
Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case

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This article argues that within the European state system, the struggle to control the institutions and instruments of organized violence produced an externally-oriented conception of security that rested upon the unconditional legitimacy of the state, a societal consensus over basic values and the near-elimination of violence from political life, which permitted a strong identification of the security of the state with the security of its citizens. The conditions for such identification do not hold in many parts of the world, and hence this conception cannot address either the threats to state structures or regimes that do not emerge from other states, or the threats that states and regimes can pose to their own citizens or societies.

A more historically-sensitive three-dimensional matrix for studying security on regional/interstate, state/regime and societal/individual levels possesses greater explanatory power, while remaining true to the traditional concerns of security studies with the role and influence of institutions and instruments of organized violence. Such an approach, which is rooted in an account of the role of institutions of organized violence in state formation processes, is used to present a more nuanced account of the processes of 'military development' in the modern Middle East.

Introduction

Recent contributions to the debate over 'redefining security' or the 'renaissance of security studies' have called into question how the concept of security should be defined, but have virtually ignored the issue of whether or not the 'redefinition' or 'renaissance' has any analytic utility or relevance to the security policies of the world beyond the advanced industrial states of the 'North' (Booth, 1991; Haftendorn, 1991; Kolodziej, 1992; Walt, 1991b).

With only a few exceptions (Ayoob, 1989, 1995; Buzan, 1991), most prominent analyses of security in the so-called 'Third World' have been explicit extensions or amendments of concepts and models drawn from the Western experience (Ayoob, 1995; Barnett and Levy, 1991; David 1991; Levy and Barnett, 1992; Walt, 1987). Also with few exceptions (Ball, 1988; Deger and West, 1987; Harkavy and Kolodziej, 1982; Neuman, 1984), little actual research has been done on the external and internal factors that shape security policies in the developing world. Hence the adequacy of Western approaches to the 'quest for security' in the developing world can easily be called into question at the conceptual level, but until the contours of an alternative research agenda are more fully developed, such a critique will remain purely theoretical.

This article moves towards such a research agenda by sketching a framework for studying the quest for security in the developing world that goes beyond the confines of mainstream security studies, and by demonstrating its utility via a preliminary examination of the process of state formation and 'military development' in the contemporary Middle East. My central theses can be summarized as follows —

- the struggle to control the institutions and instruments of organized violence has been central to the emergence of the modern state, and its conception of representative political institutions, civil society and civil-military relations;
- within the European state system, the resolution of this struggle produced an externally-oriented conception of security, understood as a particular *set of ideas* about the role and place of organized violence in political life;
- this conception of security rested upon the unconditional legitimacy of the state, a societal consensus over basic values and the near-elimination of violence from political life, which permitted a strong identification of the security of the *state* with the security of *its citizens*;
- the basic social and political conditions that underpin this conception of security do not exist in many (or most) regions of the world;
- hence, this 'orthodox' conception of security cannot adequately comprehend either the threats to state structures or regimes that do *not* emerge from other states, or the threats that states and regimes can pose to their own citizens and societies;
- the explanatory power of the orthodox conception of security is thus severely limited, even with respect to questions considered central to International Relations.

The language of these propositions does diverge from the 'threat, use and control of military force' formulations central to mainstream conceptions of

security studies. My argument does not, however, claim that we should 'redefine' security by somehow transcending or ignoring its intimate connection to conflict, violence and force. In fact my goal is to engage more fully the traditional concerns of security studies with the role of institutions and instruments of organized violence in political life, but to do so by focusing attention on a wider range of elements of the 'quest for security' than are usually treated in the literature. The goal of this article is not to sketch a deductive model that can generate 'testable hypotheses', but rather to take the prior step of sketching an 'explanatory logic' or framework that can be usefully contrasted with the logic underlying the predominant approach to understanding the quest for security in the developing world.

I begin with a brief overview of the existing International Relations literature on security in the developing world. Sections two and three then elaborate the foundations for a broader conception of security, based upon the literature on state formation and institutions of organized violence, and the concept of 'military development' as the dynamic and specifically security-oriented aspect of this process. Sections four and five sketch a preliminary case study of military development in the modern Middle East that demonstrates the utility and scope of this approach for understanding the quest for security along its regional, state and societal dimensions.

Security Studies and the Developing World

The orthodox conception of security emerges out of a familiar realist ontology, which takes as its starting point a self-help world of states locked within the security dilemma, and acting as utility maximizers who autonomously define their own interests. Under this rubric 'security studies is defined as *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force* . . . it explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war' (Walt, 1991b: 212, emphasis in original). Non-military phenomena are excluded on the grounds that their inclusion 'would destroy [the] intellectual coherence [of the field] and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems', and that 'it would be irresponsible . . . to ignore the central questions [of war and peace] that form the heart of the security studies field' (Walt, 1991b: 213). This definition appears broad, for it not only engages questions of the causes of war and conditions of peace, but also seems to make room for studying the *consequences* of war-making and war-preparation. In this sense, it goes beyond most conceptions of 'strategic studies', which have been usually understood to deal narrowly with the first part of the definition (Buzan, 1991: 23-5). But there is no doubt

that it remains constrained within a state-centric conception in which the threat of violence is central: as Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones point out, 'a subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral' (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988: 7).

The practical result of this has been that the most prominent debates on security in the developing world have focused on a narrow range of issues. The central orienting point has been the work of scholars such as Stephen Walt, who has elaborated a structuralist account of interstate alliance formation behaviour that is developed from Kenneth Waltz's balance of power theory. He postulates that states 'balance against the states that pose the greatest threat', whether or not these are the most powerful states in the system (1987: 263), and has applied balance of threat theory to Southwest Asia and the Middle East (Walt, 1987, 1991a). Walt has concluded that balancing behaviour has been more prominent than 'bandwagoning', in these regions throughout the cold war, once one takes his expanded conception of 'threat' into the account of state behaviour.

There have been three main lines of challenge to this structuralist account. The work of Steven David, Michael Barnett and Jack Levy has retained the focus on alliance formation, but drawn domestic or internal factors into the analysis. David argues that the central feature of Third World state behaviour is 'omnibalancing', by which state rulers balance against both external *and* internal threats to their rule, often 'appeasing other states . . . in order to counter the more immediate and dangerous domestic threats' (David, 1991: 236). Levy and Barnett go beyond this still narrow focus on political threats, and argue 'that the most frequent threats to the domestic security of Third World elites tend to originate in weaknesses in the domestic political economy', with the goal of state managers being to balance domestic political stability, economic considerations and external security threats (Levy and Barnett, 1992: 23).

Another line of challenge that overlaps this argues that the security problematic of most states in the developing world is conditioned by their fundamental institutional and political weaknesses (Ayoob, 1989, 1991, 1995; Azar and Moon, 1984; Korany, et al., 1993; Sayigh, 1990). Most developing world states are still weak *qua* states, and lack a basic societal consensus over the core values that would structure political life: the nature of governing institutions, the legitimacy of the state or the foundations of political order (Buzan, 1991: 112–14). Hence threats emerge not only from other states, but from within the state, or from groups that cut across state boundaries. Security from the threat of organized violence remains a central preoccupation, but it is subsumed under the broader umbrella of vulnerabilities that 'threaten state boundaries, institutions or regime survival'

(Ayoob, 1991: 259), which must be understood in the context of the process of state-building and the incorporation of post-colonial states into the contemporary world order.

The third challenge, represented by scholars such as Thomas Homer-Dixon or Jessica Tuchman Mathews, has attempted to broaden the concept of security (in the developing world and elsewhere) by arguing that external threats of organized violence are far less urgent than other potential threats to human well-being and survival, such as environmental degradation, refugee flows, economic deprivation or communal conflicts (see, *inter alia*, Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Loescher, 1992; Thomas, 1987; Tuchman Mathews, 1989). But insofar as most scholars under this rubric have presented little more than a 'shopping list' of possible threats to security, they have not shown how security from violence, from environmental threats or from economic deprivation (for example) can be considered analytically similar or can be integrated into a coherent 'model' for comprehending the security problematic of the developing world.¹ Those who do attempt to construct more robust analytic explanations, such as Homer-Dixon, end up conceding that the central issue for security studies should remain the potential for violent interstate conflict, although they do contribute a richer analysis of the potential causal chains that can lead to it (Gizewski and Homer-Dixon, 1995; Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994; Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1995).

