

## **Essays on Multilateral Sanctions and Conflict Resolution**

### **THESIS**

submitted at the Graduate Institute  
of International and Development Studies  
in fulfilment of the requirements of the  
PhD degree in International Relations / Political Science

by

**André ALVES DOS REIS**

Thesis N° 1465

**Geneva  
2023**



# **Essays on Multilateral Sanctions and Conflict Resolution**

**© 2023 André ALVES DOS REIS**

INSTITUT DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT  
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**Essays on Multilateral Sanctions and Conflict Resolution**

**THESIS**

submitted at the Graduate Institute  
of International and Development Studies  
in fulfilment of the requirements of the  
PhD degree in International Relations/Political Science

by

**André ALVES DOS REIS**

Thesis N° 1465

**Geneva  
2023**

**Andre ALVES DOS REIS**

Sur le préavis de Thomas BIERSTEKER, professeur honoraire de l'Institut et directeur de thèse, de Cédric DUPONT, professeur à l'Institut et membre interne du jury, et de Clara PORTEL SAIS, Professor, Constitutional Law, Political and Administrative Sciences Department, University of Valencia, Spain et experte externe, la directrice de l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement autorise l'impression de la présente thèse sans exprimer par là d'opinion sur son contenu.

*Le dépôt officiel du manuscrit, en 4 exemplaires, doit avoir lieu au plus tard le 25 mai 2023.*

Genève, le 24 avril 2023

Marie-Laure Salles  
Directrice

Thèse N° 1465

## RESUME / ABSTRACT

Titre de la thèse / Title of thesis : Essais sur les sanctions multilatérales et la résolution des conflits/Essays on multilateral sanctions and conflict resolution

Résumé en français: *Cette thèse explore la compréhension des sanctions multilatérales en tant qu'outil de résolution des conflits. La résolution des conflits n'est pas seulement la résolution en soi, mais aussi la prévention, la gestion et la transformation des conflits. Ainsi, chacun des trois articles présentés dans cette thèse étudie les sanctions multilatérales sous l'un des nombreux aspects par lesquels un outil de résolution de conflit pourrait être vu, étudié et utilisé. Le premier article étudie les sanctions en tant qu'outil stratégique de résolution des conflits en construisant un modèle qui tente d'expliquer les facteurs associés à l'utilisation des sanctions par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. Le deuxième article étudie les organisations régionales et leurs engagements, leurs systèmes et leurs pratiques en matière de sanctions contre les changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement, notamment les coups d'État. Le troisième article ramène la discussion au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies en examinant l'efficacité des sanctions en matière de contrainte et de signalisation dans le cadre des conflits armés intra-étatiques. Cette thèse contribue à la littérature sur les sanctions avant tout et au domaine plus large des études sur les conflits et la paix.*

English Summary: *This dissertation explores multilateral sanctions as conflict resolution tools. Conflict resolution is not only resolution per se but also conflict prevention, management, and transformation. Thus, each of the three papers presented in this dissertation studies multilateral sanctions within one of many aspects through which a conflict resolution tool could be seen, investigated, and used. The first paper investigates sanctions as a strategic conflict resolution tool by building a model to explain the factors associated with the United Nations Security Council's use of sanctions. The second paper investigates regional organizations and their commitments, systems, and sanctions practices against unconstitutional changes of government, most notably coups. The third paper brings back the discussion to the United Nations Security Council by looking at the effectiveness of sanctions on constraining and signalling when dealing with intra-State armed conflicts. This dissertation contributes to the sanction's literature first and foremost and the broader field of conflict and peace studies.*

## **Acknowledgement**

Many people provided support throughout my academic, professional, and personal journey. From the day I started my education in Brazil until today, I have encountered fantastic people that have enriched my life, intellect, and perspective. I hope I have done the same for them. Here, I would like to express my gratitude to you all.

Also, I sincerely thank Professor Biersteker, who has supervised me since my master's studies at IHEID, always guiding me with questions and stories that instigated me to reflect and learn. I have never met Professor Biersteker once and left without learning something new.

Finally, my gratitude for my family: my mother, who always supported me; my wife, whose patience knows no bounds these days; and my daughter, who wanted to play with me several times, but the only answer she heard was that I was too busy writing my thesis.

To all, my sincere thanks.

Andre

# Table of Contents

Chapter I: Introduction.....	10
<i>First paper: UNSC Sanctions on cases of intra-State armed conflicts: building a selection model.....</i>	13
<i>Second paper: Regional organisations and the norm against unconstitutional changes of government: commitment, systems and sanctions.....</i>	14
<i>Third Paper: Understanding effective signalling and constraining: the initial steps of a mid-range Theory on UNSC sanction effectiveness .....</i>	15
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	16
<i>Bibliography .....</i>	16
Chapter II: UNSC Sanctions on cases of intra-State armed conflicts: building a selection model.....	19
<i>Introduction.....</i>	19
<i>Selection bias and sanctions: the perennial curse.....</i>	20
<i>The non-randomness of mediation, peacekeeping operations, and United Nations Security Council decisions .....</i>	23
<i>Initiating a discussion on the imposition of sanctions by the UNSC.....</i>	27
<i>Hypotheses .....</i>	29
<i>Research Design.....</i>	31
<i>Dependent variable.....</i>	33
<i>Independent Variables.....</i>	34
<i>Controls.....</i>	36
<i>Findings .....</i>	38
<i>Analysis.....</i>	46
<i>Conclusion.....</i>	49
<i>Appendix.....</i>	52
<i>Bibliography .....</i>	54
Chapter III: Regional organizations and the norm against unconstitutional changes of government: commitment, systems and sanctions.....	60
<i>Introduction.....</i>	60
<i>Post-Cold War, democratization and regional organizations: the fight against unconstitutional changes of government (UGC) .....</i>	61
<i>Regional Sanctions: a new frontier of sanctions literature.....</i>	64
<i>Theoretical and Hypotheses Formulation.....</i>	67
<i>Large N-analysis.....</i>	69

<i>Independent Variables</i> .....	69
<i>Statistical Model, Dependent Variable and Controls</i> .....	70
<i>Findings and discussion</i> .....	72
<i>West Africa, ECOWAS, and coups</i> .....	78
<i>Guinea-Bissau 2012 coup</i> .....	80
<i>Analysis</i> .....	89
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	93
<i>Appendix</i> .....	95
<i>Bibliography</i> .....	99
Chapter IV: Understanding effective signalling and constraining: the initial steps of a mid-range theory on UNSC sanction effectiveness.....	104
<i>Introduction</i> .....	105
<i>Background</i> .....	105
<i>Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and the study of sanctions</i> .....	109
<i>QCA as a method</i> .....	111
<i>Research Design</i> .....	115
<i>Case Selection</i> .....	115
<i>Building the data matrix for QCA: outcome (effectiveness) and conditions</i> .....	117
<i>Constraining model</i> .....	119
<i>Signalling Model</i> .....	121
<i>Analysis</i> .....	122
<i>Constraining model</i> .....	122
<i>Signalling model</i> .....	124
<i>Discussion and Conclusion</i> .....	126
<i>Appendix</i> .....	130
<i>Bibliography</i> .....	132
Chapter V: Conclusion.....	135
<i>Bibliography</i> .....	142

## Chapter I: Introduction

The 90s were known as the sanction decade. Sanctions became a go-to tool, a trend that became stronger in the 2000s. During this period, different actors extensively used sanctions as a policy/conflict resolution tool to address many crises and conflicts, further foreign policy goals, and signal normative preferences.<sup>1</sup> Despite its growing popularity among practitioners and policymakers, the academic debate on sanctions has remained relatively sterile<sup>2</sup> while the field has evolved significantly in its practice.

The first significant development concerns the crises that sanctions were asked to address. Taking the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as an example, it has imposed more than twenty sanctions regimes since the Cold War.<sup>3</sup> Of those until 2013, fourteen were to address an ongoing armed conflict. The remaining were related to nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), unconstitutional change of government (e.g., Guinea Bissau), and counterterrorism.

Not only did the crises being targeted by sanctions have changed, but the type of sender has also changed. The United Nations and other international organizations have increasingly used sanctions to achieve their mandate. Historically, sanctions were a tool of statecraft; in recent decades, for example, regional and sub-regional organizations have adopted sanctions as part of the toolbox to address conflict and unconstitutional changes of government in their respective regions.<sup>4</sup>

Within the actor dimension, the target of the sanctions has changed along with the senders. While sovereign states continue to be the target of certain sanctions regimes, an increasingly sprawling number of non-state armed groups, companies, and individuals have become the target of international sanctions.<sup>5</sup>, raising important questions regarding how sanctions affect those different actors.

The sender and receiver of sanctions have evolved and changed as well, and the message itself – the sanction – has morphed extensively. Sanctions regimes, initially, were more akin to full-blown embargos. With time, and after a series of international processes (Interlaken, Bonn/Berlin, Stockholm)<sup>6</sup>, sanctions have become much more targeted in their bid to

---

<sup>1</sup> Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, *Targeted Sanctions*.

<sup>2</sup> Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert, 'Conclusion'; Peksen, 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?'

<sup>3</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

<sup>4</sup> Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'; Whitehead, 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality'; Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'; Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>5</sup> Pekin, 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?'

<sup>6</sup> Brzoska, 'From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions'.

maximize "pain" to the intended target while reducing adverse collateral effects to the general population, the so-called "targeted" or "smart" sanctions.<sup>7</sup> Thus, sanctions moved from blunt instruments to tools encompassing various measures that differ significantly, such as travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargos, diplomatic sanctions, commodity bans (import or export), financial measures, aid cuts, and full-blown embargos. Such measures could be applied to individuals, entities, and all actors within a region of a country or to the entirety of a State.<sup>8</sup>

Finally, such "communication" between sender and receiver via sanctions does not occur in a vacuum. It is often preceded, complemented, or followed by other tools, such as peacekeeping forces, use of force, mediation efforts, and judicial referrals to international tribunals, in a complex landscape of complementary and competing priorities, methods, and messages.

Within this context of remarkable evolution and increasing complexity, it is important to stress that the scholarly field did witness conceptual and empirical developments—for example, the concept of sanctions episodes from Eriksson,<sup>9</sup> and the three-purpose sanction conceptualization from Giumelli<sup>10</sup>. Moreover, the empirical work done by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC).<sup>11</sup> Recently, there have been theoretical and empirical developments such as mapping European Union sanctions<sup>12</sup> and sanction termination<sup>13</sup>, understanding regional organization sanctions<sup>14</sup>, the impact of sanctions on rebel groups<sup>15</sup> and how sanctions interplay with mediation<sup>16</sup>, to mention a few. They are all positive developments for the field.

However, such developments are still the exception instead of the norm. Although sanctions, especially multilateral sanctions, have been used extensively by the international community to deal with conflicts, the fundamental questions as to what factors are associated with the use of sanctions by international actors, whether sanctions can be used as preventive tools or in which conditions multilateral sanctions are effective, remain largely un-answered.

---

<sup>7</sup> Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert, 'The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions.

<sup>8</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.  
<sup>9</sup> Eriksson, *Targeting Peace*.

<sup>10</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions.'

<sup>11</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.  
<sup>12</sup> Giumelli, Hoffmann, and Książczaková, 'The When What, Where and Why of European Union Sanctions'; Weber and Schneider, 'Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US.'

<sup>13</sup> Attia and Grauvogel, 'International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018'; Hudáková, Biersteker, and Moret, 'Sanctions Relaxation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Past Sanctions Regimes.'

<sup>14</sup> Charron and Portela, 'The Relationship between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes'; Borzyskowski and Portela, 'Piling on The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU'; Hellquist and Palestine, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy.'

<sup>15</sup> Radtke and Jo, 'Fighting the Hydra'.

<sup>16</sup> Biersteker, Brubaker, and Lanz, 'Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation'; Giumelli and Weber, 'UN Sanctions as Leverage in Mediation Processes?'; Hudáková, "'Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick'"; Portela and Romanet Perroux, 'UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya'; Amaral, 'UN Sanctions and Mediation in Sierra Leone.'

In fact, according to Peksen, the literature on sanctions suffers from four significant shortcomings: sender-biased, usage of static data, state-centric models that do not explain non-state actors, and finally, the study of sanctions in isolation.<sup>17</sup> One could argue that it also suffers from an excessive focus on Western sanctions, with most studies focusing on the US and EU.

These generalized shortcomings pose a significant problem for policymakers and academics. Regarding policy, United Nations and other actors risk misusing such a tool without proper knowledge, resulting in suboptimal (or even counterproductive) results. Aside from the direct effect of not addressing the challenge *per se*, such use can even undermine the tool's legitimacy, creating a perception of ineffectiveness. Academically, without the proper knowledge about sanctions, an essential piece of the puzzle on how the international community influences crises and conflict dynamics is missing.

This dissertation addresses such shortcomings by studying multilateral sanctions as a conflict resolution tool. It assumes an enlarged and contemporary conceptualization of conflict resolution that encompasses conflict prevention, management, resolution and transformation<sup>18</sup> Thus, the overarching research interest of the three papers is to understand how multilateral sanctions perform as a strategic instrument to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.<sup>19</sup>

The first paper of this dissertation tries to understand what factors are associated with the decision of the international community (United Nations Security Council) to use sanctions as a policy instrument to resolve conflicts, in other words, the strategic nature of applying sanctions. The second paper investigates the role of multilateral sanctions in preventing the onset of crises (conflict prevention) and, to some extent, dealing with crises once they erupt. Finally, the third paper studies the more traditional role of multilateral sanctions in managing and resolving conflicts and peacebuilding.

Before moving into a more in-depth presentation of the papers, it is essential to clarify what this dissertation means by sanctions and the conceptual framework that underpins its logic. For this dissertation, adapting Biersteker et al.'s definition, multilateral sanctions are understood as "*legally binding restrictive measures applied by a regional or international organization (change made by the author) to coerce targets to change their behaviour,*

---

<sup>17</sup> Pekin, 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?'

<sup>18</sup> Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman, 'Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Resolution'.

<sup>19</sup> And to a lesser extent, transform conflicts through peacebuilding.

*constrain them from engaging in proscribed activity, and/or signal a violation of international norms.*<sup>20</sup>

As mentioned by the definition adapted from Biersteker, this dissertation is anchored on Giumelli's conceptual framework of sanctions as a three-purpose tool. Sanctions can have three purposes: coercion, constraining, and signalling/stigmatization (audience and targets).<sup>21</sup> Coercion is the ability to coerce actor A to carry out an action that it would not do otherwise. Constraining is when sanctions aim to hamper the capacity of the target to pursue its objective. Signalling is when sanctions attempt to signal certain norms or information to the target and different audiences, shaping the actors' interests, knowledge or expectations.<sup>22</sup>

This conceptual framework is a foundational stone of this dissertation because it encapsulates how a sender, from its perspective, aims to prevent, manage, and resolve the conflict through sanctions (often in tandem with other tools). It is through these three concurrent channels that a sender of sanctions intends to influence (or prevent) a crisis or a conflict, being effective in doing so according to the conditions related to the sanctions themselves and the context, such as the actors involved, usage of other conflict resolution tools as well as the magnitude of international interest, among other factors.

*First paper: UNSC Sanctions on cases of intra-State armed conflicts: building a selection model*

The first article investigates the role of sanctions as a strategic conflict resolution tool. If actors use sanctions to prevent and resolve conflicts, what factors prompt them? Or in other words, what variables are associated with their decision to use sanctions?

In order to study the strategic selection behind the usage of sanctions, certain conditions are necessary. First, there needs to be a credible, defined universe of cases, which means one needs a coherent theme or goal to define such a universe of cases. For example, it is improbable that what drives trade sanctions are the same factors driving sanctions addressing armed conflicts or human rights. The role of the UNSC in addressing intra-State armed conflicts provides both factors.

Thus, the intended contribution of the first paper is to lay out the initial building blocks of a model on what factors are associated with the imposition of UNSC sanctions: which types of conflict does the Council decide to address via sanctions? Are UNSC sanctions related to

---

<sup>20</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)', 407

<sup>21</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions.'

<sup>22</sup> Giumelli.

conflict dynamics, intensity, or complexity? Or are they associated with the UN's involvement in the conflict?

The first paper relies on a large-N logistical model – taking into account rare events - to explore and answer such questions. It analyses all intra-State (and internationalised) armed conflicts post-Cold War until 2013. It uses a relatively new unit of analysis to sanction studies: a triad of conflict-country/territory-a period of 6 months as the unit. Sanctions are treated as the main dependent variable and the various factors that could be associated with the imposition of sanctions as explanatory variables.

Finally, the first paper dialogues with three main strands of literature beyond sanctions: mediation, peacekeeping and the scholarly production on the United Nations Security Council. Thus, it attempts to establish a bridge between them and the sanctions literature, which can be helpful in future attempts to study sanctions vis-a-vis other conflict resolution tools.

*Second paper: Regional organisations and the norm against unconstitutional changes of government: commitment, systems and sanctions*

The second paper's primary purpose is to understand sanctions and the systems that enable their imposition as conflict prevention tools. To do so, it conducts a study of the regional systems created in the post-Cold War to prevent unconstitutional changes of government from occurring and to react against them once they occur.

Thus, the second paper explores whether regional organizational systems to guard against unconstitutional government changes (including sanctions) effectively deter coups – the most flagrant violation. Here the systems that enable sanctions and sanctions themselves are theorized as some form of deterrence, both in terms of material costs that could be imposed on the target if it violates the norm and of possible stigmatization.

The paper follows a mixed-methods approach. The entire first segment of the paper investigates through logistic models whether regional commitments to democratic governance, systems, and then sanctions decrease the likelihood of coups. The large-N analysis uses a panel data analysis of countries from 1950 to 2012 (excluding North America, parts of Europe, Australia, and New Zealand). Coup attempts are the primary dependent variable, while the enunciation of the democratic norm, the regional system, and sanctions per se are the main explanatory variables.

Due to the findings of the logistical analysis, the first paper then integrates an exploratory case study of the coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2012 and the reaction of the international community to

it – especially ECOWAS. The purpose of the in-depth case study is to understand whether the sanctioned practice might explain some dynamics found in the first segment of the paper.

Regarding contribution, the second paper dialogues with three strands of literature: international and regional regimes, coups, and sanctions. It does so by providing a unique investigation of the preventive nature of sanctions – which is under-studied by the literature or assumed. It also touches on other essential themes such as sanctions by non-Western actors; confluence and overlapping of sanction regimes; the relationship between mediation and sanction, and how the practice of sanctions might affect sanctions as a prevention tool.

*Third Paper: Understanding effective signalling and constraining: the initial steps of a mid-range Theory on UNSC sanction effectiveness*

The third article investigates the role of UNSC sanctions in managing and resolving intra-State armed conflicts and supporting peacebuilding. Cases of intra-State armed conflicts have been the primary focus of the UNSC in the post-Cold War era. The Council has been asked to deal with intra-State armed conflicts in several countries for the past 30 years. While doing so, the Council has increasingly used sanctions to deal with non-State armed groups, linked sanctions with other tools, and innovated the type of sanctions being imposed.

The third paper explores which conditions the sanctions imposed by the UNSC were effective, focusing on two of three purposes theorised by Giumelli<sup>23</sup>: constraining or signalling<sup>24</sup>. It does so because the literature has exhaustively studied coercion. However, the author also believes that signalling and constraining provide a better chance of building a mid-range theory of the effectiveness of UNSC sanctions.

The investigation focuses on whether conditions such as the dynamics of the Council, type of sanction, some aspects of sanctions (e.g., clear enforcement role), or the presence of peacekeeping explain the effectiveness of the sanctions in constraining or signalling in each sanction episode. It does so through a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) research design that compares all UN sanctions episodes in case of intra-State armed conflicts (units of analysis) from post-Cold War until 2013, using data compiled by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, the third paper brings to the literature issues, such as the modularity of sanctions and its complementarity with other conflict resolution tools to explain effectiveness. It also shows

---

<sup>23</sup> Giumelli.

<sup>24</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions.'

<sup>25</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'; Biersteker, 'SanctionApp'.

that QCA could be a fundamental research approach in the toolkit for studying sanctions, given its capacity to deal with complex causality and equifinality and to deal with medium-sized N.<sup>26</sup>

### *Conclusion*

The three articles collectively provide a well-rounded picture of sanctions as a strategic tool to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, framing sanctions within the broader peace and conflict resolution literature discussions. The three papers also try to address some of the identified shortcomings of the literature. However, they do not intend to fill all the literature gaps or address all the questions raised by the rapidly developing policy environment on sanctions from 1990 until the mid-2010s. This dissertation only aims to initiate discussions and open new avenues for research that document, analyse, and dialogue with such developments.

### *Bibliography*

- Amaral, Joana. 'UN Sanctions and Mediation in Sierra Leone: Opportunities and Pitfalls When Managing Veto Players'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 274–93. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802001>.
- Attia, Hana, and Julia Grauvogel. 'International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28 August 2022, 002234332210870. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080>.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman. 'Introduction: The Nature of Conflict and Conflict Resolution'. In *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, x–xix, 2009.
- Biersteker, T. J. 'SanctionApp', 2022.
- Biersteker, Thomas J., Rebecca Brubaker, and David Lanz. 'Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 180–202. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802002>.
- Biersteker, Thomas J, Sue E Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho. *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, 2016.
- Biersteker, Thomas J, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 404–12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317752539>.
- Biersteker, Thomas J., Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert. 'Conclusion'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J.

---

<sup>26</sup> Grauvogel, 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions'; Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region.'

Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 265–79. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.013>.

———. ‘The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions’. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 220–47. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.011>.

Boogaerts, Andreas, and Edith Drieskens. ‘Lessons from the MENA Region: A Configurational Explanation of the (in)Effectiveness of UN Security Council Sanctions between 1991 and 2014’. *Mediterranean Politics* 25, no. 1 (1 January 2020): 71–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1474643>.

Borzyskowski, Inken von, and Clara Portela. ‘Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU’, 2016.

Brzoska, Michael. ‘From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions’, n.d., 19.

Charron, Andrea, and Clara Portela. ‘The Relationship between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes’. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 101–18. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.006>.

Closa, Carlos. ‘Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations’. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2355307>.

Eriksson, Mikael. *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions*. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.

Giumelli, Francesco. ‘The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions’. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

———. ‘The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions’. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 38–59. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.003>.

Giumelli, Francesco, Fabian Hoffmann, and Anna Książczaková. ‘The When, What, Where and Why of European Union Sanctions’. *European Security* 30, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1797685>.

Giumelli, Francesco, and Annette Weber. ‘UN Sanctions as Leverage in Mediation Processes?: An Anatomy of Missed Opportunities in South Sudan’. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 251–73. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802007>.

Grauvogel, Julia. 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions: Insights from a Qualitative Comparative Analysis'. In *Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions*, by Peter van Bergeijk, 202–22. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021.  
<https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00017>.

Hellquist, Elin, and Stefano Palestini. 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy: Introduction to the Special Issue'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 437–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120968109>.

Hudáková, Zuzana. "'Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick": The Threat of Sanctions in the UN Mediation Process in Yemen'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 203–27.  
<https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802004>.

Hudáková, Zuzana, Thomas Biersteker, and Erica Moret. 'Sanctions Relaxation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Past Sanctions Regimes', n.d., 43.

Nathan, Laurie. 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'. *WORKING PAPERS*, n.d., 47.

Peksen, Dursun. 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (19 September 2019): 635–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250>.

Portela, Clara, and Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux. 'UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya: Synergy or Obstruction?' *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 228–50.  
<https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802005>.

Radtke, Mitchell, and Hyeran Jo. 'Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel Groups'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 759–73.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127>.

Weber, Patrick M, and Gerald Schneider. 'Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2022): 97–114. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729>.

Whitehead, Laurence. 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality: Family Resemblances and Shaming'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 546–60. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120937474>.

## Chapter II: UNSC Sanctions on cases of intra-State armed conflicts:

### building a selection model

*Many actors impose sanctions strategically to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. Considering the strategic selection process is essential to fully understand the tool and account for its effects. The paper attempts to design a selection model for UNSC sanctions for cases of intra-State armed conflicts. Not only UNSC's role in attempting to manage and resolve intra-State armed conflicts was notorious since the end of the Cold War, but such focus provided the opportunity to build a selection model on a credible universe of cases. Using a panel data of intra-State armed conflicts from 1989 to 2013 – with the triad conflict-country/territory-period of 6 months as the unit of analysis- and logistic models (including for rare events), this paper found a strong and positive association between UNSC use of sanctions and (prior) presence of UN peacekeeping forces, failure of a peace agreement, Western sanctions, as well as a negative association with democracy as regime type. Violence against civilians by non-State armed groups, “Islamist” or jihadist rebel ideology and the number of dyads were also found to be positively associated but less significant. Interestingly, UN-led mediation, conflict intensity and refugee flows were not significantly associated with sanctions. Such results support the claim that a combination of “intractability”, sunken costs, Western influence, and a narrow humanitarian imperative (R2P) might explain the Council's decision to address a conflict through sanctions.*

#### *Introduction*

Conflict resolution lies at the heart of the United Nations. It is stated in the very first article of its Charter. Within the UN system, the Charter gives the Security Council the “primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.” In addressing such threats, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has many tools to address armed conflicts: condemnation, encouragement (endorsement) of mediation efforts, peacekeeping operations, sanctions, and authorization of force.

Although the role played by the Council in dealing with armed conflicts and international crises has been extensively investigated by the literature, especially on conflict resolution, the reality is that very little academic research has investigated what drives the Council to use a particular conflict resolution tool in a particular crisis or conflict, with only notable exceptions.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup> Kyle Beardsley and Holger Schmidt, ‘Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-20021: Following the Flag or Following the Charter?’, *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March 2012): 33–49, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00696.x>; Kyle Beardsley, ‘The UN at the Peacemaking–Peacebuilding Nexus’, *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 4 (September 2013): 369–86, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213491354>; Martin Binder, ‘Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN’s Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?’, *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 6 (November 2015): 712–26, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315585847>; Peter B White, David E Cunningham, and Kyle Beardsley, ‘Where, When, and How Does the UN Work to Prevent Civil War in Self-Determination Disputes?’, *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 380–94, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317744826>.

Such a gap is acute in the case of UN sanctions. This article addresses the following question: which factors are associated with the UNSC's use of sanctions to address intra-state armed conflicts? In other words, what type of conflict characteristics are most associated with the use of sanctions by the Council?

Answering such questions is important to fully comprehend UNSC sanctions and a necessary first step to investigating the role of such sanctions on conflict dynamics, termination, and reoccurrence. Due to severe selection bias, any evaluation of the effects of sanctions requires accounting for sanctions biases.

This article is divided into several sections. First, a brief literature review discusses the selection bias of sanctions and the specific case of UN sanctions. It is followed by a discussion of how this challenge has been dealt with in the literature regarding other conflict resolution tools (mediation and peacekeeping operations). This review is followed by formulating hypotheses on the possible explanatory factors associated with sanctions in cases of intra-State armed conflicts.

The following section is devoted to the research design: unit of analysis, dependent, independent, and control variables. The actual findings of the statistical regressions and a discussion follow the research design. Finally, a conclusion discusses the findings, the limitations, and potential next steps for research.

### *Selection bias and sanctions: the perennial curse*

Different game-theoretical models with similar characteristics underpin the sanctions literature. According to what Kaempfer and Lowenberg have called the traditional (instrumental) school of sanctions, imposing sanctions is to produce policy change on the other actors by inflicting pain.<sup>28</sup>

One can think of Sender and Target as rational actors who disagree over a policy issue. The decisions to threaten and impose sanctions by the Sender, and to comply or resist by the Target are made through strategic interaction and cost calculations, often amidst imperfect information. In simpler terms, the act of imposing sanctions, in general, follows several steps theoretically. First, the Sender disagrees with Target regarding some policy issues or behaviour. Thus, the Sender threatens sanctions if Target does not change its behaviour. The Target then acquiesces (and the whole interaction ends) or resists the threat. Then, during the

---

<sup>28</sup> William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, 'The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach', *The American Economic Review* 78, no. 4 (1988): 786–93.

next round, Sender may decide not to do anything or impose sanctions. Then, it is Target's turn to change behaviour and comply with what the Sender demands or resist. This interaction continues until Target fully or partially acquiesces, and Sender decides to lift sanctions, or Sender decides to lift sanctions even without the acquiescence of Target. The Sender can then lift sanctions, do nothing or impose new sanctions.

Although such a dynamic is a very simplistic sketch of the relationship between the Sender and Target and relies on critical assumptions – including that the target can indeed acquiesce to the demands from the Sender, it helps to show how the study of imposed sanctions might suffer from “compound” selection bias.<sup>29</sup>

The first and most apparent selection bias is that sanctions seem to be imposed when the Target miscalculates the willingness of the Sender to impose sanctions or when the Target considers that any sanction imposed and its costs are outweighed by the benefits pursuing the disputed policy.

Thus, sanctions are likely to be imposed on "hard cases," meaning cases in which Target already considered the costs of acquiescing higher than resisting. Thus, it is improbable that sanctions can modify the behaviour of the Target. Because most of the research on sanctions studies cases in which sanctions were imposed, the researcher is bound to study the effects of sanctions on hard cases, not the entire spectrum of cases.<sup>30</sup>

That is why several data projects on sanctions, like the TIES<sup>31</sup> and EUSANCT project<sup>32</sup>, try to include threats. However, including threats is theoretically easy but empirically tricky. First, what accounts for a threat is disputable. Second and most important, it can only account for public threats, while one can argue that some critical threats are made in private. Worse, in some cases, the vaguer notion that sanctions could be imposed if a policy is pursued deters such policy, even before any threat is given.

However, this is not a unique source of selection bias. As Nooruddin points out<sup>33</sup>: the decision of an actor- in his model, the United States - to threaten and impose sanctions is not random:

---

<sup>29</sup> Irfan Nooruddin, 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy', *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 59–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394>.

<sup>30</sup> T. Clifton Morgan and Anne C. Miers, 'When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of Sanctions', in *Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International)*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1999.

<sup>31</sup> Navin A. Bapat and Bo Ram Kwon, 'When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework', *International Organization* 69, no. 1 (2015): 131–62, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000290>.

<sup>32</sup> Patrick M Weber and Gerald Schneider, 'Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2022): 97–114, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729>.

<sup>33</sup> Irfan Nooruddin, 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy', *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 59–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394>.

it is part of a selection process from the Sender that decides to use sanctions to address that foreign policy dispute with the Target.

Such strategic selection of an actor is essential. It should explain why the actor decided to use sanctions instead (or, in many cases, as a complement) of other tools at their disposal. It is unclear whether such a selection process counterbalances the bias towards hard cases when studying only imposed sanctions. On the one hand, one could argue that States would only use threats and imposition of sanctions when they are more likely to succeed. On the other hand, sanctions could be used when utilising other tools is not an option, or, more likely, when other tools are not achieving the results necessary, or when cases are considered so intractable that “require” a combination of tools.

Noorudin's main point, however, was that the likelihood of success for a particular sanction (threat) imposed is conditional on this selection process by the Sender.<sup>34</sup> Thus, assessing the effectiveness of sanctions without accounting for such a selection process amounts to building misguided models and potentially misestimating sanction effects.

His point was taken by other authors that started to use statistical models that first account for the selection bias before assessing the effect of some factors in sanctions effectiveness, such as institutional constraints<sup>35</sup>, economic costs and winning coalitions<sup>36</sup>– or later, the effect or effectiveness of sanctions in foreign investments<sup>37</sup>, shadow economies<sup>38</sup>. Often, these authors used different statistical models that account for this two-level dynamic, such as Heckman.

Although such models did advance the field, they had significant limitations, especially in understanding the UN Security Council sanctions. Most of them focused on unilateral sanctions, such as the ones imposed by the US.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, such studies often mix under the same model of sanctions imposed by States, sanctions imposed by multilateral institutions against non-members (EU), and sanctions imposed by multilateral organisations against its members (UN). Biersteker and Hudáková point out that the lack of distinction between different

---

<sup>34</sup> Nooruddin.

<sup>35</sup> Jin Mun Jeong and Dursun Peksen, 'Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 1 (January 2019): 194–217, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717728105>.

<sup>36</sup> D. Lektzian and M. Souva, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 848.

<sup>37</sup> David Lektzian and Glen Biglaiser, 'The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on the Use and Success of US Sanctions,' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 1 (February 2014): 70–93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213501976>.

<sup>38</sup> Bryan Early and Dursun Peksen, 'Searching in the Shadows: The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Informal Economies', *Political Research Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (December 2019): 821–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918806412>.

<sup>39</sup> Nooruddin, 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy.'

Sender's practices is confusing.<sup>40</sup> It is even more surprising considering that the literature has already shown evidence of the different effects of multilateral versus unilateral sanctions.<sup>41</sup>

Connected to focusing on unilateral sanctions or mixing sanctions from different types of Senders, most selection models use explanatory factors such as the ratio between Sender and Target GDP or military, trade relations, and geographical proximity. Although some of these variables might be viable options for unilateral sanctions, they are probably not suitable for understanding the UNSC imposition of sanctions.

Third, because most of these articles focus on explaining the effectiveness of sanctions coded by TIES, they tend to mix different sanctions. For example, mixing sanctions in terms of purpose and thematics makes it extremely difficult to determine the actual universe of cases in which it is realistic that a country will employ sanctions. Noorudin, for example, uses all possible dyads between the United States and other countries as his universe of cases. A notable exception is the growing body of literature on the impact of sanctions on democratization and authoritarian leaders: such thematic angle helps to narrow the type of sanctions being studied<sup>42</sup> and the universe of cases – dyads between the Sender and authoritarian regimes-year, for example.

In summary, the literature has advanced in its realization that sanctions pass through a process of threat and imposition. However, by focusing excessively on unilateral sanctions or by mixing a very diverse set of sanctions: different topics, purposes, and senders, the literature does not help explain sanction imposition beyond very generic patterns. Some of its findings are broadly inapplicable to UNSC sanctions. That is why it is essential to investigate how the literature on other conflict resolution tools or on the Council itself has dealt with those issues.

### *The non-randomness of mediation, peacekeeping operations, and United Nations Security Council decisions*

The non-randomness of using sanctions to address cases of intra-State armed conflicts is not unique to sanctions. It is also prevalent in conflict resolution tools such as mediation and

---

<sup>40</sup> Thomas Biersteker and Zuzana Hudáková, 'The Emergence, Rise, (and Demise?) Of Targeted Sanctions at the United Nations,' *International Organization*, Under review.

