10 Faultlines within Sectors in Partnership Executive Boards

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Introduction

The partnership model is ubiquitous in sustainability. Much of the partnership debate in research (and in policy and practice) revolves around differentiating between the public, private, and voluntary sectors from which partners are drawn. Differences between these sectors are assumed to affect the relations between them, and therefore the effectiveness of partnerships. Yet, differences beneath the surface of these categories are rarely examined. In this chapter we argue that the partnership debate's focus on sectoral factions disregards other aspects of diversity and their potential to affect partner relations and partnership effectiveness. "Diversity" signifies the extent to which members of a group are similar or dissimilar, and can be examined across multiple characteristics. These multiple dimensions of diversity provide some of the micro-foundations for relations between partners, a critical pathway to partnership effectiveness according to this volume's analytical framework (Chapter 1).

Our purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to identify aspects of partner diversity that are understudied but consequential, and consider their effects on pathways to partnership effectiveness. These analyses enable the examination of the extent to which multiple dimensions of diversity – and the interactions between them – may produce more or less significant faultlines in partner relations. Examining these micro-foundations of partner relations enables an improved theorization of partnership effectiveness; it also holds important implications for board decisions and the sustainability impacts these partnerships may deliver. Taking governance boards as our empirical setting also allows us to extend a partnerships literature that tends to overlook the role of governance boards (see Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a, 2021b for rare examples of such analyses).

To fill this gap, this chapter contributes a framework – faultline analysis – borrowed from the corporate governance literature. First introduced by Lau and Murnighan (1998), faultline analysis enables the simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of diversity in teams and governance boards. Rather than assuming the significance of sector groupings, faultline analysis provides a set of theories and methodological tools to empirically identify sub-groups, and to measure the faultline strength between them. Partnerships for sustainability that use boards

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as governance mechanisms tend to appoint board members from different stakeholder groups as constituency representatives or, in rare cases, in their individual capacity (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b). It is possible that faultline analysis will identify functional sub-groups that fit the officially recognized stakeholder categories; we argue, however, that this cannot be assumed, but rather requires empirical analysis.

We apply faultline analytical tools to the executive boards of six Global Financing Partnerships (GFPs) to examine how multiple dimensions of diversity may affect collaboration inside partnerships (Pathway 3 of this volume's analytical framework). Our empirical analyses compare the boards of three GFPs addressing climate change (71 board members) with three that address health (70 members). The climate GFPs have 100 percent public sector board membership (even if the board engages with non-voting civil society and private sector observers); in contrast, the health GFP board members are drawn in differing numbers from public, private and voluntary sectors. Our analyses show that certain faultlines that are expected between different sectors are not observed, while other faultlines exist within the same sector. Statistical significance testing showed that, in this sample of partnerships, board members from the public sector are as likely to have either economic- or issue-focused professional experience as members from the private sector. However, a statistically significant association was calculated between donor and sector: against the policy narrative of the private sector mobilizing significant resources for sustainability, donors to these partnerships are significantly associated with the public sector, not private. Furthermore, donors are significantly associated with an economic logic of action (counter to expectations that economic logics belong more in the private sector), and non-donors with an issue-specific framing whatever sectoral grouping they belong to.

Regarding the volume's analytical framework, our findings illuminate collaboration inside the partnership as a pathway to effectiveness (Pathway 3) by investigating boards as an effective accountability mechanism (Proposition 1). Additionally, our faultline analyses reveal the ways in which collaboration between partners can have an impact on other pathways to effectiveness and partnerships' ultimate problem-solving effectiveness: which partners are included and partner relations can circumscribe the scope of goals that partnerships may set for themselves (Pathway 1) and the credible commitment of resources by partners (Proposition 2), shaping partnerships' impacts on affected populations (Pathway 4) and overall contributions to sustainability. We also show that beyond the partnerships studied, "partnership" cannot be considered a generic mode of governance – the specificity of partners included and the relations between them holds consequences for partnership effectiveness and sustainability impacts.

Rather than repeating reviews of the partnership literature already provided in this volume and elsewhere (for example, Andonova 2017; Clarke and Crane 2018; Wang et al. 2018), we begin this chapter with a closer look at the corporate governance literature. Theories of governance and group formation offer axes of analysis that are critical to questions of relations between partners and partnership effectiveness. We then introduce faultline analytical concepts, before

defining the methods and measures we use in our empirical analyses. We report on the alignments and faultlines generated through the simultaneous examination of three dimensions of board member diversity (sector, professional experience, and donor or non-donor status) in the boards of six partnerships that address climate change and health. Finally, we discuss our analyses with reference to this volume's analytical framework and the wider literature.

The Role of Governing Boards

Governance mechanisms are theorized to contribute significantly to the performance of all organizations. As the most noteworthy mechanism of corporate governance, boards are considered to affect a firm's performance as measured by financial success, market share or investor satisfaction (Bezrukova et al. 2009; Jehn and Bezrukova 2010). In partnerships, Burci (2009) argues that "boards take programmatic decisions such as adopting the work plan and budget of the partnership, and the partnership secretariat is expected to implement its decisions and be accountable to it." (p.378). If boards influence an organization's results, what then influences board performance? A number of theories have been proposed to explain the significance of governance boards in firm performance. For the purposes of this review, we group these theories according to external and internal factors that are considered to affect governance boards as the boards, in turn, affect the organizations they govern and more widely.

