Political Responses and Electoral Behaviour at Times of Socioeconomic Risk Inequalities and Immigration

THESIS
submitted at the Graduate Institute
in fulfilment of the requirements of the
PhD degree in International Relations/Political Science

by

Elif Naz KAYRAN

Thesis N° 1359

Geneva

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RESUME / ABSTRACT

Titre de la thèse / Title of thesis : Réactions politiques et comportements électoraux en temps d'inégalité de risques socio-économiques et de l'immigration / Political Responses and Electoral Behaviour at Times of Socioeconomic Risk Inequalities and Immigration

Résumé en français: Cette thèse examine les bases économiques de l'opposition politique à l'immigration dans l'Europe du XXIème siècle. L'objectif du projet est d'aller au-delà des analyses des effets économiques de l'immigration, de la culture, de l'identité ethnique et de la partisanerie. Il s'agit plutôt de comprendre l'impact de l'inégalité des risques socio-économiques. Il présente trois conclusions principales. Tout d'abord, l'exposition croissante aux risques de chômage aggrave les inquiétudes économiques. Ces risques conduisent également à se sentir relativement moins bien par rapport à ses compatriotes. Deuxièmement, la demande d'une politique d'immigration d'exclusion ne ressemble pas vraiment à un rejet culturel. Elle peut plutôt s'expliquer par les transformations de la structure des marchés du travail et les demandes d'assurance qui en découlent. Dans les conditions où les marchés du travail privilégient les natifs, les différences fondées sur le risque ne polarisent pas autant les positions sur la politique d'immigration. En troisième lieu, il existe une hétérogénéité des motivations au sein de la base électorale de l'extrême droite entre ceux qui votent pour s'assurer contre les risques futurs et ceux qui portent des préjugés contre les immigrants. Les analyses comparatives du projet couvrant la période depuis les années 2000 constituent la base d'un lien bien établi entre l'exposition inégale aux risques économiques et les réactions contre l'immigration. Je montre comment les récentes inégalités socio-économiques façonnent les réponses politiques des citoyens face à l'immigration et comment, à leur tour, ces demandes déterminent la trajectoire de la politique européenne au cours de ce siècle.

English Summary: This dissertation examines the economic basis of political opposition to immigration in Europe in the twenty-first century. The aim of the project is to go beyond analyses of the economic effects of immigration, cultural differences, ethnic and national identity, and partisanship, and instead to understand the impact of unevenly distributed socioeconomic risks. It provides three main findings related to the European politics of immigration in this century. *First*, increasing exposure to unemployment risks not only worsen economic anxieties but also lead to feeling relatively worse-off compared to fellow citizens. *Second*, demand for exclusionary immigration policy has little resemblance of a cultural backlash but instead can be explained through the structural transformations in the jobs markets and subsequent demands for insurance. Under conditions where labour market institutional contexts privilege natives, risk-based differences are less conducive to becoming polarised. *Third*, there is an apparent heterogeneity of motivations within the electoral base of the radical-right between those who vote to insure themselves against future threats and those who hold prejudice against immigrants. The multi-level and multi-country comparative analyses of the project covering the period since the 2000s lay the foundation for a link between uneven exposure of economic risks in advanced post-industrial democracies and subsequent reactions against immigration. Ultimately, I show both how recent socioeconomic inequalities shape citizens' political responses towards immigration and how, in turn, these demands determine the trajectory of European politics in this century.

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Project Summary

This dissertation examines the economic basis of political opposition to immigration in Europe in the twenty-first century. It presents a systematic account of the extent to which rising inequalities of economic prospects have transformed the politics of immigration. In this way, the project seeks to make sense of growing tensions between natives and immigrants and subsequent political demands and backlash against heterogeneity. Importantly, I argue that this opposition should be understood considering the transformation of production systems in Europe and the restructuring of existing welfare regimes. Therefore, the aim is to go beyond analyses of the economic effects of immigration, cultural differences, questions of ethnic and national identity, and partisanship, and instead to understand the impact of experiencing socioeconomic risks. The project has three main findings related to the European politics of immigration in this century. *First*, increasing exposure to unemployment risks not only worsen economic anxieties and perceived prospective difficulties but also lead to feelings of being relatively worse-off compared to fellow citizens. This result is different from focusing on the labour market vulnerabilities from a status-based approach and instead takes into account inequalities of risk exposure. *Second*, there is a remarkable demand for exclusionary and restrictive immigration policy and increasing scepticism towards immigration in European societies. Yet, this has little resemblance of a cultural backlash but instead can be explained as consequences of structural transformations in the jobs markets and subsequent demands for insurance. Precisely because of this, welfare politics can shape the mass politics of immigration. Under conditions where labour market institutional contexts seemingly privilege natives, risk-based differences are less conducive to becoming polarised. *Third*, there is an apparent heterogeneity of motivations within the electoral base of the radical-right between those who vote to insure themselves against future threats and those who hold substantial prejudice against immigrants. Focusing on the culturally motivated anti-immigrant voters of these parties obscures the fact that the current electoral potential of radical-right parties has a lot to with the destabilisation of citizens' economic prospects. Taken together, the multi-level and multi-country comparative analyses of the project covering the period since the 2000s lay the foundation for a well-evidenced link between uneven exposure of economic risks in advanced post-industrial democracies and subsequent reactions against immigration. Ultimately, I show both how the recent pressures of globalisation and inequalities shape citizens' political responses towards immigration and how, in turn, these demands can determine the trajectory of European politics in this century.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

In the past two decades, European societies are amid a seemingly never-ending turmoil. One of the most visible expressions of this has been the growing resonance of nativism amongst European politics. An explosive manifestation of such processes was the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom in 2016. The building blocks of this popular referendum for leaving the European Union were in great part motivated by the idea of 'taking back control' of borders and restricting immigration. This backlash has been a long time in the making following increasingly contentious debates over immigration to the country. However, this resentment towards immigration in the UK is nowhere near an isolated event. There has been expanding support for openly xenophobic parties in Europe such as the Danish People's Party, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Swiss People's Party, and the Freedom Party of Austria. Even in places with previously less room for anti-immigrant politics such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal, emerging nativist movements have gained significant traction.[1] Indeed, across Europe, support for racially exclusionary views has disconcertedly increased at these times of growing cultural connectedness and transnationalisation of societies.

Despite this contestation, however, both long-term settlement and new immigration continue on economic, family, and humanitarian grounds making ethnic heterogeneity an essential and enduring characteristic of Europe. Yet, the mobilisation of opposition to immigration seems to be a key catalyst in the politics of this century. Looking back on these events of the past decades, the nativist reaction towards immigrants emerges as a determining symptom of the crises in today's European politics. Therefore, studying this rising tension between immigrants and natives is not only necessary for discerning the roots of such exclusionary attitudes and prejudice but can help shed light on the politics in this century.

Given this widespread tension across Europe, unsurprisingly, there is an ever-expanding scholarly endeavour addressing various aspects of this phenomenon. Without going into the specificities of this rich literature here, I would like to highlight one prevailing point. Existing studies diverge between favouring sociocultural *versus* material explanations as to the most crucial

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[1] The parties I refer to here are Vox in Spain, LAOS and more recently the Golden Dawn in Greece, and *Partido Nacional Renovador* (PNR), whose new name as of 2020 is *Ergue-te* (Rise up), in Portugal. Even though PNR is still very much a fringe actor in terms of vote share, it has almost doubled its voters in 2015 compared to the previous national election in 2011.

determinant of reactions to immigration politics (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). While the former approaches emphasise questions of ethnic identities and their increasing role in politics, cultural capital, and education (Norris and Inglehart 2019, Rydgren 2008, Manevska and Achterberg 2013), the latter highlight socioeconomic vulnerability and the material effects of immigration such as increasing competition for jobs, welfare, and other state resources (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Dancygier and Donnelly 2013) as the roots of the tension between immigrants and natives. Importantly, while the cultural explanations to discerning reactions to ethnic heterogeneity are widely accepted, the proposition that the economic effects of immigration, i.e. ethnic competition, induces negativity has received considerable pushback- particularly from experimental research (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). In this study, stepping away from both the cultural theoretical frameworks and the ethnic competition hypotheses in explaining the politics of immigration, I propose a *different* economically motivated argument.

There are three central questions I focus on in this dissertation: Why are some citizens more likely to become more sceptical towards immigration? What determines the politicisation of immigration policy and restrictiveness demands? Who votes for the nativist political parties running on anti-immigration platforms? Considering the economic and institutional restructuring in the past decades, my short answer is the following: Pushback against immigration is rooted in the growing inequalities of exposure to unemployment risks and future uncertainty. In this project, I study defensiveness towards immigration and following demands for exclusion as symptomatic of different predicaments- other than the effects of ethnic heterogeneity itself. Increasing scepticism towards immigration and subsequent responses have a lot to do with the fears over socioeconomic destabilisation and further decline amongst natives. Primarily, I focus on examining the unemployment risk-based drivers of opposition towards immigration and subsequent political responses in Europe. Importantly, I suggest that much of the existing tension towards immigration can be understood if we consider the tremendous transformation of production systems in Europe and the restructuring of existing welfare regimes. In this respect, the background of this investigation and theoretical framework is set with two related phenomena.