<sup>41</sup> Abel Escribà-Folch, 'Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts,' *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 129–41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309356489>.

<sup>42</sup> Abel Escribà-Folch, 'Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions,' *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 6 (June 2012): 683–713, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427883>; Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright, 'Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers: Dealing with Tyranny,' *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (7 June 2010): 335–59, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x>; Julia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest, 'Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes: Claims to Legitimacy Count,' *European Journal of Political Research* 53, no. 4 (November 2014): 635–53, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12065>; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius, 'Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective,' *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (March 2013): 19–34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.773200>.

peacekeeping. This section investigates three different kinds of literature, in this respective order: mediation, peacekeeping operations, and the literature on the United Nations Security Council. Beber argues that the effects of mediation cannot be separately studied from its causes since mediation cannot be treated similarly to a drug trial in which the medication is given randomly to a treatment and control group. Fortna argued the same type of logic regarding peacekeeping operations. Thus, how these other pieces of literature have dealt with the selection effects of their respective tools might elucidate how this could be applied to UNSC sanctions.

Regarding mediation, Beardsley lists several conditions that need to be met for a mediation to occur: the mediator(s) needs to be willing to be involved in mediating the conflict; the conflicting or dispute parties need to agree to solve their dispute through mediation, and more important than that, they need to mutually agree on one or a coalition of third party actors to mediate.<sup>43</sup> Not surprisingly, the mediation literature often compares mediation to a market: a supply side (offering of mediation) and a demand side (procurement and acceptance of mediators by parties).<sup>44</sup>

One of the most standing themes within the literature on mediation is how the factors that might attract offers of mediation might not be the same that make conflicting parties accept mediation, resembling a market failure in which there is a mismatch between supply and demand. The market metaphor helps to explain the selection effect. Mediation, differently from sanctions, is not imposed on the conflicting or disputing parties. Thus, mediators must offer their services, and conflict parties must accept mediation and the mediator. Both dynamics are likely affected by different factors, which might affect, in turn, the outcomes of such efforts per se.<sup>45</sup>

Overall, the literature pointed out several factors that might explain the occurrence of mediation (and who mediates), such as actor-related factors (e.g., historical and colonial ties), characteristics of conflict (e.g., intensity, reoccurrence, type of incompatibility), and conflict resolution dynamics (e.g., prior mediation, presence of peacekeeping).

---

<sup>43</sup> Kyle Beardsley, *The Mediation Dilemma*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

<sup>44</sup> J. Michael Greig, 'Stepping Into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?', *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 249–66, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00121.x>; Mark J.C. Crescenzi et al., 'A Supply-Side Theory of Mediation: A Supply-Side Theory of Mediation', *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (December 2011): 1069–94, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00681.x>; Beber, 'International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias'; Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner, and Jacob Bercovitch, 'Fear of Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 4 (September 2013): 354–68, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213491358>.

<sup>45</sup> Melin, Gartner, and Bercovitch, 'Fear of Rejection.'

Mediation is more likely when the stakes of the disputes are very high<sup>46</sup> or serious<sup>47</sup>, rebels are strong<sup>48</sup>, and the conflict has received prior mediation.<sup>49</sup>, when neighbouring conflicts with similar intensity have been solved through mediation<sup>50</sup>, and more likely, at intermediary stages of a conflict<sup>51</sup>. In terms of offering to be a mediator, Greig and Regan point to geographical proximity, colonial, formal, or historical ties, and prior involvement in the conflict.<sup>52</sup> However, the understanding of this selection process is still underdeveloped.<sup>53</sup>

The literature on mediation also points out that the UN became a significant actor in mediating conflicts worldwide post-Cold War. The UN seems to be more attracted to intractable, intense, and high-stakes conflicts than its counterparts, and it seems to be best at solving this type of conflict as well.<sup>54</sup> UN mediation also seems to be associated with other conflict resolution tools.

If mediation grappled with selection bias, the same could be said about the peacekeeping and peace operations literature. One of the canonical findings is that peacekeeping is likely to happen in the most intractable conflicts.<sup>55</sup> Thus, it is necessary to account for such a selection process to evaluate the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.<sup>56</sup>

The literature on peacekeeping operations (PKOs) has identified several factors contributing to the decision to authorize and deploy them. Fortna highlighted that PKOs were not sent to conflicts that ended via military victory or peace agreement but to intra-State armed conflicts that ended up in a stalemate, and with many casualties.<sup>57</sup> Hultman pointed out that PKOs

---

<sup>46</sup> Govinda Clayton and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 'Will We See Helping Hands? Predicting Civil War Mediation and Likely Success', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 3 (July 2014): 265–84, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213508693>.

<sup>47</sup> Molly M. Melin and Isak Svensson, 'Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars', *International Interactions* 35, no. 3 (28 August 2009): 249–71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903084521>.

<sup>48</sup> David E. Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, 'It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 570–97, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336458>.

<sup>49</sup> Patrick M. Regan and Allan C. Stam, 'In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes', *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 239–60, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00157>; Molly M. Melin, 'The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs: The Impact of State Relationships', *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (September 2011): 691–715, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00665.x>.

<sup>50</sup> Tobias Böhmelt, 'The Spatial Contagion of International Mediation', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 1 (February 2015): 108–27, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214544615>; Tobias Böhmelt, 'The Importance of Conflict Characteristics for the Diffusion of International Mediation', *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 3 (May 2016): 378–91, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316628827>.

<sup>51</sup> J. Michael Greig and Patrick M. Regan, 'When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars', *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (December 2008): 759–81, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00525.x>.

<sup>52</sup> Michael Greig and Regan.

<sup>53</sup> Beber, 'International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias'.

<sup>54</sup> Bercovitch and Sigmund Gartner, 'Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation?'

<sup>55</sup> Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*; Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, 'Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? 1', *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 37–54, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504005.x>.

<sup>56</sup> Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*; Govinda Clayton and Han Dorussen, 'The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict', *Journal of Peace Research*, 19 May 2021, 002234332199007, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076>.

<sup>57</sup> V. Page Fortna and Lisa L. Martin, 'Peacekeepers As Signals The Demand For International Peacekeeping In Civil Wars,' in *Power, Interdependence, and Non-state Actors in World Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2009), 87–107.

tend to be deployed when there are intense levels of violence against civilians, especially after 1999 when the Responsibility to Protect doctrine started to develop fully.<sup>58</sup>

PKOs seem to be deployed when there is a prior history of UN or regional organizations being engaged in the conflict when the country targeted lacks a formal relationship with significant powers or is not a major power itself.<sup>59</sup> Trade relations between countries and P5 seem to correlate with the decision to authorize PKOs.<sup>60</sup> The incompatibility between government and rebels (control over government versus secessionist groups) does not significantly affect the decision to use peacekeeping operations.<sup>61</sup>

Finally, Cordell et al. pointed out that UNSC seems to authorize peacekeeping operations when there is a successful example of peacemaking, such as the signature of a peace agreement (which contradicts part of the literature) because it shows the mission as less risky. However, the likelihood of authorizing PKOs is negatively associated with the ongoing number of peacekeeping efforts led by the UN at a particular moment. It appears that the Council – by itself or stimulated by the Secretariat – reflects on how much the UN system can deliver simultaneously before deciding on new missions.<sup>62</sup>

More recently, a third strand of literature has developed. Differently from the literature on mediation and peacekeeping, this literature does not focus on a particular resolution tool but on the action and decision of the UNSC per se. It often investigates the full spectrum of possible conflict resolution tools that the organism can and does apply in the case of (often, intra-State) armed conflicts.

Beardsley and Schmidt investigating the role played by the UN in international crises argue that rather than being linked to the interests of the P5, the actions of the Council are associated with the disputes per se. Thus, the UN tends to intervene when there is a high level of violence, a longer crisis duration, a higher number of actors involved, and in certain regions. On the other hand, the Council does seem less likely to engage in disputes involving P5 members, but such a pattern slightly shifted after the end of the Cold War.<sup>63</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Lisa Hultman, 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?', *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (January 2013): 59–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312461662>.

<sup>59</sup> Mark J. Mullenbach, 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions,' *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2005): 529–55.

<sup>60</sup> Szymon M. Stojek and Jaroslav Tir, 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-Led Deployments to Civil War States,' *European Journal of International Relations* 21, no. 2 (June 2015): 352–76, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114532665>.

<sup>61</sup> Gilligan and John Stedman, 'Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?'; Mullenbach, 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.'

<sup>62</sup> Rebecca Cordell, Thorin Wright, and Paul F. Diehl, 'Extant Commitment, Risk, and UN Peacekeeping Authorization,' *International Interactions* 47, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 135–60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814764>.

<sup>63</sup> Beardsley and Schmidt, 'Following the Flag or Following the Charter?'

Dorussen et al. found that UN political missions tend to occur when conflict has not escalated and more time has passed since the last occurrence of a clash vis-a-vis peacekeeping, with the latter tending to be deployed to more recent conflicts. Also, lower-cost missions tend to be replaced by more cost-intensive missions.<sup>64</sup> Binder found two pathways that explain the Council's decision to act in humanitarian crises: (1) Council acts when there is considerable human suffering, prior involvement of UN plus spillover effects, or (2) considerable human suffering, prior involvement and a State with no countervailing power.<sup>65</sup>

Finally, Beardsley used selection models on Security Council action before evaluating the effects of the action of the Council on peacebuilding. The most limiting factor of his analysis is that his selection model is essentially the same for every type of tool. The only difference is the count that changes according to the tool modelled. To account for the selection bias, he introduced into the selection model a variable for the Cold War, P5 participation in the conflict, regional dummies, count of the same type of tool, intensity and duration of the conflict, plus interstate variables.

Such authors generally agree that the Council acts and uses its tools strategically, not randomly. Due to this fact, as put by Beardsley and Schmidt, modelling selection bias by the UN is beyond academic interest; it is vital to understand the contribution of UN conflict resolution tools to solve international crises.<sup>66</sup>

### *Initiating a discussion on the imposition of sanctions by the UNSC*

Sanctions possess unique characteristics that must be considered when constructing the model. The literature on mediation, peacekeeping, and UNSC decision-making provides some insights into what could be associated with the imposition of sanctions by the Council. These factors are essential because they are relevant points of reference that will guide the development of the hypotheses below, the selection of the variables, and the interpretation.

Mediation, at least theoretically, is impartial or neutral - although the literature has expanded on the importance of biased mediators- while peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the Member-State. Distinctively from mediation or peacekeeping operations, sanctions are restrictive measures. Since sanctions can be seen as a "stick" to stigmatize,

---

<sup>64</sup> Han Dorussen, Tobias Böhmelt, and Govinda Clayton, 'Sequencing United Nations Peacemaking: Political Initiatives and Peacekeeping Operations,' *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2022): 24–48, <https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211000678>.

<sup>65</sup> Binder, 'Paths to Intervention.'

<sup>66</sup> Beardsley and Schmidt, 'Following the Flag or Following the Charter?'

constrain or coerce, most hypotheses assume that sanctions are associated with adverse factors such as battle deaths or peace failure.

Second, sanctions – as used by the Council- have some "stickiness". In other words, UNSC sanctions tend to last. For example, the sanctions regime for Sierra Leone lasted from 1997 to 2010, ending many years after the civil war had officially ended. The stickiness of sanctions encourages a model to try to capture the association of sanctions and armed conflicts to focus on when armed conflicts are active since the actual termination of sanctions might be driven by a different factor. Academically, the literature is only beginning to understand sanctions termination (and relaxation), with few recent studies.<sup>67</sup>

Third, sanctions are much more multi-faceted tools than similar conflict resolution tools. Mediation has different approaches. Peacekeeping operations can also significantly differ in terms of the mandate. However, sanctions can be starkly different because the UNSC has at its disposal various types of sanctions that it can impose: travel bans, assets freezes, diplomatic sanctions, an arms embargo, bans on the trade of commodities or specific equipment, economic sanctions on entire economic sectors or financial, transportation bans, and ultimately full embargo.<sup>68</sup>

To add more complexity, the Council has also developed the Al Qaeda-IS regime that, differently from the more territorial nature of the other sanctions regimes, sanctions individuals and entities globally, applying specific measures and effectively labelling such<sup>69</sup> organizations and individuals as terrorists.

A sanctions regime such as Sudan remarkably differs from the Angola regime, although both address intra-State armed conflicts. Thus, there is a degree of abstraction when one argues that a country or a conflict is under sanctions without distinguishing which type of sanctions. However, capturing such distinction is tricky in a model due to the few cases in which sanctions were imposed. Different research approaches might be best equipped to deal with such diversity. However, such consideration might explain why some results of the models might be less straightforward or difficult to interpret because a conflict under sanctions can vary greatly.

---

<sup>67</sup> Zuzana Hudáková, Thomas Biersteker, and Erica Moret, 'Sanctions Relaxation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Past Sanctions Regimes', n.d., 43; Hana Attia and Julia Grauvogel, 'International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research*, 28 August 2022, 002234332210870, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080>.

<sup>68</sup> Thomas J Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)', *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 404–12, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317752539>.

<sup>69</sup> The counterterrorist regime is unique to UNSC as a sender, but not to others such as US and EU that do possess thematic regimes such as child soldiers or terrorism.

## *Hypotheses*

As the United Nations Security Council has its primary mandate to keep international peace and security, one could think that the Council would act in the case of armed conflicts in which there is a high number of casualties due to clashes between parties. It also aligns with the literature on other conflict resolution tools in which they are deployed to conflicts with higher casualties (intensity), as discussed before.

*H1: Intra-State armed conflicts with higher intensity (more casualties due to clashes between conflicting parties) are more likely to be subjected to sanctions by the UNSC*

Following the logic that the Council might be more inclined to act and thus use sanctions in intractable conflicts, it is very likely that sanctions are associated with intra-State armed conflicts, which are complex, where a multitude of actors and interests collide, making any settlement less likely.

*H2: Intra-State armed conflicts with higher complexity are more likely to be addressed by the Council with sanctions.*

On the other hand, rather than being driven by the intensity of conflict, the Council might be more concerned with preventing genocides and politicides, which are at the root of the creation of the UN post-WWII and aligns with the normative shift in the 1990s<sup>70</sup>. The emergence of the "responsibility to protect" doctrine in the late 90s affected the Council and peacekeeping.<sup>71</sup> Thus, the Council might be more inclined to use sanctions when parties target civilians deliberately.

*H3: The higher the number of civilians deliberately targeted by conflict parties, the higher the likelihood that sanctions are used to address a conflict.*

Following such a normative shift but connecting to a more realist-rationalist paradigm<sup>72</sup>, the Council might be more inclined to act when armed conflicts trigger apparent spillovers due to its mission to protect international peace and security and not necessarily conflicts whose effects are entirely internal. This is supported by the mandate enshrined by the Charter, in which the Council decides whether such a situation threatens international peace and peace

---

<sup>70</sup> Martha Finnemore, 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention.', in *Essential Readings in World Politics*, ed. Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, Fifth Edition, The Norton Series in World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

<sup>71</sup> Hultman, 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians.'

<sup>72</sup> Binder, 'Paths to Intervention.'

and security (not national security). Thus, the Council will be more likely to act with sanctions when armed conflicts affect other Member-States.

*H4: The higher the spillover effects of an intra-State armed conflict, the higher the chances of the Council using sanctions as a tool.*

A strong strand of literature highlighted the importance of path dependence and sunken costs to explain the usage of conflict resolution tools. Thus, it is not far-fetched to think that the Council might use sanctions when the Council itself is already using other conflict resolution tools. In other words, once the Council is committed to addressing an armed conflict, it might throw everything it has to deal with it.

*H5: The presence of peacekeeping forces increases the likelihood of sanctions being used by the UNSC to address a particular intra-state armed conflict.*

*H6: The occurrence of a mediation event led by the UN increases the likelihood of sanctions being used by the UNSC to address a particular intra-state armed conflict.*

Finally, following the ongoing logic that sanctions are restrictive measures and that the Council might use sanctions when conflicts become intractable, it is plausible that certain events might affect the likelihood of conflicts being sanctioned. For example, a peace agreement failure might attract the Council to use sanctions since such failure might signal that negotiations or mediation are insufficient to solve the conflict or that the conflict is becoming intractable.<sup>73</sup>

*H7: The failure of a peace agreement increases the likelihood of an intra-State armed conflict party being sanctioned by the Council.*

---

<sup>73</sup> It is true that some UNSC members articulate sanctions as preventive measure, especially the role that sanctions might play in peacebuilding efforts when sanctions rather than being a punishment, works to support the government during the transition to a stable society (see Melanie Ramjoué, 'Using UN Sanctions as a Peacebuilding Tool: Ideas for Enhancing the Sanctions Design Process', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 10, no. 3 (December 2015): 89–96, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2015.1095649>.)

The point view of sanctions as a restrictive/negative measure is taken in this paper due to two reasons. First, the presence of sanctions is being studied in cases of active intra-State armed conflicts. Second, although sanctions might be used to support peacebuilding efforts, historically, sanctions were already being used and were then re-targeted and reformulated to support the peace process. For example, in Sierra Leone, was the ousting of the President and failure of peace agreement that triggered sanctions in the first place, but then later sanctions were repurposed to push parties (especially RUF) to negotiate, agree on the peace agreement and its implementation (see Joana Amaral, 'UN Sanctions and Mediation in Sierra Leone: Opportunities and Pitfalls When Managing Veto Players', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 274–93, <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802001>.)

## Research Design

A large-N statistical analysis tests the hypotheses developed in the section above by using 2,538 observations of intra-State armed conflict from 1989 to 2013<sup>74</sup> built with CDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Global version 22.1<sup>75,76</sup>

The decision to use observations of intra-State armed conflicts is due to formulated hypotheses, and it is also an opportunity to study sanction imposition amidst a feasible universe of timely, spatially and thematically coherent cases. It helps to refine which type of sanction purposes will be considered, in which circumstances, and the possible independent and control variables. It is relevant to say that although, in general, it is intra-State, the actual sample covers cases classified by UCDP as intra-State and internationalized intra-State armed conflicts. The latter is still intra-State armed conflict but with the participation of foreign actors (including governments). This paper will discuss and reference both cases simply as intra-State armed conflicts.

The period from 1989 to 2013 is both a practical decision in terms of the availability of data also due to theoretical assumptions. The literature on conflict resolution tools highlights the importance of specific international configurations as enablers or impediments. It is assumed that 1989-2013 was marked by a period of collaboration between the great powers, with the US as the sole superpower shored by its capabilities and alliances. The cutoff of 2013 is due to the events of the Crimea annexation in 2014 that not only put the West and Russia in opposition for the first time but also added the extensive usage of sanctions by the West to deal with Russia<sup>77</sup>. Also, by 2013, China started to play a more assertive role in the UNSC vis-a-vis decades before, when China was primarily focused internally.

The unit of analysis is Conflict-Country/Territory-Six months period. The 2,538 observations represent semesters of active intra-State armed conflict, or within one year after the conflict ended, following the Uppsala Conflict Data project.<sup>78,79</sup> The unit of analysis used in this paper

---

<sup>74</sup> For two models, the data will range from 1989 to 2015.

<sup>75</sup> Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare', *Journal of Peace Research* 59, no. 4 (July 2022): 593–610, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221108428>; Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset,' *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (July 2013): 523–32, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313484347>.

<sup>76</sup> The actual number of observations in the models are 2316, since there are some variables as Polity and Alliance with P5 in which there is missing data for some observations.

<sup>77</sup> The Russian Federation was already critical of West interventionism in Libya 2011 when the mission moved from protecting civilians to regime change. However, because Crimea directly opposed Russia and the West, it is considered here a better cutting of point.

<sup>78</sup> Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare'; Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.'

<sup>79</sup> There are 136 conflicts in the dataset divided into 169 Conflict-Country/Territory dyads.

demands some explanation since it is slightly different from the standard practice on sanctions of Country-year or in conflict studies of dyad or conflict-year, and there are important reasons to do so; first, by using effectively three dimensions to define the unit of analysis: what (conflict), when (period of 6 months), and where (country or territory in which the armed conflict takes place), the unit of analysis is much more precise than the standard ones.

The analysis of the sanction regimes drives the decision to use conflict as a dimension instead of the classic country in the sanctions literature. Although the Security Council organizes its sanction regime per country, the reality is that the Council does not necessarily want to address all conflicts in a specific country. For example, the Angola Sanction regime focused on the conflict between UNITA and the Government of Angola and barely addressed the ongoing conflict between the government of Angola and FLEC.

Since this paper aims to understand what is associated with the decision of the Council to use sanctions and not the impact of sanctions per se, this distinction is appropriate. The same consideration is essential concerning the sprawling sanction regime of Al-Qaeda/ISIS: it imposes sanctions on a particular organisation present in a specific conflict but not in all conflicts in a country.

On the other hand, only one conflict would cause oversimplifications. Apart from the Al-Qaeda-IS regime, most Council sanction regimes are country-based. Such country-based sanctions do not necessarily follow the historical logic of the conflict. For example, the Council has imposed sanctions to deal with the DRC armed conflict, which attracted an immense variety of rebel groups and governments. However, these multiple conflicts within DRC are often coded regarding the main historical opposition, in other words, the rebel groups and their opposition to neighbouring governments, rather than the DRC government per se. A simple Conflict-Year unit would force the sample of conflicts under sanction to be over-dimensioned in coverage (by including the entirety of these conflicts as sanctioned, meaning conflicts in Burundi, and Rwanda, among others), making it difficult to match some State-based control variable. On the other hand, it would under-represent the conflict with the DRC government as the leading actor. Thus, adding the geographical component of where the battle takes place helps to address the overcomplex and webbed nature of specific conflicts vis-a-vis how the Council operates.

The decision to use a period of six months – instead of a year- as the temporal unit of analysis is also driven by data and literature. First, the conflict literature increasingly uses smaller

temporal units to account for nuances and temporal sequencing. Second, this is particularly important for sanctions because the Council is sometimes particularly fast in its response; thus, having the data divided by six months helps capture this dynamic much better than yearly data. Also, it addresses some of the criticisms of the literature on sanctions regarding the lack of use of time series that could account for different dynamics.<sup>80</sup>

The dataset itself was constructed by building upon the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Global version 22.1<sup>81</sup> data on battle deaths containing violent events linked to armed conflicts from 1989 until 2022 for the whole world. The data collapsed during the conflict period of six months-country. Since it is a 3-D unit, the pair conflict-country was combined into a single ID that was then paired over a period of six months (January-June / July-December). Periods of six months with more than ten battle deaths were considered active, and Semesters with less than ten or fewer battle deaths were labelled as inactive. If the same conflict country had ten or fewer battle deaths for two consecutive semesters, it is dropped from the dataset; and it is only incorporated again in case a semester registers more than ten battle deaths. The decision behind the ten threshold is due to UCDP's classification that uses the threshold of 25 battle deaths per year. With ten battle deaths per semester, the same logic is relatively followed but with a slightly lower threshold. The choice of cutting after two semesters is to focus the models on sanction usage in the case of intra-State armed conflicts and not precisely on sanction termination.

### *Dependent variable*

The primary dependent variable for this piece is imposed sanctions. Sanctions are operationalized through a binomial variable - *Sanctions*- which takes the value of 1 if UN sanctions are currently imposed on a particular intra-State armed conflict<sup>82</sup> and 0 if not. Each sanction regime was evaluated to see whether the Council was being specific in the conflict it was trying to tackle or trying to tackle all conflicts in a country. For example, in Angola, the

---

<sup>80</sup> Dursun Peksen, 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature', *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (19 September 2019): 635–47, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250>.

<sup>81</sup> Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare'; Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset

<sup>82</sup> Since defining the universe of cases is of paramount importance for the accuracy of the model, only sanctions in which the Council used to deal with intra-State armed conflicts were included, which led to sanctions related to nuclear proliferation, coups, inter-state (Ethiopia-Eritrea), and support to terrorism not being included. On the other hand, sanctions on terror groups were included because ignoring these would mean ignoring the new pattern in armed conflicts in which groups linked to al-Qaida and ISIS became influential rebel groups and how the Council decided to intervene in these conflicts via the ever-growing sanction regime IS/al-Qaida.

Two sanctions regimes were complicated: the secondary sanctions on Liberia, initially geared toward affecting the conflict in Sierra Leone but morphed into addressing the conflict in Liberia itself. The second was the sanctions imposed on Iraq that were initially to address the war against Kuwait but were effectively treated later by several actors as a factor in limiting the Iraqi government's reaction against minorities (and allowing military strikes from the West). In both cases, the interest of the Council morphed into addressing internal conflicts, so it was coded as 1 for these cases of intra-State armed conflicts.

Council was concerned about addressing the MPLA-UNITA conflict, while the Council took a broader approach in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The data for operationalising the dependent variable are taken from the UN Targeted Sanctions Consortium data project.<sup>83</sup>, using both the quantitative and qualitative datasets and the UN Sanctions App<sup>84</sup>. The UN Targeted Consortium data not only describes the type and temporal dimension of sanctions but also brings all the relevant sanctions that have substantially altered the sanctions regime.

### *Independent Variables*

The first set hypothesis is related to the intensity of the conflict. The intensity of the conflict is measured by *Battle-deaths*, including casualties from all sides of the conflict and civilians. The civilian deaths are assumedly due to the clashes, not because they were targeted deliberately.

All the data on battle deaths is gathered from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Global version 22.1<sup>85</sup> And only counted for conflicts in which the national government is part of the conflict. Because battle deaths are commonly skewed with a long tail, battle deaths were transformed via natural log and then lagged a semester to account for temporal sequencing.

Regarding the second hypothesis, the operationalization of complexity has two good candidates: the number of dyads and the number of actors involved. However, many actors might not necessarily mean more complexity because that could only main incompatibility opposing two main coalitions. In contrast, several dyads cover the conflict's multiplicity of "sides" much better. Thus, the second hypothesis is operationalized by the number of *Dyads* of a particular conflict, according to UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset version 22.1<sup>86</sup>.

The number of civilian casualties measures the third hypothesis due to one-sided violence (OSV) perpetrated by non-State actors, also from UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Global version 22.1<sup>87</sup>. Civilian deaths accounted in UCDP for one-sided violence when conflicting parties deliberately target civilians. The decision to account for *Non-State OSV* has two reasons. First, empirically, linking one-sided government violence to a particular conflict is challenging when multiple conflicts concomitantly occur in a specific country. However, the such linkage is possible regarding non-State armed groups. Second, according to the UCDP

---

<sup>83</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

<sup>84</sup> T. J. Biersteker, 'SanctionApp', 2022.

<sup>85</sup> Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare'; Sundberg and Melander, 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset.'

<sup>86</sup> Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare.'

<sup>87</sup> Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, 'One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,' *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (March 2007): 233–46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075124>; Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare.'

Georeferenced Event Dataset, a lot of the one-sided violence that is often credited to the government is perpetrated by paramilitary or militias in the UCDP database; for example, the UCDP data links part of the massacres in Rwanda to Hutu militias and one-sided violence in Colombia to a paramilitary group. Similarly to Battle-deaths, Non-State OSV underwent a log transformation and was lagged by a semester.

The fourth independent variable uses the number of *Refugees* to measure the spillover effects of intra-State armed conflicts, as mentioned by Binder<sup>88</sup>. The data comes from the number of refugees originating from a particular country in the annual accounts of UNHCR<sup>89</sup>, thus following an annual count instead of a semester. It is a country-based variable (linked to where the conflict occurs). Refugees were chosen (instead of IDPs) because they are the most likely to serve as a proxy for the spillover effects. Similarly to other variables, *Refugees* passed through a log transformation and lagged, but for two semesters due to the annual temporality of the data.

The fifth hypothesis is operationalized by UN PKO dealing with a specific conflict. It takes the value of 1 if a PKO addresses the conflict in a determined semester. The variable is also lagged by one semester. Focusing on the UN is due to the likelihood of being more associated with sanctions than any type of peacekeeping operations.

The sixth hypothesis is a binomial variable *UN-Mediation* that tracks of occurrence of mediation for specific conflicts that had the involvement of the UN, lagged by a semester. The data for the mediation is taken from the new dataset shared by Ari on peace negotiations.<sup>90</sup> It was only considered mediation that had the involvement of the UN. Since it is a binomial, it does not account for how many mediation events happened in a particular semester, but only if a UN mediation has occurred.

Finally, the last hypothesis is tested by a binomial variable *PA failure* that takes the value of 1 if a peace agreement connected to that conflict has failed, lagged one semester. UCDP gathers the data, and for each peace agreement, there is a date of signature and failure (if applicable)<sup>91</sup>. In general, UCDP considers the failure of a peace agreement when one party withdraws from the agreement or violence shows that the parties have neglected the accord.

---

<sup>88</sup> Binder, 'Paths to Intervention.'

<sup>89</sup> UNHCR, 'UNHCR's Refugee Population Statistics Database', 2022.

<sup>90</sup> Barış Ari, 'Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts: A New Dataset,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 July 2022, 002200272211117, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221111735>.

<sup>91</sup> Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg, 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare.'

Because of the high number of ceasefire announcements and failures, it was decided to account only for the failure of partial and complete peace agreements.

Before discussing the control variables, it is important to discuss issues regarding endogeneity that might arise at this point because some of these independent variables might be affected by sanctions. First, most independent variables (and controls) are lagged temporally to account at least minimally for temporal sequencing. Second, when doing a large-N analysis of conflicts, one needs to assume that conflict resolution tools are not used randomly and do intend to influence the conflict. Thus, fully accounting for reverse causality is difficult. That is why all the findings need to be understood as associations. Finally, beyond the standard logistic regression, logistic regression for rare events is used- in which all observations after a conflict is sanctioned are dropped, thus minimizing the confounding effects of considering the values of such variables after sanctions have been imposed.

### *Controls*

In order to control for other factors, several variables were selected. First, across the literature on peacekeeping, mediation, and UNSC, the countervailing power of a country where the conflict occurs seems relevant, which can be understood by the raw power of the country itself or its alliances.

To control for raw power, the variable *National Capability* is utilized. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) produced by the Correlates of War project on National Military Capabilities (v.6.0)<sup>92</sup> lagged by a year. The CINC is an Index of five factors (military expenditure, size of the military, production of iron and steel, population, and urban population), thus being a good proxy for raw power.

To control for alliances, the model uses a *P5 alliance* (also lagged for a year). This binomial variable takes a value of 1 if the country has a formal alliance with a P5 member of the Council. To code the *P5 alliance* variable, the data from the Correlates of War project Formal Alliances (v4.1)<sup>93</sup> was used. It would make sense that a P5 would support its ally in shielding it from sanctions.

Another type of control is the regime type, a variable that has been extensively used in all types of study as a control. To operationalize regime type, the variable *Polity* is added using

---

<sup>92</sup> J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965', *Peace, War, and Numbers* 19, no. 48 (1972): 9.

<sup>93</sup> J. David Singer and Melvin Small, 'Formal Alliances, 1815—1939: A Quantitative Description', *Journal of Peace Research* 3, no. 1 (March 1966): 1–31, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336600300101>.

data from the Polity V<sup>94</sup> In Variety of Democracy Project scores a regime in a range from -10 (authoritarian) to +10 (democratic).<sup>95</sup>

The fourth control accounts for the duration. Duration might be necessary because the Council might be inclined to use sanctions after a specific duration of a conflict, but also because it is good practice to account for temporal dimensions. Duration is operationalized by a count of uninterrupted semesters of active armed conflict, as defined before. To account for duration/time, three versions of Duration are included: Duration, Duration squared, and Duration cubic, as recommended by Carter and Signorino.<sup>96</sup>

The fourth control comes from an interpretation that the post-Cold War period was not marked by collaboration among powers but was a world led by the United States and its allies. Thus, their actions would extensively explain how the Council behaves. To account for the prevalence of the West, a variable called *West Sanctions* (lagged) was added. The West Sanctions variable is a binomial variable that takes a value of 1 if a country is under sanctions by the EU or the US. The data was based on the EUSANCT project<sup>97</sup>, which provides a quantitative dataset and a qualitative casebook for EU, UN, and US sanctions. Because, as in other sanctions projects, it accounts for any type of sanction, a re-coding process was necessary to only account for sanctions that were minimally connected to the armed conflict or immediate consequences/causes, such as human rights abuses or coups. Sanctions motivated by other reasons, such as combat of drugs, nuclear proliferation, or alignment with external powers, were not added. Finally, when dealing with the extended model in which UNSC sanctions related to terror are added, the West Sanctions variable also includes the foreign terrorist organisation designations made by the US (coded by the researcher).

Another critical control is the potential corporatist behaviour from the Council, which refrains from sanctioning its current members. A control was added for UNSC *Membership*; a binomial variable takes the value of 1 if the country in which the conflict occurs is a current member of the UNSC, which was coded using membership information from the UNSC.<sup>98</sup>

Finally, the Council's activity and influence on armed conflicts cannot be fully captured without looking at the sanction regime regarding Al-Qaeda/IS post 9/11. To control for this factor, the

---

<sup>94</sup> Monty G Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2018', *Center for Systemic Peace. Www. System Micpe a Ce. Org*, 2020.

<sup>95</sup> Michael Coppedge et al., 'V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset V10. Varieties of Democracy (v-Dem) Project', *V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg*, 2020.

<sup>96</sup> David B. Carter and Curtis S. Signorino, 'Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data,' *Political Analysis* 18, no. 3 (2010): 271–92, <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpq013>.

<sup>97</sup> Weber and Schneider, 'Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US

<sup>98</sup> United Nations Security Council, 'United Nations Security Council Countries Elected Members,' United Nations Security Council, n.d., <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/countries-elected-members>.

binomial variable *Islamist* takes the value of 1 if the conflict has the presence of an actor that claims to have "Islamist" purposes. This control variable is only used in the models in which the Al-Qaeda/IS regime is included in the dependent variable. The data for this variable was taken from the RELAC dataset.<sup>99</sup>

### *Findings*

The first model to test the hypotheses on what is associated with UNSC sanctions is done through a logistic regression for each of the hypotheses enunciated, with all controls included. Rather than uniting all the hypotheses in one single regression, this approach was taken to avoid including too many variables without a prior investigation. Also, it is not good practice to include too many variables.

