

1 The Effectiveness of Partnerships

Theoretical Framework

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What Is Partnership Effectiveness?

Conceptualizing and assessing the effectiveness of transnational forms of governance such as public-private and multistakeholder partnerships, with multiple configurations across different scales and jurisdictions, is a complex task. For the purposes of this volume, we define effectiveness as the contribution of partnerships to problem solving and sustainability, through a set of pathways that affect actors and their collective capacity to advance relevant objectives and public purpose. This conceptualization starts with the premise that the effectiveness of a governance institution or instrument is ultimately judged by the extent to which it addresses or contributes to solving the specific problems that are the subject of governance. The problem-solving premise is indeed at the heart of a substantial literature on the effectiveness of formal international institutions and environmental regimes. As Keohane (1996) stipulates, “in this broad normative and analytic sense, the proof of effectiveness is to be seen in the improvement of the targeted aspect of the natural environment” (p.14). In a synthesis on environmental regime effectiveness, Young (2011) highlights that “perhaps the core concern is the extent to which regimes contribute to solving or mitigating the problems that motivate those people who create the regimes” (p.19854).

However, the literature on institutional effectiveness is also quick to note that the problem-solving effects of governance regimes are often difficult to discern empirically and that, in addition, they may be an insufficient measure of effectiveness. On the one hand, even if the implementation of a partnership appears to successfully advance a set of objectives, its actual effectiveness may be endogenous to its level of ambition or the ways in which a specific problem is defined (Downs et al. 1996; Mitchell et al. 2020; Miles et al. 2002; Young 2011). Moreover, as partnerships are typically embedded in other layers of governance, one of the challenges is to disentangle their effects from those of other related institutions, as well as from exogenous factors such as changes in economic trajectories and social practices. More generally, evaluating effectiveness requires a counterfactual consideration of what would have been plausible to achieve in the absence of

a public-private or multistakeholder partnership, and attempting to establish the pathways through which the partnership has influenced relevant processes, behavior, and outcomes (Carbonnier et al. 2011; Haas, Keohane and Levy et al. 1993; Young and Levy 1999). Such analysis furthermore needs to consider preexisting conditions, the effects of other institutions, as well as alternative explanations for the attribution of influence.

On the other hand, more ambitious conceptions of effectiveness would go beyond assessing the impact of a governance instrument on a specific problem in order to examine critically how the problem was defined in the first place, and if such framing is considered adequate, efficient and just (Keohane 1996; Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell et al. 2006; Young 2011).¹ They would inquire about intended and unintended effects, be they positive or negative, which may materialize beyond the problem-solving capacity of an initiative (Young and Levy 1999). Such analysis would consider to what extent and how an initiative may contribute to cumulative, catalytic or disruptive effects in advancing aggregate sustainability at different scales from the local to the global (Clark and Harley 2020; Hale 2020a; Michaelowa et al. 2021; van der Ven, Bernstein and Hoffmann 2017). Moreover, it has been theorized that relative effectiveness may depend on the problem structure of an issue, and the extent to which an instrument makes progress in addressing a “difficult” problem because of its complexity or grid-locked politics, in comparison to tackling a more benign and tractable problem (Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell 2006). Finally, the extent and durability of governance effects have to do with the distributional and behavioral impacts of different instruments with respect to affected actors. Governance regimes that create conditions for behavioral change, positive incentives for relevant constituencies, and supportive coalitions tend to produce more stable collaboration and greater long-term effectiveness (Aklin and Mildenerger 2020; Andonova 2003; Dai 2007; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Ostrom 1990; Young 2011).

It is because of such considerations, that our definition of effectiveness includes the pathways through which partnerships may affect actors and outcomes, and their contribution to creating different capacities both for addressing specific issues and advancing aggregate sustainability (Clark and Harley 2020; Young 2020). This implies that partnerships can produce different kinds of effects, including with respect to different actors and constituencies. As Gutner and Thompson (2010, p.233) point out, the performance of a given institution is to an extent “in the eye of the beholder;” it may vary with respect to what objectives are being evaluated and by which audience. In this sense, our emphasis on the pathways to effectiveness seeks to capture both the processes and the mechanisms through which different types of effects are produced for different actors, both directly and through second-order or unintended impacts. We posit that such a disaggregated approach allows us to gain a better understanding of the contributions that a partnership makes to creating different capacities for addressing issues that pertain to sustainability.² It further challenges both scholars and policy makers to inquire critically about the extent to which partnership outcomes, that advance solutions to a specific problem, may detract from prospects of attaining inclusive social well-being

with respect to other issues or actors, and therefore their ultimate contribution to sustainability. Because of such considerations, the definition of effectiveness and the theoretical framework that we elaborate in the next section seek to provide a tool to document multiple types of partnership effects and, importantly, the interplay and tensions that may appear between them with respect to a broad understanding of sustainability that depends on the complex interplay between earth systems and societal factors and institutions.

Our conceptualization also takes into account the organizational specificities of partnership governance and the ways they differ from more formal institutions such as regulations or international regimes. Partnerships exemplify an informal and typically non-legalized form of agreements on a set of objectives and public purpose, with explicit and implicit functions and means of steering behavior (Andonova 2017; Pattberg and Widerberg 2016; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009; Westerwinter 2019). They are often, at least initially, driven by like-minded groups of actors that find common interest in focusing on smaller, more tractable components of complex global problems, such as climate change, biodiversity conservation or global health (Andonova 2017). Therefore, the solutions advanced by partnerships typically target a narrower set of objectives rather than comprehensive problem solving (Horan 2019). For instance, partnerships can jump-start the creation of new financial instruments to support climate mitigation or access to specific medical technologies, but no single partnership can (or has the authority to) provide a comprehensive normative and regulatory framework for addressing complex global issues, such as climate change or global health. The nature of collective action through partnerships has raised critical considerations about the agendas that they prioritize and the role of power in shaping the goals of partnership arrangements, their representativeness, and the discourses that surround them (Bäckstrand 2006; Faul 2016; Mert 2009, 2015; Utting and Zammit 2009).