First, on the one hand, increasing globalisation has made European economies internationalised marketplaces for goods and human capital (Kriesi et al. 2006, Sassen 1996). On the other hand, technological developments, most notably the astounding improvements in

automation and digitalisation have added to the ongoing processes of post-industrialisation and occupational change in the labour markets (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003, Oesch 2013). However, where most European states have experienced positive economic growth due to efficiency boosts and lowered production costs, the fruits of these developments are not shared equally (Rodrik 1997, Baccaro 2008). While such changes have benefited some by increasing the supply of economic opportunities, this has neither helped narrow socioeconomic cleavages within societies nor alleviated employability concerns facing a growing number of workers in European job markets (Scheve and Slaughter 2004, Im et al. 2019). Importantly, these labour market changes have significantly altered what it means to be a 'valued' worker in terms of which skills and tasks are rewarded over others (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2010).

Second, another predicament concerning the economic destabilisation in Europe has been the weakened capacity of the welfare states in counter-balancing uncertainty and insecurity induced from market forces (Clayton and Pontusson 1998). While there has been some economic growth in many places in Europe from an absolute perspective, the resources for ensuring future security have shrunk considerably, adding to the challenges facing workers (Clegg 2007). While the recalibration of welfare states has been an ongoing process heightening during the 1980s and 1990s, recent decades have crystallised this tension of reduced compensation at such times of increasing future uncertainty. Already faced with changes in labour markets, European workers have found themselves, unlike in previous decades, provided with less compensation and insurance from market risks. Economic restructuring and the subsequent unequally distributed economic chances, therefore, came at a particularly contentious period in the history of welfare states in Europe (Pierson 1998).

Rightly so, comparative political economy scholars in recent years have studied these joint developments in European societies (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005, Thewissen and Rueda 2019, Walter 2017, Gingrich and Häuserman 2015, Beramendi et al. 2015, Marx 2014, Rueda 2015, Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012). These empirical efforts have already provided important explanations as to how these new vulnerability cleavages alter the welfare policy demands, voting behaviour, and more broadly, the mass politics in this century. However, we know relatively less concerning *why*, *how*, and *to what extent* such developments, unrelated to immigration, underpin negativity towards heterogeneity. While several recent valuable accounts have already focused on this matter (Dancygier and Walter 2015, Polavieja 2016, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Pardos-Prado

and Xena 2019), there are still many open questions in terms of the economic risk-based grievances of mass politics of immigration.

The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Next, I briefly present an overview of existing approaches highlighting what we know so far in terms of the economic basis of adverse reactions towards immigration and where this project aims to make contributions to the literature. Following this, I present my theoretical framework. In the third section, I discuss the empirical approach and data I use in this project. Finally, I discuss the division of labour between the three separate manuscripts making up this dissertation and state the main contributions of the project to understanding reactions towards immigration and politics at large.

1. What is the Economic Basis of Negative Reactions towards Immigration? Existing Approaches and Pending Questions

Taking stock of the existing literature, I distinguish three broad strands of empirical work when it comes to the observable outcomes of the 'politics of immigration'. In this way, I identify several ways in which the project aims to contribute to ongoing work. While earlier studies have added to our knowledge in meaningful ways, there are still theoretical and empirical aspects requiring further research attention.

1.1 Dynamics of immigrant-native relations in the literature

The first cluster of studies focuses on the individual-level relations between immigrant and native groups. They examine the root causes of anti-immigration attitudes, prejudice, and exclusionary views amongst natives (Allport 1954, Blumer 1958, Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017, Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Several scholars sustain that understanding current negative backlash towards immigration can be discovered using sociocultural frameworks of the politics of national identity and perceived threats against the way of life and cultural norms in host societies (Manevska and Achterberg 2013, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Notwithstanding the relevance of such explanations, there is a non-negligible amount of evidence also suggesting that both the immigrant *versus* native competition for material resources (Jackson 1993, Billiet, Meuleman, and

Dewitte 2014, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013) and economic vulnerabilities in the labour markets writ large shape negativity towards immigration (Helbling and Kriesi 2014, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Scheve and Slaughter 2001).

Indeed, it is highly intuitive to think of deeply rooted sociocultural characteristics of natives as primary explanations as to why we see differences between citizens in terms of their prejudicial responses towards immigrants and xenophobic attitudes. However, when considering changes over time for the same individuals, such explanations, culturally-rooted explanations are far less useful when thinking about the dynamics of the relations between immigrants and natives (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013). To put it differently, it is neither theoretically nor empirically suited to explain outcomes that change with by and large time-constant explanatory frameworks. In this respect, growing in recent years but much smaller in volume, there has been empirical efforts focused on establishing dynamics of group relations from a longitudinal perspective from material self-interest frameworks (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Importantly, the most easily discoverable economically motivated answer to these increasingly conflictual relations between natives and immigrants is the growing heterogeneity in host societies (Billiet, Meuleman, and Dewitte 2014). However, this explanation of the ethnically rooted economic competition has not received much support in earlier work (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Notably, the evidence so far is mixed for the role of ethnic competition for jobs and welfare resources (Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015) as well as concerning the effect of the actual number of immigrants in host societies (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017). Therefore, the economic basis of attitudes towards immigration does not seem to be straightforwardly linked to immigration itself as a source of grievances. Therefore, there are still important questions remaining on how to conceptualise and empirically evaluate the determinants of such dynamics.

In this respect, rather than a focus on immigration itself as the driver of increasing tension, recent studies find robust effects for individual economic vulnerability based on occupation-rooted factors of skill transferability (or lack thereof), exposure to the potential impact of automation, and offshoring (Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Dancygier and Walter 2015, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). A common limitation in these valuable contributions, however, is that studies either focus on the role of broader labour market dynamics or the ethnic competition theories when paying careful empirical attention to testing their implications (Pardos-Prado 2020, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). Due in significant part to this omission, thorough assessments of labour market vulnerabilities

often approach the study of the dynamics of group relations disjointly without considering the previous evidence on the economic effects of immigration on native reactions. Most crucially, this has led to a theoretical stretch of the ethnic competition frameworks being brought forward in explaining the evidenced link between labour market vulnerabilities and anti-immigration reactions (Polavieja 2016). This separation of the empirical investigation of labour market vulnerability and realistic material competition frameworks have, thus, led to the exclusion of looking at these different sources of material motivations within an integrated framework while simultaneously paying careful empirical attention to testing these other channels.

1.2 Immigration policy preferences in the literature

The second cluster of studies in the literature, where the project aims to contribute, focuses on citizens' immigration policy preferences. Within this work, there are both micro-level and macro-level economic explanations discerning the variation of tolerance to openness in immigration policymaking in Europe (Gerber et al. 2017, Pardos-Prado 2020, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Crepaz and Damron 2009, Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003). Concerning the individual-level determinants, there has been far more interest in understanding *what predicts* these preferences rather than *why* economic vulnerability should relate to differences across immigration policy demands. Indeed, thanks to earlier evidence, we know that the unemployed, the lower educated, those with less competitive skills, and the older workers are systematically against more open policies (Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Gerber et al. 2017). However, the underpinning logic of the well-evidenced role of economic vulnerability has been relatively understudied. What is mostly absent in current debates is how the immigration policy is a critical policy instrument determining the supply and demand-side dynamics in host economies and how decisive (and often overestimated) consequences it can have for the real and perceived economic prospects of natives. In this way, like other protection and compensation policy mechanisms in European welfare states, immigration policy can also be thought to function as an essential policy instrument determining further entry of risks into the labour markets of the countries. This aspect seems to be underrated across extant studies focusing on the economic motivations of immigration policy preferences so far.

Compared to the wealth of studies on individual characteristics, there are fewer but more varied accounts that investigate immigration policy demands from the perspective of contextual

conditions (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). In this respect, some empirical attention has been devoted to macro-economic conditions, demographic and systemic shocks, and historical experience with immigration (Polavieja 2016, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, Meuleman et al. 2020, Semyonov et al. 2004). Surprisingly, however, despite the increasing focus on labour market vulnerability as a source of immigration-related grievances, we still know relatively little about how institutions that shape and condition these vulnerability experiences relate to the politics of immigration. In this respect, there are two particularly influential frameworks proposing either a compatible or an antagonistic view of welfare states and immigration politics.

According to the first view, through the norm-building effects of inclusive institutions, increasing heterogeneity and strong welfare protections can co-exist cohesively and should nurture tolerance (Crepaz and Damron 2009, Boräng 2015, Banting 2005, Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Studies from this approach argue that differences in welfare state institutions determine how immigrants will be treated in destination countries and how citizens will view this potentially threatening new heterogeneity in their society. In this vein, more comprehensive protection and compensation for the ongoing risks beget more harmonious societal relations and acceptance of openness. In contrast, studies adopting an antagonistic view of expansive welfare and politics of immigration emphasise the welfare magnet effects and the perceived over-representation of immigrants as public resources beneficiaries, and related grievances across citizens (Razin, Sadka, and Suwankiri 2011, Gilens 1995, Borjas 1999, Finseraas 2008, Eger 2010). This approach sees an inherently challenging relationship between solidaristic and inclusive welfare institutional protection and the impact of immigration in host societies.