Table 1 shows the results of the logistic regression, clustered by conflict. The decision to cluster by conflict makes sense, considering the unit of analysis of this article. The table shows the results of each model in odds ratio. If the odds ratio is above 1, the independent or control variable increases the odds, while under one is when the presence of the variable - or higher levels - decreases the odds. Also, following what is standard in the literature, it is considered significant if \*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , or \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

All independent variables are above 1, which means that they increase the odds of an intra-State armed conflict being targeted by the Council with sanctions. It is aligned with what was expected. Three out of seven independent variables appear to be statistically significant: non-State OSV is significant at \*  $p < 0.05$ ; the presence of UN peacekeeping and failure of the peace agreement is strongly significant at  $p < 0.01$ , with all appearing to increase the odds of sanctions being present.

---

<sup>99</sup> Isak Svensson and Desirée Nilsson, 'Disputes over the Divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) Data, 1975 to 2015', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 5 (May 2018): 1127–48, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737057>.

Table 1: UNSC Sanctions / logistic regression - clustered by conflict

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
Battle Deaths	1.02111 (0.12763)						
Dyads		1.58410 (1.49986)					
Non-State OSV			<b>1.31809</b> <b>(2.25885)**</b>				
Refugees				1.17793 (1.14102)			
UN PKO					<b>20.21592</b> <b>(4.24331)***</b>		
UN Mediation						2.00569 (0.80367)	
PA Failure							<b>26.60666</b> <b>(4.26365)***</b>
Alliance P5	0.68639 (0.47808)	0.73702 (0.36182)	0.80883 (0.27361)	0.74421 (0.38021)	0.83019 (0.23470)	0.64944 (0.53393)	0.88991 (0.14443)
Polity	0.95777 (0.89528)	0.95561 (0.89728)	0.95358 (0.90483)	0.97568 (0.44440)	<b>0.89295</b> <b>(1.77518)*</b>	0.95156 (1.00102)	0.94833 (0.99003)
Membership	0.28591 (0.16639)	0.30183 (0.16391)	0.28106 (0.16991)	0.34828 (0.15453)	0.26101 (0.28117)	0.29235 (0.17157)	0.25136 (0.23936)
National Capability	0.99987 (1.45004)	0.99989 (1.28533)	0.99989 (1.26822)	0.99987 (1.47161)	0.99987 (1.32104)	0.99989 (1.27046)	0.99990 (1.31377)
West Sanctions	<b>1.59310</b> <b>(1.81155)*</b>	<b>1.56384</b> <b>(1.77695)*</b>	1.55023 (1.63237)	1.45144 (1.36433)	1.38816 (1.13160)	1.52810 (1.53412)	<b>1.82339</b> <b>(2.32789)**</b>
Duration	1.07276 (0.41324)	1.02536 (0.12954)	0.94415 (0.30666)	1.06722 (0.42265)	1.11691 (0.57782)	1.08827 (0.52945)	1.00464 (0.02601)
Duration <sup>2</sup>	0.99635 (0.24991)	0.99911 (0.05341)	1.00214 (0.13918)	0.99610 (0.28144)	0.99556 (0.23128)	0.99520 (0.32316)	1.00080 (0.04792)
Duration <sup>3</sup>	1.00003 (0.10233)	0.99999 (0.04732)	0.99996 (0.13999)	1.00004 (0.14894)	0.99999 (0.02366)	1.00005 (0.16515)	0.99996 (0.11998)
Sanctions-lag	22,769.86635 (12.99829)***	24,870.15034 (12.32275)***	24,306.63199 (12.70998)***	17,781.16778 (12.61796)***	22,186.20876 (13.75802)***	21,712.00848 (13.25887)***	29,867.88365 (13.39992)***
Chi2	265.57	280.27	283.95	259.40	412.09	631.56	316.25
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
R2_P	0.88	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.89

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Among the controls, without discussing *the Sanctions lagged variable*, only the presence of *West Sanctions* appeared to be barely significant in the three models. Regime type is barely significant in one model. All controls, however, had an odds ratio aligned with what was expected: the UNSC is less likely to use sanctions to address conflicts in countries that have an alliance with P5, have higher National Capability, are members of the Council, or are more democratic. The presence of West Sanctions on a country does increase the likelihood of sanctions being used by the Council and is statistically significant across three models.

The next step is to include Sanctions related to the regime of Al-Qaeda-IS and a new control variable for *Islamists*. The addition of terror-related sanctions is vital for many reasons: empirical considerations, unintended positive consequences, and robustness.

The Council has actively sanctioned organizations linked with two transnational terror networks. Although initially intended for counterterrorism, the Council directly influences several intra-State armed conflicts via such sanctions. As pointed out by Svensson, recently, many intra-State armed conflicts are a dispute between governments and "Islamists" organizations. These organizations often have alleged unofficial or official ties with the transnational terror networks or act effectively as branches. Thus, accounting for sanctions on terror groups is necessary if one would like to understand the Council sanction patterns in the case of intra-State armed conflicts.

Moreover, adding sanctions on terror organizations also has the unintended positive consequence of increasing the number of "positive" (sanctions") events, which improves the model accuracy. Finally, adding this new segment of sanctions not previously included puts the previous results under the test.

Table II shows the logistic regression results for sanctions cases, including terror-related ones. The results for the independent variables remain relatively similar, with Non-State OSV, the presence of UN PKO, and the failure of the Peace Agreement being strongly significant.

Table 2: UNSC Sanctions (with terror) / logistic regression - clustered by conflict

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
Battle Deaths	0.96966 (0.21303)						
Dyads		1.47737 (1.36521)					
Non-State OSV			<b>1.34495</b> <b>(2.99423)***</b>				
Refugees				1.05347 (0.63508)			
UN PKO					<b>11.90934</b> <b>(3.69713)***</b>		
UN Mediation						2.06451 (0.93620)	
PA Failure							<b>17.39593</b> <b>(3.60382)***</b>
Alliance P5	1.27888 (0.42752)	1.38693 (0.55664)	1.58791 (0.87387)	1.33690 (0.52719)	1.83730 (1.23646)	1.25963 (0.40140)	1.52444 (0.74723)
Polity	<b>0.90758</b> <b>(3.19585)***</b>	<b>0.90675</b> <b>(3.07248)***</b>	<b>0.89825</b> <b>(3.65789)***</b>	<b>0.91390</b> <b>(2.67598)***</b>	<b>0.88524</b> <b>(3.59229)***</b>	<b>0.90859</b> <b>(3.14610)***</b>	<b>0.89925</b> <b>(3.14729)***</b>
Membership	0.70524 (0.19772)	0.71021 (0.19180)	0.69436 (0.21439)	0.70861 (0.19731)	0.62439 (0.28581)	0.69484 (0.21044)	0.63224 (0.27066)
National Capability	1.00001 (0.38456)	1.00001 (0.53016)	1.00001 (0.45002)	1.00001 (0.40552)	1.00001 (0.57860)	1.00001 (0.49777)	1.00001 (0.66701)
West Sanctions	<b>3.66922</b> <b>(2.87390)***</b>	<b>3.51593</b> <b>(2.67332)***</b>	<b>3.83791</b> <b>(3.11711)***</b>	<b>3.44858</b> <b>(2.77296)***</b>	<b>2.66533</b> <b>(2.02015)**</b>	<b>3.78679</b> <b>(2.96046)***</b>	<b>3.92888</b> <b>(2.89810)***</b>
Islamist	<b>2.29734</b> <b>(1.69714)*</b>	1.98673 (1.27289)	<b>2.70101</b> <b>(2.24206)**</b>	<b>2.34580</b> <b>(1.75271)*</b>	<b>2.57641</b> <b>(2.02763)**</b>	<b>2.36150</b> <b>(1.76116)*</b>	1.94767 (1.16822)
Duration	1.04786 (0.42643)	0.98115 (0.15356)	0.91168 (0.79875)	1.02483 (0.22996)	1.02957 (0.25552)	1.02332 (0.21609)	0.97797 (0.19478)
Duration <sup>2</sup>	0.99906 (0.11441)	1.00296 (0.30348)	1.00514 (0.61033)	1.00014 (0.01651)	1.00098 (0.11135)	0.99991 (0.01080)	1.00365 (0.40305)
Duration <sup>3</sup>	0.99997 (0.18238)	0.99991 (0.49881)	0.99990 (0.68302)	0.99996 (0.27752)	0.99994 (0.40069)	0.99996 (0.23302)	0.99990 (0.60972)
Sanctions-lag	<b>36,761.01903</b> <b>(10.31061)***</b>	<b>38,710.35066</b> <b>(10.52161)***</b>	<b>43,087.56761</b> <b>(10.49214)***</b>	<b>34,203.33910</b> <b>(10.56170)***</b>	<b>32,837.27131</b> <b>(11.26292)***</b>	<b>33,906.65708</b> <b>(10.67141)***</b>	<b>44,288.32587</b> <b>(10.85738)***</b>
Chi2	274.27	312.27	305.53	278.08	397.17	695.69	336.68
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
R2_P	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.89	0.88	0.89

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

In the case of controls, regime type (Polity) gains significance across all models, indicating that the more a State is democratic, the less likely it is that the Council will use sanctions to deal with intra-State armed conflicts in that country. Islamist displayed statistical significance, increasing the likelihood of sanctions being present. The weaker significance of Islamist vis-a-vis Polity and West Sanctions might be due to the temporal cut of the model from 1989 to 2013 before the ISIS threat became apparent with the fall of Fallujah, Mosul, and Tikrit in Iraq in 2014. It also could be explained by the fact that West Sanctions include cases of US designations of certain groups as foreign terrorist organizations<sup>100</sup>, reducing the effect of Islamist. The overall significance is expected, given how counterterrorism tends to benefit from a consensus of the permanent members.

However, the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 might be biased because they include observations after the Council has decided to use sanctions to address an armed conflict. Even after controlling for the prior presence of sanctions (which can also underestimate the value of the independent variables) and temporal sequencing, it is not possible to rule out that events happening after the armed conflict has been sanctioned are driving the results or that such variables might be affected by sanctions (endogeneity).

Thus, to account for such potential bias, all observations for an intra-State armed conflict under sanctions were dropped, except for the first semester in which sanctions were imposed, dropping the number of sanctions to slightly above 1% of the sample. A Cox Proportional Hazard model would be ideal under such a data structure. However, with the rarity of events and the number of variables, the model will gravely suffer from overfitting.

To account for such rare events, the literature has proposed two logistical approaches: penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression (*firthlogit*) by David Firth<sup>101</sup> and logit with corrected coefficients by King and Zeng (*relogit*)<sup>102</sup>. Recently, *firthlogit* has been more widely used by the literature, so this would be the model used to ensure the robustness of the findings.

Even using the penalized maximum likelihood, the number of variables vis-a-vis events is large. By dropping all cases of sanctions after the first sanction is imposed, the number of observations drops from 284 to 19 in the Sanction model without terror-related and from 421 to 27 in the model with

---

<sup>100</sup> The operationalisation of the variable West Sanctions in the model with terror sanctions is different. It is a binomial variable, that takes the value of 1 if US or EU is addressing that conflict (country or group) with sanctions.

<sup>101</sup> David Firth, 'Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates,' *Biometrika* 80, no. 1 (1993): 27–38, <https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/80.1.27>; Georg Heinze and Michael Schemper, 'A Solution to the Problem of Separation in Logistic Regression,' *Statistics in Medicine* 21, no. 16 (30 August 2002): 2409–19, <https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.1047>.

<sup>102</sup> Gary King and Langche Zeng, 'Explaining Rare Events in International Relations,' *International Organization* 55, no. 3 (2001): 693–715, <https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180152507597>.

terror-related. Since the most important in those cases is to have the number of “positive” events as high as possible, these robustness models will use Sanctions, including AL Qaeda/IS regime.

The proportion between events (Sanctions) and variables is debatable in the literature. A conservative rule says ten events per variable for a normal logistic regression. In comparison, a more liberal approach allows five events per variable.<sup>103</sup> Since the models will be run using a penalized maximum logistic model that helps to deal with small sampling and rare events, the liberal approach will be taken. Thus, roughly, the model should contain a maximum of 5 variables. Apart from the primary independent variable, only four controls are possible. Besides the ones that appeared as strongly significant: Polity, West Sanctions, and Islamist, the model keeps Duration seems accounting for time seems reasonable given the nature of the data.

The results of the penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression essentially confirm the previous results: Non-State OSV, presence of UN PKO, and Peace Agreement failure continue to increase the odds of sanctions and are strongly significant at \*  $p < 0.01$  for UN PKO and Peace Agreement Failure, and significant at \*  $p < 0.05$  for Non-State OSV. The novelty is the significance of Dyads at  $p < 0.05$ , which might signal that conflict complexity might matter in terms of increasing the odds of sanctioning onset.

In terms of controls, both Polity and West Sanctions remain primarily significant. However, Islamists lose significance, partly because West Sanctions "steal" part of the effects since the US diligently sanctions terror organizations linked to terrorist networks. It can also be that the data is limited until 2013, before the emergence of ISIS in late 2013 and 2014.

The results of King and Zeng, using a model clustered by conflict (see appendix), largely confirm such results. The only difference is that Dyads decrease from significant to barely significant. Thus, the result of those models could be considered robust enough due to their consistency across different models. Also, the logistic regressions in Table 3 and King and Zeng (Appendix) model are clustered by conflict, which is more robust than a normal regression.

Two adjustments are necessary for the next step, in which the independent variables will be tested together. First, temporarily, the dataset covers until 2015, so the model can incorporate new sanctions. Second, due to the slight enlargement of the number of cases (30), a more liberal approach to the number of variables would allow a maximum of six variables.

---

<sup>103</sup> Paul Allison, 'Logistic Regression for Rare Events', *Statistical Horizons* (blog), 13 February 2012, <https://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-for-rare-events/>, forum

Table 3: UNSC Sanctions (with terror) / penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
Battle Deaths	0.89522 (1.17600)						
Dyads		<b>1.56502</b> <b>(2.04305)**</b>					
Non-State OSV			<b>1.24494</b> <b>(2.26922)**</b>				
Refugees				0.94347 (1.17734)			
UN PKO					<b>7.83978</b> <b>(3.45886)***</b>		
UN Mediation						1.91183 (0.95556)	
PA Failure							<b>14.16277</b> <b>(4.13662)***</b>
Polity	<b>0.90758</b> <b>(3.19585)***</b>	<b>0.90675</b> <b>(3.07248)***</b>	<b>0.89825</b> <b>(3.65789)***</b>	<b>0.91390</b> <b>(2.67598)***</b>	<b>0.88524</b> <b>(3.59229)***</b>	<b>0.90859</b> <b>(3.14610)***</b>	<b>0.89925</b> <b>(3.14729)***</b>
West Sanctions	<b>2.90648</b> <b>(2.60693)***</b>	<b>2.73127</b> <b>(2.45977)**</b>	<b>2.94863</b> <b>(2.67011)***</b>	<b>3.19923</b> <b>(2.70756)***</b>	<b>2.16351</b> <b>(1.77180)*</b>	<b>2.84593</b> <b>(2.57045)**</b>	<b>2.96348</b> <b>(2.65530)***</b>
Islamist	1.76215 (1.34070)	1.36277 (0.68096)	1.82039 (1.40661)	1.65360 (1.19061)	1.78145 (1.35864)	1.72508 (1.28691)	1.41939 (0.79841)
Duration	1.01271 (0.41109)	0.98885 (0.36435)	0.96712 (0.94430)	0.99694 (0.10318)	1.00281 (0.09478)	0.99276 (0.24478)	0.99405 (0.19603)
Chi2	13.21	16.70	16.47	13.29	24.25	12.40	27.88
P	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.00
R2_P	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Three models are built. A model incorporating all significant independent variables, plus Polity and West Sanctions. A second model in which all independent variables, except Dyads, are incorporated, plus Polity, West Sanctions, and Islamist.<sup>104</sup> Finally, a third model only incorporates the significant variables. The third model does not claim to be a final model, but it is an important test because it moves away from the upper limit of the number of variables recommended.

Table 4: UNSC Sanctions (with terror) /Penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression (firthlogit)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
Dyads	1.42000 (1.55046)		
Non-State OSV	<b>1.16683</b> <b>(1.76728)*</b>	<b>1.18943</b> <b>(1.98096)**</b>	<b>1.18009</b> <b>(1.89784)*</b>
UN PKO	<b>6.06413</b> <b>(3.15051)***</b>	<b>6.00275</b> <b>(3.10992)***</b>	<b>5.32858</b> <b>(2.92338)***</b>
PA failure	<b>6.96604</b> <b>(2.74911)***</b>	<b>7.92914</b> <b>(3.06767)***</b>	<b>9.13561</b> <b>(3.25207)***</b>
Polity	<b>0.91082</b> <b>(2.58061)***</b>	<b>0.90949</b> <b>(2.64714)***</b>	<b>0.91152</b> <b>(2.59602)***</b>
West Sanctions	<b>2.17711</b> <b>(1.84529)*</b>	<b>2.33075</b> <b>(2.01626)**</b>	<b>2.33731</b> <b>(2.03463)**</b>
Islamist		1.79602 (1.40598)	
Chi2	42.26	41.44	40.00
P	0.00	0.00	0.00

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

The results remain essentially the same, with the presence of UN PKO and failure of the Peace Agreement as broadly significant and increasing the odds of sanctions. Non-State OSV also increases the odds of sanction but has decreased in significance in some models. Both Dyads and Islamists increase the odds but are not significant. The results using the corrected

<sup>104</sup> The decision to drop Dyads in the second model and replace Islamists is due to the importance of terror sanctions post-2014 and the fact that Dyads did not appear significant in all models.

coefficient logistic regression are similar for UN PKO and Peace Agreement; however, Dyads is significant, and Non-State OSV is not.

### *Analysis*

Before analyzing the independent variables and related hypotheses, a brief discussion of the control variables is needed. Most of the controls followed what was expected regarding coefficients/odds ratio but did not achieve statistical significance. Two controls, though, displayed strong results: regime type and West Sanctions.

The results of the models seem to suggest that an intra-State armed conflict happening in a less democratic state has better odds of being sanctioned than in a more democratic State. Being sanctioned by the US or the EU increases the odds of being sanctioned by the Council, which shows some merit in discussing the significant influence of Western powers in the Council during this period, at least regarding sanctions imposition. It is unsurprising given that US, France and UK have drafted most UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions.<sup>105</sup>

Finally, the Islamist control variable appeared to be significant in some models. Not only was it expected, but it also shows how this strand of work became relatively crucial for the Council. The overall sample of observations under sanctions increased significantly compared to when only sanction country regimes were considered.

What are the findings about the elaborated hypothesis and related independent variables? In short, the Council sanctioning practice might be more complex than it seems. First, sanctions do not seem associated with traditional factors/facets of conflicts, such as their intensity (*battle deaths*) or complexity, differently from other conflict resolution tools. The complexity of the conflict (Dyads) was significant, but only in a few models. Both *H1* and *H2* were not confirmed. The control *Duration* and its variations - another critical element of an armed conflict- did not appear to be significant. Thus, at first sight, critical considerations of an armed conflict are not statistically significantly associated with sanctions.

The third hypothesis on violence against civilians is the first one, which appeared consistently significant across all models, although with limited significance in the last iteration. Violence against civilians perpetrated by non-State actors (militia, paramilitary, rebels, among others) in intra-State armed conflicts increases the odds of the sanctions being used to address the conflict, both in the standard logistic model and rare event variations.

---

<sup>105</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

Such results support the idea that the Council acts in case of human suffering (the humanitarian argument) and aligns with several sanctions episodes. For example, the onset of sanctions in Sudan in 2004 erupted after war broke out between the government of Sudan and the rebel groups SLM/A and JEM in the context of mass killings of civilians by pro-government militias. The addition of terror-related sanctions only enhances the effect because these organizations target civilians as a deliberate warfare tactic. As another example, the imposition of sanctions on Boko Haram coincided with a great campaign of civilian victimization (including kidnapping) in 2014, not only in Nigeria but in neighbouring Chad and Cameroon. Notably, the Council sanctioned Boko Haram in 2014, although the group's pledge of allegiance to ISIS occurred in 2015.

However, such an interpretation that puts humanitarian concerns as a driver is challenged by the lack of significance of the variable refugees. Refugees were largely insignificant statistically in all models. It is also surprising considering their more immediate consequence for regional stability. However, if one analyzes the more recent refugee crises, both conflicts in Syria and Ukraine (due to the involvement of P5) did not result in any action by the Council.

Thus, how do we reconcile the findings that confirm *H3* but reject *H4*? One possible explanation is that the normative context shift in the 90s does explain the Council's behaviour, but the Council's understanding of human suffering is possibly narrower than initially expected. Rather than using sanctions in any case of considerable human suffering, the Council's usage of sanctions is associated with cases in which there is deliberate violence against civilians. Rather than human suffering per se, the Council might be wired to respond to cases that amount to politicide or genocide.

The fifth hypothesis regarding UN peacekeeping operations proved statistically significant in all models, significantly increasing the odds of sanctions being used. The significance of peacekeeping operations is unsurprising, given that most sanctions cases also witnessed peacekeeping operations.<sup>106</sup>

The significance of peacekeeping operations might support a reading that the usage of sanctions by the Council might be explained by path dependence or sunken costs. It means that once the Council is committed to solving or addressing an armed conflict, it tends to use all possible tools, and sanctions seem to follow and then coexist with the presence of UN peacekeeping operations.

---

<sup>106</sup> Biersteker et al.

For example, the case of DRC sanction regimes seems to be illustrative. Established in 1999 after the Lusaka Agreements, the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DRC (MONUC) helped observe and monitor (then later supervise the implementation) the ceasefire between the different parties. The ceasefire did not hold, putting the MONUC mission in jeopardy. By 2000, with DRC's request and with evidence of natural resources financing the armed conflict, the Council established several mechanisms usually related to the Council to investigate the conflict (e.g., Panel of Experts). By 2003, the Council finally imposed sanctions.<sup>107</sup>

Such interpretation of path dependence or sunken costs might not be proper for all conflict resolution tools. The sixth hypothesis, regarding the UN's involvement in armed conflict mediation, proved statistically insignificant. There are several potential reasons. First, *talk is cheap*, which means that mediation per se is not costly enough to move the Council to use sanctions. Second, different from peacekeeping operations, mediation by the UN is mainly overseen by the UN Secretariat. Thus, the use of both tools is not always coordinated<sup>108</sup>. Third, a conflict being mediated by the UN may be seen by the UNSC as a good development; thus, it is unlikely that the Council would also use sanctions that are seen as restrictive measures. Finally, the emergence of terrorist groups might also have played a role because the literature seems to indicate a potential effect of sanctions (or their likely imposition due to the nature of the group) on actually curbing efforts to mediate conflicts with these entities.<sup>109</sup>

Finally, the last hypothesis, H7, was primarily confirmed in all statistical models. The failure of peace agreements seems strongly associated with the Council using sanctions. It is possible that although talk is cheap, once talks produce agreements, the failure of such agreements is costly enough of a signal to make the Council use sanctions. Alternatively, the Council might interpret the failure of agreements as a sign that the conflict is becoming intractable; thus, the Council might decide that it is time to use sanctions to resolve the conflict.

For example, in Sierra Leone, the Council imposed sanctions after a coup d'état that ousted the elected President, Ahmad Kabbah. The coup was led by a faction of the armed forces supported by RUF in 1997. The ousting happened only a few months after signing a peace agreement that ended a civil war between the Sierra Leone government and RUF. It also applies to sanctions on the Central African Republic that occurred after the failure of the

---

<sup>107</sup> Biersteker, 'SanctionApp'.

<sup>108</sup> Thomas J. Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker, and David Lanz, 'Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 180–202, <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802002>.

<sup>109</sup> Magnus Lundgren and Isak Svensson, 'The Surprising Decline of International Mediation in Armed Conflicts', *Research & Politics* 7, no. 2 (April 2020): 205316802091724, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020917243>.

ceasefire and Libreville agreements in 2013, which led to the Séléka coalition takeover of the government despite protests from several international actors.<sup>110</sup>

Overall, the findings seem to indicate that the imposition of sanctions by the Council seems to be associated with the victimization of civilians, the presence of peacekeeping forces, and the failure of peace agreements. Besides those variables, only West Sanctions and regime type appeared statistically significant across different models.

### *Conclusion*

This research piece tried to answer the question of which factors are associated with the use of sanctions by the UNSC when dealing with intra-State armed conflicts. There is the understanding that sanctions are not applied at random but rather through a strategic approach by the Council. Such a strategic approach theoretically and now empirically shares but also differs in many factors from the imposition of sanctions from countries and other conflict resolution tools.

This article contributes to the overall discussion of the need to understand the selection model through which a case is chosen to be targeted by sanctions by the UNSC before evaluating the effects of sanctions themselves. This a fact that is well enshrined in other conflict resolution literature, such as peacekeeping and mediation, but still needs further development within the sanction's literature.

It does so by providing a credible and thematically coherent universe of cases from the perspective of a unique sender. Such an approach is different from most of the literature on sanctions that collapse different types of sanctions, on different topics, from different senders; or focuses on a particular sender but investigates only the cases in which sanctions were imposed, but not the universe of cases in which sanctions could have been imposed.

A series of statistical models were used to investigate the hypotheses formulated. Individually, each statistical model might have weaknesses. Collectively, they tell a coherent story of which factors are consistently associated with sanctions.

The statistical models show that non-State one-sided violence against civilians, the presence of UN peacekeeping operations, and failure of a peace agreement were consistently significantly associated with the use of sanctions, supporting arguments related to the normative shift post-Cold War, sunken costs, and sanctions as a reactive instrument. The

---

<sup>110</sup> Biersteker, 'SanctionApp'.

analysis used a series of brief cases to exemplify such relationships. However, one sanction regime exemplifies all those factors at once: Rwanda.

The imposition of sanctions in Rwanda happened after the failure of the Arusha Peace Agreement mediated by the UN. It unleashed an unprecedented killing of civilians (the Rwanda genocide) and re-started the war between the government and RPF. UNSC had a UN PKO presence in the country that could not contain violence and was reduced in numbers by the Council when it was clear it could not contain hostilities.

Rwanda exemplifies all the statistically significant factors associated with sanctions and might suggest possible avenues for refining the model. The Arusha Peace Agreement was mediated by the UN, and as the literature on mediation has shown, the UN became an increasing mediator after the post-Cold War. Thus, it might be that rather than reacting to peace agreement failure, UNSC might be reacting to cases in which the peace agreement that failed was mediated by itself or even regional organisations. Rwanda is also marked by the failure of another conflict resolution tool: peacekeeping operations, which were incapable of protecting civilians.

Thus, two possible refinements of the model might be to look at the effect of the failure of peace agreements mediated by the UN and regional organisations vis-a-vis others; and whether the presence of UN PKO is highly associated with sanctions or is the inability of UN peacekeeping forces to keep the peace - the significance of one-sided violence against civilians might signal that it might be the latter. Both refinements would contribute to the growing body of research that tries to understand how different conflict resolution tools interact with each other.

Beyond the tested hypotheses, several other independent variables and hypotheses could be tested in the future. One area briefly touched by the Islamist variable that demands much more attention in the literature is how the Council reacts to sanctions vis-a-vis characteristics of non-State armed organisations<sup>111</sup>. The peacekeeping and mediation literature has established the importance of investigating non-State groups.

One possible avenue for future research is to investigate the change over time in how the UNSC reacts to armed conflicts, via pooled cross-sectional and time series data, maybe by

---

<sup>111</sup> John Agbonifo, 'Nonstate Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness', *African Security* 14, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 27–54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1904536>; John Agbonifo, 'Sanctions, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Coercing Non-State Armed Actors in Africa', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 12, no. 1 (April 2017): 65–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1281679>.

focusing on distinctive conflicts - similar to what Radkte and Jo did when studying the effect of UN commodity sanctions (and other incidents) on UNITA and Al-Shabab.<sup>112</sup>

One of the initial ambitions of this article was to investigate not only the presence of sanctions but also which factors are associated with the different levels of sanctions that the Council imposes. However, the plan of using such a nuanced sanction measurement is hindered by the actual number of armed conflicts addressed by sanctions. Such nuanced measurement is probably manageable if sanctions are the independent variable but not as dependent variable. In other words, not if the object of the research is to explain the imposition of the sanction per se.

This article has stretched quite extensively on what can be investigated via statistical analysis using models that account for rare events, such as those proposed by Firth, King and Zeng. Further research in which sanctions are studied through a more fine-grained operationalisation may be better suited for alternative research methods, such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), especially when sanctions are the dependent variable.

Furthermore, this paper took the challenging route of testing various hypotheses regarding which factors are associated with sanctions, creating the foundation from which others might benefit. Further research might benefit from looking specifically at a particular tool at a time, exploring more in-depth sequencing and causal pathways, and possibly using instrumental variables. An approach similar done by Tiernay - that used the Black Hawk Down incident as an instrumental variable to test whether peace agreements or peacekeeping forces come first<sup>113</sup> - would help to disentangle the sequencing between sanctions and other tools.

Overall, this article supports the view that the Council is moved by humanitarian concerns (although narrower than some might claim), sunken costs dynamics, and signs of intractability. Rather than being a definitive answer, this paper should be the beginning of a necessary conversation on how to understand the strategic approach of the Council regarding using sanctions to address cases of intra-State armed conflicts.

---

<sup>112</sup> Mitchell Radtke and Hyeran Jo, 'Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel Groups', *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 759–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127>.

<sup>113</sup> Michael Tiernay, 'Which Comes First? Unpacking the Relationship between Peace Agreements and Peacekeeping Missions', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 2 (April 2015): 135–52, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520396>.

## Appendix

Table A1: Summary					
VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Membership	2,538	0.0827	0.276	0	1
Polity	2,423	1.246	5.862	-10	10
UNSC Sanctions	2,538	0.112	0.315	0	1
UNSC Sanctions (terror)	2,538	0.177	0.381	0	1
Islamists	2,538	0.295	0.456	0	1
Duration	2,538	5.327	8.464	0	50
Duration (squared)	2,538	99.99	283.1	0	2,500
Duration (cubic)	2,538	2,739	11,039	0	125,000
Battle Deaths	2,538	3.436	2.412	0	10.61
West Sanctions	2,538	0.445	0.744	0	2
West Sanctions (terror)	2,538	0.255	0.436	0	1
Non-State OSV	2,538	1.253	1.913	0	10.31
UN PKO	2,538	0.0489	0.216	0	1
PA failure	2,538	0.0122	0.110	0	1
Refugees	2,538	9.737	3.732	0	15.66
UN Mediation	2,538	0.0674	0.251	0	1
Alliance P5	2,431	0.291	0.454	0	1
Dyads	2,538	1.287	0.624	1	6
National Capability	2,538	12,895	23,922	0	190,629
Sanctions-lag	2,538	0.104	0.306	0	1
Sanctions-lag (terror)	2,538	0.166	0.372	0	1

Table A2: UNSC Sanctions (with terror) / Logit with corrected coefficients - clustered by conflict (relogit)

	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(V)	(VI)	(VII)
Battle Deaths	-0.11046 (0.96945)						
Dyads		<b>0.45038</b> <b>(1.76690)*</b>					
Non-State OSV			<b>0.22011</b> <b>(2.34580)**</b>				
Refugees				-0.05851 (0.92921)			
UN PKO					<b>2.06467</b> <b>(3.24720)***</b>		
UN Mediation						0.67741 (0.86937)	
PA Failure							<b>2.66425</b> <b>(3.43154)***</b>
Polity	<b>-0.08012</b> <b>(2.83785)***</b>	<b>-0.07399</b> <b>(2.58721)***</b>	<b>-0.08083</b> <b>(2.97606)***</b>	<b>-0.08372</b> <b>(3.01690)***</b>	<b>-0.09012</b> <b>(2.83844)***</b>	<b>-0.07679</b> <b>(2.74397)***</b>	<b>-0.08205</b> <b>(2.66115)***</b>
West Sanctions	<b>1.06945</b> <b>(2.40261)**</b>	<b>1.00730</b> <b>(2.19325)**</b>	<b>1.08411</b> <b>(2.46190)**</b>	<b>1.16526</b> <b>(2.70988)***</b>	<b>0.77474</b> <b>(1.61059)</b>	<b>1.04845</b> <b>(2.33732)**</b>	<b>1.08896</b> <b>(2.35354)**</b>
Islamist	0.56820 (1.23739)	0.31276 (0.54548)	0.60122 (1.32222)	0.50493 (1.08422)	0.57938 (1.23262)	0.54720 (1.18161)	0.35282 (0.65400)
Duration	0.01315 (0.50978)	-0.01088 (0.38959)	-0.03328 (1.01946)	-0.00269 (0.09811)	0.00320 (0.11583)	-0.00688 (0.24481)	-0.00558 (0.18662)
Constant	-4.41110 (8.98332)***	-5.19324 (11.90739)***	-4.86669 (12.04319)***	-4.14604 (5.92699)***	-4.77607 (12.93985)***	-4.69558 (13.05087)***	-4.74585 (13.15982)***
Chi2	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
R2_P	.	.	.	.	.	.	.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A3: UNSC Sanctions (with terror) /Logit with corrected coefficient (relogit)

	(I)	(II)	(III)
Dyads	0.38545 (1.72932)*		
Non-State OSV	0.09342 (0.87701)	0.11594 (1.08298)	0.10594 (0.98588)
UN PKO	1.76672 (2.74607)***	1.72537 (2.70567)***	1.63985 (2.51015)**
PA Failure	2.11401 (2.90521)***	2.27687 (2.98418)***	2.43910 (3.36876)***
Polity	-0.09509 (2.98549)***	-0.09699 (3.32674)***	-0.09394 (3.10110)***
West Sanctions	0.74616 (1.51588)	0.82499 (1.72906)*	0.82354 (1.70378)*
Islamist		0.52138 (1.02519)	
Constant	-5.32996 (11.57502)***	-4.98225 (12.16322)***	-4.84303 (12.86591)***
Chi2	.	.	.
P	.	.	.
R2_P	.	.	.

## Bibliography

Agbonifo, John. 'Nonstate Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness'. *African Security* 14, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 27–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1904536>.

———. 'Sanctions, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Coercing Non-State Armed Actors in Africa'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 12, no. 1 (April 2017): 65–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1281679>.

Allison, Paul. 'Logistic Regression for Rare Events'. *Statistical Horizons* (blog), 13 February 2012. <https://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-for-rare-events/>.

Amaral, Joana. 'UN Sanctions and Mediation in Sierra Leone: Opportunities and Pitfalls When Managing Veto Players'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 274–93. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802001>.