Simultaneously, individual partnerships are typically embedded in a broader universe of transnational initiatives, formal treaties and domestic policies within a particular context (Abbott et al. 2015; Andonova 2017; 2010; Biermann and Kim 2020; Hale 2020b; Horton and Koremenos 2020). They reflect multiple normative bases and professional interests of different partners. The embeddedness of partnerships provides further reasons for the need for a framework that examines the mechanisms through which partnerships produce effects on actors, collaborative processes and different aspects of sustainability. We therefore expect that with respect to aggregate notions of problem solving and sustainability, partnerships are likely to contribute specific and variable outcomes, and their effects are likely to be best examined in terms of complementarity, durability or even trade-offs, alongside that of other initiatives. We critically scrutinize different types of effects that materialize or fail to do so across scales of governance, what types of positive reinforcement or contradictions they create and for whom, and how they fit within larger institutional landscapes. Furthermore, within a single partnership, our conceptual framework allows the examination of the extent to which that partnership may contribute to problem solving and sustainability through different pathways to, and conditions of, effectiveness that we identify. We thus adopt a less linear

and more fine-grained approach compared to existing studies, to explore intended and unintended consequences, as well as their direction with respect to actors and layered sets of governance objectives. The next two sections elaborate our theoretical framework, which draws on approaches across multiple disciplines to propose first a typology of pathways to partnership effects, followed by a set of conditions for effectiveness, which guide our inquiry and the empirical analyses presented in subsequent chapters of the book.

Pathways to Partnership Effectiveness: A Multidisciplinary Framework

In order to elaborate the different pathways of partnership effectiveness, we draw on several sets of literature dealing with questions of institutional effectiveness and public-private and multistakeholder partnerships from a variety of disciplinary perspectives and levels of analysis. Such a conceptualization is necessary to advance the theorizing and debate on the sources, mechanisms and limits of partnership effectiveness, and to develop new, appropriate methods for measuring impacts. We propose a typology, captured schematically by Figure 1.1, which identifies five different pathways along which the effects of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships can be examined, and which can be used to situate different perspectives and research priorities alongside each other. The theoretical framework on pathways to effectiveness builds on insights from studies in international relations, business administration, public policy, and critical political economy in order to identify the relevant processes through which multiple types of effects can be expected to materialize. As such, it offers a broadly applicable

Figure 1.1 Pathways to partnership effectiveness.



Source: Authors.

tool for assessing partnerships across levels of governance and with respect to different dimensions that may be more or less relevant with respect to specific context and disciplines. Each pathway is now elaborated in turn.

Contribution to Problem Solving for Sustainability

The ultimate goal of partnerships is, or ought to be, to effectively create value for societies by helping to solve often intractable problems they face. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the overarching concern of our inquiry is to examine the extent to which global partnerships have contributed to addressing specific issues related to sustainability. As already noted, however, existing studies across multiple disciplines have established the difficulties in determining the larger problem-solving impact of partnerships and disentangling it from that of other social and policy factors. Different strands of the literature have identified alternative intermediate pathways that allow us to examine distinct – and more discrete and tractable – dimensions along which partnership effectiveness can be manifested. We examine these different dimensions as plausible pathways through which the effects of partnerships can be expressed, and to gain a larger, cumulative understanding of effectiveness.

Goal Attainment

At the most fundamental level, partnership effectiveness can be measured in terms of the extent to which the partnership itself has been implemented and achieved its formally identified goals. Although such assessment may appear trivial, its importance cannot be overlooked. A case in point are the partnerships launched at the 2003 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) as an official outcome of the intergovernmental summit, with the intention of advancing the implementation of global commitments to sustainability (Andonova and Levy 2003). Research has shown, however, that about half of a sample of WSSD initiatives were either never implemented or performed poorly with respect to their stated goals (Pattberg et al. 2012). In their analysis, Pattberg et al. (2012) estimated that a large share of their sample simply lacked the commitment of resources and other instruments likely to be necessary to achieve these objectives. Furthermore, there is often a mismatch between stated partnership objectives and partnership outcomes (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). In 2021, the United Nations Office for Partnerships for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) platform has recorded that merely 225 of the 5,487 initiatives registered are on track to reach their objectives, with only 276 being completed.³

Studies in business administration and public policy evaluate effective goal attainment by partnerships against the counterfactual of their added value, compared to preexisting approaches or what partners could have achieved by themselves (Austin 2000; van Tulder et al. 2016; Austin and Seitanidi 2014; Waddock 1988). Goal attainment is thus a foundational aspect of partnership effectiveness. However, the validity of goal-attainment approaches to assessing the effectiveness

of formal or informal institutions is nonetheless contingent on a series of counterfactuals (Bernauer 1995; Gutner and Thompson 2010; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Mitchell 2006; Young and Levy 1999). The analysis needs to establish if certain goals are achieved as a consequence of the activities implemented by the partnership, rather than by exogenous factors, such as changes in market prices, economic downturns or government policies. Other important counterfactuals to consider are how ambitious the stated goals are in the first place (Downs et al. 1996; Faul 2014), the extent to which they challenge the status quo rather than adopting seemingly new but minimal, lowest-common denominator agreements (Berliner and Prakash 2014; 2015; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Sethi and Schepers 2014; van Tulder and Keen 2018), and whether they are actually aligned with the broader objectives of advancing sustainability globally (Horan 2019). Thus, a more rigorous conceptualization of effectiveness requires the specification of the mechanisms through which a partnership has affected the behavior and capacity of actors and the outcomes of their collaboration (Chan et al. 2016; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Miles et al. 2002; Young and Levy 1999). The next set of pathways therefore seek to capture processes and effects that materialize with respect to different actors and institutions, either internal or external to the partnership.

Value for Partners

Effective partnerships are expected to create value for the partners that are involved in them: businesses, civil society organizations, other types of nonprofit institutions, as well local, national or global public agencies (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Clarke, MacDonald and Ordonez-Ponce 2018; Porter and Kramer 2011; Seitanidi and Crane 2014; Stadtler 2016; Stadtler and Probst 2012). Indeed, from the perspective of business administration studies, the primary rationale for public-private and business and civil society partnerships is the cocreation of actor-specific and public gains that would otherwise not be possible to attain or do so efficiently (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; 2014). Such value is a measure of partnership success (Waddock 1988) and is assumed to be additional to what each sector can achieve with its own resources and logics of action, in order to justify the costs and changes that are intrinsic to partnering. Such value increasingly reflects the expectation that private actors, such as corporations, are responsible for preventing and redressing human rights abuses, environmental degradation and social injustice, as part of their broader societal embeddedness and license to operate (Ruggie 2013).