The work of almost all of these scholars ultimately revolves around, or is oriented towards, questions generated by the neorealist security studies problematic outlined above. Walt focuses entirely on the systemic dynamic of interstate relations between rational actors, and attempts to test hypotheses concerned with balancing or bandwagoning behaviour. His critics (David, Levy and Barnett) incorporate domestic factors, but their central analytic goal is still to explain international alliance formation, rather than a broader range of outcomes or consequences of the quest for security. Ayoob goes somewhat further, by adding the historical dimension of state formation, but he too remains committed to a state-centric vision that keeps the state and its institutions as the primary referent point for security. Factors such as famine or environmental degradation can become security issues, but only if such 'vulnerabilities . . . threaten . . . to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally' (Ayoob, 1991: 259). Homer-Dixon remains concerned with charting causal pathways to violent interstate conflict.² Similarly, although the voluminous work of scholar-practitioners on the security problematic of various states and regions pays little attention to the conceptual debates in the field, these analysts concentrate overwhelmingly on the role of military

force in interstate relations, and thus also fit into the broad contours of a neorealist conception of security and security studies (for examples from the Middle East see Cordesman, 1993, 1994; Kemp, 1991; Yorke, 1988).³

The challenges to the spare structuralist vision of Walt contain important insights but, with the partial exception of Ayoob, they ignore the crucial historical context of the traditional conception of security and its intimate connection to the question of controlling the instruments of organized violence. The neorealist conception of security emerged historically as a consequence of political struggles to establish the modern state, but the central concern that drove this development was not the state, but rather the place of violence in political, social and economic life, both between and within communities. As Albert Hirschman argues, this conception gains its power simultaneously by establishing the pursuit of the 'national interest' at the interstate level as a means for creating security and order and harnessing the passions of princes, and by establishing the minimal conditions of loyalty to the state (such as religious tolerance) that facilitate the peaceful pursuit of other values and goods (Hirschman, 1977: 37, 51, 79). Security studies can take for granted the 'outward-directed' nature of security only because of the successful evacuation of organized violence from social and political life in the idealized version of the modern state. Even Ayoob's acknowledgement of the historicity of security ends up projecting an evolutionary path for Third World state formation that is identical to that of Western states, thus also accepting the historical end point that provides the very foundation on which Stephen Walt's structuralist account is constructed.

A strict focus on 'the threat, use, and control of military force' also obscures the way in which the *idea* of *security* that lies behind this emerged as a shared value or concept within politically self-conscious communities. 'Security' is a potent signifier, and its invocation takes a phenomenon out of the sphere of everyday politics and 'present[s it] as an existential threat requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Deudney, 1990: 466; Waever, 1995: 1). Behind the modern instruments and institutions of organized violence that are the focus of mainstream security studies lies a set of ideas about *which* collective endeavours should fall under the sign of security, *what* the source of threats are, and *who* the group is that should be secured. In the historical development of the European state, the 'nation-state' emerged as the object of security, other such entities were the source of threat, and military force was the primary means of safeguarding the community. These should not, however, be assumed to be settled issues in the rest of the world, and hence security studies needs to start its analysis at least one or two steps earlier in the process.

State Formation and Security

To make this argument convincing, I would need to offer an account of how the orthodox conception of security focusing on the threat of interstate violence emerged through the process of European state formation, and how it presented our now-commonplace understanding of the role of institutions and instruments of organized violence. This takes us beyond the narrow 'study of the threat, use and control of military force' (which presumes that the understanding of security as restricted to external threats of force has already been settled), and examines not only the interstate context, but the matrix of state/society relations and the impact of institutions of organized violence on processes of social, political and economic change. Although alien to contemporary security studies, this is not an analytically long stretch: as David Ralston has observed, 'how people prepare for and wage war, and the organizations they create for that purpose, are in fact closely related to the ways in which they deal with the other, more peaceable aspects of life in society' (Ralston, 1990: 178).

The most suggestive architecture for comprehending this process has been advanced by Charles Tilly. Tilly's metaphor of war-making and state-making as organized crime is the starting point for an analysis of the dynamic process by which the institutions of organized violence are crucial to the emergence of the modern state, and the different developmental paths the process of state formation could take. His argument is that 'war makes states' — the main impetus for consolidation of national states in Europe was preparation for, and actual fighting of, wars (Rasler and Thompson, 1989; Tilly, 1985, 1990). The early modern 'Military Revolution' (1550–1650) contributed greatly to the creation and consolidation of the modern state through technological revolutions (the widespread use of cannon and gunpowder), changes in the scale of warfare and concomitant revolutions in tactics and organization that required vast state investments that were beyond the reach of many local rulers (Finer, 1975; Hintze, 1975; McNeill, 1983; Parker, 1988). Together these changes catalyzed (if they did not almost dictate) the emergence of the modern state, as medieval social and political structures were reshaped and transformed. State-formation was also inextricably linked to regional and global bids for hegemony and status, and was not exclusively an internal process. The impact of war on state-making manifests itself in the political realm through the extension of territorial control and the acquisition of a monopoly of force, the emergence of centralized rule and administrative structures and the erosion of local autonomy or particularity. In the economic realm, it was manifest through the innovation of public debt, the creation and expansion of taxes and extractive bureaucracies and a

‘ratchet effect’ on government expenditures that increased progressively the role of the state in economic life.

Perhaps most importantly, however, this process of state-formation contained two open-ended evolutionary dynamics. First, a symbiotic relationship emerged between nascent state-makers and their war-making apparatuses. Because state-makers had to amass ever-increasing amounts of resources to feed their expanding war machines, new political and socio-economic institutions were absolutely essential to mobilize resources to build modern armies. Thus, for example, the development of modern military organizations was contemporaneous with the development of professional bureaucracies, and ‘with the rise of the modern corporation and its elaborate system of planning’ (Perlmutter, 1977, 10). This symbiotic relationship between war-makers and state-makers tilted over time in favour of the state-makers, who subordinated the military to increasing degrees of control by civilians, and by other institutions within the embryonic ‘civil society’.

The second dynamic developed between state-makers and other groups and forces within society. State-makers started by extracting resources for war-making and promising protection and security (against both internal and external threats) in return for a monopoly over the use of force. Over time, however, this required the forging of broader alliances within society, which resulted in another symbiotic and reciprocally beneficial relationship, this time between state-makers and other social groups. As Tilly describes it, ‘agents of states bargained with civilian groups that controlled the resources required for effective warmaking, and in bargaining gave the civilian groups enforceable claims on the state’; these claims were ultimately politically enfranchising, and ‘led to a civilianization of government and domestic politics’ (Tilly, 1990: 206).