Ari, Barış. 'Peace Negotiations in Civil Conflicts: A New Dataset'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 4 July 2022, 002200272211117. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221111735>.

Attia, Hana, and Julia Grauvogel. 'International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 28 August 2022, 002234332210870. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221087080>.

Bapat, Navin A., and Bo Ram Kwon. 'When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework'. *International Organization* 69, no. 1 (2015): 131–62. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818314000290>.

Beardsley, Kyle. *The Mediation Dilemma*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2011.

———. 'The UN at the Peacemaking–Peacebuilding Nexus'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 4 (September 2013): 369–86. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213491354>.

Beardsley, Kyle, and Holger Schmidt. 'Following the Flag or Following the Charter? Examining the Determinants of UN Involvement in International Crises, 1945-2002: Following the Flag or Following the Charter?' *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 1 (March 2012): 33–49. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00696.x>.

Beber, Bernd. 'International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of Bias'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 4 (September 2012): 397–424. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894212449091>.

Bercovitch, Jacob, and Scott Sigmund Gartner. 'Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation'. *International Interactions* 32, no. 4 (December 2006): 329–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620601011024>.

Biersteker, T. J. 'SanctionApp', 2022.

Biersteker, Thomas, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'The Emergence, Rise, (and Demise?) Of Targeted Sanctions at the United Nations'. *International Organization*, Under review.

Biersteker, Thomas J., Rebecca Brubaker, and David Lanz. 'Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation'. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 28, no. 2 (4 July 2022): 180–202. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802002>.

Biersteker, Thomas J, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 404–12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317752539>.

Binder, Martin. 'Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN's Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?' *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 6 (November 2015): 712–26. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315585847>.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 'The Importance of Conflict Characteristics for the Diffusion of International Mediation'. *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 3 (May 2016): 378–91. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316628827>.

———. 'The Spatial Contagion of International Mediation'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 1 (February 2015): 108–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894214544615>.

Carter, David B., and Curtis S. Signorino. 'Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data'. *Political Analysis* 18, no. 3 (2010): 271–92. <https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpq013>.

Clayton, Govinda, and Han Dorussen. 'The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 19 May 2021, 002234332199007. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076>.

Clayton, Govinda, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 'Will We See Helping Hands? Predicting Civil War Mediation and Likely Success'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 3 (July 2014): 265–84. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213508693>.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, and Allen Hicken. 'V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10. Varieties of Democracy (v-Dem) Project'. *V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg*, 2020.

Cordell, Rebecca, Thorin Wright, and Paul F. Diehl. 'Extant Commitment, Risk, and UN Peacekeeping Authorization'. *International Interactions* 47, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 135–60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2020.1814764>.

Crescenzi, Mark J.C., Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Clayton L. Thyne. 'A Supply Side Theory of Mediation1: A Supply Side Theory of Mediation'. *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (December 2011): 1069–94. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00681.x>.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 'It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (August 2009): 570–97. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709336458>.

Davies, Shawn, Therése Pettersson, and Magnus Öberg. 'Organized Violence 1989–2021 and Drone Warfare'. *Journal of Peace Research* 59, no. 4 (July 2022): 593–610. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221108428>.

Dorussen, Han, Tobias Böhmelt, and Govinda Clayton. 'Sequencing United Nations Peacemaking: Political Initiatives and Peacekeeping Operations'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2022): 24–48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942211000678>.

Early, Bryan, and Dursun Peksen. 'Searching in the Shadows: The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Informal Economies'. *Political Research Quarterly* 72, no. 4 (December 2019): 821–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918806412>.

Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman. 'One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data'. *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (March 2007): 233–46. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307075124>.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 'Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions'. *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 6 (June 2012): 683–713. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427883>.

———. 'Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts'. *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 129–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309356489>.

Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. 'Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1: Dealing with Tyranny'. *International Studies Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (7 June 2010): 335–59. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00590.x>.

Finnemore, Martha. 'Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention.' In *Essential Readings in World Politics*, edited by Karen A. Mingst and Jack L. Snyder, Fifth Edition. The Norton Series in World Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014.

Firth, David. 'Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates'. *Biometrika* 80, no. 1 (1993): 27–38. <https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/80.1.27>.

Fortna, V. Page, and Lisa L. Martin. 'Peacekeepers As Signals The Demand For International Peacekeeping In Civil Wars'. In *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics*, 87–107. Princeton University Press, 2009.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War'. *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (June 2004): 269–92. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00301.x>.

———. *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2008.

Gilligan, Michael, and Stephen John Stedman. 'Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?'. *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 37–54. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504005.x>.

Grauvogel, Julia, and Christian von Soest. 'Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes: Claims to Legitimacy Count'. *European Journal of Political Research* 53, no. 4 (November 2014): 635–53. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12065>.

Greig, J. Michael. 'Stepping Into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 249–66. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00121.x>.

Heinze, Georg, and Michael Schemper. 'A Solution to the Problem of Separation in Logistic Regression'. *Statistics in Medicine* 21, no. 16 (30 August 2002): 2409–19. <https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.1047>.

Hudáková, Zuzana, Thomas Biersteker, and Erica Moret. 'Sanctions Relaxation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Past Sanctions Regimes', n.d., 43.

Hultman, Lisa. 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?'. *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (January 2013): 59–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312461662>.

Jeong, Jin Mun, and Dursun Peksen. 'Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 1 (January 2019): 194–217. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717728105>.

Kaempfer, William H., and Anton D. Lowenberg. 'The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach'. *The American Economic Review* 78, no. 4 (1988): 786–93.

King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 'Explaining Rare Events in International Relations', n.d., 23.

Lektzian, D., and M. Souva. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51, no. 6 (2007): 848.

Lektzian, David, and Glen Biglaiser. 'The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on the Use and Success of US Sanctions'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 1 (February 2014): 70–93. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213501976>.

Lundgren, Magnus, and Isak Svensson. 'The Surprising Decline of International Mediation in Armed Conflicts'. *Research & Politics* 7, no. 2 (April 2020): 205316802091724. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020917243>.

Marshall, Monty G. 'Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2018'. *Center for Systemic Peace. Www. Syste Micpe a Ce. Org*, 2020.

Melin, Molly M. 'The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs1: The Impact of State Relationships'. *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (September 2011): 691–715. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00665.x>.

Melin, Molly M., Scott Sigmund Gartner, and Jacob Bercovitch. 'Fear of Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 4 (September 2013): 354–68. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213491358>.

Melin, Molly M., and Isak Svensson. 'Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars'. *International Interactions* 35, no. 3 (28 August 2009): 249–71. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620903084521>.

Michael Greig, J., and Patrick M. Regan. 'When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars'. *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (December 2008): 759–81. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00525.x>.

Morgan, T. Clifton, and Anne C. Miers. 'When Threats Succeed: A Formal Model of the Threat and Use of Sanctions'. In *Annual Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International)*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1999.

Mullenbach, Mark J. 'Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions'. *International Studies Quarterly* 49, no. 3 (2005): 529–55.

Nooruddin, Irfan. 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy'. *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 59–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394>.

Peksen, Dursun. 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (19 September 2019): 635–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250>.

Radtke, Mitchell, and Hyeran Jo. 'Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel Groups'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 759–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127>.

Ramjoué, Melanie. 'Using UN Sanctions as a Peacebuilding Tool: Ideas for Enhancing the Sanctions Design Process'. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 10, no. 3 (December 2015): 89–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2015.1095649>.

Regan, Patrick M., and Allan C. Stam. 'In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes'. *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 239–60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00157>.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965'. *Peace, War, and Numbers* 19, no. 48 (1972): 9.

Singer, J. David, and Melvin Small. 'Formal Alliances, 1815—1939: A Quantitative Description'. *Journal of Peace Research* 3, no. 1 (March 1966): 1–31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002234336600300101>.

Stojek, Szymon M., and Jaroslav Tir. 'The Supply Side of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Trade Ties and United Nations-Led Deployments to Civil War States'. *European Journal of International Relations* 21, no. 2 (June 2015): 352–76. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066114532665>.

Sundberg, Ralph, and Erik Melander. 'Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (July 2013): 523–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313484347>.

Svensson, Isak. *Elusive Peacemakers: A Bargaining Perspective on Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts*. Report / Universit t <Uppsala> / Department of Peace and Conflict Research 75. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2006.

Svensson, Isak, and Desir e Nilsson. 'Disputes over the Divine: Introducing the Religion and Armed Conflict (RELAC) Data, 1975 to 2015'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 5 (May 2018): 1127–48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717737057>.

Tiernay, Michael. 'Which Comes First? Unpacking the Relationship between Peace Agreements and Peacekeeping Missions'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 2 (April 2015): 135–52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520396>.

UNHCR. 'UNHCR's Refugee Population Statistics Database', 2022.

United Nations Security Council. 'United Nations Security Council Countries Elected Members'. United Nations Security Council, n.d. <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/countries-elected-members>.

Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 'Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective'. *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (March 2013): 19–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.773200>.

Weber, Patrick M, and Gerald Schneider. 'Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 1 (January 2022): 97–114. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729>.

White, Peter B, David E Cunningham, and Kyle Beardsley. 'Where, When, and How Does the UN Work to Prevent Civil War in Self-Determination Disputes?' *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 380–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317744826>.

## Chapter III: Regional organizations and the norm against unconstitutional changes of government: commitment, systems and sanctions

*This paper investigates whether regional commitments to democracies, systems and sanctions can prevent (and deal with) the occurrence of coups. This paper makes three arguments: (i) that commitment to democratic norms decreases the likelihood of coups occurring under the regional organization's jurisdiction; (ii) that robust systems (including sanctions) are more effective in reducing the occurrence of coups, and (iii) regional sanctions imposed against coups decrease the likelihood of future coups for Member-States of the regional organization. Empirical research supports the first claim and backs the second one (especially for continental and regional organizations) but does not support the third one. Such mixed results seem driven by West Africa's experience, a region prone to coups with a highly sophisticated sanctions system. An in-depth case study of the coup in Guinea Bissau in 2012 shows that although sanctions can deal with coup leaders, the “diminishing returns” on the effect of sanctions might be due to how sanctions are being imposed and how they relate to a more encompassing landscape of competing interests and contradictions, especially with other conflict resolution tools.*

### *Introduction*

In the last decades, a growing number of regional organizations have incorporated "democracy" as a condition of membership. They did so by re-interpreting general membership conditions to include respect for constitutional principles and by incorporating protocols that couple such provisions with the possibility of imposing sanctions for violation, especially for cases of unconstitutional changes of government.<sup>114</sup>

This article investigates whether regional organizations were successful in preventing the most flagrant form of violation of this norm: coups d'état. The focus on coups is explained not only by being the most straightforward form of violation but because coups often trigger nefarious effects, such as armed conflicts.<sup>115</sup>, reduced economic

---

<sup>114</sup> Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'; Whitehead, 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality'; Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'; Wobig, 'Regional Regimes for the Defense of Democracy and Coups d'Etat.'

<sup>115</sup> McGowan, 'Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004'.

growth,<sup>116</sup> and overall instability. Thus, preventing coups does have a clear conflict prevention reasoning.

By understanding how commitments to “democratic governance” and the imposition of sanctions affect the likelihood of coups, this article offers an essential contribution by studying sanctions as a conflict prevention tool, a facet often overlooked by the literature. This article also contributes to the growing literature on regional organizations and sanctions.

This research piece uses a mixed-method approach to achieve such an objective. It conducts a large-N logistical statistical analysis (fixed effects) on how these international arrangements and sanctions affect the likelihood of a coup attempt. It uses panel data covering the world (except North America, parts of Europe, Australia, and New Zealand) from 1950 to 2012. It is followed by an in-depth case study of the Guinea Bissau coup d'état in 2012 that explores how these sanctions regimes occur in practice, and it tries to explain some of the findings from the statistical analysis. Finally, a conclusion section reflects on the findings, limitations, and future avenues for research.

*Post-Cold War, democratization and regional organizations: the fight against unconstitutional changes of government (UGC)*

Since the end of the Cold War, large parts of the world have witnessed a wave of democratization. The democratization process has occurred concomitantly with the blossoming of international activity.<sup>117</sup> The phenomena became quite interlinked,<sup>118</sup> with international organizations being credited with promoting democratic values and democracy in general.<sup>119</sup> In addition, to avoid democratic backsliding, States have increasingly enshrined "democratic" clauses within regional arrangements, linking membership to these institutions and democratic governance.<sup>120</sup>

In the Americas, at the continental level, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the commitment to defend democratic norms with Resolution 1080 in 1991. This defence was further developed in 1992 when the organization added a

---

<sup>116</sup> Blum and Gründler, 'Political Stability and Economic Prosperity'.

<sup>117</sup> Wobig, 'Regional Regimes for the Defense of Democracy and Coups d'Etat'; Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'; Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'.

<sup>118</sup> Mansfield and Pevehouse, 'Democratization and International Organizations'.

<sup>119</sup> Simmons, 'Review Commentary The State of the Art in the EU Democracy Promotion Literature'; Kurki, *Democratic Futures*.

<sup>120</sup> Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'; Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'; Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*.

suspension clause through the Washington Protocol. Such commitment was then fully enshrined by OAS Democratic Charter in 2001.<sup>121</sup> In Africa, with the emergence of the African Union in the early 2000s (against the backdrop of Sierra Leone's long civil war triggered by a coup), the democratic clause was formally incorporated into its Charter and expanded in subsequent protocols.<sup>122</sup>

The same phenomenon occurred within sub-regional organizations such as Mercosur, UNASUR,<sup>123</sup> Andean Community, ECOWAS, or SADC<sup>124</sup>, which have adopted similar regimes to the continental ones. However, their understanding of the democratic clause has expanded through time.<sup>125</sup> GUAM - an organization of the four former ex-USSR republics Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova - and the Pacific Forum have followed a similar path in other regions.<sup>126</sup> ASEAN never imposed sanctions due to democratic rupture, nor has any democratic clause<sup>127</sup>. The League of Arab States has a loose principle on respecting human rights that was used to justify action against Egypt and Syria, but that was ignored in other cases where sanctions were used to sustain authoritarian regimes.<sup>128</sup>

Although these clauses or commitments are often called "democratic" clauses, they are probably better defined as clauses that guard against unconstitutional changes of government – most notably, coups. Beyond the bare minimum criteria, understanding what constitutes a violation of a democratic regime or even what can be considered an unconstitutional change of government varies significantly across regions, organizations, and time.<sup>129</sup>

With the development and inclusion of democratic clauses and commitments, many regional organizations have also developed a relatively sophisticated sanctions mechanism. Most notably, African Union and ECOWAS have developed and used

---

<sup>121</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'; Hawkins and Shaw, 'Legalising Norms of Democracy in the Americas'.

<sup>122</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'; Souaré, 'The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment'.

<sup>123</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'; Morales Martinez and Preta Oliveira de Lyra, 'The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008–2015)'.

<sup>124</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'; Souaré, 'The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment'.

<sup>125</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'; Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>126</sup> Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*; Wobig, 'Regional Regimes for the Defense of Democracy and Coups d'Etat'; Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'.

<sup>127</sup> Schembera, 'Understanding ASEAN's Approach to Sanctions against Norm Breakers'.

<sup>128</sup> Debre, 'Legitimation, Regime Survival, and Shifting Alliances in the Arab League'.

<sup>129</sup> Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'; Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*; Whitehead, 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality'.

such mechanisms quite often.<sup>130</sup> MERCOSUR (Ushuaia II) developed a sophisticated regime in the Americas but is not yet operating.

If such democratic clauses (or commitments) are violated, the typical immediate sanction imposed by regional organizations is the suspension of membership. Although membership suspension appears meaningless, membership in regional organizations comes with benefits. Thus, this suspension is far from an innocuous act. Furthermore, in specific arrangements, such as ECOWAS, the menu of sanctions available has increased drastically to include individual and costly broad economic sanctions.

Developing such regional architecture against unconstitutional changes of government brought scholars' attention to international regimes and to the coups literature. They wanted to understand whether the inclusion of democratic clauses was an effective tool to prevent coups or democratic backsliding. Three studies are highly relevant to this paper.<sup>131</sup>

Those three studies used large-N statistical analysis to understand the likelihood of coups in the presence of such clauses, one with the regional organization as a unit of analysis<sup>132</sup>. Powell et al. found that African Union's clause on democratic governance did decrease the likelihood of coups in Africa after 2002 but found no proof that it was linked to any leverage.<sup>133</sup> Wobig found a negative correlation between democratic clauses and the occurrence of coups between 1990 and 2008. However, it was only significant when States were democratic and middle-income countries.<sup>134</sup> Genna and Hiroi's findings seem to indicate that these clauses were negatively associated with the occurrence of coups.<sup>135</sup>

All these three studies had some significant limitations. First, they focused on the presence of clauses per se but often not on the degree of institutionalization of such clauses. One of the problems of such an approach is that regional organizations such as SICA and CARICOM are sometimes treated similarly to ASEAN because there is no differentiation between non-existent and informal commitments/soft law commitments.<sup>136</sup>

---

<sup>130</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>131</sup> Wobig, 'Defending Democracy with International Law'; Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*.

<sup>132</sup> Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*.

<sup>133</sup> Powell, Lasley, and Schiel, 'Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014'.

<sup>134</sup> Wobig, 'Defending Democracy with International Law'.

<sup>135</sup> Genna and Hiroi, 'Do Democracy Clauses Matter?'

<sup>136</sup> Genna and Hiroi consider SICA as having a proper clause, although this is not the understanding across the literature.

Second, despite explicitly referencing sanctions, their models did not include the actual practice of punishing a violation. Interestingly, they all rely on the enforcement or threat to explain compliance. Powell et al. invoke deterrence caused by such norms, in which the certainty of being costly punished would deter actors from conducting coups.<sup>137</sup> Wobig theorizes that such systems and sanctions make it much more difficult for the coup plotters to mobilize enough of a critical mass to commit a coup; and also reduce the chances of consolidating power by boosting the legitimacy of the opposition and by imposing material costs on the coup leaders and other sectors of society (that then can turn against the junta).<sup>138</sup>

Thus, testing only the commitment or system through a simple binary variable is insufficient. One must understand how these systems deal with violations and when they sanction those disobeying the norm. Are regional sanctions different from other types of sanctions? What is their practice? The sanctions literature started to answer some of those questions.

### *Regional Sanctions: a new frontier of sanctions literature*

Historically, the sanctions literature has been heavily invested in understanding sanctions imposed by States, most often Western States. Only recently that a shift has occurred towards multilateral sanctions, and even more recently towards regional sanctions. In the past years, the sanctions literature has started to contribute to the understanding of these regional systems against unconstitutional changes of government both theoretically and empirically.

First, it is theorized that regional sanctions are much less likely to be ignored and are potentially costlier because the target State and sender States cannot opt out of interaction due to their geographical proximity.<sup>139</sup> Second, regional sanctions supposedly benefit from higher legitimacy: sender and target are peers who agreed to be subjected to a norm, its institutional arrangement, and its consequences in case of violation.<sup>140</sup> Third, and most importantly, there is a clear notion that every member might be subject to sanctions in case of violation.<sup>141</sup> However, such a veiled threat is possibly subject to power relations, consistency, and the development of the sanction mechanism in a specific region.

---

<sup>137</sup> Powell, Lasley, and Schiel, 'Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014'.

<sup>138</sup> Wobig, 'Defending Democracy with International Law'.

<sup>139</sup> Hellquist, 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review'.

<sup>140</sup> Hellquist.

<sup>141</sup> Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'.

Following these three characteristics, Hellquist compares sanctions imposed by regional organizations to " *academic peer review*".<sup>142</sup> The sender of the sanctions derives its authority as a representative of a community, similar to an academic. The enforcers of such rules and the targets are both peers. Regional sanctions against members tend to be "constructive criticism, " aiming to solve the situation rather than punish violators.

On the other hand, Whitehead seems to dispute such a metaphor by offering another: "*family resemblance*".<sup>143</sup> Whitehead points out that regional organizations differ significantly between them and within themselves. Whitehead suggests that the relationship between Member-States is not of equality but rather a complex mix of shared identity and rivalries, with leading States often being able to pass judgments on smaller ones without fearing being subjected to the same.<sup>144</sup>

While Powell. et al. compare such a system in which there is a constant veiled threat to the concept of deterrence defined by Lebow and Stein<sup>145</sup> in which: "*A defender must define the unacceptable behaviour, make public the commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess at least rudimentary capabilities to implement the threat.*"<sup>146</sup>. In Powell et al. understanding, the regional systems would fit such description with their public commitments, clauses, and actual sanctions.

Empirically, the literature has shown that imposing sanctions is deeply political.<sup>147</sup>, which might echo Whitehead's framing. Member States decide on extraordinary meetings or general assemblies - or increasingly delegate to a Council composed of a few countries to recommend sanctions.<sup>148</sup> Furthermore, the practice of imposing sanctions for violations is uneven: the type of sanctions differ significantly, as well as which coups are being sanctioned,

In Africa, the African Union has suspended almost immediately every single coup, but only a few sub-regional organizations have the capacity to impose sanctions. In that case, the same cannot be said about the Americas. Palestini states that reaction against unconstitutional changes of government tends to rely on sub-regional

---

<sup>142</sup> Hellquist, 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review'.

<sup>143</sup> Whitehead, 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality'.

<sup>144</sup> Whitehead.

<sup>145</sup> *Strangely*, Powell. et al *cut short the definition of Lebow and Stein*

<sup>146</sup> Lebow and Stein, 'Deterrence'. 344

<sup>147</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'; Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'; Genna and Hiroi, *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality*.

<sup>148</sup> Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'; Hellquist, 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review'.

arrangements. Palestini explains that sanctions, in the American continent, are usually imposed when the threat is against the incumbent; it is against a weak State, and surprisingly, in the absence of support from the US.<sup>149</sup>

The literature also seems to suggest that the conditions to suspend or lift sanctions are unclear because there is a lack of clarity on what constitutional order means.<sup>150</sup> In general, it means free elections, but in some cases, the African Union has lifted sanctions during interim governments.

Despite such regimes and sanctions, from the 2000s until 2015, only one ousted President returned to power in Africa.<sup>151</sup> In the Americas, the same pattern was observed in its most high-profile coup case in Honduras in 2009.<sup>152</sup> Nathan, for example, argued that such a disconnect between using sanctions to punish coups and agreeing to transition governments that do not bring back the status quo undermines the whole African regional system against the coup. Such bias towards compromise speaks to Hellquist's point of regional organizations' inclination towards solutions, not punishment.

Finally, regional sanctions do not occur in a vacuum. Borzyskowski and Portela draw attention to sanctions "cooperation," which is the recurrent imposition of sanctions on the same target by the US, EU, and regional organizations.<sup>153</sup> Souaré argues that such cooperation might enhance their effectiveness. The African Union - for example - often establishes an international contact group to request action from international partners.

Regional sanctions coexist with United Nations sanctions, but the literature suggests a division of labour between regional organizations and the UN. The first focuses on unconstitutional changes of government, and the latter on armed conflicts. With one notable exception: the Guinea Bissau coup in 2012, in which the UNSC imposed sanctions primarily to deal with the unconstitutional change of government.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>149</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'.

<sup>150</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>151</sup> Nathan.

<sup>152</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'.

<sup>153</sup> Borzyskowski and Portela, 'Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU.'

<sup>154</sup> Charron and Portela, 'The Relationship between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes'.

## *Theoretical and Hypotheses Formulation*

The emergence of the norm against unconstitutional changes of government and the systems built to enforce it presents a unique opportunity to study sanctions and the regimes that enable them as a conflict prevention tool for two reasons.

First, there is a clear notion that every member might be subject to sanctions in case of norm violation.<sup>155</sup>, thus there is an audience for the regional system and its sanctions. Second, the norm violation is clear: coups. Donno mentions the clarity regarding whether a particular act constitutes a violation as one key issue (together with geopolitical interests) that could explain when international organizations punishment for Member-States in case of norm violations.<sup>156</sup>

The hypotheses below will test whether these regional systems against unconstitutional changes of government are effective in decreasing the likelihood of coups. Differently from the rest of the literature that often collapses continental (OAS, AU, EU) and sub-regional organizations (Mercosur, ECOWAS, SADC, among others), in this paper, each set of relationships will be tested separately, given that recent literature has shown some division of work and differences between the continental and sub-regional organizations.<sup>157</sup>

Although this paper does not subscribe to a view of sanctions focused on coercion when theorizing crisis or conflict prevention, it is helpful to take Lebow and Stein's definition of deterrence and break it apart into key components as some form of the blueprint of what type elements could be tested. Lebow and Stein's deterrence definition can be broken into four components: a public definition of unacceptable behaviour, a commitment to punishing actors that carry such behaviour, some form of the capability to implement the threat, and finally, the demonstration of the resolve to do so.

So, the first step is to test the first two components: a public declaration by regional organizations in favour of a democratic commitment and that they are willing to act to support such commitment. In other words, test whether such commitment decreases the likelihood of coups. One can see it as the enunciation of a norm defined by

---

<sup>155</sup> Hellquist and Palestini, 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy'.

<sup>156</sup> Donno, 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'.

<sup>157</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'; Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

Finnemore and Sikkink “*standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity*”.<sup>158</sup>, plus a public declaration of the intention to support it.

*H1: States that are part of Continental regimes that have adopted democratic commitments are less likely to suffer coup attempts.*

*H1b: States that are part of Sub-regional regimes that adopted democratic commitments are less likely to suffer coup attempts.*

The second set of hypotheses draws that for any international norm, the threat of enforcement and actual enforcement is crucial to understand norm compliance<sup>159</sup>. It speaks to Lebow and Stein’s elements of having a system to carry out the threat and the resolve to do so. In this sense, it is theorized that regional organizations that possess more developed and functional systems underpinning their commitment against unconstitutional changes of government might have a better chance of deterring coups.

*H2: The more developed the Continental system against an unconstitutional change of government, the less likely it is for a State that is a Member-State of such a system to suffer a coup attempt.*

*H2b: The more developed the Sub-Regional system against an unconstitutional change of government, the less likely it is for a State that is a Member-State of such a system to suffer a coup attempt.*

Finally, the last two hypotheses explore how sanctions imposition by regional organizations affect the likelihood of coup attempts occurring for the target and the organization's entire membership. This set of hypotheses borrows from the idea that sanctions often signal elements regarding norms to the targets and an audience.<sup>160</sup> In the case of regional organizations, the target audience is their Member-States.

It is theorized that when sanctions punish those who violate the rule, it becomes clear to potential violators that they will suffer the consequences of sanctions if they attempt a coup (a sign of willingness to continue punishing any violation of the norm). Assuming that the costs or consequences of such sanctions are high enough— not only materially

---

<sup>158</sup> Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. 891

<sup>159</sup> Powell, Lasley, and Schiel, ‘Combating Coups d’état in Africa, 1950–2014’.

<sup>160</sup> Giumelli, ‘The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions’.

but also due to stigmatization, potential violators might desist from attempting a coup because of the consequences.

*H3: The higher the number of sanctions previously imposed by a Continental organization against an unconstitutional change of government, the less likely it is for a State who is a Member-State of this organization to suffer a coup attempt.*

*H3b: The higher the number of sanctions previously imposed by a Sub-Regional organization against an unconstitutional change of government, the less likely it is for a State who is a Member-State of this organization to suffer a coup attempt.*

## Large N-analysis

The following sections discuss the large N analysis's research design and methodological choices. The large-N analysis aims to understand how the norm, systems, and sanctions fare as a deterrent factor to the onset of coup attempts.

### *Independent Variables*

The independent variable *commitment* for the first two hypotheses is operationalized by a binomial variable. It takes the value of 0 when there is no democratic commitment from the regional organization and 1 when there is a democratic commitment. An official democratic commitment is assumed to be close to a norm incorporated by the regional organization. The categorization of the normative stance thus could be due to a resolution, a treaty, or a charter that fully articulates the commitment. Examples of such categorization are the OAS Resolution 1080, in which OAS recommended forceful measures against Haiti due to the coup d'état that occurred, or the ECOWAS decision in 1997 regarding Sierra Leone, in which they defined a clear stance against unconstitutional changes of government.

The independent variable *system* for the subsequent two hypotheses is operationalized through a scale created by the researcher that scored from (0) to (3) for each regional organization. Each regional system received one point for each of the following characteristics: (i) the presence of a commitment – formal or informal - against unconstitutional changes of government, (ii) the presence of a fully developed democratic clause with sanctions envisioned in case of violations – at least suspension<sup>161</sup> (iii) first case of sanction against an unconstitutional change of government after the system described in two was developed.

---

<sup>161</sup>

Generally through a formal Protocol (e.g., OAS) or a new Charter (e.g., AU)

For example, Mercosur declared in 1996 its commitment against undemocratic changes of government amidst its reaction against the coup in Paraguay (score 1) with its Declaration on Democratic Commitment. By 1998, the regional organization had adopted the Ushuaia Protocol I, which linked unconstitutional change of government with suspension from the bloc (and other possible repercussions) (score 2). By 2012, with a coup against Paraguay President Lugo, Mercosur activated for the first time the Ushuaia Protocol I to suspend Paraguay from the bloc (score 3).

Finally, the third set of hypotheses is operationalized by a simple cumulative count of the sanctions imposed by regional organizations against coups. Although it is a crude metric, there is little in-depth data on regional sanction episodes that would enable a more sophisticated measurement. The data regarding sanctions were gathered through secondary sources by cross-analyzing and referencing Nathan,<sup>162</sup> Palestini<sup>163</sup>, Charron and Portella.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, it was cross-checked with publicly available data.

All regional organizations were divided into two types: continental (OAS; AU, ASEAN, CoE, and EU.<sup>165</sup>) and sub-regional (MERCOSUR; UNASUR; SICA; CAN; CARICOM, UNASUR, ECOWAS, COMESA; ECCA; IGAD; IGLD, UMA; SADC, Pacific Forum). Then, these organizations received scores across the three independent variables discussed above. Each score was then matched to each Member-State, considering when the organization was created and when the Member-State joined the organization.

As a rule of thumb, if the country was a member of more than one organization, it received the highest score possible. If the rule were the opposite (lowest), all countries would receive 0 as a score because there are plenty of regional or subregional organizations that do not possess such clauses.

### *Statistical Model, Dependent Variable and Controls*

The analysis uses a logistical analysis on panel data of countries from 1950 to 2012 using country-year as the observation unit, with a total of 7571 observations, to test the hypotheses discussed in the previous section. The panel data is structured as country-year; each country has observations since 1950 or since its independence.

---

<sup>162</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>163</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'.

<sup>164</sup> Charron and Portela, 'The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa'.

<sup>165</sup> The EU could be considered a sub-regional organization at its beginning. However, most of the countries included in the sample were East European countries. By their entrance into the EU, one could consider the European Union a full-fledged continental organization.

The panel data include countries across the developing world, excluding North America, Southern/West/North Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.

The dependent variable is attempted coups. As discussed, coups are the most flagrant form of unconstitutional change of government. For this paper, the definition by Bjørnskov and Rode is used: coups are illegal and overt attempts by actors connected to the State to overthrow the sitting Executive. A coup attempt lasting more than seven days is considered successful.<sup>166</sup>

This definition differs slightly from Powell and Thyne's definition of coups due to its lower requirement regarding the perpetrator being just linked with the State apparatus.<sup>167</sup> The dependent variable is a dummy variable (1 or 0), receiving one in case a State suffered a coup attempt in a particular year. Bjørnskov and Rode provide this data. Bjørnskov and Rode's definition is less restrictive but seems more appropriate given the number of coups perpetrated by lower echelons of the military or associated groups.<sup>168</sup>

The statistical model chosen for the models was a logistical regression with fixed effects. The decision to use fixed effects was due to the results from Hausman tests that rejected the null hypothesis, which would favour a random effects model. Logistical models are the best option, instead of ordinary OLS, because the dependent variable is a binomial.

In terms of controls, variables considered essential factors for coup incidence by the coup literature were included. First, socio-economic development tends to be negatively associated with the occurrence of coups, meaning that least developed countries face more challenges in terms of stability. Also, increased economic growth is negatively associated with coup onset.<sup>169</sup> So, two control variables, *GDP per capita* lagged and *GDP growth* lagged by a year, were added. Both data are gathered from the World Bank.

There is a U-shaped relationship between regime type and occurrence of coups: full democracies and entire authoritarian regimes seem less likely to witness coups vis-à-vis anocracies. Anocracies are hybrid regimes that combine both authoritarian and democratic characteristics, thus becoming structurally more vulnerable.<sup>170</sup> Thus, a

---

<sup>166</sup> Bjørnskov and Rode, 'Regime Types and Regime Change'.

<sup>167</sup> Powell and Thyne, 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010'; Bjørnskov and Rode, 'Regime Types and Regime Change'.

<sup>168</sup> Bjørnskov and Rode, 'Regime Types and Regime Change'.

<sup>169</sup> Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt, 'When to Expect a Coup d'état?'

<sup>170</sup> Hiroi and Omori, 'Causes and Triggers of *Coups d'état*'.

variable measuring if the regime type is an *Anocracy*, lagged, was included, using the regime type scale of the Polity V (-5 to 5 in the Polity Scale, plus outliers),<sup>171</sup>

The history of political instability in a particular country also seems to contribute.<sup>172</sup> Countries that suffer more regime changes are more vulnerable to coups in a vicious cycle. Thus, the variable regime *Duration* lagged (measured in years) was also added as a control, taken from Polity V<sup>173</sup>. The occurrence of armed conflict within a country is also associated with coups.<sup>174</sup>, thus a binary variable lagged for the presence of civil war was included.<sup>175</sup>

Two main political forces were also included as a control. First, coups usually are associated with regimes in which the *Military* has a strong influence; thus, a variable to measure the degree of influence or control that the Military has over the Executive was added, taken from Varieties of Democracy V.<sup>176</sup> Some authors have identified the potential role of domestic groups in upholding democratic commitments.<sup>177</sup> A lagged variable measuring the strength of civil society (index) from Varieties of Democracy V was also added.

Finally, a temporal control for Cold War was incorporated since the literature indicates the period was marked by an intense number of coups, especially in Latin America and Africa, taking the value of 1 for every year before 1990.

### *Findings and discussion*

All the first three logistical regressions (fixed effects) test whether commitments from regional organizations to democratic norms decrease the odds of attempted coups. The results were significant both for Continental and Sub-regional organizations, although the first might have a more substantial decreasing effect. Model III shows that decreasing the likelihood of coups is stronger when commitments are at both levels since the result is statistically significant. Table 1 below shows the results of the first three logistical regressions.