The first wave of governance research used principal-agent theory to examine relationships between the board, shareholders and senior management (Daily, Dalton and Cannella 2003; Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 1996). Based in neoclassical economic concepts of rationality and utility maximization, the premise of principal-agent theory is that if managers act in their own interests and not in those of the principals (that is owners, investors, or shareholders), then a governance board drawn from these principals is required to monitor their actions (Hermalin and Weisbach 2001; Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, agency theory lacks explanatory power with regard to: first, different types of principals (conflicts between large and small owners, or overlapping principals and agents such as are found in family firms); and second, the variety of roles (beyond monitoring) that board members play (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2016; Charan, Useem and Carey 2013). Potential conflicts of interests between executives, directors and shareholders are also highlighted in studies of power relations between organizations' boards and senior management (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella 2009). While stewardship theory emphasizes alignment between the interests of owners, boards and managers, this remains a minority view (Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin 1998).

Secondly, board effectiveness has been theorized to rely on board composition, internal organization and decision-making processes. Stakeholder perspectives reveal the contribution of, and difficulties arising from, the inclusion of broader representation (usually organized labor) in board deliberations and decision making (Crucke and Knockaert 2016; Moriarty 2014). Additionally, applications of

behavioral economics approaches to boards emphasize the importance of boards in resolving conflicts among stakeholders and in gathering and processing information (Huse 2005; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse 2009).

Thirdly, an expansive perspective on boards from political sociology and political economy examines the balance between the distribution of the benefits and risks that organizations generate for the economy and society (and more recently, the environment), or sustainability more broadly (as is the focus of this volume). Such research considers the ways in which board structures shape the development of different types of capitalisms locally and globally, alongside the ways in which boards perpetuate the control of elites over societies and economies (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2016; Zahra and Pearce 1989). More narrowly, the role of the board in monitoring and accountability in terms of measuring an organization's external performance comprises the majority of corporate governance research and policy attention (Berthelot, Francoeur and Labelle 2012, Murray 1989).

Finally, boards are theorized to act as broker between an organization and its external context. Resource theory focuses on the board mobilizing useful external resources into the organization and giving advice to senior management – referred to as the board's service role (Crucke and Knockaert 2016; Forbes and Milliken 1999). These resources could consist of funding, lines of credit or useful relationships with external individuals and organizations. Legal approaches focus either on the organization's wider legal environment (Baber et al. 2005), or on the board's legally mandated responsibilities (Zahara and Pearce 1989). In addition, different societies hold different normative expectations for organizations, which shape board composition, such that the US model of shareholder corporate governance differs from stakeholder models of governance that are more widely used in, for example, Germany or Japan (Aoki 1988; Jackson 2005).

Most of the concerns identified from the corporate governance research above are reflected in the volume's analytical framework. Internal relations (whether between board members, or between board and stakeholders and managers) are reflected in Pathway 3: collaboration inside the partnership. References to the effects on the broader political economy and the organization's context echo the concern in Pathway 5 with influence outside the partnership. Effects on the organization's performance are seen in Pathways 1 and 2 (goal attainment and value creation for partners) and how these contribute to sustainability more broadly. The final set of issues identified in the literature underpin the empirical analyses in this chapter: how board members mobilize resources into the partnership (see also Andonova 2018), and how board members' attributes align to contextual norms (here, sustainability logics and sub-sectoral stakeholder representation). The links between the corporate governance literature and the volume's analytical framework are summarized in Table 10.1.

It is important to note that while the corporate governance literature addresses most of the pathways to effectiveness identified from the multi-disciplinary literature review in Chapter 1 of this volume, it omits the impact on affected populations (Pathway 4). This is perhaps unsurprising, since most of the corporate literature draws on neoclassical economics and business referents, which have

Table 10.1 Relevance of corporate governance literature to partnership effectiveness

Corporate governance literature		*Analytical framework (Chapter 1)*
Internal factors		
1. Board-to-organization	Relations between board, shareholders and senior management: power; conflict or harmony	Cooperation between partners
2. Inside board	Include stakeholders Resolve conflicts between board members	Cooperation between partners
External factors		
3. Inside-out	Effects on global political economy Effects on organization's context	Influence on collaboration and institutions outside partnerships
	Effects on organization's performance	Goal attainment Value creation for partners
4. Outside-in	Align organization and board to contextual norms	Who is represented on board? Which logic of sustainability?
	Mobilize resources	Who is a donor?

Source: Authors.

tended to discount affected populations (and environments) as externalities. Externalities are conceptualized as effects on third parties (who have no control over the transaction) and have tended not to be accounted for in evaluations of the effectiveness of corporations.[1] This has meant, in practice, that corporations whose actions negatively affect populations and environments do not account for social and environmental costs of their actions, but only the increases in profits and shareholder value. And yet, public funds are generally used to repair the damage. Thus, the analytical framework in Chapter 1 adds the hitherto neglected dimension of impact on affected populations (Pathway 4) as an aspect that would enrich the corporate governance literature, and any study of partnership boards.

Thus, despite the substantial literature dedicated to governing corporations, boards tend to be overlooked in the partnership literature. And yet, significant theoretical importance is ascribed to boards' influence on any organization. The corporate governance literature illuminates the ways in which one pathway to effectiveness (collaboration among partners) interacts with other pathways, here, goal attainment and value creation for partners, and influence outside of partnerships. While not all partnerships are governed by executive boards, if we fail to study the potential effects of this significant governance mechanism in those partnerships that have executive boards, we cannot give a full account of partnership effectiveness. This chapter therefore foregrounds partnership boards as key actors

in the governance of certain partnerships, as they in turn exercise their governance functions in the sustainability issue they address.

