottom outlets and 2 surface spillways. Each bottom outlet is 6m wide and 10 m high Surface spillways each 5 m wide. Bottom and surface spillways are equipped with radial gates. At total reservoir water level of 300m, combined spillway discharge capacity of 20,046m ³ /s Further discharge of 1,500m ³ /s through six low level sediment sluices arranged below the power intake opening	CCMD Consortium (China) for Dam main body (spillways, ECRFD, CFRFD, & power intake) Contract included designing, manufacturing and installing equipment for flooding gates, lower gates, dam top equipment and mechanical equipment, supporting installation of dam's body and services, Also provision of hydro-mechanical equipment part of power station
Earth Core Rock Fill Dam (ECRFD)	Classic ECRFD with a central earth core, fine and coarse filters and upstream and downstream rock fill shoulders Founded on alluvial sediment up to 30m Thick, with 1m thick plastic concrete cut off wall which penetrates 4m into bedrock to provide seepage prevention under the layer of the ECRFD	
Concrete Faced Rock Fill Dams (CFRFD)	Two CFRFDs, on right and left banks- extend 1590m left and 4315m right due to topographical conditions Interface between CFRDs and ECRFD required design and construction of 48m high concrete interface structure Interface structure sloped to provide water tight pressure joint between core and concrete wall	
Power Intake Dam	Steel reinforced concrete structure 300m wide and 67m high Accommodates 10 power intakes, each intake designed for rated discharge of 300m ³ /s and equipped with trash rack, stop logs and submerged roller gate of 8.5m wide and 10.5 m high.	

¹⁹ Including designing manufacturing and installation of equipment for flooding gates, lower gates, dam top equipment and mechanical equipment supporting installation of Dams body and services.

Power plant	10 turbine units with capacity of 125MW each Installation began in July 2007 and completed by August 2008	Alstom (France) manufacture and install turbine units CCMD- hydro-mechanical equipment part of power station
Transmission lines and substations	2 parallel lines of 500kv (kilo-voltage) each from main power plant to Khartoum with distance of 350km for each line and 2 5--/200kv substations in Omdurman and Khartoum North connected with 38km line of 50kv 3rd line of 240km to Atbara with voltage of 500kv and 500/200kv substation in Atbara 4th line of 5455km from Atbara to Port Sudan of 220kv and 220/110kv substation in Port Sudan 5th 310 km line from Merowe to Dongola of 220kv and 3 substations of 220/33kv in Merowe, Debba and Dongola. Works completed in May 2007	ABB (German) prepared designs that enable computer control of entire system Harben Power Engineering (China) build all the lines and substations

Source: (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007)

Figure 2.8. Electrical power distribution lines from the Merowe Dam, to Dongola, Khartoum, and Port Sudan.



Source: (Dams Implementation Unit, 2007)

2.2.5. Impacts of the dam

The numerous negative environmental and social impacts of Merowe were understated and not properly addressed by the Lahmeyer EIA. This was confirmed by an independent review of the EIA conducted by the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (EAWAG) in 2006 (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006). EAWAG's report raised critical environmental concerns of the project, which it termed as "important deficiencies" in the EIA. Furthermore, national experts have raised important concerns and potential impacts that have not been considered or addressed by project implementers (Seif al-Din Hammad, 2007; Hashim, 2009; Hashim, Forthcoming).

Environmental impacts

The main conclusions of EAWAG's review on the environmental shortcomings of Lahmeyer's EIA of the Merowe Dam include the inadequately assessed risks of sedimentation, greenhouse gas emissions from decomposing organic matter, biodiversity loss and disrupted fish migratory patterns, irrigation (in) feasibility, and deteriorating water quality. It concluded that the trapped sediments (estimated at 130 million tons yearly) would result in a reduction of power generating capacity of 39% over the next 50 years (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006: 5, 9). Others predict a shorter life span of 20 years before total loss of capacity (Verhoeven, 2012).

Figure 2.9. Manasir village Kabna Al Fougara, partially submerged by the reservoir behind the Merowe Dam.



Source: Azza Dirar, February 2014

Countering the EIA's claims that "no methane would be produced" by the reservoir and that "greenhouse gas emissions from Merowe project are considered to be non-significant"

(Lahmeyer International, 2002, cited in Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006 : 79), the EAWAG review concluded that decomposing organic material would actually release 200,000 to 300,000 tons of carbon per year (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006: 7). The same source asserts that Aquatic biodiversity loss is compounded by the total neglect of migratory fish species in Lake Nubia and the 700km stretch between Aswan and Merowe (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006: 61). These species, not recognized or mentioned in the EIA, are seriously threatened by isolation caused by Merowe.

The irrigation plans of the dam are limited to broad claims of integration into the dam structure design without clear planning details. There is as a lack of studies of schemes in conjuncture with dam operation rules, provisions to limit salinization of irrigated land, and without serious consideration of total water allocation within Sudan. This last point has been of concern to national activists, as it is expected that high levels of evaporation from the reservoir (1.5 BCM/y) illustrate the irrationality of water usage and threatens (in conjuncture with other proposed dams which also expect to see significant evaporations) to leave Sudan with no additional water for irrigation under the 1959 treaty allocations (Seif al-Din Hammad, 2007; Hashim, 2009; El Moghraby, 2013). The EIA claims that “no significant change of water quality is expected” is based on assumptions and long term observations in similar large dam reservoirs elsewhere confirm that water quality will deteriorate as a direct result of degrading biomass in the reservoir (Lahmeyer International, 2002, cited in Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006: 78).

The environmental impacts have attracted national concerns and studies as well, with a key study by Seif El Din Hammad (2007) (a former minister of irrigation) investigating potential evaporation loss of proposed and constructed dams. It concluded that if all the planned dams were implemented, Sudan would be faced with serious water shortages for agricultural extension (Seif al-Din Hammad, 2007). National experts also express broader environmental concerns of the environmental and ecological irrationality of dams in Sudan, which are threatened by redundancy and short reservoir capacities due to the rivers hydrology and high rate of sedimentation. As El Moghraby (2013) has stated, such dams are a good place to damage the ecology.

Cultural and social impacts: emergency archaeology and ‘demographic engineering’

Large dam reservoirs typical have large social and cultural impacts, due to the inevitable displacement of people living in the area that becomes the reservoirs. The experience of the Nubian displacement in Wadi Halfa as a result of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s is paralleled in the Merowe experience. The area of the current reservoir was once home to over 50,000 inhabitants from Hamdab, Amri and Manasir groups. As we will see, the people have been lured away by compensation schemes, or uprooted and involuntarily resettled away from their homes.

With the loss of the land in a continuously inhabited place comes the loss of cultural heritage. Roughly 16 archaeological teams were engaged in ‘emergency archaeology’ to identify (rather

than salvage) the sites to be lost. Local residents ordered the teams out of the area as part of the resistance struggle (refer to Section 3.1.2 for greater detail).

Considered within a critique of the broader political structures of the Sudanese state (see Harir and Tvedt, 1994) and Hamdi's triangle, Hashim (2010) also asserts that the state is pursuing an unofficial strategy of 'demographic engineering'. The pursuit of consolidating political power through strategically targeted investment to create favourable electoral conditions is the motive, with the result being heightened tensions between the Arab/African identity as the hegemonic Islamic/Arab identities marginalise Africans/Nubians affected by the proposed dams in Northern Sudan (Hashim, 2009; Hashim, 2006; Verhoeven, 2012; Hashim, 2010). Further support for broad claims directed against domestic political structures is represented by the perceived strong linkages between the case of dams in Sudan and the experiences in Darfur (Schmedinger, 2009; Hashim, 2009).

2.2.6. Criticism of the dam

Construction of the Merowe dam has attracted much criticism, both domestically from civil society organizations, leading environmentalist and human rights activists, and internationally from various organizations and NGOs. The main criticisms to the project include the weakness and inadequacy of feasibility and impact assessment studies, disregard to international principles in relation to environmental and social standards of large dams, and significant violations of human rights generally associated with the resettlement procedure. These key criticisms are highlighted below whilst more extensive review of international responses to Merowe are presented in Section 3 as part of the literature review.

Figure 2.10. Still from a video taken during the filling of the reservoir, August 2009.



Source: anonymised.

As the preceding discussion of environmental impacts has shown, the EIA for Merowe was seriously deficient in thoroughly assessing project impacts. EAWAG's review of the document asserts that the EIA "...report was far from meeting European or international guidelines, such as the guidelines of the World Commission on Dams. (WCD, 2000)" (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006: 4). The norms set out by the WCD are discussed in Section 3, but it suffices to say that the procedure followed by Lahmeyer in drafting the EIA did not involve any major stakeholders, and undertook no specific technical studies or referenced existing studies as "no serious attempt was made to use the vast scientific knowledge base on environmental effects of large dams..." (ibid: 4) – despite the widely available scientific literature gathered from four decades of research on the effects of Aswan High Dam. Furthermore, the EIA was restricted from public review²⁰ as well as Sudan's Higher Council of the Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR).

²⁰ Whilst the EIA was denied to Sudanese public and HCNER review, it was made available to US (IRN) and UK (CH) NGOs upon request. This cooperation with international NGOs is speculated to be a result of the influence these NGOs may have over international public opinion with donors and (especially in light of the 2005 peace agreement and funding commitments from Western donors for infrastructure development under Joint Assessment Mission -JAM). (Moheildeen, 2007: 268-269)

In direct violation of Sudanese national law²¹ construction works began without secondary review of the EIA and without the approval of the HCENR. It is worth mentioning here that the secretary general of HCNER, Nader al Awad, was dismissed from his position for insisting that the Merowe EIA be disclosed and subjected to proper procedural standards, indicating how irrelevant environmental and social impacts were to DIU planning and implementation actions (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005; Verhoeven, 2012; Mohieldeen, 2007). A committee to review the EIA was formed, as one of the authors of the current report who was also on the committee testifies, though the committee was dissolved before it even met, and construction of Merowe ensued without any independent review of the EIA (El-Moghraby, email threads, 2014).

The compensation and resettlement provisions for the project have been highly criticized on the basis of “inappropriate decision-making procedures” (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005; Hildyard, 2008). As the following sections will illustrate, the resettlement procedure was also characterized by poor consultation or public engagement, and compensation was based on no proper recognition of entitlements. The Merowe Dam Implementation Unit (MDIU) assumed full responsibility of making the resettlement and compensation arrangements and in so doing, often issued bylaws that overrode earlier governmental decisions. This clear conflict of interest resulted in the DIU pushing their vision for resettlement projects and awarding contracts to its own construction company, enabling it to maximize profits and minimize costs (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005). The affected people’s rejections of official resettlement plans were repeatedly ignored by the DIU, despite their recognition by various government decisions.

The many human rights violations associated with the Merowe project have attracted much international attention and criticism. Some of the most striking violations resulted after peaceful protests to forced resettlement ended in violent confrontations with DIU forces, in some cases even killing protesters. Brutal oppression was supplemented with brutal eviction tactics, which consisted of sudden and unannounced closing of the dam’s gates and flooding the regions inhabitants. The sudden filling of the reservoir created an acute humanitarian crisis and was made worse by complete blockade of the region to relief agencies and support. Details of these events are covered in the next section.

2.3 Resettlement, Compensation, Compliance and Resistance

*Lucky is the man who sees his friend being eaten by a crocodile – Sudanese
/ Nile proverb*

Construction of the Merowe dam flooded the villages and homes of between 50,000-70,000 people from Hamdab, Amri and Manasir groups. The following reviews the official

²¹ Sudan’s Environment Protection Act of 2000 which states that all environmental feasibility studies must be subject to review and certification by the HCENR.

resettlement plans set down by the DIU through the Lahmeyer EIA, and details the procedural shortcomings in implementation with regard to the three affected groups, the shape of the people's resistance and the main events which followed.

2.3.1. Compensation and resettlement packages and processes

The arrangements for the compensation and resettlement plans and their implementation were conducted by the same authority in charge of the dam itself— the DIU. The official claims of the project authorities and the Lahmeyer EIA was that resettlement offered great opportunities to improve the living standards of the affected populations, and were planned with a development-oriented approach in mind (Lahmeyer International, 2002).


The official resettlement sites selection consisted of four main locations²² as shown in Figure 2.11. The New Hamdab project (El Multaga) located in the Debba province in the Northern State was built to house Hamdab people, which composed 7% of the dam-affected people (DAP).²³ New Amri (Wadi al Mugadam) located in the Bayouda desert within the Northern State, was built to resettle Amri people, which composed 26% of DAPs. Makabrab located in the River Nile state at the El Damer locality close to the Atbara river, and Al Fida scheme located up the river close to Abu Hamad, were both established house the Manasir who are the largest group of the DAP (67%) (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, 2007; Hashim, 2009; Askouri, 2014). Each site was to benefit from agricultural and irrigation schemes, health and education services, in addition to housing units with electricity provisions (see Figure 2.12 and Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.11. Locations of resettlement village groups New Hamdab (for Hamdab communities), New Amri (for Amri communities), Makabrab (for Manasir communities), and the 'Local Option' (for the Manasir who refused

²² The location and names of all sites to be double-checked prior to peer-review publication, as per footnote 22 on penultimate draft.

²³ El-Multaga is "located on the western bank of the Nile between Goshabe and Abu Kileiwat villages on longitude (31-6-8 and (31-12-21) East, and latitude (17-58-11) and (17-55-11) North."

resettlement). Arrows point from the original villages on the river (now totally or partially submerged by the reservoir) towards the resettlement village groups.



All resettlement sites are located far from the land around the reservoir, which the EIA asserts is recommended for “...natural conditions will not allow agricultural activities” (Lahmeyer International, 2002: 11-13). This conclusion is contradicted by findings of the YAM consultant’s development report carried out on behalf of the Rive Nile State, which identifies ripe agricultural opportunities in the land surrounding the reservoir (YAM for Development & Consultation Co, 2007). This has led some to suspect the intentions behind depopulating the region to be associated with plans of resettling Egyptian farmers into the region (Hashim, 2006; Hashim, 2010).

The Lahmeyer EIA only assessed arrangement for the El-Multaga (New Hamdab) resettlement site in detail and made brief mention of what it categorized as “other sites”. The agricultural and irrigation plans for El-Multaga as presented in the document indicated that the irrigation scheme would operate through a series of pumps linking different levels of canals and gathering pools (Lahmeyer International, 2002: 11-53--11-83). This is due to the elevation of farmland from the Nile, and the unsuitability of gravity canal systems. The pumps were planned to run on electricity, and in New Hamdab a power station was built on site to provide the necessary irrigation. The power station has four diesel generators of 2000kv each to operate pumps at the main and sub-stations, rather than using electricity from the dam (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, New Hamdab, 2007).

Figure 2.12. Moukabrab village from a distance, emphasising the connections of roads and distance from the river. A drinking water tower may be seen on the left.



Source: Mark Zeitoun, February 2014.

Compensation allocation was based on a census conducted by the DIU in 1999 to determine the assets of the affected people. According to the DIU the rates for compensation were arrived at through “dialogue between Dam’s Administration and the Committees representing the affected population” (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Compensation, 2007). Compensation took monetary form as well as in-kind compensation for lost assets of housing, land, palm trees and other productive assets.

Figure 2.13. El Multaga (New Hamdab) village, showing water tower reservoir and modular houses.



Source: Merowe Dam Implementation Unit website (<http://www.merowedam.gov.sd/en/new-hamdab.html>)

The establishment of a specialized technical committee mandated with proposing the rates concluded monetary compensation figures for loss of assets. It concluded with figures for compensation of various assets such as land, fruit trees and other properties. For example, each “productive palm tree will be compensated by 50,000 Sudanese Dinars (SD) [roughly USD90 at the rate of USD1 = SD550], to be paid in cash over a period of 6 years”, whereas non-productive palm trees are compensated by 6,500 SD, and palm seedling are compensated by 400 SD. Compensation rates for other trees such as mango (90,371 SD), citrus (55, 325 SD) and guava (50,000 SD) have also been pre-determined. This monetary compensation does not include compensation for lands and other properties that are not determined by lists drawn up by the technical committees (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Compensation, 2007).

In addition to this, “the government compensates the resident families upon resettlement in the site with a sum of 50,000 SD for each family” also to be paid in yearly instalments over six

years “with the first payment made upon arrival at the new resettlement site”. Furthermore it “...allocates a sum of money for a rotating fund to finance the cultivation and agricultural operations” (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Compensation, 2007).

The DIU website claims that “monetary compensation is paid for everybody who owns a house but does not want to move with his group to the new resettlement area” (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Compensation, 2007), however in many cases this has still not been met, as will later be shown in the affected people’s testimonies. Funding for compensation was acquired through the Ministry of Finance and the National Economy.

In-kind compensation for housing was guaranteed to “everybody who owns a house in the affected area” with each “given a house in the resettlement site, if he wishes to move into the new site”. Furthermore, “every family residing in the area drowned by the reservoir will be given six feddans²⁴ in the resettlement projects”. This minimum level of land compensation was to be supplemented by an additional three feddans of land for every feddan lost in the Nile valley. Resettled farmers were also granted a grace period of two years during which they were to be provided with free agricultural extension services of water, electricity, seeds and fertilizers (Dams Implementation Unit, Merowe Dam Project, Compensation, 2007).

As will be seen, contrary to claims of the DIU that the site selection procedure and compensation negotiations involved the DAP through their representative committees, the people’s input was largely unheeded. Further, the document emphasizes the adherence to international standards in its resettlement approach, with special reference to World Bank principles of involuntary resettlement guidelines, (Lahmeyer International, Environmental Impact Assessment Report for the Merowe Dam Project. Part 11 Resettlement Scheme, 2002, pp. 11-1—11-2) but as experience was to demonstrate, no such standards of consultation and participation were respected in implementation.

2.3.2. The resettlement and compensation package

Many of the Hamdab, Amri and Manasir people initially welcomed and accepted the dam’s construction. As we will see, their initial consent to the project became qualified or changed completely, with time, to the point today that a majority are greatly disappointed. The experience of each of the three groups is outlined below.

Hamdab people

The Hamdab people were the first group to be resettled in June 2003, as they lived immediately behind the site of the dam. They accepted the resettlement arrangements set out for them and moved to El-Multaga, approximately 100km down the river from their homeland and far from its shore. They were unaware of the difficult conditions that they were about to face.

²⁴ Ibid, 1 feddan = 0.5 hectare = 1.308 acre

Following their 2005 visit to El-Multaga, a joint International Rivers Networks and Corner House report concluded that rapidly deteriorating conditions were contributing to worsening poverty (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005). Unfair compensation for lost assets and attempts of the project authorities to dwarf the people's entitlements,²⁵ combined with conditions of poor soil quality and failing agricultural production, has reportedly increased the poverty rate from 10% to 65% in the period of two years.

The agricultural projects resettled farmers engaged in at the new site failed repeatedly, due to failing irrigation schemes. Throughout the seasons of 2005 to 2007 repeated water shortages resulting from the breakdown of the various pumps threatened the destruction of their livelihoods (Sudan Tribune, 2009). The General Union of Hamdab Farmers issued a public release declaring the total failure of the agricultural scheme in the resettled area in 2009 (General Federation of Al Hamdab Sons, 2009).

After many failed attempts to remedy the situation, the people finally staged a protest in March of 2009, on the day before the presidential inauguration of the Merowe Dam.²⁶ The people took to the streets at the roundabout of the junction of the main roads leading to Omdurman, Merowe and Dongola and blocked the roads in protest of the severe problems. The roadblock protest was soon met with police clashes in order to end the blockade (Sudan Tribune, 2009). Water shortages continue to plague the resettlement site in 2014, as is discussed in the data presentation section and revealing testimony of the affected people.

Amri and Manasir people

Based on the experiences of deteriorating conditions the Hamdab people faced, the Amri and Manasir groups were more cautious in accepting the arrangements set up for them by the dam authorities. Whilst some of the people from these groups accepted resettlement, a large proportion resisted and demanded to alternatively be resettled close to the reservoir's shoreline. The people established their respective committees to represent their aims in negotiations with state officials. The Manasir established the "Council of Dam Affected Manasir" with a separate "Manasir Executive Committee" and Amri established "Amri Dam Affected Peoples Committee".

Those that declined the official plans opted for an option proposed by their representative committees known as the "local option". The River Nile State government commissioned a feasibility study of this option, and this was conducted by the Sudanese consultancy YAM Development and Consulting Co (see YAM, 2007). The YAM report's agricultural feasibility

²⁵ By creating additional stipulations, which, for example, restrict "people who own houses but are not married [to] receive[ing] only land plots, but no new houses. People who live outside the project area, or who have temporarily moved to other places as migrant labourers, but still own land or houses in the project are are not being compensated." (Bosshard & Hillyard 2005, pp. 6)

study highlighted the opportunities for flood recession agriculture, among many other livelihood activities, as benefits of living along the reservoir.

Based on the positive assessment provided by the YAM report, the Manasir Executive Committee (MEC) came up with six alternative locations along the shore of the reservoir for the development of their resettlement sites.²⁷ A census conducted among the Manasir by the Central Organ for Statistics confirmed a majority (70%) favoured the 'local option' of remaining on the reservoir shore, while 30% were for resettling to Makabrab. The committees engaged in a series of negotiations with the relevant state and federal ministries and officials to realize the local option proposal and reasserted their demands through various peaceful means (The Council of the Merowe Dam Affected People- The Manasir, *The Just Demands for Compensation and Resettlement*, 2003).²⁸ However, "broken promises" and "tactics of deception and obscurantism" jeopardized their efforts (Hashim, 2009: 32, 31). In 2003, the Amri Executive Committee filed an official complaint to the UN Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, as will be discussed later and details of which are provided in Annex B.

2.3.3. Procedural shortcomings with the compensation package and its execution

The compensation and resettlement experience was characterized by a lack of transparency and consultation of affected people, and a shocking disregard by the DIU of the formal negotiations between the Committees of the dam affected peoples (DAPs) and State officials and ministries. In a manner similar to the execution of the EIA, the absolute power granted the DIU by the presidency ensured the outcome. A 'bureaucratic battle' ensued between federal and State ministries and departments wishing to facilitate the local option implementation, and dam authorities' adamant on resettlement in the officially planned projects which took the form of "contradictory government letters" (Hashim, 2009: 34). This battle is encapsulated in a back and forth between different State actors and dam authorities, in which contradictory statements on what the people demanded were made by each side²⁹ (Hashim, 2009: 33-36).

In 2004 despite contradictions from dam authorities, the federal Minister of Agriculture issued ministerial decree ordering the concerned departments to study the local option for implementation, and to establish a committee for this purpose, but there was no DIU representation in the committee (ibid: 34).³⁰ Continued negotiation and State support

²⁷ These sites are Um Sarih, al HAras, Al-Huweila, Kiheila East, Kiheila West and Um Tineidba, all located around the reservoir.

²⁸ The Manasir council here identified the 1999 census upon which compensation was based as flawed and secretive, and therefore rejected by the people due to the lack of their consultation.

²⁹ For example, despite repeated rejection by the Manasir, the commissioner of social and ecological affairs in the DIU Ahmed Muhamed Ahmed Al Sadig stated in a letter to the General Manager of Agriculture, Animal Resources and Irrigation of the River Nile State on 19/1/2004 that they have agreed to move to Makabrab. Further, in a letter to Osama Abdalla by 28/01/2004 the governor of the RNS urged him to be transparent and cooperative with the affected people and to expedite the studies related to the local option. (Hashim, 2009: 34)

³⁰ On 20/7/2004 the former Federal Minister of Agriculture (Majzub al-Khalifa) issued a ministerial decree facilitating local option implementation. (Hashim, 2009: 34)

resulted in a presidential decree released on 08/04/2006 granting the local option to commence. The Decree (No.70, Year 2006) gave the directive for the concerned parties in the River Nile State to take over the lands of the shores of the reservoir that were within its State boundaries and to allocate these to the rightful people.³¹ It also authorized the State Governor and concerned parties to implement the decree by taking the necessary measures. In response, a host of State decrees released a month later planned to set the wheels in motion: No. 37, upon which lands around the reservoir allocated to the Manasir, No. 38, upon which surveying of lands around the reservoir were to begin so as to facilitate the resettlement of the Manasir and No. 39, upon which resettlement of Manasir in areas suggested by the DIU were to be suspended.³² The decrees were a celebrated victory among the Manasir, though this was soon led to turn to disillusionment.

A few days after the decisions were released, the head of the DIU Osama Abdalla appeared on television making a mockery of the decisions and indicating the weak chances of their successful implementation.³³ The demeanour by which Abdalla referred to the Amri and Manasir who were calling for local resettlement was dismissive and insulting, captured by the phrase he publically stated: "Let them flee like rats!" [full reference]. Frustrated by lack of recognition of their demands and the futility of formal bureaucratic engagement, the affected people strengthened their resistance through peaceful, and later, armed struggles to realize their aims

³¹ Presidential decree No. 70. / 2006.

³² State decrees No. 37. 7/5/2006, No. 28, 7/5/2006, No. 29, 7/5/2006

³³ *Al-Sudani Newspaper*, 10/5/2007. Cited in Hashim 2009

3 Resistance to the Merowe Dam

3.1 The local struggles

The people's establishment of representative Dam-Affected Committees was the first step of peaceful resistance to forced resettlement. However in light of the mounting bureaucratic failures discussed above, the resistance developed into a peaceful civil movement in the form of protests and demonstrations. On many accounts, protests were met with the violent confrontation of the Dam authorities' security forces and multiple arrests of Committee members. Two main incidents of erupted violence are the events of Sherri Island with regards to the Manasir, and the widely reported "Amri Massacre".

3.1.1. Confrontation with the DIU

The Manasir Executive Committee withdrew its consent of construction of the dam and urged the dam authorities to close their offices on the island many times in 2004. Repeated confrontations with the Dam authorities resulted in arrests of a Committee member in December of 2004 (Hashim 2009). Contrary to claims of the government, the arrested members were not engaged in violent activities against the state.³⁴ Tensions escalated as DIU deployed military forces to the region in January of 2005, to which the Manasir reacted by calling for a mass meeting in al Qab town, upon which they reconfirmed their withdrawal of consent and declaring the Manasir territory closed off to dam authority presence. Retaliations of the DIU in the form of further arrests continued to antagonize the community.

In an unexpected turn of events on November 29 of 2005 violence erupted on the island (International Rivers Network; Corner House, 2005). The incident was apparently triggered by Chinese contractors' occupation of the wells of Manasir communities in Sani area for their own domestic use and construction purposes, preventing access to Manasir women and children. Attempts of the Manasir Committee to remedy the situation amicably with the DIU failed as the latter obstinately refused to negotiate stating that "the lands and the wells are the property of the dam authorities and they have the right to set priorities on how and who could use them and when" (Sudan Tribune, Hamdab Dam- Row over water wells between Chinese, residents, 2005). The Manasir responded with a final ultimatum to demanding the closure of the dam offices in the area. However the refusal of the dam authorities, security forces terrorization of villagers, and the mounting discontent and frustration over the past months, erupted into a violent confrontation and the dam offices were set ablaze and destroyed by the villagers. Security forces made many arrest attempts and large demonstrations condemning the dam authorities and its security apparatus followed the

³⁴ This was clarified in a press statement by the armed faction of the DAPs known as the Movement of Displaced (MOD) which emphasized that "these [arrested] persons are innocent people and have no relation whatsoever with the movement [MOD]. It has become clear that the Security Organ believes that just being from the dam affected area warrants arrest." (Sudan Tribune, Movement of Displaced (MOD) Press Statement, 2004).

event. The federal government response to the event was the deployment of three army battalions to be stationed in Al Qab, Sherri and Sani (Sudan Tribune, 2005).