Regarding controls, most of them behaved as expected and are significant. Anocracy, civil war, and the Cold War are significant, and increased coup attempts odds. The ascendancy or control of the Military over the government is also significant and

---

<sup>171</sup> Coppedge et al., 'V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10. Varieties of Democracy (v-Dem) Project'.

<sup>172</sup> Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán, 'Breaking Out of the Coup Trap'.

<sup>173</sup> Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2018'.

<sup>174</sup> Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt, 'When to Expect a Coup d'état?'

<sup>175</sup> Marshall, 'Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2018'.

<sup>176</sup> Coppedge et al., 'V-Dem Codebook V9'.

<sup>177</sup> Souaré, 'The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment'.

increases the odds of a coup occurring. On the other hand, GDP per capita and GDP growth are statistically significant but decrease the odds of a coup. All these six control variable effects align with what the literature says. Civil society and regime duration are not statistically significant and present unexpected directions.

It is possible that the Democratic commitment against unconstitutional changes of government only reflects the democratic State of the countries. The three models were tested with an additional control variable that measured the democratic levels by taking the median Polity scores for all countries in a sub-region<sup>178</sup>. The effect of the democratic commitments decreased in size but remained statistically significant, while the control variable proved statistically insignificant (see appendix).

Table 1: Regional Commitment Models

	I	II	III
<i>Continental Commitment</i>	<b>0.50586</b> (2.88454)***		
<i>Sub-Regional Commitment</i>		<b>0.54180</b> (2.55014)**	
<i>0.Continental#1.Sub-regional</i>			0.88986 (0.27621)
<i>1.Continental #0.Sub-regional</i>			0.69795 (0.99774)
<i>1.Continental #1.Sub-regional</i>			<b>0.43574</b> (3.04205)***
Anocracy	<b>1.47715</b> (2.62741)***	<b>1.47886</b> (2.64564)***	<b>1.47011</b> (2.59508)***
Civil War	<b>1.26884</b> (2.87426)***	<b>1.28067</b> (2.98043)***	<b>1.27876</b> (2.95174)***
GDP growth	<b>0.96895</b> (3.19186)***	<b>0.96790</b> (3.29179)***	<b>0.96907</b> (3.17757)***
GDP per capita	<b>0.99991</b> (1.74746)*	<b>0.99991</b> (1.76117)*	<b>0.99991</b> (1.74434)*
Duration (regime)	1.00133 (0.18318)	1.00175 (0.23870)	1.00175 (0.24011)
Military	<b>1.93949</b> (2.27168)**	<b>1.98170</b> (2.35343)**	<b>1.91800</b> (2.23081)**

<sup>178</sup> The median was used because it better represents the center of gravity of members-States democratization levels, while outliers would disproportionately impact the mean.

Civil Society	1.65361 (1.06173)	1.54785 (0.92046)	1.73088 (1.14939)
Cold War	<b>1.66807</b> <b>(2.60741)***</b>	<b>1.74496</b> <b>(2.86350)***</b>	<b>1.66625</b> <b>(2.49439)**</b>
Chi2 P	88.94 0.00	87.11 0.00	90.38 0.00

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Following such results, the next step is to test whether the institutionalization of such regimes against unconstitutional changes of government and sanctions per se decreases the odds of coup attempts, testing *H2*, *H2b*, *H3*, and *H3b* in Table 2.

Table 2: Regional Systems and Sanctions

	I	II	III	IV
<i>Continental System</i>	<b>0.71179</b> <b>(3.11450)***</b>			
<i>Sub-Regional System</i>		<b>0.76344</b> <b>(1.92278)*</b>		
<i>Sanctions (Continental)</i>			0.95517 (1.03795)	
<i>Sanctions (Sub-regional)</i>				1.06812 (0.56672)
Anocracy	<b>1.47790</b> <b>(2.62905)***</b>	<b>1.48220</b> <b>(2.66697)***</b>	<b>1.50041</b> <b>(2.74735)***</b>	<b>1.48821</b> <b>(2.69724)***</b>
Civil War	<b>1.27124</b> <b>(2.89128)***</b>	<b>1.28554</b> <b>(3.00810)***</b>	<b>1.26662</b> <b>(2.84999)***</b>	<b>1.26227</b> <b>(2.80964)***</b>
GDP growth	<b>0.96916</b> <b>(3.17133)***</b>	<b>0.96787</b> <b>(3.30138)***</b>	<b>0.96701</b> <b>(3.39590)***</b>	<b>0.96602</b> <b>(3.49649)***</b>
GDP per capita	<b>0.99991</b> <b>(1.69581)*</b>	<b>0.99991</b> <b>(1.74739)*</b>	<b>0.99991</b> <b>(1.76385)*</b>	<b>0.99991</b> <b>(1.75570)*</b>
Duration (regime)	1.00200 (0.27607)	1.00229 (0.31338)	1.00162 (0.21954)	1.00127 (0.17104)
Military	<b>1.91444</b> <b>(2.22811)**</b>	<b>1.97082</b> <b>(2.33197)**</b>	<b>2.05417</b> <b>(2.48050)**</b>	<b>2.09339</b> <b>(2.55206)**</b>

Civil Society	1.71920 (1.14032)	1.54706 (0.91323)	1.32692 (0.60475)	1.20851 (0.40353)
Cold War	<b>1.67559</b> <b>(2.67115)***</b>	<b>1.91417</b> <b>(3.43658)***</b>	<b>2.00214</b> <b>(3.67232)***</b>	<b>2.09161</b> <b>(3.94370)***</b>
Chi2	102.55	98.85	95.77	96.01
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

---

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table 2 results regarding the control variables remain relatively the same, showing an important consistency across the models. Regarding the independent variables, Model I and Model II test Hypothesis H2 and H2b, respectively. Both: Continental System and Sub-regional systems decrease the odds of a coup occurring, although regional systems are barely statistically significant at  $p < 0.1$ .

Regarding *H3* and *H3b*, sanctions do not seem to have a statistically significant effect on deterring coup attempts. In terms of *H3*, the effect is at least aligned with the expectation of decreasing the odds of a coup occurring, while *H3b*, sub-regional sanctions strangely display an above one odds ratio, showing it increases the odds of a coup – although both need to be seen with a pinch of salt due to their lack of statistical significance. Figure 1 below further investigates these models by showing linear prediction (margins with 90% CI).




Figure 1: Linear prediction models for Systems and Sanctions (margins with 90%CI)

Figure 1 presents more questions than answers. Both Continental and Sub-regional systems show a decreasing trend in which the higher the institutionalization and functioning of the regime, the less likely a State under such a system will suffer a coup attempt. For example, the Continental System differs between having a fully developed system (score 3), which means having developed a clause and imposing the sanction at least once, and not having a system. In contrast, for Sub-regional systems, the difference seems to be having some form of commitment versus not having – although each level is not statistically different per se.

On Sanctions, there is an interesting effect of decreasing the odds of coups for the first two sanctions for the Continental Level, the first one for the Sub-regional level, and then increasing for the subsequent sanction count – although not statistically significant. Although any interpretation might be taken with a pinch of salt due to the lack of statistical significance, a pattern seems to exist in which sanctions have an effect in the first instances when applied. However, the more the regional system uses sanctions, it loses such effect completely.

One possible explanation for these puzzling results is that a particular region/subregion drives the results. West Africa seems the best candidate for the high number of sanctions primarily driven by ECOWAS (and AU). To test that, the sub-region of West Africa was transformed into a dummy variable and interacted with System (Continental and Sub-Regional) and then with Sanctions (Continental and Sub-regional). There seemed to be a clear difference (see Appendix).

To better visualize the difference, West Africa was dropped from the sample, and the same regressions of Figure 1 were used to construct Figure 2 (now without West Africa). Figure 2 below further investigates *H2*, *H2b*, *H3*, and *H3b* by showing linear prediction (margins with 90% CI) across the four models, but now without West Africa.




Figure 2: Linear prediction models for Systems and Sanctions (margins with 90%CI), without West Africa

The results changed and aligned with what was expected before. Continental Systems and Sub-regional systems show decreasing odds of a coup occurring the more a regional system is fully developed. A fully developed system (commitment, clause, and at least one sanction) is statistically different from 0 for both Continental and Sub-regional systems. Also, there is a clear decreasing pattern.

Even the results of sanctions differ. Both Continental and Sub-regional follow a similar pattern displayed by the system, although it is not statistically significant for Sub-regional. For Continental systems, the result must also be taken cautiously since the high number of sanctions is because of African Union sanctions on West Africa.

Overall, the findings largely supported the first four hypotheses layout in the paper. First, democratic commitment seems to decrease the odds of coups occurring, both for Continental and Sub-regional levels, which confirms *H1* and *H2*. Interestingly, when such a norm exists at both Continental and Sub-regional levels, the effect is more potent and statistically significant, suggesting an interactive reinforcing dynamic between norms at these two levels.

In the case of the degree of institutionalization of the regime systems against unconstitutional changes of government, the results support *H2* and *H2b* to some extent. For Continental Systems, the effect was markedly higher when it reached its full maturity (score 3) in both models (with and without West Africa). The results were statistically significant for Sub-regional systems, but only in the model without West Africa did the system's institutionalization show a clear pattern as was hypothesized.

Finally, hypotheses *H3* and *H3b* could not be confirmed. In the model with West Africa, it seems that sanctions do display a trend towards decreasing the likelihood of coups, although not statistically significant. However, the more sanctions are used, this effect vanishes. The results change slightly in the model without West Africa, but such results are statistically insignificant or need to take cautiously - as explained above. (African Union).

Overall, the results support the idea espoused by Powell et al. of these regimes as some sort of deterrence to coups. However, it seems that the threat of sanctions (the system) is more effective than the actual sanction imposition in deterring coups from happening. The enunciation of the norm per se seems to be important as well. However, the most puzzling is the disproportionate effect that West Africa (and consequentially the ECOWAS system) holds in decreasing its overall effectiveness when included in the model.

### *West Africa, ECOWAS, and coups*

The large-N statistical analysis essentially confirmed the first two sets of hypotheses (*H1*, *H1b*, *H2*, and *H2b*), especially when the analysis was done without West African countries. However, why does West Africa have such a disproportionate effect?

West Africa is known for being a cradle for coups.<sup>179</sup> Between 1958-2008, West Africa accounted for more than 40% of coups in Africa. From 2010 to 2022, of the 40 coups in Africa, twenty were in West Africa and the Sahel.<sup>180</sup> Most of the region is plagued by the previously discussed in the literature on coups: anocracies, military ascendancy over the civilian administration, active conflict, and economic underdevelopment.

However, West Africa also possesses one of the most sophisticated sanctions regimes to combat unconstitutional changes of government. West African governments are under the overlapping systems of the African Union continental system plus ECOWAS, a highly developed sub-regional system. In both cases, the organizations can suspend Member-States, but they can also impose various sanctions. It is likely to be an endogeneity case: ECOWAS was pushed to develop a very sophisticated regime of combatting unconstitutional changes of government because the region is quite prone to a coup, but because the region is quite prone to coups, the region is a hard case for proving the effectiveness of these regional norms, systems, and sanctions.

Studying ECOWAS sanctions might present a unique opportunity to study the practice of sanctions by sub-regional systems on a hard case. ECOWAS is the only sub-regional system in which they have imposed more than three sanctions. However, it is still puzzling that such a sophisticated system seems to not have had any significant effects in preventing coups, which demands more research and attention.

Following this logic, Guinea Bissau 2012 coup is a good candidate for investigation.<sup>181</sup> First, Guinea Bissau is in West Africa, which was identified as the region driving the results. Guinea Bissau is also a country that has witnessed many coups over the years, the exact problem that such sanctions apparatus was created to deal with. The Military led the coup in Guinea Bissau in 2012. Thus, Guinea Bissau seems to be a typical case.

At the same time, Guinea Bissau can be considered a critical case within the typical universe of cases. It is a weak country in economic and military terms, whose economy is based on subsistence and exportation of commodities. Guinea Bissau is also immersed in a web of organizations: regional (AU and ECOWAS), transnational (CPLP), and global (UN), providing the opportunity to explore such interactions.

---

<sup>179</sup> McGowan, 'Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004'.

<sup>180</sup> Onapajo and Suleiman, 'Why West Africa Has Had so Many Coups and How to Prevent More'.

<sup>181</sup> The in-depth case study of Guinea-Bissau was conducted in 2015-2016 through extensive research of secondary data such as official documents, news, and commentaries. Five in-depth interviews then complemented it: two UN officials, one diplomat, one scholar, and one civil servant of a regional organization that talked under the condition to be fully anonymized. The research was then complemented in 2020-2021 by a review of more secondary data, especially on the period post-2014.

Finally, the coup itself was sanctioned by ECOWAS, AU, EU, and the UN, the only instance of UNSC sanctioned exclusively due to a coup.

Thus, Guinea Bissau 2012 coup has both characteristics of a typical case of a coup-prone State and one in which some distinctive particularities turn it into a critical case for the study of sanctions on dealing with unconstitutional changes of government. In other words, if sanctions by different layers of organizations cannot force parties to keep constitutional order and prevent further coups in a relatively weak country, there is probably a worthy puzzle investigation.

### *Guinea-Bissau 2012 coup*

Guinea-Bissau is a country located in Western Africa. It has around 2 million people and a GDP of 1.4 billion. Its economy is based on agriculture and fishing; its principal export is cashew nuts. A large share of its population lives below the poverty line.<sup>182</sup> The country also has become a passage point for drug trafficking between Latin America and Europe, especially cocaine, with the alleged connivance of the government and army.<sup>183</sup>

The country is an active member of several regional (or transnational) organizations, notably ECOWAS, AU, CPLP, and the United Nations. Among those organizations, special ties exist with ECOWAS due to its neighbouring situation and with CPLP due to historical and language reasons (notably Portugal, Brazil, and Angola).

After its independence from Portugal in 1974, the politics of Guinea Bissau was primarily dominated by the Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) – which led to the rebellion against the Portuguese. The first appointed President was Luis Cabral from PAIGC. However, in 1980, Cabral's government was toppled by a coup led by Nino Vieira 1980.<sup>184</sup>

The history of Guinea Bissau then became a succession of elections followed by coups - with a two-year civil war from 1998 to 2000 (with the participation of two neighbouring countries).<sup>185</sup> The succession of coups and political assassinations did not go unnoticed by regional and international organizations, primarily ECOWAS. The regional bloc served as the primary mediator, easing the tensions among the factions

---

<sup>182</sup> World Bank, 'Guinea-Bissau Overview', accessed June 07, 2016, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau>

<sup>183</sup> 'The World Factbook'.

<sup>184</sup> 'Guinea-Bissau Profile - Timeline'.

<sup>185</sup> Massey, 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'.

during the never-ending crises in the country, condemning the events, often in tandem with African Union.<sup>186187</sup>

Besides the African regional organizations, the Lusophone Commonwealth (CPLP) was also an active international actor in Guinea-Bissau during this period. ECOWAS and CPLP interactions have always involved some degree of disagreement and cooperation, especially with the dispute between Nigeria and Angola regarding influence over the region.<sup>188</sup> In 2010, the two organizations released the CPLP-ECOWAS Roadmap for the Security Sector Reform (SSR) to reform the Guinea-Bissau military and police since its military was considered the largest source of instability in the country. Angola, chairing CPLP in 2010-2011, sent 270 police and military personnel to the country to assist the SSR.<sup>189</sup>

Besides ECOWAS and CPLP, other international actors should also be mentioned. Guinea-Bissau became part of the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (chaired by Brazil). In 2009, followed by the turmoil, the UN upgraded its office in the country to a UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNSC/RES/1876).<sup>190</sup>

The Europe Union launched a development aid program for the country in 2007. However, European aid to the government was frozen due to a military uprising in 2010.<sup>191</sup> The African Union, as the leading regional organization of the African continent, was always present, supporting ECOWAS. The OIF (International Organization de La Francophonie) also had some engagement during the period.<sup>192</sup>

#### The coup in 2012

In January 2012, President Malam Sanhá died. Following Guinea-Bissau Constitution, an interim government led by Raimundo Pereira was installed,<sup>193</sup> and an electoral process was scheduled within 90 days. Representing the PRS, Kumba Ialá decided to run. The current prime minister Carlos Gomes Junior - known for his ties with Angola and its military reform agenda- was chosen to run by the PAIGC. However, several PAIGC members contested that choice and decided to run independently.

---

<sup>186</sup> Yabi, *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict*.

<sup>187</sup> Charron and Portela in Charron and Portela, 'The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa'. Indicated that ECOWAS and AU sanctions against Guinea-Bissau in 2008-2009. The author could not verify both sanctions, only finding an AU sanction against Guinea-Bissau due to non-payment of member fees. Besides, only Closa in Closa, 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations', mentioned such a case, but only for ECOWAS.

<sup>188</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?'

<sup>189</sup> Kohl, *The Reform of the Guinea-Bissau's Security Sector*.

<sup>190</sup> "Guinea-Bissau Chronology of Events : Security Council Report," accessed June 02, 2016, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/guinea-bissau.php?page=all&print=true>.

<sup>191</sup> European Commission, 'A Fresh Start for Guinea-Bissau: EU to Resume Cooperation and Provide New Support'.

<sup>192</sup> Yabi, *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict*.

<sup>193</sup> BBC News, 'Guinea-Bissau Leader Malam Bacai Sanha Dies in Paris'.

The campaign and the first round of elections occurred peacefully. However, Ialá and five other candidates opposed the results of the first round of elections, alleging fraud, which placed Carlos Gomes Junior as the frontrunner. On April 12<sup>th</sup>, during a press conference, Ialá stated that would be no second round and threatened any person seeking to participate in this second round.<sup>194</sup>

An hour later, elements of the military occupied the streets of the capital and took control of radio stations and the headquarter of the PAIGC, launching a coup.<sup>195</sup> The Military Command arrested the interim President Raimundo Pereira, and the elections runners Carlos Gomes Junior and Kumba Ialá.<sup>196</sup> The Coup leaders formed a Military Command under General Ture Kuruma. It alleged a possible attack by Angola, supported by Carlos Gomes Junior, against the Guinea-Bissau military as the reason for the coup.<sup>197</sup>

#### *International Community reaction: a tale of mediation and sanctions in 2012*

The international community's initial response to the coup d'état was unanimously condemnatory.<sup>198</sup> United Nations Security Council released a press statement the following day, condemning the attack and asking for the restoration of the constitutional order, release of political prisoners, and continuity of the electoral process.

In a Presidential Statement, the Security Council reinstated its demands. It declared its readiness to consider further measures, including sanctions, against the coup's perpetrators if the situation remained unsolved on April 21st. Another press statement reiterates such attitude from the Council two weeks later.<sup>199</sup>

Following the coup, the Peacebuilding Commission, the World Bank, and African Development Bank decided to freeze their projects in Guinea-Bissau (except for projects that dealt with the urgent needs of the population).<sup>200</sup> The CPLP had an extraordinary meeting in Lisbon, in which the organization condemned the coup and even threatened to bring the perpetrators to ICC<sup>201</sup>. The African Union, on April 17<sup>th</sup>, sanctioned the regime by suspending the country's membership until the restoration of the constitutional order.<sup>202</sup>

---

<sup>194</sup> Senior UN official, interview.

<sup>195</sup> Senior UN official.

<sup>196</sup> Senior UN official.

<sup>197</sup> Senior UN official.

<sup>198</sup> Al Jazeera, 'Guinea-Bissau Coup Leaders Consolidate Power'.

<sup>199</sup> Security Council Report, 'Guinea-Bissau Chronology of Events'.

<sup>200</sup> Senior UN official, interview.

<sup>201</sup> Le Monde, 'En Guinée-Bissau, la junte dissout les institutions et crée un conseil de transition'.

<sup>202</sup> Al Jazeera, 'Guinea-Bissau Suspended from African Union'.

ECOWAS also reacted quickly, sending a mission on April 13<sup>th</sup>, starting consultations with the Military Command, the other five Presidential candidates, and the PAIGC.<sup>203</sup> ECOWAS also condemned the coup, suspending Guinea-Bissau membership, asking for the immediate restoration of constitutional order, and releasing all political detainees.

The Military Command, during the initial days after the coup, ensured ECOWAS of its intention to leave the power immediately and return the country to constitutional normality, drafting an agreement with a set of modalities to restore the constitutional order.<sup>204</sup> However, on April 16<sup>th</sup>, the Military Command agreed with 24 opposition parties to establish a National Transitioning Council - NTC (including members of the Military) that would last for two years. The NTC would be led by Manuel Nhamadjo, who was third in the first round of the elections and vice-President of the PAIGC. However, Nhamadjo refused, claiming the illegitimacy of the transitional government.<sup>205</sup>

ECOWAS reacted strongly to the proposal of the Military Command, denouncing its change of terms - especially its two-year time frame. On April 26<sup>th</sup>, ECOWAS Authority Extraordinary met at a Summit in Abidjan, which was called to deal with Guinea Bissau and Mali – another coup that has occurred in the region.

ECOWAS Authorities issued a communiqué reiterating its condemnation of the coup. They instructed ECOWAS to deploy ECOWAS Standby Force immediately. They threatened the Military Command with targeted and non-targeted sanctions (diplomatic, travel ban and assets freeze, among other sanctions) if the requests made previously by the Commission were not attended to. The requests were the release of the detained political leaders, restoration of the constitutional order, new elections within one year, and the return of the Military to the barracks in 72 hours.<sup>206</sup>

Some Guinea-Bissau national actors welcomed the Communiqué from ECOWAS<sup>207</sup>. The following day, the Military Command released the detained political leaders Raimundo Pereira and Carlos Gomes Junior and accepted ECOWAS troops. However, on April 30<sup>th</sup>, ECOWAS stated that the sanctions would be imposed since the talks with the Military Command broke down regarding the other demands. On May 3<sup>rd</sup>, the European Union – after condemning the coup- imposed travel bans and asset

---

<sup>203</sup> Senior UN official, interview.

<sup>204</sup> Senior UN official.

<sup>205</sup> IPS, 'Guinea Bissau: Junta Presents Ecowas With a Fait Accompli'.

<sup>206</sup> Senior UN official, interview; Al Jazeera, 'ECOWAS Troops for Guinea-Bissau and Mali'.

<sup>207</sup> Diplomat, interview

freeze sanctions against the coup leaders, while ECOWAS met again in Dakar to discuss the crisis.<sup>208</sup>

The divergence among the international actors then started to become apparent. EU and CPLP (led by Angola and Portugal) demanded immediate restoration of the constitutional order, continuity of the scheduled elections, and deployment of UN troops, avoiding dialogue with the Military Command. On the other hand, ECOWAS started to accept a transition process with elections within one year and the provision of security by its troops.<sup>209</sup> The African Union also softened its position and, by highlighting the principle of subsidiarity, largely followed ECOWAS decisions.<sup>210</sup>

The strong ties between PAIGC candidate Carlos Gomes and the CPLP countries, especially Angola, were not well seen by some ECOWAS members, such as Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire<sup>211</sup>. Nigeria always felt West Africa Littoral States as its natural area of influence, generally exercised through ECOWAS. For Côte d'Ivoire, Angola's support for former President Laurent Gbagbo was still vivid in the memory of its arch-rival and now President Ouattara.

The following weeks of May were intense diplomatic engagements between ECOWAS and the Military Command; and among international partners.<sup>212</sup> At the UN, Portugal introduced on May 14<sup>th</sup> a draft UNSC Resolution aiming to send a strong message to the Military Command. Initially, the draft contained travel bans and asset freeze sanctions against the coup's leaders, but the freezing of assets suffered resistance from other members. However, the main point of contention was how to refer to the previous government ousted by the coup.

While Portugal and CPLP pressured to frame them as the legitimate government, the African countries, mirroring the ongoing ECOWAS posture, were reluctant to accept such a position—also, there were some discussions regarding the necessity of a UNSG Special Envoy.<sup>213</sup> After intense negotiations, Togo and Portugal co-sponsored the Resolution (an ECOWAS-CPLP sponsorship). As the UN high official stated, the primary purpose of the UNSC 2048 was to show some consensus among the international partners and fulfil, to some extent, the threats made by the UNSC in the previous communications, sending a clear message to the Military command.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> Senior UN official, interview.

<sup>209</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?'

<sup>210</sup> Döring and Herpolsheimer, '*New Regionalisms' and Violent Conflicts in Africa*.

<sup>211</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?'

<sup>212</sup> Senior UN official, interview.

<sup>213</sup> Security Council Report, 'Negotiations on a Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Resolution : What's In Blue'.

<sup>214</sup> Diplomat, interview.

The UNSC Resolution 2048 was adopted unanimously on May 18th, 2012, under Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNSC requested the Military Command to step out and restore constitutional order – although how and what constituted constitutional order remained vague. Besides its main request, the UNSC resolution ended up singling out ECOWAS mediation and called for UNSG to harmonize the different possible positions of various partners. The UNSC 2048 also included targeted sanctions against the coup leaders – travel bans. The UNSC also reiterated its readiness to impose other sanctions (arms embargo and asset freeze) and to modify/suspend/lift the sanctions regime considering possible progress in the country. Finally, a new Sanctions Committee was established.

Some national stakeholders welcomed the UNSC Resolution 2048 since it put more pressure on the Military Command. The Military was not surprised by the Resolution but was displeased by the spotlight gained with the imposition of sanctions.<sup>215</sup> In the following months, the UNSC Resolution 2048 was the baseline for the international actors' interactions with what to expect from the international community. However, the main content of the discussion or the solution being constructed; was the ECOWAS plan.<sup>216</sup>

While the United Nations was imposing sanctions, ECOWAS negotiated with the Military Command. It had an initial agreement the same week, pointing out Rui Duarte Barros as the interim Prime Minister. The following week, after the UNSC Resolution, ECOWAS finalized its deal with the Military Command. On May 27<sup>th</sup>, the Military finally handed in the power to a transitioning government that did not include the faction of PAIGC from Carlos Gomes, while troops from ECOWAS were arriving in the country to ensure security.<sup>217</sup>

The reactions to the deal were mixed. Although the Military complied with the international community's request to return to the barracks and leave the power, the transitioning government was not exactly a constitutional provision. CPLP and the EU did not recognize the transitional government. The EU decided to extend its sanctions in July.

However, the deal was a clear result of ECOWAS strategy, its leverage, and political considerations. ECOWAS member-States did not see with good eyes the influence of Angola on the faction of Carlos Gomes. ECOWAS became the main bridge between

---

<sup>215</sup> <sup>215</sup> Senior UN official., A civil servant working at a regional organization, interview

<sup>216</sup> Senior UN official.

<sup>217</sup> Fortin, 'Guinea-Bissau Military Junta Steps Down, Hands Power To Transitional Government.

the international community and the Guinea Bissau interim government.<sup>218</sup> More than that, ECOWAS started to reference the ousted Carlos Gomes Junior bloc of PAIGC as a faction and an impediment to the solution of the crisis.<sup>219</sup>

The PAIGC, which was reluctant to even interact with the transitioning government based on its expectations that CPLP would manage to exert more pressure to oust the current government, has started to realize that the ECOWAS solution would stay. By September 2012, the PAIGC had already emitted some cooperation signals, while the UNSC warned against the delay in returning to constitutional order. ECOWAS also started to advocate the lifting of some sanctions. By the end of the year, an incident (a possible coup attempt) was used by Guinea-Bissau to accuse Portugal of interference.

José Ramos-Horta's mediation process (2013-2014)

In January 2013, the Nobel Peace laureate Ramos-Horta (from Portuguese Speaking Timor-Leste) was nominated as Special Representative of the UNSG for Guinea-Bissau. His appointment may be interpreted as a signal from the UN to the Portuguese-speaking country group, but it is hard to affirm anything concrete on this matter.

Ramos-Horta followed the transitioning plan deal made by ECOWAS to a great degree<sup>220</sup> while stressing the importance of the transitional government being inclusive.<sup>221</sup> The PAIGC, which held the majority of Parliament, decided to re-engage in conversations with the PRS at the beginning of the year. By June 2013, it was integrated into the transitional government.<sup>222</sup>

At the international level, Ramos-Horta aligned with ECOWAS while getting CPLP support back,<sup>223</sup> which might have helped to ensure the cooperation of PAIGC. His unique position as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and political trajectory also gave him unique access to the UNSC, giving more credibility to any promise or threat.<sup>224</sup>

The international community was present. The US launched an operation that arrested Mr Na Tchuto, a former admiral linked with the coup, under accusations of connection

---

<sup>218</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?'

<sup>219</sup> Diplomat, Interview

<sup>220</sup> Civil servant of regional organisation, Interview

<sup>221</sup> Ramos-Horta, *Guinea-Bissau: Rescue from Collapse?*

<sup>222</sup> International Crisis Group, 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?'

<sup>223</sup> International Crisis Group.

<sup>224</sup> Scholar, interview.

with drug trafficking.<sup>225</sup> The EU applied UN sanctions and expanded its list of sanctioned individuals.<sup>226</sup>

In an interview, Horta alluded that the increasing collaboration of specific political segments was due to the shadow cast by the threat of sanctions. It induced a positive salutary environment among the political factions who were, by then, stating their perception of the imperative need and willingness to reach a political solution; otherwise, more sanctions would be imposed.<sup>227</sup> Horta, however, started to advocate for lifting sanctions on some military leaders due to their collaboration.<sup>228</sup>

Although the national actors have perceived the international pressure and the necessity to move forward, the scenario remained volatile, with some disagreement and episodes of violation of human rights. The result was the constant rescheduling of the elections. However, by the end of 2013, the UNSC - led by Togo - decided to release a Presidential Statement. The Presidential Statement was clear to request the elections in early 2014, more support to ECOWAS troops, and threatened with targeted sanctions any political or military leader who pursued actions that could hamper the electoral and reform process.<sup>229</sup> It was a clear threat from ECOWAS to the regime.

The elections were rescheduled from March 2014 to April 2014. General elections and then the second round for President took place. José Mario Vaz, from the PAIGC, was elected President. The PAIGC also won a slender majority in the Parliament, appointing Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira. No major incident occurred, and the military helped ensure the elections' security.

Post-2014: new and old tales

The elections did not completely solve the challenges of Guinea-Bissau. Another crisis erupted in August 2015, when a division within the PAIGC between Vaz and its prime minister, Domingos Simoes Pereira, led to the dissolution of the government.

The crisis triggered political violence and instability. ECOWAS again intervened and sent Nigeria's former President Olusegun Obasanjo as its special envoy, which led to the appointment of Carlos Correia as Prime Minister. However, President Vaz vetoed

---

<sup>225</sup> Nossiter, 'U.S. Sting That Snared Guinea-Bissau Ex-Admiral Shines Light on Drug Trade'.

<sup>226</sup> Interview with scholar

<sup>227</sup> Ramos-Horta, *Guinea-Bissau: Rescue from Collapse?*

<sup>228</sup> Silva, 'AFRONTA'.

<sup>229</sup> Security Council Report, 'Guinea-Bissau Briefing and Consultations'.

the cabinet proposed by Correia, and another crisis erupted involving the President, the Prime Minister, and factions of the PAIGC.<sup>230</sup>

The growing instability drew a veiled threat from ECOWAS during its summit in mid-2016, commending the military for not intervening and advising on continuing to do so. An ECOWAS ministerial delegation was sent, which led to the adoption of a six-point roadmap in September. In October, political actors and civil society stakeholders met under the auspices of ECOWAS and signed the Conakry Accord.<sup>231</sup>

A new prime minister was appointed but was rejected by the PAIGC. A faction of the PAIGC, which was previously expelled from the Party, plus the opposition party, backed the appointment. ECOWAS again instated dialogue, mentioned the military and sent another mission. The mission met all stakeholders, asked for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement, and threatened to recommend sanctions in case the terms of the agreement were not implemented – including the appointment of a prime minister- within 30 days.

ECOWAS hosted another political dialogue for Guinea-Bissau stakeholders. No consensus was achieved. In June 2017, ECOWAS mentioned the military again and commended their non-interference (while making a veiled threat by recommending that they continue to stay out of the political disputes) and, for the first time, threatened sanctions against individuals blocking the agreement.<sup>232</sup>

Another round of failed negotiations occurred. By December, during another Summit, ECOWAS decided to send three Presidents to host talks with Guinea-Bissau stakeholders. If no solution were agreed upon, the bloc would impose collective and individual sanctions and ask other international actors (UN, AU, and other sub-regional organizations) to do the same.

In January 2018, the President announced a new Prime Minister but was again rejected by PAICG. ECOWAS sent another ministerial mission that reported the indeed failure of the government to appoint a name for PM agreeable to everyone. ECOWAS then announced sanctions against those blocking the agreement in February 2018.<sup>233</sup>

After the sanctions were imposed, negotiations continued, and within three months, a consensus name for Prime Minister was agreed upon. Aristides Gomes was appointed

---

<sup>230</sup> Odigie, 'ECOWAS's Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau's Protracted Political Crisis, 2015-2019'.

<sup>231</sup> Odigie.

<sup>232</sup> Odigie.

<sup>233</sup> Thérroux-Bénon, Kanté, and Toupane, 'Stability in Guinea-Bissau Requires More than Elections'; Odigie, 'ECOWAS's Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau's Protracted Political Crisis, 2015-2019'.

in April,<sup>234</sup> and the Parliament was reopened. Legislative elections were then postponed to early 2019; after the new elections, another crisis regarding the selection of Cabinet. ECOWAS sent another mission to host dialogues. A solution was rapidly achieved amidst the background of recent sanctions and political pressure.<sup>235</sup>

In 2020, former Prime Minister Umaro Embalo was elected President, effectively ending the long rule of PAIGC. It was also the first time in Guinea-Bissau history that a President ended their term and was succeeded by their elected successor. A coup was attempted in 2022. Despite the changes on the ground, the UNSC sanctions regime has remained in place and is relatively similar to the initial sanctions imposed in 2012.<sup>236</sup>

### *Analysis*

First, the Guinea-Bissau case is, by definition, a case in which prevention has failed; otherwise, the coup would have never occurred. However, it does not mean that the threat and imposition of sanctions per se were meaningless. Quite the contrary, they seemed instrumental in pushing the military and later political factions to the negotiation table, showing sanctions potential as a conflict management and resolution tool.

For example, ECOWAS demanded the release of the detained political leaders and the acceptance of ECOWAS troops. One day after the sanctions were threatened, the Military Command bowed to these demands, eliminating possible roadblocks in the negotiations. Furthermore, the willingness of the Military Command to negotiate and give back the power to civilians in the following week of the UNSC resolution also shows some impact of the sanctions being imposed.