Multiple Diversities within Sectors

The corporate governance literature argues that external performance measures are affected by internal board functioning, and that internal board functioning is affected by the diversity of board members. Some researchers have argued for the positive influence of more diverse board members in sourcing heterogeneous and innovative perspectives and information that are useful to the organization (Wiersema and Bantel 1992; Forbes and Milliken 1999). However, diversity has also been shown to engender inter-group conflict and impede decision making (Cannella, Park and Lee 2008). Thus, Tuggle, Schnatterly and Johnson (2010, p.552) argue that "it is the heterogeneity or homogeneity of these traits among board members that affects how they work together." But which traits?

The management literature tends to use a limited definition of diversity. The majority of empirical studies that have been undertaken on diversity have focused mainly on demographic characteristics, such as race and/or gender (Thatcher, Jehn and Zanutto 2003). The recent literature on stakeholder involvement in boards mainly examines the inclusion of one particular stakeholder group, namely employees (Freeman 1984; Moriarty 2014; Van Buren 2010). Nevertheless, Tuggle et al. (2010) highlight the ways in which board members' heterogeneous professional experiences influence discussions in board meetings, while Thatcher and Patel (2012) identify conflicts originating from informational differences.

Partnership researchers' focus is narrower still. There are many differences in the partnership literature across business and management, international relations and politics, and public administration. However, all three bodies of literature tend to focus on differences between public, private and voluntary sectors, each of which is conceptualized as internally cohesive. And yet, specialist literatures studying each of these sectors emphasize the differences in scale, scope, practice and preferences within these groups. This within-sector heterogeneity cannot be ignored by those of us who study the interactions between them. Too often a definition of heterogeneity, purely in terms of public, private, and voluntary sector factions, obscures other aspects of board members' diversity that could affect relations between partners. Inside boards, membership of sub-groups could map directly onto sectoral categories but could also cut across them. The identification of sub-groups is therefore an empirical question.

This chapter contributes sharper conceptual tools that may be used in examining the internal diversity and functioning of partnership boards, and an empirical application of these tools. We move beyond the conventional partnerships research focus on factional groups (public, private, voluntary sectors) to open up the research space to examine differences within sectors. The intersections of a variety of sectoral and non-sectoral aspects of diversity impact individuals in different ways than one alone might, and are theorized to change the responses

that an individual may experience in professional and wider social contexts. We now review one of the methodological innovations (faultline analysis) that could provide additional rigorous evidence on some of the pathways to effectiveness summarized in Chapter 1 of this volume. By measuring faultline strength between sub-groups formed on the basis of other diversities (across or within sectors), we show the utility of identifying other significant, if less obvious, faultlines in partnership boards and their effects on partnership effectiveness.

Faultlines, Board Functioning and Organizational Performance

Faultlines are hypothetical dividing lines splitting board members into sub-groups based on the analysis of several intersecting attributes (Lau and Murnighan 1998). Faultline analysis provides theoretical propositions that seek to identify sub-groups based on the simultaneous analysis of multiple attributes. It then considers how the interactions between these sub-groups may affect governance processes and outcomes. In the late 1990s, early pioneers of faultline analysis defined core concepts and theorized the effects of faultlines on team processes and firm outcomes. Lau and Murnighan (1998) suggested that diverse teams split into sub-groups holding opposing opinions, theorizing sub-group formation and polarization through mechanisms of homophily. The early 2000s saw a wave of studies that developed measurement techniques and extended the scope of attributes examined beyond demographic diversity (Kaczmarek, Kimino and Pye 2012).

In the social categorization approach we adopt, sub-groups are considered to result from team members differentiating between an in-group (us) and an out-group (them) (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). Thus, the more traits that individuals share on more than one dimension of diversity, the higher the comparative fit in one sub-group rather than another. For example, where several board members with professional experience in economics (Econ) represent a donor (D) government (Gov) they are considered more likely to form a sub-group. Where a sub-group of board members share most or all of the same traits, a strong sub-group is identified; if members of a sub-group only share a few traits, that indicates a weak sub-group. Inside strong sub-groups, it is probable that members of those sub-groups will identify more strongly with their fellow sub-group members than the wider group; the opposite is theorized regarding members of weak sub-groups where only one or a few attributes are shared (Phillips et al. 2004). Moreover, the more highly correlated two dimensions may be (in this study, for example, donor status correlates with economic professional experience), the higher the comparative fit (Jehn and Bezrukova 2010; Veltrop et al. 2015). In contrast, where two dimensions are not correlated (e.g., working in the public or private sector and professional experience) then these sub-groups are considered less likely to affect performance (Knippenberg and Van Ginkel 2010). This crosscut diversity is theorized to weaken faultlines, enhance information-sharing and improve decision making (Sawyer et al. 2006). Additionally, when members have to address matters that are related to one of many dimensions of diversity,

then that dimension is more likely to be activated (Lau and Murnighan 2005). For example, if a project is proposed that foregrounds economic rather than social or environmental outcomes, the board members who have economic professional experience might work together more harmoniously even if they diverge on other dimensions.

