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Abstract

Criminal justice systems traditionally pursue enforcement through prosecution and trial with a final determination of responsibility. Yet, most of today’s investigations of large corporations are resolved through settlements, of which corporate non-prosecution agreements form a prominent example. They enable prosecutors to agree with corporations not to prosecute in exchange for conditions such as cooperation, fines and preventive measures. Having initially emerged for juveniles in the US, the thesis investigates why states have recently introduced such procedures as an alternative enforcement response to complex economic crimes involving corporations. It shows in particular that the evolution of corporate non-prosecution agreements in the US was prompted by domestic developments causing a legal response that prioritised efficiency, national security and especially economic considerations. The subsequent rise across other domestic legal systems could largely be attributed to US export interests, which were supported by international law and organisations, especially the OECD, and met with local demands that mirrored the US rationalisation and export strategy. The thesis then challenges the dominant reform narrative, justifying the diffusion of corporate non-prosecution agreements based on their importance for combatting corporate crime and protecting public welfare, and offers two additional narratives that emphasise competition and corporate self-governance rationales. More generally, by integrating a transnational criminal law and narrative approach, the thesis contributes to the analytical tools for the study of domestic criminal justice reforms in a globalised world.

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