However, the Military Command did not comply with the initial request of international actors to reinstate the previous government and to allow the continuity of elections. That might suggest that sanctions might create an environment of cooperation between the target and the international community – bringing them to the table- but are not expected to move the target to accept specific core requests that undermine the actor's core agenda. In this sense, targeted sanctions effectively extracted some concessions and eliminated some roadblocks in the negotiations; but did not eliminate the need for mediation efforts; in fact, sanctions supported them.

---

<sup>234</sup> Thérroux-Bénon, Kanté, and Toupane, 'Stability in Guinea-Bissau Requires More than Elections'.

<sup>235</sup> Odigie, 'ECOWAS's Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau's Protracted Political Crisis, 2015-2019'.

<sup>236</sup> 'Guinea-Bissau Attempted Coup: Guinea-Bissau's President Says Coup Attempt Has Failed, Government Is in Control | CNN'.

As Ramos-Horta stated, the effect of the sanctions was also beneficial later in the episode because they have created a feeling that a political agreement would need to be reached, and elections would need to be held and respected; otherwise, heavier sanctions would follow.<sup>237</sup> In other words, the certainty of the imposition of sanctions in case of a political deadlock or any spoiling activity fostered a logic that a political solution and agreement were needed to avoid worse consequences.

However, perhaps the practice of mediation and the nature of the political compromise accepted by ECOWAS might hint at why sanctions might be having difficulty serving as a conflict prevention mechanism in West Africa. ECOWAS already in its communique threatening individual and broad sanctions coupled them with the “vague” demand to return to constitutional order with elections within one year, not the immediate return to the status quo before the coup.

Also, despite the high leverage due to UNSC, AU, and EU sanctions, ECOWAS agreed to a political agreement closer to what the military wanted than the international community. One could understand that as an example of constructive criticism: ECOWAS was more concerned with solving a situation<sup>238</sup> than making it right or punishing violators, as argued by Hellquist through its academic peer review metaphor.<sup>239</sup>

However, it might also be an example of geopolitical considerations influencing decision-making. As reported, some ECOWAS members were uneasy with Angola's influence, which might explain why they were so receptive to an agreement that ousted Carlos Gomes and its faction. The political compromise reached spoke to the norm against the unconstitutional change of government (the military left power). However, political considerations tempered it- - resembling the metaphor of Whitehead and Donno's argument regarding how geopolitical considerations affect the punishment of norm violation<sup>240</sup>. The heavy handedness in which ECOWAS treated other political stalemates in subsequent years in Guinea-Bissau gives credit to Whitehead's metaphor.

The example of Guinea Bissau, in which sanctions were used to achieve a political compromise with the junta, might explain why the sanctions practice might be undermining the system and sanctions built to avert coups in West Africa. Such argument finds resonance in Nathan.<sup>241</sup> that argues that the mediation efforts by

---

<sup>237</sup> Ramos-Horta, *Guinea-Bissau: Rescue from Collapse?*

<sup>238</sup> Another possible consideration is that ECOWAS was also dealing with a coup in Mali, so it did want to solve the situation as fast as possible

<sup>239</sup> Hellquist, 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review'.

<sup>240</sup> Donno, 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'.

<sup>241</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

African Union and sub-regional organizations and sanctions regimes were contradictory in West Africa and Africa.

The architecture created by the democratic clauses (ECOWAS charter, Protocols) and sanctions are indeed capable of signalling the importance of the norm against unconstitutional changes of government: not only the military left power within a month (which has been a practice also in other coups in Africa<sup>242</sup>), but even the junta rhetoric from the start was its intention to return to constitutional order – echoing findings of the literature that state that coup leaders increasingly use democratic language to justify their actions<sup>243</sup>.

However, it does not seem to work correctly to prevent coups because of how the system is operationalized - which might explain the strange pattern of sanctions initially decreasing the odds but then reverting (even though not statistically significant). Due to the solution being political compromises, not punishment, actors might find there is still some political gain to attempt a coup to reverse or impede policies since the status quo pre-coup is rarely restored<sup>244</sup>, as happened in the case of Guinea-Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau also suggests an interesting reverse reading of the advantage of regional organizations and their sanctions. The espoused benefits of regional organizations: proximity and legitimacy, might also be its Achilles' heel. Due to proximity to the situation and consequently vested interests in the actual decision, geopolitical considerations and political alliances might play an outsized role in the decision to impose and lift sanctions, undermining how actors see the threat of sanctions.

It might be especially the case for sub-regional organizations, where such political dynamics are even closer. In the Americas, the role of UNASUR regarding Venezuela was highly criticized due to its politicized nature. Closa and Palestini argue that rather than enforcing democratic governance, the democratic system of UNASUR was used to enforce the regime stability of the autocratic-leaning Venezuelan government.<sup>245</sup>

The Guinea-Bissau case also allows for exploring other dynamics. First, the piling of several sanctions regimes on the junta: EU, ECOWAS, AU, and UN created a conditioning environment in which the transition process and its negotiations took place. According to a UN official, unilateral, regional, and global sanctions imposed by

---

<sup>242</sup> Souaré, 'The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment'.

<sup>243</sup> Yukawa, Hidaka, and Kushima, 'Coups and Framing'.

<sup>244</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'.

<sup>245</sup> Closa and Palestini Cespedes, 'Between Democratic Protection and Self-Defense'.

the different international actors served as a conditioning factor in the negotiation process.

Sanctions can be used as powerful instruments of coordination and convergence. The signalling power of sanctions was also on full display during the crisis. The sanctions imposed by UNSC in May were a powerful signal of minimal convergence of the international community in essential pillars. Not surprisingly, the UNSCR 2048 became the primary baseline for all actors but not the actual content of the solution.

The leverage and dominance achieved by ECOWAS can be explained by its first-mover advantage and the signalling of both AU and UN of the principle of subsidiary. However, there was a clear game of "good cop, bad cop" between ECOWAS and other international actors. Thus, sanctions between these actors cooperated to use Borzyskoski and Portela's terminology.<sup>246</sup> However, they also competed.

ECOWAS' initial sanctions on the coup leaders increased its *bona fide*. However, the sub-regional block quickly shifted gears to support the interim government and new elections. While other actors, especially the EU (and the UN to some extent) - unsatisfied with the solution to the crisis - continued to threaten more sanctions if the military returned to power or elections did not occur. Such is the case that ECOWAS used the Security Council to threaten sanctions if elections were postponed, possibly a way to signal the threat's credibility.

Second, sanctions do not just impact mediation but also are affected by the mediation and the mediator on the ground. By selecting someone like Ramos-Horta as a mediator in 2013, the UNSC gave a strong message about the importance of Guinea-Bissau. Due to his personal and political prestige, Ramos-Horta had direct access to the UNSC. Any promise made by him and any threat of sanctions were much more credible than a mediator far from the centre of power - although this is not always guaranteed, as shown by Ramos-Horta's incapacity to convince the Council to impose sanctions on drug trafficking.<sup>247</sup>

Finally, the 2015-2018 crisis shows another face of regional organizations' engagement with domestic political structures and sanctions. The prolonged political crisis in which Guinea-Bissau national stakeholders and ECOWAS raises intriguing questions. First, it seems that ECOWAS was uncomfortable with imposing sanctions, nor did the actors think it was possible. Unlike the coup, political stalemates are much more challenging to frame under the norm against unconstitutional changes of

---

<sup>246</sup> Borzyskowski and Portela, 'Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU'.

<sup>247</sup> Interview with UN official

government and are intrinsically a domestic issue.<sup>248</sup> The uneasiness of ECOWAS might be due to the normative enlargement of using sanctions to deal with political stalemates represents. However, once imposed, it seemed to affect the negotiations.

## Conclusion

This article presents several findings. First, regional norms and commitments against unconstitutional changes of government decrease the odds of a coup occurring both for Continental (H1) and Sub-Regional Organisations (H1b).

Second, the regional systems against unconstitutional changes of government both for Continental (H2) and Sub-Regional systems (H2b) also proved to be statistically significant. Moreover, once West Africa is dropped from the sample, the difference between having no system and having a fully developed system (with a decreasing trend downwards) is clear. It shows that a more fine-grained measurement of regional systems provides a much more accurate picture of these regional mechanisms than a simple binomial variable.

Third, sanctions were not fully proven to prevent coups, as hypothesised in H3 and H3b. For sub-regional organisations, in both models, sanctions were statistically insignificant. For continental, it was statistically different at higher levels (however, this is driven by AU). More interestingly, though, is the pattern showed for both types of organisations in which sanctions initially do have some dampening effect on coups occurring, but such effect is primarily lost as more sanctions are imposed by regional organisations (with West Africa).

It also shows significant differences between Continental and Sub-regional organisations, not only at the level of their practice but potentially at the level of their effects on Member-States. Thus, collapsing these two types of regional organisations under the same bracket, as most of the literature on regional organisations does, might obscure important dynamics.

Another important finding is the disproportionate effect played by West Africa and how by dropping it from the sample, all the relationships between norms, systems, and

---

<sup>248</sup> Interview with a diplomat.

sanctions become largely what was expected (even though sanctions still appear statistically insignificant for sub-regional organizations).

Although West Africa might be portrayed as a hard case for these systems to prove effectiveness, the case of Guinea Bissau seems to suggest that beyond the simplistic notion that the region is prone to coups, part of the problem might be that the solution to coups is still political, which means compromises.

Such compromises still benefit the coup perpetrators because they involve caretaking governments and new elections, not returning to the previous political configuration. In other words, if, for some reason, the status quo for some political actors is detrimental, it might pay off to realise a coup (and potentially create the space to rewrite policies and rules) and then pass power back to democratic leaders.

The case of Guinea-Bissau also shows how complex and interlinked sanctions are at various levels. It sheds light on the interlinked nature of sanctions and mediation, with important considerations for the importance of threats; and potential "good cop, bad cop" dynamics enabled by the overlap of sanctions (e.g., ECOWAS, who is mainly responsible for the mediation, and other actors who act as senders of sanctions more consistently). The relationship between those different sanctions should probably be at the forefront of any research agenda.

It also shows that the role of sanctions as preventive tools is probably intrinsically related to its role as a resolution tool. More interestingly, sanctions can be highly effective in pushing for a solution while undermining its role as a preventive tool due to the signal given to the audience that a beneficial political compromise is possible.

Finally, the in-depth case might suggest that the advantage of regional sanctions systems as more legitimate, closer, and having more impact might also be its weakness. Political considerations might drive regional organizations' decisions excessively, undermining the normative system. It is not only the case for West Africa but also in Latin America, where similar dynamics were found.

The case of Guinea-Bissau is unique due to the involvement of the United Nations. Thus, the actual empirical test of the hypotheses would benefit from other case studies in West Africa and extra-Africa, such as in the Americas. Also, measuring the independent variables in the large-N deserves further development once more data becomes available for the types and modalities of sanctions imposed by regional organizations.

Finally, there is very little in the literature on sanctions that try to uncover the preventive role of sanctions. Its role as deterrence is often assumed but not proved. The literature would benefit from expanding the research on other sanctions cases - with a defined audience and violation - to see whether sanctions systems and sanctions per se perform or not their expected preventive effect.

## Appendix

Table A1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
Coups	7,571	0.0608	0.239	0	1
Cold War	7,571	0.521	0.500	0	1
Commitment Continental	7,571	0.221	0.415	0	1
Continental System	7,571	0.473	0.931	0	3
Commitment Sub-regional	7,571	0.188	0.391	0	1
Sub-regional System	7,571	0.245	0.605	0	3
Sanctions- Continental	7,571	0.470	1.568	0	11
Sanctions- Sub-regional	7,408	0.0687	0.411	0	5
Anocracy	6,746	0.292	0.455	0	1
Duration	6,732	14.66	17.38	0	132
Civil War	6,764	0.294	1.147	0	10
GDP growth	5,723	4.097	6.779	-64.05	150.0
GDP per capita	5,667	4,937	8,673	124.3	111,657
Military	6,964	0.231	0.255	0	1
Civil Society	6,964	0.362	0.288	0.00200	0.953
Democratic Region	7,507	-1.100	5.993	-9	9
Countries	7571	80.53	46.23	1	163

Table A2: Model testing Commitment with Democratic Region/Sub-region control variable

	I	II
Continental Commitment	0.53683 (2.38369)**	
Sub-regional Commitment		0.61178 (1.93915)*
Anocracy	1.48266 (2.64674)***	1.50322 (2.73401)***
Civil War	1.26853 (2.87092)***	1.27923 (2.96318)***
GDP growth	0.96899 (3.18746)***	0.96815 (3.27294)***
GDP per capita	0.99991 (1.73509)*	0.99991 (1.72862)*
Duration	1.00129 (0.17555)	1.00216 (0.29274)
Military	1.91430 (2.21776)**	1.91486 (2.22381)**
Civil Society	1.78384 (1.17059)	2.03846 (1.40153)
Democratic Continent	0.98322 (0.54305)	
Cold War	1.58860 (2.14627)**	1.58011 (2.23458)**
Democratic Sub-region		0.96150 (1.54371)
Chi2	89.23	89.51
P	0.00	0.00
R2_P		

Table A3: Interactive Model between Systems with a dummy variable for West African countries

	I	II
0.Continental System #1.WestAfrica	<b>1.73931</b>	
	<b>(2.02958)**</b>	
1. Continental System #0..WestAfrica	0.80522	
	(0.42854)	
2. Continental System #0..WestAfrica	<b>0.55487</b>	
	<b>(2.04924)**</b>	
2. Continental System #1..WestAfrica	1.00951	
	(0.02177)	
3. Continental System #0..WestAfrica	<b>0.16956</b>	
	<b>(2.39978)**</b>	
3. Continental System #1.WestAfrica	<b>5.13454</b>	
	<b>(2.28525)**</b>	
0.Sub-regional System#1.WestAfrica		<b>1.75674</b>
		<b>(2.13349)**</b>
1. Sub-regional System #0.WestAfrica		0.75642
		(0.69867)
2. Sub-regional System #0.WestAfrica		<b>0.37774</b>
		<b>(2.02721)**</b>
2. Sub-regional System#1.WestAfrica		1.25223
		(0.52744)
3. Sub-regional System#1.WestAfrica		2.43938
		(1.33206)
Anocracy	<b>1.47622</b> <b>(2.73015)***</b>	<b>1.46633</b> <b>(2.70822)***</b>
Civil War	<b>1.12291</b> <b>(1.81687)*</b>	<b>1.13137</b> <b>(1.96396)**</b>
GDP growth	<b>0.96714</b> <b>(3.58889)***</b>	<b>0.96723</b> <b>(3.62608)***</b>
GDP per capita	<b>0.99995</b>	<b>0.99994</b>

	<b>(1.97649)**</b>	<b>(2.10302)**</b>
Duration (regime)	0.99189 (1.23435)	0.99210 (1.21436)
Military	<b>4.36154</b> <b>(5.61946)***</b>	<b>4.50303</b> <b>(5.82023)***</b>
Civil Society	1.60810 (1.28298)	1.47077 (1.05430)
Cold War	<b>1.76440</b> <b>(3.26406)***</b>	<b>1.93895</b> <b>(3.95320)***</b>
Insig2u	0.44702 (2.35467)**	0.39503 (2.58511)***
Chi2	143.37	144.62
P	0.00	0.00
R2_P	.	.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Interactive Model between Sanctions by regional organizations with a dummy variable for West African countries

	I	II
0.Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	<b>1.67343</b> <b>(1.92456)*</b>	
1. Sanctions- Continental #0 WestAfrica	<b>0.46817</b> <b>(2.21005)**</b>	
1 Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	0.55148 (0.56158)	
3. Sanctions- Continental #0b.WestAfrica	0.94469 (0.09094)	
4. Sanctions- Continental #0b.WestAfrica	1.31347 (0.35564)	
4. Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	<b>5.64679</b> <b>(2.42121)**</b>	
7. Sanctions- Continental #0b.WestAfrica	0.56410 (0.54457)	
7. Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	1.48697 (0.36632)	
8. Sanctions- Continental #0b.WestAfrica	0.54774 (0.57437)	
8. Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	3.16512 (1.41210)	
11. Sanctions- Continental #1.WestAfrica	<b>5.44990</b> <b>(2.37640)**</b>	
0. Sanctions- Sub-Regional#1.WestAfrica		<b>1.67748</b> <b>(1.96792)**</b>
1. Sanctions- Sub-Regional #0b.WestAfrica		0.33236 (1.07722)
1. Sanctions- Sub-Regional #1.WestAfrica		2.16461 (1.43715)
3. Sanctions- Sub-Regional #1.WestAfrica		2.88831 (1.59087)
5. Sanctions- Sub-Regional #1.WestAfrica		2.89484 (1.59213)
Anocracy	<b>1.45840</b> <b>(2.62817)***</b>	<b>1.49063</b> <b>(2.83575)***</b>
Civil War	<b>1.12067</b> <b>(1.79454)*</b>	<b>1.12580</b> <b>(1.88126)*</b>
GDP growth	<b>0.96587</b> <b>(3.68331)***</b>	<b>0.96576</b> <b>(3.77928)***</b>
GDP per capita	<b>0.99995</b> <b>(1.89712)*</b>	<b>0.99994</b> <b>(2.00565)**</b>
Duration	0.99149	0.99176

	(1.29340)	(1.24925)
Military	<b>4.42636</b>	<b>4.62464</b>
	<b>(5.68122)***</b>	<b>(5.93013)***</b>
Civil Society	1.54217	1.28124
	(1.17248)	(0.68171)
Cold War	<b>1.84682</b>	<b>2.15407</b>
	<b>(3.60468)***</b>	<b>(4.65170)***</b>
Insig2u	<b>0.43706</b>	<b>0.40904</b>
	<b>(2.41090)**</b>	<b>(2.54769)**</b>
Chi2	140.31	145.26
P	0.00	0.00
R2_P	.	.

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## Bibliography

Al Jazeera. 'ECOWAS Troops for Guinea-Bissau and Mali', 27 April 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201242704130728252.html>.

———. 'Guinea-Bissau Coup Leaders Consolidate Power', 14 April 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/2012413232852260513.html>.

———. 'Guinea-Bissau Suspended from African Union', 17 April 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124171148930754.html>.

BBC News. 'Guinea-Bissau Leader Malam Bacai Sanha Dies in Paris'. Accessed 10 June 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-16473457>.

Bjørnskov, Christian, and Martin Rode. 'Regime Types and Regime Change: A New Dataset on Democracy, Coups, and Political Institutions'. *The Review of International Organizations* 15, no. 2 (April 2020): 531–51. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09345-1>.

Blum, Johannes, and Klaus Gründler. 'Political Stability and Economic Prosperity: Are Coups Bad for Growth?' *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3618841>.

Borzyskowski, Inken von, and Clara Portela. 'Piling on: The Rise of Sanctions Cooperation between Regional Organizations, the United States, and the EU', 2016.

Charron, Andrea, and Clara Portela. 'The Relationship between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 101–18. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.006>.

———. 'The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa'. *International Affairs* 91, no. 6 (November 2015): 1369–85. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12452>.

- Closa, Carlos. 'Institutional Design of Democratic Conditionality in Regional Organizations'. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2013. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2355307>.
- Closa, Carlos, and Stefano Palestini CCspedes. 'Between Democratic Protection and Self-Defense: The Case of Unasur and Venezuela'. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2699050>.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, et al. 'V-Dem Codebook V9', 2019.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, and Allen Hicken. 'V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset V10. Varieties of Democracy (v-Dem) Project'. *V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg*, 2020.
- Debre, Maria Josepha. 'Legitimation, Regime Survival, and Shifting Alliances in the Arab League: Explaining Sanction Politics during the Arab Spring'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 516–30. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120937749>.
- Donno, Daniela. 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'. *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (2010): 593–625. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000202>.
- Döring, Katharina P. W., and Jens Herpolsheimer. 'New Regionalisms' and Violent Conflicts in Africa: The Politics at the AU and ECOWAS in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Working Paper Series Des SFB 1199 an Der Universität Leipzig, Nr. 5. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag Leipzig, 12.
- European Commission. 'A Fresh Start for Guinea-Bissau: EU to Resume Cooperation and Provide New Support', 25 March 2015. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_IP-15-4663\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4663_en.htm).
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'. *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917. <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789>.
- Fortin, Jacey. 'Guinea-Bissau Military Junta Steps Down, Hands Power To Transitional Government'. *International Business Times*, 23 May 2012. <http://www.ibtimes.com/guinea-bissau-military-junta-steps-down-hands-power-transitional-government-699709>.
- Gassebner, Martin, Jerg Gutmann, and Stefan Voigt. 'When to Expect a Coup d'état? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants'. *Public Choice* 169, no. 3–4 (December 2016): 293–313. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0365-0>.
- Genna, Gaspare, and Taeko Hiroi. 'Do Democracy Clauses Matter? The Effects of Regional Integration Associations on Political Stability and Democratic Consolidation'. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2631079>.
- Genna, Gaspare M, and Taeko Hiroi. *Regional Integration and Democratic Conditionality: How Democracy Clauses Help Democratic Consolidation and Deepening*, 2016.

<http://www.vlebooks.com/vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9781317605010>.

Giumelli, Francesco. 'The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 38–59. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.003>.

'Guinea-Bissau Attempted Coup: Guinea-Bissau's President Says Coup Attempt Has Failed, Government Is in Control | CNN'. Accessed 29 September 2022. <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/01/africa/guinea-bissau-coup-attempt-intl/index.html>.

BBC News. 'Guinea-Bissau Profile - Timeline'. Accessed 11 June 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13579838>.

Hawkins, Darren, and Carolyn Shaw. 'Legalising Norms of Democracy in the Americas'. *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 3 (July 2008): 459–80. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210508008127>.

Hellquist, Elin. 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review: The African Union against Egypt (2013) and Sudan (2019)'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 451–68. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120935530>.

Hellquist, Elin, and Stefano Palestini. 'Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy: Introduction to the Special Issue'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 437–50. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120968109>.

Hiroi, Taeko, and Sawa Omori. 'Causes and Triggers of *Coups d'état*: An Event History Analysis: Causes and Triggers of *Coups d'état*'. *Politics & Policy* 41, no. 1 (February 2013): 39–64. <https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12001>.

International Crisis Group. 'Guinée-Bissau: les élections, et après?' Policy Briefing. Briefing Afrique. International Crisis Group, 4 August 2014.

IPS. 'Guinea Bissau: Junta Presents Ecowas With a *Fait Accompli*', 21 April 2012. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201204220243.html>.

Kohl, Christoph. *The Reform of the Guinea-Bissau's Security Sector: Between Demand and Practice*. PRIF Report 126. Frankfurt am Main: Peace Research Inst. Frankfurt (PRIF), 2014.

Kurki, Milja. *Democratic Futures: Revisioning Democracy Promotion*. Interventions. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013.

Le Monde. 'En Guinée-Bissau, la junte dissout les institutions et crée un conseil de transition'. *Le Monde.fr*, 16 April 2012. [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/04/16/la-junte-a-bissau-dissout-les-institutions-et-cree-un-conseil-de-transition\\_1685874\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/04/16/la-junte-a-bissau-dissout-les-institutions-et-cree-un-conseil-de-transition_1685874_3212.html).

Lebow, Richard Ned, and Janice Gross Stein. 'Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable'. *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336–69. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010415>.

Lehoucq, Fabrice, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 'Breaking Out of the Coup Trap: Political Competition and Military Coups in Latin America'. *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 8 (July 2014): 1105–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013488561>.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. 'Democratization and International Organizations'. *International Organization* 60, no. 01 (January 2006). <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830606005X>.

Marshall, Monty G. 'Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2018'. *Center for Systemic Peace. Www. Syste Micpe a Ce. Org*, 2020.

Massey, Simon. 'Multi-Faceted Mediation in the Guinea-Bissau Civil War'. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies* 32, no. 1 (2004): 76–95.

McGowan, Patrick J. 'Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings'. *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 2 (January 2006): 234–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X05277886>.

Morales Martinez, Elias David, and Mariana Preta Oliveira de Lyra. 'The Role of UNASUR in the South American Democratic Crises (2008-2015)'. *Carta Internacional* 13, no. 1 (16 May 2018). <https://doi.org/10.21530/ci.v13n1.2018.729>.

Nathan, Laurie. 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'. *WORKING PAPERS*, n.d., 47.

Nossiter, Adam. 'U.S. Sting That Snared Guinea-Bissau Ex-Admiral Shines Light on Drug Trade'. *The New York Times*, 15 April 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/world/africa/us-sting-that-snared-guinea-bissau-ex-admiral-shines-light-on-drug-trade.html>.

Odigie, Brown. 'ECOWAS's Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau's Protracted Political Crisis, 2015-2019'. *Conflict Trends Accord*, 2019. <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/ecowass-efforts-at-resolving-guinea-bissaus-protracted-political-crisis-2015-2019/>.

Onapajo, Hakeem, and Muhammad Dan Suleiman. 'Why West Africa Has Had so Many Coups and How to Prevent More'. *The Conversation*. Accessed 29 September 2022. <http://theconversation.com/why-west-africa-has-had-so-many-coups-and-how-to-prevent-more-176577>.

Palestini, Stefano. 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 469–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120911700>.

Powell, Jonathan, Trace Lasley, and Rebecca Schiel. 'Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014'. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51, no. 4 (December 2016): 482–502. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-015-9210-6>.

Powell, Jonathan M, and Clayton L Thyne. 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (March 2011): 249–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436>.

Ramos-Horta, José. *Guinea-Bissau: Rescue from Collapse?* Chatham House, 2013.

Schembera, Kerstin. 'Understanding ASEAN's Approach to Sanctions against Norm Breakers'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 531–45. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120972583>.

Security Council Report. 'Guinea-Bissau Briefing and Consultations'. *What's in Blue* (blog), 25 November 2013. <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/11/guinea-bissau-briefing-and-consultations-1.php>.

———. 'Guinea-Bissau Chronology of Events'. Accessed 11 June 2016. <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/guinea-bissau.php?page=all&print=true>.

———. 'Negotiations on a Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Resolution : What's In Blue'. *What's in Blue* (blog), 17 May 2012. <http://www.whatsinblue.org/2012/05/negotiations-on-a-guinea-bissau-sanctions-resolution.php>.

Silva, António Aly. 'AFRONTA: Ramos Horta Pediu à ONU o Levantamento de Sanções a Elementos Das Forças Armadas e Outros'. *Ditadura Do Consenso* (blog), 28 June 2014. <http://ditaduradoconsenso.blogspot.com/2014/06/jomav-pediu-onu-o-levantamento-de.html>.

Simmons, Peter. 'Review Commentary The State of the Art in the EU Democracy Promotion Literature', n.d., 14.

Souaré, Issaka K. 'The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur on Military Coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): An Empirical Assessment'. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2014): 69–94. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X13000785>.

'The World Factbook'. Accessed 11 June 2016. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pu.html>.

Théroux-Bénon, Lori-Anne, Aissatou Kanté, and Paulin Maurice Toupane. 'Stability in Guinea-Bissau Requires More than Elections'. *ISS Today*, 2018. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/stability-in-guinea-bissau-requires-more-than-elections>.

Whitehead, Laurence. 'Regional Organizations and Democratic Conditionality: Family Resemblances and Shaming'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 546–60. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120937474>.

Wobig, Jacob. 'Defending Democracy with International Law: Preventing Coup Attempts with Democracy Clauses'. *Democratization* 22, no. 4 (7 June 2015): 631–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.867948>.

Wobig, Jacob P. 'Regional Regimes for the Defense of Democracy and Coups d'Etat', n.d., 209.

World Bank. 'Guinea-Bissau Overview'. Accessed 11 June 2016. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guineabissau/overview#2>.

Yabi, Gilles Olakounlé. *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau*. Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010.

Yukawa, Taku, Kaoru Hidaka, and Kaori Kushima. 'Coups and Framing: How Do Militaries Justify the Illegal Seizure of Power?' *Democratization* 27, no. 5 (3 July 2020): 816–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1740207>.

#### **Chapter IV:** Understanding effective signalling and constraining: the initial steps of a mid-range theory on UNSC sanction effectiveness

*Building upon the conceptual framework of sanctions as a three-purpose tool, this paper investigates under which conditions United Nations Security Council sanctions are effective in constraining and signalling cases of intra-State armed conflicts. Through a crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) across 41 sanctions episodes, using mainly data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, the study finds the unanimity of P5 for signalling and clarity on who needs to enforce the sanctions for constraining are (almost) necessary conditions. For signalling, the study maps two pathways, both indicating the importance of the Council being selective in how many norms it tries to signal with sanctions. For constraining, the study finds five different pathways, with most of them being a different combination of the presence of two out of three conditions: diplomatic sanctions, peacekeeping operations and restrictive measures on commodities that represent major funding for conflicting parties; and one specific pathway in which constraining was effective when international tribunals were involved, and the Council was deliberately targeting governments.*

## *Introduction*

This article engages the traditional debate about the effectiveness of sanctions through a new lens. Resting on the shoulders of the recent literature that shows that multilateral sanctions do not summarise themselves to coercion<sup>249</sup>, it explores the conditions that determine the success of the United Nations Security Council sanctions in constraining targets and signalling norms (and stigmatizing targets).

The article investigates such questions for cases where the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on intra-State armed conflicts. By doing so, this article contributes to the literature through three main channels.

First, it analyses two neglected purposes of sanctions: constraining and signalling, since the literature has been primarily focused on the coercive side of sanctions.<sup>250</sup> Second, it attempts to erect a preliminary mid-range theory regarding which conditions explain the success of sanctions on constraining and signalling in intra-State armed conflicts. Third, it shows how Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a methodological approach, is uniquely equipped for studying sanctions, considering its capacity to deal with complex causality and multiple conditions that could mimic the nature of sanctions - which is entirely modular (designed in many different manners<sup>251</sup>) and often operate together with other tools<sup>252</sup>.

The article is divided into several sections. The first segment is a brief review of sanctions and the new developments in the academic literature. The second section explains the research design and methodology: QCA and its suitability to study sanctions, QCA as a method, methodological choices, and procedures. The third section presents the main findings of the QCA. Finally, the final segment provides an overall conclusion.

## *Background*

In the last twenty-five years, the United Nations Security Council, freed from the Cold War shackles, has become much more active in dealing with threats to international peace and security. A sign of such change was the growing number of sophisticated

---

<sup>249</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'; Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>250</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>251</sup> Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>252</sup> Peksen, 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?'

sanctions regimes imposed by the organization, primarily addressing intra-State armed conflicts.<sup>253</sup>

From 1989 until 2013, more than seventy States have suffered episodes of armed conflict. The UN, during this period, applied sanctions to fourteen of those. Not only did the UN start to use sanctions more frequently (but still relatively less in proportion compared to other tools), but also their design has changed.<sup>254</sup> The UN moved to so-called targeted sanctions, designed to focus on individuals, companies, political groups, and governments, using different types of measures (e.g., travel bans and asset freezes).

Despite the increased use of sanctions to deal with armed conflicts, sanctions effectiveness remains poorly theorized, even though the literature on sanctions has evolved. For example, Eriksson developed the concept of "sanction episodes"<sup>255</sup> and Giumelli of sanctions as a multi-purpose tool.<sup>256</sup> Both concepts were fully incorporated into the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) empirical analysis/dataset of UNSC-targeted sanctions<sup>257</sup>.

First, Eriksson's concept of sanctions episodes<sup>258</sup> is the proposition of a different unit of analysis for the study of sanctions, moving from country regimes to sanctions episodes<sup>259</sup>. Sanctions episodes are "*periods in which the sanctions regime remains stable regarding purposes, types, targets, and context.*"<sup>260</sup>

The concept of sanctions episodes acknowledges that sanctions regimes change considerably over time, making it easier for the researcher to deal with sanctions regimes that span decades and whose motives, targets, and purposes have dramatically changed. It also allows fine-tuned judgments regarding the effectiveness (and conditions present) for a defined period. Finally, it has an unintended positive effect of increasing the "N" of cases that can be studied, enabling methodological approaches such as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

Another significant contribution to the literature is conceptualising sanctions as a three-purpose tool<sup>261</sup> - from the sender's perspective, linking sanctions with a conceptual

---

<sup>253</sup> Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>254</sup> Eriksson and Wallenstein, 'Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed Conflicts'.

<sup>255</sup> Eriksson, *Targeting Peace*, 2016.

<sup>256</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>257</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

<sup>258</sup> Nooruddin, 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy'.

<sup>259</sup> Eriksson, *Targeting Peace*, 2016.

<sup>260</sup> Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>261</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'.

understanding of power. These three purposes are coercion, constraining, and signalling/stigmatization (audience and targets).<sup>262</sup>

The coercive purpose is the ability to make actor A do something that it would not do otherwise; in other terms, it changes its behaviour. Usually, sanctions with a coercive purpose have specific demands attached to them.<sup>263</sup> Thus, the coercive purpose of sanctions is a standard stick-carrot mechanism. Although still dominant within the study of sanctions due to its inherent easiness to comprehend, the coercive purpose is rarely achieved.

The second purpose is to constrain the target.<sup>264</sup> Sanctions with constraining as their purpose aims to "lock in" the status quo by hampering the capacity of the target to pursue its objectives. Thus, the effect of sanctions would be better measured regarding what objectives the target will not achieve than whether it changed its behaviour.<sup>265</sup> Also, these sanctions do not possess any specific demands.<sup>266</sup>

The last purpose is to prevent an event or particular outcome by shaping actors' interests and expectations (signalling). The signalling effect has been studied in some depth in the case of unilateral sanctions<sup>267</sup>.

This article deliberately focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions in constraining and signalling, but not its coercive purpose. First, the literature has studied sanctions as coercive measures at exhaustion, while sanctions as constraining or signalling have never received that much attention.

Second, the imposition of sanctions suffers from a severe selection bias: sanctions are typically applied to hard cases, making successful coercion even more difficult. That is especially true for cases of armed conflicts since rebel groups are often targets of the sanction regimes<sup>268</sup>. Different from governments, there are reasons to assume that compliance with UNSC demands is much more unlikely in the case of rebels. Third, and perhaps most important, constraining and signalling might be better suited to building a mid-range theory on which conditions sanctions can be effective. It might be the case because both purposes differ qualitatively from coercion.

---

<sup>262</sup> Giumelli.

<sup>263</sup> Giumelli.