Of course, Tilly’s European ‘model’ of state-formation had many historical variations (Downing, 1992), and it certainly does not encompass the only possible historical paths for newly-independent or emerging states. A straightforward application of it to the developing world encounters at least three analytic difficulties. First, it seems not to be able to deal well with the phenomenon of weak ‘quasi-states’ whose empirical sovereignty is extremely weak or non-existent, but whose juridical sovereignty is sustained by a strong international normative apparatus in the contemporary system (Herbst, 1989; Jackson, 1990). Quasi-states rarely (if ever) succumb to the contradictions of their polities or societies, and Tilly’s evolutionary dynamics can hence be frozen, or take pathological turns. Second, it does not easily incorporate the emergence of *rentier* or predator states (such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia or other resource-rich new states) whose autonomous revenue sources ‘have an effect on state power very different from those revenues

that need to be extracted from the population and that must consequently be negotiated with rather than imposed on social groups' (Crystal, 1995: 197). Again, the relationship between state-makers and social groups does not unfold along any of the paths outlined by Tilly, since the motor of the process (increasing the resources at the disposal of the state) is not 'connected' to society. Finally, his model does not seem to allow consideration of the radically different international circumstances in which states in different times and places undertake their state-building projects (Herbst, 1990). Particularly important is the extreme subordination, dependence and systemic powerlessness of most post-1945 states, and the general absence of major interstate wars. As Tilly himself points out,

... the extension of the Europe-based state-making process to the rest of the world ... did not result in the creation of states in the strict European image ... states that have come into being recently through decolonization have acquired their military organization from the outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled. (Tilly, 1985: 185-6)

Even given these shortcomings, however, the more general implication of Tilly's emphasis on the role of institutions and instruments of organized violence in the process of state formation is worth preserving and pursuing.⁴ My use of Tilly is meant to argue that any study of security policies and practices in the developing world must be sensitive to historical processes of state-formation that these are part of, and more importantly, must not *a priori* reduce the condition of security strictly to the security of states and regimes. Instead, it must tackle more broadly the historical and social context in which security policies are framed and pursued, and, perhaps more importantly, attempt to unpack the dynamic processes by which choices are made over the sources of threats and the appropriate means to respond to them. These choices not only have ramifications for the alliance formation or external orientation of developing world states (and their propensity for violent conflict) but for the ensemble of 'ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies'. This latter part of Walt's definition of the appropriate scope of security studies has been almost entirely absent from the security studies literature on the developing world.

Security and the Concept of 'Military Development'

A concern with historical processes of state-formation and the role of institutions of organized violence remains too broad an ambit for analysing the conditions of security and insecurity in the developing world, and the institutions and instruments designed to achieve it. We can move from these

general issues to the more narrow concerns of security studies by addressing questions that can be grouped along three different dimensions or levels —

- regional/interstate security — what threats do states pose to each other?
- state/regime security — what threats do the institutions of organized violence pose to the institutions of the state or regime?
- societal/individual security — what threats do those who control the means of violence pose to citizens and society?

Although the interstate dimension of conflict in the developing world remains an important factor in this approach, attention must also be paid to evolving patterns of internal conflict and civil–military relations. More importantly, the direction of ‘causal’ relationships is *not* specified — I do not assume *a priori* that the quest for security is driven solely by the existence of states in a self-help system, and that the state-level and societal dimensions of security/insecurity are merely *consequences* of these developments. The question of which dimension of security is most determinant at any time and place is an empirical one. One should actually expect to find the three dimensions interacting in different ways, with measures taken on one dimension perhaps decreasing security along another.

The idea of different ‘levels’ of security is not novel. The most important innovation, however, is the shift to a different conceptual language that focuses on the process of *military development* and the insertion of new states into a *global security order*.⁵ The resonance with International Political Economy concepts such as the ‘global economic order’ and the process of ‘economic development’ is not accidental. Jill Crystal’s (1994) survey of recent scholarship on the emergence and perpetuation of authoritarian rule in the Middle East offers political economy explanations, in which a state’s position in the world economy and its path of economic development greatly influence the way in which authoritarian rule evolves. Scholars in this tradition share an understanding of what ‘the global economy’, and ‘economic development’ are. This analogy with political economy concepts is not, however, meant to decouple economic and security issues, which can be intertwined in complex ways (such as the link between industrialization and modern weaponry, between economic scarcity and intrastate conflict, or between external alliance choices and the domestic political economy). Instead, my intention is to highlight the lack of similarly well-articulated and consciously applied ‘framework’ concepts for security studies, within which research on the dynamics of regional, state and societal security could be conducted. The concepts of military development and a global security order are intended to move in that direction.

The reasons for this lacunae in the scholarly literature are complex, but

one issue in particular should be noted. The literature on 'modernization' of the 1950s and 1960s (Fisher, 1963; Janowitz, 1988; Johnson, 1962) did attempt to analyse the role of the military in the transition from so-called traditional to modern societies by regarding the military as a generally positive force within postcolonial societies: a conduit for modernizing influences, an integrative organization in fractured polities and an instrument of the 'new middle class' that could be the vanguard of modernization (Halpern, 1962: 278–9; Hurewitz, 1969: 419–37; for critical overviews see Ball, 1988: 5–18; Owen, 1978). This literature was, however, crippled by the same flaws that afflicted the broader modernization literature — it misread the evolutionary experience of European states, it mistakenly conceptualized the state and state/society relations in Western pluralist terms, it ignored the impact of external forces and relationships on domestic political change, and its concern with military rule or military intervention missed the 'militarization' of politics and society that had occurred in many parts of the developing world. While the theories of economic development proposed by modernization theorists did generate a critique (dependency theory) and counter-critique that fuelled research and debate, no such development occurred within the literature on 'military modernization', with the possible exception of the literature on militarization (Eide and Thee, 1980; Wolpin, 1986). Perhaps the reason for this can be found in the general reluctance of scholars to deal with the organized use of violence, especially in light of the badly flawed analyses of the 'military as modernizer' literature. But this strategy of neglect has made much scholarship irrelevant to understanding the consequences of the massive upheavals unleashed by the process of military development in the postcolonial world.

The main elements of the *global security order* are analogous to those of the 'global economic order'. They include such things as: local or regional conflict dynamics, the pursuit of status or hegemony, relations of power between dominant and subordinate actors, governing ideologies that shape state security policies, and forces such as technological innovation. Within this, *military development* is the *process* that is catalyzed by the diffusion of 'modern' military technologies and techniques of organization to post-colonial states. It goes beyond simple measures of the growth and modernization of armed forces, or of the transfer of technologies of warfare, to encompass —

- the development of military doctrines (e.g. mass v. elite armies, centralized v. decentralized control, defensive v. offensive force postures);
- the creation of ancillary state and societal institutions and practices (forms of civil–military relations, patterns and norms of military recruitment and education, claims on economic and social resources);

- the choices between different overarching concepts of security (who or what represents the threat, and how best to counter it) that are accepted by (or imposed on) societies and states as the justification for constructing modern military establishments.

Insecurity and Military Development in the Modern Middle East

Two questions provide good starting points to demonstrate how such an approach can analyse security and insecurity in the contemporary Middle East —

- what have been the most important sources of insecurity driving the development and use of institutions of organized violence in postcolonial Middle Eastern states/societies?
- how have patterns of military development within Middle Eastern states had an impact on the three dimensions of security outlined above?

In principle, this approach could examine postcolonial states of Africa, the Middle East or Asia, as the processes of state-building and regime consolidation have occurred simultaneously with the incorporation of these states into the global security order. My analysis, however, will concentrate on the Middle East, since it presents in a stark form many important features. By virtually any indicator one chooses, the Middle East is the most highly militarized region of the globe. Other states may have larger armies, arsenals or defense budgets, but in comparative terms (relative to population or wealth), Middle Eastern states rank at or near the top on many indices. Table 1 summarizes some of these figures. Further, the importance of interstate conflict makes the region a ‘hard case’ for my argument, since if I can demonstrate (even in a preliminary fashion) that factors other than interstate conflict need to be adduced in order to explain patterns of insecurity and military development in the region, then its utility in other regional contexts will be more securely established. Finally, the degree of state terror and repression in many states of the region is also high and organized violence (covert or overt) has been pervasive in political and social life.

The first step towards challenging a structuralist account of state policy is to establish, even provisionally, that the expansion of the military capabilities of Middle Eastern states occurred in response to *both* internal and interstate imperatives. Until independence, most Middle Eastern states possessed only small ‘constabulary’ forces, suitable for maintaining internal order and supporting the regime, and dependent upon the external patron for training,

Table 1
Military Indicators, Selected Middle Eastern States, 1991

	Mil. Expend./ GNP (global rank)	Armed Forces/ Popul. (global rank)	Weapons/ Personnel ^b (ratio)	Weapons/ Personnel (global rank)
Syria	7	3	11.05	9
Iraq	2	7	3.78 ^c	53 ^c
Egypt	63	47	2.63	64
Jordan	13	4	8.96	15
Saudi Arabia	3	28	13.98	7
Algeria	104	72	6.57	25
Israel	18	2 ^a	7.55 ^a	21
Morocco	43	50	3.27	59

^aFigures used in column two on Israel's armed forces do not include reserve forces. Actual strength has varied between three and five times the active force level. The ratio (and global rank) assume an Israeli force of 650,000, the number (excluding reserve forces) is about 195,000.