Two issues regarding faultline analysis are particularly important in the study of partnership boards: the structural effects of faultlines on group functioning (Pathway 3), and the effects on resulting group decisions (Pathways 1 and 4, and broader sustainability impacts). Stakeholder inclusion can be considered an ethical practice, and yet it can impair board functioning (Crucke and Knockaert 2016). The effects on group functioning are theorized to follow a curvilinear relationship, wherein groups (here, boards) with either very strong or virtually non-existent faultlines experience higher levels of conflict in comparison to groups with medium faultline scores (Thatcher et al. 2003). Secondly, faultlines affect the decisions that the wider group takes (Kaczmarek et al. 2012), and therefore the organization's performance (Veltrop et al. 2015). In the empirical context studied, these decisions pertain to the goals a partnership sets for itself (Pathway 1); the actions needed for the implementation of those goals; and the broader contribution the partnership makes to sustainability, including its impact on affected populations (Pathway 4).

In much faultline analysis, researchers undertake regression analyses for corporate effectiveness criteria. "Performance" in the corporate governance literature is usually interpreted to mean maximizing profit and return on investment. However, an exclusive focus on maximizing shareholder value is a relatively recent phenomenon (Friedman 1962), which is also geographically limited to certain high-income countries (Mazzucato 2021). The responsibilities of businesses and financial institutions to society and the environment are again becoming more explicitly recognized (Fink 2019; Gartenberg and Serafeim 2019). Given the complexity inherent in sustainability issues and the framework of partnership effectiveness proposed in this volume, simple outcome measures and regressions on economic measures alone are not appropriate to these analyses; a different methodological approach is required.

Operationalizing Faultline Analysis

A faultline perspective on partnership boards can be broken down into three analytical questions. First, which multiple dimensions of diversity matter in the boards studied? Secondly, how do different dimensions of diversity interact to form sub-groups among board members, with the potential for in-group harmony and out-group discord? Third, how does this affect organizational performance? Faultline analysis empirically identifies sub-groups within larger groups through analyzing the micro-foundations of group formation. While originally focused on individuals' demographic characteristics (such as race, gender, age), other relevant attributes can be identified according to the context, organization and group examined. Faultline analysis simultaneously examines multiple attributes of the

same individual and compares the resulting profile with others in the group, to then cluster them into empirically identified homophilous sub-groups.

In this empirical context, what aspects of diversity matter in measuring faultlines in boards? The emphasis in the partnership literature, on the assumed differences between public, private and voluntary sectors, overlooks other potentially noteworthy aspects of diversity among partners (board members in this analysis). And yet, diversity among board members relates to many more aspects of professional and organizational diversity. The corporate governance literature also draws attention to the salience of the organizational context in board member selection. Contextual norms are reflected in the composition of governing boards, which in turn affect the framing of the organization's contribution and ways of working (Table 10.1).

Three dimensions of diversity are particularly relevant to the analysis of GFPs for sustainability. First, board documents identify board members not only by their sector, but also by sub-sectors (governments and International Organizations (IOs) in the public sector; business and finance in the private sector; and finally civil society). Secondly, as Crucke, Moray and Vallet (2015) argue, "faultlines are explanatory constructs for the effects of internal representation of competing logics" (p.236). Regarding sustainability, three different logics of action are considered important: economic, environmental and social. The solution to any issue or intermediate goals contributing to resolving that issue can be portrayed using any one, or combination of two or three, of these frames (Elliott 2012, Raworth 2017). In the GFPs studied, we coded the logics identified in individual board members' professional experiences as either "economic"; or "issue" (relevant to the issue addressed by the GFP: health or climate change); or "other" (representing professional experience not directly related to the issue, e.g., law or diplomacy). Finally, board members are identified in partnership documents with reference to their resource mobilization for the partnerships on whose boards they sit (in this analysis as donors or not). Thus, we operationalized faultlines relevant to partnership governance boards by coding characteristics identified as salient in GFPs' selection of board members (sub-sector and resource mobilization) and individuals' professional experience (as a proxy for their framing of the sustainability issue in question), as summarized in Figure 10.1.



Figure 10.1 Operationalizing key dimensions of diversity. Source: Authors

Method

As with partnership research, the team diversity literature has also tended to analyze one characteristic of diversity at a time and has provided contradictory findings. Faultline analysis offers a more precise view: sub-groups may be formed within and across (as well as between) factions, and this may affect the processes, decision making, and impacts of global governance partnerships. Thus, a major contribution of faultline analysis is the simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of diversity that have been identified as relevant to the boards studied, and their normative and operational context. Faultline analysis also provides methods for measuring these structures and operationalizing the analysis of sub-group formation, thus opening new avenues for reconsidering the relations between partners and their contribution to the effectiveness of partnerships.

Sampling and Sample

While a variety of governance structures and practices have been identified (for example, Aguilera and Jackson 2003), global financing partnerships tend to use governance boards largely comprised of stakeholder representatives with a small minority of partnerships appointing a small minority of individual members. Consistent with faultline analysis, we identified a set of global financing partnership boards in which different configurations of attribute diversity were present. We selected three partnerships in climate change where only public sector representatives hold seats and three in health where private and voluntary sector participation is encouraged (Table 10.2).

Table 10.2 Sample of six global financing partnerships for sustainability

Name	*Mission*
Climate Change	
AF: Adaptation Fund	Finance projects and programs that help vulnerable communities in developing countries adapt to climate change (AF 2018)
GCF: Green Climate Fund	Limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change (GCF 2020)
GEF: Global Environment Facility	Safeguard the global environment by helping developing countries meet their commitments to multiple environmental conventions (GEF 2018)
Health	
Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance	Help vaccinate the world's children against deadly and debilitating infectious diseases (Gavi 2020)
GFATM: Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	Raise, manage and invest the world's money to accelerate the end of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as epidemics (GFATM 2020)
RBM: Partnership to End Malaria	Mobilize for action and resources, and forge consensus for coordinated action against malaria (RBM 2021)

Source: Authors, based on cited sources.