The diversity of partners involved in public-private and multistakeholder partnerships is considered to be an advantage for partnerships, yet tensions may surface between the different – and potentially contradictory – goals and interests of different partners, and also between conflicting demands of the partnership and those of the partners' home sectors (Buse and Harmer 2007; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a; Stadtler and Lin 2017; Utting and Zammit 2009). What types of value may be created by a partnership and

for whom? How do these types of expected value influence the motivation to engage in a partnership in the first place? These questions represent another integral aspect of partnership effectiveness and require more critical examination and the surfacing of paradoxical tensions as to what different partners may gain from the partnership, how they might value those gains, and how that value may relate to the stated partnership goals.

Collaboration Inside the Partnership

Intrinsic to partnerships are the partners who are brought into these collaborative arrangements and how they work together (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010). Nevertheless, not every actor that has a stake in the achievement of partnership goals can be intimately involved in the partnership itself. Therefore, effectiveness concerns are raised (mainly in the policy administration and international relations literature) as to which actors are excluded from or under-represented in partnerships, as well as the reasons for those exclusions. Alford and Hughes (2008), for example, propose rational explanations, while Faul (2016) and Harman (2016) advance analyses of power, and Knutsson and Lindberg (2019) and Macgilchrist (2016) foreground the ways in which such power may be contested.

Secondly, while claims continue to be made for the effectiveness of partnerships in redefining relationships between partners (Wessal and Wescott 2019), the complexity of collaborating across sectors is recognized by many researchers; Klijn and Teisman (2003) go so far as to argue that non-collaborative relationships are typical of partnerships rather than being the exception, while Babiak and Thibault (2009) argue that relationships of competition (rather than collaboration) are characteristic of partnering. Critically, Caldwell, Roehrich and George (2017) find that relational coordination affects both internal performance and external value creation, and Maltin (2019) argues that working out relationships between partners and discussing unspoken interests makes partnerships more adaptable to setbacks – and ultimately more successful.

Many scholars argue that institutional design and participation are both intrinsically linked to increased inclusion, and thus the perceived legitimacy and effectiveness of partnerships (Andonova and Carbonnier 2014; Bäckstrand 2006; Beisheim and Campe 2012; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Bexell and Mörth 2010; Buse and Harmer 2007). However, structure alone cannot account for more or less effective collaboration (Andonova and Levy 2003; Pattberg et al. 2012); partners who are formally included in a partnership's governance structure may be excluded from much of its decision-making in practice (Dingwerth and Eichinger 2010; Faul 2016). The interplay of the structuring of partnerships and the partners' agency in the workings of an initiative is expected to ultimately shape effectiveness (Brinkerhoff 2002; Casey 2008; Mandell 2001). Collaboration among partners is thus a pathway that produces important effects itself in terms of empowerment or disempowerment of actors, and the participatory quality and procedural legitimacy of the partnership (Bäckstrand 2006; Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014; Bexell and Mörth 2010; Dingwerth 2005; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b; Mert 2015).

It furthermore has implications for other types of effects such as the efficiency of achieving partnership goals and their durability (Maltin 2019).

Impact on Affected Populations

The stated *raison d'être* of partnerships typically lies in leveraging resources and instruments that create value not only for partners, but also for other target populations by addressing problems broadly related to sustainability that a single authority has been unable or unlikely to solve alone as a consequence of complexity (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Börzel and Risse 2005; Wessal and Wescott 2019). However, in solving one aspect of a sustainability problem, a partnership might exacerbate a different aspect, or may influence the issue agenda in ways that privilege some solutions and constituencies over others. From this perspective, Cook et al. (2012, p.6) draw attention to what they call the “triple injustice” of environmental policies that can compound the existing double inequity suffered by populations who contribute the least to climate change but nonetheless tend to be the most vulnerable to its consequences (Füssel 2010). While affected populations could be involved in the coproduction of the solutions that partnerships may provide, they tend to be poorly represented in many partnerships, and therefore less able to influence the solutions that are prioritized (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2006; Buse and Harmer 2004; Compagnon 2012; Faul 2016; Storeng 2014). Similarly, Barlow and Köberle-Gaiser (2008) argue that if health partnerships were to consult clinicians, more innovative impacts would follow. More critically, Verger, Bonal, and Zancajo (2016) argue that education partnerships increasingly engage with target populations (in their analysis, families) only as consumers of education, not as concerned citizens or responsible parents.

Alongside institutional arrangements, the distributional implications of partnerships and the extent to which they facilitate changes in actor behavior toward sustainability, is another significant determinant of effectiveness with respect to relevant constituencies (Andonova 2014; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Stadler 2016; Young and Levy 1999). Consequently, the effectiveness of partnerships should be investigated with respect to their benefits for affected populations and their inclusion in solution design, as well as the extent to which affected populations are able to influence partners' and partnerships' behavior and their willingness to engage in new commitments on a specific issue. This is important where, for example, benefits for affected populations may be in tension with the benefits that partners seek for themselves (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Bäckstrand 2006; Hawkes and Buse 2011; Mukherjee and Reed 2009).

Influence on Collaboration and Institutions External to the Partnership

In addition to collaboration inside partnerships, researchers also examine cooperation between partnerships and other external actors, as well as the ways in which partnerships interact with other mechanisms and systems of governance. Partnerships are considered to transform the system of actors and rules around

the issues they address (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Andonova 2017; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a; Trujillo 2018), external actors' issue-framing and prioritization (Harman 2016), as well as their adoption of partnerships as a mode of governance or implementation (Robertson et al. 2012). Partnerships may also influence other governance mechanisms and cooperation processes in the wider ecosystem into which the partnership is introduced (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Andonova 2017; Auld, Renckens and Cashore 2015; Biermann and Gupta 2011; Söderbaum 1999; Stone 2008).