Both approaches have their separate merits in discerning how institutions may lead to distinct norm-building and push-pull factors of immigration. However, so far, the competing hypotheses potentially signal that there may be no systematic differences in immigration policy demands due to institutional differences in the labour markets. Therefore, it remains not fully answered as to *if* and *how* welfare politics alter the micro-foundations of immigration policymaking. Yet, we should still not discard the possibility of such a link so easily because labour market institutions are well evidenced to condition the effects of economic vulnerabilities on various social policy and welfare-related outcomes (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Anderson and Pontusson 2007). Surprisingly, these findings from the broader welfare states studies have not been translated into the analysis of economically motivated immigration policy preferences. Therefore,

in this project, I focus on this particular aspect of the link between economic vulnerability, labour market institutions, and immigration policy preferences.

1.3 Electoral politics of immigration in the literature

The third set of studies that the project aims to contribute to is concerned with the electoral relevance of the politics of immigration within the broader comparative politics literature. Within these empirical efforts, many studies concentrate on how the electoral politics in this century changed due to the increasing relevance of immigration (Schain 2006, Afonso 2015, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020, Ivarsflaten 2008, Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017). Besides, they also focus on the substantial changes in socio-economically rooted interest cleavages and institutional transformations (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015, Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, Oesch 2008, Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003, Kitschelt 2007).

In this respect, from a top-down approach, most scholars stressing the dynamics of party politics as determinants of electoral outcomes would readily agree that politics of welfare retrenchment necessitated trade-offs concerning which citizen coalitions to attract and how (Gingrich and Häuserman 2015, Beramendi et al. 2015). This body of research has led to a fruitful debate on how we should make sense of the decline of social-democrat parties and the break-up of old class coalitions in today's economic conditions and welfare politics (Oesch and Rennwald 2018). Next, there is also an ongoing debate as to how challenger parties outside of mainstream politics, namely the radical-right, managed to capture the economically vulnerable voters. Some argue that this is because radical-right parties have adjusted their economic proposals to match the material interests of these groups, while others hold that the main reason of why such voters turned away from the social-democrat parties is due to widening cultural cleavages within the electorate of social-democrats (Rovny 2013, Rovny and Polk 2019, de Lange 2007, Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Burg 2014).

Despite such debates about the party politics of the radical right, there is no doubt that immigration is the determining factor the vote choices for radical-right parties (Arzheimer 2012, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019). However, existing work has often dealt with this issue as inherently linked to the so-called 'cultural dimension' of voting behaviour despite the well-evidenced economic connotations of the politics of immigration (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). Indeed, immigration has serious redistributive and social insurance implications for the

native voter base. Therefore, more research attention is needed as to why the politics of nativism promoted by the radical-right have been so successful in the last two decades and for which voters such appeals are more convincing. This is important since there seems to be some mixed evidence as for how radical-right parties managed to propose competitive agendas targeting economically vulnerable citizens leaving open questions in the literature.

Next, the demand-side literature of electoral behaviour has also been dealing with debates over whether what we observe in the increasing electoral base of the radical-right has much to with economic grievances (Bolet 2020, Kurer 2020, Gidron and Hall 2017, Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018) or whether the sociocultural dimension trumps in predicting who voted for these parties (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, Fetzer 2000, Norris and Inglehart 2019). More specifically, the focal point of this literature has been on understanding whether there is a cultural or economic basis for the rising extremism and radical-right vote in advanced democracies, with an emphasis on the role of immigration (Rydgren 2008, de Lange 2007). However, despite growing evidence for the relevance of nativist economic policy proposals in RRWP agendas for their vote potential (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Lefkoridi and Michel 2014), much of the existing work attributed a cultural role for the political programmes in the immigration issues area (Norris and Inglehart 2019, Rydgren 2008).

Yet, there could perhaps be a different way of thinking about this matter. Indeed, while some radical-right voters may be loyal supporters of such parties based on the xenophobic and culturally nativist policies alone (Fetzer 2000), concrete economic grievances may drive others. This statement resonates particularly true if we think of the explosive increase in the radical-right voters in the last two decades. Therefore, recently, it has become more challenging to reconcile the idea that these culturally motivated conventional voters are the *only* ones supporting RRWPs (Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020). Importantly, casting some doubt on some of the earlier work, when it comes to economic frameworks there seems to stronger evidence and more agreements around the following two recent conclusions: not current, but prospective hardship (Mutz 2018, Kurer 2020) and not absolute, but the relative socioeconomic position amongst others in the society discern the economically motivated radical-right voters (Engler and Weisstanner 2020, Gidron and Hall 2019, Burgoon et al. 2019). However, despite this, there still seems to be a fundamental tension of material interests for these voters with regards to not voting for left-wing parties and instead choosing radical-right platforms that are relatively less addressed in earlier

work. Therefore, to assess the relevance and substance of economic motivations for the radical-right vote, it is fruitful to consider potential heterogeneity across decisive motivations and the role of immigration not just from a cultural but also from an economic perspective in predicting the electoral behaviour.

2. The Argument: Unemployment Risk Inequalities Shape Politics of Immigration

In this project, I offer an argument focusing on both micro-level foundations and contextual conditions through which economic vulnerability relates to the politics of immigration. The project's main interest lies in explaining *to what extent*, *where*, and *for whom* economically motivated grievances shape political responses to immigration. I propose that the unequally distributed economic risks, and subsequent insecurities and deprivation, can explain much of what we see in terms of nativist opposition to immigration in the past two decades. I argue that exposure to higher economic uncertainty at home society intensifies the tension between immigrant and native groups. I hold that this can account for both *changes over time* and *cross-sectional* attitudinal *differences* between individuals. On this basis, I expect risk-exposed individuals to demand more restrictive immigration policies and adopt more exclusionary views with regards to sharing rights and economic resources with immigrants. Both kinds of outcomes are echoed in the current stream of radical-right party platforms leading to an unexpected alliance of both culturally and economically motivated individuals voting for these parties in the past two decades.

Overall, the theoretical framework of the project is two-fold. On the one hand, I argue that when thinking of the materialistic basis of the adversity towards immigration, we need to take into account the increasingly unequal unemployment risk exposure amongst citizens. This development is due to economic restructuring, globalisation, deindustrialisation, and automation, changing how advanced capitalist markets work. On the other hand, I present a novel theoretical framework explaining how, these risk inequalities shape politics of immigration, taking stock of individual relative deprivation theory and political economy literature. Importantly, I hold that opposition to immigration has much to do with economic changes that have little to do with the ethnic heterogeneity in European societies writ large.

2.1 Theoretical Framework Part I: Conceptualising risk-based economic vulnerabilities within and across countries

This first part of the theoretical framework is devoted to how I choose to explain a series of political responses to immigration from a material self-interest perspective. By all accounts, my approach in this section is on familiar ground. First, I take stock of the aptly entitled *homo insecuritas* model by Rehm (2016, 19) proposing a crucial link between the unequal distribution of occupational unemployment risks. Rehm argues that country idiosyncrasies lead to differently distributed unemployment risk pools in each society and alter the welfare demands of citizens to protect against uncertain futures. Second, the argument here is also related to the study of relative deprivation emphasising the psychological consequences of exposure to inequalities within a group or a society (Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972, Clark and Senik 2010, Smith et al. 2012).

The idea of using unemployment risks as economic vulnerability indicators is not new; neither is the approach of using relative benchmarks as more precise measures of grievances (Kurer et al. 2019, Aytac 2018, Kayser and Peress 2012, Kayser and Leininger 2016). However, apart from a few notable works (Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016), scholars seem to take either a risk-based or relative-based approach. In this project, I bring together these two influential conceptions to understand the economic motivations underpinning adversity towards immigration. I hold that individual risks benchmarked to the average performance in the country capture the relative standing of the individuals within their society highly exposed to the volatilities in labour markets and economic shocks (Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018, Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018, Clark and Oswald 1996). These unevenly distributed risks, then, can help us discern precise economic motivations. Importantly, this can be indicative of which citizens are more likely to demand more insurance and compensation against this risk, on the one hand, and who may be feeling particularly anxious about their prospects due to such worse-off position, on the other hand. This approach raises four critical issues that I address here concerning this conceptual refinement and simple empirical transformation.

First, considering the evidence finding an essential role of prospective rather than current hardship (Mutz 2018, Kurer 2020), I sustain that economic vulnerability should be approached from a risk-based perspective rather than static indicators of education, employment status, social class or income. Following earlier work, I focus on the objective risk of job loss, i.e. occupational unemployment rates, (Rehm 2016, Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006). The risk of losing

employment captures consequences for socioeconomic vulnerability both in the immediate and in the long-term due to income and status loss, withdrawal from social life, adverse effects in the family and personal life. Therefore, it is both informative of a real objective potential economic decline and functions as a reliable indicator of perceived subjective status loss with strong emotional responses attached to it (Brand 2015, Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey 2001). In this way, rather than focusing on cleavages between the wealthy *versus* the poor or the working class *versus* the middle class or differences across employment status, i.e. unemployed *versus* employed or temporary *versus* permanent contracts, I concentrate on the degree of future uncertainties individuals are exposed when studying economically motivated grievances. In my empirical analyses, however, these other critical alternative considerations of economic interests and standing related to current conditions are always taken into account.