Data Collection

The "black box" of board room deliberations remains largely closed to researchers. Therefore, for this research project, we collected documentary data on the attribute diversity of board members in these six global financing partnerships for sustainability. Official partnership documents provided data on the relevant sub-sector categories of board membership (government or IO, business or finance, and civil society) and also their role in resource mobilization (donor or non-donor). Professional biographies available online provided data on the professional backgrounds of board members, as a proxy for their framing of the issue that the partnership addresses (economic, issue – health or climate change, respectively – or other).

Data Analysis

Table 10.1 in the literature review above summarizes the theoretical derivation of the attributes relevant to the empirical analyses of these partnership boards: sub-sector (government or IO, business or finance); funding relationship (donor or non-donor); and professional experience (relevant to the issue that the partnership addresses (environment or health), economic (development economics, finance, investment), or other (addressing an issue that is different to that addressed by the GFP, such as law or diplomacy). Board documents and board members' professional biographies were first analyzed against these theoretically derived codes. Subsequently, we derived descriptive statistics and carried out a chi-squared test to ascertain the significance of the association between the three dimensions of diversity examined. We then computed sub-groups using the average silhouette width (ASW) method (Meyer and Glenz 2013), as we now describe.

Computing Faultline Measures

Many faultline measures are limited to analyzing small groups and computing no more than two sub-groups (Thatcher et al. 2003), or give overarching faultline values without identifying which members belong to which sub-groups (Gibson and Vermeulen 2003; Trezzini 2008). Rather than limiting our analysis in this way, we adopted Meyer and Glenz's (2013) cluster-based approach –average silhouette width (ASW) – since it allows the identification of the number of sub-groups and also sub-group membership. Furthermore, the ASW algorithm supports our focus on individuals' comparative fit, resulting in the calculation of sub-groups with higher within-group similarity and lower between-group similarity (Knippenberg and Van Ginkel 2010).

The ASW algorithm operates in two steps. First it starts pre-clustering with one of two agglomerative clustering algorithms: the Ward algorithm (Ward 1963) and the average linkage algorithm. For a sample size of n observations, these two algorithms yield a set of n different configurations of clusters, composed of 1 to n observations. The first configuration is composed of n clusters, where each cluster is composed of a single observation. Then, depending on the algorithm and

clustering criteria, for each of the following configurations the number of clusters is reduced by one, as the pair of closest clusters is merged into one. The question that poses itself at this stage is which of the *n* configurations would represent the optimal solution. This is all the more pertinent as the observations exist in a high dimensional manifold and their number is large.

A quantification and hierarchization of the goodness of fit of each configuration is given through the computation of the average silhouette width (ASW). The ASW strength quantifies two important pieces of information into a single score: (a) how well an individual fits inside its own cluster, (b) in comparison to how it might fit into another cluster. This requires the quantification of the dissimilarity to other observations inside its own cluster; the quantification of the dissimilarity to the other observations inside the closest cluster; and the comparison of the two.

The dissimilarities between two observations are calculated using Euclidean distance. Since all our attributes are categorical, the algorithm makes use of dummy coding for each level of the observations' attributes where the occurrence of a level is given a value of $1/\sqrt{2}$ and 0 otherwise (Meyer and Glenz 2013). This way, two observations that differ in terms of one attribute would have a Euclidean distance of 1. The Euclidean distance between two observations in terms of the number of different attributes δ can be expressed as follows:

$$d(\delta) = \sqrt{\delta \times 2\left(1/\sqrt{2}\right)^2} = \sqrt{\delta}$$

At the level of each configuration yielded by the Ward or average linkage algorithms, the ASW cluster algorithm computes the cluster faultline score by averaging over the individual silhouette widths, proceeding by moving only one observation at a time to the closest cluster to calculate the new faultline score. It does so for all observations and makes one of the moves final if it yields the best increase in the overall configuration's faultline score, which is an average of the faultline scores of all clusters. Among all resulting configurations with different initial associations from Step 1, only the one maximizing the ASW is retained. In addition to its hierarchization and quantification advantage, this method is all the more interesting as it overcomes the issue of agglomerative clustering that is only able to merge entire clusters together. In practice, a maximum number of clusters that we are not willing to exceed during the optimization is fed to the algorithm. This is essential to guard against the calculation of an equal number of clusters as observations, where each observation fits perfectly inside a cluster composed only of itself.

Analysis and Findings

In this section we present our findings from applying faultline analysis to 141 members of six global financing partnership boards. We first focus on the characteristics that are present across the space of these partnerships. Secondly, we compare climate change and health partnership board members' alignments,

the sub-groups identified within and across sectors, and individual "fit" in those sub-groups.

The Space of Partnerships

Across the six partnerships studied, certain alignments were not present in the data (Table 10.3). Only one private sector actor is a donor to a partnership on whose board they serve, and their professional background is economic (D/Bus/Econ); there are no D/Bus/Iss or D/Bus/Other. As expected, there were no civil society donors (D/CS/*). Thus, of the total 39 donors, 98 percent were public sector representatives (87 percent government and 11 percent from IOs). A higher proportion of donors had an economic professional background (71 percent), whereas the majority of non-donors held an issue framing (67 percent). Board members' work experience generally aligns either with the GFP issue (climate change or health) or with an economic framing of the issue addressed; there appear to be few linkages to other sustainability issue areas on these boards.

