

Universalism within: The tension between universalism and community in progressive ideology

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Abstract

Social-democratic parties face a dilemma between the universalist ethos of their socialist tradition and the nationalism that they share with the other political actors of the state where they act. In this paper, we examine comparatively the position of the Spanish party *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and the Catalan party *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) on three political debates that pertain to the link between welfare and identity in Spain. We show how these parties experience opposite tensions between nationalism and the universalism of their left-wing ideology. Whereas ERC calls for a withdrawal from the Spanish system of social security, the PSOE advocates imposing on Catalonia a symmetric form of solidarity with the rest of Spain, despite recognising the region's different identity. Above all, both parties take identity for granted as a pre-political factor that 'naturally' justifies differential treatment, according to ERC, or equalising federalism, in the case of the PSOE.

KEYWORDS

Catalonia, left-wing parties, nationalism, Spain, welfare state

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But who are the 'others' that ordinary citizens are so willing to help? Ferrera (2005, p. 1)

1 | INTRODUCTION

Universal solidarity is a pillar of the social-democratic tradition. Yet, the principle of universal solidarity is bounded within existing structures of political power (Bommes, 2012; Brubaker, 1989; Ferrera, 2005). Social-democratic parties thus face a dilemma between the universalist ethos of their socialist tradition and the fact that welfare policies are provided for a specific community within a particular territory and defined by the category of nationality. Current works examining the boundaries of social sharing tend to study the link between identity and welfare either with reference to the inclusion/exclusion of newcomers or by looking at the determination of separatist movements to withdraw from the system of 'national' solidarity of the parent state. The first aspect has recently drawn the attention of a booming literature on the welfare chauvinism of the populist radical right (PRR) (Abts et al., 2021; Enns-Jedenastik, 2016, 2018; Kitschelt, 1995; Lefkofridi & Michel, 2017). The second strand of literature has probably been explored less in detail, but it has still been researched fairly extensively (Béland & Lecours, 2005, 2006; Dalle Mulle, 2018; McEwen & Moreno, 2005). Whereas studies focusing on the PRR have obviously excluded left-wing parties from their units of inquiry, those centring on sub-state nationalism and the territorial politics of welfare have examined minority nationalism left-wing actors.

No study has so far simultaneously considered the arguments on welfare and redistribution of both majority and minority left-wing parties. In this contribution, we fill this gap by examining comparatively the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) and the Catalan left-wing separatist party *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). We focus on three key political debates that illustrate the link between social sharing and national identification in Spain during the period 1990–2019¹: territorial redistribution, federalism and immigration. We hypothesise that both parties have to deal with the tension between the particularism of nationalism and the universalism of their left-wing ideology. Yet, we expect such tension to take opposite forms: Whereas ERC has to justify retreating from solidarity with the rest of Spain, the PSOE has to defend imposing solidarity with the rest of Spain on Catalonia despite recognising the existence of an alternative form of national identification in this community.

Needless to say, both state-wide and sub-state parties can be analysed from the perspective of theories of nationalism. According to Ernest Gellner's (1983) classical definition, nationalism is 'a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (p. 1). This definition however overemphasises the tendency of nationalist movements to seek the constitution of a state as their overriding goal, thus failing to explain the existence of autonomist nationalist parties.² As Walker Connor (2005) argued, 'the essence of self-determination is choice, not result'. Nationalism holds that 'any nation has the right to secede, if it so desires' (p. 23). This is a key element to consider when comparing state-wide and sub-state parties, because often at the core of the nationalist conflict between these two actors lie different conceptions of the location of sovereignty, intended as 'the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the political community' (Hinsley, 1986, p. 1). Furthermore, Gellner's definition is not very useful to distinguish between the nationalism of state institutions and that of sub-state nationalist movements. Several authors have proposed to focus on nationalism as a form of politics. Adding to Gellner's principle, Brubaker (1996) suggests a more encompassing notion of nationalism as a form of 'remedial political action' based on a discourse claiming 'that the identity and interests of a putative nation are not properly expressed or realized in political institutions, practices, or policies' (p. 79). This approach helps to identify nationalist actors as units of analysis in all their diversity. However the work of Michael Billig (1995) has made researchers aware of how nationalism informs contemporary societies in much deeper and pervasive ways than organised forms of 'remedial political action'. Therefore, in line with the perspective that frames this themed section (Dalle Mulle & Kernalegenn, 2022), we understand nationalism 'as an unconscious script in our daily life in modern societies that legitimises political power in more banal ways than those usually emphasised in a literature often too focused on instances of "hot" nationalism' (introduction to this themed section). This broader conception of nationalism is especially salient for

left-wing parties because it allows making visible how the Left often implicitly accepts nationalist postulates about the determination of the legitimate political community, the contours of citizenship and the boundaries of solidarity (Brubaker, 1989; Greenfeld, 1992, p. 1–26; Yack, 2012, pp. 136–160).

In this paper, we show that our case-study parties take identity for granted as a pre-political factor that 'naturally' (i.e. without need to be explained) justifies differential treatment (according to ERC) or symmetric federalism (in the case of the PSOE). Furthermore, whereas ERC has constructed a specific discourse about conditional solidarity, the PSOE has consistently stressed the primacy of equality over recognition. Both have tended to bypass the question of identity by means of an emphasis on specific consequentialist arguments.³

In the next section, we introduce some theoretical consideration about the link between the welfare state and identity, as well as their implications for both state-wide and sub-state left-wing parties. Section 3 explains our methodology and the reasons behind the selection of cases. Then, in Sections 4 and 5, we examine in detail the discourse of ERC and the PSOE along the three dimensions identified above (territorial redistribution, federalism and immigration). Finally, we draw some comparative conclusions.

2 | THE WELFARE STATE, IDENTITY AND THE LEFT: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

From an analytical perspective, we approach the relationship between the Left and nationalism following Rokkan's conception of the nation-state as a combination of structure and boundary (Rokkan, 1999, p. 115). On the one hand, as a form of 'bounded structuring', the state progressively institutionalises social interactions of a particular population within a specific territorial unit (Ferrera, 2005, p. 18). On the other, whether from an analytical or a behavioural perspective (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), nationalism can be seen as a process of recreating and reproducing boundaries within which individuals develop their sense of belonging to the collective identity of the group (Barth, 1969; Skey, 2013; Wimmer, 2013).