Amri communities also received their fair share of confrontation with dam authorities. Yearlong tensions exploded in unprecedented violence when dam authorities, adamant on their plans to resettle the group, triggered the situation by attempting to forcibly remove the inhabitants from their homes. The violent events began on the 7th of April 2006 when dam authorities deployed militia to the region; villagers retaliated by setting fire to two dam office buildings and a number of militia vehicles (Sudan Tribune, Merowe dam affected areas explode into violence and burning, 2006).

Ten days after the incident, another violent attack of the dam militia ensued on the 22 of April in an Amri schoolyard. The militia opened fire on an unsuspecting congregation of people while they were having breakfast in the yard. The disproportionate use of force was confirmed in reports that 16 pickup Land Cruisers SUVs armed with heavy artillery and machine guns opened fire on unarmed civilians (Sudan Tribune, 2006). The attack resulted in the deaths of three and wounding of fifty – and came to be reported as the “Amri Massacre”.

The harsh measures of the State in crushing movements protesting the plight of the Merowe dam affected people continued elsewhere in Sudan. In 2011-2012 a series of student protests in Khartoum were violently dispersed by security forces and ended in arbitrary arrests of civilians (Sudan Tribune, 2007; Sudan Tribune, 2011; El Wardany, 2011; Sudan Tribune, 2012). The violent crackdown on protestors has attracted much international attention and condemnation (Sudan Tribune, HRW urges Sudan to rein in security forces, 2012; Human Rights Watch, Sudan: End Violence Against Peaceful Protesters Promptly Charge or Release Political Detainees, 2012).

3.1.2. Political struggle of the Manasir

In response to mounting tensions and violent tactics of the dam authorities, a small group of disgruntled Manasir personalities established a political organization named “The Movement of Displaced Manasir”. This group of 20-50 members of young Manasir trained in guerrilla warfare in the Nubba Mountains by the SPLM, was lead by Ali Askouri, a London-based intellectual and anti-dam activist in 2004. The political movement was stationed in Eritrea for a brief spell before it put down its arms and returned to Sudan following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Hashim, 2009)³⁵.

Reaction to the sudden flooding

The first event of sudden flooding was during the 2006 flood season. Authorities opened the floodgates on the 7th of August (The Amri Committee, 2006)³⁶, forcing over 2,000 families from Amri regions to abandon their homes. No warning was given to the people and they

³⁵ Based on interviews with Ali Askouri in Hashim (2009)

³⁶ August 7th over 100 Amri families were forced off their land, by the 23 of August, more than 2, 740 families were affected, mainly women, children and elderly. (The Amri Committee, 2006)

were stranded without any aid (IRIN, 2006; Leadership of the Hamdab Affected People, LOHAP, 2006). Authorities have argued that the floods were a result of the natural annual occurrence and exceptionally high rainfall in Ethiopia. These claims are contradicted by historical evidence and the experience of the region's inhabitants (The Amri Committee, 2006).

The second and more severe flooding came in July-August 2008 with the final re-diversion of the river and closing of the dam gates (Askouri, 2008; Sudan Tribune, 2008). As before, unsuspecting inhabitants were forced to abandon their homes and all their belongings to get to higher grounds. The gates were closed in July of 2008 when the first reports of flooding drove out 200 families from seven small villages. By October of 2008 the entire region affected by the dam was inundated (Aljazeera Arabic, 2008).

Following the floods, no governmental support was provided to the affected people. The area was closed off to reporters, journalists and relief agencies, and the people were left to fend for themselves (Sudan Tribune, Merowe dam floods thousands in area closed to outsiders, 2008). This attracted widespread international condemnation from UN agencies, for example from the UN Special Rapporteur on Housing and Human Rights (UNOCHR, 2007; UNMIS, 2007).

Presently, almost six years after the inundation of the region, approximately two thirds of Manasir and, to a lesser extent, Amri groups still reside along the reservoir. Their act of resistance is to have rebuilt their homes and adapted their livelihoods despite continued negligence by the State in the provision of basic services and support.

Dismissal of the archeologists

In addition to all the international attention on violations of rights and complicit companies, a small body of literature responds to the loss of archaeological and Nubian cultural history (Adams, 2007; Welsby, 2009; Shawkat, 2012). The Humboldt University of Berlin, for example, has been a major stakeholder in the region through the interest in studying Nubian culture. The Humboldt University Nubian Expedition (HUNE) and its subproject on the Culture of the Manasir reflect this scholarly stake (HUNE 2008, 2011).

Prior to the dam's construction various archaeological salvage works, both from national institutions (e.g. the Sudanese Antiquities Services, the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums) and international institutions (e.g. the Sudan Archaeological Research Society in London, the British Museum, Humboldt University of Berlin, and University of California Santa Barbra, amongst others) commenced emergency excavations to document the region that would be flooded by the reservoir (Ahmed, 2003). However, excavation was brought to an abrupt end by protesting Manasir people, who eventually kicked the foreign archaeologists out of their land (Sudan Tribune, Sudan's Merowe requests to stop excavating reservoir area, 2007). Klenitz and Näse³⁷ (2011) document the failed archaeological salvage mission and

³⁷ Both authors were involved in the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project (MDASP), Naser as project director of HUNE from 2004-2008, and Kleinitz as specialist working for Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS), HUNE and American missions between 2004-2009.

discuss the way in which the conflict between the affected people and international salvage excavation projects represents a political strategy of the affected peoples to negotiate better compensation and resettlement outcomes.

The preservation of the Nubian heritage, both the concern of national and international actors, has contributed to a loosely coordinated campaign among social anthropologists. The concerns among some of cultural domination and eradication (e.g. Hashim, 2006, 2008) are reflected in the resistance of the affected Nubian people of proposed Dal and Kajbar dams (see Anti-Dal and Kajbar dam Committee, 2011).

3.1.3. Legal action within Sudan

For the first time in Sudan's history, the national security apparatus has been challenged in the Constitutional Court by the Manasir Executive Committee, on the basis of its unconstitutional arbitrary arrests of community representatives (Sudan Tribune, 2007; Amnesty International, 2007). The lawsuit was accepted by the court on 12 May 2007 and was in response to the arrest of seven committee members in 2007. Following the release of members on 26 May without charge, Amnesty International reports that "They had been detained for more than two months under Article 31 of the 1999 National Security Forces Act, which allows the security forces to detain people for up to nine months without access to judicial review. The detainees were routinely denied access to their families or lawyers. Their release comes following the signing of a new Agreement between Nile State and the Manasir Association Executive Committee. Under the Agreement, the communities threatened with displacement by the construction of the Merowe High Dam in northern Sudan will be resettled around the Merowe Dam reservoir" (Amnesty International, 2007).

3.1.4. Unity of the people's committees

The actions of the Sudanese state appear to have strengthened solidarity between the dam affected peoples. In a recognition of their shared circumstances, the people affected by Merowe, and elsewhere, the people terrorized in their resistance to proposed Dal and Kajbar dams, joined together in a unity of dam affected peoples.

In response to the rising waters of the reservoir above the stated level of 300m asl (metres above sea level) in the dams operation program, the unity of Dam Affected Peoples Committees culminated in joint proclamation "National, Regional and International Proclamation to Obviate the Ominous Hazards of Mirwi [sic] Dam" in 2009 (Anti-Dam Committees, 2009). The uncertainty of the contour water level limits were a matter propelled by the lack of transparency the DIU operated under. The proclamation demanded that information pertaining to the dam operating programme made public.

3.2 The international struggles

3.2.1. The UN response

The coverage of the social impacts of the Merowe Dam in the international media has been widespread (Giles, 2006; Sanders, 2007; Lacey, 2005; IRIN, 2006; Kavilu, 2011). Various international human rights (HR) organizations have documented and responded to the violations encountered by the affected people. Among these, Human Rights Watch (Sudan Tribune, HRW urges Sudan to rein in security forces, release or charge detainees, 2012; Human Rights Watch, “It’s an Everyday Battle”: Censorship and Harassment of Journalists and Human Rights Defenders in Sudan, 2009; Human Rights Watch, Sudan: End Violence Against Peaceful Protesters Promptly Charge or Release Political Detainees, 2012 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013: Sudan, 2013) and Amnesty International (Amnesty International, Fear of torture or ill-treatment/ Incommunicado detention, 2007; Further Information on Fear of torture or ill-treatment/ Incommunicado detention, 2007; The African Commission: Amnesty International’s oral statement on forced evictions, 2007)³⁸ have responded to the violations of civil and political rights in regards to forced eviction, arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment of detainees, violent crackdown on peaceful protestors, (Human Rights Watch, World Report 2013: Sudan, 2013) and media representation and freedom of expression. (Human Rights Watch, 2009) Other international organizations for documenting conflict and violence – such as the Centre for Documentation of Environmental Conflict³⁹ (CDCA-Italian acronym) and the World Organization Against Torture⁴⁰ (OMCT-Italian acronym) – have been closely monitoring and documenting the events linked with the case (CDCA, 2014; OMCT, 2007).

In November 2003, the Amri Committee released an official complaint to the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing that details the extent of the impact and suggesting malicious intent by the DIU. The complaint – reproduced in Annex B – also articulates international standard violations, and human rights abuses, and points to the responsibility of foreign companies in a manner very much consistent with IRN’s Merowe campaign (see next section). The Housing and Land Rights Network (HLRN) picked up the appeal.

In response, the UN Housing and Human Rights Rapporteur, Miloon Kothari, issued a statement (Sudan Tribune, UN rights expert urges suspension to dam projects in northern

³⁸ There has also been an “Incommunicado detention/fear of torture or ill-treatment” plea by Amnesty International in June of 2007 which included a team member of this research project, Mohamed Jalal Hashim, among other journalists, lawyers, and academics and academics (Amnesty International, Incommunicado detention/fear of torture or ill-treatment, 2007d)

³⁹ Italian based organization with extensive documentation of conflict over Merowe, including description of causes and impacts, detailed timeline of events, information on main stakeholders including peoples’ movement and social organizations in Sudan and international NGOs, multinational corporations, and others, and a links to important resources on the protect (news reports, documents, relevant reports, etc.)

⁴⁰ On the basis of information received from Sudan Organization Against Torture, calls upon government to suspend Merowe and Kajbar projects and the states involved to make sure their national companies do not violate rights. Report documents the experience of economic, social and cultural right violations, the violence of the state and makes a list of requests to actors behind the dam’s constructions.

Sudan, 2007; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights-OCHR, 2007) condemning the actions of the state and urging the suspension of construction until the violations have been corrected (United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights-OCHR, 2007). The statement was accompanied by the rapporteur's report documenting the case and the communication with the government, (United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur—Summary of communications sent and replies received from Governments and other actors, 2007: 55-59) as well as an annex to the report discussing international standards on adequate housing as set down by the “Basic Principles and Guidelines in Development Based Evictions and Displacement” (UNHRC, 2007).

3.2.2. Campaigns by the International Rivers Networks, Corner House and others

The International Rivers Network (IRN) is an US-based international NGO whose main work consists of aiding in the campaigns and movements of people affected by dams (International Rivers Network, Dams, Rivers and Rights: An Action Guide for Communities Affected by Dams, 2006). IRN has taken up Merowe dam as a specific campaign, publicizing injustices by conducting research and reporting on the case (Bosshard, Thousands Flooded Out by Merowe Dam in Sudan, 2008; Sudan Tribune, Advocacy group calls to suspend Merowe Dam construction, 2006). The IRN website also serves as a platform for publicizing the appeals of the affected peoples committees (International Rivers Network, 2008; The Executive Committee of the Manasir Communities, 2009) and reports of affected people in diaspora communities abroad (LOHAP, 2008).

IRN's Merowe campaign has various facets. It was IRN, for instance, that requested EAWAG to independently review Lahmeyer's EIA, after having acquired it from the government (Teodoru, Wüest and Wehrli, 2006). In 2005 IRN staff Peter Bosshard and Nicholas Hildyard (the Corner House-CH, U.K based NGO) paid a field visit to Sudan and to El-Multaga Resettlement Site to document the cultural, social, and environmental impacts of the project (Bosshard and Hildyard, 2005). The report was well received by academics, experts within Sudan, international civil society, the media and other observers. It was covered in the BBC, the New York Times, inter-press service, IRIN news service, Khartoum monitor, Sudan tribune and other media sources.

The IRN and CH campaigning has involved them in correspondences with project authorities and funding bodies in numerous ways. In a Memorandum (The Leadership Office of the Hamadab Affected People (LOHAP), International Rivers and The Corner House, 2007) sent to ambassador of China in Sudan, the Dam Implementation Unit (DU) and China EX-IM bank, for example, IRN, in collaboration with CH and LOHAP, summarized the social and environmental problems of the project and presented recommendations for their solution. During the violent turn of events in 2005 among the Manasir, IRN and CH released a press call entitled “Urgent Call for a Negotiated Agreement to End the Violence in the Merowe/Hamdab

Dam-Affected Areas”, (International Rivers Network; Corner House, 2005) urging all actors to press for negotiated peace.

The campaigns of these institutions have heavily implicated foreign businesses engaged in (International Rivers Network, Memorandum on the Merowe Dam Project, 2007) the project for their complacency with the environmental, social and human rights violations. The lack of adherence to international standards and regulations to which the businesses are privy are highlighted and articulated in their publications and activities. Most relevant to the study at hand, The Corner House (CH) published a report in 2008 (Hildyard) which discusses the ethical and human rights obligations of multinational construction companies and financial institutions in their involvement with infrastructural projects, as they are articulated in international standards (World Commission on Dams-WCD and Involuntary Resettlement guidelines of the World Bank). Applying such standards to Merowe dam, the report concludes that the project is in violation of the WCD standards on 63 counts. The report also criticizes the proclaimed “neutral” status, which some companies use as a means of justifying continued involvement in the Merowe project.

Foreign companies, with a focus on China

Working in conjuncture with the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre⁴¹ (BHRRC) (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2014), IRN and CH also launched a campaign against implicated foreign businesses, pressuring them on addressing the project’s violations. The consortium provided documentation of the social and environmental consequences of the project in urging a number of foreign companies to reconsider their involvement, including ABB (Germany), Alstom (France), Harbin Power Engineering (China) and Lahmeyer (Germany) (International Rivers Network and The Corner House, Email from Peter Bosshard-IRN, and Nicholas-CH, to Björn Edlund, ABB, regarding Merowe/Hamadab Dam Project, Sudan 2005). BHRRC has further sent a copy of the UN housing rapporteur Miloon Kothari’s statement to the involved companies and documented their responses (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2014; UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing 2007; International Rivers Network and The Corner House, 2005).

Elsewhere, action with regards to the accountability of foreign companies has taken shape in divestment and sanctions campaigns in the United States. The Yale law school provided a comprehensive resource for divestment of companies operating in Sudan (The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic and The Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Project, Yale Law School, 2005),⁴² which included extensive coverage of the negative environmental and social impacts and human rights violations associated with Merowe dam and the companies linked to the project. In 2006, Alstom, ABB and Harbin were

⁴¹ BHRRC is an independent documenting organization. Contains an extensive documentation of information regarding the impacts of Merowe and the complicit international parties, and continuously monitors the situation.

⁴² The report makes specific mention of ABB (p. 39-40) Alstom (p. 40-41) Harbin power (p. 42) and Lahmeyer International (p. 43) as targets for divestment.

included in the report of the Sudan Divestment Task Force for their involvement with Merowe dam (Sudan Divestment Task Force, 2006). The Minnesota State Board of Investment also included ABB as a target for divestment for violations in 2007 (Minnesota State Board of Investment, 2007).

Significant recognition and literature of China's influential role and involvement in both financing and constructing large infrastructure projects throughout Africa particularly dams, and the specific harmful business partnership with the government of Sudan (Bosshard, China's Role in Financing African Infrastructure, 2007; Oster, 2007; Foste et al., 2008; Kaplinsky, 2008; Verhoeven, 2012; Verhoeven, 2013).

In regards to the country's growing role in overseas dam construction, the resounding criticisms commonly articulate the environmental and social concerns of such involvement (Bosshard, 2010). As Lori Pottinger of IRN conclusively states: "The cumulative social and environmental impacts of China's worldwide dam-building could outweigh the benefits these projects are intended to bring" (Pottinger, 2007). Such emphasis on China is mirrored in IRN's publication of a comprehensive guide on the role of China in overseas dam (International Rivers Network, 2008).

China's long-standing business partnership in Sudan has warranted special mentions. Human Rights First (2008) reports the shared political responsibility of China in human rights violations in Sudan, including in its discussion violations associated with Merowe and Kajbar dams. IRN's Peter Bosshard provides an overview of how Chinese dams of Merowe, Dal and Kajbar dams warns are contributing to ethnic conflict in Sudan (Bosshard, 2011). In a conference by the China Environment Forum and the Africa Program hosted at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Peter Bosshard and Ali Askouri (LOHAP) discussed the trends in Chinese funded dams with Merowe as a case study (Ellis, 2007).

3.2.3. Legal action by the Environmental Defender Law Centre and African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights

Of the afore-mentioned businesses found liable in violations at Merowe, concrete legal action has been taken against Lahmeyer International (Bosshard, 2010; Salih, 2010). The company has been called to court by the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) on accounts of being liable to prosecution in "criminal offenses of flooding in coincidence with abandonment, coercion, and criminal damage of property, destruction of buildings and killing of vertebrate animals" (European Center For Constitutional and Human Rights, 2010). The plaintiff, Ali Askouri, a representative of the Leadership Office of the Hamdab Affected People (the LOHAP) and former head of the Movement of Displaced Manasir (MOD), presented the case. The Environmental Defender Law Centre (EDLC) laid the groundwork for the case, which was later, picked up by the ECCHR (Environmental Defender Law Center, 2014). The case was not the first international recognition that Lahmeyer received for its corrupt activities as the World Bank sanctioned it in 2006 for another hydro-project in Lesotho (World Bank News & Broadcast, 2006).

Another law-suit has been filed in a case brought before the African Commission on Human and People's Rights (ACHPR) of the African Union in 2013 (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2013). The case was considered during the 14th EOS session during 20 to 24 July in Nairobi Kenya) for violations of several articles of the African Charter and Human and People's rights, to which Sudan is a signatory (African Commission on Human and People's Rights, 2013). The Egyptian Initiative initiated the case for Personal Rights (EIPR) on behalf of the complainants, Ali Askouri and Abdel Hakeem Nasser, two activists from the affected people (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2013). The accusations of violations of political and civil rights include the failure to consult the affected residents, lack of adequate compensation and excessive use of force against peaceful protestors. It makes special reference violations encountered in the procedures surrounding the local option demand of the affected peoples.

4 International Norms and Justice

This section presents a review of the literature relevant to the analysis of the interaction between transnational mobilization, international norms and justice struggles on the outcomes for affected people. The first section covers the relevant international norms, namely the World Commission on Dams, and international standards concerning Development-Induced Displacement and Involuntary resettlement. This section includes a discussion on the emergence of these norms as a product of the activity of transnational non-governmental actors, specifically within the transnational movement against the pivotal Narmada River Valley projects. The third section presents the main theoretical justice literature concerning environmental and social justice, as well as other possible local conceptions of justice. The final section presents the key literature on transnational movements, looking at the dynamic interaction between transnational justice mobilization and local struggles, as well as with international norms.

4.1 International norms

This section reviews the relevant international norms around dams. By ‘international norms’, we mean the global or international conventions, agreements and understandings (whether formal or informal, legally binding or not) that have been developed by and between the numerous people and institutions involved. The focus here is on the World Commission on Dams (WCD) and the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol, as well as standards are set forth by development induced displacement and involuntary resettlement guidelines of various international organizations and international development agencies.

4.1.1. The World Commission on Dams

Still the benchmark document on dams, the year 2000 World Commission on Dams (WCD) presented a framework for decision-making to reconcile competing ‘development’ interests, and to avoid the well-studied social and environmental costs of dams (World Commission on Dams, 2000).

The main contribution of the multi-stakeholder Commission was their development of the internationally accepted standards for decision-making in dam planning and implementation. This is encapsulated in “seven strategic priorities” broadly emphasizing public participation and consultation in the key processes of a) assessment of risks; and b) recognition of rights:

- (1) Gaining public acceptance, (2) comprehensive options assessment, (3) addressing existing dams, (4) sustaining rivers and livelihoods, (5) recognizing entitlements and sharing benefits, (6) ensuring compliance, and (7) sharing rivers for peace development and security.

The report is accompanied by a total of 17 thematic reviews, each review deals with a special issue from five thematic categories of Social Issues, Environmental Issues, Economic and Financial Issues, Options Assessments and Institutional Issues. This includes reviews of practices relating to displacement, resettlement rehabilitation and development of people

negatively affected by the construction of dams (Thematic Review 1.3) (Bartolome et al., 2000). This contributing study outlines the global experiences with regards to displacement and resettlement and the legal and regulatory instruments facilitating this process have performed in safeguarding the rights of affected people. Learning from the existing constraints that have been experienced, the paper presents a set of “good practices” by explicitly building on a number of UN and other international instruments and conventions on human rights and development. These generally revolve around approaching resettlement as a development programme, offering means of livelihoods rather than compensation for lost assets, and above all the inclusion of affected people in negotiations of “just” compensation.

In a more direct discussion of human rights and development as they apply to dam projects, Thematic review 5.4 focuses on the human rights challenges posed by dam construction as they are codified in international human rights law and conventions (Rajagopal, 2000). It identifies five key categories of rights: the right to development and self determination (UN Declaration on the Right to Development), right to participation, (international bill of human rights—UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO Convention 169) right to life and livelihood, (UDHR ar.3, ICESCR ar. 6, 11, CBD) right of vulnerable groups, (ILO 169. UDHR ar.2, ICESCR ar.2, CEDAW) right to remedy (UDHR ar.8, ICCPR ar.2). The paper further makes recommendations for the integration of Declaration on Right to Develop with WCD.

Other thematic reviews warranting specific mention include those looking at social issues such as the impact on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities (Colchester, 2000), which assess the violations of these groups distinctive rights as articulated in international conventions, as well as the social impacts in regards to equity and distribution (Adams, 2000), and with clear policy directives to asses and address inequities.⁴³ Furthermore, reviews of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment implementation procedure in developing countries (Verocai, 2000) allows for identification of areas for improvements and drawing lessons for good practice.

The WCD was very contentious from the outset, seen by many to put a brake on ‘development’ required by less industrialised countries (see e.g. Briscoe 2010), and have demonstrably influenced investment from traditional donors (e.g. The World Bank, DFID) in large infrastructure (Sneddon and Fox 2008, Moore, *et al.* 2010). Its strategic priorities have been used by anti-dam activists globally (Imhof, Wong and Bosshard, 2002) and its recommendations have been pressed for by civil society in places like Uganda (Oweyegha-

⁴³ For example Adams (2000) identifies six principles for addressing dams and equity (equity considerations must be fundamental to process of assessing development options, avoiding violence harassment or force in construction, analysis of impacts and other alternatives should consider cumulative, off-site and overtime aspects, minimized negative and maximized positive impacts, participation of interested parties integral to planning process, monitoring programme of impacts integral to planning). Three key considerations in planning for equity: managing adverse effects and addressing equity at key stages of project cycle, turning losers into winners, and public participation

Afunaduula, 2004), India (Dharmadhikary, 2001), and Asia (Baghel and Nüsser, 2010) with wide spreading impact, particularly the impact on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities (Joji, 1999). A decade and a half after its publication, the report still holds sway over dam design and implementation, and has great potential for transforming processes of dam development (Moore, *et al.* 2010).

The framework for decision-making laid out by the WCD is certainly less influential in 2014 than in 2000, however.⁴⁴ ‘Storage’ of water is the term most frequently used by the traditional donors when contemplating a renewal to their earlier interest in supporting large dams, which is typically justified in terms not only of hydropower, but ‘water security’ and as a clean-energy response to climate change (see e.g. DFID 2009, World Bank Group 2009). The hydropower industry-developed Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (IHA 2011) seems to be replacing the WCD principles. In any case, with less than 10% of dams currently funded by these traditional donors, furthermore, the international political economy has shifted – and the bulk of dams are built through domestic, bi-lateral or multi-lateral funds that are much less (if at all) influenced by the WCD (see Skinner and Haas 2014).

4.1.2. Environmental norms from the UN

Various United Nations Conventions have pertinent input into international standards surrounding dams. One of the cornerstones of international standards for the environment and development are the outputs of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Various norms developed from the event include, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) (United Nations, UNCBD, 1992; United Nations, UNFCCC, 1992; United Nations, UNCCD, 1994).

The overall impact of the Rio conference has been tantamount to the establishment of a new development paradigm, which focuses on values of environmental and social sustainability, recognition of rights and participation through multi-stakeholder process of engagement and implementation. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (United Nations, General Assembly, 1992) a non-binding statement of broad principles for environmental policy, encapsulate the ethos of the new paradigm.

The UNCED Agenda 21 is a non-legally binding action plan for sustainable development (United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992). Key principles that relate to dams include the promotion of sustainable human settlement development, with special emphasis on the provision of adequate infrastructure, minimizing and avoiding

⁴⁴ Further criticism of the WCD relates to its development as a summary of transnational interests, which is discussed in the following sections, and its liability to reproduce neoliberal economic structures and interests (D'Souza 2010).

environmental damage, and ensuring sound Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), among other recommendations, precedes decisions.

The EIA has become widely recognized as a prerequisite to large infrastructure developments. Embedded within regulatory structures of states and procedural requirements of companies EIAs are normally a conditional component for financing and approval of large dams. However, the ability of EIAs to effectively address potential impacts and project feasibility has been dismal (Fisher, 2013). A key identified shortcomings of EIA implementation in this regard is the question of who conducts the EIA as, if the consultant is a party with some vested interest in the project, then there is a risk that “favourable evaluation to minimize the potential impact or overstate the likely effectiveness” (Brian Richter quoted in Livingston, 2013 p.4) will follow. Another serious concern is that often EIAs are too narrow in scope and do not include cumulative impacts, for example from other dams existing on the river (Richard Beilfuss interviewed in Livingston, 2013: 4)(Glasson, *et al.* 1999) .