^bThe Weapons/Personnel ratio measures the number of major weapons systems per thousand soldiers.

^cThis ratio (and the global rank) assume an Iraqi force of 1.6 million soldiers, the real number was probably closer to 800,000. The recalculated figures would be: 7.56 (ratio) and rank of 22.

Source: Columns one and two from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1994). Columns three and four (using 1985 data) from Wendt and Barnett (1993).

materials and leadership. In Iraq, for example, Britain undertook after 1921 to train the Iraqi officer corps (which had inherited most of its personnel from Ottoman service) and to support the army with specific British-led forces (the Assyrian levies) and the Royal Air Force. Although Britain wanted to reduce the costs of maintaining Iraq's defences, it also wanted Iraq to create a small professional (non-conscript) army. Thus at independence in 1932, Iraq's armed forces numbered 11,500 (Hemphill, 1979). The Iraqi story was typical — in Jordan at independence in 1946 the Arab Legion numbered 6000 (and was British led until 1956); in Syria in 1945 the army was 5000 strong (not including the French *Troupes Speciales*); in Egypt it was around 25,000; in Saudi Arabia it was probably around 10,000 in 1947 (mostly tribal forces) (Be'eri, 1970: 335; Glubb, 1957: 90; Hurewitz, 1969: 250, 450). These forces were almost exclusively used for maintaining internal order, and were seldom suitable for major war-fighting. Not all states, however, gained independence with small armies. Israel had an army of roughly 50,000 in 1948; Algeria after the war of independence had an armed force of about 130,000 (which was reduced by 1964 to

Table 2
Armed Forces of Selected Middle Eastern States, 1946–90.

	1946/48	1954/55	1960	1970	1980	1990
Syria	5000 ^a	25,000	45,000	75,000	250,000	408,000
Iraq	25,000	40,000	70,000	95,000	430,000	500,000+ ^b
Egypt	25,000+	80,000	100,000	255,000	447,000	434,000
Jordan	6000	23,000	36,500	70,000	65,000	100,000
Saudi Arabia	10,000	10,000 ^c	35,000 ^c	65,000	79,000	146,000
Morocco	–	28,000	30,000	65,000	117,000	195,000
Algeria	–	–	130,000 ^d	80,000	101,000	126,000
Israel ^e	50,000	54,000	65,000	105,000	196,000	190,000

Source: Figures from 1970 to 1990 are from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (various years). Figures prior to that are (except where indicated) from Hurewitz (1969).

^aFigures for 1945/6 from Be'eri (1970: 335). By the end of the 1948 war Syrian forces had increased to 12,000.

^bThis includes only regular forces. Mobilized reserves bring the total over 1,000,000. Figure from International Institute for Strategic Studies (1990). By 1994 the regular force had shrunk to about 380,000 (Cordesman, 1994: 194).

^cThe figure of 10,000 'modern' forces is for 1943 from Hurewitz (1969: 250). Cordesman (1984: 101) lists forces in 1956 at 20–30,000, of which half were regular army (*firqā*), half bedouin irregulars (*līmā*). Safran (1985: 68) notes that American officers estimated the number of regular Saudi troops at between 7500 and 10,000 in 1953. This excluded the royal bodyguard, paramilitary and tribal forces, which would have more than doubled this total. I have thus selected 10,000 as the appropriate figure. The third column figure is for 1963, not 1960.

^dAlgerian figure for 1962 from Hurewitz (1969: 189) was made up of the regular 'external' army (40,000) and the guerrilla forces (90,000). By 1964 the force had been reduced to 65,000.

^eFigures on Israel's armed forces do not include reserve forces. Actual strength has varied between three and five times the active force level. Figures from 1945 are from Hurewitz (1969: 365), and have been calculated for 1955 using the same ratio between his figures and the ACDA figures as for the early 1960s.

65,000) (Hurewitz, 1969: 189, 365). Morocco received upon independence in 1956 the transfer of 26,000 soldiers from the French and Spanish armies (some of whom had experience in World War II), in addition to a few thousand independence fighters who were incorporated into the armed forces (Hurewitz, 1969: 340).

The growth of armed forces in the region is summarized in Table 2, which charts changes in the number of soldiers of these eight states since World War II. Although it does not correct for increases in population, the trend towards relatively massive military establishments is clear. These forces appear, however, to have grown in response to both external/systemic and

internal threats and insecurities. Even without discussing in detail the more involved aspects of military development (recruitment patterns, military doctrines, threat assessment), some suggestive evidence can be assembled.

In several states, the experience of interstate war generated an immediate and pressing security concern that fuelled military development. The growth of armed forces in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria was catalyzed by the 1948 and 1956 wars. The Egyptian army rose from 25–30,000 soldiers in 1948 to 80,000 by 1955, Jordan's army increased from 6000 to 23,000 in the same period, Syria's army grew from 5000 to 25,000 and Israel's from around 90,000 (including civilian reserves) to 250,000 (Hurewitz, 1969: 450). Once new levels were reached, they set benchmarks for further expansion, as the armed forces never shrank (until recently), and their growth tended to outpace population growth in the region. The systemic influence of incorporation into the global security order, and the accompanying projection of the American–Soviet rivalry on to the Middle East, also played some role in the process of military development. American military assistance efforts included the ill-fated Baghdad Pact, and the development of close military-security relationships with Israel (after 1967), Saudi Arabia (after 1965) and Egypt (after 1979). Soviet relationships with Egypt (after 1955), Syria (after 1956) and Iraq (after 1958) were analogous. In both cases, massive amounts of arms and military assistance were provided either at low cost, or via privileged access. Although these military assistance relationships did not create durable ties of bargaining influence between patrons and clients, and although the socialization effect of military assistance appears to be small, links with external powers have shaped the pattern of military development of postcolonial states, and have helped incorporate these states into a global military system (Krause, 1991). As a simple counter-factual, one could ask whether, in the absence of links with external patrons, the Syrians, Saudis, Egyptians or Iraqis would have constructed (or been able to construct) the same military establishments as emerged between 1960 and 1990.

But a second set of forces — the pressure to use the army *internally* as a vehicle to hasten the process of state formation — was also at work. This pressure manifested itself most clearly in states that possessed low levels of legitimacy or weak and fragmented national identities. Iraq was a classic example — in the first four years after independence the army was doubled in size (to around 23,000), conscription was introduced, and nationalist political figures embraced the army as the symbol and defender of the nation. The *coup de grace* was the crushing of a 'revolt' by the Assyrians, which established the army's position as a critical prop for the central government and a force for national integration (Abbas, 1989: 203–7; Hemphill, 1979).⁶ The first military coup occurred only three years later. In

Syria, the early rapid expansion of the armed forces in the mid-1950s coincided with their use in the crushing of unrest and revolt among the Druzes, and to a lesser extent the Alawis (Ma'oz, 1972: 399). A similar pattern was manifest in Saudi Arabia, albeit somewhat earlier. The *Ikhwan* (religious) and tribal forces of Ibn Saud conquered and unified most of the diverse tribes of the peninsula in the 1920s before formal statehood was achieved in 1932. As Nadav Safran (1985: 59) has argued, 'Ibn Saud's basic security concern . . . in the period up to World War II . . . was internal rather than external threats, and the practical problem was money.' He concludes that between 30 and 50% of state revenues were spent on defence and security. The armed forces fell into disuse and disrepair until the 1950s, when the political threat from Nasserist Egypt to the Saudi monarchy (including coup attempts) triggered the establishment of a loyal armed force which was quickly expanded (with American assistance) throughout the late 1950s (Cordesman, 1984: 92–105; Safran, 1985: 103–10).