In this connection, two elements are relevant for our argument. First, the connection between boundary-making and belonging is key because individuals will recognise other members of the group as belonging to their own community and will develop certain values, for instance, empathy or solidarity, that can legitimate collective actions such as welfare or redistributive policies. Second, the nation-state is the main contemporary agent of boundary-making, playing a critical role in generating both external differentiation and internal 'dedifferentiation', such as linguistic standardisation (Tilly, 1984, p. 48). Belonging to the political community thus entails an internally inclusive and externally exclusive dynamic that distinguishes 'citizens' from 'noncitizens'. As a consequence, the modern state is more than a form of territorial organisation; it is also a 'membership association' (Brubaker, 1992, p. 21).

The nation-state as the main institutional driver of modern forms of social closure emphasises the 'national' scope of 'basic human equality' (Marshall, 1950). An illustrative area where the tensions between universalism and boundary emerge relates to the inclusion/exclusion of foreign migrants from social security. Migrant workers have early on been included, to some extent, in social insurance schemes (Feldman, 2003; Ferrera, 2005; Fox, 2016, 2021; Joppke, 2001). Yet, the legitimacy of migrant access to social security, especially to social assistance, remains a controversial issue and a good object of inquiry to explore the principles that define who is entitled to what social rights.

In this connection, we build upon Van Oorschot's (2000) criteria of welfare deservingness. Van Oorschot shows how European public opinions rely on a limited number of principles to decide who qualifies for social policies. Identity is the most relevant criterion in justifying the exclusion of specific recipients (notably foreign immigrants) from access to social solidarity (Van Oorschot, 2006). Two other important criteria for the purpose of this article are reciprocity and need. Reciprocity builds on a principle of equity, whereby a person's benefits should hinge on her previous contributions to the system. Need, on the contrary, simply postulates that the more needy a person, the more legitimate her reliance on social support (Van Oorschot, 2000, p. 36). As we will see later, ERC and the PSOE have made use, in different proportions, of these three criteria (identity, reciprocity and need) to build their discourses

about (legitimate) social redistribution. It is important to note that identity is more encompassing than the other criteria, which therefore are nested into it (Abts et al., 2021, p. 10; see also see Deutsch, 1975, p. 142; Galais & Serrano, 2020; Harell et al., 2021).

However, though Van Oorschot assumes identity to coincide with citizenship, we contend that similar dynamics unfold at the sub-state level as well. The idea of being a distinct political community from that of the wider state can legitimate a rejection of solidarity with other areas of the parent state (McEwen & Moreno, 2005, p. 6). This has been the case in Catalonia, which is a net contributor region to Spain's social security and whose population holds dual or competing forms of national identification (Dalle Mulle, 2018).

How do left-wing parties navigate the relationship between identity and welfare and between the particularism of nationalism and the universalism of the progressive tradition? Before answering this question, we need to define what we mean by the Left. In line with the other contributions in this themed section, we argue that the unifying trait of left-wing traditions is a commitment to reducing inequality, not only of a civil and political nature, but especially those pertaining to social differences. In other words, despite its different manifestations, the defining feature of progressive ideology is an emphasis on equality among individuals (Bobbio, 1996; see also Sypnowich, 2006).

Although in the context of the French Revolution nationalism was associated with the political Left, since the ascent of Marxism in the last quarter of the 19th century, the relationship between the Left and nationalism has become more complicated. The transformation of socialism into a mass movement happened within the context of processes of state modernisation and democratisation, including the nationalisation of mass society and the so-called question of nationalities, that created different challenges for the participation of socialist parties in the political system. Whether, and if yes how, national strategies are necessary, or at least compatible with the universal principles of socialism, has been a key and recurrent question for socialist actors since at least the end of the 19th century (Ryan & Worth, 2010, p. 55). From the Second World War, the Right has even enjoyed a near monopoly on debates on nationalism and the nation (Conversi, 2020, p. 34).

Walker Connor (1984) stated it bluntly when he claimed that 'nationalism and Marxism are philosophically incompatible' (p. 5). This theoretical incompatibility notwithstanding, in practice, socialism and nationalism have often blended (Connor, 1984, p. 584; see also Hobsbawm, 1990, pp. 123–125). This is true for both the Marxist and the non-Marxist Left. Despite a self-avowed internationalism that was supposed to overcome national divisions, late 19th-century German and French socialists did think in accordance with contemporary national categories and even openly incorporated nationalist ideas in their programmes. Yet, for many a socialist movement in Europe, the implicit universalist ethos of the socialist tradition forced militants to feel the need to justify their references to the nation, as if this were a constant derogation to a general rule. Socialists throughout Europe kept asking themselves 'should we defend the nation?' (Ducange, 2021, p. 8). True, Lenin defended self-determination and actively promoted sub-state national identities. Yet, Lenin's strategy did not amount to an acceptance of nationalism. It was instrumentally aimed at de-politicising nationalism and preventing the bourgeoisie from using it against the socialist revolution (Martin, 2001).

Since the interwar years, socialist parties, notably social-democratic ones, have implicitly accepted the world of nation-states brought about by the Great War. However, this does not mean that they have been at ease dealing with issues related to nationalism and the nation. Examining the evolution of social democracy in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, Sheri Berman (2006, pp. 66–176) has compellingly argued that although the roots of social democracy's acceptance of national communitarianism—based on the twin pillars of a 'people's party' approach and willingness to collaborate with 'bourgeois' forces—are to be found in the work of interwar years 'dissidents', these 'innovators' were marginalised by mainstream socialist parties throughout the interwar period (with the exception of the Swedish Social Democratic Party). Even after the Second World War, when most European socialist parties de facto accepted to pursue their goals through planning and welfare states, they simultaneously rhetorically clung to traditional Marxist programmes based on revolutionary means, internationalism and class struggle well into the 1960s and 1970s (Berman, 2006, pp. 177–199).⁴

The framing of decolonisation, and to a lower extent sub-state nationalism, as an emancipatory force pursuing a social justice agenda against foreign occupiers provided favourable ground for the combination of nationalist and socialist discourses, a marriage that however rarely extended to the post-colonial period (Conversi, 2020, pp. 937–939). Even in the post-Cold War context of accelerating globalisation, in which appeals to national sovereignty have offered multiple avenues to mobilise voters around the defence of welfare and democracy against cosmopolitan neoliberalism, contemporary left-wing parties have struggled to formulate coherent views of nationalism and the nation, especially in Western Europe (Laxer, 2001).