The effectiveness of EIAs may be improved if conducted by “independent third-party evaluators” who may be from diverse backgrounds so as to diversify the guidelines and recommendations produced (Livingston, 2013: 4). The development of an independent sustainability certification programme for dams has been suggested, to facilitate such relatively objective evaluation. Furthermore, mechanisms to ensure accountability of the consultants to the public or local government should be established so that the reports may be released directly to the public (Richter, Beilfuss and Baird, in Livingston 2013)

Rainey 2013 identifies an important structural shortcoming of EIAs: the exclusion of specific issues by delimiting those the EIA is to focus upon, and – typically – the technocratic preclusion of questions and discourses of resistance. For example “in their specificity towards certain projects ESIA [environmental and social impact assessments] do not allow us to ask the questions: Whose interests are promoting mega –dams? What types of economic development does a community aspire to? What is the full range of alternative options for investing in community infrastructure? And who will pay for the on-going damage caused by a big dam?” (Rainey, 2013: 2). The restrictively technical emphasis of EIA tends to “force community advocates into a technical decision-making frame that does not allow the arguments from a moral, ethical or spiritual standpoint”. (Rainey, 2013: 2)

4.1.3. Development induced displacement and involuntary resettlement

A distinct area of norms under the banner of “Development Induced Displacement” (DID) and more broadly, “Involuntary Resettlement” (IR) has emerged through the 1970s and 1980s in response to increasing sensitivity to the negative socio-economic impacts of large infrastructure projects. ‘DID’ refers to the experiences of evictions and population dislocations to make way for development projects.

The emergence of DID norms has been greatly supported by World Bank assessments of the extent of involuntary displacement induced by infrastructure projects, demonstrating the enormity of this phenomena, which “during the last two decades of the previous century the magnitude of forced population displacements caused by development programs was on the order of 10 million people each year...” (Cernea, 2000: 11). Looking into different causes or categories of DID (water supply- dams, reservoirs, irrigation; transportation—roads, canals, highways; energy—mining, oil extraction; agricultural expansion; among others) the research was an important stage in the emergence of norms.

A 1994 study of all World Bank assisted development projects between 1986 and 1993 concluded the construction of 300 high dams (over 15m in height) displaced 4 million people annually (World Bank Environment Department, 1994). Two key implications of these findings were, first, that empirical evidence now supported and validated the concerns over the growing problem of population displacement as a result of development projects. Second, the costs are disproportionately borne by the poorest and most marginalized and vulnerable populations. This commonly includes “people in poverty; ethnic, racial, religious or political minorities; indigenous peoples”, among other vulnerable groups. (Robinson, 2003: 4)

The UN *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* presented to the UN system by Francis Deng in 1998, the UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, provided an important international document that would do a great service to the emergence of DID norms (Deng, *Guiding Principles on Internal Development*, 1999). Deng, a former Sudanese diplomat, along with a team of international legal scholars drafted the *Guiding Principles* as a non-legally binding document. However, as Deng notes, it is “based on and consistent with international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law by analogy” (Deng, Forward, 1999: i).

Although not specifically addressing or emphasizing development-induced displacement, the broad definition of “internally displaced” extends beyond those displaced by conflict scenarios and in refugee-like situations as well as those displaced by natural or human disasters. Rather it integrates displacement resulting from development projects as principle 6 of the document states that the “prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes cases of large-scale development projects that are not justified by compelling and overriding public interest” (Article 2. C).⁴⁵ The guidelines provide a legal policy framework and serve as an important resource for legal scholarship and application to DID scenarios (Kälin, 2000).

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) concluded that impoverishment and disempowerment were common experiences among those resettled due to dams and hydro-infrastructure construction. The most damaging experiences include deterioration across cultural and economic life as well as deterioration in health and other social measures of well-being. Common experiences among the affected groups include “assetlessness,

⁴⁵ Full quote of Principle 6: “(6.)1. Every human being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence. (6.)2. The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement: ... (c) In cases of large-scale development projects, which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests.” (Deng, 1999)

unemployment, debt-bondage, hunger and cultural disintegration” (Bartolome et al., 2000: 6).

This recognition of the most vulnerable people is articulated in principle 9 of the *Guiding Principles*, which provides that “States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to the land”. Furthermore, the recognition of indigenous peoples rights and the institutionalisation of this in the International Labour Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO convention 169). The convention has, among other things, emphasized the participation of indigenous peoples in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of development projects, which are likely to affect them.

One of the greatest contributors to the emergence of these norms (DID) has been the World Bank, particularly through the work research and policy work of Senior Adviser for Sociology and Social Policy (1974-1997) Michael M. Cernea (1986, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2008).

Cernea’s work on DID over two decades within and outside of the WB merits special mention and acknowledgement. Among other contributions, he argues for a more constructive alliance between economic and sociological knowledge on resettlement, and the need for a shift from the “economics of compensation” towards an “economics of resettlement with development”. Cernea, along with other contributing authors and theorists, played an instrumental role in the development of the Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) model for resettling displaced populations.

The IRR conceptual model, (Cernea, 1990; Cernea, 1995; Cernea, 1996a; Cernea, 1998; Cernea, 1999a; World Bank, 1994) developed through empirical and theoretical foundations, presents a model for resettling displaced populations. At its core, it explains what is expected and what commonly occurs when populations are forcibly displaced and from that it elaborates a theoretical policy guidance tool. Building from three fundamental components of “risk, impoverishment and reconstruction” each component reflects eight interlinked variables which are the impoverishment risks, and when reversed are also the *reconstruction means*. These are from landlessness *to land-based resettlement*, from joblessness *to reemployment*, homelessness *to house reconstruction*, from marginalization *to social inclusion*, from food insecurity *to adequate nutrition*, from increased morbidity *to improved health care*, from loss of access to common property resources *to restoration of community assets and services*, and from community disarticulation *to networks and community rebuilding*. The model serves four basic functions of “predictive, diagnostic, problem-resolution and research”. Widespread

applications of the IRR model have shown its instrumental value in understanding impoverishment risks⁴⁶ and contributing to better resettlement planning.

The Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM) have integrated the *Guiding Principles* into their organizational strategies (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDCM) & Norwegian Refugee Council, 2009). The document reviews the emerging standards for states to address the consequences on populations, with special emphasis on standards derived from human rights law. Reviewing the human rights challenges arising from the construction of dams, it identifies the relevant human rights instruments that safeguard those rights. This includes the **right to participation** (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, : art 25) **with particular emphasis on the participation of indigenous people** (International Labour Organization ILO, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), adopted 27 Jun 1989, entered into force 05 Sep 1991: art 7) **the right to life and livelihood** (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UDHR, Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948, : art 3; ICCPR, 1966: art 6, 17, 23; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICESCR. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1966, : art 6,11) **the rights of vulnerable groups** (UDHR, 1948, : art 2; ICCPR, 1966, : art 2; ICESCR, 1966, : art 2; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 18 December 1979) **and the right to remedy** (UDHR, 1948, : art 8; ICCPR, 1966; United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986)

In 2001, the World Bank revised its policy on Involuntary Resettlement (World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement, 2013) that provides a guideline to safeguard groups displaced by development projects. The new policy (World Bank, OP 4.12: Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement, 2001) addresses a wide range of issues regarding resettlement planning. This includes organizational responsibilities (emphasizing community participation and integration with host populations) socioeconomic surveys, legal frameworks, site selection procedures, valuation of and compensation for lost assets, land tenure issues, access to training employment and credit by resettled peoples, shelter, infrastructure, social services provision among others (World Bank, Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook Planning

⁴⁶ Ota (1996) applied to India's Rengali project showed that landlessness risk increased, Mbrungu (1993) and Cook (1993) show how in Kenya Kiambere Hydropower project, resettled farmers saw their land sizes drop as well as their agricultural productivity and incomes. Reconstruction of social disarticulation inherent in displacement and resettlement is rarely deliberately pursued but cases where they have been in Ethiopia (Woldesalassie, 2000) through restoring religious village associations for example have been successful. In Sudan a good example of such deliberate effort to maintain community articulation and harmony is found in the planning and implementation of Jebel Awliya dam in which the reconstructed villages took on the same architectural landscape and planning as the old villages but on an expanded scale "so that the child who used to go from his parent's house to his grandparent's home can follow the same twists and turns of the alleyways" (Hashim, 2014 conversation). This was among other social considerations such as participation of affected people as labourers in construction of new homes.

and Implementation in Development Project, 2004). The basic principle of the policy is that displaced people should enjoy greater benefits of the project and their standards of living should be improved or at least not degraded. Although the revised resettlement provisions of the WB have been criticized for weakening standards, the policies and recommendations of the WB have served as a model for the Involuntary resettlement policies of other regional development banks and organizations (Inter-American Development Bank, IADB, 1998; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, 1992; Asian Development Bank, ADB, Involuntary Resettlement, 1995; ADB, Involuntary Resettlement Safeguards A Planning and Implementation Good Practice Sourcebook – Draft Working Document, 2012).

4.2 Justice

This section reviews the elements of justice employed to examine the resistance of the people affected by the Merowe dam. Justice theory is steeped in moral and philosophical propositions, and “justice” as a concept is a highly normative and subjective matter. For this reason, the study of justice in contemporary political sciences is commonly linked to the empirical claims of various movements for justice.⁴⁷

4.2.1. Environmental Justice

The concept of environmental justice (Schlosberg 2004, Schlosberg 2007, Sikor 2013) (Walker, 2009; Walker, 2011; Harvey, 1996) extends beyond classical justice theories which emphasize distributive justice within the confines of a democratic state society. It deals with how justice is invoked in the struggles of different social actors, in particular to over access to and control of resources. Drawing conclusions from mainly US-based empirical analysis of justice claims made in particular environmental justice mobilizations⁴⁸ (Schlosberg 2004), environmental justice theory is elaborated as a framework consisting of three interrelated dimensions.

These dimensions of justice are distributive, participative, and recognition. Within the strand of environmental justice thinking, distributive justice is concerned with how environmental goods (benefits) and bads (risks) are allocated among the different social actors involved. Participatory or procedural justice refers to the active contribution of different social actors in the environmental decision-making process. Recognition has to do with the way that social actors’ cultural identities and ways of life are recognized. The interrelatedness of these dimensions is empirically reflected in the interlinked nature of justice claims, which call for all three dimensions to be addressed simultaneously. “Justice then requires not just an understanding of unjust distribution and a lack of recognition, but importantly, the way the

⁴⁷ Although, this field of literature has arguably emerged out of critiques to political philosophy and ethic literature dealing with theories of justice, such as John Rawls (1971) *Theory of Justice*, Charles Taylor (1976) *The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice*, and other liberal justice theorists.

⁴⁸ Namely, within the context of globalized movements against the new global economy run by the WTO, IMF and WB global institutions, focus is on movements for food sovereignty, and indigenous peoples movements—both movements protest “...systems and processes that deprive people of their land based livelihoods...”. (Scholsberg 2004: 523-524)

two are tied together in political and social process [i.e. of procedure/participation]” (Schlosberg 2004: 528).

4.2.2. Social justice

Theorizations of justice emerging out of substantive claims of movements have taken “pluralist” or “contextualist” approaches (see e.g. (Wenz, 1988)(Zwarteveen and Boelens 2011). Pluralistic views of justice accept that a wide range of notions of what just exists simultaneously, whilst the contextualists emphasize that the plurality is context specific and is shaped by the particular situations. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive and their compatibility is reflected in the strategy of movements — as various groups may appeal to plural notions of justice in articulating context specific grievances and legitimizing local claims (which as we will see is very much the case in regards to the Merowe dam). This dynamic allows for the existence of unity among different local struggles on a global scale without the insistence of uniformity to the shape and demands of particular movements.

Indeed, environmental justice theories owe much of their developments to contemporary social justice literature, particularly in the emphasis of recognition and its participatory component to address distributive injustices (Young, 1990; Fraser, 2003; Fraser, 1998b; Fraser, 2000; Fraser, 2001; Honneth, 1995) Based on analysis of “new social movements”⁴⁹ of the 1960s and 1970s, these theorists have drawn attention to the underlying reasons of misdistributions. In a seminal work, Young offers an exhaustive critique of the distributive paradigm and calls for a greater focus on the “social structures and processes that produce distributions rather than on the distributions” (1990: 18). The study of ‘justice’ should thus acknowledge and incorporate the differences in social groups, namely between the “privileged” and the “oppressed”, which operate in democratic societies through the cultural imperialism of the former in the denigration and silencing of the latter. Recognition is the primary means of correcting such a bias, as “a democratic public should provide mechanisms for the effective recognition and representation of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged.” (Young, 2005: 95) Young argues, “participatory democracy is an element and condition of social justice” (1990: 183).

Fraser (1998b) similarly asserts the insufficiency of the distributive lens by drawing attention to a distinction in the types of social injustices different groups are subject to. She argues that the integration of redistribution and recognition in the study of social movements is a necessity to understanding the injustices on both socioeconomic and cultural levels.

On the one hand, socioeconomic injustices (exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation) have occupied theories of distributive justice undergirded by strong egalitarian

⁴⁹ Social movements in post-war era dominated by issues of labour and nations, but since the 1960s “new social movements” are centered on concerns such as gender, race, sexuality, and cultural identity. Young (1990) looks at black liberation, women movements, and American Indian movements in the U.S. Fraser (1998) looks at similar cases of women and race as well as sexuality in the gay and lesbian identity politics.

normative presumptions (Rawls, 1971; Sen, 2009). On the other hand, cultural injustices (cultural domination, non-recognition, communicative and interpretive practices of one's culture and disrespect) have occupied theorists stressing recognition as a key component in contemporary struggles over identity and difference (Fraser, 1998a; Honneth, 1995). However when "bivalent collectivises" or groups that are subject to both socioeconomic and cultural injustice at the same time make both kinds of claims simultaneously,⁵⁰ there is a much needed redress to the theoretical limitations (Fraser 1998b). Similarly to Young, Fraser highlights the participatory derivative of recognition, as she argues the two faces of the bivalency "...intertwine to reinforce one another dialectically...impeding equal participation in the making of culture, in public spheres and in everyday life." (1998b: 440)

4.2.3. Sudanese/Nubian/Meroitic conceptions of justice

Though substantial literature was searched and the authors of this report are steeped in Meroitic culture and language, no concept of justice *per se* has been recorded in relation to the people and tribes living around the Nile's fourth cataract. This may have key implications on the search for a theory of justice, both in the previous discussions of environmental and social justice and in local conceptions of justice. It suggests that "justice" is not an exogenously held belief which is applied to social realities, but rather develops and emerges out of articulations of injustices, very much in-line with the pluralistic approach to justice. In this regard, based on preliminary findings from interviews with affected people and community members, (see Section 6) the expressed grievances, in terms of un-met expectations for compensation and resettlement among others, serve to develop a notion of justice which is implicitly associated with a level of 'satisfaction', however broadly constituted. The local notion of justice is also composed of a sense of honour in ways not explored further here, but evidenced by the wide use of the concept (through the term 'Karazay-at' (see Section 6.4).

4.3 Transnational mobilization and activism

The co-existence and reinforcement of justice notions understood from the plural and contextual justice perspectives enables the emergence of unified transnational justice mobilizations that maintain their distinct contextual ambitions. The study of transnational justice mobilizations can broadly be categorized into analysis of the interaction between dynamic of global (or higher level mobilizations) with local (or 'site specific') struggles, as well as the interaction of these different scales of mobilizations with international norms.

The dynamic interaction between local justice mobilizations and transnational actors in global mobilizations is an expansive field of enquiry (Bulkeley, 2005; McFarlane, 2009; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002; Lipschutz, 1992; Falk, 1993; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Mittelman, 2000; Florini, 2000). The key transnational actors are identified to be international non-governmental organization (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002) although other non-state

⁵⁰ Such as women, blacks, American Indians, gays and lesbians.

actors include professional groups, foundations, and epistemic communities. A typology of essential types of transnational action includes three categories of *transnational advocacy networks* (from Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002):

informal configurations bound by shared values and characterized by exchange of information and services;

transnational coalitions—characterized by coordinated action shared strategies and formalized campaigns; and

transnational movements—which have a greater capacity to coordinate sustained mobilizations across national boundaries

Transnational mobilizations link with local struggles based on a number of common issues. Analysis thus requires specific framing activities of transnational actors, in which local struggles are understood within frames of wider struggles (thus re-articulating issues to reflect common themes). However, the transnational / cross boundary interactions may be influenced by a variety of factors. Aside from the interests of international actors in local struggles for their own strategic or institutional agendas, closed or repressive authoritarian domestic regimes and relatively open international opportunity structures may push domestic actors in into the transnational arena.

The function of transnational actors is to primarily serve as “makers and managers of meaning” (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002) and through their framing activities, they are involved in the creation and enforcement of international norms (see also Wapner 2002). International norms in turn provide the resources and political opportunities for local actors to draw on in the development and legitimization of claims.

The World Commission on Dams (WCD), for example, has been interpreted to have emerged out of the efforts of the transnational coalition against the Narmada River Valley projects in India⁵¹ (Khagram, 2000a). Specifically out of shared global experiences and solidarities among struggles against large dams in general (for example, in Brazil, Thailand, and Uganda, where movement against World Bank financed projects were mounting). The transnational coalition and the coordinated global efforts the “entire spectrum of stakeholders” in the creation of the WCD, including social movements, peoples organizations, leaders of anti-dam movements, indigenous peoples, senior representatives of financial institutions and corporations, trans-boundary networks of dam-affected communities, support groups and the extended global alliances — were successful in addressing negative impacts of large dams through a democratic process of the commission (Kothari, 2002: 238).

The outcomes of coordinated transnational efforts for the Narmada dams in India have been viewed as a success through the delaying and halting of construction works (see e.g. Mehta

⁵¹ The Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save Narmada Movement) was composed of a coalition of national and transnational NGOs directed against the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada River and the international financing institutions of the World Bank. The project was expected to displace 120,000 and submerge an area of 370 km² (Shihata, 2000). See also Sneddon and Fox (2008) for analysis of the use of the WCD to the Pak Mun dam in Thailand, and the Mphanda Nkuwa dam in Mozambique.

2001). This success is attributed to “...the existence of a sustained grassroots social movement and the political opportunities presented by India’s democratic regime....[which enabled] domestic groups to act with less fear of, and at least with the right to legally contest, physical repression” (Khagram, 2002: 207). However, others argue that what might have been a global success of the transnational movement against the dam was a local failure for those directly affected by the proposed dam (Randeira, 2003).

Randeira (2003) argues that while the local movements against Narmada initially focused on issues of just compensation for land and livelihood loss, fair resettlement and rehabilitation policies and implementation. These demands were overshadowed by the agenda and priorities of transnational campaigns focused on the action of multilateral banks. The complex contradictions of the Narmada dam movement are explored by Jai Sen (1999) who outlines how the dynamics of local resistance was shaped by the choice of arenas of negotiation and use of international institutions. Whilst the campaign “succeeded” in affecting structural changes in the World Bank lending policies, domestic legal action in the Supreme Court of India failed to produce just outcomes.⁵²

⁵² After six years of deliberation the court dismissed all objections regarding environmental and rehabilitation issues. See Randeira (2003) for full discussion on limitations of domestic legal action by citizens against the state.

SECTION 2 – DATA AND ANALYSIS

5 Results of the questionnaires

5.1 Introduction to the data collection, and limitations

The structured questionnaires were administered in four locations in which affected people resided. Three of the locations (New Hamdab, New Amri and Makabrab) were formal resettlement sites, and one was a 'local option' site (Manasir) – see Figure 5.1. Fifty respondents were randomly sampled from each site (totalling at a sample size of 200 respondents), with an equal distribution of males and females (25 of each). A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Annex C.

The questions were designed to discern the level of satisfaction among people affected by the construction of the dam on issues of compensation, resettlement, state-provided services, the success of agriculture and livelihoods. The questionnaire also sought the respondents' assessments of the social and cultural impacts. Answers were presented on a five-point scale of justice: fair, reasonable, unreasonable, unfair, and clearly unsatisfactory (or not applicable). 'Satisfaction', as we shall see, is integral to the local concept of justice, and so the last option is understood to reflect extreme injustice.

Limitations of the questionnaires derive from either the nature of the method, or the angle chosen. The broad way in which the questionnaires address the issues, for instance, is a product of the short time span (three days) that security reasons dictated. The questions are clearly subjective, as well, and answers are expected to reflect a 'lead' followed by the respondents. Such limitations dictate that concrete conclusions (and sophisticated quantitative analysis) be avoided, and remedied by significant contextualization made possible by the commentaries which accompanied the scaled answers, and secondary sources (e.g. *Latest picture from the Ground, Manasir, Amri and Hamdab* By Dr. M. Jalal Hashim). Commentaries were available only for the questionnaires, which were administered by team members and not by the research assistants.

The discussion, which accompanies the presentation of data, draws on earlier field surveys compiled in unpublished paper written by one of the authors,⁵³ and this serves to contextualize the raw data findings.

5.2 Introduction to the surveyed sites

Official resettlements


New Hamdab⁵⁴ (also known as El Multaga), is the new home of the Hamdab dam affected people and is located approximately 100km from their original village (termed 'Old Hamdab'). The residents were resettled to the site in 2003, during the phase of the dam's construction, as they resided on the site of construction itself. The bulk of the residents originally willingly accepted the government's arrangements for compensation and resettlement. However, two

⁵³ "*Latest picture from the Ground, Manasir, Amri and Hamdab*" By Dr. M. Jalal Hashim, 2013.

⁵⁴ New Hamdab is made up of two villages with 450 houses each.

years after resettlement, reports of increased poverty and deteriorating conditions indicated how government provisions failed to meet expectations. The data that follows indicates their own perceptions of their conditions almost a decade later. A minority of members of this community remained in Old Hamdab, which is located 45km downstream of the dam. These residents were not offered any compensation or resettlement provisions.

Figure 5.1 (recall). Locations of resettlement village groups New Hamdab (for Hamdab communities), New Amri (for Amri communities), Makabrab (for Manasir communities), and the 'Local Option' (for the Manasir who refused resettlement). Arrows point from the original villages on the river (now totally or partially submerged by the reservoir) towards the resettlement village groups.



The Amri and Manasir communities were more clearly divided between those willing to resettle, and those resisting relocation and opting for unofficial settlement along the reservoir shore. The resettled Amri people reside in the Wadi Al Mugadam (New Amri)⁵⁵ resettlement project located in the Bayouda dessert approximately 100km from Merowe. The government built two resettlement sites for the Manasir, (which composed the largest group of affected people) the Makabrab Scheme⁵⁶ near Atbara River and El Damer town, and the al Fida Scheme near Abu Hamad. The former site was selected for data collection.

The divide in these communities between those wanting to stay and develop the local option and those willing to accept government provision has created sometimes significant social

⁵⁵ New Amri is made up of five villages.

⁵⁶ The Makabrab settlement is composed of six villages, each consisting of 960 houses with the exception of village 6 made up of 1800 houses. With the exception of village No. 5 which is fully inhabited, the other villages have significant numbers of vacant houses.

tensions, which is understood to be exacerbated and incited by government interventions. As discussed in greater detail following (and in Section 5), the most severe case of disruption was with the Manasir communities

Unofficial settlement along the reservoir (the ‘local option’)

About one-sixth of Amri and two-thirds of Manasir (based on census requesting local option) and to a lesser extent Hamdab, people have resisted the formal resettlement arrangements requiring them to be relocated away from the reservoir and to government planned resettlement sites. These resisters live in ad hoc villages along the reservoir that have been rebuilt by the respective communities themselves after the devastating floods. In light of the refusal of the state to endorse the local option for resettlement, these residents have taken it upon themselves from 2008 to restart their lives and rebuild their livelihoods along the reservoir, sometimes right beside their half- or fully-submerged homes. As such, they also live independent of State services (such as electricity provided by the dam) or other forms of support. Old Hamdab, Old Amri and Manasir local option sites are all located along the reservoir shore.

The surveyed local option sites are all from Manasir territories and include samples from 8 neighbouring villages along the west side of the reservoir (Al Ganawiet, Abu Remailah, Um Belgi, Al Takarna, Al Hiba Gharib, Al Hiba Sheirik, Kabna, Um Dweyma). Although some data collected in semi-structured interviews with women from the Amri village Birti, is integrated into the discussion below.

5.3 Transparency and the 1999 Census

Official compensation and resettlement arrangements to the affected people included provisions of housing, land, and services (agricultural, irrigation, health, education, electricity), as well as monetary compensation for lost assets (see Section 2). The provisions were based on a census and property accounting, which was conducted in 1999 by the DIU.⁵⁷ The story that emerged during data collection phases was one with major themes of inadequacy and unfulfilled expectations.

The level of transparency characterizing the interaction of the dam authorities with the people in general communication is shown in Table 5.1. Contextual information (discussed previously) suggests that the low level of transparency can be attributed in large part due to the manner in which the DIU conducted the 1999 census.

<p>Table 5.1. Level of transparency through which the state representing the management of dams engaged in communicating the necessary information for those affected</p>
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⁵⁷ DIU is referred to elsewhere as “dam authorities”.

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	Unfair	There was no transparency whatsoever
New Hamdab	0%	0%	4%	14%	82%
New Amri	0%	16%	10%	28%	46%
Makabrab (Manasir)	40%	20%	8%	12%	20%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	6%	94%

As the data shows, 94% of Manasir in the local option (i.e. those who refused resettlement), 82% of resettled Hamdab and 46% of resettled Amri feel that there was ‘no transparency whatsoever’ in the communication of information. In specific reference to the 1999 census, this lack of transparency was in the form of partial disclosure to the census’ purpose, and people were under the impression that it was for taxation purposes. As such, the respondents openly profess that they understated their belongings and assets, and that had they known it was a study to form the basis of future compensation, they would have reacted differently. Further flaws of the 1999 census have been cited in relation to other compensation grievances covered below.

The anomaly of Makabrab

Whilst the majority responses in the three regions discussed above lay between the parameters of answers 4-5 (unfair-no transparency), the majority of responses in Makabrab lay between answers 1-2 (fair-reasonable, makes up 60% of answers). As we shall see, such contrasting positive assessments provided by Makabrab inhabitants are consistent throughout the questionnaire.

The variation may be explained in part by the location of Makabrab. Situated close to the Atbara River and El-Damer town, it is better for agriculture and livelihoods than the more remote desert locations of New Amri and New Hamdab. The proximity to urban centres and central location of the site allows ample opportunities for further diversification of income generating activities, this, as will be shown below, is opposed to the need for migration among New Hamdab and New Amri inhabitants in the face of failing agricultural schemes. Better control and access to livelihood resources (especially the reliability of irrigation and consequent success of agricultural initiatives) is another key explanatory factor.

In light of the social schism amongst Manasir people who accepted resettlement and those who resisted (see “Karazay” story in section 5.6) another possibility to explain the anomaly of Makabrab positive assessments could be the existence of a positive bias among the Makabrab Manasir in an attempt to justify or reconcile their decision, a speculation offered by others during key interviews. These disparities are illuminated further below.

5.4 Level of satisfaction with compensation

The affected people's satisfaction with the compensation they received is discerned through specific focus on the compensation for houses, livelihood resources (agricultural land/products, livestock) and freehold agricultural land.⁵⁸ The local option Manasir did not receive compensation for any of these assets, and as such have in the majority consistently answered on the 'unjust' end of the questionnaire. The discussion is thus focused on the three-resettlement sites. The local option experience gathered from field observations and informal interviews are covered in the next section.