A fundamental concern in global governance is the extent to which voluntary transnational partnerships may codify least common denominator objectives that could crowd out more ambitious and binding instruments (Sethi and Schepers 2014); or alternatively, if they may create a focal point and learning mechanism that can facilitate the brokerage of new formal institutions and agreements (Sun 2017). Thus, Visseren-Hamakers, Arts and Glasbergen (2011) examine the interactions of partnerships with intergovernmental regimes in the area of conservation and biodiversity. Equally, Verger, Bonal and Zancajo (2016) argue that education partnerships may shape the perspective of families on education in ways that influence the dynamics of public accountability (see also Forrer, Kee and Newcomer 2010). In global health, a particularly poignant debate centers the extent to which partnerships bestow authority to powerful non-state actors and soft agreements, which may create split accountabilities and the potential weakening of the authority of international institutions (Burci 2009). Partnerships for sustainable development thus influence existing complex systems at the same time as they are affected by them.

Disaggregating Partnership Effectiveness

In summary, the theoretical framework elaborated in this section and summarized in Figure 1.1 captures our argument that both the direct goal-related outcomes of partnerships, as well as their influence on a variety of actors at different levels, represent integral components of any analysis of their overall effects. It provides a disaggregated approach to understanding effectiveness and allows scholars to examine concrete pathways through which outcomes occur that are particularly salient in one or more disciplines, or important with respect to unresolved debates. For instance, while studies have demonstrated that some of the large global health partnerships have succeeded in their immediate objectives in terms of raising resources and deploying life-saving medical technologies, there is less systematic evidence on their impacts on different communities within countries of deployment, on national health systems, or with respect to global health institutions, all of which are necessary components for addressing global health issues. These are distinctive pathways that are addressed across the pillars in our framework (Figure 1.1). The disaggregated approach to analyzing partnership effectiveness that we propose, and its application across a broad spectrum of cases, enables the creation of cumulative knowledge and more generalizable conclusions across disciplines (Matson, Clark, and Andersson 2016; Ostrom 1990).

At the same time, the analytic framework is also a tool to examine how the different pathways to effectiveness integrate to address an overarching problem, and the implications for understanding what and how a specific partnership or a set of partnerships contribute to aggregate conceptions of sustainability. We could stipulate that partnerships which create synergistic or complementary outcomes across multiple pathways are likely to make greater contributions to problem solving and to enable different capacities for advancing inclusive well-being (Clark and Harley 2020; Ostrom 2009; Young 2020). By contrast, contradictory or disjointed effects of partnerships along the different pathways may indicate important limitations or even negative effects in terms of problem solving and sustainability. The analysis would thus need to inquire about the magnitude, direction and form of partnership outcomes and their effects along the different pathways. Taking into account such contradictions and second-order impacts is even more important for our understanding of what it takes to advance sustainability as an integrated objective. Targeted approaches to a specific problem could bring out high problem-solving effectiveness, but inadvertently undermine other essential aspects of sustainability, as critics to vertical interventions in global health, for example, have pointed out (Ehrenstein and Neyland 2018; Harman 2016). Significantly, the disaggregated framework for evaluating the effectiveness of partnerships is likely to lead us to a more critical understanding of the ways in which partnerships may contribute to effectiveness, and how they may not. With the global recognition of sustainable development as a broad set of interlinked objectives that materialize in a polycentric manner, we can no longer assume a single-issue focus of most transnational governance arrangements.⁴ Therefore, examining the link between the different pathways to effectiveness and their contributions to a set of overarching societal aspirations must be a central part of the discussion.

Finally, all partnerships examined in this volume seek to make a contribution to sustainability, broadly defined. The pathways to effectiveness framework elaborated in this chapter addresses the long-standing challenge of identifying the underlying reasons for which partnerships may – or may not – succeed in that aim. Specifying the different mechanisms through which partnerships might contribute to sustainability allows the subsequent examination of the extent to which they do. Moreover, in the absence of such disaggregation, it is difficult to isolate partnerships' effects from that of other governance institutions, policies, and networks with which they interplay or coexist. Each pathway alone cannot explain the dynamics of partnership effectiveness. It is therefore important to map out the different pathways being examined, in an attempt to establish the extent to which a partnership's effects can be seen as additional or complementary to that of other governance instruments – or if they have produced diffusion, disruption, or catalytic effects. Analyzing the different and interrelated mechanisms that determine partnership effects would thus allow us to document, and, to the extent possible, isolate the specific contributions (or lack thereof) of partnerships to advancing sustainability.

The empirical chapters in the volume therefore seek to establish both the significance of specific pathways and how they shape the broader contribution of

a partnership or sets of partnerships to problem solving and sustainability. This entails analysis of the implications for understanding the overarching effects of initiatives, across different pathways through mutuality or contradictions, synergies or trade-offs. Aggregate analyses alone cannot show these differences, and also do not allow the examination of how these factors may be positively linked to, or in tension with, each other. Adopting a disaggregated approach thus allows us to uncover pathways along which partnerships may have produced limited sustainability effects, with implications as to how problems are being approached, and which elements of partnering or sustainability may have been sidelined.

Structuring of Partnerships and Conditions for Effectiveness

The multidimensional conceptualization of effectiveness provides a framework for a systematic comparative analysis of the degree to which partnership effects have materialized across a variety of cases and across issues that are at the core of advancing sustainability. This type of analysis furthermore allows us to attempt to identify a set of conditions that are likely to shape the effectiveness of partnerships. Due to their inherent embeddedness in complex systems of governance, conditions that are both external and internal to partnerships influence the different pathways to their effectiveness (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Vollmer 2009; Young 2011; Westerwinter 2019). Existing studies of transnational governance initiatives – including transnational public-private partnerships, cities’ networks and private certification schemes – have identified a range of political and contextual factors that influence their implementation and uptake. They reveal that governmental policies may provide variable incentives, more hospitable regulatory environments, and reduced transaction costs for actors to adopt transnational voluntary initiatives (Andonova, Hale and Roger 2017; Andonova and Sun 2019; Büthe and Mattli 2011; Cashore et al. 2004). Domestic institutions, social capital and industry associations, in turn, have provided implementation support and expertise that have shaped in important ways, for example, the variable adoption and effects of transnational climate initiatives, private certification and disclosure schemes (Dolšak and Prakash 2017; Eberlein et al. 2014; Grabs 2020; Gulbrandsen 2012; Sun 2022; van der Ven, Sun and Cashore 2021). Studies have similarly found that actors in countries with stronger institutional and societal capacity are more likely, and better equipped, to engage in transnational partnerships (Andonova 2014; Westerwinter 2019). This may seem paradoxical, because such initiatives are assumed to target those sustainability problems and populations that have been under-provided by more traditional governance instruments (Andonova and Levy 2003; Beisheim et al. 2014; Krasner and Risse 2014; Risse 2011). Global external factors, such as sovereignty costs for states associated with partnership arrangements or markets on which the resources and outcomes of partnerships may depend, can similarly influence partnership implementation and effectiveness (Reinsberg and Westerwinter 2019).