This observation is even more puzzling when considering that in the years after the Second World War, the Left's egalitarian ethos has generally translated into a solid support for the welfare state, which is a system of bounded redistribution based on an implicitly nationalist interpretation of the community of solidarity. For this reason, we expect the tension between universalism and particularism mentioned earlier to appear along the welfare dimension. More specifically, this tension can take two forms. The first relates to the difference between interpersonal and group equality. Whereas interpersonal equality applies to individuals within a specific group, group equality concerns equality between different communities. Group equality inevitably involves the possibility of inequality between members of different groups, thus generating a tension between interpersonal and group equality (Dalle Mulle, 2016). As we will see later, this is a major point of friction between sub-state and state-wide left-wing parties in Spain.

The second manifestation of the universalist–particularist tension regards the relation between equality and recognition. Following the liberal political tradition prevalent in Western Europe, state-wide parties have tended to see equality and recognition as opposed, as if more recognition automatically entailed less equality (Benhabib, 2002). The willingness of state governments to organise various policies at the centre, notably social security, in order to ensure equality among citizens can thus clash against policies of recognition of the diversity of specific territorial areas. For the sub-state nationalist left, by contrast, acknowledging diversity does not go against equality. Rather, diversity entails equality of recognition among distinct communities, thus referring to the classical critique of the unfairness of treating equally the different (Requejo, 1999, pp. 260–271), or in Bobbio's (1996) words 'treat like as like, and unlike as unlike' (p. 69; see also Fraser, 1997; Kymlicka, 1995).

Scholars have rarely discussed the tension between the particularism of nationalism and the universalism of the egalitarianism at the core of the Left with reference to social democratic parties and, even less so, by comparing both state-wide and sub-state parties. In the next sections, we do precisely that through the case studies of ERC and the PSOE. We show how ERC has called for independence on the basis of, among others, economic arguments that entail a rejection of solidarity with poorer regions of Spain. *Esquerra* has therefore confronted a dilemma about withdrawing from state solidarity. On the other hand, the PSOE has recognised that the population of Catalonia holds an alternative form of national identification, but it has stuck to a conception whereby group rights are detrimental to individual equality. In other words, it has confronted a dilemma concerning imposing state solidarity. Before proceeding to the analysis of our case studies, however, we need to clarify some important methodological aspects.

3 | CASES, SOURCES AND METHODS

This article builds on the content analysis method proposed by Mudde (2002). This entails the following three steps: (a) the careful selection of the corpus of sources to be studied; (b) the construction of dimensions along which to develop the analysis; (c) the identification of the 'causal chains' of concepts constituting the arguments made by the actors analysed.

The body of sources is made up of all manifestos (20 in total) for the Spanish elections of both ERC and the PSOE from 1989, when after that year's Congress ERC turned into a clearly left-wing separatist party (Culla, 2013, pp. 316–342), to November 2019, when the last relevant election was held. However, manifestos also have

important limitations. Acting as official platforms of a party position, they often take a conservative stance, aimed at limiting the risk of criticism (and thus representing a sort of institutional consensus on sensitive issues). Hence, in manifestos, political positions are sometimes formulated in uncontroversial ways. The territorial question is a case in point for state-wide parties in Spain, for which any deviation from the belief in the mononational conception expressed in the constitution can expose such parties to criticism. Therefore, the PSOE has addressed more explicitly the territorial question in specific declarations, where it has defended positions that have often not been incorporated in following manifestos. We thus include these documents as well. The three main dimensions along which the analysis will run pertain to the debate over territorial redistribution, the federalisation of Spain and the access of immigrants to social security.

With regard to the identification of the 'causal chain' of concepts, in this phase of the research, we are mostly interested in meaning, exploration and understanding, rather than in counting and explanation. What we aim at is 'abduction', that is, 'the hermeneutic task of penetrating the frames of meaning which lay actors themselves draw upon in constituting and reconstituting the social world' (Giddens quoted in Ong, 2012, p. 423). More specifically, abduction is concerned with 'exploring through everyday language the knowledge that social actors use in the production, reproduction and interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation' (Blaikie, 2000, p. 100). It involves a first task of immersing oneself in the specific universe under study to penetrate the frames used by social actors (which we do in Sections 4 and 5) and a second one of trying to take a step back and derive scientific concepts that can help understand such reality (which we do in Section 6). More concretely, we have reported in an Excel file, available as Data S1, all instances in which the parties have made reference to the three dimensions mentioned earlier and we have interpreted them in light of the theoretical premises introduced in the previous section, notably Van Oorschot's criteria of identity, need and reciprocity. This exploratory qualitative analysis enables to examine how these two parties have construed their reasoning about the 'legitimate community of solidarity' and the relationship between identity and social redistribution.

4 | *ESQUERRA REPUBLICANA DE CATALUNYA*: WITHDRAWING SOLIDARITY FROM A LEFT-WING PERSPECTIVE

In the 30 years studied in this article, ERC has consistently advocated Catalan independence. It has upheld this goal not only with reference to Catalonia's right to self-determination but also emphasising the economic and welfare benefits that independence would offer to its population. Hence, claims about welfare and the boundaries of social sharing have featured prominently in its propaganda. Overall, the party has openly referred to the deservingness criteria of reciprocity, whereby Catalonia would deserve to enjoy more of its fiscal effort and would be economically mistreated by the Spanish state. The party however has not abandoned the principle of identity, which appears, albeit mostly implicitly, as the ultimate reason to call for an end to social sharing with the rest of Spain.