5.4.1. Compensation for houses

Each family that was entitled to compensation was to receive a house consisting of two rooms and utilities.⁵⁹ The majority of responses from New Hamdab and New Amri reflect dissatisfaction with the compensation for housing that they received as 46% and 40% respectively responded "unfair" – see Table 5.2.

Among the identified reasons for the high rates of dissatisfaction with compensation is again the 1999 census, in particular it's timing. According to the affected people, the census, which was taken many years before compensation was received (in some cases almost 10 years later), was unable to account for new additions to the family as a result of the significant time gap. A single family in 1999 with five child sons could be five separate families by 2008, for example, yet would be compensated with one new house. Furthermore, any new houses that were built since 1999 were not compensated.

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	Unfair	There was no compensation whatsoever
New Hamdab	0%	34%	18%	46%	2%
New Amri	16%	12%	24%	40%	8%
Makabrab	40%	30%	6%	22%	2%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

⁵⁸ Two categories of land ownership in Sudan are leased land (*hikar*) and freehold land (*mulkah hurra*). The latter is fully owned by the person whereas the former is leased on long-term basis from the state. Freehold land was registered prior to 1925 under the Land Registration Act instated by the British. All unclaimed land after this date became state land and was leased to the population over a long-term basis and for low-rent, or *atab*, payments. Both land ownership are subject to inheritance and *hikari* lease is continually renewed over generations.

⁵⁹ Each house consisted of 2 rooms aligned with each other and separated by a small corridor. They also contain a kitchen, one pit latrine and an outer wall. The rooms are built with unbaked bricks from within and baked bricks from outside. The outer walls are built of unbaked mud bricks and the roof is made of corrugated metal sheets which absorbs heat.

Furthermore, recognition of people entitled to housing compensation was generally cited by respondents – ‘unfair’ or worse to 80% from New Hamdab and 78% from New Amri (Table 5.3). The dam authorities disqualified any families that were not permanently residing in the affected areas and decided to only recognize the entitlements of permanent residents and those with regular ties (such as those with a wife or mother in the area). Due to the common occurrence of migration in the region, many people with assets such as houses, fields, palm trees and lands were pushed out of their entitlements.

Region	Fair	reasonable	unreasonable	unfair	(5) There is no compensation whatsoever
New Hamdab	0%	12	8%	68%	12%
New Amri	0%	10%	12%	42%	36%
Makabrab	10%	48%	14%	18%	10%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	20%	80%

5.4.2. Compensation for livelihood resources

In consistency with the concerns over the census discussed above, many families received less than they were entitled to, whilst others received nothing. Inadequate counting of assets such as palm trees, livestock and land were seen to result in further distortions. The effect of these shortcomings is made worse by the method of payment, which is covered in six instalments over a period of six years. The set compensation figure is not adjusted for inflation and as such each palm tree compensated at SDG 500 (at 1999 rates) continues to depreciate as time goes on. These reasons have warranted the responses of unfair livelihood resource compensation of 72%, 50% and 30% of New Hamdab, Amri and Makabrab respondents respectively (Table 5.4).

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	Unfair	There was no compensation whatsoever
New Hamdab	0%	10%	8%	72%	10%
New Amri	4%	8%	30%	50%	8%
Makabrab	2%	34%	22%	30%	12%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	2%	98%

5.4.3. Compensation for freehold agricultural land

Poor entitlement recognition also applies in the compensation for freehold agricultural land, as only those that were acknowledged as permanent residents in the affected areas were recognized as owning freehold land. However, even those that were entitled to such land have yet to receive compensation, as 74% of New Amri and 54% of Makabrab respondents confirm (Table 5.5).

Region	(1) Fair	(2) Reasonable	(3) Unreasonable	(4) Unfair	(5) There was no compensation whatsoever
New Hamdab	2%	14%	14%	46%	24%
New Amri	0%	4%	6%	16%	74%
Makabrab	16%	12%	12%	6%	54%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	2%	98%

5.4.4. Compensation for agricultural and irrigation schemes

Every family with recognized entitlements received six feddans of land as a 'donation'. This land was incorporated into an agricultural scheme with provisions of irrigation.

In Makabrab, the new agricultural projects are judged as relatively successful, with 54% reporting a successful agricultural season in the first year of resettlement (Table 5.8). The soil in this region has been good for growing citrus fruit trees and also suitable for growing date palm, as reflected in the 70% ranking of 'fair' (Table 5.6). Furthermore, irrigation in the Makabrab is very regular and satisfying, confirmed by 66% of respondents (Table 5.7). Electric pumps typically operate the irrigation and the relatively flat land means that little levelling is required. The reliable and continuous flow of water in this region has enabled some to grow foliage fodder crops for their livestock rearing as well, for sale to pastoral tribes that frequent the area (a very lucrative activity).

In stark contrast, irrigation in New Hamdab (100% unfair) and New Amri (80% unfair) (Table 5.7) has been inconsistent and unreliable. Contextual information has explained that this is due to repeated failures of the main irrigation pumps, which must lift water up three levels before reaching the fields. In New Hamdab, this failure of pumps has also resulted in acute water shortages even for domestic use, and at the time of the field visits many were still depending on (much more expensive) water tanks filled at the Nile and trucked overland to the villages.

The unreliable water supply in these two sites contributed greatly to failing agriculture, as 96% of New Hamdab's and 44% of New Amri's first season of agriculture was unsuccessful (Table 5.8). Furthermore, the distance between the village and the agricultural land is greater in these two sites, 98% unfair (i.e. 'far') in New Hamdab and 88% in New Amri (Table 5.9), and the only means of transportation is by donkeys.

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	Unfair	There is no land because there is no new homeland
New Hamdab	4%	36%	24%	34%	2%
New Amri	2%	40%	22%	32%	4%
Makabrab	70%	14%	0%	10%	6%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	8%	92%

Region	Fair (successful)	Reasonable	Unreasonable	unfair (failing)	There is no irrigation because there is no new homeland
New Hamdab	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
New Amri	2%	8%	8%	80%	2%
Makabrab	66%	18%	4%	6%	6%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	12%	88%

Region	Fair (successful)	Reasonable	Unreasonable	unfair (failing)	There is no agriculture because there is no new homeland
New Hamdab	0%	0%	4%	96%	0%
New Amri	4%	30%	14%	44%	8%
Makabrab	54%	40%	2%	4%	0%

Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	2%	12%	86%
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Table 5.9. Distance between the village and the agricultural scheme as the main source of subsistence compared to the situation in the old homeland where all the sources of subsistence were within the boundaries of the village

Region	Fair (close proximity)	Reasonable	Unreasonable	unfair (far)	There is no agriculture scheme
New Hamdab	0%	2%	0%	98%	0%
New Amri	0%	0%	4%	88%	8%
Makabrab	26%	38%	8%	24%	4%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	2%	4%	94%

5.5 Level of satisfaction with resettlement

5.5.1. Provision of Services

The resettlement sites are equipped with schools and health centres, the likes of which were not present in their old locations. Each new village has two primary schools and two secondary schools (one for each gender). The schools are generally well built and maintained, and they are also well staffed and funded. This is well reflected in the 84% of Makabrab that responded fair to service provision (Table 5.10). Health care provision has also improved, as each village has a medical centre and the proximity of resettlement sites to large urban areas further facilitates access to health care.

However mixed reviews in the other resettlement villages (72% unfair in New Hamdab and distribution between 30% reasonable and 26% unfair in New Amri) indicate the relative significance of livelihood resources and agricultural success to services of health education and electricity (Table 5.10). As one woman in New Hamdab commented, “Inshalla (*God willing*) we sit in the dark, just give us water!” reflecting the primacy of water (for livelihoods, and dignity) to electrified housing.

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	unfair	There is no new homeland and no services and no electricity Homeland
New Hamdab	2%	20%	6%	72%	0%
New Amri	24%	30%	20%	26%	0%
Makabrab	84%	4%	6%	6%	0%
Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%

5.5.2. Livelihood outcomes in all locations

The new adapted livelihoods of the Manasir local option people relies on hill terrace farming, rudimentary gold mining and fishing from the reservoir, and 88% have classified their experience of livelihood outcomes as unfair, being dependent upon these activities and charity of others (Islamic *zakat*) for subsistence (Table 5.11).

The resettlement sites of New Hamdab and New Amri are similarly bleak in their assessment of their livelihoods, as 98% and 50% respectively have similarly classified themselves. This is in contrast to the residents of Makabrab, where 54% of which claim that the livelihood options they have in agriculture and livestock are rewarding and therefore fair (Table 5.11).

Region	Fair (rewarding-agriculture and livestock)	reasonable (available through effort: agriculture and livestock)	unreasonable (available with great difficulty-agriculture and livelihood)	unfair (unattainable at all- subsistence through zakat and fishing from the lake and small-scale gold mining)	(5) Immigration away from the village (no livelihood options available)
New Hamdab	0%	0%	2%	98%	0%
New Amri	0%	12%	16%	50%	22%
Makabrab	54%	22%	12%	6%	6%

Manasir Local Option	0%	0%	12%	88%	0%
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5.6 Social impacts among all affected people

As mentioned earlier, the social rift created amongst local option settlers and officially resettled members of each community has been experienced primarily within the Manasir communities. Great bitterness and a sense of betrayal has been cultivated by the local option Manasir towards their fellow Manasir that promoted resettlement – and as we will see later, the latter are referred to as ‘Karazayat’ (Karzai’s), after the man chosen by the US as president of Afghanistan (as explained in greater detail in Section 6.4.1).

The rift is to the extent that a member of local option community would no longer receive his brother from the Makabrab when the latter came to pay homage and respect for the dead. This schism in the community has recently started to mend, and relations between families are being restored.

Other factors contributing to social divisions have been the loss of entitlements to land in the old homelands by newly resettled members of the community. This is the case for the New Hamdab respondents, of whom 62% have expressed the unfairness the experience with regards to this loss (Table 5.12). This may be reflected in their perceptions of broken ties with Old Hamdab respondents, of whom 54% report unfair or abnormal relations (

Table 5.13. Relationship between those who moved to the new homeland and those who stayed in the local option (along the reservoir of old homeland)

).

Table 5.12. The preservation of claims to land in the old homeland alongside claims to land in the new homeland

Region	Fair	Reasonable	Unreasonable	unfair	There is no new homeland and no services and no electricity Homeland
New Hamdab	6%	28%	4%	62%	0%
New Amri	10%	10%	16%	52%	12%
Makabrab	56%	6%	12%	18%	8%
Manasir Local Option	0%	2%	0%	26%	72%

Region	Fair (Normal)	reasonable	unreasonable	unfair (not normal)	There is no relationship whatsoever
New Hamdab	28%	8%	10%	54%	0%
New Amri	18%	30%	14%	30%	8%
Makabrab	46%	34%	4%	14%	2%
Manasir Local Option	4%	10%	16%	34%	36%

5.7 What would be done differently in hindsight?

The questionnaire data has painted a mixed picture. The livelihood outcomes in the resettlement sites of New Hamdab and New Amri are generally 'unjust' or inadequate, and this should be read against the relative satisfaction ('just') in Makabrab. Asked their position on the dam if they could return to the time before its construction reflects the variation in experience. 56% of Makabrab find it was reasonable and would accept it but negotiate for better positions, while 68% of local option Manasir and 74% of New Hamdab reject it or oppose the dam. 32% felt the same way in New Amri, though 44% would accept it but escalate protests to obtain better development (Table 5.14).

Region	(1) Fair (full support)	(2) reasonable (negotiate a better position)	3) unreasonable (escalate protests to obtain better development)	(4) unfair (reject it all together)	(5) Anti-dam construction by all means
New Hamdab	4%	4%	18%	32%	42%
New Amri	8%	16%	44%	16%	16%
Makabrab	28%	56%	14%	0%	2%
Manasir Local Option	0%	2%	30%	50%	18%

5.8 The Manasir local option story: independence and self-reliance

The story of the people that have resisted resettlement to live along the reservoir is in large part one of self-reliance. After losing the bulk of their possessions to the filling of the reservoir

in 2008, they have rebuilt their homes and lives with no governmental support. In the Manasir areas, the communities' independent settlement reconstruction (without state support) has taken place despite the construction of two government resettlements in the local option (Abu Haraz on the east bank and Um Sarih on the west bank). These two sites now stand as abandoned (or yet to be inhabited) – ghost towns – primarily due to the inadequacy and lack of sanitary utilities.

The Manasir's continuous battles with the authorities to be compensated for their loss have yielded little results. After a long struggle partial compensation for lost palm trees was paid, but this was deemed neither sufficient nor adequate.

No formal agricultural schemes or irrigation provisions have been provided. The people have instead adapted by taking up the initiative to cultivate newly cut terraces on the hills of the reservoir. Furthermore, flood recession cultivation of grains and fodder has been adapted over 5 years, following the people's understanding of the (new) water level fluctuations in their immediate areas. This agricultural activity produces only 20% of their needs, with the rest supplemented from other areas. Fishing from the reservoir has emerged as a subsistence and livelihood activity among these communities.

The dam authorities built two schools in Um Sarih and one in Al-Sabhib, which the Manasir send their young to. However, the people themselves provide all health services. There are three hospitals built and run by the people (Kabna, Sherri and al Qab), most of which have only one qualified doctors. Health centres built by the people are functioning on 10% of their capacity.

Based on field visit and interviews with women in Kabna, the area is not connected to the main electricity grid and those who can afford to, power their houses only during the night using diesel fuel generators. Furthermore, the settlements were built on a temporary basis (with hopes of moving to government sites) and as such the latrines pits were not dug deep enough. This has been identified as posing a sanitation hazard.

6 Findings from the interviews and workshop

6.1 Introduction

This section presents and discusses the testimonies of stakeholders and actors involved in the Merowe dam that were gathered during semi-structured interviews and workshop proceedings in February and March of 2014.

A total of 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted with people from the affected communities, in the villages in question as well as in Khartoum. The group included prominent activists, journalists, and dam affected peoples (DAP) committee members. The former Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, and head of YAM Consultancy and Development (which conducted the YAM study on the feasibility of rebuilding on the reservoir shore), and the former Nile Basin Initiative ENTRO National Flood Coordinator and national water expert (HY) were also interviewed. Various interviews during field visits were conducted, including group interviews with women in the local option sites of Kabna (Manasir) and Birti (Amri) as well as in the resettlement sites of New Amri and New Hamdab. Furthermore, interviewees with schoolteachers in Kahera resettlement site, farmers in New Amri and New Hamdab, and artisanal gold miners outside al Qab village were conducted during a second visit.

A workshop was held at Khartoum Museum of Natural History (March 6) where activists and academics gathered to discuss this project's 'justice' approach to the Merowe dam issue. Many members of the three Affected Peoples Committees were present, including current and former presidents of Amri and Manasir committees, as well as a DIU representative, representatives from national civil society organizations, and anti-dam committee members for other proposed dams in northern Sudan (e.g. Kajbar), as well as a single Nubian person from Khashm al Girba (resettled by the Aswan High Dam). The proceedings of the workshop were recorded and testimonies of the speakers are included in the following discussion. For a full list of the semi-structured interviewees and workshop participants see Annex D.

Figure 6.1. Group interview held at New Kahela village, 04 March 2014.



The presentation of this section is structured according to the main themes that arose in interviews and workshop discussion: the consultation and interaction process with regards to resettlement and compensation—with special emphasis on the processes surrounding the local option (section 5.1); Testimonies of the main events, namely the sudden flooding and filling of the reservoir, the Amri massacre, various protests and the corresponding responses

of the state (section 5.2); the overall treatment of the State, with specific emphasis on the divisive actions against the affected people, State oppression with regards to protestors and activists, and representation of the issues through monopoly on the media (Section 5.3); and the impact of external actors and intervention, from Khartoum and beyond (section 5.4).

The various interviewees are referred to below using the initials of their names, whilst the workshop speakers (WS) are numbered based on their order of speaking at the event. Refer to Annex D for full list of respondents.

6.2 The story of consultation/ forced interaction

The Manasir saw how we were eaten by the crocodile, and the result of this was the resistance – New Hamdab activist

Dam affected peoples committees were established by the government before 1999 to aid in the resettlement process. The following presents the people's testimonies of the interaction process, with special emphasis on the experiences of negotiating the local option, and the outcomes of this process for the affected people.

6.2.1. The story of being resettled and of staying behind ('local option')

The testimonies reveal that the interaction between the state and the affected communities concerning resettlement planning and implementation is characterized by a lack of transparency, consultation, and participation as well as ignored or neglected governmental procedures and formal commitments, and harsh measures of forced eviction and resettlement.

Lack of transparency

"In the process, from the beginning, there is no transparency" (WS1ⁱ)

The testimonies of the government's lack of transparency and deliberate misinformation regarding Merowe has come through in numerous discussions with affected people and other national actors. In specific reference to the resettlement process of the Manasir, this manifested itself in two main ways. Firstly, people were initially presented with plans for a Makabrab settlement that looked very different from what it turned out to be – as a riverside settlement, for example (MWC-TMKⁱⁱ, OHⁱⁱⁱ). Secondly, not all resettlement location possibilities were disclosed by the authorities in their discussions with affected people, and there was deliberate concealment of the option to stay behind (WS3^{iv}). Additionally, and in keeping with the questionnaire results (Section 4), the compensation procedures which accompanied the resettlement provisions were based on a population census which "was not at all a transparent census" (OH^v), as people were under the impression that it was for taxation purposes and therefore understated their assets and incomes.

Lack of consultation/participation

“The whole issue [of resettlement] has been taken by the Merowe administration, and the other people were not [genuinely] participating” (WS1^{vi})

According to the current president of the Manasir Committee, consultation processes were limited to resettlement issues, and the construction of the dam itself, for instance, were not put up for discussion. He says, “...if we had a choice whether the dam could be in our area or not, the dam would never be built, because we knew the ways which the management of affairs has been...would never bring justice, because justice is fulfilled through...a conducive environment in general, which you cannot pick and choose from”. His statement was indicating that the socio-political situation in Sudan was enough to guarantee the outcome would be unjust, noting also that “the people in power don’t care about what the people below decide” (WS3^{vii}).

Formal procedures of resettlement site selection initially engaged the affected people through the United Dam Affected Peoples Committee. This resettlement site search committee of 6 members (2 from each group of affected people, Hamdab, Amri and Manasir) identified four resettlement sites and presented them in a report to the authorities. Their suggestions were completely ignored and on 17/09/2002 a Presidential Decree decided the locations independently of any consultation processes. As a current member of the Amri Committee who participated in the ignored site selection committee puts it, “The decision of the president...decided for the people where they were going to live, by official document from him, so to whom will you raise your complaint? He didn’t even consult anyone—didn’t take the report seriously” (WS6^{viii}).

The Hamdab were the first to be resettled, and despite their disapproval of being resettled to the area of El-Moultaga, they complied due to the lack of an alternative and the peoples trust in the government (WS8).

Remaining behind

The Manasir people expressed their desire to stay by the reservoir, and the majority support of this decision was confirmed in a referendum that showed 76% supported this option (MWC, OH). But the DIU refused them this option, and built the resettlement sites it planned with the hope of moving all the Manasir there (MWC^{ix}, OH^x, WS1^{xi}).

The feasibility of the Local Option settlement (i.e. settling beside the semi-submerged villages on the banks of the reservoir) was studied by the YAM consulting group, and published in a study commissioned by the River Nile State government (YAM pers. comm.^{xii}). According to the consultant (also referred to as YAM), the study revealed a “beautiful situation” for settlement with ample livelihood opportunities brought by conditions for agriculture of the receded land due to high silt deposit. However, the “people in power” ignored and rejected the recommendations of the study. He believes the local option was neglected due to the

desire of the government to contract “bigger schemes” and thus expend greater funds, which may be funnelled unrightfully among officials.

The YAM study contributed to mobilizing the Manasir for this option “...by telling them of the coming good things” (WS7^{xiii}). As such, the struggle for the local option persisted until many agreements were reached with the government on developing the local option (WMC^{xiv}, OH^{xv}, WS3^{xvi}) however, none of these agreements were respected, and the state’s refusal to recognize and implement them was followed by the harsh measures it used to evict people from the area (see Section 2.3).

Forced eviction

The neglect of local option demands and the forced eviction through flooding was a recurring theme amongst the interviewees (OH, MWC see ix, WS4^{xvii}), for example, as a Manasir committee member and activist recounts:

“When [the authorities] knew that people wanted the local option, they used means that you wouldn’t even use against animals...they forced people to evict their homes...by closing the gates in the middle of the night during the flooding season...they even had buses ready for the evicted people to be transported to resettlement sites miles away”. (OH^{xviii})

The sudden flooding was accompanied by continued negligence in relief of the immediate suffering it caused and in the long-term support of services in order to pressure the people into abandoning their lands. (WS4^{xix}) Further testimonies on the flooding are covered in the next section.

6.2.2. Outcomes for the dam-affected people

Current state of affairs for the ‘local option’ residents

The situation at the local option Manasir areas has reportedly been described as being in dire straits (MWC, OH, MYS). This is due to the severe isolation and continued withholding of basic services and support to the area. There are no roads linking the area to the outside “...they go to Wadi Halfa and other areas but bypass the Manasir” (WMC^{xx}). The lack of health care services mean women often give birth in unfavourable conditions (WMC, OH^{xxi}), and they cannot be quickly transported to the nearest hospitals. Furthermore, the “water is not good for drinking” and the latrines are not in proper sanitary conditions. (MWC^{xxii}). Perhaps the most striking injustice is that of electrical power, as “the electricity moves over them, you can see the lines moving right over them and to other areas, bypassing them completely” (MWC^{xxiii}).

Such descriptions and commentaries are often accompanied with statements of pride of self-reliance and triumph of resistance (WS3, WS4 see xix, OH), however. Despite the conditions, “we stayed and we will continue to stay no matter what” (OH^{xxiv}). “Even if they lost all their

rights...life in the old homeland is much better...[because]...it is in fulfilment of the natural human right to choose where he will live and settle..." (WS3^{xxv})

Current state of affairs for the residents of New Hamdab

"Hamdab were the first group to be relocated. There is a saying in the north, 'the lucky person is the one who sees his friend being eaten by the crocodile before him' and the Manasir saw how we were eaten by the crocodile, and the result of this was the resistance" (WS8).

The Hamdab were the first to be resettled, and (as the questionnaire results confirm), despite their disagreement to being resettled in the area of El-Moultaga, they generally relocated due to the lack of an alternative and the peoples trust in the government (WS8^{xxvi}). The difficult experiences of the Hamdab began as the water pumps broke down, and their main agricultural livelihood suffered accordingly; "...anything we planted we saw die in front of us..." (WS8^{xxvii}, WM^{xxviii} NHW^{xxix}).

Despite the establishment of a governmental committee to remedy the situation, none of the recommendations were implemented (WS8^{xxx}). The testimony of a New Hamdab inhabitant confirms that clean drinking water is still lacking in the region, and people depend on water transported from the Nile and from nearby wells, albeit with great difficulty (WM^{xxxi}).

The lack of water has forced people into alternative sources of livelihoods. The only options they have to choose from is migrating to other areas for work or in search of gold, and working as labourers (e.g. to harvest potatoes) in large nearby private farms owned by the DIU (WH^{xxxii}, NHW^{xxxiii}) – see Figure 6.2. Interviews with women in New Hamdab revealed that due to demographic loss of young working males to migration, children are forced to earn as wage labourers on these large private farms (NHW^{xxxiv}). The exploitation of children in this manner had not previously been known to any of the researchers, and has evidently developed in the last few years.

Figure 6.2. Children picking potatoes, DIU farm near New Hamdab, (March 2014).



Source: anonymised.

6.3 Iconic events

6.3.1. Sudden flooding

'people in Darfur are better off' (MYS2)

The questionnaire results revealed that the sudden flooding was interpreted by the affected people as a deliberate attempt to force out those that resisted resettlement. The testimonies of the people presented here provide an idea of the sense of crisis and betrayal involved.

In Manasir areas, those who were present when the flooding happened unanimously testified that it was unexpected and occurred "...in the middle of the night, with no prior warning whatsoever" (MWC-AMH), and therefore people were unprepared and suffered severely. "The people were sitting in their homes and suddenly the water came" (WMC-AMH^{xxxv}); "The water came at night, the pregnant the old and the vulnerable were all evacuated" (MYS1); Women "...had to take her children and go to higher grounds" (MWC AMH), while "the men were busy trying to dam their houses and areas with sand..." (MYS1). It was "a state of chaos...it was everyman for himself" (MYS1).

The flooding "...created a humanitarian crisis" (OH^{xxxvi}), and "not even any organization was present...no help or relief was present" (MYS1^{xxxvii}); "the whole area was blocked off to any

aid” (MWC-AMH^{xxxviii}); in the absence of emergency relief, the people escaped to higher grounds, “...congregating in refugee camps...” (MSY2^{xxxix}); They “...built their tents and sat, waiting for help” (OH^{xl}) which never arrived. The situation was such that one member of the community commented that “...people in Darfur were better off because they could at least have access to relief organizations” (MYS2).

The Amri flooding in 2006, prior to the Manasir, was also a severe crisis. “We didn’t know whether to look after our kids or to go fetch some food. We felt very much like what Osama Abdallah called us – ‘fleeing rats’” (NAF^{xli}).

6.3.2. The Amri massacre

To recall from Section 2, the Amri massacre occurred on 22 April 2006 in an Amri schoolyard, resulting in the death of people. The people’s testimonies assert that the shootings were unprovoked, and occurred during a peaceful congregation of the three DAP communities (Amri, Hamdab and Manasir). They met to discuss how to form a unified committee, the compensation problems faced, and to find solutions to the recognition of their entitlements (NAF^{xlii}).

The surprise attack occurred as men with machine-guns mounted on pick-up trucks fired at them, killing three people (NAF,OH). Threatened by the unity of the committees, the attack was a violent way of breaking up solidarity, and provided lessons to the government for the future, where “...it continued to use divisive tactics to split up the movement” (OH^{xliii})

The event also demonstrated, however, that solidarity was strong among the DAPs as during the incident many from people from Hamdab were “...standing with them, helping them”. They “filled their boats and lorries... [and] helped on recovering the wounded”. (TA) This solidarity was punished by the dam authorities as the Hamdab that were in attendance were stopped and arrested on their return by the security forces of the DIU (TA^{xliv}).

6.3.3. Protests and state responses

Many protests have taken place since the displacement of the DAP in major cities around Sudan. This section describes the motivations and demands of such protests, and the responses of the state authorities.

Demands and motivations

University student protests in Khartoum in 2011-2012 were general protests showing solidarity with the Manasir and their plight. The first protest was a small sit in (40 students) at the University of Khartoum (U of K), was followed by a larger one on the same campus, and a third occurred at simultaneously at Niilen State and Al Haliya universities. Student activists from University of Khartoum testify that the main motivations were to raise awareness on the state of the Manasir and correct a strong bias in the representation of the issues, as “the press and reporting is not published and the people touring and visiting Merowe were censored in what they saw” (MSY1^{xlv}).