One of the objectives of this volume is to examine a range of partnership initiatives across different issue areas in order to gain more generalizable descriptive

inference on the pathways to effectiveness and the applicability of the theoretical framework. Because of the inherent diversity of public-private partnerships and multistakeholder partnerships in terms of size, goals and embeddedness at different levels of governance, it is often difficult to control for, or to examine comprehensively, the variety of external factors that can shape effectiveness in contexts of complex causation (Gutner and Thompson 2010; Young 2011). For this reason, we focus our theoretical inquiry on identifying a set of conditions and characteristics that are internal to the structuring of partnerships, which may help to explain why some are more likely to be effective and others are not. The analysis of conditions for effectiveness is thus exploratory in nature and theory-generating, rather than theory-testing. Nonetheless, the objective is to illuminate important and generalizable conditions that shape partnership effectiveness and explore these conditions systematically through the empirical cases and data presented in this volume (King, Keohane and Verba 2021; Young 2011).

The broad literatures on institutional effectiveness and on institutional design provide theoretical foundations for proposing a set of conjectures on how the structuring of partnerships and their internal characteristics are likely to shape effectiveness. Institutional theory and studies of international regimes have identified a set of functions, features and processes through which institutions broadly conceived can influence the behavior of participating actors and the relative effectiveness of international regimes.⁵ A number of theoretical and empirical works have further highlighted specific design features of both formal and informal institutions that can shape how effectively they perform such functions and their overall impacts.⁶ More recently, the scholarship on global governance has elaborated accounts of the evolving agency and institutional architecture in international affairs toward complexity and hybridization of authority, with implication for their effectiveness and legitimacy.⁷ Other perspectives, including studies on regime evolution, experimentalist governance, and more recently on catalytic effects, emphasize the significance of processes that shape the variable development, diffusion and, ultimately, the broader impact of different governance modalities.⁸

The work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), in turn, has identified a set of features that are specific to facilitating effective governance of common pool resources through decentralized, informal and localized arrangements, conditions that resonate particularly closely with the relatively decentralized and dispersed nature of partnership governance. These conditions have been further explored with respect to international institutions and polycentric governance (Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003; Dolšák and Ostrom 2003; Keohane and Ostrom 1995).

Building broadly on the theoretical insights of the institutionalist literature, we proceed to elaborate four propositions on how the structuring of partnerships and their features related to contractual arrangements, commitment of resources, adaptability, and innovation, are likely to shape effectiveness. Necessarily, we adapt institutionalist perspectives to the specificity of partnership governance, which operates in a relatively decentralized manner, both transnationally and at local scales. The four propositions also draw on existing studies on partnership

effectiveness, which have highlighted the significance of partnering processes, mechanisms and structuring through characteristics, such as institutionalization, learning-by-doing, and the level of integrative value creation, as significant factors likely to influence their relative success (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; 2014; Bäckstrand 2008; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Beisheim et al. 2014; Buse and Harmer 2007; Stadler 2016; Van Tulder et al. 2016, among others).

Proposition 1. Sophisticated contracting, in terms of establishing appropriate specificity of commitments and mechanisms to enable accountability, is likely to increase the effectiveness of partnerships.

This proposition may appear somewhat counterintuitive, given that partnerships frequently rest on informal and limited contracts, at least at the time of their creation. Many partnerships are simply announced and registered as part of partnership platforms; some are launched by memoranda of understanding; while others are more formalized (Andonova and Levy 2003; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009). As partnerships expand and become institutionalized over time, they establish more formal rules and operational procedures (Andonova 2017). Why then is contracting important for partnership success? We stipulate that the quality of contracting is important for the effectiveness of partnerships precisely because of their largely informal and often experimental nature, which aims to influence actors and layers of governance through a certain degree of disruption and institutional learning-by-doing (De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Hoffmann 2011).

Research on collaboration for the provision of collective goods has shown that both formal and informal agreements can help to establish reciprocity, common expectations, and mechanisms to deal with the implementation of common objectives as well as with transgression from established goals, while minimizing long-term damage to cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990). Moreover, the design features of collaborative arrangements matter for advancing their functions and governance objectives (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Beisheim and Liese 2014; Koremenos et al. 2001; Mitchell 1994; Ostrom 1990; Roger 2020; Westerwinter 2019; Young 2010).

Drawing on these theoretical premises, we conjecture that contractual arrangements that establish clear lines of responsibility between partners, and mobilize their comparative advantages toward common objectives, are particularly important for informal agreements such as partnerships.⁹ This is because, in the absence of a common understanding of their relative contribution and complementarity in terms of expertise, resources, access, norms and associated responsibilities, partners will face more limited incentives and higher transaction costs in implementing informal agreements (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Maltin 2019; Ostrom 1990). Such a level of specificity is particularly important for creating common meaning and trust across sectors and partners, which typically have different domains of activity, priorities, and organizational culture and language (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Stadler and Lin 2017; Waddock 1988), and in attempting to reconfigure

power relations, that may vary within or between sectors (Brown 2009; Faul 2016; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a). The process of discussing and elaborating common goals, as well as clarifying partners' commitments and contributions to the partnership, is likely to strengthen the prospect of effective implementation (Buse and Harmer 2007).