In many cases, armed forces rhetorically patterned on Western models (to defend the state against external threats to its territorial integrity and national interests) evinced a deeper concern with internal security. Their primary mission has tended to be the defence of a particular ruling elite against internal threats to its control that rise from its narrow base of support, or from a fractured polity. In some cases these internal and external security missions were fused for the entire armed forces; in others, strong 'royal guard' or elite forces were tasked with maintaining regime security, while opposition groups were shunted into 'gendarmerie' or semi-regular forces. For example, in Jordan after the coup attempt of 1957, the regime depended upon loyal Royal Guards brigades, and when the largely Palestinian national guard (which was as large as the regular army) was incorporated into the regular army in 1965, only 40% of its men were accepted (Hurewitz, 1969: 323; Safran, 1969: 440). The regime still possesses a 10,000-strong para-military force (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). In Saudi Arabia, 'for internal defense the Saudi clan continued placing primary confidence in the tribal forces [the White Army]', which were as large as the regular forces (Hurewitz, 1969: 251). The White Army (renamed the National Guard in 1963) was also an important means of maintaining loyalty to the Saudi regime and funnelling money to tribal and village leaders. It was modernized in the early 1970s, and through the 1970s and 1980s it was more than two-thirds the size of the regular forces. In the 1970s the National Guard had 25,000 men, compared to regular forces of 35–45,000; in 1994, it had 57,000 active members (with 20,000 tribal levies) compared to a regular force of 104,000 (Cordesman, 1984: 173–8, 218–21, 229; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994). In Syria, Hafez Asad's brother controlled (between 1971 and 1983) a

50,000-man elite force (*saraya al-difa'*) tasked with protecting the regime; this was later supplemented with a 10,000 strong Presidential Guard (Drysedale, 1985: 248; Middle East Watch, 1991: 38–9). The regime also relies upon various special forces and 'political' military units, although the Defence Brigades have been subsequently reduced in size after they threatened regime stability. In Iraq, the Republican Guard, which was created in 1963 as a sort of 'elite corps of the regime', was supplemented later by the 'People's Army', a 75,000 strong (in 1979) adjunct of the Ba'ath party itself (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 93–4, 184).

While one cannot specify precisely the balance between internal and systemic pressures, it is clear that both played a role in the process of military development in the Middle East. The most straightforward implication of this (echoing Barnett, Levy and David), is that domestic imperatives need to be incorporated even into explanations that focus strictly on the alliance formation or external orientation of Middle Eastern states. A more subtle implication, however, is that the *process* of responding to internal and external forces has consequences for the 'quest for security' that go beyond the level of state interactions, but which can only be grasped if one adopts a broader conception of the scope of security studies. It is to this inter-relationship between military development and the quest for security that I now turn.

Three Dimensions of the Quest for Security in the Middle East

Much more could be said about the specific circumstances that fuelled military development in these Middle Eastern states, but this sketch allows me at least to outline the interrelationships between the process of military development and the quest for security. At this stage, the discussion is more taxonomical than analytic, but since my main purpose is to establish the necessity of studying the different dimensions simultaneously to generate robust explanations, the more analytical task can be deferred. The consequences of this process of military development can be analysed along the three dimensions of security outlined previously — threats states pose to each other, threats posed by the institutions of organized violence to state institutions or regimes, and threats posed by those who control the means of violence to citizens and society. For reasons of presentation, I will start with the state and societal levels, and deal with the regional/interstate dimension of security last.

State/regime Security

In most Middle East scholarship, the relationship between 'state-makers' and 'war-makers' has been posed in terms of the military role in politics, and

focused on studies of military participation and rule, and/or coup d'états (Abdel-Malek, 1975; Be'eri, 1970; Haddad, 1965, 1970, 1973; Horowitz, 1982; Rabinovitch, 1972; Tahir, 1989; Tarbush, 1982). As some authors have pointed out, however (Owen, 1978; Picard, 1988), this approach does not help us answer the question of what threats the institutions of organized violence pose to the institutions of the state or to the regime in power. The most effective exercise of military influence would be the complete absence of coup attempts, and hence a decline in the number of coups is hardly evidence that militarization is waning; likewise, a retreat of the military from formal positions of power says little about the way in which the boundaries of political debate may be set, and the constraints under which civilian politicians may operate. Although the direct role of the armed forces in Middle Eastern politics may have waned, with fewer coups and fewer army officers in cabinets (Baram, 1989; Be'eri, 1982; Cooper, 1982), the balance of social and political power between the military and other institutions has not necessarily changed. The armed forces arguably have a larger weight in the political and societal development of Middle Eastern states today than when they were small, faction-ridden and coup-prone.

One way to analyse this is suggested by Tilly's notion of a dynamic relationship between war-makers and state-makers. In the European experience, the initial role of war-makers in creating the apparatus of the modern state was modified over time as a symbiotic relationship between them and other state-makers emerged. As political institutions and efficient modern bureaucracies emerged, the balance between the two groups tilted in favour of state-makers who subordinated the armed forces to greater degrees of control and reduced their relative weight in political life. Borrowing from Tilly (1985: 175–7), this gives at least three evolutionary patterns of civil–military relations —

- citizens could increasingly control the state, which in turn controlled the means of organized violence;
- a dominant elite (or self-interested 'monarch') could control the state, and the means of organized violence;
- the 'managers' of organized violence themselves could control the state.⁷

The first would correspond to a representative democracy, the second to an authoritarian regime (of varying degrees of severity) and the third to a military junta or dictatorship. The issue is *not*, however, whether or not the people occupying these roles wear uniforms, but rather which set of interests they represent, or which interests dominate in political and allocative struggles. Some generals have been quick to tap civilian bases of power; some civilians have been mere puppets of the armed forces.

The process of 'civilianization' that would lead to the first outcome has so far been thwarted in the Middle East (with the partial exception of Israel), and the social and political roles of military establishments in the post-colonial Middle East have evolved along the last two paths, both of which have historical precedents. The 'dominant elite' pattern fits well the late Ottoman experience. Military reform was a near-continuous obsession of Ottoman rulers after its defeats by the Russians in 1768–74, although serious measures could not be taken until the destruction of the Janissaries (the archaic former core of the regime and the army) in 1836 (Hurewitz, 1969: 28–40; Shaw, 1965). Yet the process of state-building proceeded on a wide front, and the Ottoman response to systemic pressures generated far-reaching domestic social, economic and political changes in the economy and society, conducted under the umbrella of the *Tanzimat*.⁸ Military reform always occurred in the context of a robust and complex civil society, which has evolved towards more representative political models. The 'military junta' pattern resembles the Egypt of Muhammed Ali, the early 19th-century officer who took power after the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt had opened that area to Westernizing influences. Aside from reorganizing the army, opening an elaborate military training system and importing new weapons, Muhammed Ali also launched his personalistic empire-building effort by wiping out competing claimants for power and transforming social, political and economic relations (Farhi, 1972; Mitchell, 1988: 34–48; Ralston, 1990: 82–8). As Anwar Abdel-Malek (quoted in Ralston, 1990: 80) put it — 'for Muhammed Ali the army . . . was everything, the pivot of national life. . . . With the army as his starting point, Muhammed Ali constructed a state.'

Contemporary cases, although not always clear-cut, also fit these two patterns. Syria, for example, falls in the 'military junta' pattern, in which those who control the instruments of organized violence also control the state, and use it to entrench their rule, or 'loot' it for personal gain. The dominant Asad-Alawi group plays a major role in all aspects of political and economic life, and the armed forces are highly sectarian. In 1980 Alawis commanded half of all army divisions and controlled all the military intelligence services (although they comprise no more than 15% of the population). In the 1980s smuggling, often run by the military itself, accounted for 70% of all non-military trade (Hinnebusch, 1990; Sadowski, 1987). The result was a state in which the armed forces consumed enormous amounts of resources (in relative and absolute terms) and played a heavy role in domestic political and economic life. This could also easily describe the Iraqi situation, and in both cases state managers have constructed extractive apparatuses that are outside of the 'regular economy' and which stall the possible emergence of a more symbiotic relationship between war-makers

and other social forces.⁹ On the other side, one could argue that Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Morocco correspond to the 'dominant elite' model, in which the process of military development was more or less subordinated to the needs of the ruling elite (Cordesman, 1984; Safran, 1985; Vatikiotis, 1967).