Similar motivations drove a major sit-in in the justice square of the River Nile State (RNS) from November 2011 to January 2012. The sit-in was “...meant to show that the people are wronged and are still surviving without any services. It was to make apparent to the rest of Sudan [that the Manasir were] a people wronged and to make apparent to the Government that it cannot forget us and forget our situation” (OH^{xlvi}).

The sit-in had additional demands of releasing arrested community members from custody, and taking the necessary steps to develop the local option. Furthermore, they demanded the affected people should see some of the benefits from the electricity. Most of all, they wanted the flooding to be addressed publicly and to recover all that was lost to it (OH^{xlvii}).

As an active Manasir committee member states, “we are not fighting for what is not ours. We are not in this to get yours from under you, we are only fighting for what is rightfully ours”. (OH)

State response

Of the three student protests on campuses in Khartoum, the last two were ended violently by the security forces (referred to as *al Amn*, and generally understood to be composed of both police and the National Intelligence Security Services). The second and larger protest at the University of Khartoum was violently ended when 400 students were beaten up and arrested. The third protest at Nile State and Al Haliya and was abruptly stopped before it began when security authorities threatened students with axes and knives not to protest. The Government repeatedly accused opposition parties for sparking the protests, when in fact there was no involvement (MSY1^{xlviii}).

The three-month sit in el Damer town of the RNS was supported widely, as people were easily mobilized for the cause. The turnout included people from all communities, not just of the dam affected peoples. Nevertheless, the State repeatedly tried to break it up through the “use of immoral tactics” (OH^{xlix}). This included poisoning the drinking water supply to make people ill, and various methods aimed at creating dissent between protesters and the host community. (OH^l)

6.4 The story of people’s relations and of society’s relationship with the state

6.4.1. *Karazayat*: Division of communities

The state has been accused of attempting to break the unity among the DAP both in the representative committees and within their respective communities through various means.

Within the communities, the state is seen a responsible for creating conflict between those that resettled away from the homelands and those who stayed behind to fight for a local option (OH). The state engaged in bribing the resettled and enticed them to encourage the local option people to move as well (OH). This was seen as a deep betrayal, as the people that complied were seen as siding with the state. As such they are referred to as *Karazayat* (plural of *Karazay*), after the Afghani president chosen by the US, and generally seen as one who

betrays his nation. *Karazayat* are “...the people who are loyal to the government and themselves, not to our people” (WM^{li})

The ‘karazayat’ were identified as traitors to the community for their decision to side with the State in its attempt to de-stabilize community unity and harmony. As one interviewee put it, it is not all those that have moved to government resettlement sites are *de facto* “karazayat” but rather those that did so and then aim to coerce others to do so as well, for example by returning to the original villages with tales of prosperity in government built resettlement sites (OH).

There was a movement against the people by a militant group of the Manasir—the Fallujah⁶⁰ (OH^{lii}). Their motto against the Karazay was “*Al saraf yinsarif*” (*the one who collected has deserted us*). This group destroyed the homes of the resettled so they could not return and try to encourage others to betray (OH^{liiii}).

The current leader of the Manasir Executive Committee clarifies that the real grievances of the affected people should not be amongst themselves (i.e. between those who accepted resettlement and those who pushed for the local option) but with the authorities that attempted to pit these groups against one another. “...I don’t blame the people who moved or stayed because the issue/disagreement is with the authorities that attempted to split the people even from the three areas, which had a united committee that was against the project” (WS3).

This responsibility of the state in splitting the communities is confirmed by another Manasir Executive Committee member who attests that the split resulted from “the malicious involvement of the government...[and] the aim was not to be split...”. (OH see note liii *previous*). The divisive tactics that the state employed to fragment and weaken any mounting resistance was successful to an extent, despite the recognition of most active Manasir that internal conflict would weaken the overall goals of the movement. However it was sufficiently clear at the time that the karazayat posed a major threat to the possibility of realizing the demands of local option Manasir. Even with the importance of avoiding internal divisions explicitly acknowledged, it has been claimed that the successful ventures of bribery and deceit of those who promoted the State’s resettlement terms was enough to shake legitimacy and weaken recognition of the demands and aspirations of the former [ref].

As a DIU representative testifies: “the government also got involved in some issues and created unrest and confusion among the affected people...so that it can further its agenda in the way that it wanted to, and I was a witness to that for a while...watching the plotting and scheming that happened from the committee and governmental actors” (WS2^{liv})

The divisive action of the state with regards to the committees was seen to weaken the united front of affected people and their negotiating power. “As soon as the government found out [about the united DAPs committee], they appointed a committee for the Manasir, and then

⁶⁰ Fallujah- named after the town in Baghdad that was destroyed by American bombing, to represent the destruction they invoked on those perceived as traitors.

for Amri and Hamdab...and started to deal with each separately” (WS3^{lv}). This “would make the other groups feel as though the meeting group was making deals with the government and in so doing would stand to benefit from the first pick of the resettlement and compensation resources. This was the intention of the government, to create distrust against the committees and play them off against each other” (OH^{lvi}).

6.4.2. State oppression

The oppression of the state is seen to be manifested in various ways throughout the Merowe project: forced evictions, flooding, blocking of relief, Amri shootings, and violent ending to protests. In the words of WS4^{lvii}, “They have no consideration for any of their actions, whether they kill or drown”.

Such actions are supplemented by arbitrary arrests and continuous threat of prosecution faced by activists, journalists and academics.⁶¹ As a prominent Manasir journalist and activist testifies, “If you confront [the State]...you will just disappear, they will take you from your home and they will shoot you” (JZ^{lviii}).

One activist gave a testimony to his arrest on the 3rd of June 2013 for making speeches with three other Manasir Youth Committee members, “...by force of 20-30 security forces and five soldiers they arrested us... the arrests were done in a horrible way” (OH^{lix})

The violence of the state has been a significant obstacle in the peoples struggle, however as Manasir leader proudly notes, their movement “...is the first peaceful civil movement in the modern history for Sudan” and people should take the Manasir experience as a lesson, in order to “..to have an idea of the meaning of peaceful resistance, and not to take military resistance. Our defeat will arrive once we decide to take a military resistance path.” (WS3^{lx})

6.4.3. State-controlled media, and (mis)representation:

The oppression of journalists is seen by interviewees as part of a wider ambition of suppressing the facts with regards to the Merowe Dam, both to Sudanese citizens and to the outside world.⁶² The coverage of state-sponsored is therefore seen as greatly skewed with “no attention on the implications of the dam, in terms of resettlement and compensation, social and environmental impacts, and very much attention on the body of the dam, in terms of tours to the area...they don’t show them the people that are affected”. “They show you a picture of the old village and new village but they are not shown the people in the area” (WS7^{lxi}). Instead “...groups of people are taken and shown only the concealed truth” (WS9^{lxii}). “This is a type of brainwashing and the reason for the poor attention to the implication” (WS7).

As a result of the heavily controlled media representation, the public discourse amongst the many less well informed Sudanese is one which criticizes the Manasir and other affected

⁶¹ A team member working on the project, Mohamed Hashim Jalal, was arrested for 3 months for writing a book criticizing the dams in northern Sudan and the manner in which the state implemented them.

⁶² Foreign academics are not permitted access to the dam and surrounding area, this was experienced by team member, Mark Zeitoun, on his visit to the region.

people who protest for continued dissatisfaction despite their compensation provisions. Manasir Women Committee member residing in Khartoum, for example, states

“...people say to me, ‘what else do you Manasir people want, they have given you what’s yours haven’t they...? Then what are you still complaining about’ they have no idea what the compensation experience has been and ...no idea about our families in the locality that have no compensation whatsoever...” (MWC-UHS^{lxiii})

The public discourse is exemplified in the statement by engineer in Khartoum, who admittedly is aware of the issues only through the media: “[The affected] people have been given good conditions and more land than they owned before, but they are still looking for more” (HY^{lxiv})

6.5 External actors and intervention

Various external actors, both in Khartoum and beyond, have been identified as generally engaged in the Merowe dam, both in positive ways of assisting the affected people and in negative ways of being complicit with the violations of the state.

Positive involvement is largely regarded as coming from Khartoum. Many individuals in Khartoum were identified as having a significant impact on the affected peoples struggle. This included both people of Manasir origin and other activists, journalists and experts. (OH^{lxv})

Whilst international actors and their positive involvements have been identified by some, no direct impact on the situation is perceived by any of the people interviewed in the village. TA and MH worked with Nicholas Hillyard (from the Corner House) and Peter Bosshard (from IRN) in their field visit to El-Moultaga. The former recognize that there may have been an impact achieved by their report externally, they testify that it has had a negligible impact at local and national levels (GIWS^{lxvi}). Others have commented on the ineffectiveness of external intervention and their desires to have “...a Sudanese cause solved within the Sudan”. Whilst they recognize a value in the application of pressure this type of involvement may have, “ultimately the issue must be solved internally” (OH^{lxvii}, MWC^{lxviii}).

Negative involvement has been linked to the foreign partners of the state in the construction of the dam, namely the project consultants and the funders. Lahmeyer International and the EIA it produced received special mention. The “EIA done by Lahmeyer, which is corrupt, was probably just for the sake of credibility to the funders, as a procedure, not done or taken seriously” (JZ^{lxix}). The company should not have undertaken the EIA because they were the consultant and therefore a clear conflict of interest would result (HY^{lxx}). If there was any positive outcome from the flawed and heavily criticized EIA, it would be in providing the dam-operation procedures which were used by YAM for their study of the local resettlement option, to show how settlement (through e.g. recession agriculture) at the lake is possible (YAM^{lxxi}).

Project funders are recognized as being accountable, as “They were supposed to investigate and make sure if the people were consulted in a full manner and whether their needs would be fulfilled by the proposed project. This was not done, not by the Arabic funds or the other

donors” (WS3^{lxxii}). “Tackling financiers could have been a good rallying point for the affected people and NGOs”. (WS5^{lxxiii})

Although no such action has occurred to any significant capacity in the Merowe case (some protests at Chinese embassies in relation to Dal and Kajbar dams) some of the affected people expressed a demand for legal mobilization training which would enable such actions to be taken (for example through greater knowledge of international standards and human rights based campaigning) (OH, TA, MH, MWC^{lxxiv}).

6.6 Conclusion

“I am of the lucky ones that saw the crocodile eat the others...” - Dal activist

The people of Merowe were not initially in opposition to the dam, on the contrary, the expected to see great benefits from it (WS7^{lxxv}). The dam had promised to bring development for over 40 years and people used to sing its praises (literally) (GIWS). The people understood “that development was a necessary sacrifice”, from the Nimeri era (i.e. up to 1985), and they believed that “those who sacrifice for development will be rewarded with a palace”. But they were not treated with such gratitude (OH^{lxxvi}). The current grievances of the affected peoples movements against the DIU are primarily about how the latter has treated them. (GIWS^{lxxvii})

The promises of development have also been unfulfilled as the motto of the dam was “the end of poverty and energy export”. “These were lies, we now have more expensive electricity and we import electricity” (GIWS^{lxxviii}). The sacrifice of the people has gone unacknowledged, and they have to live with the shock of loss and homelessness, “...in a state of constant travelling, or waiting to go home”. (MWC-UHS^{lxxix}). If they could now return back to before the dam, “they would go out of their way to oppose it”, and the lessons they leave to Dal and Kajbar people is “refuse dam[s] at all costs”. (GIWS^{lxxx})

In the words of the Dal activist: “I am of the lucky ones that saw the crocodile eat the others...” (WS10^{lxxxi}).

7 Analysis

This section interprets the data collected within the theoretical frameworks reviewed. More specifically, it discusses the local struggles against the displacement caused by construction of the Merowe dam, the extent to which they have drawn upon or been assisted by external actors, and the influence of international norms. The aim is to answer the over-arching research question “when and how local claims and higher-level mobilizations of environmental justice lead to improvements in marginalized people’s access to natural resources and poverty alleviation”, and specific research questions RQ4 – RQ8. Theory on justice is also drawn upon, to answer the specific research questions RQ1 – RQ4

The first section provides a mapping of the local, national and international actors involved in the case. This is followed by a discussion of conceptions and claims of justice made by local and national actors, analysed through the lenses of environmental and social justice in the second section. The third section discusses how national and international actors have interpreted and made use of international/global environmental norms. The fourth section discusses the influence of said norms and the wider political economy on the uptake of struggles to higher-level mobilization and on influencing the outcomes for local peoples. The final section presents an initial comparison of the impacts of global environmental norms on local struggles over resources.

7.1 Resistance and compliance of local, national, and international actors (RQ4)

Actors engaged in the Merowe case can be classified as individuals and groups located at local, national and international levels, and plotted on a spectrum between anti-dam and pro-dam extremes, as in Figure 7.1. The nuance of the many groups and individuals classed as contestation and compliance is described following.

Figure 7.1. The positions of actors in relation to the Merowe Dam..

	Anti-Dam	Resistance/Compliance with dam	Pro-dam
International	IRN CH HRW EDLC	LOHAP EAWAG ECSP EIPR UNEP	ECCHR WOAT UNDP UN Rapporteur on Housing Lahmeyer Exim Bank IDB Chinese Gov't GCC Gov't - 1
National	protesting university students Manasir journalist	Committee of anti-Dal/Kajbar/Shirke dams hydrology/scientific epistemic community	Ministry of Water/Agric al Ayaam (newspaper) DIU Supreme Council for Agric Revival
Local	Local option residents (Manasir) individual DAP	New Amri residents individual DAP	New Hamdab residents Makabrab residents (Manasir) individual DAP

Resistance is strongest in the ‘local option’ groups, as these are still actively struggling through civil mobilizations to realize their aims. This is followed by some of those living the resettlement sites, which have experienced greater risks of impoverishment as a result of failing agricultural schemes and lack of alternative livelihood options (in New Amri and New Hamdab). Resistance in these locations focuses primarily on redressing inadequacies of resettlement and compensation they have received (or that as of yet not delivered). The Makabrab locality represents the greatest degree of compliance, due to favourable agricultural and economic outcomes, yet still contests incomplete compensation, particularly to uncompensated freehold agricultural land.

Resistance and compliance of the dam-affected people

Within the Dam Affected People DAP groups at the broadest level, it is relevant to distinguish between those who have a) resettled and accepted government compensation (referred to as ‘resettled’ DAPs), and b) established new settlements and livelihoods on the shore of the Merowe reservoir (the ‘local option’ DAPs). The analysis shows that individuals from both groups, however, have resisted and contested either the procedure or outcome of the resettlement, contributing to variations in contestation and compliance with the government schemes.

Resettled DAPs

Amongst the resettled DAPs, the experience has been most dramatic for the New Hamdab (el Multaga) situated about 100km from the original Hamdab villages) and the New Amri (Wadi al Mugadam, in the Bayouda desert, around 100km from the original Amri villages). The questionnaires reveal a story of unfulfilled expectations of these groups, in terms of procedure, implementation and outcome of compensation.

For example, 82% of respondents in New Hamdab and 46% in New Amri say that there was 'no transparency whatsoever' in the State's communication of information to those affected. A similar proportion expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the State conducted the official census used to grant compensation entitlements and resettlement arrangements.

The residents of New Amri and New Hamdab expressed general dissatisfaction in relation to compensation for houses and services, livelihood resources, and freehold agricultural land (including agricultural and irrigation schemes). 72% of New Hamdab and 50% of New Amri answered "unfair" in ranking the compensation for livelihood resources (e.g. land, agriculture and agricultural products and livestock). 100% of New Hamdab and 80% of New Amri rated the irrigation schemes "unfair", which notes and interviews have revealed as inconsistent, unreliable and unavailable. Poor water supply gave way to failing agricultural schemes as 96% of New Hamdab's and 44% of New Amri's first season of agriculture was unsuccessful.

Such experiences were not reflected across all resettlement sites, however. The questionnaire findings from residents of Makabrab resettlement consistently demonstrate higher levels of satisfaction for compensation of lost assets and with current livelihood resources and public services. The majority (60%) of responses from this site lay between answers "fair" and "reasonable", a distinction discussed further as 'the Makabrab anomaly' in the box in Section 5.3. The proximity of Makabrab to both the river and to markets may provide more opportunities for agriculture and livelihoods than the more remote desert locations of New Amri and New Hamdab. Indeed, 54% of residents of Makabrab reported a successful first agricultural season, and the space and type of soil is good for growing citrus fruit trees and date palm, reflected in 70% ranking of fair. Furthermore, 66% of respondents agreed that irrigation in Makabrab is very regular and satisfying.

Local Option DAPs

The 'local option' residents rebuilt or constructed anew their homes and livelihoods and communities with no governmental support. The questionnaire results (a near unanimous response of "no compensation whatsoever") reflect the fact that these people were not offered any compensation by the government, and are not served by any basic government services such as electricity or drinking water, much less livelihood schemes.

The residents are adapting their livelihoods to the new conditions, for example with initiation of terrace cultivation on the hills of the reservoir, the development of flood recession cultivation as well as fishing from the reservoir. Nonetheless, livelihood outcomes have suffered a blow here too, with being dependent on activities of hill terrace farming, rudimentary gold mining and fishing from the reservoir and the charity of other (*zakat*) for

subsistence. With agricultural activity produces only 20% of needs, 88% of local option Manasir rating their livelihood outcomes as unfair. This ranking of livelihood outcomes is mirrored in New Hamdab and New Amri assessments as 98% and 50% respectively agree of unfair outcomes (in contrast to Makabrab residents, where, 54% consider livelihood options they have in agriculture and livestock are rewarding and fair.)

Local government

Local governments and state bodies (e.g. Northern State, Nile Basin State) within the jurisdiction of the affected areas are to some extent in contestation with procedural aspects of their relations with the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU) and federal State. This was particularly emphasized in negotiations with the DAP committees for implementing a local option of resettlement, and the limitations to their institutional power by the DIU which undermined and overrode any decisions and formal procedures. This is exemplified by the letter from the governor of the RNS to Osama Abdalla of the DIU urging him to be transparent and cooperative with the affected people in relation to negotiation and implementation of the local option⁶³.

Furthermore, DAP committees of proposed dams of Kajbar, Dal, and Al-Shirek, have expressed opposition to the dam in solidarity with the people displaced and impoverished as a result of it and the opposition is represented in the emergence of a “Unity of Anti-Dam Committees”.

Contest and compliance of national actors

National actors include DAP community members in migrant communities in Khartoum that have engaged in public political processes through the representative committees as well as through protesting in solidarity. DAP youth communities studying at universities in the capital and elsewhere in major cities of the Sudan have shown their solidarity and contributed to the struggles of their families in the localities through student protests. Furthermore, DAP individuals in Khartoum include some who are distinctly anti-dam, such as Manasir journalist [JZ](#), whose writings have warned against accepting the dam and agreeing to compensation and resettlement provisions.

Other actors on the national level include individual activists, academics, intellectuals, public servants and civil society groups from the broader Sudanese community (i.e. not from DAP communities) who have opposed or contested the dam on the basis of environmental or social shortcomings.⁶⁴

⁶³ Letter sent on 28/01/2004, cited in Hashim, 2009 p. 34

⁶⁴ Examples include: Mohamed Jalal Hashim-cultural anthropologist and archeologist, Asim El Moghraby - environmentalist and physical ecologist, Yehya Abdel Majid-former minister of Irrigation and Water Resources, consultant for local option feasibility study, Nader Awad- Higher Council for Environment and Natural resources, Sudanese Environment Conservation Society-Muwai Shadad (based on Khartoum Workshop testimony, March 2014).

National actors that are proponents of the Merowe Dam include the DIU, Sudanese technocratic elites, and different state figures that have heralded the dam as the promise of poverty alleviation and economic development. Furthermore, a small minority of DAP who have benefitted from resettlement schemes also offer little opposition to the dam, though they may contest some distributive aspects of compensation (OKO, Makabrab). The dismissal of the director of the Higher Council of the Environment and Natural Resources (following criticism of the execution of the dam's EIA (see Section 2.2.6) is considered to have been a significant motivating factor for some national actors in establishing links with global players in relatively open international political opportunity structures.

Resistance and compliance of international actors

International actors who have expressed opposition to or otherwise resisted the Merowe on the basis of human rights violations and lack of adherence to international standards for dams are primarily the international non-governmental organizations (e.g. International Rivers Network, the Corner House, EAWAG, Human Rights Watch).⁶⁵ International attention from the United Nations Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, and the UN Mission in Sudan has also expressed strong criticisms to the dam on the basis of such violations.

Further international contestation comes from representatives of the DAP internationally. The Leadership of Hamdab Affected People (LOHAP), based in London and headed by DAP Ali Askouri, LOHAP has been working internationally with IRN and CH in their transnational/higher-level mobilizations as well as spearheading contestation the complacency of international firms in the human rights abuses linked to Merowe through legal action in international courts.⁶⁶ International actors who have supported the dam include China and the GCC states who have financed it, and the foreign companies and expertise that enabled it. The foreign investment into Merowe correlates with global political economic factors motivating foreign interests.⁶⁷

7.2 Analysis of local and national Resistance: negotiations, protests, cultural identity, heritage

Negotiations and bureaucratic battles

The bulk of the mobilization of DAP Executive Committees was dedicated to lobbying the Government of Sudan via the formal institutional structures of Federal and National states, and the DIU. The negotiation approach has resulted in reforming official policy directives, yet sustained change is eluded as agreements were ignored and business-as-usual of the state

⁶⁵ Other organizations that have problematized the dam based on social and environmental impacts: CDCA, OMCT, Amnesty International,

⁶⁶ ECCHR criminal complaint against Lahmeyer. Other legal action initiated by Askouri, EIPR and African commission on human rights...?

⁶⁷ For example, new global political economy of food and water, agricultural partnerships in the form of large-scale land deals with Arab states.

continued. Any achievements are of course the result of the closed domestic political opportunity structures and the wider political economic forces at play.

This is perhaps most starkly represented with the case of mobilizations for the recognition and implementation of the 'Local Option' resettlement plans that were proposed by the people. The final outcome of the entrenched "bureaucratic battle" in which DAP Committees lobbied local, federal, and the central government, was successful (see Section 2.3.3). The battle was primarily between federal and State Ministries and departments wishing to facilitate the local option implementation, and the DIU adamant on resettlement in the officially planned projects. The final symbolic victory of this battle was the issuance of a Presidential Decree, which gave the official green light to the Local Option (i.e. the option to resettle at the reservoir shores), and this was followed by a host of State level decrees. The declaration by DIU head Osama Abdallah just a few days later publicly mocked the decision fought for by the DAP committees ("let them flee like rats!"), and the decisions were ultimately completely disregarded and the interests of the more powerful actors (primarily the authoritarian DIU) continued to prevail.

Public demonstrations and non-violent resistance

The DAP also expressed their discontent through mass demonstrations, organised by as three month sit-in at el Damer, and student protests at universities in Khartoum. Motivated by desire to gain visibility for the injustices, as well as more direct tactic of pressuring the state, the demonstrations expressed key demands of the DAP movements in different national arenas. Often these demonstrations ended violently by the state's security apparatus.

A noteworthy point here is the ability of the DAP movement to gain solidarity and support among broader Sudanese groups and circles. For example, a member of the Manasir Executive Committee (MEC) who was involved in the Ed Damer sit-in claims that mobilizing people behind the cause of the Manasir was not difficult, once their real situation was understood. The motivation was thus to expose their real situation, in the light of repressive state control of the media and monopoly on representation with the wider Sudanese public. Repeated testimonies from national and community activists corroborate this motivation of public protests, as the basic awareness raising and visibility gaining aims of civil mobilization was meant to "make apparent to the rest of Sudan [that the Manasir were] a people wronged and to make apparent to the government that it cannot forget us and forget our situation" (OH). In one light, public protests are thus a key strategy and an essential first step in challenging the discursive state hegemony through engagement in discursive battles in which dominant representations and narratives are challenged.

The protests were often met with violent repression from State security forces, however. Violent break-up of peaceful protests (reports) and arbitrary arrests and detention of protestors and DAP committee members (reports) became routine. Furthermore, additional violence was directed by the State against the DAPs, most infamously in the Amri massacre and Sherri Island eruptions of violence.

The data collected suggest DAP Committees do not consider violence as a viable mode of resistance. As, the Manasir DAP Committee leader stated at the project workshop, the approach of the DAPs in Merowe represents “the first peaceful civil movement of Sudan” by resisting the temptations of the State to engage in armed conflict. Both the State and the people know full well, he explains, that the use of violence will ensure fragmentation and destruction of the movement. The armed training of the Movement of the Displaced Manasir is a case in point. The lessons learned throughout Sudan may or may not have been understood by the movement’s leaders, who otherwise recognize that “Our defeat will arrive once we decided to take a military resistance path” (current leader of Manasir Executive Committee).

The local struggle against the Merowe Dam has materialized over its sustained trajectory as a non-violent civil movement using protests and engaging in government negotiations. Persistent pursuit of non-violence contestation through formal institutional structures is exemplified through the first lawsuit against the Sudanese Government in a constitutional law – in regards to un-lawful arrests and detention of seven members of the Manasir Executive Committee in 2007. Without generating reforms in deeply entrenched political structures of the current Regime, the case is unlikely to result in foreseeable changes in the state-citizen relationship.

The case does represent the emphasis of discursive rather than physical battles that the movement generally embodies, however. Continuing this non-violent approach is challenging, in the face of the State’s continuous recourse to violence. Particularly within the political context of the authoritarian Regime in the Sudan, these types of struggles are rarely maintained for long, as the divide and rule tactics coupled and violent confrontation of the state often deteriorate dissenting groups into armed movements (Deng 1995, Johnson 2003).

Cultural resistance

In ordering the foreign archaeologists to leave the site, the Manasir can be considered to have instrumentalized cultural heritage, in the words of Leturcq (2009) or Kleinitz, and Näser (2011). Though further investigation is required, the action may have been to gain international attention, or simply to interrupt a government-sponsored activity that (i.e. less strategic resistance). In this sense, both the Sudanese government and dissident groups may be employing the heritage-making process to recreate or contest the status quo. The DAP have, for example, been subverting the official discourse on heritage in order to gain national and international viability for their own purposes. The destruction of their cultural heritage – and its preservation – is used interchangeably. At another level, OH and MWC stated an interest “for Sudanese problem[s] to be solved within Sudan” when asked about whether the movement should go international and whether international actors can help in this case. While acknowledging the potential benefits of increased international pressure against the State, these activists expressed that their immediate reality was always going to be first and

foremost the State, and this obliged a sustained movement influencing domestic political structures.

7.3 Analysis of international resistance: web-based and legal campaigns

IRN's involvement in Merowe case is built on networks of information exchange between national actors [ref al Moghraby -Pottinger communications]. These are built upon existing networks of information exchange between national actors and IRN which were strengthened or brought closer by the closed domestic political opportunity structures, and shared principles and values, to focus on concerns over environmental and social impacts of Merowe.

Along with Corner House (CH), IRN engaged in monitoring and reporting the social, human rights and environmental violations involved in Merowe and presenting these against a rubric of appropriate behaviour established by various international norms. For example, in response to the devastating floods, various appeals on behalf of the affected people committees have been made to the International Community and International Organizations (see e.g. the Amri appeal to the UN Housing Rapporteur, the publications of the Unity of Dam affected Committees).