<sup>264</sup> Biersteker, Eckert, and Tourinho, 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>265</sup> McCormack and Pascoe, 'Sanctions and Preventive War'.

<sup>266</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>267</sup> Dorussen and Mo, 'Ending Economic Sanctions'; Lektzian and Sprecher, 'Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict'.

<sup>268</sup> Agbonifo, 'Nonstate Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness'; Agbonifo.

When imposing a sanction with a coercive purpose, the sender expects a conscious alteration of the behaviour of the target to comply with its demands.<sup>269</sup> Thus, coercion effectiveness falls into a classic bargaining model in which the action of the sender matters, and a change of behaviour of the target is required. On the other hand, both constraining and signalling are relatively more independent of the target decision-making. The primary purpose is to affect the material capacity of the target (constraining), influence the legitimacy of certain actors, or alter the information available to actors (signalling). When sanctions are effective in constraining or signalling, sanctions might have a better chance of coercing the target to alter its behaviour. It might be the case due to their effect in shaping the calculus of the targets.

The focus on constraining and signalling also fits the ambition of this article to explain the effectiveness of targeted sanctions in the case of armed conflicts. First, the UNSC has not expressed threats clearly to all targets in all instances. Second, often the actual act of sanctioning is done by Committees, which list individuals and entities based on the criteria developed by the Council. This process is opaque, and the processes of listing delisting are unclear to targets.<sup>270</sup>

Both characteristics create an environment in which a traditional bargaining model of threat and imposition of sanctions (coercion) is defective. It is much more likely that actors assess their options once sanctions are imposed – not before, especially in the case of non-state armed groups in which compliance might mean cease of existence.

Finally, the latest TSC data<sup>271</sup> on the effectiveness of coercion show that from the seven episodes cases in which coercion was effective, either constraining or signalling was also effective in five. In the two remaining cases, at least one of the purposes was mixed.<sup>272</sup> However, the same relation does not apply in reverse: out of eighteen sanctions episodes in which constraining was effective, only two coercion was also effective. The same applies to signalling, in which coercion was deemed effective only in four out of twenty-three episodes in which signalling was considered effective. Such results add to the argument that one can also build a mid-range theory that explains coercion effectiveness by studying constraining and signalling effectiveness.

---

<sup>269</sup> Giumelli, 'The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions'.

<sup>270</sup> Biersteker, 'Enhancing Due Process in UN Security Council Targeted Sanctions Regimes'.

<sup>271</sup> Sanctions App, access in January 2022

## *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and the study of sanctions*

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is a data analysis approach that allows the researcher to evaluate causal relations and identify generalizations. Charles Ragin developed the method in 1987 in his attempt to develop a mid-way method to approach a set of cases that would be too few for a large N statistical analysis and too many for in-depth case studies.<sup>273</sup>

QCA has been used to study topics such as war termination<sup>274</sup>, UN intervention<sup>275</sup>, international negotiations<sup>276</sup>, military action and public opinion<sup>277</sup>, and sanctions—especially by European academia.<sup>278</sup> Among the scholarly literature on sanctions using QCA, most of the research has investigated EU sanctions (sometimes in combination with other sanctions), their effectiveness, and their usage to promote certain goals or deal with specific crises. Some studies, however, went beyond EU sanctions.

Grauvogel investigates the mobilization of opposition under regimes sanctioned by the EU, US, and UN.<sup>279</sup> Palestini uses QCA to investigate regional sanctions, analyzing how American regional organizations impose sanctions against undemocratic behaviour.<sup>280</sup>

Among the studies that used QCA to understand sanctions, Boogaerts and Drieskens's fuzzy-set QCA investigation of the (in)effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions in the MENA region is worthy of discussion due to the similarities with the purposes of this article.<sup>281</sup> The authors use similar concepts and data to the ones used in this article (three-purposed framework, sanctions episodes, and TSC dataset).

Their article is probably the first attempt to investigate the effectiveness of UNSC sanctions across the three purposes using QCA. It shows that coercion, both the presence of EU sanctions and lack of trade diversion, is vital for successful coercion. In combination with UNSC sanctions on aviation, EU sanctions seem effective in

---

<sup>273</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>274</sup> Chan, 'Strategic Anticipation and Adjustment'.

<sup>275</sup> Binder, 'Paths to Intervention'.

<sup>276</sup> Dell'Aguzzo, 'Conditions for Successful Multiparty Mediation in Separatist Armed Conflicts'.

<sup>277</sup> Haesebrouck, 'Who Follows Whom?'

<sup>278</sup> Grauvogel, 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions'.

<sup>279</sup> Grauvogel.

<sup>280</sup> Palestini, 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'.

<sup>281</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

constraining targets. Effective signalling seems to be related to a focus on key supporters and unanimity among the permanent members of the UNSC.<sup>282</sup>

However, their article possesses some limitations that warrant some caution. First, the sanctions episodes address non-proliferation, armed conflict, and counterterrorism issues. Also, there is excessive focus on the EU sanctions as a significant condition, despite being an article that aims to explain UNSC sanction episodes.

However, why have these scholars started to use QCA as a research method to study sanctions? QCA possesses important characteristics that might make it an appropriate methodological approach, as suggested by some authors.<sup>283</sup>

First, despite the extensive use of targeted sanctions by the UNSC for cases of intra-State armed conflicts and conceptual innovations as "sanctions episodes," the number of sanctions episodes is still relatively small for a large-N statistical exercise. The same applies to studying more prolific senders like the US or EU.

Second, QCA can handle causal complexity: conjectural causation and equifinality. The first is when one explanatory condition relies on other conditions' presence (or absence) to have an effect. The second is when multiple configurations of explanatory factors lead to a similar outcome.

Given the findings of the literature on sanctions, it is safe to assume that both conjunctural causation and equifinality hold for sanctions.<sup>284</sup> For example, recent literature shows that sanctions hamper rebel groups' territorial control when sanctions are imposed on rebel groups that are not adaptable to changes in funding sources.<sup>285</sup> Also, for constraining and signalling, a very different constellation of factors has led to successful outcomes regarding sanction effectiveness, possibly pointing out equifinality.<sup>286</sup>

Finally, QCA appears to be the most appropriate approach to answer the question proposed by this article. Rather than questioning whether a sanction has or has not had an effect – which would be more akin to statistical analysis, this article proposes an understanding of which conditions sanctions were successful in signalling or constraining its targets. In-depth case studies would be another appropriate pathway,

---

<sup>282</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens.

<sup>283</sup> Grauvogel, 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions'; Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'; Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

<sup>284</sup> Grauvogel, 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions'.

<sup>285</sup> Radtke and Jo, 'Fighting the Hydra'.

<sup>286</sup> Biersteker, Tourinho, and Eckert, 'The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions'.

but they lack the mid-range capacity to generalize within a particular set of cases that QCA offers.

### *QCA as a method*

The researcher, when doing QCA, uses set-theory to compare cases across configurations of conditions to a specific outcome. The value of a condition or outcome indicates the presence or absence, or more accurately, the degree of membership of that case regarding that condition or outcome.<sup>287</sup>

Due to QCA's reliance on Boolean algebra, such conditions and outcomes are coded only by binary variables, a crisp-set. Boolean logic allows variables to exist only in the absence (0) or presence (1), highlighting the qualitative difference between those states, not the degree.<sup>288</sup>

After some years, Ragin introduced fuzzy sets – based on the work of Lofti Zadeh. Fuzzy sets allow conditions and outcomes to have grade-set membership.<sup>289</sup> For fuzzy sets, three values serve as anchors: the value to be considered fully in (score of 1), the value to be considered fully out (score of 0), and the value of maximum ambiguity (score 0.5).<sup>290</sup>

Other forms of QCA were later developed by other researchers, such as multivalued QCA, temporal QCA, and two-step QCA. However, fuzzy-sets and crisp-sets QCAs are still the most used approaches.<sup>291</sup>

QCA compares cases through configurations of explanatory variables vis-à-vis the presence (or absence) of an outcome. By doing so, QCA can identify conditions in which specific outcomes are achieved by comparing similarities and differences between the conditions, helping to build mid-range theories.<sup>292</sup> The content and intent of such mid-range theories rest significantly on the purpose of the exercise per se, mainly falling into two categories.<sup>293</sup>

The first is when QCA is used to understand the effect of the presence/absence of a condition on a specific outcome—for example, understanding the effect of the presence/absence of sanctions on achieving a comprehensive peace agreement. It would require the universe of cases of all peace agreements negotiated during a

---

<sup>287</sup> Oana, Schneider, and Thomann, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Using R*.

<sup>288</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>289</sup> Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*.

<sup>290</sup> Ragin.

<sup>291</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>292</sup> Ragin, *The Comparative Method. Moving beyond Quantitative and Qualitative Strategies*.

<sup>293</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

specific period, the condition "sanction" itself calibrated, plus other conditions that the literature and the researcher deemed important.

The second category is when the researcher investigates the conditions that led to that particular outcome alone or in conjunction. For example, this article utilizes QCA to understand a particular outcome since it attempts to understand which conditions make UN-targeted sanctions effective in constraining or signalling<sup>294</sup>.

The method works by dealing with relations of necessity and sufficiency of the conditions selected by the researcher. Necessity means that a condition (or conjunction of conditions) needs to be (almost) present for a particular outcome to occur; however, it does not cause it by itself. At the same time, sufficiency is when a condition (or conjunction of conditions) always leads to an outcome when present. However, its presence is not necessary for the outcome to happen<sup>295</sup>.

QCA evaluates every single condition for both necessity and sufficiency. In the case of sufficiency, if one condition is not enough to lead to an outcome, then QCA can provide a conjunction of conditions leading to an outcome (conjectural causation). Because different conjunctions of conditions can be sufficient to achieve a particular outcome, there are often multiple pathways through which specific outcomes can be achieved (equifinality).

Both necessity and sufficiency are measured through two different "measurements of fit": consistency and coverage. Both metrics serve as descriptive measures, similar to the statistical analysis's measurements of significance and strength.<sup>296</sup>

According to Ragin, consistency "*assesses the degree to which instances of the outcome is displaying the causal condition thought to be necessary*"; in other words, how much the set-theoretic relationship between one or a combination of conditions and the outcome. For consistency, the closest to 1, the better.<sup>297</sup>

When analysing necessary conditions, the minimum threshold score is 0.9 in consistency for a single condition to be considered necessary. It is essentially a rule of

---

<sup>294</sup> If the purpose was to investigate the effect of sanctions per se in combination with other factors, the universe of cases would not be limited to cases in which sanctions were applied, but rather all cases of intra-armed state conflicts in which sanctions could be applied.

<sup>295</sup> Rihoux and Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods*.

<sup>296</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>297</sup> Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*.

thumb. For QCA on the limited number of cases, the consistency should be perfect or almost perfect, while the consistency is expected to fall for larger sets.<sup>298</sup>

Coverage, on the other hand, "assesses *the relevance of the necessary condition – the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with the instances of the outcome.*"<sup>299</sup> It measures how much a specific condition explains a particular outcome.

The primary function of coverage when analysing necessary conditions is to help the researcher distinguish between necessary and trivial conditions. For a condition to be considered necessary, it needs to possess a high consistency and a minimum 0.5 score in terms of coverage.<sup>300</sup>

Finally, operationally, QCA has three significant steps. The first step is to construct the data into set-type scores of memberships (0 or 1 for crisp-sets; or values varying from 0 to 1 for fuzzy sets), both for the conditions and outcomes. The researcher does a preliminary analysis of any necessary conditions at this step. As a rule of thumb, the number of conditions varies typically from three to five, but there is room for more conditions.

Second, with the help of the software, the researcher transforms such a matrix into a "truth table." Each row contains a unique combination of the conditions, and each case is assigned accordingly. The second step shows the importance of being mindful when adding too many conditions since each condition added increases the number of rows of the truth table exponentially.<sup>301</sup>

Finally, the truth table is "simplified" into logical formulas that explain the outcomes, the so-called solution formulas. Before the solution formulas are derived, the researcher needs to determine two factors.

First, it is the minimum consistency level the row needs to achieve to be considered for a solution. A score of 0.75 is the standard accepted threshold.<sup>302</sup> The second is the frequency threshold, meaning the minimum number of cases necessary per truth row. Typically, the cut-off is a single case; however, the cut-off might be two or more cases for QCA that possesses a large-N (more than 100, for example).

---

<sup>298</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>299</sup> Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*.

<sup>300</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>301</sup> Mello.

<sup>302</sup> Mello.

This process typically generates three solution formulas: conservative/complex, intermediate, and parsimonious. All three solutions come with measures of fit. First, the solution in its entirety displays both a score inconsistency and a score regarding coverage. They follow the same logic of consistency and coverage previously discussed for one condition. Consistency of the solution shows the overall consistency between the solution and the outcome, while coverage explains how much of the cases are explained by the solution.

It is unclear what are good minimum scores regarding consistency and coverage for the entire solution. The practice seems to point out that at least 0.9 is required regarding consistency. Regarding coverage, some authors argue for 0.7 or 0.75, while others accept lower thresholds, such as 0.6, mainly when QCA is applied to a larger N.<sup>303</sup>

Each solution presents the so-called recipes, formulas, or pathways, which are essentially a combination of conditions sufficient to lead to the outcome under investigation. It is advisable to have a consistency of 0.9 for each formula.<sup>304</sup> Each one also has two metrics of coverage: raw coverage which is the total coverage of that combination leading to the outcome without considering any overlap, and unique coverage –which includes only cases in which that combination of conditions explains the pathway and not others. There is no agreed minimum threshold.

Each type of solution has its unique characteristics in terms of the solutions themselves. The conservative minimized formula is derived by only using empirical rows associated with the desired outcomes (and following the threshold of consistency and frequency) without assumptions about empty rows. On the other hand, the parsimonious utilize all rows, including logical remainders, using them as counterfactuals to derive the solution. Thus, the parsimonious tend to produce the most simplified and easier-to-interpret solution, but some assumptions might not be correct.

The intermediate, as the name suggests, stands between the two. The intermediate uses logical reminders to simplify the configurations, but only the researcher deemed plausible, excluding others from the calculations. The researcher selects the expected directions regarding each condition (presence, absence, both) to the outcome, and then the software uses those assumptions to derive the intermediary solution.

---

<sup>303</sup> Mello.

<sup>304</sup> Mello.

Which solution to use is a considerable debate within the QCA literature, especially between the intermediate vis-à-vis the parsimonious solutions. Some argue that only the parsimonious solution can be used for causal analysis. In contrast, others perceive the parsimonious solution's reliance on simplifications as risky.<sup>305</sup>

In the sanction's literature, there seems to be a preference for the intermediary solution<sup>306</sup>, which seems a "safe" choice, even when the number of conditions grows, making the interpretation challenging.

## *Research Design*

### Case Selection

What is a "case" for this article? As proposed by Ericksson<sup>307</sup> and operationalized by the TSC, this study uses "*sanctions episodes*" as the unit of analysis. Sanctions episodes have enough variation across different factors that allow this type of comparison.

To ensure internal validity and comparability between sanctions episodes, the article focuses on cases of targeted sanctions applied to deal with intra-State armed conflict, dropping episodes in which sanctions were used primarily to counter-proliferation of nuclear weapons, unconstitutional changes of government, or counterterrorism.

For intra-State armed conflicts, there is enough consistency in terms of actors (rebel groups and governments), purpose, and the general goal of the UNSC (cease hostilities, uphold a particular peace agreement, or the peace process) to warrant a comparison across the cases.

Also, most UN sanctions imposed over the last two decades attempted to solve intra-State armed conflicts, making it a logical choice for the study of UNSC sanctions. Due to the difference between targeted and comprehensive sanctions, this study does not include cases in which comprehensive sanctions were used.

Following the classification of TSC, from 1991 until 2014, there were 63 UNSC-targeted sanction episodes<sup>308</sup>. Such count, thus, excludes at least sanctions episodes in which the UNSC has imposed comprehensive sanctions following targeted sanctions. One episode regarding former Yugoslavia, two episodes for Haiti, and one

---

<sup>305</sup> Mello.

<sup>306</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'; Boogaerts, Portela, and Drieskens, 'One Swallow Does Not Make Spring'; Grauvogel, 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions'.

<sup>307</sup> Eriksson, *Targeting Peace*, 2011.

<sup>308</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

sanction episode for Iraq in which the UNSC imposed a comprehensive regime almost immediately.

From those 63 sanctions episodes, 22 were not included in the final set of cases. First, all cases unrelated to the armed conflict were eliminated, such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>309</sup>, counterterrorism<sup>310</sup>, and purely democratic support.<sup>311</sup> Three sets of cases proved to be more difficult to classify.

First, there is the sanction regime of Al Qaeda-Taliban and its four episodes. Post-US invasion of Afghanistan, the UNSC established a sanction regime to deal with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Although the Taliban resembles a typical armed group, the regime has become hyper-focused on Al-Qaeda (counterterrorism).<sup>312</sup> Due to this, all sanctions episodes regarding Al-Qaeda-Taliban were not included. The only exception is the sanction regime 1988, created in 2011 to deal exclusively with the Taliban.

Second, there are the sanction episodes for Haiti. The Haiti case is a complex case with elements of peace enforcement. However, the origins and dynamics of the episode were due to a coup d'état against President Aristide, followed by the persecution of his supporters by the junta. Thus, the three sanctions episodes of targeted sanctions against Haiti were also not included since they seem far from the standard armed conflict comparability criterion.

Finally, the set of cases when the UNSC imposed sanctions to safeguard the peacebuilding processes, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d'Ivoire. These cases were kept in the final universe because intra-State armed conflicts tend to reoccur due to the fragility of the post-conflict period<sup>313</sup>. Thus, such periods can be considered integral to studying intra-State armed conflicts. Also, the challenge of dismissing them would be classifying cases in which peacebuilding and peace-making coincide, such as Somalia or Iraq.

The last step was to evaluate which of the 41 remaining sanctions episodes possess constraining or signalling as a purpose. Fortunately, all those 41 sanctions episodes have both constraining and signalling purposes. Thus, the final set of cases is 41 sanctions episodes, roughly 65% of the total sanction episodes from 1991 to 2013.

---

<sup>309</sup> Three sanctions episodes for North Korea, and four sanctions episodes for Iran

<sup>310</sup> Three sanction episodes for Libya, two sanction episodes for Sudan, two sanction episodes for Afghanistan, and one for Lebanon

<sup>311</sup> Guinea-Bissau

<sup>312</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. TSC Qualitative Database

<sup>313</sup> Bara, Deglow, and van Baalen, 'Civil War Recurrence and Postwar Violence'.

Building the data matrix for QCA: outcome (effectiveness) and conditions

As discussed earlier, this article aims to understand under which conditions the UNSC targeted sanctions effectively constrained its targets and under which conditions signalling (stigmatizing) was effective. Thus, the primary outcome of both QCA models is the sanction episode's effectiveness in constraining or signalling.

This article operationalizes effectiveness by using the scores on effectiveness given by the TSC.<sup>314</sup> The TSC measures the effectiveness of UNSC-targeted sanctions for each sanction episode, scoring them as effective, mixed, or ineffective for each relevant purpose (coercion, constraining, signalling). To achieve this score, the TSC uses a combination of two different metrics based on the judgment of its researchers.

First, it is the policy outcome. The TSC researchers provided a score from 1 to 5 on the extent of achieving the policy outcome for that particular purpose for that episode. The score varies from (1) - there is no indication that the policy outcome was achieved, up to (5) when there is a significant achievement of the policy outcome.

Second, it is the sanction contribution. The TSC researchers score from (0) to (5) on the contribution of sanctions to achieving the policy outcome. The researcher scored (0) when sanctions were counterproductive in achieving its objectives. Besides 0, the researcher can score the sanction episode from (1) – when there is no real contribution by sanctions, up to (5) when sanctions appear as the most significant contributing factor.

Taking those scores, the TSC scored as effective for a specific purpose, every sanction episode in which the policy outcome scored 4 or 5, and sanctions contribution was 3, 4, or 5. The TSC assessment was considered mixed when policy outcome was scored 3, and UN sanction contribution was 3, 4, or 5. Finally, it was labelled ineffective when the policy outcome was 1 or 2, or the UN sanctions contribution was 0, 1, or 2.

Given how the TSC scored effectiveness, it is possible to transform the effectiveness into an outcome set-type membership score following a binomial value (crisp-set) or a continuum (fuzzy set).

Boogaerts and Drieskens chose the fuzzy-set route.<sup>315</sup> Using the method developed by Hufbauer to operationalize effectiveness<sup>316</sup>, they multiplied the policy outcome and

---

<sup>314</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. Quantitative Dataset

<sup>315</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

<sup>316</sup> Hufbauer, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*.

sanction contribution score and, through direct calibration, transformed the effectiveness of sanctions into a continuum from 0 to 1.

As explained before, when doing the calibration process in fuzzy sets, three scores are essential: the score to be considered fully in, the score to be considered fully out, and the point of maximum ambiguity when the calibration method and the transformation of TSC effectiveness into a fuzzy set show some critical limitations.

For example, Boogaerts and Drieskens chose the following thresholds (6, 13, 18) to evaluate sanctions' effectiveness in constraining. An episode case that scored 4 in policy outcome and 3 in sanction contribution, thus effective for the TSC, would be considered "more out than in," which seems illogical.

Rather than being a problem caused by Boogaerts and Drieskens threshold decision per se, the transformation of the TSC effectiveness score into the fuzzy set is bound to end up with logical flaws. For example, suppose a score of 9 is used as a point of maximum ambiguity. In that case, cases in which sanctions have some degree of effectiveness may end up not being considered, vis-a-vis cases that scored ten but had lower scores in one of the metrics.

Thus, the best alternative is to transform effectiveness measurement into a crisp set, using a logic similar to the rules set by the TSC itself. The easiest route would be only to consider effective sanctions episodes deemed effective by the TSC. However, such a choice would be conservative.

As explained, a sanction episode was considered mixed in effectiveness when policy outcome was scored 3, and UN sanction contribution was 3, 4, or 5. It means that mixed cases had a certain degree of effectiveness, even modest. The TSC analysis might be obfuscating more than clarifying it by utilizing only a high effectiveness threshold. It is relevant because sanctions are generally applied for hard cases. Thus, effectiveness is expected to be hard to achieve. Also, empirical cases show that their impact usually complements other tools or conditions, not being the most defining factor by itself.

Thus, in both models, the effectiveness of sanctions was transformed into a crisp set. However, sanctions were considered effective (1) when policy outcome was scored 3, 4, or 5, and sanction contribution was scored 3, 4, or 5. Sanctions were ineffective (0) when policy outcome was scored as 1 or 2, or sanction contribution was 0, 1, or 2.

In terms of conditions, as rightly pointed out by Boogaerts and Drieskens,<sup>317</sup> there is very incipient theorization regarding what leads to the effectiveness of sanctions, especially for constraining and signalling. Thus, the selection of the conditions for both models is primarily driven by empirical observation and knowledge of the researcher about each sanction episode, drawn mostly from the TSC's qualitative database.

The conditions are also in a crisp set format since most of the data of the TSC were also coded binomially.<sup>318</sup> The QCA literature suggests parsimony in selecting conditions to avoid extreme complexity. Mello suggests that the minimum number of cases for six conditions should be 36, while for seven conditions, it is 42.<sup>319</sup>

Given that the number of sanctions episodes under study is 41, one model uses six conditions, and the other uses five conditions. Before explaining the conditions chosen for both models, it is important to stress that the final conditions presented in this paper are a result of an iterative process between selecting conditions, their coding, and the analytical findings suggested by the QCA literature.<sup>320</sup> Most conditions, with few exceptions, use the TSC dataset as the data source. In some instances, the researcher needed to adjust it, in which case the procedure was explained when the condition is discussed in this paper.

Some conditions proved challenging to operationalize due to their presence in all sanction episodes. Initially, one ambition was to investigate the role played by diplomatic efforts. However, diplomatic efforts were present in all cases, and there was no clear manner to distinguish between those efforts. The same applies to the presence of Special Envoys.

Furthermore, conditions related to the final effect of the sanction goals were not included. Saying that sanctions were effective when they produced political impact does little to explain the design or the context that might explain such an outcome. For example, Boogaerts and Drieskens use political impact as one of the conditions to explain their signalling model. This type of condition was avoided in both models because such conditions run the risk of finding tautological results in which the outcome and the conditions could be measuring similar issues.

### Constraining model

---

<sup>317</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

<sup>318</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. Quantitative dataset

<sup>319</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

<sup>320</sup> Mello.

The constraining model includes six crisp-set conditions. The first table in the Appendix shows the 41 sanctions episodes with the scores for the outcome and the conditions chosen. The following conditions are part of the final model:

- **Peacekeeping Operations Deployed (PKO):** peacekeeping forces (regional or from the UN) should positively contribute to the constraining of targets – less access to resources and smaller room to engage in illicit activities.<sup>321</sup> At the same time, sanctions can enhance and facilitate the work of peacekeeping forces by constraining the target's ability to engage in war.<sup>322</sup> The only modification from the TSC dataset was the re-coding of Angola Episode 4 from 1 to 0. Although the episode lasted from 1999 to 2002, the peacekeeping forces left in 1999: just one month after the episode started.
- **Commodities Exports that serve as the primary funding source are sanctioned by the UNSC (Funding):** constraining is essentially a purpose in which sanctions attempt to affect the material capability of the target. Thus, it is expected that sanctions will lead to effective constraining when sanctions are imposed on commodity exports that represent the primary source of revenue for the target.<sup>323</sup> To code this variable, the researcher used the TSC data on sanctions on commodity exports. Then, the researcher judged whether the exported commodities represented the primary funding source for the target(s). For Angola Episodes 3 and 4, the diamond trade ban was considered (1) since diamonds were a main source of revenue for UNITA. For Côte Ivoire episodes, the diamond sale was a source of revenue but not significant for the rebels – which relied on tolls and other natural products like cocoa and coffee,<sup>324</sup> and the government, which relied on oil.
- **Government as the main target (GovConstrain):** constraining governments are expected to be qualitatively different from constraining rebel groups. Governments often possess access to various resources – commodities, financial tools, and taxation- and possess diplomatic standing internationally. By putting governments as the main targets of constraining, the UNSC might trigger different dynamics than when its main target for constraining is rebel groups or both sides.
- **Diplomatic sanctions are imposed (Diplomatic):** although diplomatic sanctions tend to be seen as sanctions that target the receiver's legitimacy, they might substantially hamper the target's capacity to engage with other international actors

---

<sup>321</sup> Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace'.

<sup>322</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. Qualitative dataset

<sup>323</sup> Radtke and Jo, 'Fighting the Hydra'.

<sup>324</sup> United Nations Environment Programme, C?

– affecting its material capabilities as well. Both sanctions episodes in Angola<sup>325</sup> and Libya seem to point in this direction, even though the first applied to a rebel group and the latter to the government.

- **Enforcement authorities are identified (Enforcement):** considering the purpose of the sanctions to affect the target materially, the enforcement of the sanctions is vital for its effectiveness. Identifying who is supposed to enforce the sanctions should be a necessary step in effectively constraining the target since it facilitates the actual implementation of the sanctions.
- **International Courts are engaged in the case: (ICC/ICJ):** the latest condition is based on the empirical observation that sanctions, in combination with the usage of judicial courts, seem to be quite effective in curtailing individual actors.<sup>326</sup>

### Signalling Model

The signalling model includes five crisp-set conditions. The second table in the Appendix shows the 41 sanctions episodes with the scores for the outcome and the conditions chosen. The following conditions are part of the model:

- **Unanimous P5 voting (P5):** sanctions approved by unanimous voting from all permanent members might show a strong signal towards targets that UNSC posits a common front.<sup>327</sup>
- **Individual (Individual):** this condition includes cases in which sanctions signal (or stigmatize) individuals. The signalling or stigmatization of individuals sends a clear signal about the position of the UNSC and crafts a narrative about the armed conflict or a potential spoiler to the peace process. For example, during the Angola civil war, the UNSC Security Council increasingly used sanctions to stigmatize Savimbi- the leader of UNITA- as the main responsible for the ongoing war.<sup>328</sup>
- **Too many norms being signalled (Many norms):** this condition captures how many different norms are being signalled by the UNSC during an episode. The expectation is that sanctions episodes with too many norms end up obfuscating the intentions of the Council, undermining its effectiveness. Finally, this condition was operationalized by coding 1 for every episode in which the UNSC signalled four or more norms simultaneously.
- **Episode lasting five or more years (Time)** as a condition is expected to be absent; the logic behind this condition is that time possibly degrades the signal provided by the Council, especially when conditions seem to be static, or Council

---

<sup>325</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. Qualitative Dataset

<sup>326</sup> Biersteker et al.

<sup>327</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

<sup>328</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

fails to respond to novel elements on the ground. The logic behind this condition is a product of the analysis of Somalia and Iraq sanctions episodes.<sup>329</sup>

- **Economic costly sanctions (Economic):** Signalling primarily aims to affect the legitimacy and information available. However, sanctions that possess economic costs to the targets (and senders) possibly contribute to the signal by giving it "teeth." <sup>330</sup> In other words, by including economic sanctions, the sender (UNSC) might signal an essential piece of information: that the sanction is not cheap talk. The economic condition was coded by labelling as 1 all sanctions episodes in which the UNSC imposed commodity, financial, or transportation sanctions.

## *Analysis*

### Constraining model

The first step of the analysis is to investigate whether there is a necessary condition among the six conditions chosen for the model. Only Enforcement appears necessary, with a consistency above 0.9 and coverage above 0.5. Logically, enforcement appears as a necessary condition for effective constraining since identifying the authorities to enforce is essential in ensuring the full implementation of the sanction.

After analysing the necessary conditions, a truth table was constructed using the software, with cases assigned to each row, according to the combination of conditions. Only rows that exhibited a consistency of 1 and a minimum frequency of 1 were considered valid for the minimization process and generation of the solutions.

From the three solutions provided by QCA, this article will focus on the intermediate solution. The intermediate solution is a compromise, more straightforward to interpret but still bound to realistic assumptions. It also follows the current standard in the sanctions literature when using QCA.

As shown by Table 1, the solution for effective constraining has multiple paths (5), which presents a typical case of equifinality. The intermediate solution has a solution coverage of 0.75 – meaning that it explains 75% of the cases in which sanctions were effective in constraining. The model also possesses a perfect consistency score (1), which means no contradictory cases for the five pathways chosen.

The first path is *Funding\*Enforcement\*PKO\*~ICC/ICJ\*~GovConstrain* → E, being the one with the highest raw coverage (31.25%) and highest unique coverage (25%). It

---

<sup>329</sup> Biersteker, 'SanctionApp'.

<sup>330</sup> Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox*.

covers Liberia EP4 (1,1), Liberia EP5 (1,1), Angola EP3 (1,1), Sierra Leone EP4 (1,1), and Sierra Leone EP5 (1,1).

Table 1. Intermediate Solution (Constraining Model)

<i>INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---</i>			
<i>frequency cut-off: 1</i>			
<i>consistency cut-off: 1</i>			
<i>Assumptions:</i>			
<i>Funding (present)</i>			
<i>Enforcement (present)</i>			
<i>PKO (present)</i>			
<i>solution coverage: 0.75</i>			
<i>solution consistency: 1</i>			
	Raw coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
<i>Funding*Enforcement*PKO*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	0.3125	0.25	1
<i>Funding*Enforcement*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	0.125	0.0625	1
<i>Enforcement*PKO*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	0.1875	0.125	1
<i>Enforcement*~PKO*~Diplomatic*ICC/ICJ*GovConstrain</i>	0.125	0.125	1
<i>Funding*Enforcement*PKO*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ</i>	0.1875	0.125	1
<i>Funding*Enforcement*PKO*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	LiberiaEP4 (1,1), LiberiaEP5 (1,1), AngolaEP3 (1,1), SierraLeoneEP4 (1,1), Sierra LeoneEP5 (1,1)		
<i>Funding*Enforcement*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	AngolaEP3 (1,1), AngolaEP4 (1,1)		
<i>Enforcement*PKO*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ*~GovConstrain</i>	AngolaEP2 (1,1), AngolaEP3 (1,1), Sierra LeoneEP1 (1,1)		
<i>Enforcement*~PKO*~Diplomatic*ICC/ICJ*GovConstrain</i>	Libya2EP1 (1,1), Libya2EP2 (1,1)		
<i>Funding*Enforcement*PKO*Diplomatic*~ICC/ICJ</i>	LiberiaEP2 (1,1), LiberiaEP3 (1,1), AngolaEP3 (1,1)		

It suggests that the combination of these conditions: Funding, Enforcement, and PKO is effective in constraining targets- when international courts (ICC/ICJ) are not present and when the government is not the primary object of the sanction. This pathway seems to be the most important one regarding its explanatory power. The pathway speaks to the literature, especially in the cases of Sierra Leone and Liberia, in which the commodity exports ban (diamonds, timber), together with peacekeeping forces, largely contributed to the overall cease of hostilities and posterior successful

peacebuilding process.<sup>331</sup> Both measures seem self-reinforcing, especially when the target is not mainly the government.

The causal paths *Funding\*Enforcement\*PKO\*Diplomatic\*~ICC/ICJ→E* and *Funding\*Enforcement\* Diplomatic\* ~ICC/ICJ\* ~GovConstrain → E*, and *Enforcement\* PKO\* Diplomatic\*~ICC/ICJ\*~GovConstrain-→ E*. seem to be variations of the same recipe of the first path, with three different combinations.

The addition of diplomatic sanctions to the combinations of conditions allows it to be effective against governments (LiberiaEP2 (1,1), LiberiaEP3 (1,1)), but also against rebels (AngolaEP3 (1,1)), (AngolaEP4(1,1) - even without peacekeeping such as the case of AngolaEP4. The addition of diplomatic sanctions also seems sufficient to constrain the presence of peacekeeping troops effectively, independently of the presence of sanctions on commodities that serve as primary sources of revenue.

The main pathway and its variations seem to indicate that the effectiveness of sanctions in constraining passes through the clarity regarding its Enforcement and the presence of at least two out of these three conditions to be sufficient: sanctions on commodities serving as major sources of funding, peacekeeping operations, and diplomatic sanctions.