Second, considering a risk-based framework makes the issue of using absolute measures problematic both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, figuring out who may be likely to benefit from social protection or less immigration necessitates identifying who feels more vulnerable and is exposed to higher risk in *each* context. Relatively higher unemployment risk within the country is a correlate of who will feel like they are on the wrong side of the changes resulting from the economic and social transformations in recent decades (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Gidron and Hall 2017). Therefore, grasping what it means to have a certain level of risk in each country at a given time necessitates focusing both on the levels and the distribution of such risks in *each* context (Burgoon et al. 2019, Milanovic 2000). Empirically, average employment performance at the country level, i.e. the national unemployment rate, informs on the contextual conditions. Likewise, unemployment risks within each occupation group tell us about the absolute risk exposure of individuals. However, both pieces of information are required to know how better- or worse-off individuals are concerning exposure to economic uncertainty in each context. Therefore, in cross-national or temporally comparative research, we should study unemployment risk exposure from a relative perspective. In this way, relative risk carries information both in terms of the economic context and the group-based risk simultaneously which increases the conceptual validity of the measure.

Third, while relativising unemployment risks theoretically and empirically improve conceptualisation and measurement, this is not to suggest that it is at odds with the previously used indicators of socioeconomic risk. A relativised occupational risk exposure measure, as used in this

project, strongly correlates with absolute occupational unemployment rates as put forward in earlier work by Rehm (2016). Since the relativisation of absolute unemployment risk, empirically, only transforms the absolute risk measure, it does not alter the risk distribution across occupations.[2] However, the decisive measurement advantage of the relative indicator is that it more accurately captures is the unemployment risk exposure distribution in the country. Indeed, even if there are improvements in an economy which may lead to employment growth for some jobs, it does not necessarily follow that such effects of development will be equally distributed. Therefore, while absolute measures are insensitive to such inequalities, using a national benchmark is a simple way of ensuring both temporal and cross-sectional comparability.

To illustrate this point further, in 2010, an unskilled manual worker in Finland was facing an 18.77 *per cent* absolute unemployment rate in her occupation. Comparatively, someone in the same job category in Spain was facing a staggering 33.11 *per cent* unemployment rate. However, in the same year, the average unemployment rate in Finland was about 9 *per cent* and about 17.5 *per cent* in Spain. If the workers remain in their national labour markets, the Finnish worker has far more reasons to experience anxiety given worse-off status at home compared to the Spanish, since she has double the risk of being unemployed given her national labour market conditions. While the Spanish worker experiences more threat in absolute terms, given the general state of her domestic labour market, her future position in the labour market seems to be less strikingly *far behind* than the Finnish. Indeed, even if there is low unemployment in a country such as in Finland, it does not necessarily follow that certain workers will have less economic grievances. As in this simple example, while more secure in absolute terms, the Finnish worker is more *relatively* at risk in her own country. Therefore, she is likely to experience the adverse socio-psychological effects of being behind and, subsequently, demand more insurance compared to those who are better-off in her domestic labour market.

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[2] From a methodological perspective, it is important to note here that this cautions against using absolute and relative indicators jointly in empirical analyses. In quantitative analyses using both can introduce multi-collinearity and bias in estimations since the two measures are very strongly related. Instead, I approach the absolute state of economic vulnerability as a potentially confounding factor at the individual using different objective and subjective indicators such as income, education, employment status, job tenure and perceived subjective vulnerabilities. This allows me to account for an 'absolute' state of insecurity of individuals without introducing empirical errors in my analyses.

Fourth, how economic vulnerabilities should be operationalised has been widely studied in earlier work from comparative political economy (Rovny and Rovny 2017). Marx and Picot (2020), for instance, provide a detailed discussion of the variety of vulnerability indicators and their respective advantages and limitations. In this project, I use occupation groups as the primary source when empirically capturing economic interest, because such distinct task groups are meaningful categories indicating on education, skill, and socialisation of workers simultaneously. More importantly, such categories lend themselves to making arguments rooted in these social group contexts relative to average performance as shaping reactions vis-à-vis out-groups such as immigrants from a cognitively meaningful perspective (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Oesch 2006, Dancygier and Walter 2015).

When choosing to use occupational categories as points of aggregation, there is a multitude of options for capturing unemployment risks due to the labour market developments occurring in these past decades. Some of these sources of risk include offshorability, routinisation, or dualisation as well as gender and age differences (Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Dancygier and Donnelly 2013, Pardos-Prado 2020, Thewissen and Rueda 2019, Kurer and Palier 2019, Schwander and Häusermann 2013). Notwithstanding the importance of such variation, in this project, I am not theoretically interested in what specific cause is driving the unemployment risk levels across work categories. Instead, I am concerned with a much more straightforward idea. The variation I focus on is how certain occupational groups in any given country at a time point are exposed to higher or lower risks of losing their job and income rather than what exactly causes such inequalities. In sum, I am interested in unemployment risk differences among citizens regardless of what domestic or globalisation related determinants may be underpinning such risk-based cleavages.

2.2 Theoretical Framework Part II: Linking unemployment risk inequalities and political reactions towards immigration

How are such unemployment risk-based inequalities mobilised against immigration? To this question, I propose two related logics explaining how unemployment risk differences are

influencing political reactions towards immigration in recent decades.[3] The first logic is associated with the individual relative deprivation theory (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972). From this perspective, increasing opposition to immigration can be understood as the consequence of a psycho-social response of individuals when faced with being relatively worse-off *vis-à-vis* other groups - often with the perception that such a position is unfair (Mols and Jetten 2017, 40, Meuleman et al. 2020). This mechanism triggers ways in which individuals demand closure and containment, engage in boundary-drawing in the society (such as the conventional *us* versus *them* divide), and act in a reactionary and conflictual manner when disproportionately high risks and threats are present for them (Kuziemko et al. 2014, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).

From a complementary perspective, the second logic is related to the reasoning of insurance against future uncertainty which leads to negativity towards immigration. As widely evidenced in earlier work, we can expect more substantial demands for protection amongst individuals exposed to relatively higher economic vulnerability (Alt and Iversen 2017, Rehm 2016). Based on this, we can think of these vulnerabilities to function as heightening demands not only after such risks are already present in the country but also by preventing further uncertainty, i.e. immigration, from entering domestic labour markets. Therefore, worsening reactions towards immigration can be understood as grounded in such economic motivations for insuring future status to compensate for the worse-off position in society.

To put these two potential channels in perspective, I note that since the 80's most traditional destination countries in Europe were characterised as 'reluctant' immigration countries (Cornelius and Tsuda 2004, Hollifield 2004). Increasing human mobility facilitated by the globalisation and the demand for foreign labour in the job markets contributed to the growing heterogeneity in these societies (Ruhs 2013). This process has accelerated after the deepening of European integration with the free movement of persons between the European Union member states (Boswell and Geddes 2011). In this way, if we think of the two developments mentioned in the beginning, i.e. structural change in the economy at times of receding welfare protection, perhaps a third necessary

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[3] In this project, I do not focus on assessing the relative importance of either channel or pursue a causal mechanism analysis of these explanations. However, wherever relevant, I assess whether assumptions concerning these arguments hold. Details of these procedures are available in the relevant parts of the project and referred to in each manuscript.

process to consider is the rhetoric of 'uncontrollable' immigration weaponised by political actors against incumbent governments (de Lange 2007, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018). This argument about the difficulty of controlling immigration holds water, perhaps if we think of the free movement within European borders and humanitarian migration or family reunification laws. However, when considering the significantly more politicised non-European economic immigrants, there seems to be little evidence of an out of control immigration that can threaten the economic prospects of natives (Finotelli and Kolb 2017, Münz et al. 2006).

Despite this, immigration is portrayed as the primary culprit of economic instabilities and as a factor putting excessive pressure on the job markets and the public resources of states (Wodak 2015, Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003). For instance, this has been a conventional narrative in the rhetoric and communications of nationalist and far-right political parties and has been prevalent in the negative media attention targeting immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009, Rydgren 2008). In this way, blaming immigration to appeal to the economic grievances of citizens becomes an easy way of fostering support for radical-right political entrepreneurs. Through this, these political actors have been able to obfuscate the actual roots of the economic inequalities and uncertainty in European societies (Rydgren 2008, Husbands 1988, Rooduijn, de Lange, and van der Burg 2014). [4] Even if the economic grievances and deprivation of citizens in this century are not immediately due to the economic effects of immigration, such insecurities have indeed been channelled towards immigration. This logic can, then, further explain why we see worsening inter-group relations, opposition to immigration, and finally, support for parties precisely proposing such nativist agendas in the last two decades.

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[4] Of course, immigrants are never the only group targeted. Among others are the economic and political elites, European institutions and bureaucracy, and other minority groups which are often been at the attention of these parties as well.