IRN also commissioned the independent review by EAWAG of Lahmeyer's EIA of the dam, and issued a report assessing the socio-economic, cultural and environmental impacts (based on visits to the El Multaga site only). Such reports have been widely distributed, creating in resources that can in theory provide leverage opportunities in legitimizing claims in campaigns against powerful actors. These campaigns primarily target the international business partners engaged in the constructions of Merowe, with an emphasis on Chinese involvement. In this sense, the NGOs are very much 'makers and managers of meaning', in Khagram et al.'s (2002) terms (see Section 4.3), at least at the international level.

The main international campaigns of IRN and CH are waged against international donor agencies and private companies involved in the planning or construction of the dam. The specific targeting of China in this regard is explained by the increased role of Chinese firms and financing bodies in African development projects, and associated broader campaigns linked through a common target. The shape of the campaign is defined by the shape of activism experienced in similar campaigns, and target company heads through letters and information exchange. Such correspondence has been monitored by the independent documentation organization, Business and Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC).

In light of global transnational justice mobilisation trends which target the activities of Chinese firms and financing bodies in overseas development projects, IRN's international Merowe campaign is shaped by organizational and strategic interests linked to the organization's broader campaigns (e.g. the Belo Monte, Grand Inga, Xayaburi, etc.).

This represents the function of transnational actors in unifying movements rooted in diverse economic, political, cultural and social contexts, through framing and interpretation activities of the discursive struggles. As a result of the deliberate deployment of discursive material by

international actors such as IRN against Chinese actors, the emergence and empowering of a broader transnational movement targeting Chinese overseas development activities through multiple avenues is made possible. For the case of the Merowe in particular, international lobbying has provided at information, and created platforms for local activists (notably LOHAP in the German Department of Public Prosecution, and the AU's African Charter for Human and People's Rights) that may otherwise not have been accessible.

This raises potential issues of representation as the uptake of the Merowe struggle into higher levels may assumedly have been influenced and motivated by the potential alignment of the strategic interests of the organisation and its choice to represent the struggle. These issues require further investigation into the transnational networks between IRN and the national constituents that it claims to represent.

7.4 The influence of international norms (RQ5)

To recall from Section 4.1, international norms are understood to be the global or international conventions, agreements and understandings (whether formal or informal, legally binding or not) that have been developed by and between the numerous people and institutions involved. Possibly relevant norms identified there includes the World Commission on Dams (WCD), environmental impact assessments, international environmental conventions (such as the UNCCD), and internationally recognised standards about displacement and involuntary resettlement.

7.4.1. The relevance of international norms to the interviewees

The relevance of international norms to the case of the Merowe Dam was tested explicitly during the semi-structured interviews. While the interviewees did touch upon the relevance of external actors to their struggles, there was effectively no mention of the relevance of any of the aforementioned norms. In the perceptions of the people who have been affected by and resisted the dam, international environmental norms have no or little relevance.

There is some evidence of the use of *national* law and norms, however. Violations of the national constitutional law and human rights norms were challenged in a lawsuit filed to the constitutional court, for example (Section 3.1.3). The justice notions behind these legal claims are supported by national code of law that represents the key empowering norm in this case. A second example comes from the claims made by national actors regarding the violation of national environmental law in the process of conducting and approving the EIA. The national procedures of EIA review prior to project approval were bypassed and ignored (see Section 2.2.5).

With the domestic political opportunity structures were too closed to influence from within in respect to international norms, we may interpret that the national movement became international oriented. The norms invoked by national actors thus pertain to national law, while the norms invoked by the international partners of IRN involve a set of global environmental and social norms.

7.4.2. The use of international norms by national and international actors

Whether international norms have influence at higher levels must thus be interpreted through secondary sources. The main appeal of the Merowe campaigns of IRN and CH was anchored in terms of violations of standards of EIAs and other components of the World Commission on Dams.

Environmental Impact Assessments

Perhaps the only direct application of international norms in the implementation of Merowe Dam was the conducting of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The means and quality of the study has been an important rallying point for international organizations campaigns and a source of great international attention to the dam. Despite the inaccessibility of the Sudanese public to the EIA and the bypassing of Sudan's environmental legislation in the review and approval of the assessment, the EIA was made available by the DIU to the international NGOs upon the request of IRN. It has certainly been used as a resource for claim-making among national actors as well, notably *Askouri vs. Lahmeyer* in the German courts (via the ECCHR).

The question begged is why the GoS even conducted an EIA in the first place. In an otherwise unaccountable political atmosphere, it would not have been surprising to if the State had not conducted an EIA, or at least had not shared it upon request. The act may signify the self-consciousness of Sudanese authorities with regards to its image - particularly for accountability to 'Western' countries in order to maintain donor relations and financing of infrastructure development (see e.g. Mason 2005, Mohieldeen 2008). The execution of the EIA may also have been a requirement of the donor agencies (China, GCC), though this has not yet been investigated.

World Commission on Dams guidelines

The Corner House report found that the Merowe project was in fact found to have at least 62 violations of the WCD's environmental and social guidelines (not counting violations of guidelines on involuntary resettlement). Indeed, an initial evaluation of the WCD's seven strategic priorities⁶⁸ demonstrates an unequal application of the widely held (and also derided) principles, in this case. The extent of the people's involvement in the dam is limited to their participation in the 1999 survey of their assets. Their entitlements were recognised to the extent that they were offered the compensation scheme, which in some ways (for offering more land in the new site than was owned back in the village) could be judged as fair.

WCD guidelines were also invoked by the EAWAG critique of the Lahmeyer EIA. Given the resentment that has built up over the longer-term, and general level of dis-satisfaction,

⁶⁸ To recall from Section 3.2.1, these are (1) gaining public acceptance, (2) comprehensive options assessment, (3) addressing existing dams, (4) sustaining rivers and livelihoods, (5) recognizing entitlements and sharing benefits, (6) ensuring compliance, and (7) sharing rivers for peace development and security.

however, it is safe to say that the WCD had little influence over the entire process – though such conclusions should be tempered by the recognised methodological weakness of the absence of interviews with DIU staff.


As discussed, the international actors targeted different audiences in their campaigns, and were employing a different set of norms. This may simply be an attempt to legitimize some of the local people's claims in international arenas, as Sneddon and Fox (2008) have noted in the case of dams in Thailand and Mozambique. To an extent, the approach also obliges international companies directly to challenge the "neutrality" position they often hold in justifying their complacency with projects that may be associated with human rights violations and conflicts. This might mark the beginning of a new trend in transnational movements that are directed to facing transnational capital and its structures by addressing businesses (i.e. an elaboration of 'environmental accountability' (see Wapner (2002), Mason (2005), Falkner (2003)).

International norms institutionalized in international legal structures also played a role in supporting the legal claims of Askouri, in the international legal arenas. In both the German and AU court cases, international human rights norms and supporting legal principles, were explicitly and implicitly used in legitimizing the justice claims represented.

7.5 The influence of external actors / transnational justice mobilisations (RQ6,8)

To recall from Section 4.3, the study of transnational justice mobilizations can be categorized into analysis of the interaction between dynamic of global (or international) mobilizations with local (or 'site specific') struggles, as well as the interaction of these different scales of mobilizations with international norms. In the terms of Khagram et al (2002), we can note in the Merowe case some evidence of the formation of informal configurations and to a lesser extent transnational coalitions, stopping short of transnational movements. This is captured in the revision of the Theoretical Framework developed in the REDEGN programme, shown in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2. Indicative application of the REDEGN Theoretical frame (from Fig 1). to the Merowe case.



The extent to which the local struggle has drawn upon external actors

Although the focus of the domestic struggles has been on influencing the state and appealing to Sudanese civil society and population through peaceful protests, there has been some reach to international actors, especially amongst community members abroad and national academics and intellectuals. In response to the flooding of the reservoir, for instance, various appeals on behalf of the affected people committees have been made to the international community and international organizations (e.g. the Amri appeal to the UN Housing Rapporteur, the publications of the Unity of DAP Committees). Though further investigation is required to substantiate, initial findings suggest that immediate local struggles focus their efforts and strategy on the state and Sudanese public, affected people abroad and national academics rally in wider circles (the Manasir's dismissal of the archaeological crews being a notable exception).

Discussions and statements amongst academics and DAP activists at the project workshop indicated a growing awareness of the international actors in their experienced injustices

through Merowe. This awareness, coupled with emphasis on peaceful mobilization, suggests a potential of strategy shifts in the future.

The extent to which local struggle has been assisted by external actors

As discussed, the Merowe campaigns of IRN and CH have made use of international norms as a strategic campaigning instrument. This is consistent with the theorised dynamic of transnational mobilizations of framing issues within wider problems and in ways where they may draw upon norms to validate claims (Khagram et al. 2002). IRN has a wider campaign globally against Chinese financed dams (IRN, China EX-IM bank and Sinohydro as targets) and thus may be engaged in a strategic deployment of issues to correlate with its greater international agenda. As in the case of the Narmada dam (in India – see Section 4.3), this type of international mobilization and its impacts can be quite distant from local demands and experiences. Such discrepancies between higher level and local claims may be highlighted by a comparison of the issues prioritised by the international organizations (e.g. environment, cultural history) compared with the prioritised issues among the affected peoples (better compensation, basic amenities, etc.).

The extent to which national and international actors have influenced the struggle

The activities of national and international actors in the struggle may stem from the different interests of respective actors. It has been noted above that the impetus behind international involvement and the shape of the IRN and CH international campaign, embarks from a point of departure that may be characterised as “international norms around dams”, and one that aligns with issues shared in other global campaigns.

National actors that are not from the DAP communities but still involved in the struggle include various experts and intellectuals whose activities have been initially inspired by national ecological, cultural and archaeological concerns. It is expected that these actors had different interests than the international actors, and played important roles in linking the movement with international actors, although this has not been adequately investigated.

Two examples of such national actors include the authors of this paper. One is the involvement of a physical ecologist and environmentalists (al Moghraby) who contests the irrationality of the dam from an ecological and environmental perspective and within the context of an integrated Nile basin development, which the Government of Sudan refuses to acknowledge and cooperate in. His involvement is driven by the lack of adequate assessment of alternatives, a comprehensive impact assessment and violations of environmental procedures in implementing the EIA. There is a strong possibility of a direct connection between the activities and concerns of this actor and the international movement embodied in IRN’s campaign, as pre-existing networks with the organization and the shared environmental and procedural concerns might have been sufficient ground for loose networking.

The second case is that of an archaeologist and cultural anthropologists (Hashim), whose professional expertise in and passion for the culture of the areas threatened by dams has linked him to the struggle. The closeness with the affected communities resulting from prolonged research in the area predisposes the actor to defend their interests and strengthens ties of solidarity. As a Nubian ethnographer, the threat of cultural extinction and the politics of identity and assimilation that are identified to be wrapped within the dam programme are key concerns behind the involvement in the struggle. As such, Hashim's intellectual work and publications focus on exposing the connections between the dams of northern Sudan and the underlying motives of "demographic engineering" perpetrated by an authoritarian and racist regime. (Hashim 2006, 2009, 2010)

7.6 Justice claims (RQ1-3)

This section deconstructs the explicit and implicit justice claims of DAPs, and structures the analysis through the frameworks of environmental justice and social justice, to interpret justice conceptions and applications relevant to the DAP. The DAPs' explicit applications of "justice" in relation to the impact of Merowe focus on issues of unfair compensation and resettlement outcomes, and unsatisfactory processes of engagement and consultation. These are understood to stem from lack of transparency and dishonoured or unhonoured formal procedures and commitments. Implicit justice invocations are derived from grievances with respect to the treatment of the state, specifically in its divisive actions against communities and committees and the oppression and violence towards resistance.

It is useful here to bear in mind that 'injustice' is often easier to spot and more readily articulated than 'justice'. Therefore, in a way, positive conceptions of justice are arrived at or emerge through a process of negation, in which negative experiences of injustice are inverted to yield notions of what is just. These conceptions may be implicitly or explicitly invoked in the claims of different actors. This understanding enables the following analysis, which pays particular attention to the analysis of the main grievances and claims of unjust experiences and outcomes in order to infer underlying conceptions of justice.

7.6.1. Environmental justice in the Merowe case

The three dimensions of environmental justice defined by Schlosberg (2004) (distribution, participation and recognition) apply *to an extent* to the conceptions of justice invoked by those displaced by the Merowe dam.

Distributive injustices, for example, are expressed in the outcomes for different subgroups of DAP of the resettlement and compensation experience, both those that were formally resettled and those denied formal support for the resettlement option of their choice (the local option along the reservoir). In the resettlement sites of New Amri and New Hamdab,⁶⁹

⁶⁹ The Makabrab resettlement site experience is more positive in terms of livelihood success due to regular irrigation and more productive land.

the unsatisfactory distributive outcomes where expressed in terms of inadequate livelihood resources and sources of income which resulted in greater impoverishment, dependence on *zakat*, and out-migration in search of labour and earning opportunities elsewhere.⁷⁰ For example 98% of New Hamdab, 50% of New Amri and 88% of Manasir local option people sampled responded that livelihoods were unattainable as a result of the dam and subsistence was through *zakat* fishing and small-scale gold mining. The agricultural livelihood base of the DAPs deteriorated due to insufficient and inadequate irrigation and unproductive lands. The impoverishment risks commonly associated with development induced displacement (Cernea, 1990, 1998, 1999) were not well accounted for as *de-facto* distribution of land in resettlement sites did not account for productivity of soils and was not accompanied by comprehensive agricultural livelihood rehabilitation and orientation in adaptation to different agricultural terrain.

The monetary compensation provided to these groups is seen as generally incomplete and unsatisfactory to maintain livelihoods. For example, palm trees were compensated in a lump sum (SD 500), whilst the productive life span of these trees extends far beyond this entitlement value. The use of the compensation decreases yet further, when considering the devaluation of monetary compensation due to payment in instalments over 6 years without adjusting for inflation rates.

Justice has been hindered, furthermore, by truncated entitlements through various additional stipulations of the dam authorities on compensation and resettlement. Examples of such stipulations include limiting compensation of houses to people that own houses and are married, and those that are not married only receive land plots. People who own land or houses but who live outside the area, as migrant labourers are also not compensated. More shockingly, houses that were built after the 1999 census (which was flawed for reasons discussed in section x) were not being compensated. All this serves to hinder distributive justice in the fair and rightful compensation for lost assets.

The local option distributive injustices are articulated as being more severe as there are no formal provisions of housing, agricultural schemes and support services, public services of education, health or even electricity. The narratives of the local option outcomes are characterized by complete state isolation and neglect of the citizens therein symbolically reflected in the lack of roads linking these areas to the rest of Sudan.

Thus in the words of the environmental justice frame, DAPs have experienced a greater distribution of impoverishment risks and less distribution of development benefits promised by the dam.

This inequality in the distribution of benefits can be related to the poor participation and engagement of affected people in decision-making processes around issues of compensation and resettlement. The lack of effective participation was greatly undermined by the poor

⁷⁰ This includes small-scale gold mining and working as agricultural labourers on large private farms owned by the DIU.

transparency of the DIU, for example during the compensation census of 1999, which served as the basis of entitlements, as well as through misinformation of the plans for the Makabrab resettlement. Where formal process of engagement did exist through limited participation of DAP representative committees in formal procedures of local and federal state institutions, their inputs and decisions were repeatedly ignored. This is exemplified in the initial disregard of the recommended resettlement sites selected by united DAP committee in 2002 and more acutely in the dishonoured commitments and broken promises of the local option resettlement in 2006. This process of 'engagement' is in essence a complete lack of consultation and participation; they were offered "no choice" and "no alternatives" to the dictated governmental provision.

Such 'participatory shortcomings' (to maintain the language of the environmental justice frame) clearly demonstrate a disrespect by the dam authorities of the DAP desires to maintain a certain way of life, which is tantamount to a lack of recognition of these particular social groups. The interests of national economic development and modernization, symbolized by the construction of large infrastructure, thus subordinate local people's livelihoods and welfare.⁷¹ The non-recognition exercised by the authorities extends beyond ignoring the desires of the DAP to determine their way of life, to more oppressive means of destabilizing and sabotaging the social continuity, unity, and harmony of these groups and their representative committees. The claim is substantiated by common testimonies of deliberate politics of division engaged by the state to break solidarity among DAP committees of Hamdab, Amri, and Manasir groups, and to weaken resistance to resettlement posed by the Local Option.

Gaining recognition for the suffering experience and current status of the affected people has been the impetus behind protests and demonstrations which were by cited DAPs as being motivated by raising awareness among the Sudanese public to their situation.

The often stated motivation for the demonstrations was to shed light on the plight of the DAP and gain national visibility in their struggle (MYS1 & 2 and OH) sat alongside others addressing the resettlement and compensation grievances. This discursive struggle challenges powerful representational biases and is reflected in other similar grievances echoing the lack of recognition to the real experienced injustices by the DAP due to state monopoly on media representation which serves to depict the DAP as amply compensated and justly treated. The testimony given by one Manasir woman in Khartoum illustrates the effect of representational biases in the interaction with the broader Sudanese public: "*...people say to me, 'what else do you Manasir people want, they have given you what's yours haven't they...? Then what are you still complaining about'*" (MWC-UHS^{lxxxii}) *Shedding* light on the reality of the Manasir experience is thus seen an important battle ground for the affected people as the general

⁷¹ A common misrecognition in dam experiences in developing countries which prioritizes the national interest and ambitions of modernizing projects at the expense of local human welfare. (sources..) Subversion is further exemplified in the national emphasis in Sudan on large-scale export oriented agribusinesses at the expense of small-scale farming.

Sudanese public has *“no idea what the compensation experience has been and ...no idea about our families in the locality that have no compensation whatsoever...”* (MWC-UHS^{lxxxiii})

Another injustice of recognition is expressed in the testimonies of various DAP committee members ([WS3](#), [WS4](#), [WS7](#)) in their grievances towards the deliberate separation of the initial United DAP committees by the state. Issues of recognition here are within the context of formal official engagement with the state, rather than within the wider context of public discourse.

7.6.2. Critique of the frame of environmental justice in authoritarian or violent contexts

The three interrelated dimensions of environmental and social justice of “distributive, participatory and recognition” successfully capture key justice issues involved in the Merowe case. However, other justice issues do exist which are not captured by these dimensions.

Quite notably, the above analysis omits some of the more egregious injustices experienced in this case. As noted, cultural injustice is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication (Fraser, 1998). With regards to communication, the language of DIU director Osama Abdalla in reference to the ultimate forced eviction of resistors to resettlement through the phrase “fleeing like rats” is a cultural injustice of disrespect.

Attempting to interpret an above-the-law Minister’s public mocking of displaced citizens as ‘procedural injustice’ is akin to calling the death of a child whose house has been targeted by fighter jets ‘collateral damage’. Whilst arguably technically true, the approach opens the door to greater collective punishment of innocent civilians. Similarly, to discuss to a government-funded militia attacking the very people displaced by a government dam in terms of representational or distributional justice, is itself an injustice.

At the very least, we can learn that an analytical frame developed to interpret unfair treatment of citizens in the US is wholly inappropriate. Young’s (1990) observation – that the actors involved start from very different positions of power (i.e. one is oppressed, the other privileged) – is entirely important here, and we must reach beyond Schlosberg’s frame in authoritarian contexts and/or when violence is used. In such extreme cases, participation and representation may understandably seem like luxuries, and if demanded must be read within the political economic (and of course social) context from within which they derive.

Young’s (1990) premise for a conception of justice is argued to concepts of domination and oppression, which underlies all distributive injustices. In participatory democracies the mechanisms of oppression are reproduced through formally democratic processes and subtle cultural hegemony. In an authoritarian regime such as Sudan, this is characterized in more explicitly violent and physical forms of oppression.

The extent to which the data collected is affected by ‘confirmation bias’ should be held in mind whilst interpreting the results and analysis. Had the research been designed to reflect a

more local interpretation of justice, the questions – and answers – would certainly be different.

Critique of Development-induced-displacement frame

The utility of the World Bank-supported Development-induced-displacement frame is also found to be limited, for its instrumental perspective focussed on living standards. Arguably the living standard of the resettled Hamdab, Amri and Manasir people is no worse off than before, if quality of life and livelihoods is interpreted in terms of material assets. Just as the Schlosberg framing obscures violence from consideration of justice, however, the DID frame allows no space or importance for cultural considerations and conceptions, such as the social rifts developing from betrayal.

7.6.3. Local conceptions and applications of justice: dissatisfaction, implicit justice, homeland, identity, (mis)representation

The main grievances of the ‘dam-affected-people’ are broadly centred on expressions of dissatisfaction with compensation and resettlement procedures, implementation and outcomes. This is supported by ample evidence gathered through the questionnaires, which reflect dissatisfaction with multiple elements of the compensation and resettlement process. Environmental and social justice frames capture some of these local particularities, though others are certainly beyond their grasp.

Such grievances as echoed by clearly articulated grievances broadly against the state-citizenship relationship, and as it manifests in the lack of honouring of commitments on behalf of the State, its neglect of its obligations towards its citizens, and the use of physical violence and arbitrary detention to break up the civil movement of the DAPs. These grievances can be a basis to infer implicit justice claims against the treatment of the state in general. One example is in the treatment of the state during planning and implementation stages, as expressed by the Manasir committee leader, “the decision by the government did not respect the decision of the people...because the people in power don’t care about what the people below decide”(WS3). However the neglect of the state takes harsher forms during the stages of resistance as state response of violence is, in one activist’s testimony, indicative of the fact that “..they have no considerations for any of their actions, whether they kill or drown” (WS4).

Such examples illuminate more deeply held notions of injustices suffered as a result of the Merowe dam. A more explicit reference to such justice issues is provided by the Manasir committee leader who states that “the ways in which the management of affairs has been in this approach [referring to the general experience of treatment of the state] would never bring justice, because justice is fulfilled through the general environment—and a conducive environment in general—which you cannot pick and choose from” (WS3). The “conducive environment in general” could be read as the openness of domestic political opportunity structures, and the recognition here that the existence of injustices are inextricably linked to the existence of an oppressive state, serve as important indications of what may constitute implicit justice.

There is an added dimension of cultural significance and cultural identity invoked in various grievances. The symbolic importance of land and its close links with cultural heritage has been repeatedly invoked by the notion of “homeland”, due to the inundation of the land, and the resulting forced resettlement away to new lands . As the Manasir Committee leader stated, “loosing their area [homeland] is a major point” (WS3).

An illuminating example of deeply held notions of cultural ties to land, is provided by one Manasir activist interviewee who expressed his rejection of a statement made by a former leader of the Manasir (Al Hassan Nars Al Deen). This leader moved to Makabrab and urged the Manasir to live in pockets among greater Sudan in the spirit of assimilation and embracing Sudanese nationalism. The rejection of this statement by the activist was upon the basis that “it destroys the identity of the people”. (OH) To understand the significance of this rejection it is useful to consider how cultural and tribal identity functions in Sudan. In discussing how cultural identities survive as distinct categories in a context of interaction and integration in Sudan, Harir notes that it is the “...traditionally defined territory that carries their name [of tribal groups] and which, despite constant interaction with other groups, socially reproduce themselves independent of others” (1994 : 18). Therefore the links between territory and identity are deeply entrenched and the loss of the former poses clear symbolic threats to the latter.

These notions relate to the justice involved in the existential fulfilment of a cultural identity, and are represented in claims, which assign these historically significant regions with conceptualizations of “home” and thereby invest it with value. In the words of one Manasir activist, he “would not exchange homeland for a palace” (MYS) and another Manasir journalist in Khartoum had “refused compensation for lost land because no value could be put on losing your home” (JZ).

The key implication here is that the concept of ‘home’, is transformed into a mobilizing factor, which is perhaps just as powerful as the compensation, resettlement and livelihood outcomes. Certainly, anecdotal evidence gathered often discussed homesickness and longing for home. The loss of one’s homeland is clearly felt by those immediate inhabitants who have been displaced and resettled elsewhere, yet due to the powerful conceptual or sentimental value which the idea of “home” has, it may affect those Manasir and members of DAP communities that have migrated and been living away from the area to an even greater extent.

In an authoritarian state such as Sudan where media representations are tightly controlled, misrecognition takes the added dimension of unrecognized injustices that have been suffered by the DAP. The image of the Merowe experience constructed by the State (through news outlets, and guided tours to the area), selectively exclude the conditions of the DAP in resettlement sites and those that have remained by the reservoir (the ‘local option’ residents). The public discourse it creates around these groups is one of generous compensations and extravagant resettlement provision. These have been articulated by the DAP communities to be a source of grievance as their everyday forms of continued suffering are largely unseen.

One example is in the TV programmes⁷² reporting agricultural success in resettlement sites, which depict prospering farms in the region. However the farms belong to the DIU and not the resettled DAPs, and such reports therefore serve to misinform and misrepresent the situation of the resettled groups.

The state-society interaction as it has been elaborated by DAPs and different social actors involved in the Merowe case, is described as a series of oppressive and repressive tactics employed by the ruling elites. Testimonies of harsh measures of forced eviction through sudden flooding, frequent recourse to violence in quelling resistance and ending peaceful protests and arbitrary arrests of academics, journalists and protestors, all serve to illustrate this point.

A note on justice and international norms

The claims of national and international actors also reflect implicit and explicit conceptions of justice. These justice notions are less readily captured by the theories used above as they often manifest through interaction with various international norms. International norms—defined as principled beliefs of right and wrong that are widely accepted and institutionalised—are paralleled to representing shared conceptions of justice. These justice claims in international struggles based on the use of norms are discussed further in the following section.

⁷² The existence of these TV programs have been explained and elaborated by interviewees in New Amri village 2.

8 Discussion and conclusions

The objective of this study was to contribute to the broader Nepal-Uganda-Sudan REDEGEN research programme's goal to "radically change our theoretical understanding of the dynamics of environment and development by examining when and how local claims and higher-level mobilisations of environmental justice lead to improvements in marginalized people's access to natural resources and poverty alleviation".

Seven of the eight specific research questions⁷³ were addressed in Section 7, and found to confirm, challenge and deepen each of the related hypotheses. Further findings relevant to both the case and to theory are discussed following, considered alongside the research's main objective.

8.1 Findings directly relevant to the Merowe struggle

Our analytical approach to the case has confirmed that the impact of the Merowe Dam is best interpreted within a political economic context of development guiding the government's strong central 'command and control' nature, and characterised by top-down technocratic processes by ruling elites. The broader international political economic context is characterised by shrinking influence of 'Western' donors and increasing influence of Chinese and GCC donors, and oil and geopolitical interests.

Though it has not been adequately addressed in this report, the study found that *the resettled villages have moved from self-reliance to dependence* upon the government and markets for the benefits of basic services and rights, while those that have remained behind maintain self-reliance, at the cost of complete lack of government support and basic rights.

The study did not investigate the impacts of the dam further than the existing literature on economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts, but has furthered understanding about *social tensions* created between those who promoted the government's resettlement plans (referred to as 'Karazayat'), and those that rejected it, remaining behind to build new lives on the reservoir shore (the 'local option').