4.1 | Territorial redistribution

Since the late 1980s, ERC has consistently denounced the existence of a fiscal deficit between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. The expression 'fiscal deficit' refers to the difference between what Catalonia contributes to the Spanish state and what it receives back in terms of public spending. The party has lamented that such deficit amounts to around 8%–12% of the Catalan GDP (ERC, 1993, p. 14; ERC, 1996, p. 12; ERC, 2008, p. 22) and that it has been a major burden on the Catalan population. According to ERC, the deficit originates in the inefficiency of the Spanish administration and in the openly discriminatory measures against Catalonia adopted by the Spanish political class. In

1993, the party lambasted the size of the state's bureaucracy and concluded that 'in this context it is clear that Spain is not the solution. On the contrary, Spain is the problem' (ERC, 1993, p. 14; see also ERC, 1996, p. 12). The manifesto for the 2000 election went so far as to conclude that Catalonia had been exploited by Madrid as a colony and the 2011 one suggested that no social justice could be achieved in Catalonia so long as the deficit would exist (ERC, 2011: 108).⁵

But why is the fiscal deficit unjust? Apart from the sheer size of it, the party has referred to two reasons. The explicit reason is that, on the basis of its efficiency and productive capacity, Catalonia would deserve a higher level of social spending per capita and better services. In the manifesto for the 2000 Spanish general election, for instance, ERC claimed that, in the period 1982–1998, Catalonia received 8.5% of state investments despite accounting for 16% of the population, 20% of the GDP and 23% of tax revenues. As a consequence, state spending per capita in Catalonia was a third of spending in a less advantaged region of Spain and only two-thirds of the Spanish mean (ERC, 2000, p. 17). ERC has thus referred to a principle of equity, or, to use Van Oorschot's criteria, reciprocity, whereby the Catalans deserve more than what they currently get from the Spanish state because they contribute more to the system of social redistribution.

However, and this is the implicit reason, the fiscal deficit is unjust also because Catalonia is a different nation from Spain endowed with a right to self-determination. This identity reason is rarely spelled out clearly, but one can perceive it as the underlying motivation in a number of party statements. In 1996, talking about the advantages of the system of *concert economic* (economic agreement) in force in the Basque Country, *Esquerra* asserted that 'the system of economic agreement should allow to recover resources that, until now, leave Catalonia and could be reserved for *internal solidarity*' (ERC, 1996, p. 26, our emphasis). Here, the reference to 'internal solidarity' clearly conveys the idea that the true collectivity of redistribution is Catalonia, whereas the rest of Spain lies outside the relevant boundary of solidarity. Similarly, in a revealing excerpt written in the early 2000s, the party anticipated criticism from the Left about ERC's demand for the constitution of a Catalan social security by concluding that:

the establishment of a Catalan Social Space is an act of sheer social justice. We thus reject the solidarity pretext of the [Spanish] 'Single [Social Security] Fund' since Catalonia, as a matter of right [*per dret*], out of need [*per necessitats*] and because of its own capabilities [*per capacitats*], has sufficient standing to be conceived of as an autonomous unit and this should not be considered as a violation of the principles of solidarity and international progress that any left-wing party should follow. (ERC, 2000, p. 18)

In other words, Catalonia has a right to its own social security not only because the circumstances require it (*per necessitats*) and because it can afford it (*per capacitats*) but also (and in the first place) because it is a nation with a right to self-determination (*per dret*)—and this, according to the party, does not violate internationalist principles of solidarity between different peoples. In this way, *Esquerra* pre-emptively countered accusations of ignoring the fact that Catalonia's independence would most likely generate a potential loss of welfare in poorer regions of Spain. In this connection, in its most recent manifestos, ERC has stressed that there will be economic cooperation between the Catalan Republic and the other 'peoples' of the Iberian Peninsula, but it has remained vague about the concrete forms that this collaboration could take (ERC, 2019, pp. 20–21).

Therefore, the party has consistently argued in favour of the constitution of an independent state as a way to improve Catalonia's social security or, in the short term, the adoption of a system of inter-territorial redistribution akin to that in force in the Basque Country (ERC, 1996, p. 15; ERC, 2004, p. 16; ERC, 2008, p. 22; ERC, 2011, p. 10), although this latter option has been put on the backburner with the outbreak of the independence row between the Catalan *Generalitat* and the central government from 2012 onwards (ERC, 2016, p. 4; ERC, 2019, pp. 8–10). Hence, overall, ERC has justified its claims against solidarity with the rest of Spain on the basis of the deservingness criteria of identity and reciprocity.

4.2 | Federalism

In the last 30 years, ERC's position on federalism has followed a circular pattern. In the early 1990s, although not rejecting it in principle, the party was very sceptical of the possibility that the Spanish state could evolve towards a true federation that would recognise the differential identities of its constituent nations. In the late 1990s and throughout most of the 2000s, under the leadership of Josep Lluís Carod-Rovira, *Esquerra* assumed a more conciliatory approach that led the organisation to participate in government in Catalonia with other left-wing formations and to put on the table the reform of the Statute of Autonomy of the region. After the 2010 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal over this reform of the Statute, party support for federalism melted as snow in the sun.

The 1993 manifesto openly portrayed the Spanish state as driven by a lingering centralist mentality that clashed against the reality of a plurinational Spain made up of many different territories in need of tailor-made policies. The Spanish state was deemed to be hardly reformable. Hence, according to ERC, there was no point in supporting any devolution of powers to regional authorities (ERC, 1993, pp. 11–18). The argument went further and accused Spanish authorities of superficially recognising difference while surreptitiously homogenising the country through the imposition of a uniform process of devolution to territories with very different historical characteristics (ERC, 1993, p. 86).