3. Empirical Approach & Data

The temporal scope of the project is from the beginning of the twenty-first century until now. Therefore, the empirical analyses cover a period from the 2000s until 2018.[5] In this way, I aim to ensure a good fit between the observation period and the theoretical framework I proposed here. Geographically, my interest lies in advanced capitalist European democracies with similar histories of immigration, welfare politics, exposure to cultural heterogeneity, and globalisation. This choice is because cases should be comparable in terms of economic and political dynamics as advanced post-industrial democracies and the development of party competition spaces, as well as economic and political institutions. With these considerations in mind, I exclude the Central and Eastern European countries and restrict my sample to country cases from Northern, Western, and Southern Europe. Therefore, the implications of this project should be understood as reflective of this regional focus.

Investigating whether risk-based economic cleavages bring about worsening group relations, subsequent exclusionary and restrictive policy preferences, and political choices require an empirical approach assessing these relationships both in longitudinal and cross-sectional perspectives. Importantly, studying *where* and *under what conditions* the proposed theoretical relationships work necessitates a cross-national comparative approach to validate such arguments in different empirical settings. Based on these theoretical and practical considerations, in this project, I use observational survey data capturing the relevant outcomes of interest concerning the politics of immigration. The data sources I rely on are either longitudinal panel data, German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP 2018), or cross-national large-scale survey data, namely European Social Survey (ESS 2019) and German General Social Survey (GESIS 2020). Some of the essential advantages of these data sources are having rich, high-quality, nationally representative, cross-national, and longitudinal panel data which covers the geographical and temporal scope of the project. Notably, one determining advantage of the observational data sources I use here are their availability going back at least two decades and cost-efficient high quality comparable cross-national data for my country cases of interest.

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[5] This temporal scope varies across different analyses depending on the most recent year where data is available for certain primary and secondary sources. Nevertheless, the empirical scope of the project is, broadly, the first and second half of the twenty-first century.

One obvious drawback of using observational data is the fact that question items I use to measure attitudinal and policy preference outcomes are not explicitly designed to capture and evaluate the theoretical interests of this project. In relevant parts of each substantive manuscript, I discuss these limitations in more detail and aim to strengthen my empirical leverage through a variety of validity checks and triangulation. It is worth noting, however, that even though specific theoretically relevant nuances are difficult to capture using the existing survey items, the results are remarkably robust across a series of tests and alternative measurement strategies. Nevertheless, the empirical approach in this project understands immigration and immigrants as a unified group juxtaposed to natives and a broad policy issue rather than fine-grained skill, country of origin, or motivation-based differences within immigrant groups themselves. Therefore, the results of the project should be understood with this distinction in mind.

A second issue is the difficulty in capturing attitudes, preferences, and other related subjective responses of individuals towards immigration distinctly in these surveys. Crucially, in much of the survey data available, many of the immigration-related outcomes are very strongly correlated. For instance, earlier work uses attitudinal questions asking respondents their perceptions towards immigration interchangeably with questions emphasising policy-related issues, such as the preferred level of new immigration (Polavieja 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). Indeed, it is quite challenging to untangle such closely related and correlated outcomes in observational survey data which is not explicitly designed for such purposes. In this respect, an advantage of my approach is the objective nature of the occupational risks which alleviates concerns about endogeneity in the primary relationships I investigate. However, due to this matter related to the survey items, in this project, I do not focus on, for instance, examining the relationship of subjective attitudes or threat perceptions of immigration on other immigration-related responses, such as policy preferences. If I do so, it is only to establish a conservative test for the effects of the objective risk measures on my outcomes of interest. As an alternative approach, wherever data is available, I make use of objective measures of capturing ethnic competition based on labour market competition or fiscal exposure to account for these critical factors. As a result, I demonstrate strong validity between various subjective question items aimed at measuring underlying concepts of ethnic threats and the real exposure to heterogeneity.

Third, using longitudinal analyses combined with two-way fixed effects approaches and methodological strategies such as hierarchical modelling well-suited for the structure of my data,

I aim to minimise confounding and maximise my empirical leverage. However, since my data is observational, unlike in experimental studies, it is, nevertheless, difficult to establish causal relationships. Therefore, the empirical analyses of this project should be read with this caveat in mind. Yet, I argue that given the state of the literature, there is indeed a need for studies with an empirical focus with more (not less) of an emphasis on testing economic roots of anti-immigration across different contexts. Based on this, I sustain that the advantages associated with observational evidence greatly outweigh its disadvantages for this specific project. The project necessitates a great deal of representative data across a large number of country cases covering my geographical scope of interest.

Furthermore, data collected from a singular or small number of recent time points would be harder to reconcile with my arguments that aim at precisely targeting the period covering since the 2000s leading to a mismatch between the empirical data I use and my research goals. However, this is no way to suggest that experimental evidence does not have crucial bearings when studying these topics. I believe it is quite the contrary. Without going into the specifics here, in each substantive section of the project and the concluding chapter of this manuscript, I further identify the limitations of my empirical approach and propose multiple ways in which future experimental studies can expand on this project and address the shortcomings of the analysis.

I complement the individual-level survey data with other individual and context level data sources. The national-level comparative data come from publicly available and widely used datasets providing measures for institutional, political, and economic variables at the country level, such as the OECD and World Bank datasets. Besides these sources, I also gather data from specialised projects such as the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2017), Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2017), Chapel Hill Expert Survey data on party positions (Marks et al. 2015), and the Immigration Policies in Comparison: IMPIC data (Helbling et al. 2017) to measure specific contextual level factors that are theoretically relevant in this project.

Importantly, I use European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) waves of 16 countries from 2000 to 2017 to measure my specific theoretical and empirical approach in capturing economic vulnerability and socioeconomic risks in this project (Eurostat 2018). With this data, in the first step, I calculate my primary measures of relative deprivation and vulnerability using the occupational unemployment risks at 1-digit and 2-digit ISCO task categories aligned with existing

work on unemployment risks (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019). In the second step, in line with the theoretical and empirical arguments of the project, I divide the absolute occupational unemployment rate indicator by the average national unemployment rate at each country each year ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{nat}$). Using this national benchmark, I relativise the measure of absolute risk and use this transformed indicator as my measure of economic motivations and vulnerability in this project. The data I collect from ELFS extends earlier inquiry and empirical efforts on occupational risks, socio-economic inequality, and economic vulnerability. I also further demonstrate the measurement validity of capturing socioeconomic risks at the occupational level and how this is a robust predictor of economic anxieties and subjective relative deprivation.

Leveraging regionally specific rich data available from SOEP, I alternate the reference point and benchmark I use in my measurement strategy. I check whether changing the benchmark for relativisation from the *average national* unemployment rates to *sub-national regional* reference points such unemployment rates in each state (*Länder*) in Germany indicate vulnerabilities differently ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{state}$). I find that there seems to be strong validity across various measures and operationalisation strategies for the operationalisation I use. The research design and method sections of each substantive part of the project further detail my data collection and the measurement validity checks finding strong support for using this objective indicator in this project.

Finally, an issue that I would like to address here relates to the question of whether individuals are even aware of these occupational and national unemployment risks. While measures requiring this type of information are already widely used in the political economy literature (Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016, Burgoon et al. 2019, Kayser and Leininger 2016, Kayser and Peress 2012), this, nevertheless, seems to be a high information assumption and a complicated way of thinking of one's vulnerabilities. I concede that in the empirical analyses of this project, I do not precisely check the knowledge and cognitive capacities of individuals concerning their objective relative risk exposure. Establishing these cognitive links goes well beyond the focus of this project. Indeed, future research can address these critical questions about the objective measures we use and their subjective projections. However, using the various sources of survey data I have, I devote a great deal of attention to checking whether this objective measure of relative risk position indeed predicts individual responses in the expected directions. In this respect, while I focus mostly on establishing convergent validity, I also demonstrate strong divergent validity

using available question items in the ESS. Overall, I find evidence to suggest that this measure is a robust predictor of negative evaluations about future economic opportunities, feeling insecure about income and job security, and importantly, feeling relatively deprived of resources in one's own country compared to other residents.

4. Plan of the Project

How do I study the distinct aspects of my theoretical framework? I tackle the implications and expectations following the main argument of this project in three stand-alone manuscripts. Each article-length manuscript has its own introduction, conclusion, separate literature review, original theoretical framework, research design, and findings sections related to the specific research questions and goals addressed. The division of labour follows the three observable outcomes pertaining to the politics of immigration, as I discussed above. The most critical bridging characteristic that ties these three manuscripts is that I test how immigration attitudes, immigration policy preferences, and voting for anti-immigrant radical-right parties relate to being exposed to relatively higher unemployment risk in European societies. While each paper focuses on different outcomes and employs distinct analyses, the core argument running through is the relevance of risk-based cleavages as predictive of politics of immigration - even when many other critical alternative factors are considered.

Moreover, each manuscript devotes considerable attention to describing and validating the relative occupational unemployment risks as a suitable measure for my theoretical interest in this project to capture grievances. I also check whether such subjective measures of deprivation predict adverse reactions and opposition to immigration in the theoretically expected directions. In this way, I triangulate my results using different datasets and questions items. Therefore, each paper consolidates the first part of the theoretical framework with the second part by building a coherent narrative with separate contributions, levels of analyses, and outcomes of interest. Below, I provide brief descriptions of the three papers focusing on the research goals, empirical approach, and main findings.