The questionnaires have added considerable nuance to our *understanding of the impact at the local level*, particularly with the sense of satisfaction/justice with the government's resettlement package. Notably:

- very high levels of dissatisfaction with compensation generally, and with replacement of livelihoods in particular (due in large part to failings in the new irrigation schemes);
- very high levels of dissatisfaction with the resettlement process, in particular with the assets census, the rapid and un-announced filling of the reservoir;
- very high levels of dissatisfaction with the transparency of communication and accountability of the state in the resettlement process

⁷³ RQ7 about the role of the wider political economy has been touched upon, but not adequately researched or interpreted.

- significant social cleavages between those who accepted resettlement, and those who refused it;
- significant difference between resettled groups in terms of satisfaction, with residents of one village group (Makabrab) generally more satisfied than the others. The discrepancy is hypothesized to be in part due to the new villages proximity to both the river and to markets; and
- mixed sentiment on lessons learned from the experience, with residents from the four villages stating they would reject or directly oppose the construction of the dam – in the proportion of 74%, 68%, 68% and 2%.

The interviews and analysis of literature revealed a number of features about the effectiveness of resistance, notably:

- *The focus of the international NGO campaign was on private companies, not on governments or the public.* This might mark the beginning of a new trend in transnational movements that are directed to facing transnational capital and its structures by addressing businesses (i.e. an elaboration of ‘environmental accountability’ – see e.g. Mason (2005), Gupta and Mason (2014)).
- *Different groups of activists are speaking to different communities,* and may be talking past each other. Initial findings suggest that immediate local struggles focus their efforts and strategy on the State and Sudanese public, affected people abroad and national academics rally in wider circles. The plight of the people affected by the dam can only be helped by more interaction amongst the actors.
- *Effective resistance must directly address domestic political opportunity structures.* Domestically, the context of an authoritarian and repressive state shapes the local resistance and affects the outcomes that can be achieved. Recognition of the significance and priority of a domestic peaceful struggle mounted against the state, as opposed to resistance with any international involvement, amongst interviewed local activists reiterates this sentiment.
- *Resistance is also a discursive battle mounted against the state’s representational biases and control of public discourse.* The effectiveness of a struggle lies in part in its ability to gain the moral solidarity of other national constituents and to regain control over the way that local DAP are represented in the heavily censored state media. This is primarily addressed through mass demonstrations and public protests to gain visibility.
- *Injustices multiply, with time.* The discovery of children potato-harvesters in DIU farms near New Hamdab suggests a predatory nature and vicious cycles to injustices. With the New Hamdab irrigation schemes failed, the older men look abroad for work. The more recently arrived DIU farm (with a fully functioning irrigation scheme) benefits from the hard work and low pay of the sons of these men.

The findings are considered highly relevant for other environmental struggles in Sudan, notably for planned dams. *The resistance induced by the Merowe Dam has achieved a number of remarkable successes*, given the context. The struggle has:

- managed to attract some solidarity of people in Sudan well beyond the villages, especially in Khartoum
- won legal battles within the national legal structure, even if these have been skirted around
- managed to engage in legal battles with private companies where they are somewhat accountable (i.e. German company Lahmeyer, in German courts);
- managed to engage in legal battles with the Government of Sudan, in the African Union (via the African Charter for Human and People's Rights)
- inspired a generation of younger activists to continue the struggle (e.g. on university campuses), and expand it to other cases. An anti-Dal Dam activist has noted, for instance, that "I am of the lucky ones that saw the crocodile eat the others..."
- made impressions upon the President of the Republic, to the point that he has cancelled planned visits

There are also *several lessons to learn from the Merowe struggle*, including:

- the non-accountability DIU and its militias, and state authoritarianism within its own institutions (in addition to citizens);
- the effectiveness of 'divide-and-rule' tactics, notably of offering compensation only to those who agreed to resettlement;
- the very limited accountability of the donors of the project;
- the extent of the violence, mockery, and legal maneuvering which the State is ready to employ, and non-existent state accountability;
- the power of framing political economic interests as local development and improvements of local peoples livelihoods and well-being, particularly in Sudan's peripheries.
- the effects of a veiling discourse generated by a state-controlled media;
- the limited influence of the UN;
- the somewhat less limited influence of international NGOs (particularly if these have a different agenda than the Executive Committees);
- the universal attributes and appeal of 'justice'
- the very limited influence of international norms (about displacement, participation, etc.)

8.2 Contributions to theory on justice, international norms, and transnational mobilisation

1. *Justice is best interpreted from the ground up*. However broadly defined and in the number of ways in which it manifests, 'justice' is a very useful conceptual tool in the analysis

of social mobilisations around environmental issues. Theories based on empirical studies of environmental and social justice movements (rather than normative approaches about what justice “ought to” look like) serve to unpack local conceptions of justice, which are implicitly or explicitly represented. Young’s (1990) insistence on differentiating the very asymmetric power of the players (between privileged and oppressed) is considered key in this regard. Schlosberg’s (2004) framing of environmental justice is considered more relevant when actors are roughly equivalent in capacity, and the playing field is levelled.

2. The relationship between justice and international norms merits greater exploration. On one hand, the parallel use and comparison of ‘justice’ and ‘international norms’ is possible because these norms are fundamentally widely accepted principled beliefs (about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’) institutionalized in various ways that reflect their broad approval and adoption. On the other hand, the emergence of these norms are inspired and motivated as well as compounded by strong undergirding conceptions of justice, for which enough support was rallied around to enable these concepts to be legitimized through recognition and formal allegiance through institutionalization. The relationship between the two remains largely unexplored, however.

3. In closed authoritarian contexts, the local struggle must focus on local and national conditions in order to open up political space. A lesson learned from the Narmada dam movement was that success depended in part upon the existence of “sustained and organized domestic struggles, open political opportunity structures of India’s democratic regime”. The existence of organized domestic movements is enhanced by the openness of democratic structures, and their activities are more effective within these contexts. In the case of Sudan, closed domestic opportunity structures impede the mobilization efforts of national constituents, and limit the outcomes these struggles can achieve. As a result, the national movement has been obliged into international arenas (through e.g. IRN network and Askouri’s activities). However, these internationally oriented efforts do not focus on the addressing domestic political structures, or push for outcomes that serve to open these structures. The analysis here suggests that this should be a key outcome and therefore a measure of the success of transnational movements as explained by the “boomerang and spiral models” of transnational justice mobilizations dynamics in which closed domestic structures push struggles into relatively open international structures in order to influence greater openness in the domestic sphere (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

4. The local struggle (in closed authoritarian contexts) cannot ignore local and national conditions. Whilst it may be tempting to conclude that local struggles can be served by international actors, the Merowe case has demonstrated the very real limitations faced. The domestic political limitations to the struggles suggest the imperative of reforming national institutional structures and opening opportunity structures to the effective and successful implementation international norms. In the absence of effective institutionalised structures enabling the enforcement of norms, mobilizing efforts making use of valid norms will be met

with limited success. This is mirrored in contrasting Merowe case with the Narmada dam movement (Khagram, 1999, 2000).

For example, a key factor for success of Narmada dam movement was the institutionalization of environmental norms through the establishment of the Ministry of Environment, and the political space and resources it created for activists (Khagram et al 2002). In the case of the Merowe, whilst such an institutional structure existed in the form of the HCENR [Higher Council for Environment and National Resources], and was supported by national legal norms (e.g. environmental protection laws), the structure was overtly bypassed by the authorities. This neglect of national norms and lack of legal accountability is a function of broader closed political opportunity structures within the domestic sphere.

5. *Particularly where media is controlled, a significant portion of the struggle is spent on challenging perceptions.* The stated goal of the many of the local activists involved in the Merowe struggle is to set the official record straight. In this way *misrepresentation* takes the added dimension of unrecognized injustices that have been suffered by the DAP.

6. *In closed political spaces – such as the authoritarian government in Sudan – accountability is the limiting factor.* Analysis along lines of the openness of domestic opportunity structures are also useful in comparison with the struggles for justice in the Nepal hydropower cases. In contrast with the situation in Sudan, the accountability of the company Sinohydro in its Nepalese context (where it is also building dams - refer to Dunghaya Sikor) is much more prevalent. Likewise, the people affected by the dam in Nepal clearly wield a greater level of agency and bargaining power through collective organization in their engagement with the Chinese company through formal political processes and institution. Key examples here reflecting this openness of political structures is the established Labour union and organized labour strikes as an effective strategy in bargaining better working conditions, and others ...[historical political influences.../political economy]. The very fact that the GoS did undertake an EIA, and that various arms of the government (and former high-level civil servants) did support the DAP's struggle shows, however, that the GoS is aware that no government can rule for long without the consent of the people (whether coerced, or bought).

7. *Local struggles occur within global political economic processes* that must also be challenged, if change is to occur. If the domestic pursuit of political power domestically is be considered the seed of the dam program, the alignment of global political and financial opportunities was its sun, soil and water. A key conclusion that can be drawn from the international mobilization strategies of International Rivers and Corner House activities reflects Kothari's (2002) conclusions in regard to national and global levels of justice mobilisations. The assertion that national struggles represent political interests (Kothari, 2002) within wider political structures of transnational capital and the existing global institutions (whether they are the World Bank, IMF, Chinese, or GCC direct foreign investment) is supported by the experiences of the Merowe struggles. The powerful global institutions are interchangeable within the current context, and different actors emerge from within the same structure – the Chinese firms and financing bodies in the case at hand. Furthermore, the stronger influence of the globalization of commerce and political interests,

encapsulated in the various different political/economically motivated global business partnerships, over the globalization of norms (Kothari, Pratap and Visvanathan, 1994; Scholte, 2005). Economic forces or “transnational capital” will always produce the conditions of injustice warranting of mobilizations for justice, unless they are explicitly challenged (Kothari, 2002; Kothari, Pratap and Visvanathan, 1994).

Annex A: Objectives of the Merowe Dam Project

Objectives of the Merowe Dam Project, as stated by the Dams Implementation Unit

This national project is build to achieve the following objectives:

1. To generate electricity power to meet the increasing demand for purposes of economical and social development.
2. To provide relatively cheap electricity power to improve the irrigated agriculture in the country.
3. To benefit from the flow irrigation for the upper stream river to achieve agricultural development, and to improve the breeds of agricultural seeds.
4. To use the electricity to pump up the ground water and use it to expand the agricultural sector
5. To establish industrial projects, food industry projects, and mining fields that depend on the electricity as a main energy source.
6. To introduce the fish industry in the Dam's lake.
7. To protect the downstream areas from the destructive floods.
8. To improve the river transportation
9. To improve the living standards for the local residents in the area of the project, by creating investments and new job opportunities.
10. To reduce the pressure on the current dams, especially with regard to the struggle for water use for irrigation or power generation.

Annex B: Complaint to the UN Rapporteur on Adequate Housing by the Amri Committee

www.hlrn.org/img/violation/Merowe%20AMRI%20COMPLAINT.doc

Forced Eviction due to Flooding, Merowe Dam, Sudan: Complaint to UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing

by The Amri Committee November 2003

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Summary of Complaint

- 1.1 In August 2006, an estimated 2,200 families – mainly women and children – were forced to abandon their homes after the River Nile in the reservoir area upstream of the Merowe Dam, currently under construction in the Northern State of Sudan, began to rise.
- 1.2 **No specific warning of flooding was given by Merowe’s Dam Implementation Unit (DIU), an agency of the Government of Sudan under the direct supervision of the President of Sudan, prior to the inundation.**
- 1.3 **It is widely believed by the affected communities that the flooding was part of a deliberate strategy by the Dam Implementation Unit and the Government of Sudan to force the Amri communities to accept a resettlement package that they have to date rejected.**
- 1.4 The affected villagers, all from the Amri group, lost everything and, as of 25th August 2006, are still without shelter, clean water or food. The rising floodwaters have covered fields and destroyed crops and fodder. More than 12,000 heads of livestock have been lost to the rising floodwaters and more are expected to die due to a lack of fodder. There is now a severe risk of disease breaking out, both in the area and downstream.
- 1.5 **There is strong evidence that the flooding was the direct result of the on-going construction of the Merowe Dam, although consultants to the project dispute this.**
- 1.6 **Neither the Dam Implementation Unit nor the Government of Sudan has acted to relieve the suffering of the affected communities. On the contrary, the authorities have cordoned off the area and relief efforts have been blocked.**
- 1.7 The Amri Committee is the elected body that represents those communities of the Amri people who are to be resettled as a result of the construction of the Merowe Dam in Sudan.
- 1.8 This complaint is submitted by the Committee on behalf of villagers forcibly evicted by the August flooding and subsequently denied their right to shelter, water, food, health and livelihood.
- 1.9 It is asserted that by actively denying relief to those affected by the flooding, the Government of Sudan has violated the rights guaranteed to the affected individuals under the following conventions and international instruments to which Sudan is a party: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); The Convention on the Rights of the Child; and The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.

- 1.10 In the event that independent investigation establishes that the Merowe Dam was a cause of the flooding, it is further asserted that the Dam Implementation Unit violated the above rights by failing to manage the construction of the dam with proper regard for public safety.
- 1.11 The Amri Committee would also draw the Special Rapporteur's attention to the responsibilities under international law of the China Export Import Bank and the Development Funds of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman, as agencies of their national governments, to honour the international agreements to which their governments are party. Should the Merowe Dam be established as a casual factor in the August flooding, The Amri Committee request that the Special Rapporteur address any violations to the rights of the affected communities by these parties.
- 1.12 The Amri Committee therefore requests that the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing:
- Raise the issues documented above with the Government of Sudan and seek information on relief measures, if any, undertaken by the government;
 - Press for the opening up of the area so that relief agencies and NGOs are able to start relief operations immediately in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis;
 - Investigate the alleged violations and report of his findings;
 - Investigate the role of the Merowe Dam in causing the August floodings and report on his findings
 - Press for the Government of Sudan to hold accountable any persons or institutions found to have violated the rights of the affected communities;
 - Press for the rights of those affected to be respected and for restitutions and remedies to be put in place to compensate for past and ongoing violations.

Background to the Complaint

- 2.1 The Merowe Dam, now almost half built, on the River Nile, is being developed by the Dam Implementation Unit, an agency of the Government of Sudan under the direct supervision of the President, with funding from the China Export Import Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and the Development Funds of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman. Lahmeyer International of Germany manages the construction of the project; Alstom of France is supplying electro-mechanic equipment; and ABB of Switzerland is building transmission substations.
- 2.2 The Merowe Dam will displace more than 50,000 people, mainly from the Hamadab, Amri and Manasir peoples.
- 2.3 Two of the groups – the Hamadab and the Amri – are located in the Northern State, whilst the third (and largest), the Manasir, are in Nile State.
- 2.4 The Amri make up one quarter of communities that will be affected by the Merowe Dam and have been extremely resistant to being moved to resettlement sites outside of their traditional lands.
- 2.5 In November 2003, violence erupted in the Hamdab area after the dam authorities refused to recognise and negotiate with the elected committee representing the communities. Further unrests followed attempts by the dam authorities to conduct a socio-economic survey against the wishes of the affected communities.
- 2.6 In April 2006, Special Forces closely linked to the dam authorities opened fire on a peaceful gathering of villagers who were meeting to discuss the planned survey, killing three people and injuring 47. Since then, the area has been under an undeclared condition of siege. Journalists and international observers who visited the area in June reported the heavy presence of militia units in and around the area.
- 2.7 The April shootings had led to negotiations between the Amri and a Ministerial Committee, headed by Bakri Hasan Salih, an advisor to the President of Sudan. They reached an agreement in early May

under which the Sudanese Government undertook to look into the communities' grievances, while the affected people resolved to allow the socio-economic survey to take place.

- 2.8 The survey, which is being used by the authorities to set compensation levels, was carried out in June and supervised by a team from the Attorney General's office. Its results have provoked outrage among the communities. Despite Sudanese law requiring that the loss of land that has been farmed for ten years or more be compensated, the dam authorities have refused to compensate where land has been farmed for less than 20 years. No (or minimal) compensation will also be paid for the loss of such fruit-bearing tree as mango and lemon or for fodder crops. Compensation for guava trees will be reduced from SDE500,000 to just SDE 10,000 (US\$ 233 to just US\$ 4.5). On the basis of the survey, two-thirds of the affected people will be ineligible for any compensation.
- 2.9 The Amri are to be resettled at Wadi Al Mugadam in Bayuoda desert. It was originally intended to move them by the end of December 2005. However, the resettlement site is still not ready: only half of the needed houses have been built and there is insufficient land to meet the legal resettlement entitlements of the affected communities. The site covers 35 000 feddans but Sudanese law requires that almost double that amount (60000 feddans) should be made available to compensate the total number being resettled.

Details of the August Flooding

- 3.1 On 7th August 2006, over 100 Amri families – mainly women and children – living on the Island of Kouk and in the village of Shakoura were forced to abandon their homes after the River Nile in the reservoir area upstream of the Merowe Dam, currently under construction in the Northern State of Sudan, began to rise.
- 3.2 **No specific formal warning of flooding was given by the Dam Implementation Unit, prior to the inundation on or after 7th August 2006.**
- 3.3 The families, all from the Amri people, have been left without food or shelter.
- 3.4 By 23rd August 2006, more than 2,740 families were affected, mainly comprising women, children and the elderly. Preliminary reports estimate that 2,740 children; 4,795 women; and 2,055 elderly have been forced to move.
- 3.5 Some 700 houses had been completely destroyed in the villages of Shikora, Al Bana, um Haza, El Batareen, Um Kouk, El Khezian and Gerf El Doud, Al Aragoub, AL Ghananiem, Um Daras, Um Sarif, AL Galieha.
- 3.6 A further 380 houses have been damaged in the same villages on higher ground and are now in danger of collapse due to the floodwater.
- 3.7 The affected villagers have lost everything. As of 25th August 2006, they are still without shelter, clean water and are suffering from shortage of food and milk for children.
- 3.8 The rising floodwaters have covered fields and destroyed crops and fodder. The Head of Amri People Committee estimated the loss to be around 10 billions Sudanese pounds (roughly USD 5 millions).
- 3.9 More than 12,000 heads of livestock have been lost to the rising floodwaters and more are expected to die due to a lack of fodder, estimated loss of roughly USD 1.2 millions)
- 3.10 Villagers who managed to leave the area report that many human remains are surfacing on the water as a result of graveyards being inundated by the rising waters. Thousands of dead animal float in the floodwaters, and the water is completely contaminated. Many incidences of diarrhoea and an unknown type of fever have been reported.
- 3.11 There is a widespread fear that the floodwaters will spread contagious diseases to the heavily populated areas downstream from the dam.

Response of the Authorities to the Flooding Incident

- 4.1 Neither the Dam Implementation Unit nor the Government of Sudan has acted to relieve the suffering of the affected communities. On the contrary, the authorities have cordoned off the area.**
- 4.2** On 14th August 2006 Adil Awad, the Chief of Dam Security unit, told a group of journalists who tried to enter the area that he was under orders from higher authorities not to allow any Press, non-governmental organisations or relief aid to enter the area. Journalists from Rai Al Sha'ab, Alwan and Al Aldwa were detained and interrogated in Nuri, a village downstream from the dam where the security chief is stationed.
- 4.3** Press reports also record that representatives of the UN were also denied entry to the area.⁷⁴

Responsibility for the Flooding

- 5.1 As the Merowe Dam is now substantially built, villagers believe the dam structure now straddles the River Nile and the free flow of water downstream is thus constricted.
- 5.2 It is widely believed by the affected communities that the August flooding was part of a deliberate strategy by the Dam Implementation Unit and the Government of Sudan to force the Amri communities to accept a resettlement package which they have to date rejected.**
- 5.3 For their part, the project developers and their consultants deny that the dam has payed any part in the flooding. In an email to Peter Bosshard of the International Rivers Network, a US-based non-governmental organisation that is working closely with the affected communities, Egon Failer, Executive Director of Lahmeyer's Hydropower and Water Resources Division blamed the flooding on "heavy rainfall in Ethiopia, which happens every year".⁷⁵
- 5.4 In response, IRN has pointed out⁷⁶:
- a) According to the representatives of the affected communities, the Amri area has historically never been flooded, irrespective of the water levels in the Nile.
 - b) 1500 homes in the Amri area were flooded *before* the increased water flows due to the heavy rains in Ethiopia reached the area.
 - b) The secretary of the Attorney General gave a generic and unspecific warning that several villages would be flooded well before this date.
 - c) Construction of the Merowe Dam may have contribute to the flooding situation even though the structures have not been completed and the floodgates have not been closed - for example, if the water diversion channels were insufficient to deal with heavy rain falls.
 - d) The refusal of the Sudanese authorities to allow access to the dam area makes any independent monitoring of the situation impossible.
- 5.5 In light of the above, The Amri Committee request that the UN Rapporteur investigates the alleged role of the Merowe Dam in causing the flooding and issue a report.**

⁷⁴. IRIN News Report, "Flooding in Sudan displaces thousands", 16 August 2006. "A UNMIS humanitarian mission that went to the region to try to assess the damage . . . was prevented from entering the Amri area by Sudanese authorities."

⁷⁵. Email from Failer, E. to Bosshard, P., 23 August 2006.

⁷⁶. Email from Bosshard, P. to Failer, E., 24 August 2006.

Rights Violated

- 6.1 The Amri Committee contend by **actively denying relief to those affected by the flooding, the Government of Sudan violated the following conventions and international instruments to which Sudan is a party:**
- **Universal Declaration of Human Rights, specifically Art.25, par.1:** “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”
 - **The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), specifically Article 11.1:** “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.”
 - **The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), specifically Article 16.1 and Article 27.3:** “No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home . . .” and “States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in the case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.”
 - **The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966), specifically Article 17.1:** “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home.”
- 6.2 **The Amri Committee further asserts that the Dam Implementation Unit (DIU), as an agency of the Government of Sudan, would also be in violation of the above Conventions and instruments, should it be established that the DIU’s failure to manage the construction of the Merowe Dam with proper regard to public safety was a cause of the flooding**
- 6.3 The Amri Committee would also draw the Special Rapporteur’s attention to the responsibilities under international law of the China Export Import Bank and the Development Funds of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and the Sultanate of Oman, as agencies of their national governments, to honour the international agreements to which their governments are party. Should the Merowowe Dam be established as a casual factor in the August flooding, The Amri Committee request that the Special Rapporteur rule on any violations to the rights of the affected communities by these parties.

Requests to the UN Rapporteur

- 7.1 The Amri Committee request that the UN Rapporteur:
- Raise the issues documented above with the Government of Sudan and seek information on relief measures, if any, undertaken by the government;
 - Press for the opening up of the area so that relief agencies and NGOs are able to start relief operations immediately in order to avoid a humanitarian crisis;
 - Investigate the alleged violations and report on his findings;
 - Investigate the role of the Merowe Dam in causing the August floodings and report on his findings;

- Investigate any violations by the international funders of the Merowe Dam, should the dam be found to have been a causal factor in the August flooding;
- Press for the rights of those affected to be respected and for restitutions and remedies to be put in place to compensate for past and ongoing violations.

Annex C: Questionnaire employed

Sudanese Environmental Conservation Society in partnership with University of East Anglia

Exploratory project on Forests and water

Environmental Survey project on the areas affected by the construction of Merowe Dam

Name of the area.....

Name of village.....

Date..... Participant type (gender, education, occupation.....)

Section One (Compensation for what was lost in old homeland)

1. Level of transparency through which the state representing the management of dams engaged in communicating the necessary information for those affected.
(1) Fair (2) Reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There was no transparency whatsoever
2. Compensation for properties in kind (houses)
(1) Fair (2) Reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There was no compensation whatsoever
3. Compensation for livelihood resources such as land, agriculture and agricultural products (palm and fruits) and livestock
(1) Fair (2) Reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There was no compensation whatsoever
4. The level of awareness of the concept of environmental justice in terms of the need to preserve the environment and preserve the equilibrium state for the preservation of species (for example, the complete disappearance of the Hyrax) and connect it to whether life on the banks of the lake is possible in terms of physical and psychological health
(1) Fair (was found) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4)unfair (does not exist
(5) The government is not concerned at all about this even if the affected people requested it
5. Naming the villages by numbers
(1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4)unfair

(5) It constitutes a loss of identity

6. Compensation for freehold agricultural

(1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There is no compensation whatsoever

Section Two (Agriculture after the flooding)

7. Space of land and type of soil

(1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There is no land because there is no new homeland

8. Irrigation scheme and its continuity in providing water in an organized and timely fashion

(1) Fair (successful) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair (failing) (5) There is no irrigation because there is no new homeland

9. Success of agriculture in the first season in the new homeland

(1) Fair (successful) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable
(4) unfair (failing) (5) There is no agriculture because there is no new homeland

10. Distance between the village and the agricultural scheme as the main source of subsistence compared to the situation in the old homeland where all the sources of subsistence were within the boundaries of the village

(1) Fair(close proximity) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair (far) (5) There is agricultural scheme

Section Three (housing and services in the new homeland)

11. The planning of the houses in terms of area, number of rooms and uses, and the quality of implementation and the beauty of the design/finishing

(1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There is no compensation for houses whatsoever

12. The availability of Health services, education services, and urban centers

(1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable
(4) unfair (5) health and education services are not provided by the state
because there is no new homeland

13. The overall image of the new village compared to the general picture of the old village in terms of the Nile, mountains, valleys and the names of neighborhoods and villages and landscapes

(1) Fair (similar) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable
(4) Unfair (different) (5) There is no village

14. Features of the new homeland in terms of health and education services and the electricity grid

(1) Fair (close to urban centers) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable
(4) unfair (far from the Nile)
(5) There is no new homeland and no services and no electricity

Section Four (Social Harmony between family that have been resettled)

15. Ability to accept as true and the people readiness to accommodate that their ancient/honored land/ country/ region will disappear/ no more exist on the earth, and if the drowning/ sinking of their land has shocked them

(1) Fair, there is enough preparation that the authority has worked to create it; (2) Reasonable; the people through their leaders were trying to understand this (3) Un-reasonable; People has been divided between doubt and uncertainty; (4) Unfair; People and their leaders did not originally notice this issue despite its serious impact; (5) The drowning caused a deep shock that made most of the people lost their balance and create a very strong internal deep of anger that they are still living under its influence and they will remain so for a long time.