This position gradually softened (see ERC, 1996, p. 71), and, in the early 2000s, a curious paradox underlaid ERC's position on federalism. On the one hand, the party repeatedly complained about the return of the Right in government and the erosion of Catalan autonomy that this change was supposed to have caused (ERC, 2000, p. 7). On the other, *Esquerra* adopted a gradualist strategy involving the acceptance of devolution of powers and federalism as a valuable path towards full self-determination (ERC, 2004, pp. 6–11). More specifically, ERC advocated a form of asymmetric federalism that distinguished between the so-called 'historical nations' and 'ordinary' regions. It thus called for a reform of the state of autonomies established with the 1978 Constitution, which was deemed to impose an artificial equality between nations and regions. These demands for reform entailed, among others, a new Statute of Autonomy that would acknowledge Catalonia's status as a nation and a new fiscal relationship with the state (ERC, 2000, pp. 11–13, see also ERC, 2004, p. 6). In other words, ERC leveraged a conception of group equality whereby Catalonia would negotiate its position within Spain as a self-determining nation and criticised the two big state-wide Spanish parties, the PSOE and the PP, for prioritising individual over group equality.⁶

The constitutional crisis that befell Catalonia after the June 2010 ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal over the community's Statute of Autonomy put an end to these conciliatory efforts, whereas principled arguments about the organisation of an independence referendum took centre stage. In both the 2015 and 2016 manifestos, the party lamented the existence of an incommensurable clash between the conception of Spain as a single nation held by the PP and the PSOE, whereby granting the right to self-determination to the Catalan population would violate the equality of all Spaniards, and ERC's plurinational view (ERC, 2015, p. 6; ERC, 2016, pp. 11–14).

4.3 | Immigration

ERC's proposals concerning immigration have been all along inspired to a strong liberal ethos coupled with the consistent demand that Catalan institutions be in charge of regulating immigration policy in the region. In the 1990s, the party proposed to establish clear criteria for visas in order to avoid abuses and to offer welfare access to regular migrants on a par with citizens. The party further advocated spending 1% of GDP in development cooperation and identified a series of concentric 'circles' of solidarity (with other Iberian and Mediterranean countries first, the countries of the EEC second and the rest of the world last) (ERC, 1993, pp. 33 and 82–83; ERC, 1996, pp. 83–84).

The party's position on the matter became slightly more restrictive with its access to power at the Catalan *Generalitat* in 2003. Ahead of the following year's general election, the party called for a transfer of competences over immigration to sovereign nations within multinational states and mentioned the establishment of quotas for non-European migrants (ERC, 2004, p. 39). This was abandoned in following manifestos and replaced by more

general assertions about the need to regulate flows while at the same time maintaining equality of rights and access to welfare benefits between citizens and newcomers (ERC, 2008, pp. 66–67; ERC, 2011, pp. 98–101). In recent years, ERC has consistently called for an open reception of refugees and their equal access to welfare, but it has also remained quite vague regarding the (still claimed) need to regulate flows (ERC, 2015, p. 12; ERC, 2016, pp. 21–22; ERC, 2019, p. 116).

4.4 | To sum up

ERC has consistently argued for independence on the basis of an economic rationale whereby an independent Catalonia would be a country that could offer a better social security to its population. This has exposed the party to criticism that this argument would be inconsistent with left-wing egalitarianism. To counter this critique, *Esquerra* has resorted to two main criteria: reciprocity and identity. According to the criterion of reciprocity, the Catalan population should keep more of its resources than it currently does, because it makes heftier contributions to the common purse than most other Spanish communities. The identity criterion, on the contrary, simply stipulates (often implicitly) that Catalonia is the primary community of redistribution, although the party has made room for the existence of concentric circles of solidarity in a post-independence scenario. Most of this reasoning has pertained to the dimension of the fiscal deficit. With regard to territorial redistribution, the party has criticised the PP and PSOE's emphasis on individual equality and rather called for the recognition of Catalonia as a sovereign nation, thus leveraging principles of group equality. Finally, with regard to immigration, the party has adopted a fairly liberal policy, but it has also remained vague and, especially, has never had to manage immigration once in government.

5 | THE PARTIDO SOCIALISTA OBRERO ESPAÑOL: THE DILEMMA BETWEEN UNITY AND AUTONOMY

The longitudinal analysis of manifestos and other relevant statements issued by the PSOE reveals a structural tension between autonomy and equality over the territorial organisation of the state. Autonomy is often regarded as a concession to the diversity pervasive throughout Spain, rather than as a possible means to achieve equality and recognition by means of decentralisation. The party has consistently presented itself as the most adequate actor to achieve a balance between equality and autonomy, but its reasoning unfolds within an ideological framework in which equality is a hierarchically superior principle to autonomy and recognition.

5.1 | Territorial redistribution

The PSOE often presents itself as the most reliable party to ensure the 'full development of the autonomic State' and the 'articulation (*vertebración*) of Spain' (PSOE, 1993, p. 8). However, in the party's propaganda, autonomy and the articulation of diversity are often conflicting rather than complementary principles, hence the necessity to ensure 'cohesion and national solidarity' (PSOE, 1993, p. 8). Accordingly, notions such as 'inter-territorial solidarity' should reconcile autonomy and equality among individuals and regions. Territorial redistribution is the mechanism to prevent increasing fiscal autonomy from eroding citizens' equality of rights. For the PSOE, reinforcing the fiscal capacity of the autonomous communities is a legitimate policy goal only if autonomy is eventually subordinated to central rule in order to preserve equality, solidarity and cohesion, in accordance with a principle of 'fiscal corresponsability' (PSOE, 1993, p. 81).⁷

Regional differences, as an outcome of autonomy either at the individual or territorial level, have been a recurring matter of concern for the PSOE. The 1996 manifesto stressed that autonomy could not affect tax levels and the

quality of services provided throughout the country, with a number of mechanisms such as 'Inter-Territorial Compensation Funds' and European structural funds playing a part in this process of equalisation (PSOE, 1996, p. 204). General schemes of individual welfare such as pensions or unemployment are also considered mechanisms to bridge the gap between affluent and less 'advanced' regions, given that the latter group usually presents higher levels of elderly population and unemployment. Infrastructure is often considered a tool to articulate the country as well (PSOE, 1996, p. 206). The 2000 manifesto insisted on 'equality for all Spaniards in having access to basic public services' and securing 'autonomy and financial' resources for all autonomous communities while bridging the income gap among them (PSOE, 2000, p. 79).