The right degree of specificity of contractual arrangement is furthermore likely to require soft but functional mechanisms of information sharing and accountability to ensure implementation and to maintain trust and reciprocity (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2010; Bäckstrand 2008; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1990; Park and Kramarz 2019). Such mechanisms would, nonetheless, allow for a degree of flexibility to respond to inevitable setbacks that may result from factors external to the partnership, or challenges related to differences in organizational cultures and motivations. As Bäckstrand (2008, p.82) points out, in the context of networked governance with diffuse sites of governance and sources of authority, accountability critically depends on transparency, the presence of monitoring mechanisms, and adequate representation of stakeholders to secure a degree of answerability and redress (Wessel and Wescott 2019; Bäckstrand 2006). Being voluntary and horizontal arrangements structured around a set of commonly agreed goals, partnerships are less likely to rely on hierarchical accountability mechanisms or threat of sanctions.¹⁰ Indeed, by bringing together different organizational actors, the partnership as a unit and its core partners can be subject to peer and reputational accountability in the presence of transparency and information, as well as to market-based accountability mechanisms with respect to donors and competing organizations (Bäckstrand 2008; Grant and Keohane 2005). At the same time, these multiple lines of informal accountability can create split accountabilities with respect to different actors and objectives, which can be exacerbated by financial and political power (Burci 2009; Buse and Harmer 2004).

Thus, contractual specificity and accountability go hand in hand as necessary (although likely not sufficient) characteristics for partnerships to sustain reciprocity, to prevent business-as-usual behavior through cross-sector consultation, and to support the successful and durable implementation of objectives (Acar, Guo and Yang 2008; 2012; Buse and Harmer 2007). Without these features, an initiative may produce short-term reputational gains, but limited substantive commitments and long-term value either for the partners or toward societal and sustainability objectives (Michelowa and Michaelowa 2017; Sethi and Schepers 2014). It is for this reason that we use the terminology sophisticated contracting – to reflect the challenge of establishing the right degree of specificity and mechanisms of interactions, information sharing and accountability that pertains to the problem structure of the issues, the set of partners and collective objectives.

Our analysis thus emphasizes the importance of the contractual environment for the effectiveness of partnerships (see also Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993), rather than the degree of formality or informality of a partnership initiative. This logic departs from arguments that greater institutionalization of partnerships (e.g. in terms of degree of delegation of functions, formal delegation, binding

obligations, and centralized monitoring and enforcement) is likely to be conducive for greater partnership effectiveness (Beisheim and Campe 2012; Beisheim et al. 2014; Westerwinter 2019).¹¹ Moreover, we move beyond design alone to also interrogate the practices through which partnerships are implemented (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Faul 2016). We argue that greater delegation and formalization by itself might not necessarily provide the right set of mechanisms and practices to establish common understanding on objectives and responsibilities in the context of voluntary arrangements.¹² Nor may they sustain reciprocity toward the achievement of these objectives for the broadest set of constituencies, given the variable nature of partnership processes and governance. Partnership evolution and structuring is at least as much a matter of practice and managerial processes of implementation (Adler and Pouliot 2011; Andonova 2017; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Faul 2016; Young 2010), as it is of certain design choices at the beginning of the agreements. For these reasons, we focus conceptually and empirically on the structuring of partnerships; that is, the partnership agreements, processes and practices through which design features (such as specificity of commitments and mechanisms of information sharing and accountability) are put in place and evolve over time. We inquire how these features influence the implementation and effectiveness of partnerships, particularly in the absence of hierarchical enforcement.

Proposition 2. Credible commitment of resources is likely to enhance partnership effectiveness.

This proposition appears obvious. Yet, the literature has noted a slew of registered partnerships that have not committed the necessary resources or instruments necessary for implementing their stated goals or having a substantive impact on problem solving (Pattberg et al. 2012; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2011). Studies in public policy and business administration stipulate that one of the main rationales for partnerships is the potential for partners to leverage complementary resources, in order to make the advancement of a set of objectives possible or more efficient (Andonova 2018; Austin and Seitanidi 2014; Börzel and Risse 2005; Kaul and Conceição 2006; Porter and Kramer 2011). The pooling of resources is the underlying basis for both international regimes and transnational initiatives to strengthen the capacity of relevant actors and domestic institutions, exerting influence through multiple behavioral and managerial mechanisms, to increase the likelihood of effectiveness in advancing sustainability (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993).¹³ Clark and Harley (2020) have highlighted the relevance of resources and different types of capacities for advancing sustainability broadly, across levels governance. Commitment of resources is therefore, in many ways, the *sine qua non* of partnership goal attainment as an elementary measure of effectiveness. However, it is yet to be systematically assessed or measured in the academic literature.

By credible allocation of resources, we mean the pledging and management of resources in a way that establishes stable medium- or long-term expectations among all partners regarding partnership objectives. More stable and credible

resource arrangements are likely to provide the basis for longer time horizons for reciprocal action between partners and supporting capacity for implementation (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Keohane 1996; Ostrom 1990). Alternatively, a partnership that has not secured resources for implementation may fall largely into the category of window-dressing of existing practices, resulting in limited or no change in behavior or collaborative impact (Berliner and Prakash 2012).

Proposition 2 implies that we may observe a continuum of resource-related arrangements – from partnerships that are largely statements of intent without the necessary means for implementation; to partners committing resources in ways that are *ad hoc*, short-term, or ill-specified across sectors; through to arrangements that have a more integrative and well-clarified structuring of resources with a view to sustained implementation (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Buse and Harmer 2007). While resources are essential for goal attainment, their structuring and long-term prospects are similarly important factors for other pathways to effectiveness, such as cooperation among partners, impact on affected populations, and the intended or unintended effects on institutions outside of the partnership, thus underlining the aggregate contribution of different effectiveness pathways to ultimate problem solving and sustainability.

Proposition 3. Partnership processes that facilitate the adaptability of partnership arrangements are likely to be conducive to greater effectiveness.

A certain degree of learning and adaptability is important for institutions to function and remain effective, as political conditions change, particularly with respect to complex sustainability problems (Biermann 2014; De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Dietz, Ostrom and Stern 2003; Parson 2003; Young 2010). Processes that facilitate learning and adaptability may be of particular significance for partnerships, because of their multi-sectoral and experimentalist nature. Partnerships tend to be entrepreneurial and experimental governance arrangements, in the sense that each partner reaches beyond their organizational sphere and standard practices to engage in collective action with organizations characterized by different cultures, mandates, and resources (Andonova 2017; Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Green 2014; Hoffmann 2011). Such strategies may involve a number of risks. For public organizations it may pose risks of undue influence and mismatch in organizational cultures and normative premises, while, for civil society groups, it may involve a degree of professionalization and domestication of the pressure that they may exert. For business actors, risks may include heightened public attention and scrutiny, as well as additional transaction costs associated with partnering with public bureaucracies and civil society organizations that typically have different organizational cultures and normative expectations (Austin 2000; Kolk, van Tulder and Kostwinder 2008). If an initiative involves experimentation with new solutions to address aspects of complex problems that require the leveraging of public and private risks, its success is far from guaranteed. Therefore, partnerships that are organized in ways that anticipate the need for learning-by-doing are more likely to endure through the implementation of their goals and produce

sustained effects (Austin and Setianidi 2012; De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Maltin 2019).