In order to ascertain the significance of the relationship between these different characteristics, we carried out statistical analysis in the form of a chi-squared test. There is not enough evidence to claim an association between sector and professional experience: representing either public or private sectors does not correlate with an individual's professional background being more economic or issue-specific (Table 10.4a). In contrast to assumptions of within sector cohesion, this finding shows a critical faultline within both public and private sectors arising from their professional experience. Another potential faultline within the public sector is the statistically significant association between donor and professional experience, such that being a (public sector) donor is associated with an economic professional background and non-donor status (both public and private) is associated with an issue framing (Table 10.4b). The significance test also showed, however, that there is enough evidence to claim a statistically significant association between sector and donor (Table 10.4c), that is, public sector representatives make credible commitments of resources to these partnerships, while private sector board members do not.

Table 10.3 Number and proportion of intersectional alignments

	Donor			*Non-donor*				
	Economic	*Issue*	*Other*	*Economic*	*Issue*	*Other*	*Total*	*Proportion*
Business	1	-	-	1	6	-	8	6%
Finance	-	-	-	6	-	-	6	4%
Civil Society	-	-	-	1	5	-	6	4%
Government	36	10	2	16	39	-	104	74%
IO	2	4	-	3	7	-	16	11%
Total	39	14	2	28	57	-	140	
Proportion	71%	25%	4%	33%	67%	0%		

Source: Authors.

Table 10.4 Chi-squared significance tests for association between: a. Sector and work experience b. Work experience and donor/non-donor c. Sector and donor/non-donor.

a. Sector-Work Experience				*b. Work Experience-Donor*			*c. Sector-Donor*		
Sector	*Economic*	*Issue*	*Other*	*Work experience*	*D*	*ND*	*Sector*	*D*	*ND*
Private	8	6	0	Economic	39	28	Private	1	13
Public	58	60	2	Issue	14	57	Public	54	66
Voluntary	1	5	0	Other	2	0	Voluntary	0	6
p-value	0.517			p-value	0.000004674		p-value	0.00304	

Source: Authors.

These analyses challenge key assumptions in the partnership literature: that sectors are internally coherent and the private sector will contribute additional resources.

Comparing Climate Change and Health Partnership Boards

Climate change boards are composed of solely public sector actors: governments and IOs. However, there is differentiated clustering beneath this surface sectoral homogeneity; public actors fall into different alignments depending on their funding role and professional experience. Health partnerships' representatives from private and public sectors, formed (a) more clusters, and (b) more heterogeneous clusters than in the climate partnerships (Table 10.5).

Measures of individual fit in sub-groups identify the extent to which an individual "belongs" with the other individuals inside the same cluster; the closer to

Table 10.5 Summary table of analysis of alignment, clustering and individual fit

	Climate Change			*Health*		
	AF	*GCF*	*GEF*	*Gavi*	*GFATM*	*RBM*
# Board members	16	23	32	28	27	14
Business	-	-	-	4	1	3
Finance	-	-	-	3	2	1
Civil society	-	-	-	1	5	-
Government	16	23	30	16	14	5
IO	-	-	2	4	5	5
Clusters						
# clusters	3	4	3	6	6	4
# individuals in each	10, 3, 3	6, 4, 4, 9	5, 18, 9	9, 3, 2, 6, 4, 4	7, 3, 4, 4, 5, 4	3, 3, 4, 4
Individual fit						
Min	1	0.67	0.33	0.17	–0.24	–0.08
Mean	1	0.91	0.9	0.61	0.67	0.53
Median	1	0.835	0.665	0.585	0.38	0.46
Max	1	1	1	1	1	1

Source: Authors.

1.00, the better the fit. Since the algorithm also considers the goodness of fit for an individual into other clusters, a zero or negative score does not denote "bad fit" within a cluster, but rather "poorer fit" within other clusters in the same board. These individuals could be considered "floating" and likely to attach to one or other group or group position depending on the identity mobilized by the issue under discussion, or conversely as boundary-spanners who could take an active role in bridging across differences between other stronger clusters.

Intersectional Alignments, Sub-Groups and Individual Fit

Thirty "alignments" are possible between the three intersecting categories studied (funder status, sub-sector, and professional experience). Of these, 15 are present in the six GFPs studied (Table 10.6). Present on all six boards was the alignment of a non-donor government representative with an issue framing (ND/Gov/Iss). Government representatives with a professional background in economics who were donors (D/Gov/Econ) were present on five boards (not AF), as were non-donor government representatives (ND/Gov/Econ, not RBM). Also present on five boards were donors with an issue framing (D/Gov/Iss, not GEF).

We put together notions of sub-groups and individual fit to discriminate between strong and weak sub-groups depending on the number of individuals in a sub-group with the same or similar characteristics. Sub-groups where individuals align on all three characteristics measured a fit score (or FAU) of 1.00. Sub-groups where the majority of individuals align on all three categories, but a

Table 10.6 Number of individuals who adhere to specific alignments

	Climate Change			*Health*			*Count of Alignment:*	
Alignment	*AF*	*GCF*	*GEF*	*Gavi*	*GFATM*	*RBM*	*Members*	*Boards*
ND/Gov/Iss	10	4	9	9	4	3	39	6
D/Gov/Econ	-	9	16	3	7	1	36	5
ND/Gov/Econ	3	7	5	2	1	-	18	5
D/Gov/Iss	3	4	-	1	1	1	10	5
ND/IO/Iss	-	-	-	2	3	2	7	3
ND/Bus/Iss	-	-	-	2	1	3	6	3
ND/Fin/Econ	-	-	-	3	2	1	6	3
ND/CS/Iss	-	-	-	1	4	-	5	2
D/IO/Iss	-	-	-	1	1	2	4	3
ND/IO/Econ	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	3
D/IO/Econ	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	1
D/Gov/Other	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	2
ND/Bus/Econ	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1
ND/CS/Econ	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
D/Bus/Econ	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1

Source: Authors.
Note: Results are shown in descending order of the total number of individuals in each alignment category.

minority align only on two characteristics score a mean of 0.60–0.80, depending on the number of individuals who align on three attributes or fewer: the more that align on three, the higher the score. Sub-groups where just one attribute of three are aligned across the group score closer to 0.00, and sub-groups where none of these characteristics are aligned in all or most members score negatively (Table 10.7).