Of course, neither of these patterns is precisely followed, and one should not expect a long historical struggle to unfold without countervailing currents. Perhaps the two most interesting cases are Egypt and Algeria, which seem at this point to combine elements of both patterns. In Egypt, the existence of strong technocratic and state capitalist economic elites, and a relatively strong (i.e. legitimate) state has meant that post-1952 regimes have drawn support from a range of social forces and groups. Although the military has been a powerful actor, it has not occupied the stage alone. Civilian elites have an interest in keeping the costs of security down, in order to maximize their 'rent-seeking' opportunities; as Crystal (1994: 272) has described it — the Egyptian business elite wants 'a state weak enough to loot, but strong enough to be worth looting' (see also Hinnebusch, 1988). But when faced with pressure to reduce its role after the 1979 peace with Israel, the armed forces protected its interests not by launching a coup, but by launching agricultural, industrial and infrastructure projects that maintained its role and status (Satloff, 1988; Springborg, 1989). Once 'the role of the army had grown so large and had begun to affect Egyptian life in so many ways . . . it could no longer hide itself from public criticism'. The architect of these policies (Field Marshall Abu Ghazzaleh) was dismissed in 1990, and 'President Mubarak [has been] able to reassert greater control over the military budget' (Owen, 1992: 204–5).

In Algeria, by contrast, the army was the dominant partner in the army/party state, until the events of the early 1990s, and had always 'been the kingmaker at each critical juncture in Algerian politics' (Mortimer, 1996: 20). Especially throughout the 1980s, when the state was led by Chadli Benjedid (the highest ranking military officer at the death of Houari Boumedienne in 1978), the armed forces managed to maintain a high degree of institutional autonomy and 'certain of its officers enjoyed lucrative import licenses or access to tidy commissions on state contracts' (Mortimer, 1996: 20). But the process of political transformation that began in the late 1980s was a response to the economic crisis of the 1980s, which crippled the ability of the army/party state to continue its *rentier* status and to 'buy off' other potentially discontented or disenfranchised social groups. The 1992 coup to stave off the election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) illustrated the inability of the armed forces to manage the process of change, and testified to the weakness or discrediting of the traditional civilian political elite that had surrounded the FLN (Front de libération nationale),

while simultaneously reinforcing the continued importance of the army as the 'custodian of national values' and its institutional weight vis-à-vis other social or political forces.¹⁰

The reasons behind these two diverging paths of development are doubtless complex, but at least two can be suggested. First, early military intervention in the form of 'revolutionary officers' or reformist coups may have 'fixed' a certain pattern of politics that prevents the emergence of other 'modern' institutions (i.e. by institutionalizing economic corruption and inefficiency tied to satisfying demands of the armed forces, or by preventing the emergence of an independent capitalist or technocratic elite). As Raymond Hinnebusch notes in the Syrian case, 'from the moment Ba'thi officers brought the party to power . . . it was likely that the military would be an equal or senior partner in the new military-party state, and that institution building would have to go on in concert with military leadership, not apart from it' (Hinnebusch, 1990: 157). This contrasts with the Egyptian experience, in which the 1952 Free Officers movement had to forge links with civilian technocrats and bureaucrats, and middle-class nationalists, in order to perpetuate its rule and construct a strong state apparatus (Hinnebusch, 1988: 12–39). Second, oil-rich *rentier* states such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or states with strong patron–client relationships with external powers (such as Syria and Jordan) have been able to 'purchase' security (directly or indirectly) without mobilizing societal resources. This has meant that whoever controls the means of violence has been able to avoid the 'guns versus butter' trade-offs that could catalyze the 'civilianization' process, or have been able to enhance their position in this allocative struggle by lining up powerful external supporters. The civil war in Algeria illustrates what happens when this control breaks down.

Societal/Individual Security

The concept of societal/individual security is concerned with the threats posed to citizens and institutions of civil society by those who control the means of violence, whether they are a dominant 'civilian' elite, or the managers of organized violence themselves. The only situation in which the institutions of organized violence pose no (or little) threat to society or to individuals is the one in which citizens exercise real control, a situation that does not correspond to many states in the Middle East. This captures the second of Tilly's dynamic relationships, in which the state essentially promises other groups and forces in society a certain level of security, in return for the resources it extracts to purchase this security. This relationship ultimately 'led to a civilianization of government and domestic politics', the subordination of institutions of organized violence to civilian control and, as

a consequence, the military shed its internal security functions to concentrate on what grew to be considered as 'traditional' external threats to national security (Tilly, 1990: 206). By the late 1860s, most European states 'had decided to place all their emphasis on international war, and to allow their regular forces to slough off their police functions' (Yapp, 1975: 349).

This has not been the case in most Middle Eastern states. In Egypt after Sadat's assassination, for example, the army,

... was able to establish its control over the major paramilitary force, the Central Security Police. ... As Field Marshall Abu Ghazzaleh was to define the relationship later the same year: 'the role of the police and the army are complementary and cannot be separated. To both of them falls a unique task: to guarantee the security of Egypt both internally and externally.' (cited in Owen, 1992: 204)

The CSP (also known as the Central Security Forces) numbered in 1990 about 300,000 (almost as large as the Egyptian army), and its principal mission was to serve as 'the army of the police, the army of the Ministry of the Interior' (Middle East Watch, 1992: 29). The CSP was founded after the 1967 war, in order to provide Nasser's regime with an instrument of internal security that would enable demonstrations and dissent to be crushed without the direct use of the army. Likewise, in Iraq, 'for six decades the Iraqi army acted as an agent for internal repression'; in Algeria, the armed forces are fighting a civil war; in Saudi Arabia, the royal family tightly controls the upper echelons of the defence ministry (al-Khalil, 1989: 21; Safran, 1985).

One consequence of this pattern of military development has been that the emergence of 'pluralist' politics and an autonomous civil society has been frustrated or suppressed.¹¹ Although it may be the case that 'there is throughout the region a resilient civil society with a thriving associational life independent of effective state control', what is important is that associational life has developed in spite of great resistance from the state and institutions of organized violence, and that civil society has been effectively cut off from political life (Crystal, 1994: 270). The pattern of military development in most states has obstructed both the fusion of a coherent national identity under which other forms of affiliation are subsumed, and the emergence of overlapping patterns of identity and political participation that would diminish the primary importance of ethnicity or faith.

The institutions of organized violence have thwarted such developments not just by their direct role in politics (i.e. as an *autonomous* political actor), but by the fact that these institutions represent a tremendous reservoir of political power that can be captured by a particular group. In states with

weak 'national' identities, Tikritis, Alawis, Bedouins or Hijazis can, by their predominant influence over military institutions, entrench their positions and hence thwart the emergence of more pluralist or representative politics (Hinnebusch, 1990; Picard, 1979; Sadowski, 1987). This experience directly contradicts the belief that the armed forces would act as an integrative force in a fractured polity divided along religious, ethnic and other lines. It also opens the door to a closely related consequence — repression and state terror — as the institutions of organized violence become the enforcement arm of totalitarian politics.