But can we discern the adaptability of a partnership as an organizational quality and an explanatory factor of partnership effectiveness, independent of its results? Not entirely, because adaptability is manifested in response to intermediate outcomes or to external shocks and unanticipated effects. The effectiveness of a partnership is thus likely to depend critically on the extent to which partners are able to learn through implementation, deliberation, and internal and external information to adapt the course of collaboration and outcomes. From this perspective, adaptability refers to the process through which the partnership is managed and implemented, and the extent to which that process allows partners to build institutional resilience in order to address external or internal risks and setbacks. The relevance of internal factors that shape the adaptability of partnerships is likely to vary across different cases. These factors may include agile leadership, the involvement of a facilitator or platform for managing multistakeholder interactions, regular communication, openness about partner-specific motivations, and maintaining trust and common understanding of the partnership purpose (Austin and Seitanidi 2012; Maltin 2019; Ostrom 1990; Parson 2003; Stadtler and Karakulak 2020). In other words, partnership processes are likely to be important not only in terms of the collaborative effects between partners, but also for the adaptability of the partnership, which in turn is likely to influence multiple dimensions of effectiveness: from goal attainment to impact on affected populations and institutions outside the partnership, and ultimately, its contribution to problem solving.

Proposition 4. Partnerships that foster innovation – understood broadly as creating or facilitating access to innovative processes, institutions, technologies or financing – are more likely to be effective in advancing sustainability objectives.

Much of the literature on partnerships rests on the assumption that leveraging and facilitating access to innovation, which often requires collaboration across different sectors (Anadon et al. 2016), has been one of the main rationales for the creation of public-private and multistakeholder initiatives (Kaul and Conçeição 2006; Moon et al. 2010; Szlezák et al. 2010). In the governance of global health, for instance, public-private partnerships have targeted issues where private sector investment in, and access to, innovation has been frustrated by market failures, institutional barriers or the absence of profit potential (Buse and Walt 2000; Held et al. 2019; Mazzucato, Li and Darzi 2020 2020). Similarly, clean energy partnerships have emerged to facilitate the investment in innovation and diffusion of clean energy technologies and supportive policies, initially in response to the gridlock in international climate and clean energy cooperation in the 2000s (Andonova 2021; Szulecki, Pattberg and Bierman 2011; Zelli et al. 2020).

Partnerships have also been rationalized as a means of experimenting with innovative technologies, financing, or consensus building on global issues. And

yet, we have limited systematic data across issue areas on the extent to which partnerships bring about innovative solutions. In other words, we need to examine the relationship between partnership governance and innovation critically and in greater detail to establish whether, how and to what extent individual partnerships succeed in bringing to bear innovative processes, institutions, or products to achieve sustainability outcomes. For instance, the business management literature distinguishes between philanthropic partnerships (for example, donations for specific causes) and integrative partnerships that reexamine private and societal goals to find ground for overlapping and integrated solutions (Austin and Seitanidi 2014). The latter partnership model may be more likely to produce innovation and change, for example, because it requires active rethinking of existing practices (Brinkerhoff 2002; Clarke and Crane 2018). Even in integrative partnerships, the degree of innovation would depend on the extent to which they depart significantly from existing processes of partner organizations, in order to experiment with new approaches that produce disruptive and catalytic effects to advance sustainability (Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; Hale 2020a; van der Ven, Bernstein and Hoffmann 2017). Proposition 4 therefore allows researchers to explore systematically, and with greater empirical scrutiny, the interplay between different types of processes and different types of effects of partnerships, with a focus on innovation as a critical factor for sustainability outcomes.

Conditions for Effectiveness and Complex Causality

As has become evident from the preceding discussion, the four propositions on plausible conditions for partnership effectiveness have to do with how partnership structures and processes may shape their effects. These propositions imply that success of partnership initiatives is far from certain, and that effectiveness is likely to require careful internal structuring of objectives and partner commitments to provide for accountability, resources, and openness to innovation and adaptability. Indeed, partnerships that are hastily announced at high-level forums or have failed to secure adequate resources or structuring may have a high likelihood of being *de facto* inactive, as existing studies have documented. Our analysis recognizes that contextual factors, such as policy context, political support, societal capacity or external shocks, are similarly likely to influence the effectiveness of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships. While the more contained objective of the four propositions elaborated here is to discern how significant the structuring and features of a partnership are in producing results and behavioral effects, our empirical analysis also considers their interplay with contextual determinants of institutional effectiveness.

We furthermore take into account that the four factors specified by our theoretical propositions are likely to interact with each other, rather than influence partnership effectiveness independently. The quality of contracting may reinforce adaptability if the contract includes agile accountability mechanisms that enable learning, or it may hinder adaptability if contracting arrangements are either very limited or too rigid. Adaptability is furthermore a characteristic process that

cannot be subsumed under the rubric of contractual structure and resources, since it reflects the path-dependent development of a partnership and the nature of the collaborative processes and leadership within it. Thus adaptability of partnerships is likely to relate closely to the third pathway of partnership effectiveness captured in Figure 1.1, linked to internal collaboration within the partnership. Similarly, the credible commitment of resources is likely to be essential for innovation and access; and yet, it is hardly the sole determinant of how innovation is produced and accessed through partnerships. We therefore treat the four conditions stipulated in this section not as causal factors that are independent of each other, but rather as causal mechanisms, related to the internal characteristics and structuring of partnerships, that can shape – in interaction with each other and with contextual factors – the five pathways to partnership effectiveness. Our approach recognizes that partnerships operate in a context of complex causality, whereby “clusters of causal forces interact with one another” to determine specific outcomes (Young 2011, p.19859; see also Hale 2020). It provides us with a tool to examine qualitatively and critically *how* specific features of a partnership enable or inhibit complex processes that produce specific outcomes along different pathways to effectiveness.