Since climate change partnerships only comprise public actors (government and IO), it is not surprising that 9 out of 10 clusters aligned on all three dimensions of diversity, in comparison to 8 out of 15 clusters in health GFPs. GEF was the only board where there were more members in a weaker sub-group than in the two strong sub-groups; however, alignments in that weaker sub-group (D/Econ) have been shown to be significant (Table 10.4b). The sustainability framings identified from board members' biographies vary within sectors more than across them. In the health GFPs, the strength of alignment within the

Table 10.7 Faultlines and cluster alignments

Issue	*GFP Board*	*Cluster FAU*	*Alignment*			*# Board Members*
Climate	AF	1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	10
		1.00	ND	GOV	ECON	3
		1.00	D	GOV	ISS	3
	GCF	1.00	D	GOV	ECON	9
		1.00	ND	GOV	ECON	6
		1.00	D	GOV	ISS	4
		1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	4
	GEF	1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	9
		1.00	ND	GOV	ECON	5
		0.82	D	-	ECON	18
Health	Gavi	1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	9
		1.00	ND	FIN	ECON	3
		1.00	ND	BUS	ISS	2
		0.30	D	GOV	-	6
		0.17	-	IO	-	4
		0.17	ND	-	-	4
	GFATM	1.00	D	GOV	ECON	7
		1.00	ND	CS	ISS	4
		1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	4
		1.00	ND	IO	ISS	3
		0.19	ND	-	-	5
		-0.24	-	-	-	4
	RBM	1.00	ND	BUS	ISS	3
		1.00	ND	GOV	ISS	3
		0.43	-	IO	ISS	4
		-0.08	-	-	-	4

Source: Authors.
A cluster FAU score close to 0 or negative is not considered to denote good "fit" in a cluster as much as "not fit" in other clusters in the same board.

private sector clusters (1.00) is greater than that of public sector clusters that include ten individuals (Gavi: D/Gov and IO) and four individuals (RBM: IO). In GFATM, no strong sub-groups of for-profit actors were identified, but civil society formed a strong sub-group. Eight members each in GFATM and RBM were not sorted into clusters due to lack of shared alignments (negative FAU scores). Strong sub-groups with many members were present in all the GFPs, except RBM. Overall, the dimensions of diversity identified empirically vary within the same sector and interact differently within the same sector, resulting in potential faultlines that differ from existing accounts of public and private factional groups.

Discussion: Using Faultline Analysis to Advance Research in Partnership Effectiveness

Faultline analysis complements the existing – but incomplete – sectoral approach that dominates the partnership literature. Our study contributes innovative insights into how differences *within* sectors may affect group dynamics and partnership governance. Our findings show that empirically identified sub-groups may differ substantially from sector categories alone: multiple characteristics provide the actual micro-foundations for relationships between partners (Pathway 3). Moreover, at the same time as diversity affects partner relations, it is complexly intertwined with other pathways to effectiveness. For example, Ebrahim, Battilana and Mair (2014) argue that preferentially involving donors signals "upward" accountability, whereas including representatives of affected populations indicates a broader social framing of accountability (Proposition 1). And yet, few partnerships bring affected populations into their decision making (Gavi and GFATM are exceptions), which could be expected to affect the extent to which they achieve positive impacts for affected populations (Pathway 4).

Furthermore, faultlines are not theorized to cause conflict indiscriminately. First, the negative effects of faultlines may be attenuated by clear and shared organizational goals (Crucke et al. 2015), such as can be agreed through sophisticated contracting (Proposition 1). A vaccine does not vary much whether delivered in Birmingham or Bangalore, but climate adaptation strategies vary depending on local contexts, and mitigation solutions range from technical to behavioral to political. However, the goals themselves (Pathway 1) and the selection of partners (Pathway 3) may become narrower in order to avoid potential faultline conflict: a partnership focused on vaccines may select board members who subscribe to disease-focused goals rather than broader health system strengthening or public health objectives. Climate change partnerships' broader goals may provoke conflict, but arguably reflect a more complete vision of the issue addressed and sustainability more broadly.

Faultlines affect group functioning when differences in values or logics of action arise (Sawyer et al. 2006; Crucke et al. 2015). Rather than assuming cohesive logics of action inside the public, private and voluntary sectors, our empirical analyses revealed a statistically significant association between public sector

donors and an economic logic of action. Thus, despite reported reconceptualizations of development away from economic growth alone and toward sustainability (Elliott 2012; Raworth 2017), historically privileged actors (donors) continue to bring an economic focus to their governance responsibilities, which may skew the partnerships in the direction of profit making more than delivering environmental and social outcomes (Bitzer, Glasbergen and Leroy 2013; Utting and Zammit 2009). This finding supports the public administration literature that theorizes an orientation toward private sector managerialism in high-income countries' public sectors (Boston et al. 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Moreover, the correlation between donor status and public sector stands in contradiction to the widely touted policy discourse of additional resources committed by the private sector (AfDB et al. 2015; Schmidt-Traub and Sachs 2015). Thus, this study shows the continuing relevance of donor vs. non-donor as categories of analysis despite recent policy and research focus on public vs. private dichotomies; it also invites more empirical investigation of the promise of private investment in partnerships for sustainability.