Despite Rodriguez-Zapatero's new idea of 'plural Spain' from 2004 onwards, the general emphasis on the 'equal access to good public services for all citizens' lingered on in the party's documents (PSOE, 2004, p. 31). Specific measures of decentralisation were mostly targeted to improving the financial system of local government, rather than that of the autonomous communities and the party insisted on the need for increasing coordination with the state (PSOE, 2004, p. 62). By the end of the decade, despite the economic hardship and growing territorial tensions in Catalonia, the PSOE described the 'State of the Autonomies' ushered in by the 1978 Constitution as a successful model that allowed 'subsidiarity, identity and cohesion' while preserving 'solidarity and equality' regardless of where individuals live (PSOE, 2008, p. 109). Although the party admitted the need to create a 'fiscal space' for regions, whereby a similar 'fiscal effort' could result in policy variations reflecting political choices at the regional level (PSOE, 2008, p. 110), it insisted that the state should always control 'inter-territorial compensation funds' aimed at levelling inter-regional differences (PSOE, 2008, pp. 109–111).

Although the 2011 manifesto hardly touched upon territorial redistribution, the growth of Catalan pro-independence parties pushing for secession led the party to acknowledge, in 2015, that 'many citizens' in Catalonia were not satisfied with the recognition they received from the state (PSOE, 2015a, 2015b, p. 378). Furthermore, the party acknowledged the existence of some flaws within the system of autonomy and its financing scheme (PSOE, 2016). However, the party maintained the vision that the autonomic state had secured 'social and territorial cohesion' while recognising 'diversity in unity' (PSOE, 2019, p. 148). In fact, the PSOE prioritised the principle of need over that of reciprocity and individual over group equality. As a consequence, in the party's mindset, the overriding aim of redistribution was eliminating difference between Spaniards regardless of their place of residence or their contributions to the system of social security.

5.2 | Federalism

The party's discourse on the territorial organisation of Spain stems from two assumptions. First, the autonomic state has solved one of Spain's 'historical problems' (PSOE, 1993, p. 81), that is, that of an 'unarticulated and selfish Spain' (PSOE, 1993, p. 4). One of the corollaries of this position is that autonomy seems more as a concession rather than a right of territorial minorities, let alone a tool to increase the legitimacy of the state. Second, the autonomic system is deemed as a consolidated project that only needs some adjustments. During the first years of democracy, the ambiguity of the Spanish constitution was praised as an open model that could be adapted through political negotiations and the evolution of territorial preferences. However, since the 1990s, there has been an emerging perception that Spain has become a quasi-federal state or, in the party's wording, 'one of the most decentralised states in the world' (PSOE, 1993, p. 81). Moreover, not only the territorial model was considered complete, but was even deemed to require higher coordination and homogenisation, if not a reversal of some aspects of the devolution process (Maiz et al., 2010; Requejo & Nagel, 2011). Once again, the emphasis has been on equality, rather than recognition.

These two interconnected assumptions can be seen throughout the party's manifestos. In 1993, the PSOE claimed that the main challenge for decentralised states is to develop a 'national policy' to avoid that the general interest would be the mere sum of 'sectorial or territorial interests', and to ensure the preservation of the

'articulation factors that build us up as a nation, where all citizens enjoy identical rights in any part of the territory' (PSOE, 1993, p. 81). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the party further stressed the need to increase coordination and to improve the steering capacity of the central government (PSOE, 1996, p. 202; PSOE, 2000, pp. 78–80; see also PSOE, 2008, p. 110). In this connection, the recurring proposal to reform the Senate into an authentic chamber of territorial representation—which appeared in the party's documents in 2000—was meant to consolidate coordination, but also 'cohesion and solidarity' among 'regions and nationalities', while ruling out reinforcing their powers because this would threaten the sovereignty of the lower chamber (PSOE, 2000, p. 94; PSOE, 2004, p. 60). The principles of 'cooperation and coordination' were reiterated in the next manifestos (PSOE, 2004, p. 60; see also PSOE, 2008, 2011).

Different political statements by the party in the form of 'declarations' developed this approach during the following years. For instance, the 2003 *Manifiesto de Santillana* insisted that the 'equality of rights and opportunities of all Spaniards should prevail over the autonomic principle' (PSOE, 2003, p. 3; see also PSOE, 2004, pp. 59–60). After a 'Territorial Council' held in 2007, the party claimed that 'we have restored the understanding of Spain as a common project of living together [*convivencia*, in the original] for all citizens, without exclusions' (PSOE, 2007, p. 1). The manifesto for the election of 2008 insisted that the process of devolution of powers to the autonomous communities should reach its final phase by strengthening the role of the central government 'to guarantee the cohesion and solidarity among all the territories' (PSOE, 2008, p. 110). This final step would eventually consist in 'equalising the competences of the autonomous communities and homogenising, with full respect towards territorial differences, the economic and material conditions of every Spaniard' (PSOE, 2008, p. 265). Once again, equality prevailed over autonomy.

In the aftermath of the reform of Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy and the controversial ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2010, the party emphasised its middle-of-the-road position between those of the PP's government and separatist parties. In following texts, the PSOE broke with the oft-repeated idea that the autonomic process was closed and called for a transition to a federal model that would combine a 'collective commitment to a common project' with the recognition of 'differentiated identities' (PSOE, 2013a, 2013b, p. 5; see also PSOE, 2014, p. 4; PSOE, 2015a, 2015b, p. 10). However, the party did not give any indication that the transition to federalism would deviate from the classic symmetric and homogeneous structure.