By identifying a set of conditions internal to partnerships that are likely to shape their effectiveness, the propositions allow us to explore empirically their significance in shaping different dimensions of effectiveness. We expect, for example, that the credible commitment of resources is likely to be critical for goal attainment and for the extent to which a partnership can secure sustained benefits for affected populations and the problems being addressed. On the other hand, partnerships that introduce or seek to scale up innovation might be most likely to produce a visible impact on affected constituencies and on institutions outside of the partnership, while the direction of that effect may be uncertain and range from disrupting prevailing practices to strengthening existing institutions and mechanisms of cooperation. In other words, there are many outstanding empirical questions surrounding the drivers, direction and extent of partnership effectiveness. Our conceptual framework seeks to inform that empirical work and to generate much needed data and comparative insight on the basis of which it is possible to further refine our theoretical understanding of the factors and causal processes that shape the effectiveness of public-private and multistakeholder partnerships.

Conclusion

The theoretical framework on pathways to and conditions of partnerships effectiveness that we present in this chapter is derived from an interdisciplinary inquiry. Discipline-specific approaches have illuminated different aspects of institutional and partnership effectiveness. Current scholarship in each of the different disciplines that we engaged provides a partial view and multiple interpretations of what effectiveness is and how it can be researched. Growing attention to the public purpose of cross-sector partnerships in the business administration and management literatures, alongside the increased examination of public-private partnerships in

disciplines that more traditionally focus on public actors (such as international relations and policy studies), indicates the potential for cross-fertilization. Learning across diverse disciplines that take partnerships as their object of study does not mean collapsing disciplinary categories, questions or priorities. As we have argued, there are complementary contributions and interactions between disciplines that can play an important role in furthering the study of partnership effectiveness.

The pathways to effectiveness framework that we contribute capture such an interdisciplinary perspective. We posit that researchers can usefully identify the extent to which partnerships effectively contribute to problem solving and sustainability by attending to: goal attainment, value creation for different partners, collaboration between partners, effects on affected populations, and influence on external institutions and partnerships. Simultaneously, the following key conditions associated with the structuring and features of partnerships deserve research attention: sophisticated contracting, credible resource commitments, adaptability, and capacity to innovate. These pathways and conditions can interact with each other in the way that they exert influence. For instance, fulfilling the conditions of adaptability and innovation that we identify may allow a partnership to more effectively achieve its goals at the same time as having a positive impact on affected populations and institutions outside the partnership.

By applying the theoretical framework that we contribute, researchers will be able to empirically examine the pathways and conditions that promote and sustain effectiveness (or not) in their empirical studies, as well as how these factors interact. There is no guarantee, however, that these pathways and conditions interact in harmonious or complementary ways. We separate the pathways and conditions to increase researchers' analytical purchase on the many aspects of effectiveness that are at play, and then on the complexity of their interactions. Indeed, the disaggregated nature of the framework invites researchers to explicitly tackle the complex relations between the different pathways and conditions for partnership effectiveness. The chapters in Parts II and III of this volume demonstrate the utility of disaggregation, using the framework to examine a variety of empirical cases across a range of issues and crosscutting areas of investigation. By elaborating this broadly applicable theoretical approach, we seek to contribute to a deeper, more multidimensional understanding of the effectiveness of global partnerships. Applying this disaggregated model that delineates the diverse pathways to and conditions of partnership effectiveness, researchers and policy makers can ultimately gain a more substantiated and qualitative assessment of the aggregate impact of a partnership toward addressing a specific problem and its contribution to advancing sustainability.

Notes

- 1 See also further examples linked education (Faul 2014), health (Harman 2016), and nutrition (Schleifer 2018).
- 2 The importance of creating capacities for addressing sustainability has been identified by Clark and Harley 2020; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Ostrom 1990 and Young 2020, among others.

- 3 See <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships/> (accessed 26 October 2021).
- 4 See among others Clark and Harley 2020; Jordan et al. 2015; Ostrom 2010; Speth and Courrier 2020; Young 2020.
- 5 On international institutions, their effects and pathologies see, among others, Axelrod 1984; Barnett and Finnemore 2012; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Downs, Roche and Barsoom 1996; Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983; Martin 2017; Ruggie 1982; Simmons and Martin 2002; Weaver 2008. On the effectiveness of international environmental regimes more specifically, see Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Haas 1990; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell 1994; 2006; Oberthür and Stokke, eds. 2011; Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 1999; 2010, and a review article by Young 2011, among others.
- 6 Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Martin 2019; Pauwelyn, Wessel, and Wouters 2012; Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker, 2021.
- 7 See, among others, Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016; Alter and Raustiala 2018; Andonova 2017; Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Avant and Westerwinter 2016; Barnett, Pevehouse and Raustiala 2021; Biermann and Kim 2020; Biermann and Pattberg 2012; Bulkeley et al. 2014; De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Grande and Pauly 2005; Keohane and Victor 2011; Moon 2019; Ostrom 2010; Raustiala and Victor 2004; Raymond and de Nardis 2015; Tallberg et al. 2013; Young 2020; Zürn 2018.
- 8 Bernstein and Hoffmann 2018; de Búrca, Keohane and Sabel 2014; Hale 2020a; Parson 2003; Young 2010.
- 9 See Ostrom (1990) on specificity of commitments and their ownership by stakeholders as conditions for successful cooperation and sustainable management of environmental resources in the absence of hierarchical enforcement.
- 10 See Grant and Keohane (2005) on the nature and multiple mechanisms of international and transnational accountability.
- 11 On formal and informal institutions and rational design, see, among others, Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001; Martin 2019; Roger 2020; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Westerwinter, Abbott and Biersteker 2021.
- 12 See the work of Kramarz (2020) on how rigid hierarchical management and prioritization of rules and procedure may undermine stated values and outcomes of partnerships such as participatory representation or innovation.
- 13 On the relevance of resources and capacity see also the broader literature on the effects of international and transnational environmental regimes, see Andonova 2003; Andonova, Hale and Roger 2018; Börzel and Risse 2010; Graz, Helmerich and Prébandier 2020; Haas et al., 2003; Horton and Koremenos 2020; Keohane and Levy 1996; Persson and Dzebo 2019; Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Young 2010; 2011; Young and Levy 1999.

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