The first paper of the project is possibly the most ambitious in its aims. Entitled *'Group Conflict Revisited: Unemployment Risk Exposure, In-Group Threats, and Reactions to Immigration'* it has three main research goals. First, I test whether there is a link between increasing relative unemployment risk exposure and worsening group relations between natives and immigrants. Second, the paper distinguishes the unequal risk channel of economic threat from other ethnically rooted labour market or fiscal competition effects. Third, I aim to establish that being relatively worse-off in terms of future economic chances indeed predicts worsening subjective economic perceptions about income and job-related difficulties as well as the impression of being relatively deprived compared to others. In line with the ethnic competition hypotheses, higher risk of being substituted by immigrants and a higher risk of being fiscally burdened by foreigners, natives become increasingly sceptical towards out-groups. Importantly, I provide evidence suggesting that exposure to increasing unemployment risks relative to the average national and regional performance raises adverse reactions towards immigration. This effect is independent of the geographic or occupational presence of out-groups in line with the argument of this project.

For the analyses, I use high-quality longitudinal household panel data from Germany from 1999 to 2016 (SOEP) and cross-sectional survey data from the German Social Survey (ALLBUS 1992-2016). Here, I chose to focus on a single case and use a longitudinal design focusing on within-country cleavages to isolate ethnically rooted threats from other risk-based divisions and, notably, country-level factors. The case choice of Germany is due to both pragmatic data availability reasons and more important substantive concerns for being a particularly relevant case for this study on demographic, political, economic, and institutional fronts.

The second paper, entitled *'Economic Motivations, Labour Market Institutions, and Immigration Policy Preferences'*, focuses on investigating immigration policy preferences and extends the inquiry cross-sectionally to 16 European countries. In addition to assessing the relationship between relative unemployment risks and policy preferences, the paper sheds light on whether labour market institutions alter this link and, if so, in what directions. It addresses the competing hypotheses problem in the literature with regards to the *tolerance building* versus *tolerance obstructing* role of institutions on the micro-foundations of immigration policy. More concretely, it provides a micro-macro theoretical framework between labour market institutions and the politics of immigration.

Empirically, I study how risk-based preferences vary across countries by applying multi-level estimations using the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2012. Keeping with the conceptual framework of the project, I theorise immigration policy and related citizen preferences for restrictiveness as signalling *ex-ante* state intervention demands for future status security. I find that there is a significant relationship between economic threats and immigration policy preferences predicted by objective relative unemployment risk exposure. In line with an exclusiveness logic of containing and protecting privileges of native workers, the effect of unemployment risk is attenuated in more regulated labour market contexts. In the same vein, more inclusive and expansive compensation regimes heighten the positive relationship between economic risks and more restrictive preferences.

Finally, the third manuscript investigates the behavioural consequences of such rising group tensions, exclusionary attitudes, and restrictive policy demands in terms of vote choice for radical-right parties. Building on the theoretical and empirical propositions of the earlier two papers, here, I turn to test whether being worse-off in terms of unemployment risk predicts vote choice. Entitled '*What Drives the Economically Vulnerable to Vote for the Radical-right? Socioeconomic Risk Exposure and the Role of Exclusionary Security Provision*', the third paper focuses on micro-level dynamics of electoral behaviour. The article compares cross-sectional differences in electoral behaviour across different contexts at different periods. More specifically, I investigate whether relatively higher socioeconomic risks predict higher chances for radical-right party votes as opposed to other political options.

Based on my analysis of 14 advanced European democracies and 34 different radical-right parties from 2002 to 2018, relatively higher risk exposure robustly correlates with voting for radical right-wing parties conditioned by the sociocultural and attitudinal characteristics of voters. The results reveal that being exposed to the risk of losing socioeconomic status is relevant precisely for citizens who are not typical radical-right voters. The analysis also provides evidence suggesting the higher sympathy of the relatively higher risk exposed voters towards the RRWPs have a lot to do with their demands for exclusive access to jobs and welfare resources in European host societies.

5. Main Contributions of the Project

The project has three broad contributions to current debates in European politics and the literature on comparative political economy, electoral politics, and migration studies. *First*, the theoretical approach of the thesis adds to the study of adversity and opposition towards immigration by bringing together group conflict and relative deprivation theoretical frameworks in an original way. An unequally (*and unfairly*) distributed economic uncertainty within natives, fuels economic grievances and backlash towards immigration amongst European citizens. In the context of welfare reforms and changing labour markets, this means that what is often acknowledged as rising xenophobia and cultural conflict, may instead have actual economic motivations underpinning these outcomes. Advocating restrictive immigration policies and exclusionary welfare politics insulating immigrants from public resources have been politically gainful for the electoral success of the radical-right parties. Yet, the findings of the project suggest that, ultimately, such policies can do little to address the economic grievances amongst citizens. In this respect, cessation of immigration or removing immigrant access from social benefits will possibly have little actual effect on improving such ethnic tension in European societies. From a perspective of improving relations, then, providing more insurance against the new job market transformations and new policies targeting a more fair distribution of the benefits of economic globalisation have the potential of correcting such risk-based ethnic tension in the future.

Second, the project is relevant for the ongoing study of the political consequences of labour market vulnerabilities in the political economy literature. I propose two significant refinements to how we should theorise and measure economic grievances and subsequent policy demands. On the one hand, the project takes a step back and evaluates the meaning of immigration policy as an economically motivated *ex-ante* demand for citizens in advanced democracies. I incorporate what we already know about how labour market cleavages and insecurity shape welfare attitudes (Rehm 2016, Moene and Wallerstein 2001) to the study of immigration policy demands. On the other hand, the project sheds new light into the extent to which welfare policies relate to immigration policymaking. It reveals that welfare politics can indeed shape the micro-foundational capabilities of immigration policymaking across a widely heterogeneous electoral base distinguished by socioeconomic risk. While I find that the more risk-exposed individuals indeed demand more insurance from the state in the form of less immigration, the effect of context in which these risks

are lived matters demonstrably. Under conditions of less regulated markets and more inclusive insurance programmes, there seems to be more division of policy preferences amongst natives in terms of risk-based restrictive demands. These findings counter the idea that universal compensation and labour market activation are successful in alleviating insecurity concerns on *all* issue areas – case in point the immigration policy. Instead, more exclusive labour market regimes with more regulated markets and particularistic compensation seem to lead to burgeoning less negative politicisation of the risk-based immigration policy demands.

Third, the project adds to the work in electoral studies and political behaviour. I bring forward nuance to a surprisingly under-theorised aspect of the radical-right voters. Considering the electoral base of the RRWPs as composed of culturally and economically motivated voters, I show that it is not appropriate to assume that all radical-right supporters are attracted to the same policies. In this respect, socioeconomic risks are less critical for the typical voter base of these parties who already hold polarised nativist and xenophobic positions. However, I demonstrate that focusing on only these voters obscures the fact that the increasing electoral potential of radical-right parties may also be linked to the risk inequalities amongst citizens in the last two decades. This result is in line with the evidence finding that merely switching to an anti-immigration narrative has so far not been successful for most mainstream parties in Europe (Spoon and Klüver 2020, Downes and Loveless 2018). Instead, proposing active corrections for the anxieties born from future status risks may be a more fruitful plan to compete with the RRWP success in advanced democracies. Crafting new forms of compensation and protection provision seems to be an essential factor in addressing the grievances of an electorate dealing with socioeconomic status inequalities and uncertainty in today's democracies. Moving forward, particularly for the social-democrats, it seems that striking a policy balance of appealing to the economic anxieties of citizens without relying solely on a radical-right strategy of exclusivity towards immigration is possibly the best chance of countering their decline in European politics.

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Title: 'Group Conflict Theory Revisited: Unemployment Risk Exposure, In-Group Threats, and Reactions to Immigration'

Abstract:

How do increasing unemployment risk inequalities amongst natives shape growing negativity towards immigration? Group conflict theory suggests that tension between immigrant and native groups arise as a reaction to the real or perceived loss of economic privilege by majority group members. Nevertheless, such an economic basis of the sentiments towards immigration is still widely debated. This paper aims to clarify and more precisely assess economic threat mechanisms of inter-group conflict remedying limitations in earlier work. First, I investigate the elusive link between increasing fiscal and job market competition due to immigration and worsening group relations. Second, I argue that distinct from the economic effects of heterogeneity, being in a relatively worse-off position amongst natives is a separate channel worsening inter-group relations. To study these relationships, I use high-quality longitudinal household panel data (SOEP) from Germany from 1999 to 2016 and cross-sectional survey data from the German Social Survey (ALLBUS). Despite the contestation in existing work, I provide evidence suggesting that exposure to a higher risk of being substituted by immigrants and a higher risk of being fiscally burdened by foreigners turn natives increasingly sceptical towards immigration. Importantly, exposure to increasingly higher unemployment risks compared to other native workers in the host society raises adversity towards immigration. This effect is independent of geographic differences and actual exposure to the economic impact of immigrants. Overall, the paper reconciles existing accounts of economically motivated group conflict. It brings forward a comprehensive theoretical framework and empirical evidence to the study of worsening reactions towards immigration in these past decades.