The final pathway is *Enforcement\*~PKO\*~Diplomatic\*ICC/ICJ\*GovConstrain→E* is unique and points out the effectiveness in sanctions constraining governments when there is clarity in who needs to enforce, coupled with action from established international tribunals (ICC/ICJ). However, it only covers Libya2EP1 (1,1) and Libya2EP2 (1,1); thus, it might also represent an omitted condition, such as the use of force. It can be theorized that the strong stigmatization caused by the involvement of these judicial systems also affects constraining targets.

### Signalling model

As with the constraining model, the first step is to investigate whether there is a necessary condition among the conditions chosen for the model. P5 appears as a necessary condition from the five conditions, with a consistency above 0.9 and coverage barely above 0.5, confirming its possible status as a necessary condition.

It appears that the unanimous position of the P5 is an (almost) necessary condition for the signalling to be effective. It is logical if considered that it provides less room for the

---

<sup>331</sup> Wallensteen et al., *Sanctions for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building*; Vines and Cargill, 'The Impact of UN Sanctions and Their Panels of Experts'.

target and audiences to second-guess the intent of the members of the Council. Moreover, considering the Security Council's political nature and the actors' often-disparate policy preferences, the unanimity might indeed signal to targets and the audience an important message.

After analysing the necessary conditions, a truth table was constructed, with cases assigned to each row, according to the combination of conditions. Only rows that exhibited a consistency of 1 and a minimum frequency of 1 were considered valid for the minimization process and generation of the solutions.

Table 2: Intermediate solution – Signaling Model

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---			
frequency cut-off: 1			
consistency cut-off: 1			
Assumptions:			
Individual (present)			
~ManyNorms (absent)			
Economic (present)			
P5 (present)			
solution coverage: 0.7			
solution consistency: 1			
	Raw coverage	Unique Coverage	Consistency
~ManyNorms*Economic*~Time	0.55	0.55	1
P5*~ManyNorms*Individual*Time	0.15	0.15	1
~ManyNorms*Economic*~Time	SomaliaEP4 (1,1), LiberiaEP2 (1,1), LiberiaEP3 (1,1), LiberiaEP4 (1,1), AngolaEP1 (1,1), AngolaEP2 (1,1), AngolaEP3 (1,1), AngolaEP4 (1,1), SierraLeoneEP1 (1,1), SierraLeoneEP4 (1,1), Côte d'IvoireEP3 (1,1)		
P5*~ManyNorms*Individual*Time	LiberiaEP5 (1,1), SierraLeoneEP5 (1,1), TalibanEP1 (1,1)		

As shown by Table 2, the solution for effective signalling has two main pathways. The intermediate solution has a solution coverage of 0.7, indicating that the model explains 70% of the cases in which sanctions were effective in signalling, which is a good minimum score for explanatory power given the N. The model also seems to fit due to consistency being 1.

The solution for the signalling model ended up being two major formulas. First, the with the highest raw coverage and unique coverage (55%) is the formula  $\sim\text{ManyNorms} * \text{Economic} * \sim\text{Time} \rightarrow E$ .

The cases covered by this formula are sanctions episodes on conflicts fuelled by commodities trading (diamonds, logs and charcoal), in which the Council was mainly addressing rebel groups in open rebellion (Angola, Somalia, and Sierra Leone) or potential spoilers (Liberia). The only exception is Côte d'Ivoire which the government was the main target.

It suggests that the most common pathway towards effective signalling is the combination of the UNSC being selective regarding how many norms are being signalled, coupled with economic measures within episodes that do not last too long. In all the episodes, the UNSC tried using sanctions to resolve an ongoing conflict or crisis (except for Liberia, which was focused on peace enforcement).

The second recipe  $P5 \sim \text{ManyNorms} * \text{Individual} * \text{Time} \rightarrow E$ . covers cases in which, independently of the presence of economic sanctions, the sanctions were effective in signalling through a combination of P5 unanimity, not signalling too many norms, stigmatisation of individuals and, surprisingly, sanction episodes that last more than five years.

This pathway can be almost interpreted as the peacebuilding formula (Liberia EP5, Sierra LeoneP5), which might explain the presence of time as a condition. Interestingly, such a pathway does not depend on the presence or absence of economic sanctions. Although Liberia episode 5 and Sierra Leone episode 5 started with economic sanctions being present, commodity sanctions were relaxed and terminated before the actual end of the sanction episode.<sup>332</sup>

The Taliban episode is an outlier compared to Liberia EP5 and Sierra Leone EP5 under this pathway. However, Taliban EP1 is unique since the Council used the sanction episode to signal to the Taliban to initiate negotiations. In this sense, the Council was intervening with sanctions to support peace negotiations in a conflict where one of its permanent members (the US) is a conflicting party trying to engage in peace talks.<sup>333</sup>

### *Discussion and Conclusion*

This article analysed the conditions that explain the effectiveness of sanctions in constraining and signalling. As expected, the results show that the effectiveness of sanctions is causally complex, presenting both equifinality and conjunctural causation.

---

<sup>332</sup> Biersteker, 'SanctionApp'.

<sup>333</sup> Biersteker.

Regarding the findings, in each of the models, one condition appeared to be (almost) necessary for the occurrence of the outcome. Regarding constraining, clarity regarding who enforces the sanctions appeared as a necessary condition. On signalling, the unanimous support from the five permanent members of the Security Council seems to be an almost necessary condition, which supports the findings from Boogaerts and Drieskens.<sup>334</sup>

On constraining, the intermediate solution seems to suggest two possible conclusions. First, effective constraining seems to be achieved by different combinations of three conditions: sanctions on commodities when they represent the primary source of funding for targets, diplomatic sanctions, and the presence of peacekeeping operations. The first two depict the nature of sanctions being imposed per se, while the last is another policy tool at the disposal of UNSC and regional organizations.

Although those findings are not surprising for sanctions on commodities - when they are primary targets revenue sources - and peacekeeping operations, the same is not necessarily true for diplomatic sanctions. Although, logically, the sudden inability to represent itself externally and engage internationally might have material repercussions, the literature might have overlooked this aspect.

Second, when governments are the primary targets, sanctions constrain governments when combined with established international tribunal courts (ICC/ICJ). However, this second conclusion must be taken with scepticism because it was primarily driven by one sanction regime: Libya II and its two sanctions episodes. There is a possibility that Libya's sanctions episodes and some of the 25% of cases not explained could be explained by another omitted condition.

On signalling, the solution suggests two main pathways, one more focused on peacemaking and the other on peacebuilding (although both formulas had their exceptions). For both formulas, the absence of *ManyNorms* shows the importance of the Council being selective with the number of norms being signalled; otherwise, it runs the risk of making the signal confusing.

Overall, the signalling model shows that for active conflict, economic sanctions do enhance the signal of the Council by proving that it is not cheap talk. For cases where the sanction episode is geared towards sustaining a peace process, it is a combination of stigmatisation against an individual, often a potential spoiler – which supports some

---

<sup>334</sup> Boogaerts and Drieskens, 'Lessons from the MENA Region'.

of the theorised ways sanctions can support peacebuilding<sup>335</sup>- and unanimous support from P5. The results also point out that the time that a sanction episode last is indeed a critical condition, but rather than its absence or presence, its joint effect with other conditions depends on the context and purposes to which the sanctions are being applied to.

Like other studies that used QCA, the most severe limitations are two issues. First, the calibration of the outcome and conditions. Second, the selection of the conditions.<sup>336</sup>

On the calibration, this was addressed by relying mainly on the data and coding generated by TSC, which explains the decision to use a crisp set, especially for conditions. On the outcome, however, the decision to expand the notion of effectiveness to include cases in which sanctions have a modest effect can be the subject of debate. Such a decision on the calibration of the outcome might warrant another QCA analysis only looking at cases in which effectiveness passed this higher threshold.

On the selection of conditions, the selection might seem arbitrary at first sight. The relatively sterile material source that theoretically explains how sanctions can be effective also does not help select the conditions to be more solidly based. To address those issues, the construction of these models was done by testing the conditions of different conditions such as regional sanctions, diplomatic efforts, judicial (for signalling), key supporters (for signalling) and peacebuilding as objective. Those conditions did not add to the explanatory power of the final model and degraded its capacity to explain the outcome through simple combinations – a key consideration in QCA. Thus, the final models were the compromise between a good explanatory power without being mired in complexity, especially given the number of cases.

It is also necessary to affirm that the presented findings are exploratory due to the nature of the research method employed and the stage of development of the literature. One promising possible development within QCA would be the application of a multilevel QCA to the study of sanctions by separating conditions into two distinctive levels: conditions about the UNSC sanctions – the type of measure, the target chosen; and conditions related to the context – the presence of peacekeeping operations, regional sanctions. The only potential drawback would be the complexity, which will surely increase.

---

<sup>335</sup> Biersteker and Hudáková, 'UN Sanctions and Peace Negotiations: Possibilities for Complementarity'.

<sup>336</sup> Mello, *Qualitative Comparative Analysis*.

In summary, despite its limitations, the present article provides an essential contribution towards a more systematic cross-case analysis of the effectiveness of sanctions when constraining and signalling. Those results could guide further research on the area by testing if those conditions and their combination were also relevant to explain the effectiveness of sanctions on different types of issues (counterterrorism, non-proliferation) or from another type of sender (US, EU, AU).

## Appendix

Table 1A: Constraining Model dataset

Cases	Funding	Enforcement	ICC /ICJ	PKO	Gov Constrain	Diplomatic	Effectiveness (E)
<i>FRY 1 EP1</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP1</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP2</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP3</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP4</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP5</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Liberia EP1</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Liberia EP2</i>	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
<i>Liberia EP3</i>	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
<i>Liberia EP4</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Liberia EP5</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Angola EP1</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Angola EP2</i>	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
<i>Angola EP3</i>	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
<i>Angola EP4</i>	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Rwanda EP1</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Rwanda EP2</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP1</i>	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
<i>Sierra Leone EP2</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP3</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP4</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Sierra Leone EP5</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>FRY 2 EP1</i>	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
<i>DRC EP1</i>	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
<i>DRC EP2</i>	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
<i>DRC EP3</i>	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
<i>DRC EP4</i>	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
<i>Iraq EP1</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Iraq EP2</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Sudan 2 EP1</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Sudan 2 EP2</i>	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
<i>Côte d'Ivoire EP1</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Côte d'Ivoire EP2</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Côte d'Ivoire EP3</i>	0	1	0	1	0	0	0

<i>Côte d'Ivoire EP4</i>	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
<i>Côte d'Ivoire EP5</i>	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Taliban EP1</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Libya 2 EP1</i>	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
<i>Libya 2 EP2</i>	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
<i>Libya 2 EP3</i>	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
<i>CAR EP1</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Table 2A: Signalling Model dataset

<i>Cases</i>	<i>P</i> <i>5</i>	<i>Many</i> <i>Norms</i>	<i>Individual</i> <i>l</i>	<i>Economic</i> <i>c</i>	<i>Key</i> <i>Supporters</i>	<i>Time</i> <i>e</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i> <i>(E)</i>
<i>FRY 1 EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>Somalia EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Somalia EP2</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Somalia EP3</i>	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Somalia EP4</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Somalia EP5</i>	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
<i>Liberia EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Liberia EP2</i>	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Liberia EP3</i>	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
<i>Liberia EP4</i>	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Liberia EP5</i>	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
<i>Angola EP1</i>	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Angola EP2</i>	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
<i>Angola EP3</i>	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
<i>Angola EP4</i>	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
<i>Rwanda EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Rwanda EP2</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP1</i>	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Sierra Leone EP2</i>	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP3</i>	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
<i>Sierra Leone EP4</i>	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Sierra Leone EP5</i>	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
<i>FRY 2 EP1</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
<i>DRC EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>DRC EP2</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>DRC EP3</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>DRC EP4</i>	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Iraq EP1</i>	0	1	1	1	0	0	0
<i>Iraq EP2</i>	1	1	1	1	0	1	0

<i>Sudan 2 EP1</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Sudan 2 EP2</i>	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Côte d'IvoireEP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<i>Côte d'IvoireEP2</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>Côte d'IvoireEP3</i>	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
<i>Côte d'IvoireEP4</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
<i>Côte d'IvoireEP5</i>	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>Taliban EP1</i>	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
<i>Libya 2 EP1</i>	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
<i>Libya 2 EP2</i>	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
<i>Libya 2 EP3</i>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>CAR EP1</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1	0

## Bibliography

Agbonifo, John. 'Nonstate Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness'. *African Security* 14, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 27–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1904536>.

Bara, Corinne, Annekatrin Deglow, and Sebastian van Baalen. 'Civil War Recurrence and Postwar Violence: Toward an Integrated Research Agenda'. *European Journal of International Relations* 27, no. 3 (September 2021): 913–35. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211006443>.

Biersteker, T. J. 'SanctionApp', 2022.

Biersteker, Thomas. 'Enhancing Due Process in UN Security Council Targeted Sanctions Regimes', n.d., 36.

Biersteker, Thomas, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'UN Sanctions and Peace Negotiations: Possibilities for Complementarity', n.d., 28.

Biersteker, Thomas J., Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho, eds. 'Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Biersteker, Thomas J, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 404–12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317752539>.

Biersteker, Thomas J., Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert. 'The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 220–47. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.011>.

Binder, Martin. 'Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN's Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?' *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 6 (November 2015): 712–26. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343315585847>.

Boogaerts, Andreas, and Edith Drieskens. 'Lessons from the MENA Region: A Configurational Explanation of the (in)Effectiveness of UN Security Council Sanctions between 1991 and 2014'. *Mediterranean Politics* 25, no. 1 (1 January 2020): 71–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2018.1474643>.

Boogaerts, Andreas, Clara Portela, and Edith Drieskens. 'One Swallow Does Not Make Spring: A Critical Juncture Perspective on the EU Sanctions in Response to the Arab Spring'. *Mediterranean Politics* 21, no. 2 (3 May 2016): 205–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1125285>.

Chan, Steve. 'Strategic Anticipation and Adjustment: Ex Ante and Ex Post Information in Explaining Sanctions Outcomes'. *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 3 (June 2009): 319–38. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109105643>.

Dell'Aguzzo, Loretta. 'Conditions for Successful Multiparty Mediation in Separatist Armed Conflicts: A Fuzzy-Set Analysis'. *Civil Wars* 20, no. 1 (2 January 2018): 109–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2018.1466091>.

Dorussen, H., and J. Mo. 'Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, no. 4 (1 August 2001): 395–426. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045004001>.

Drezner, D. W. *The Sanctions Paradox*. Edited by null. Vol. null. Null, 1999.

Eriksson, Mikael. *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions*. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.

———. *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions*. London; New York: Routledge, 2016. <http://www.tandfebooks.com/isbn/9781315611860>.

Eriksson, Mikael, and Peter Wallensteen. 'Targeting Sanctions and Ending Armed Conflicts: First Steps towards a New Research Agenda'. *International Affairs* 91, no. 6 (November 2015): 1387–98. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12451>.

Giumelli, Francesco. 'The Purpose of Targeted Sanctions'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

———. 'The Purposes of Targeted Sanctions'. In *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*, edited by Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Editors Tourinho, 38–59. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316460290.003>.

Grauvogel, Julia. 'The Internal Opposition Effect of International Sanctions: Insights from a Qualitative Comparative Analysis'. In *Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions*, by Peter van Bergeijk, 202–22. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102721.00017>.

Haesebrouck, Tim. 'Who Follows Whom? A Coincidence Analysis of Military Action, Public Opinion and Threats'. *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 6 (November 2019): 753–66. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319854787>.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.

Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon. 'United Nations Peacekeeping Dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 3 (July 2016): 231–49. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570425>.

Lektzian, David J., and Christopher M. Sprecher. 'Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict'. *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 415–31. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00259.x>.

McCormack, D., and H. Pascoe. 'Sanctions and Preventive War'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30 December 2015. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715620471>.

Mello, Patrick A. *Qualitative Comparative Analysis: An Introduction to Research Design and Application*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2022.

Nooruddin, Irfan. 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy'. *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 59–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394>.

Oana, Ioana-Elena, Carsten Q. Schneider, and Eva Thomann. *Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Using R: A Gentle Introduction*. Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2021.

Palestini, Stefano. 'Regional Organizations and the Politics of Sanctions against Undemocratic Behaviour in the Americas'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 469–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120911700>.

Peksen, Dursun. 'When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature'. *Defence and Peace Economics* 30, no. 6 (19 September 2019): 635–47. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1625250>.

Radtke, Mitchell, and Hyeran Jo. 'Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel Groups'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 759–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127>.

Ragin, C. *Redesigning Social Inquiry. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*. Edited by null. Vol. null. Null, 2008.

———. *The Comparative Method. Moving beyond Quantitative and Qualitative Strategies*. Edited by null. Vol. null. Null, 1987.

Rihoux, Benoît, and Charles C. Ragin, eds. *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques*. Applied Social Research Methods Series 51. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009.

United Nations Environment Programme. *Côte d'Ivoire: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment*. Nairobi: UNEP, 2015.

Vines, Alex, and Tom Cargill. 'The Impact of UN Sanctions and Their Panels of Experts: Sierra Leone and Liberia'. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 65, no. 1 (March 2010): 45–67.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201006500104>.

Wallensteen, Peter, Mikael Eriksson, Daniel Strandow, Uppsala universitet, and Institutionen för freds- och konfliktforskning. *Sanctions for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: Lessons Learned from Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2006.

## Chapter V: Conclusion

Building upon the recent theoretical and empirical developments in the sanction theory, the three studies presented in this dissertation attempt to study multilateral sanctions as a conflict resolution tool.

The first paper studies sanction as a strategic tool to resolve conflicts. It is the natural start for the dissertation because it addresses the factors associated with (and might explain) sanction imposition. In the case of this paper, it explains the United Nations Security Council's use of multilateral sanctions in cases of intra-State armed conflicts.

Unlike the following two papers, which are most concerned with the effect of sanctions, the first paper invites one to take a step back and contemplate the idea that sanctions are usually strategic. Thus, any form of assessment of sanctions effects or consequences should consider this, as argued by Noorundin. In this sense, the first paper tries to lay out the building blocks of what could be a selection model of UNSC sanctions for cases of intra-State armed conflicts.

Its findings are exciting and advance the collective knowledge of UNSC multilateral sanctions. The paper shows that the UNSC's use of sanctions is associated with US

and EU sanctions – not surprising given that the US, France, and the UK are the ones who have drafted most of the resolutions that impose sanctions.<sup>337</sup>; and regime type - which needs further theorization and the ideology of rebel groups (when sanctions related to Al-Qaeda/IS sanction regime were included).

More interestingly, sanctions are strongly associated with the failure of a peace agreement (and, to a lesser extent, the number of dyads). It may indicate that sanctions are used to manage and resolve intractable conflicts, but not necessarily intense conflicts (the lack of significance of battle deaths). The strong association with peacekeeping gives credit to a theorization of “sunken costs” in which once the Council gets involved in resolving a crisis, it tries to use several tools at its disposal. The results show that sanctions accompany and follow peacekeeping forces, but it is still impossible to rule out if the reverse happens. Finally, Hultman's argument that the Responsibility to Protect affected the Council's decisions<sup>338</sup> echoed through the association of sanctions with violence against civilians by non-State actors. However, the lack of significance of refugees might indicate that the Council's humanitarian imperative is relatively narrow in its interpretation.

The second paper investigates the role of sanctions as a conflict prevention tool. Dialoguing with a growing literature on regional organizations and their regional systems against unconstitutional changes of government, it asked whether the regional commitment to democratic governance, institutionalization through a proper system, and sanction usage decrease the likelihood of coup attempts.

The findings were mixed. On the one hand, the commitment to democratic governance (or against unconstitutional changes of government) and the sanction systems built around it are effective in decreasing the likelihood of coup attempts.<sup>339</sup> The findings are further confirmed in the model without West Africa. On the other hand, sanctions per se appeared insignificant and highly mixed, with some strange backlash of its effect after the second or third time a regional system imposes sanctions. Moreover, the results show that despite the literature's tendency to bundle together organizations such as African Union and ECOWAS, there are essential differences between regional/continental and sub-regional organizations.

---

<sup>337</sup> Biersteker et al., 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'.

<sup>338</sup> Hultman, 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians.'

<sup>339</sup> Beyond imposing costs, one can theorize that stigmatization does play an important role, given the decisive result of the first two steps of hypotheses that only look at the commitment to democratic governance. The insistence of coup leaders in Guinea-Bissau on enunciating their plan to return to democratic governance from the start also enhances the argument. Moreover, such logic and justification were not only present in Guinea-Bissau but are pretty omnipresent in the justification by coup leaders in many coups. See Yukawa, Hidaka, and Kushima, 'Coups and Framing.'

The outlier nature of West Africa ( with a high number of coups, a very sophisticated regime, and a history of sanctions being imposed by ECOWAS) - is not entirely unexpected. West Africa might be a hard case for regional systems against unconstitutional changes of government and might expose the limits of such a system.

However, studying the coup in Guinea Bissau in 2012, which is both a typical case of a coup-prone country but quite critical for studying sanctions due to the unprecedented overlapping of regional, unilateral and global sanctions, the case suggests that maybe part of the ineffectiveness of sanctions could be explained by how the sanctions regime are being implemented.

Sanctions were effective - especially in combination with other tools - in extracting concessions from the military in Guinea-Bissau, forcing it towards a solution. However, the very nature of the political compromise reached through mediation might undermine the signal of the sanctions by showing that committing a coup might still compensate, as argued by Nathan<sup>340</sup>.

Political compromises might be unavoidable, or they might be linked to the very nature of the sender. Regional organizations might be indeed biased towards solutions and not punishment.<sup>341</sup> Alternatively, geopolitical considerations might contaminate their decisions too much, especially for sub-regional organizations which are too close to the conflict or crisis. Furthermore, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, the use of sanctions by ECOWAS to break a political deadlock shows that such regimes and sanctions are being utilized to influence and resolve crises that are not intrinsically linked with coups or other forms of flagrant disrespect to the democratic clauses.

Finally, the third paper investigates sanctions as a tool to manage and resolve conflicts and support peacebuilding processes. It does so by dialoguing with a long tradition of the sanctions literature: the debate on sanctions effectiveness. Unlike similar studies, however, it does not ask whether sanctions are effective in coercing targets but rather in which conditions they are effective in constraining and signalling, using a still rarely explored research method: Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

Its findings are, at the same time, surprising and expected. First, it confirms that the unanimous approval of the P5 (for signalling) and clarity on who is enforcing the sanctions (for constraining) are almost necessary conditions.

---

<sup>340</sup> Nathan, 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS.'

<sup>341</sup> Hellquist, 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review.'

In terms of constraining, the Council was effective in constraining through the presence of two out of three conditions: the presence of diplomatic sanctions, the presence of sanctions on commodities that represent significant funding for conflicting parties, and the presence of peacekeeping operations. There is also a unique pathway that explains a set of cases in which constraining was effective when the Council was aiming to constrain governments, with the active involvement of international Tribunals.

For signalling, two main pathways were identified. The presence of economically costly sanctions (*to prove that it is not just cheap talk*), absence of sanctions episodes that last more than five years and absence of sanctions that attempt to signal too many norms marked the first pathway, primarily for cases in which the sanction episode dealt with an ongoing armed conflict. The second pathway, more aligned with peacebuilding, showed effective signalling occurring from the combination of unanimous support from the P5, stigmatization of individuals (potential spoilers), and not many norms being signalled over a sanction episode that lasted more than five years. In both, the absence of too many norms being signalled at the same time by the Council was relevant, showing the importance of this condition for effective signalling.

These three papers each tell a separate contained story of sanctions; collectively, they tell a narrative of sanctions as a unique conflict prevention and resolution tool that States, regional and global organizations use strategically, modularly, and often in concertation with other conflict resolution tools. Rather than static, sanctions and their effectiveness are part of a more encompassing web of conflict resolution tools used to address a particular case of conflict or a constitutional breakdown. The papers hint that these other tools might trigger sanctions, and their effectiveness might be positively or negatively affected by such tools. However, it is also possible that sanctions sometimes become the actual trigger.

The three papers also show that it is time for the sanctions literature to study sanctions through a more progressive lens, both from the sender and target perspectives. Rather than a state-centric approach, sanctions often target factions and political groups. Rather than the usual suspects (US and EU), different actors, such as regional organizations, use sanctions effectively. Thus, it is possible and desirable to study sanctions using a plethora of different senders and units of analysis, as shown by the three papers.

Methodologically, the three papers also presented an example of how different methods can expand the collective understanding of sanctions. Using large-N

statistical analysis, QCA, and in-depth research study, they show how each method has clear advantages and disadvantages. The sanction literature must not be restrained to one or two research methods.

They also indicate future pathways for advancing the research on sanctions. First, there is an avenue of possibilities in expanding the collective knowledge on a more diverse array of senders of sanctions. This dissertation was only possible due to the availability of accurate and rich data from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium. As Giumelli, Hoffman and Książczaková have done for the sanctions imposed by the EU,<sup>342</sup> it would be beneficial to extend the TSC methodology to study regional organizations in America and Africa. For the TSC itself, it would be interesting to add cases in which sanctions were not imposed but threatened by the Council (e.g., UNSCR 792 in Cambodia) or collect more data on the individuals and entities sanctioned by the Council, which would facilitate the study of sanctions on rebel groups.

Second, following this empirical development, the literature on sanctions would benefit from a wider plurality of units of analysis. Different units of analysis combined with accurate sanctions data can unlock news analysis—for example, a still novel unit, with one notable exception<sup>343</sup>, is conflicting parties, especially rebel groups. A significant degree of advancement in the conflict and resolution literature for the past ten years is due to the incorporation of different units of analysis, such as rebel groups<sup>344</sup>, pro-government militias<sup>345</sup>, and leaders<sup>346</sup>.

Sanctions, especially by the UNSC, have been used extensively to deal with rebel groups and leaders<sup>347</sup>. Thus by investigating sanctions using rebel groups as the unit of analysis, questions regarding which type of rebel group, which characteristics, or what behaviour makes the Council sanction a group can be answered and would enrich the literature. Also, the effects of sanctions on such groups in terms of leadership, funding, and behaviour on the battlefield are vital to be studied and understood.

---

<sup>342</sup> Giumelli, Hoffmann, and Książczaková, 'The When What, Where and Why of European Union Sanctions.'

<sup>343</sup> Radtke and Jo, 'Fighting the Hydra'.

<sup>344</sup> Conrad et al., 'Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration'; Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, 'Voting for Militants'; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, 'External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse.'

<sup>345</sup> Aliyev, 'Pro-Regime Militias and Civil War Duration'; Balta, Yüksel, and Acar, 'Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias.'

<sup>346</sup> Cunningham and Sawyer, 'Conflict Negotiations and Rebel Leader Selection'; Uzonyi, 'Leader Tenure, Genocide, and Politicide During Civil War.'

<sup>347</sup> Agbonifo, 'Non-state Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness.'

If rebel groups as a unit of analysis bring attention to the effect of sanctions in ongoing intra-State armed groups, another potential avenue for future research is to study the effects of sanctions on the dynamics of conflict: conflict reoccurrence, battle intensity, one-sided violence, and external support to conflict parties. Although the sanctions literature has some examples of those studies in Escribà-Folch<sup>348</sup> and Hultman,<sup>349</sup> much more is needed; the first paper and its selection model could be the steppingstone for such studies.

Within the broader discussion of sanctions affecting conflict dynamics, it became evident in this dissertation that sanctions do not operate in a vacuum, it often operates together with other conflict resolution tools such as mediation and peacekeeping, but the knowledge of how such tools interact or even how they are sequenced (if there is a sequence) is still nascent.

Such lack of knowledge is not a particularity of sanctions. Even peacekeeping and mediation, more enshrined within conflict studies, have largely ignored each other until recently<sup>350</sup>. However, the recent development in both pieces of literature might show the way forward for how sanctions can benefit from this type of study.

First, it is essential to investigate if there is a particular sequencing between the usage of different tools by the UN, for example, or between the UN and regional bodies. Although the third paper touches on that by showing that sanctions are more likely after a peace agreement fails or there is an ongoing presence of peacekeeping forces, it is not yet possible to affirm that the direction always goes through this direction.

One possible way to investigate such an issue is by focusing entirely on the sequencing between two tools, using instrumental variables. Instrumental variables are relevant when considerations regarding endogeneity are a concern, and one wants to make causal claims. For example, Tarnay uses the Black Hawk Down incident as an instrumental variable to study which comes first: peace agreements or peacekeeping forces.<sup>351</sup> Nothing precludes sanction scholars from using a similar instrumental variable to study the relationship between sanctions and peacekeeping forces.

Besides sequencing, there is a significant avenue for research on the interactive effects between sanctions and other tools. The interactive effect could be studied

---

<sup>348</sup> Escribà-Folch, 'Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts.'

<sup>349</sup> Hultman and Peksen, 'Successful or Counterproductive Coercion?'

<sup>350</sup> Clayton and Dorussen, 'The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict.'

<sup>351</sup> Tiernay, 'Which Comes First?'

through in-depth research studies, QCA, or large-N statistical analysis, as shown in this dissertation's papers. An option would be to follow the route taken by Clayton and Dorussen, who studied the combined effect of mediation with different types of peacekeeping operations in achieving peace by creating a series of binary variables, and then accounting for the selection bias of such tools to address a conflict by using a Heckman model.<sup>352</sup> In this account, the selection model of the first paper provides the literature with an excellent initial selection model.

Finally, to advance such a research agenda, there is an urgent need to improve how sanctions are operationalized and measured. Biersteker and Hudokava's conceptualization of a selectiveness scale is a significant development beyond the binomial measurement of sanctions.<sup>353</sup> They have developed a scale ranging from 0 to 6 that tries to capture how selective is the sanction episode, meaning that the scale ranges from sanctions suspended or not yet active, highly targeted up to comprehensive sanctions. A fuzzy-set QCA analysis could use both to understand the conditions that make the Council decide on a certain level of selectiveness and how different levels of selectiveness affect the effectiveness of sanctions.

Another option is to develop what constitutes a new sanction act – amidst an ongoing sanction regime. The concept of sanction episode dialogues with this notion, but such measurement of sanctions should go even further, especially since sanctions episodes are not appropriate for time-series/panel data analysis. In the case of the UNSC, the key is to understand beyond new sanctions whether changes to whom the Council targets, changes in the interpretation of what is affected by sanctions as well changes in the criteria for sanctions to be imposed, should be considered, or not, a new act of sanctioning.

Overall, the conclusion seems to suggest that more than actual findings, this research finishes with several pathways to expand the sanctions and the conflict resolution literature at large. Although less researched than its counterparts (mediation and peacekeeping), sanctions deserve to be treated as a conflict resolution tool. There are multiple ways in which the scholarship community could elucidate many of the questions raised during this dissertation. As with any journey, this research project was an opportunity to find answers and explore new areas, but it has left many unanswered questions. They are ready to be opened, questioned, explored, and explained.

---

<sup>352</sup> Clayton and Dorussen, 'The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict.'

<sup>353</sup> Biersteker and Hudáková, 'The Emergence, Rise, (and Demise?) Of Targeted Sanctions at the United Nations.'

## Bibliography

Agbonifo, John. 'Nonstate Armed Groups, Leadership, and Sanctions Effectiveness'. *African Security* 14, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 27–54. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1904536>.

Aliyev, Huseyn. 'Pro-Regime Militias and Civil War Duration'. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 3 (2 April 2020): 630–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1393415>.

Balta, Evren, Murat Yüksel, and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar. 'Peace Processes and the Integration of Pro-Government Militias: The Case of Village Guards in Turkey'. *Armed Forces & Society* 48, no. 1 (January 2022): 205–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20910769>.

Biersteker, Thomas, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'The Emergence, Rise, (and Demise?) Of Targeted Sanctions at the United Nations'. *International Organization*, Under review.

Biersteker, Thomas J, Sue E Eckert, Marcos Tourinho, and Zuzana Hudáková. 'UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991–2013)'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 3 (May 2018): 404–12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317752539>.

Clayton, Govinda, and Han Dorussen. 'The Effectiveness of Mediation and Peacekeeping for Ending Conflict'. *Journal of Peace Research*, 19 May 2021, 002234332199007. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343321990076>.

Conrad, Justin M., Kevin T. Greene, James Igoe Walsh, and Beth Elise Whitaker. 'Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 3 (March 2019): 591–616. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718755853>.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, Reyko Huang, and Katherine M. Sawyer. 'Voting for Militants: Rebel Elections in Civil War'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65, no. 1 (January 2021): 81–107. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002720937750>.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, and Katherine Sawyer. 'Conflict Negotiations and Rebel Leader Selection'. *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 5 (September 2019): 619–34. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319829689>.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 'Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts'. *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (March 2010): 129–41. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309356489>.

Giumelli, Francesco, Fabian Hoffmann, and Anna Książczaková. 'The When, What, Where and Why of European Union Sanctions'. *European Security* 30, no. 1 (2 January 2021): 1–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2020.1797685>.

Hellquist, Elin. 'Regional Sanctions as Peer Review: The African Union against Egypt (2013) and Sudan (2019)'. *International Political Science Review* 42, no. 4 (September 2021): 451–68. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120935530>.

Hultman, Lisa. 'UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?' *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (January 2013): 59–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312461662>.

Hultman, Lisa, and Dursun Peksen. 'Successful or Counterproductive Coercion? The Effect of International Sanctions on Conflict Intensity'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 6 (July 2017): 1315–39. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715603453>.

Nathan, Laurie. 'A SURVEY OF MEDIATION IN AFRICAN COUPS'. *WORKING PAPERS*, n.d., 47.

Nooruddin, Irfan. 'Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy'. *International Interactions* 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 59–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394>.

Radtke, Mitchell, and Hyeran Jo. 'Fighting the Hydra: United Nations Sanctions and Rebel Groups'. *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 759–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318788127>.

Salehyan, Idean, David Siroky, and Reed M. Wood. 'External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Wartime Atrocities'. *International Organization* 68, no. 3 (2014): 633–61. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831400006X>.

Tiernay, Michael. 'Which Comes First? Unpacking the Relationship between Peace Agreements and Peacekeeping Missions'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 2 (April 2015): 135–52. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213520396>.

Uzonyi, Gary. 'Leader Tenure, Genocide, and Politicide During Civil War'. *Political Research Quarterly*, 10 December 2021, 106591292110584. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211058484>.

Yukawa, Taku, Kaoru Hidaka, and Kaori Kushima. 'Coups and Framing: How Do Militaries Justify the Illegal Seizure of Power?' *Democratization* 27, no. 5 (3 July 2020): 816–35. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1740207>.