Generally speaking, the party has consistently acknowledged the existence of 'differential facts' for 'some' autonomous communities (PSOE, 2014, p. 5) and frequently, although vaguely, referred to the existence of 'nationalities' in Spain. The term 'plurinational' appears only in the 2017 joint declaration with the Catalan branch of the party, issued in the context of the unilateral consultation promoted by pro-independence parties in Catalonia (PSOE, 2017). The Declaration also contained largely symbolic promises and ignored significant demands for change put forth by different Catalan parties, such as the application of the infrastructure clause included in the Statute of 2006 and the recognition of the linguistic diversity of Spain, in particular as regards the Catalan language at the state level (PSOE, 2017, p. 7).

Overall, the PSOE's discourse has been based on the idea that equality trumps recognition, whereas federalism is first and foremost about defending the 'unity of the State', rather than a device to respect diversity (PSOE, 2016, p. 384). At the last elections, this approach has, once again, prevailed. Even more so, the 2019 manifesto represents the relationship between equality and recognition as a trade-off (PSOE, 2019, p. 152): In this zero-sum game, equality—or at least a certain conception of individual equality—is considered by the PSOE as a principle hierarchically superior to recognition.

5.3 | Immigration

Generally speaking, the PSOE's migration policy has focused on finding a balance between limiting illegal immigration while regulating in a more progressive way refugees and asylum policies. Immigration has also been portrayed as

beneficial for Spain from a socio-economic standpoint. The PSOE has depicted immigrants as net contributors to the social security system who can help to sustain welfare and improve the country's low birth rates.

In the early 1990s, immigration did not generate the heated debate that most contemporary Western countries experience today. Hence, the manifestos for that period only paid little attention to the question of migration, often making general claims about fighting racial prejudices and xenophobic attitudes. However, there were already references to the need to adapt immigration flows to the professional skills needed in the country and the necessity of fostering the 'social integration of immigrants'. The documents also referred to the need to ensure that the number of newcomers would be in line with what 'our society can absorb' (PSOE, 1993, p. 64).

By the turn of the century, Spain went through a wave of immigration from outside the European Union. The party's discourse began emphasising how legal immigrants would have access to welfare in equal terms with citizens and promising to shorten the residence requirements necessary to obtain full citizenship (PSOE, 2000, p. 77). However, the party remained vague, and many of the elements related to citizenship policies have often referred to descendants of Spanish citizens living abroad, rather than to foreigners residing on the state's territory (see, for instance, PSOE, 2011, p. 142). Although the PSOE has explicitly rejected the notion of 'open borders', it has also acknowledged that immigrants must be treated with dignity respecting their human rights (PSOE, 2015a, 2015b, p. 363). In general, the party has defined access to nationality as the culmination of immigrants' 'integration process', supporting the introduction of an evaluation assessment of the candidates' 'integration trajectories' as well as of an exam on general knowledge of Spanish culture (PSOE, 2015a, 2015b, 366; PSOE, 2016, p. 369).

5.4 | To sum up

The PSOE has emphasised different elements that follow a classic social-democratic agenda, in particular equality and need. When considered from an individualist perspective, these elements do not generate significant tensions, so long as they do not cross the boundaries of solidarity of the nation-state. However, some elements fundamental to the articulation of welfare benefits potentially affect the structure under which such benefits are provided (in particular the structure of a decentralised regional system) and do generate certain tensions in the party's discourse. Thus, the party presents itself as the guarantor of the principle of equality through coordination and centralised governance. This however results in a difficult balance with the recognition of the existence of multiple nationalities in Spain. As the party primes a conception where equality is linked to unity, the boundary (i.e. the nation-state) prevails over the structure (i.e. specific policies to bring about equality and solidarity). In other words, equality among Spaniards prevails over the autonomy of Spain's constituent units.

6 | DISCUSSION

Our analysis explored, through the prism of welfare policy, how left-wing parties cope with the dilemma between the universalism of progressive ideologies and the particularism of nationalism that informs politics in modern societies. Social-democratic parties embed their claims about legitimate social sharing in a particular space and population. Contrary to most studies in the literature, we compared one state-wide and one sub-state left-wing party to account for the different ways in which these organisations deal with national identification and the boundaries of welfare.

We have shown that both state-wide and sub-state parties face the main tensions between nationalism and progressive ideology conditioned by their position towards the existing status quo. State-wide parties' welfare nationalism such as the PSOE appears as less perceptible because it defends the existing boundary of public policy. By contrast, the nationalism of sub-state parties like ERC's is more open and visible because it challenges the *status quo*. Accordingly, this different situation results in specific dilemmas and responses for each party. For instance, ERC has

made reference to the criterion of reciprocity to call for a fairer redistribution of contributions and public spending within Spain. Yet, the party's challenge of the *status quo* has in fact been based on the implicit assumption that Catalonia is a nation endowed with a right to self-determination. In ERC's discourse, 'internal' solidarity should prevail over 'external' solidarity. The criterion of identity thus lurks in the background and shapes reciprocity considerations. On the other hand, the PSOE has recognised the plurality of Spain, including the differential identities of historical nationalities such as Catalonia, but the party has consistently privileged equality among all Spaniards over recognition in the name of the unity and cohesion of the Spanish nation. Similarly, in its few references to the topic of immigration, the PSOE has defended granting equal access to the welfare state to immigrants, but it also called for ensuring that the number of newcomers would be in line with what 'our society can absorb', as well as for limiting illegal immigration in a context in which legal immigration from outside the European Union is already tightly restricted.

When shifting the perspective from which we examine questions about the boundaries of welfare, one might end up asking, as David Miller (1995) does about global justice, 'why does it make sense to assign responsibility for the rights and welfare of Swedes to other Swedes and the rights and welfare of Somalians to other Somalians?' One might well agree with Miller that 'to put Swedes, with a per capita annual income of \$24,000, in charge of their own needy, and Somalians, with a per capita annual income of \$120, in charge of their needy would seem grossly irrational from a universal standpoint' (p. 63). The reason behind this apparent inconsistency with the universalism of progressive ideology is the pervasiveness of nationalism as the strongest determinant of the legitimate boundaries of solidarity. Both majority and minority left-wing parties have to confront this feature of contemporary politics and find ways to combine it with the universalism of their left-wing ideology.