1. Introduction

In recent years, many studies link increasing tension between immigrants and natives to the rising voter support for radical-right parties (Neundorf and Adams 2018, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). Consequently, group conflict theory has seen a renewal of interest as one of the most established frameworks aimed at discerning dynamics of majority-minority group relations (Polavieja 2016, Meuleman et al. 2020, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). The group conflict framework initially developed for the study of racial prejudice in the American context (Blumer 1958, Quillian 1996), has been already extended to the study of relations between immigrants and natives in Europe (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003). The logic underpinning this theory is that aversion towards out-groups is rooted in the increasing competition for material resources

and perceived loss of exclusive privileges from the perspective of the majority group (Blalock 1967, Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Olzak 1995, Jackson 1993). However, there is mixed evidence with respect to the role of economic effects of immigration as predictors of such reactions towards immigrants (Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014, Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013, Manevska and Achterberg 2013).

On the one hand, studies testing the economic basis of group conflict have focused on a particular set of economic threats such as increasing fiscal burden, public resources competition, and replacement risks in the labour markets due to rising immigration (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Ortega and Polavieja 2012, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). Importantly, these determinants are intimately linked to the actual level of ethnic heterogeneity in host societies (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, Billiet, Meuleman, and Dewitte 2014, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Yet, in recent years, there is evidence suggesting that such ethnic group threats are not the only potential channels of economically motivated reactions towards immigration. It seems that occupationally rooted more complex considerations identify the economic interests of native with regards to their resilience and vulnerability to the changes in the labour markets (Polavieja 2016, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). On the other hand, relatively little theoretical attention has been paid to disentangling why defensiveness towards immigration may be on the rise as a result of broader globalisation and occupational change in the past two decades (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Dancygier and Walter 2015). This omission is particularly surprising since it such developments are demonstrably principal determinants of welfare attitudes, political responsiveness, and voting behaviour in this century (Rehm 2016, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2010).

To remedy these shortcomings, I propose theoretical and empirical refinements to the study of group conflict theory (Blumer 1958, Quillian 1996, Billiet, Meuleman, and Dewitte 2014, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). I argue that direct competition with immigrants and unequal economic vulnerability within natives, which I term here *'in-group threats'*, are distinct motivations. Different from earlier work, I examine both channels of economic threat simultaneously and by using precise measurement strategies in assessing such contested effects (Bolet 2020, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Pardos-Prado 2020). I suggest that there is a common and substantively important effect of being relatively more vulnerable than others in the majority-group that worsen the backlash towards immigration. I explain this by taking stock of the individual relative deprivation theory

(Runciman 1966, Smith and Pettigrew 2015) and the idea of risk-based demands for insurance (Rehm 2016, Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012)

For my analysis, I use longitudinal individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) over the 1999-2016 period and construct fine-grained region- and occupation-specific measurements of ethnic competition and in-group threats. I complement this evidence with more precise survey items available in cross-sectional German Social Survey (ALLBUS). Adverse reactions to immigration increase when majority group members experience more disproportionately higher future uncertainty compared to others. More concretely, exposure to relatively higher unemployment risks than an average German worker leads to increasing negativity towards out-groups. I confirm that such inequality-based economic threat effect is net of ethnic competition, regional differences, income, and social class. Unlike previous work finding null or weak evidence (Fetzer 2000, Manevska and Achterberg 2013, Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), I provide consistent evidence for the labour market competition (LMC) and fiscal exposure (FE) hypotheses. Natives become increasingly sceptical towards out-groups, under conditions of higher risk of being substituted by immigrants and being fiscally exposed to the economic impact of immigration.

In this article, I make three main contributions. First, I present a theoretical framework that bridges existing work on group conflict (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Blumer 1958, Blalock 1967) and relative material deprivation framework originally (Pettigrew 1998, Smith and Pettigrew 2015, Smith et al. 2012). I argue and show that to make sense of increasing defensiveness towards immigration in recent decades; it is crucial to consider the prevalent effect of unemployment risk exposure among natives. Complementing previous research on the study of native responses towards immigration from a dynamic perspective (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Goldstein and Peters 2014), I show that changing group conflict necessitates time-variant factors fit for explaining such a dynamic outcome.

Second, this paper adds to the recent work in political economy emphasising that instead of static economic status and cultural threats, uncertainties in the labour markets heighten the conflict between immigrant and natives residents (Pardos-Prado 2020, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). I validate and establish occupationally rooted unemployment risk inequalities as robust predictors of increasing economic anxieties, perceived labour market vulnerability, and importantly, feeling of being unfairly deprived of economic chances relative to others in the society. I triangulate my findings with both longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses and reveal strong validity for the measures I use. With a combination of SOEP and

ALLBUS data, I bring forward some of the first evidence linking the relative unemployment risks to perceived injustices concerning individual relative deprivation and subsequent negativity and exclusionary attitudes towards immigration. This analysis strengthens the risk-based logic of opposition to immigration and adds to the ongoing work on the political consequences of increasing risk cleavages amongst European workers (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019).

Third, the analysis reconciles existing accounts of economically motivated group conflict and brings forward new evidence on the presence of LMC and FE. Notably, while higher unemployment risks are significant sources of discontent towards immigration, direct job competition and fiscal exposure are also positively related to increasing adversity. The paper adopts a thorough investigation such out-group threats adding corrections to ongoing scholarly debates that relegate the role of ethnic competition in political responses to immigration (Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Furthermore, by isolating differently motivated economic threat effects over time, the findings help make sense of why some individuals are more prone to developing adverse reactions towards immigration despite the lack of direct ethnic competition.

2. Theoretical Framework

While the link between feeling culturally threatened by immigrants and subsequent negative sentiments are well-established in previous literature, economic motivations underpinning defensiveness towards immigration have been challenged both in terms of relative importance and prevalence across host societies (Manevska and Achterberg 2013, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). From an economic threat perspective, earlier work has chiefly focused the real or perceived effects of immigration (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, Billiet, Meuleman, and Dewitte 2014, Dancygier and Walter 2015). This strand of literature has placed the emphasis primarily on economic resource competition, such as for jobs and social benefits, and characterised immigration itself as the primary source of inter-group conflict. However, evidence for such ethnic competition effect is mixed (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010, Tingley 2013). Instead, recent studies reveal that there are other economically motivated channels shaping group relations distinct from the economic effects of immigration (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Pardos-Prado 2020, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016).

Notwithstanding the importance of the social identity theory and symbolic threats emphasising the role of cultural differences in explaining anti-immigrant attitude differences between citizens (Pettigrew 1998, Manevska and Achterberg 2013, Taijfel 1982, Fetzer 2000), in this paper, I concentrate on economic grievances that *change* group relations. As convincingly argued by Lancee and Pardos-Prado, deep-seated prejudice and aversion to immigrants are distinct from time-variant forms of political reactions (2013). Subsequently, this necessitates a shift in focus from stable and structural explanations such as social class and levels of educational attainment when discerning *changing* attitudes towards immigration. In this way, the study is most similar to and adds to the earlier work on the dynamic formulation of group conflict theory (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, Polavieja 2016).

A clear picture emerging from this strand of work is that citizens who are facing more uncertainty are more prone to reacting negatively to immigration (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Polavieja 2016). Taking stock of existing evidence, I identify two economic threat mechanisms linked to increasing anti-immigration: direct ethnic competition with immigrants, i.e. out-group threats, and unequal socioeconomic risks faced by natives, i.e. in-group threats. The former implies increasing competition over scarce economic resources such as jobs, social help, public housing or other services due to immigrants. The latter, instead, emphasises material threats faced by natives, due to vulnerabilities caused by developments other than immigration such as economic globalisation and the transformation of production across most post-industrial societies. I argue that differently from out-group threats, unequally vulnerable position of individuals *within* the majority group constitutes a distinct source of economic motivation.

2.1 Ethnic competition and 'out-group' threats

Two hypotheses have been the centre of attention in earlier work on the study of economic threats due to heterogeneity: labour market competition (LMC) and fiscal exposure (FE) (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). LMC rests on the idea that risks associated with replaceability by immigrants, such as job loss, the difficulty of re-employment, and wage-dampening, incite individual negativity towards immigrants (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Olzak 1995, Card 2001). Therefore, it implies that higher exposure to such LMC risks should increase defensiveness towards immigration. Yet, despite the wealth of studies aimed at testing the LMC, the evidence remains quite mixed and inconclusive (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014,

Polavieja 2016, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). Based on this critique vocalised in earlier work, I approach the conceptualisation of the LMC with two refinements.

In recent years, there has been a revival of LMC in the field of comparative political economy (Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Finseraas, Roed, and Schone 2017, Polavieja 2016, Bolet 2020). Importantly, scholars document that education and related skill composition characteristics (such as high versus low) are imprecise measures for testing LMC experienced by citizens due to immigrants (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013, Polavieja 2016). The growing consensus on this front stresses that occupational characteristics are vital in determining the extent of ethnic competition in each society (Polavieja 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Dancygier and Walter 2015, Ortega and Polavieja 2012). This evidence implies that understanding ethnic competition requires a more precise focus on identifying natives who are more exposed to (or shielded from) the economic effects of immigration (Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013). Therefore, in an LMC framework, while the numbers and characteristics of immigrants themselves are a crucial component, determining when and for whom the ethnic competition mechanism operates require also knowing the characteristics of natives themselves (Dancygier and Walter 2015).