Few authors in security studies have attempted to 'analyze the consolidated political power generated by a merging of developed techniques of surveillance and the technology of industrialized war', and the role of these technologies and techniques in creating new methods of surveillance, social control and repression (Dandeker, 1990; Giddens, 1981: 295). Nor have scholars related social violence and terror (i.e. by secret police networks or resistance movements) to the broader pattern of military development within postcolonial societies.¹² This goes far beyond the question of 'supplying instruments of repression'; rather, I am interested in the way in which military development has expanded 'the supervisory and information gathering capacities of the organizations of modern society', and has bent and fused other social institutions to the state and regime legitimation process (Dandeker, 1990: 2). Timothy Mitchell's (1988: 41–2) description of Muhammed Ali's reforms captures this well — 'it was an attempt to achieve the new order of the barracks and the battlefield, with its hierarchy of signal, movement and supervision, inscribed and enforced in the life of the village and peasant.' In the Middle East, the armed forces' continued role in domestic intelligence and security affairs facilitated the emergence of the '*mukhabarat* (national security) state' — 'an authoritarian-bureaucratic Leviathan whose stability derives more from fear than legitimacy' (Hudson, 1991: 408; Picard, 1988).

The best documented case of this is Ba'athi Iraq, where no less than eight intelligence gathering agencies operate competing and overlapping networks to keep surveillance on each other (al-Khalil, 1989; Middle East Watch, 1990). Similar, if less brutal, processes can be seen, however, in Syria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, and in the activities of the armed forces against Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, Israel and Egypt (Human Rights Watch, 1993: 331–8; Middle East Watch, 1991, 1992). This development goes far beyond 'militarization' (defined as a prominent political role for the military) or even 'militarism' (defined in terms of pervasive military values and attitudes in society), and touches upon the ability of a small elite to control a state, and to impose upon society a particular definition of politics (and understanding of security) through repression and terror. The most

chilling examples of this can be found in the laws concerning political activity in Iraq or Syria, and the way in which the Ba'ath movement in both these states has created a party-army network of spies, informers and torturers. Although the armed forces have not been directly involved in many of these activities, internal and external security functions are still consolidated at decision-making levels (as illustrated by the Egyptian case), and the transformation from small constabularies to modern armies has brought with it the instruments of control (whether technologies or forms of organization) that made possible the *mukhabarat* state.

The rendering insecure of entire populations or groups within a state may have little short-term impact on the external orientation of a state, and in fact the effective application of state terror can provide at least a semblance of stability. But this poses analytic problems for structural explanations of state behaviour — either such considerations are ignored, and hence the model is of limited explanatory utility (especially in dealing with the realignments that can follow regime change, such as in Iran, Ethiopia, Somalia or even Egypt), or they are included, which implies that one must incorporate the dimension of 'societal/individual security' into the analysis. The problem cannot be sidestepped by asserting that such issues fall outside the ambit of security studies, since by Walt's own definition, security studies ought to concern 'the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies' (Walt, 1991b: 212). Even a preliminary reading of the Middle Eastern case shows that societal/individual security is profoundly affected by the process of military development itself, which is at least in part driven by a response to interstate insecurities. The case for ignoring the domestic consequences of external policies, and the 'feedback' of these policies into external relationships, is thus not strong.

Regional/Interstate Security

The general nature of the links between the different levels of security can be illustrated by focusing on the regional/interstate dimension of the quest for security — the threats states pose to each other. Not surprisingly, the bulk of International Relations scholarship on the Middle East has concentrated on this dimension (and on superpower involvement in the region) (Cordesman, 1993, 1994; Kemp, 1991; Walt, 1987; Yorke, 1988). I will not review the details of the various regional conflicts here, but simply point out how systemic influences can affect the process of military development and how the regional/interstate and other dimensions of security might interact in a negative way.

The process of state-making and military development in the Middle East has in part been driven by external pressures manifested in preparation for,

and actual fighting of, wars. This was evident in the already-noted expansion of armed forces in the aftermath of regional wars, and in the more diffuse pursuit of regional status and hegemony that influenced the policy choices of states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The creation and crystallization of the regional state system turned traditional rivalries between economic, cultural and historical centres such as Cairo, Teheran, Damascus and Baghdad into rivalries between states that expressed themselves in the quest for status or regional hegemony, often measured by relative war-making capabilities. In addition, military-technological influences, and particular ideas about the 'proper' structure for a modern armed force led to the development of a relatively high-technology 'combined arms capability'. In terms of equipment, forces that earlier possessed a high proportion of relatively low capability weapons (utility aircraft and trainers, armoured cars and personnel carriers) shifted so that they have much higher proportions of high-capability weapons (advanced fighter aircraft and tanks). This reflects a belief about the efficacy of modern military technology that is disconnected from the growth of the capability of the armed forces themselves. The region is rife with cases (Libya and Saudi Arabia among the most egregious) where weapons that could not be used by the existing armed forces were acquired in large quantities, only to rust in storage or be operated by foreigners at low levels of operational effectiveness.

The more important issue concerns the way in which the regional/interstate dimension of security might interact with the regime and societal levels. Negative linkages can be postulated in either direction — insecurities at the regional level can exacerbate insecurities for the regime or its citizens, and vice-versa. The first is relatively easy to grasp — at the most basic level, war-making activities consumed enormous amounts of resources (as the figures in Table 1 suggest) that could have in principle been devoted to other developmental pursuits. Israel, Syria, Iraq and Jordan, for example, all have more than 20 soldiers per thousand population (1993 data), and are among the top ten states in this category.¹³ Military expenditures in the Middle East (including Egypt, excluding North Africa) were well over 15% of GNP throughout the 1980s (although they have dropped in recent years), while the global average was around 5.0% (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995). Although there may be no direct trade-off between defence spending and economic growth (Ball, 1988), the opportunity costs of such expenditures loom large. Perhaps more indirectly, the inability of most Arab regimes to win regional wars has undermined their legitimacy, and forced greater reliance on repression and authoritarianism to maintain regime security. This was certainly the case in Egypt after 1967, in Iraq during and after the Iran–Iraq war, and possibly also in Syria (Hinnebusch, 1993; Ibrahim, 1993).

The quest for regional/interstate security did not always involve huge direct costs. As Middle Eastern states became caught up in the rivalries of the cold war, patron–client relationships with external powers often meant the flow of huge sums in military and economic assistance to states such as Syria, Israel, Egypt and Jordan, and privileged access to modern weapons for those states that could afford to pay for them (Algeria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia). Although regional ‘arms racing’, fuelled and financed by the United States and the Soviet Union cannot be easily correlated with the outbreak of wars, ‘government spending priorities in the Middle East reflected not only the absolute number of local conflicts but also . . . the willingness of both the superpowers and local regimes to deal in goods and services that fostered those conflicts to the detriment of domestic development programs’ (Anderson, 1992: 169). On a more subtle level, these relationships allowed Middle Eastern regimes to avoid compromises with local rivals, since the possibility always existed that a patron would help bankroll or support a bid for regional hegemony (or cover the losses from such a bid by replacing weapons, for example). Such behaviour was manifest by Syria and Iraq in the 1980s, in their respective conflicts with Israel and Iran (arguably the same could be said of Egypt and Israel). Of course, the *rentier* states of the region could avoid the guns–butter trade-off not by depending on external support, but by avoiding any reliance on ‘taxation’ altogether (Waterbury, 1994). The economic crisis of the late 1980s, however, has somewhat altered this equation (Sadowski, 1992).

The second negative interaction, where insecurities at the domestic level have an impact on regional security processes, is more difficult to grasp. In principle, when the institutions of organized violence control the state (or a particular regime depends on their support to control the state) then regional conflict resolution processes (such as arms control or confidence-building measures) that threaten the claim of the armed forces on national resources and priorities will be more costly (to the regime) to entertain. A regime may not be strong enough to withstand the resistance that would accompany initiatives to make peace with its neighbours. The opposition of the Egyptian armed forces to the peace with Israel and their subsequent behaviour (and President Sadat’s assassination) is a case in point, as is the difference between the Syrian and Egyptian stances towards the peace process with Israel. More specific conflict resolution proposals such as controls on armaments, basing/deployment restrictions, transparency measures or restrictions on the size of the armed forces, could impede a regime’s ability to counter perceived internal threats to security. This makes Syrian (and to a lesser extent Jordanian) participation in such agreements more difficult to imagine. Thus when Geoffrey Kemp (1991: cover) notes that ‘far-reaching arms control agreements . . . will remain elusive until the key

regional players realize that they have more to gain than to lose from such a process' it must be added that the most important 'players' are not states, but regimes, and their calculations of gains and losses may be different.