The tension between particularism and universalism takes different forms in our cases. For ERC, the dilemma has been about whether rejecting solidarity with the rest of Spain goes against left-wing internationalism. In 2000, *Esquerra* exceptionally tackled head-on such conundrum. In that year, the party argued that Catalonia could reject such imposed solidarity because 'as a matter of right, out of need and because of its own capabilities, [Catalonia] has sufficient standing to be conceived of as an autonomous unit and this should not be considered as a violation of the principles of solidarity and international progress that any left-wing party should follow' (ERC 2002, p. 18). In other words, as any other nation, Catalonia has a right to privilege 'internal solidarity'. Such frankness has however been rare, and most often, identity considerations have influenced arguments about legitimate social solidarity only indirectly. In the PSOE's case, on the other hand, the dilemma has been about imposing symmetric solidarity to the historical nationalities of the Spanish state, despite recognising their differential forms of national identification. In 2019, the Socialist party openly asserted that, while respecting the cultural pluralism of Spain and the recognition of Catalonia as a historical nationality, the 'limit to this recognition is the equality of all Spaniards in the exercise of rights and liberties and the equality in any part of the territory' (PSOE, 2019, p. 152). In other words, when it comes to the boundaries of social sharing and the procedures for its implementation, the recognition of the differential identities of the units making up Spain is inconsequential.

7 | CONCLUSION: THE BOUNDARY IS IN THE BEHOLDER'S EYE

Our analysis also leads to a number of potential elements for discussion and future research. First, exploring how state-wide and sub-state parties deal with the tension between nationalism and the Left suggests that there are not two 'different' nationalisms, as often assumed implicitly in the literature, but rather different ways to articulate the same political ideology. Differences emerge in how these parties respond to or articulate the basic features of nationalism with regard to the congruence of existing boundaries of group solidarity. However, in essence, our parties are locked in a confrontation about the location of sovereignty (either in Catalonia or Spain as a whole) and

its consequences for welfare and redistribution. On the one hand, they face the same tensions between universalism and equality, but they respond differently. Sub-state nationalism justifies withdrawing from state solidarity by emphasising inter-group equality, whereas state-wide parties emphasise notions of universal solidarity and inter-individual equality that are nonetheless bounded around the community of the nation-state. On the other hand, they face different tensions, notably whether to either support or reject the *status quo*, but both avoid openly problematising the link between identity and welfare and rather prefer to emphasise instrumentalist aspects, as well as to appeal to other, less controversial, deservingness criteria, such as need and reciprocity (see also Dalle Mulle & Serrano, 2019).

Second, comparing majority and minority left-wing parties allows going beyond conventional distinctions between hot and banal nationalism that imply clear normative connotations. 'Embedded' nationalism can serve as a more precise term than 'banal' nationalism when exploring values underpinning institutionalised practices, although a form of embedded nationalism can also be found in sub-national arenas with significant levels of self-government, like in Catalonia. Instead of 'hot' nationalism, we propose to use the term 'contesting' nationalism, that is, a nationalism that challenges existing political and normative structures. By analysing a wider range of elements than those which are usually controversial in state-sub-state dynamics, for instance, by including immigration in our examination, we illuminate the artificiality of the hot-banal distinction. In this connection, the existence of a clear structure in the form of an established state, which defines deservingness by means of institutionalised devices such as citizenship and territoriality, results in a normative framework that easily allows disguising particularism as universalism.

Third, the tensions between the Left and nationalism are related to the particular expression of the relationship between structure and boundaries in contemporary states with complex welfare systems. This contemporary expression takes place in a world of consolidated nation-states, which have gone through long historical processes of nation-building, with unavoidable consequences for progressive ideologies. The relational and individual components of the defining traits of welfare and the different responses elaborated by political parties can be seen as an interaction between principled and consequentialist arguments, with the former often being sublimated by the latter in different ways. These elements reflect in our view one of the main commonalities between state and sub-state parties: Despite general appeals to universalist values, the welfare system that they advocate are based on a notion of 'universalism within' that is more implicit in state nationalism and more visible in sub-state nationalism, although in this latter case it is also less problematic because its practical consequences are delayed in the future.

To sum up, the discourses examined in this contribution indicate how parties respond to the perceived tension between leftist values and nationalist principles. These responses can be seen as different expressions of a 'universalism within' that aims to resolve this tension. Beyond the scope of this paper, our findings could provide a better understanding of the oft-neglected connection between a sense of belonging to the national community and solidarity below and beyond the level of the nation-state. This focus of analysis could also be extended to comparable cases of territorial conflict within existing states, as well as in supranational organisations as the European Union. All in all, in both cases one might well conclude that the boundary is in the beholder's eye.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Despite the historical strength of the Catalan branch of the PSOE, the *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (PSC), we decided not to include the PSC in this study because it has often been forced to compromise by the central leadership of the PSOE, particularly regarding the territorial question, illustrating how PSC's autonomy has been shrinking during the last years (Roller & Van Houten, 2003, p. 13; Verge, 2013, p. 332).
- ² For a similar focus on the achievement of state power, see Breuilly (1982).
- ³ For a similar argument with regard to secession, see Dalle Mulle and Serrano (2019).
- ⁴ For similar considerations on the ambiguous approach to nationalism and internationalism of different European social-democratic parties, both in historical and contemporary perspective, see Berger (2000, pp. 219–223); Kuisma (2007); Lynch (1999).
- ⁵ For a critical discussion of the data provided by *Esquerra*, see Dalle Mulle (2018, pp. 45–51).
- ⁶ For a critical discussion of ERC's claims and the level of autonomy enjoyed by the Catalan autonomous community, see Colino (2009); Dalle Mulle (2018, pp. 51–56); Monasterio Escudero (2002); Sala (2014).
- ⁷ It is worth noting that the 1993 manifesto only mentioned the special needs of non-European parts of Spain such as the Canary Islands and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, thus ignoring the historical nationalities of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. The manifesto also stated the importance for the autonomous communities belonging to the so-called general regime (or slow-track autonomous communities, under Art. 143 of the Spanish Constitution) to eventually approve their own statutes of autonomy.

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