16. Relationship between those who moved to the new homeland and those who stayed in the local option (along the reservoir of old homeland)

(1) Fair (Normal) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair (not normal) (5) There is no relationship whatsoever

17. The preservation of claims to land in the old homeland alongside claims to land in the new homeland

(1) Fair (preservation) (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable
(4) unfair (deprived) (5) There is no land because there is no new homeland

18. Compensation for family that didn't live in the village

- (1) Fair (2) reasonable (3) unreasonable (4) unfair
(5) There is no compensation whatsoever

19. New livelihood resources after the flooding in the new homeland or in the local option (old homeland)

- (1) Fair (rewarding- agriculture and livestock) (2) reasonable
(available through effort: agriculture and livestock) (3) unreasonable
(available with great difficulty-agriculture and livelihood) (4) unfair (unattainable at
all- subsistence through zakat and fishing from the lake and small-scale gold mining
(5) Immigration away from the village (no livelihood options available)

20. Your position on the dam if you returned to the state before its construction

- (1) Fair (full support) (2) reasonable (negotiate a better position) (3)
unreasonable (escalate protests to obtain better development) (4) unfair (reject it
all together) (5) Anti-dam construction by all means

Annex D: List of interviewees and Khartoum Workshop participants

[Anonymised. List of interviewees is available through the authors upon request]

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ⁱ **WS1-** Former president of the Manasir Executive Committee- Osman al Magdoun: *"In the process, from the beginning there is no transparency"*

ⁱⁱ **MWC-TMK Manasir Women's Committee (Tayba Mohamed El-Khier)** people were initially told about a resettlement called Makabrab that would be near the water and look very different from the current one. Many agreed to that Makabrab, but when the story became clear through studies that revealed the Makabrab they were planning was far away in the middle of the dessert, some changed their minds.

ⁱⁱⁱ **OH- Omar Hammad- Manasir Youth Movement Leader-** "It is important to keep in mind that initially the Makabrab settlement would be along the river somewhere nearby. People believed they would be resettled justly along the water and so they were ok and in agreement with the dam."

^{iv} **WS3—current Leader of Manasir Executive Committee- Ahmed AbdelFateh Jibril:** *"The government even hid some of the places for resettlement from the people, and especially the option for resettlement along the reservoir and this was a primary [reason] for the disagreement",*

^v **OH-** "Then came the census of 1999; this was not at all a transparent census. From experience, the people were under the impression that it was in relation to taxation and so they understated their assets and incomes".

^{vi} **WS1-** *"the whole issue [of resettlement] has been taken by the Merowe administration, and the other people were not participating, to participate genuinely especially in aspects that affect the people, like their education, their housing, their livelihood"*

^{vii} **WS3-** *"The discussion of the dam has never been posed in a way were people were asked whether they should or shouldn't have a dam, the discussion was about the choice for resettlement by the people. After the people chose, there was a decision by the government that did not respect the decision of the people, which arbitrarily decided the areas for resettling the people. The decision came out because the people in power don't care about what people below decide... if the negotiation included discussion whether the dam should be established in this area or not, and we had a choice, whether the dam could be in our area or not the dam would never have been built because we knew the ways which the management of affairs has been in this approach would never bring justice. Because justice is fulfilled through the general environment and a conducive environment in general, which you can not pick and choose from, and for this reason we chose a path of resistance and refusal to move from the area"*

^{viii} **WS6- Amri Committee member and former committee president- Abdel Mutalab Hadalla:** *"I was on a committee searching for resettlement options, there were 6 members two from each area, (Amri, Hamdab and Manasir) we went Doungla to Moutama and identified four resettlement sites, two in the Northern State and two in the River Nile State. We wrote a report with our findings and we submitted it to be studied and presented. They [authorities] held on to the report and on the 17 of September 2002, president released decision of the sites for resettlement for the three communities, where Amri would be, where would Manasir be and Hamdab. No one had been consulted. This the decision of the president he decided for the people where they were going to live, by official document from him, so to whom will you raise your complain? He didn't even consult anyone. Didn't take their report seriously"*

^{ix} **MWC-** "The local option was a desire of the people, 76% of which that wanted to stay and build their new homes on the reservoir. This is their right and they made this clear to the state in many ways. But the state from the very beginning had only two options for resettlement. The Makabrab and the Fida schemes, these two were the only choices, and 'you didn't have an option in the locality' was the attitude of the state and it tried to forcefully move the people, by the sudden and un-warned flooding"

^x **OH-** "The committee representing the peoples interests wanted to stay—so the state and the committee agreed to do a referendum which revealed 76% wanted the local option and the rest wanted Makabrab and Fida. The state refused and built the resettlement homes anyway."

^{xi} **WS1-** *"as former head of Manasir committee we told them from the beginning, don't build for the whole of the Manasir, in two areas or one area, regarding the Fida scheme we don't want it, it is useless a waste of resources, the government regarding the Makabrab that is ok, you can build that. They built both with hope of moving all the Manasir there"*

^{xii} **YAM-** Yehya Abdul Majid- Former Minister of Water, consultant for the Local Option Manasir: Local option feasibility: Study was commissioned by the River Nile State government, began in August 2006, ended 11 November 2006. The study showed the enormous opportunities provided by the Lake for the local populations... a 'beautiful situation'. People could have been settled above 300m, and then practiced recession agriculture as the Lake recedes. Lake has brought "very favourable conditions" from Oct-March and winter is the most important growing season. Irrigation is now possible 12 months of the year, for those at south end of Lake. Water is high and free of silt, so good to irrigate through the pumps. At the North end of the Lake irrigation is possible half the year, recession farming the other half. Findings ignored: "Unfortunately" "the people in power" decided to resettle people away from the Lake.

^{xiii} **WS7-** Manasir Committee Member from the local option- Abdel Kheir: *“Yehya Abdel Majid study that was made is what identified/confirmed/determined the possibility of inhabiting people in the area. Because it studied all the components of habitation and settlement around the reservoir-- from fishing to agriculture to water use and livestock rearing. Yehya Abdel Masjid contributed greatly to local option strategy of the people and their desires—by telling the people about the coming good things. Saying to them ‘Even if the government didn’t give you [compensation] don’t move, stay in your places. His advice was the main factor convincing people to stay.”*

^{xiv} **MWC-** Despite the state finally agreeing to and recognizing the local option as a resettlement project, and in further agreements promises the provision of services, development of housing, and agricultural schemes, in the local option area, the area is still a public service black whole.

^{xv} **OH-** *“Agreements that were reached with the government to develop local option were many, among them No. 70 which grants the area along the reservoir to the local option Manasir, and many others which followed with steps to build houses and local services, electricity, agricultural schemes and government investment, still not acted upon, just signed and put into a drawer.”*

^{xvi} **WS3-** The *“Manasir insisted in staying around the Nile even if they lost all their rights and the government wanted them to move but because of their insistence, they won their struggle and forced the government finally to recognize the local option— even though it hasn’t built any houses or support any services or any agricultural schemes.”*

^{xvii} **WS4- Amri Committee member and activist- Mohamed El-Houri:** *“The Amri did not move on their own choice, they were forced to move. They moved because they were inundated and flooded. They were flooded three times, first time, second time and third. The first time they were isolated in the dessert, and they were refused any access no Sudanese or foreign organization any relief agency was allowed to enter. They stayed three months in the area before they decide to move to resettlement sites”*

^{xviii} **OH-** *“When they [the authorities] knew that people wanted the local option, they used means that you wouldn’t even use against animals, methods that were completely vile and immoral—They forced people to evict their homes, they did this by closing the gates in the middle of the night during the flooding season, this sudden eviction created a humanitarian crisis. The government did this purposefully to force eviction even though a referendum it agreed to showed 76% wanting to stay. Instead it flooded their lands, and it even had buses ready for evicted people to be transported to resettlement sites miles away. Most of the people built their tents and sat, waiting for help.”*

^{xix} **WS4-** *“The people that are present in old Amri the government put pressure on them by not providing any services.” We made our own education, our own drinking water and health centers, and we started our lives without depending, and the governments knows us, they don’t touch us and we don’t touch them”*

^{xx} **MWC-** There are no links to the area, no electricity or roads linking people. *“The roads are interrupted at Manasir, they go to Wadi Halfa and other areas but bypass the Manasir.”*

^{xxi} **OH-** But there was continued negligence to the area, no support, no housings have been finished- (of the 1000 houses promised under local option agreements) no health-women were giving birth in undesirable conditions- no electricity, no road to transport,

^{xxii} **MWC-** There are no health centres, women have to give birth in unfavourable conditions and some of them in the transport to the nearest hospital, the water is not good for drinking, there are no public funds whatsoever being directed there.

^{xxiii} **MWC-** *“The local option is in a ridiculous state, they have no services, no support, not even electricity, the electricity moves over them, you can see the lines moving right over them and to other areas, bypassing them completely”*

^{xxiv} **OH-** The *“...lack of services was all to force people out, but we stayed and we will continue to stay no matter what”*

^{xxv} **WS3-** *“Now the life in the old homeland is much better, the first reason, is that it is in fulfilment of the natural human right to choose where he will live and settle, this is a main point.”*

^{xxvi} **WS4-** *He is one of the people against resettlement- “but they didn’t have any other alternatives. The people are simple (minded). They didn’t believe that the state could hurt them ‘do you thing the state make us suffer, could the state to put us in a desert without any service, and leave us there?’ We accepted to moved based on ‘gentlemen agreements’ [agreements based on trust and orally] ...there was no written agreement. We were anyway from the beginning refusing and not agreeing to the area of El Moultaga, where they wanted to move us, but there was no other option, we accepted to move to it. They moved us to El Moultaga, which is 7 km from the Nile. In a dessert encroachment*

^{xxvii} **WS4** *“The main irrigation pumps the agricultural scheme in El Moultaga, the average life-expectancy for these wells is supposed to be 25 years—for 5 years it wasn’t maintained. What happened was that after 3 years, they started to maintain them and after five years it stopped completely. The main source of income for people was agriculture, they have nothing else.”*

xxviii **WM**- New Hamdab settler and activist- Waleed Mohamed: shows how 1/3 of the fields have completely failed, and most of the rest of 2/3 have failed. After 10 years of investment in the land. Primarily because of lack of irrigation water, for the last four years. The original pumps provided were of poor quality and eventually broke because of cavitation and vibration.

xxix **NHW**- New Hamdab Women- Interviewed in village 2: "we can't grow anything because of no water, we invested in small tree samplings but they all died because of lack of water"

xxx **WS4**- *From 2005 to 2009, anything we planted we watched die in front of us because of lack of water. After that we continued our resistance and expanded our resistance until it reached Ali Osman (the deputy of the president) and he established a committee, under the leadership of AbdelHalim ElHassan, and this committee produced a study and a technical report. The technical report said that the irrigation pumps were put in the wrong level, and has a lot of technical failures. The dam authorities even refused engaging in this committee. The committee was established—from people of the ministry of irrigation and elsewhere—point being it was a governmental committee. There is a rescue solution [maintenance] within the first three years, or the other solution is to install new pumps—this was the finding of the report- the technical report and neither has been implemented. They didn't do any of these solutions for the next two years.*

xxxi **WM**- There is also a drinking water problem in New Hamdab. People protested in 2004 about lack of drinking water. People had to pull up water from the Nile (about 10km away?). Even today there is insufficient water. Drinking water comes from 2 groundwater wells. Delba province/municipality was given responsibility for provision by the DIU. They limited supply to 2h/day, alternating between 2 sections of the village. This is because the drinking water distribution network is oversized (a 6" loop system). Delba water corporation doesn't have enough funds to pump more, so they abandoned the delivery of water altogether. So the villagers picked up the service and pumped for more hours but found problems in the network: everyone had tapped into it to install booster pumps and there's no way to pump enough water to satisfy everyone. So the distribution net requires major overhaul, but they have no funds.

xxxii **WM**- "There are so few opportunities here that now we are like refugees spread throughout the Sudan." The options are "as fishermen above our homes in the old village, as chance gold-miners, as employees of Osama, nearby our own failed new lands"

xxxiii **NHW**- while our farming is struggling there are these private farms that are successful that export all what they grow, when we see it, it makes us sad, because ours is struggling and their farms are prospering, they have wells and irrigation equipment which we can't afford, our people only work there as labourers, ... our children work on these farms. When we see these farms we get sad and further more when they show these farms on TV saying they are agricultural schemes in El-Moultaga, people think they are our farms and so they think we are doing well, when in fact our situation is much worse.

xxxiv **NHW**- children as young as 8-10 years are working on these farms for 12 hours a day from 6-in the morning till 6 in the evening, for very little pay 45 Sudanese pounds daily (this is what they take home as a large proportion of their income is spent towards transport to and from the farms and daily meals)

xxxv **MWC- AMH**- She was at the village (Sherreri) when the flooding happened. "It happened in the middle of the night, with no prior warning whatsoever. The people were sitting in their homes in the evening and suddenly the water came. It was a terrible thing. Women were left with no support had to take her children and go to higher ground."

xxxvi **OH**- They forced people to evict their homes, they did this by closing the gates in the middle of the night during the flooding season, this sudden eviction created a humanitarian crisis

xxxvii **MSY1** During the flooding of the Manasir, he was present, he witnessed because he was on break from university. "We were seeing families from Birti Sherik (East), and it was a state of chaos... it was everyman for himself... The men were busy trying to dam their houses and areas with sand from the rising waters and in Sada west of the Cap they were evacuating family and animals. The water came at night, the pregnant, the old and the vulnerable were all evacuated. Not even any organization was present during this stage, no help or relief was present."

xxxviii **MWC- AMH**- During the flooding which pushed people out of their homes with nothing on them to survive, many women and children suffered. They were left with no relief services, no help from any organizations, the whole area was blocked off to any aid. The night time flooding is an unforgivable wrongdoing which is unfathomable to do towards human beings

xxxix **MSY2** People evicted from their homes were congregating in refugee camps, he believes that people in Darfur were better off because they could at least have access to relief organizations.

xl **OH**- Most of the people built their tents and sat, waiting for help. No organizations were allowed to provide humanitarian relief

^{xii} **NAF**- New Amri Farmer – interviewed in New Amri: They were flooded during the first diversion (i.e. the diversion of the river required to build the dam across the normal riverbed) in 2006. But they were still besieged by the rising waters. We didn't know whether to look after our kids or to go fetch some food. We felt very much like what Osama Abdallah called us – 'fleeing rats'.

^{xiii} **NAF**- They were simply discussing how to form a committee after 3 protestors had been released from prison when a machine gun-mounted on a pickup truck shot on them, 3 were killed, including one of the ones released just the day before. They were just meetings, not protests. They were about rights – to recognize the number of houses provided, the way that compensation happened and the quantities provided, fear of adapting to a new area.

^{xiii} **OH**- After the state division tactic following 2003, there was a meeting of all committees in Amri, and the meeting was surprised by the state bringing guns and killed people, and it continued to use divisive tactics to split up the movement

^{xiv} **TA**- During Amri struggle many from Hamdab were standing with them helping them, at the time of the shooting, the people filled their boats and lorries but the shots were fired quickly and suddenly and they couldn't do anything to help. Hamdab gave support at Amri, we helped on recovering of wounded, 13 were wounded. Hamdab were in attendance at the shooting and were arrested on return by the security forces of the DIU. Police reported and accused the wounded victims after the event.

^{xv} **MSY1**: Many different protests were organized by students in Khartoum The reasons for the protests were raising awareness of others in and around the region. The press and reporting is not published and the people touring and visiting Merowe were censored in what they saw. The water drowned everything, bringing attention to this loss and lack of it being addressed, these were among the reasons.

^{xvi} **OH**- The protest took place in front of justice square in the River Nile State, and the reason for it is because the state until 2011 took no action towards the affected people left in the local option, and it arrested 3 of their leaders. There was no recognition or attention to the affected people, and the protest was meant to show that people are wronged and are still surviving without any services. It was to become apparent to the rest of Sudan as a people wronged and to be apparent to the government that it cannot forget us, and forget our situation.

^{xvii} **OH**- Protestors pushed for the release of the arrested members and agreement was reached with Niab [governor] Wali Ali Hamid, and the steps needed to develop the local option were discussed and agreed. That people have their rights as citizens, access to health and proper housing, and construction of the local option, and that at least electricity should be there. Some projects were initiated but it is still problematic in terms of commitment and investment. Also among their demands was that the people affected should see some of the benefits from the electricity, that the state itself should be given 2% of the profits from electricity to return to the people and most of all they wanted the flooding to be addressed publicly, to recover all that was lost in flooding.

^{xviii} **MSY1**: In all cases the opposition was accused for creating the demonstrations, even though they were not that active. The second protest also from University of Khartoum, where 400 students were beaten by security force and arrested to break up the protest. The third protest was in two universities, the Nilien State and Al Haliya, where the security authorities threatened students with axes and knives not to protest.

^{xix} **OH**-Mobilizing people for this protest was easy, many people that were not even Manasir were supporting us when we made it clear what we were protesting and the wrongdoings that have been done onto us. It didn't take much convincing. The united council of affected peoples was present, people from Manasir, Amri and Hamdab. There was a peaceful normal program within the square, the protest lasted for 3 months and ten days and in this time we had daily activities, such as Quran reading, public talk sessions and other activities. But the state didn't want to allow us that platform. They started to use immoral tactics to break it up. The methods they used were not moral or just

ⁱ **OH**- They started poisoning the water and giving people diarrhoea to try and push them out. He knows this because he was part of the security for the camp. Another thing they did is to put alcohol in the drinking water containers (biir) in order to cause conflict between the protesting masses and the inhabitants of the area, to accuse the protesters of miscreant drunks and problem makers. Further they would be disguised as Manasir and go to the houses of the local inhabitants asking to use their toilets and such. This was to make the inhabitants of the area despise the presence of the protesters and annoy them. He and the other men in the security went around told the people of the village that if any Manasir came to them asking for something, to simply send them to the security of the camp.

ⁱⁱ **WM**: "We are angry with the Karazay-at . They are people who are loyal to the government and themselves, not to our people. Our relationship is not good. Karazay-at are part of the cause of our problem. "

ⁱⁱⁱ **OH**- he was a leader in the Fallujah and played a big role in it. The Fallujah is the militant faction for the committee. Before compensation they agreed with the compensated people that they must not come back and change the minds of the people. The three choices (Makabrab, Fida or local option) are all theirs to make, but they must remain as one unit, one faction, so that what people want they can get.

liii **OH-** There was a social rift that resulted from the malicious involvement of the government in splitting the people. The aim of was not to be split, but those that received compensation and were convinced by the lies of the government, and encouraged to come back to their home land and do the bidding of the state –there was a movement against these people, the motto was “Al Saraf yinsarif” This is why the Fallujah destroyed the houses of those that moved to keep the different groups of Manasir separate so that not to compromise the desires of those wishing to stay

liv **WS2- DIU representative (media and communication centre of the DIU:** *“the government also got involved in some issues and created unrest and confusion among the people affected--the Amri, Hamdab, and Merowe. So that it can further its agenda in the way that it wanted to. And I was a witness to that for a while, [and a] participant in the decision. But was watching the plotting and scheming that happened from the committee and governmental actors or people part of the government”*

lv **WS3-** “The government is collaborating with partners, essential partners, but I don’t blame the people who moved or stayed because the issue/disagreement is with the authorities that attempted to split the people even from the three areas, which had a united committee that was against the project (all three areas) and as soon as the government found out, they appointed a committee for the Manasir, and then for Amri and Hamdab thus dividing the committees and started to deal with each separately, and then after started to resettle the Hamdab.”

lvi **OH-** “It would take meet with each group individually and in private. This would make the other groups feel as though the meeting group was making deals with the government and in doing so will stand to benefit from the first pick of the resettlement and compensation resources. This was the intention of the government, to create distrust among the committees and play them off against each other.”

lvii **WS4-** *“The government already decided its position and what it wanted to do, without any type of consideration. The first point we entered in conflict with the government on the 22 of April 2006, in which the government stopped us by means of weapons and killed three and wounded 13...and because of this they have no consideration for any of their actions, whether they kill or drown”*

lviii **JZ –Manasir activist and journalist- Ja’afar al Zoulghani** Wrote in papers urging people not to accept the resettlement/compensation offered by the DIU and the state. Writings were tailored to by-pass the heavy censorship, and a lot of his writing was not published. Played a largely behind the scenes, out of fear of persecution. “If you confront them (the state) with a lot of noise and attention gathering, you will just disappear, they will just take you from your home and they will shoot you. ”

lix **OH-** President of the youth committee and the movement’s leaders, of which he is considered one of, were making speeches in public platforms, making them targets for arrest. On the 3 of June, 2013, by force of 20-30 security forces and 5 soldiers they arrested us. Me and 3 others: AbdelRahim al Kalal, Abdel Othman Toum, Yasser Saleh Ali. The arrest were done in a horrible way

lx **WS3-** “The experience was the first peaceful civil movement in the modern history of Sudan, and that they protested in the Damar for three months, and during this period he expected people from Sudanese society, from international and non-governmental organization, providing support to them. So he thinks that Manasir give a peaceful resistance, and should shed the light on the Manasir experience for lesson learned so that people may have an idea of the meaning of peaceful resistance, and not to take military resistance. Our defeat will arrive once we decide to take a military resistance path.”

lxi **WS7-** *“There is no attention on the implications of the dam, in terms of resettlement and compensation, social and environmental impacts and very much attention on the body of the dams, in terms tours to the area, and they don’t show them the people that are affected. They show you a picture of the old village and new village but they are not shown the people in the area. This is a type of brainwashing and the reason for the poor attention to implications. And this lack of attention is reflected onto the inhabitants.”*

lxii **WS9- Dal Anti-dam Committee member-Abbas Tawfiq:** *“tours being taken by Dal people to Merowe, and shown ‘in Merowe there are gardens, and airports and presidential palaces, and a lot of different things! And planes are landing and tour buses arriving! come and see the dam’ . Groups of people are taken and shown only the concealed truth.”*

lxiii **MWC-UHS** In the office many people say to me “what else do you Manasir people want, they have given you what’s yours haven’t they, they have compensated you right? Then what are you still complaining about?” They have no idea what the compensation experience has been, and they have no idea about our families in the locality that have no compensation whatsoever, not even the slightest recognition. This is a result of the complete control of the media, only showing the good things that happened and censored and completely ignored the bad things of the experience. Many people don’t know the truth. There was a TV show that would come on every Thursday evening on a national TV channel and show the gains of the Merowe dam. When people see this they see images of shiny new houses and that’s it, they don’t ask what they are not seeing.

lxiv **HY-National expert-** People's claims justified in some cases, not in others. Some people who live in Khartoum seek compensation for land that they've abandoned. People have been given good conditions and *more* land than they owned before, but they're still looking for more. The compensation provided was acceptable, but opposition political parties want to make the most of the failures... they play up the cons and downplay the pros. He became aware of the issues through the media

lxv **OH-**intervention from Khartoum has been the most significant. Dr. Hashim, gave much valued and heeded advice and as a person of similar experience (being from Halfa) in terms of dams. Furthermore other individuals in Khartoum include many, that were fighting and made a difference in the Manasir among them Ahmed Abdelfatah, fought and is still fighting, Dr. Gulam el Din, advocate for the local option, and the first person to fight for local option in Khartoum, was involved in movement to expel the governor

lxvi **GIWS- Group Interview at Workshop- TA-MH-MYS1&2:** Both TA and MH worked with Nicholas Hillyard and Peter Bosshard on their visit to Sudan to assess the social situation of the resettlement. They think that the impact was negligible at local level but they recognized the potential international impact their work might have had.

lxvii **OH-**Wanted the Sudanese cause to be solved within Sudan. Doesn't see any impact of external intervention, sees some value in the pressure application but ultimately the issue must be resolved internally.

lxviii **MWC-UHS-** We want Sudanese problems to be solved within Sudan No perceivable impact of any external involvement, outside of Sudan, but acknowledge the significance of it on putting pressure on the state

lxix **JZ-** The EIA done by Lahmeyer which is a corrupt company was probably done for the sake of credibility to funders, the financiers Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and Chinese banks procedure. But the study was not done or taken seriously.

lxx **HY-** Lahmeyer should not have undertaken the EIA because they were the consultant, and there was a conflict of interest.

lxxi **YAM-** The Lahmeyer report showed the dam-operation procedures... He used this for his study to show how resettlement at the Lake is possible.

lxxii **WS3-** Some of the partners of the government are the funders, and consultative companies. They were supposed to investigate and make sure if the people were consulted a full manner and whether their needs would be fulfilled by the proposed project. This was not done, not by the Arabic funds or the other donors. He thinks that one of the issues that should be raised is holding the funders accountable with the government about the status of the people now, because it financed the construction of the dam.

lxxiii **WS5-** *Second point is where did financing come from? This could have been a good rallying point for the affected people and NGOs, to give the opportunity to stop the dam. Most of the financing from the Arabic funds. In Kenya a dam project that didn't hold a consultation with the affected communities resulted in the WB withdrawing funding.*

lxxiv **MWC-** They had been involved (as MWC) in a workshop set up for Darfur on the matter of human rights and legal advice to populations suffering from human rights abuses. They were invited by the organization HAWA a women's rights and gender equality organization, to an event set up by the African Union around 2009/10. They made their claims on the basis of dam affected people and presented their cause to people present. They agree these types of practical workshops raising awareness on rights and how to organize and seek correction of injustices when it comes to negligence of rights is important

lxxv **WS7-** *there are some benefits of the dam it's not just all negative impacts. We stayed in the area because we were hoping to gain benefits from the dam, many benefits of the dam. According to Abalmajid study, that there are 106,000 feddans that are irrigated by flood recession, on the land recovered during closing of gates and summer season recession...I think that the problem is that the government didn't succeed in appointing good management for this dam, to execute the project based on good and deep rational analytical studies this is why there is a lot of difficulties and failures, because of the lack of management*

lxxvi **OH-** That "development was a necessary sacrifice" this was the understanding of the people. From Nimeri era, statement that he made along the lines that "those who sacrifice for development, will be rewarded with a palace"- so when dam was announced, people welcomed it thinking that the development that would result in a greater good and thus their sacrifice would be recognized and rewarded justly. This was not the case.

lxxvii **GIWS** The people of Merowe all anticipated benefits of the dam and promised development for 40 years. They were singing about the benefits it would bring. They were not against the dam's construction, they were against the way the DIU treated them, which was very unfair. They now say they should have started opposing the dam before it was constructed.

lxxviii **GIWS-** Motto of the dam was the "end of poverty and energy export" these were lies, we now have more expensive electricity and we import electricity.

lxxix **MWC-UHS** It still feels like we are not settled in a place we can call our own, in a state of always travelling or waiting to go home. But that home is a memory, everything has changed, our lifestyles changed and in many ways there have gotten

better but the shock of the change and the continued lack of recognition for the great sacrifice the Manasir have made is much worse

^{lxxx} **GIWS:** If they could return now they would say no to the dam completely both those that were resettled and those not. They would go out of their way to oppose it. The lessons to Kajbar, Dal, and Al Shirek is: "Refuse dam at all costs",

^{lxxxi} **WS 10-** " *I am of the lucky that saw the crocodile eat others at Amri and Manasir and Hamdab.*"

^{lxxxii} **MWC-UHS** In the office many people say to me "what else do you Manasir people want, they have given you what's yours haven't they, they have compensated you right? Then what are you still complaining about?" They have no idea what the compensation experience has been, and they have no idea about our families in the locality that have no compensation whatsoever, not even the slightest recognition. This is a result of the complete control of the media, only showing the good things that happened and censored and completely ignored the bad things of the experience. Many people don't know the truth. There was a TV show that would come on every Thursday evening on a national TV channel and show the gains of the Merowe dam. When people see this they see images of shiny new houses and that's it, they don't ask what they are not seeing.