Finally, and more subtly, there remains the issue of who defines security — are the strategies that are adopted for managing regional conflicts and external threats based on the idea of a relentless military struggle, or a defensive but military-based concept of how to achieve security, or do they include possible transformations in the security environment (cooperative as well as conflictive solutions). The weakness of those social forces that would benefit the most from a transformation of the Middle Eastern conflict environment has meant the dominance of particular ideas concerning how regional security can be achieved. The difference between the Egyptian and Syrian approaches to peace with Israel, when compared to the economic policies both pursued in the late 1970s and 1980s (the Egyptian *infitah*, or economic opening to the West, versus a continued Syrian commitment to a tightly controlled command economy), again suggests that the different processes of military development might play a role in such decisions (Hinnebusch, 1988; Seale, 1988).

Conclusion

The principal thesis of this article is that the quest for security in the developing world cannot be understood without reference to the process of military development, the insertion of states into the global security order and the state-building projects that new regimes have embarked upon. Thinking of 'security' in the developing world within the framework of states locked in a security dilemma has led scholars to ignore the broader forces that influence security policies and practices in the process of military development, and their complex interaction across the 'internal/external divide.'¹⁴ Such a narrow focus cannot even adequately explain the most concrete manifestation of the security dilemma (changes in military capabilities and the threats these pose) without reference to internal political and social processes.

The most common response to this charge is that the orthodox concept of interstate security is adequate for the analytical task at hand, and that the other issues I have outlined (societal/individual and regime/state dimensions of security) are important, but not relevant. At a deeper level, however, this too can be called into question, for what is at stake here is not only the appropriateness of the analytic tools of security studies scholars, but the definition of the discipline itself. The definition promoted by Walt and others (Haftendorn, 1991; Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988; Walt, 1991b) is historically myopic and Western-centric. The reason security studies scholars

can unproblematically state that 'a subject that is only remotely related to central political problems of threat perception and management among sovereign states would be regarded as peripheral' (Nye and Lynn-Jones, 1988: 7) is *precisely* because this rests upon a historically-specific resolution to the problem of evacuating the threat of organized violence from political life. With this achieved, 'security' became confined to other things — in the international arena, to interstate threats; domestically, to 'social security' and the pursuit of welfare goals in advanced industrial societies. But transplanting this vision of security to the rest of the world ignores precisely what is distinctive, interesting and important about its security problematic.

Similarly, I argue that the occluded aspects of the orthodox definition are more important for understanding security policies and practices in the developing world. The 'ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies' (Walt, 1991b: 212) are especially important in states and societies where the institutions of organized violence are the only remotely modern ones, and where 'insecurities' have as much to do with the internal process of state consolidation and regime legitimation, or with relations between states and their citizens, as with interstate conflicts and rivalries. The consequences of 'military development' are not simply manifest in regional arms races and conflicts, but are felt directly by citizens in their often difficult relationships with institutions of organized violence. Interstate rivalries may actually arise from the process of state and regime legitimation (Herbst, 1990), or may be exacerbated by it, and the weakness of most states in the developing world (*qua* states) presents serious obstacles to regional conflict management projects that often depend on a high degree of internal cohesion and legitimacy to sustain the difficult political compromises and choices that must be made.

The final argument for supporting the expanded conception of security studies outlined above is a normative one. While the equation of 'security' with the creation and maintenance of stable conflict relations between states might have been defensible during the East–West confrontation, it rests upon a problematic severing of security studies from broader currents of International Relations and political science, and ignores the consequences that the quest for security has had on political, social and economic life in developing and advanced industrialized states. Contemporary projects for security building cannot afford to reproduce this narrow focus.

The research agenda that this redefinition of security studies implies is, however, a difficult one. It requires not only an integration into security studies of insights from other currents of International Relations (Baldwin, 1995), but a greater reliance on comparative politics, regional expertise and area studies. The intellectual 'costs' of this move are high, and while it is unlikely that many scholars will or could take up the challenge, it is crucial

that the discipline of security studies at least make room for such work, rather than dismissing it as irrelevant to its central concerns. Similarly, insofar as the methodological tools of rationalist social science have become part of the baggage of conventional security studies (Haftendorn, 1991: 12; Walt, 1991b: 222), and are inappropriate to a broader approach, then room must also be made for alternative methodologies that are not judged by their ability to generate testable, generalizable, neo-positivist, hypotheses.¹⁵

With respect to the Middle East, the incorporation of the region into the global security order, the concomitant massive supplying of sophisticated military technologies, and the 'halo of prestige' that surrounds the region's modern military organizations, has driven the process of political change in Middle Eastern states and societies down particular historical paths, with often dramatically negative consequences for the security and well-being of their citizens. Not only has this been neglected by security studies analysts, but scholars concerned with the prospects for democratization and civil society in the Middle East have also neglected the systemic influences of interstate rivalries, and the impact of attempts to achieve interstate security on the prospects for political, economic and social change.¹⁶ Until both groups better understand the logic behind Middle Eastern states' military development choices, and the way in which these may be shaped by systemic and internal forces, efforts to chart paths away from the pathological relationships that have characterized the region's political life will remain futile.

Notes

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1. As Daniel Deudney put it (1990: 463–4), 'if everything that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a "security" threat, the term . . . becomes a loose synonym of "bad" '.
2. Although Percival and Homer-Dixon (1995) do focus on the civil war in Rwanda, rather than exclusively on its interstate dimension.
3. More sophisticated area studies analysts are not, however, necessarily as state-centric as the scholars cited above, and they do often incorporate such issues as the use of force by non-state actors, or the complex of state–society relations (for example, see Ben-Dor, 1983; Migdal, 1988). The target here, however, are the more conceptual attempts to draw the boundaries of the field, which tend to exclude such people from security studies.

4. A fully worked-out study could also, at least in principle, incorporate these issues into Tilly's framework.
5. The term 'military development' has also been used by Bruce Arlinghaus (1984) to mean 'the growth and modernization of armed forces'. My definition is considerably broader.
6. The army was greatly reduced after 1941, but it re-emerged after World War II with the same role and mission. On the earlier role of army officers in the emergence of modern Iraq after World War I, see Tauber (1993).
7. Tilly's account in turn leans on Frederic Lane, and although I have replicated Lane's three categories, Tilly suggests that 'monarchic control' and control by a 'dominant class' may not be the same thing.
8. As Hurewitz (1969: 37) notes concerning the Ottoman case, what began as military modernization in the early 19th century evolved in two directions, and by the 1860s 'the modernization program [*Tanzimat*] . . . bifurcated, with the military and civilians going their separate ways'.
9. As Tahir (1989: 16) notes: 'to understand the nature of the [current Iraqi] system, one must return to its structural origins in the coup d'état of 1958 (my translation).
10. For an overview on Algeria see the contributions to 'Algerie: la descente aux enfers', *Le Cahiers de l'Orient*, 36–7 (1994–5); Mortimer (1996).
11. On the debate on civil society in the Middle East, see Norton (1994, 1995) and the journal of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies (Cairo), *Civil Society*.
12. Andrew Ross (1987), for example, lists 'military regimes' as his only domestic political index of militarization.
13. The world average is 4.4 soldiers per thousand population. The figures are — Israel, 36.8; Syria, 28.5; Jordan, 26.2; Iraq, 21.2 (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995).
14. For a recent example of the persistence of thinking about military development in interstate terms, see Cordesman (1993), which discusses internal civil conflicts, but does not analyse in any way how the pattern of military development he exhaustively traces might be connected with them.
15. This raises an issue much greater than can be treated here. For an extended discussion, see Krause and Williams (1996).
16. This general neglect is reflected in most of the contributions to Norton (1994, 1995) and Salamé (1994).

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