Mitigating such historical inequalities in decision making is possible. Strong groups of non-donor public sector board members with an issue framing are present in all partnership boards. There is the potential for these "subaltern" subgroups (Tully 2002) to become sites for challenging and reformulating political and historical subjectivities (Sabaratnam 2011; Sachs 1992). However, faultline theorists maintain that if group members do not actively identify with their subgroup, they are unlikely to take action (Jehn and Bezrukova 2010; Veltrop et al. 2015). Political and sociological research suggests that individuals who belong to lower status sub-groups might preferentially associate with higher status groups and support dominant interests instead (Fanon 2008[1952]; Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a; Spivak 1988), particularly since they belong to elites domestically (Fanon 2007[1963]; Dülffer and Frey 2011). Thus, while we identify the potential for non-donors to work together, this remains an empirical question.

Future Research and Implications

The study of the macro-processes of international relations benefits from the investigation of their micro-foundations, for example through faultline analysis. The analyses presented here were conducted on documentary data collected from partnership websites; further empirical research using interview, survey or observational data is needed to examine the activation of faultlines through board members' agency. Further research is also needed from sociological and anthropological traditions to examine whether and how crisscrossing actors who share a range of characteristics with individuals in several sub-groups might bridge potential faultlines, and to what effect (Sawyer et al. 2006; van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). Another empirical question remaining is the impact of the lack of more widespread representation of affected populations inside partnership boards, and the attendant effects on partnerships' impacts on these populations (Pathway 4).

We suggest two promising avenues for methodological development. First, the ASW score usefully illuminates the individual and sub-group levels of analysis, revealing clustering across multiple dimensions of diversity, but does not (alone) give a full account of faultline strength at the board level. We posit that ASW could usefully be complemented by the calculation of social distance in order to more accurately render the whole board level of analysis (Bezrukova et al. 2009). These results could be calculated by multiplying the Euclidean distance between the centroids of the clusters identified and visualized to assess the distance between clusters in the social space of different partnership boards. Secondly, a systems approach to partnership research would helpfully investigate the extent to which individual partnerships, each with narrow goals, may complement each other – and other actors in the complex governance of sustainability – in addressing specific sustainability issues, and sustainability more broadly. Such an investigation of a "system of systems" of partnerships for sustainability could examine the patterns, forces and interrelationships between individuals, issues and goals, while identifying the complex interplay of dynamics and drivers that shape the system.

Although faultlines can be disruptive, the literature provides practical recommendations to reduce conflicts. First, by explicitly reflecting on board processes and developing interaction structures, board members can prevent faultlines negatively affecting group performance (Finkelstein and Mooney 2003; Mäs et al. 2013). In order for this reflexivity to occur, however, partners need to be aware of the multiple dimensions across which faultlines might arise, particularly the understudied faultlines within sector categories. Secondly, interactions over longer time periods could mitigate some effects of faultlines (Harrison et al. 1998; Jehn et al. 1999); partnership boards whose membership changes more frequently may not derive that benefit (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021b). Finally, "the partnership model" cannot be considered generic: different dimensions of diversity affect the micro-foundations of each partnership's functioning. The multiple diversities inside each partnership need to be identified (Lau and Murnighan 1998) and the continuing effects of historical relations surfaced (Faul and Tchilingirian 2021a).

Conclusions

Our empirical analyses focused on relations between partners (Pathway 3) and partnership boards as an accountability mechanism (Proposition 1). Through these analyses, we illuminate additional aspects of the volume's analytical framework (Chapter 1). First, boards may hold partnerships accountable for reaching partnership goals (Proposition 1), yet these goals (Pathway 1) may be framed narrowly and in ways that might exclude the welfare of affected populations (Pathway 4) or contribute less to sustainability more broadly. Narrow framing might result from boards' attempts to avoid internal conflict, and have the potential to become skewed toward donor priorities and economic framings of sustainability. Secondly, we find an absence of credible commitments of resources from the private sector (Proposition 2); they may contribute to sustainability in other

ways but (in this sample) they do not contribute financially to the financing partnerships in which they occupy decision-making board positions. Finally, "partnership" is touted as a generic model of international cooperation; in contrast, we demonstrate that the micro-foundations of partner relations matter (Pathway 3), and are complexly intertwined with other pathways to effectiveness.

In response to a partnership literature that tends to focus on one characteristic of partners (their sector), we argue that analysis of partners' sectoral alignment alone is not sufficient; other relevant aspects of diversity should be examined. Furthermore, in the contemporary shift in research attention away from relations between higher- and lower-income states toward multi-stakeholder and polycentric governance, our findings show that it is not rigorous to ignore challenges that persist from long-standing categories of development actors and the historical power relations between them. Future research could usefully engage more with multiple relevant aspects of partner identities; they provide the micro-foundations for the implementation of the partnership governance model, and hold real-world consequences for partnership effectiveness and sustainability.

Note

1 For a more extended treatment of externalities in ecological economics, see, for example, Van den Bergh (2010) and Bithas (2011).

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