Second, much of the evidence contesting LMC comes from research that brought forward national level, single case, and single time point evidence (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). Numerous scholars have criticised this approach for its inability to take into account the sub-national and contextual conditions that can alter the relevance, hence the magnitude of the LMC effect (Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Bolet 2020). Indeed, in addition to task-based substitution effects, the basis of LMC exposure may have a lot to do with the geographic distribution of immigrants (Card 2001). For instance, while specific job categories may be particularly exposed to LMC due to increased immigration, citizens with similar skill compositions yet living in areas with low shares of foreigners may not feel the LMC effects in the same way. Studying LMC requires a more fine-grained approach to identifying ethnic competition focusing both on the grounds of occupational exposure to foreign labour and due to the differential geographical distribution of immigration. Relatedly, my first hypothesis focuses on the LMC. I expect that natives who are exposed to more ethnic LMC will become more defensive towards immigration:

Hypothesis 1 (**Out-group threat-LMC hypothesis**): The higher the risk of substitution by out-groups (due to occupational and geographical exposure), the more citizens become defensive towards immigration.

Turning to the fiscal exposure (FE) hypothesis, the expectation is that natives take up increasingly defensive positions towards immigrants due to the real or perceived adverse effects of immigration on public resources both in terms of increasing competition and rising costs (Tingley 2013). Hence, the fiscal exposure mechanism rests on two logics: crowding-out and public financing (Gerber et al. 2017, Facchini and Mayda 2009, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). The former is characterised by the anticipated public resource use of immigrants introducing more competition and scarcity in the future. The latter, instead, emphasises the perceived increase in costs of public financing due to immigrants who are viewed as net-beneficiaries of publicly funded resources (Reeskens and van der Meer 2019, Razin, Sadka, and Suwankiri 2011).

While precisely untangling these different fiscal exposure mechanisms is beyond the scope of this research, one common thread of either logic is the perceived likelihood that immigrants will become disproportionate users of such public resources (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007). Therefore, I propose that when conceptualising FE, the most likely out-groups triggering such effects, are immigrants who are more likely to be beneficiaries rather than net contributors to these resources. While one can reasonably assume that all immigrants use public resources such as housing, education or healthcare, well-off immigrants are far less likely to be beneficiaries and competitors for social help and unemployment benefits (Razin, Sadka, and Suwankiri 2011).[1] Then, my second hypothesis is concerned with the fiscally motivated economic threat channel and increasing scepticism towards immigration:

Hypothesis 2 (Out-group threat-FE hypothesis): The higher the risk of fiscal exposure to out-groups (due to crowding-out and financial-burden concerns), the more citizens become defensive towards immigration.

2.2 Unemployment risk inequalities and 'in-group' threat

So far, I focused on ethnic competition and argued that when these hypotheses are evaluated using appropriate conceptualisations, they are expected to increase anti-immigration

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[1] From a public financing aspect, well-off and higher income immigrants can in fact be net contributors rather than take away to the system (Facchini and Mayda 2009).

sentiments among natives. Moving forward, I contend that exposure to relatively higher socioeconomic risk and uncertainty than an average majority group member, i.e. in-group threat, has a distinct effect on heightening aversion to immigration. This effect occurs net of ethnic competition and other individual factors. Following earlier work on economic vulnerability and political responses (Rehm 2016, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Kurer et al. 2019), I conceptualise socioeconomic risk as the risk of being unemployed. More specifically, I am interested in how future employment chances are not only getting more risk-prone for native workers in host societies but are becoming more skewed in terms of how they are distributed (Rehm 2016). The roots of 'out-group' *versus* 'in-group' threat logics are distinct in terms of *where* economic risks come from and compared to *which* group discontent is derived. Nevertheless, they are also similar since both logics rest on the idea of anticipated and not current hardship in increasing anti-immigration.[2]

The root causes of the uneven distribution unemployment risks are due to in one part to the internationalisation of production systems leading growth retention in manufacturing and industrial jobs (Walter 2017). In another part, they are linked to fast-paced technological advancements leading to shrinking employment opportunities for specific jobs that are at risk of being automated such as the routine manual and service sector occupations (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2010, Kurer and Palier 2019). In this way, my emphasis is on uncertainties and insecurities due to automation, offshoring, and more broadly, global, or domestic factors that alter economic inequalities in advanced post-industrial democracies rather than immigration itself. While out-group threats are concerned with the impact of immigration on job and welfare resources, the logic of in-group threats relates to positions within the natives. Therefore, even if economic conditions and employment chances may overall improve inequalities within the workforce still leading to worsening group relations.

I suggest that there are two related logics through which being worse-off within the majority group may increase anti-immigration reactions. The first is concerned with a socio-psychological mechanism of economic grievances and reactionary responses rooted in the individual relative deprivation theory (Runciman 1966, Smith and Pettigrew 2015). The other emphasises how citizens seek closure and protection from future decline due to exposure to

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[2] Here, I use the label 'in-group' threats for terminological simplicity and as a clear-cut way of juxtaposing this to economic threats due to 'out-groups'. Yet, this is not to imply that former threat type is coming from natives themselves but rather that vulnerabilities as consequences of broader domestic and international economic changes create risk-based inequalities amongst the in-group members.

considerably more uncertainty than most people in their society (Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012, Walter 2017).

In their recent study, Meuleman et al. establish group relative deprivation as a distinct channel of influence on intergroup relations (2020). They argue and convincingly demonstrate that perceptions of being relatively deprived vis-à-vis *immigrants* have substantively significant effects different from exposure to ethnic competition. Their argument rests on the idea that discontent arising from the perception of being treated worse than immigrants translates into heightening adversity towards these groups (Meuleman et al. 2020, 596). Yet, the perceived injustice and unfair relative deprivation experienced by natives, particularly at the individual level, is not limited to the threats posed by immigrants.

On the one hand, while out-group competition is an undeniable reality, an important (perhaps *more* important) source of unfairness and relative disadvantage exists among natives themselves in terms of economic security (Rehm 2016, Walter 2017, Moene and Wallerstein 2001). On the other hand, identification with the majority group is hardly the only or the most decisive source of attachment for most citizens in advanced democracies (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014). Instead, occupationally rooted task categories and social class differences have emerged as robust identifiers of cleavages amongst natives. They are evidenced to be robust correlates of differences in political outcomes such as welfare attitudes, voting behaviour, and political protest (Kurer et al. 2019, Burgoon et al. 2019, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Rehm 2016).

Both within and across countries, individuals, have vastly different employment chances depending on where they live, their skill composition, and their social status. Relatedly, economic grievances of workers are rooted in their position within the society (more so than the ethnic competition) as evidenced widely by the individual relative deprivation scholars (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, Smith et al. 2012, Runciman 1966). Therefore, if we think of group conflict as defensive responses to feeling deprived of privileges (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, 32), then, such effects of deprivation and economic threats need not be only rooted in potential losses due to immigrants. Limiting the scope of the link between relative deprivation and group conflict to ethnic competition, then, fails to take into account broader perceived injustices experienced by citizens and subsequent political responsiveness (Smith and Pettigrew 2015, Kurer et al. 2019, Kuziemko et al. 2014). Therefore, being unfairly deprived of future security and being disproportionately exposed to future uncertainty increases economic discontent amongst natives, raises their demands for more security and protection, and this subsequently decreases their acceptance of out-groups at home.

Foreigners are not only perceived as disproportionate users of the economic resources of the host society; they are also viewed as least deserving of benefiting from the economic chances (Reeskens and van der Meer 2019). Therefore, it does not take much for political entrepreneurs to channel risk-based grievances of citizens due to economic developments over the last decades instead to the issue of immigration. Arguably, the principle and most easily visible channel through which these economic grievances are directed to the seemingly unrelated matter of immigration are in significant part related to the presence and prevalence of such political entrepreneurs in host societies. Most emblematically, nativist populist parties construct immigration and immigrants as scapegoats for the vulnerabilities and 'most if not all current woes' of the native population (Wodak 2015, 2). In this way, even if economic grievances and subsequent need for insurance are not immediately due to ethnic competition, they can be directed towards out-groups and thus worsen inter-group relations. Accordingly, my third hypothesis is concerned with the effect of exposure to relatively higher unemployment risks and increasing reactions to immigration:

> **Hypothesis 3 (In-group threat hypothesis)** The more exposed citizens are to in-group threats, the more they will become more defensive towards immigration.

3. Data and Method

3.1 Case Selection: Germany

This paper is interested in investigating how economic threats posed by immigrants, on the one hand, and unequal distribution of unemployment risks within natives, on the other, increase negative responses to immigration. To examine these, I use a longitudinal single-case design that alleviates potential concerns present in multi-case designs due to systemic cross-national differences in group relations. Existing evidence is mixed on the matter of how contextual factors - such as media portrayals, economic and political shocks, and demographic change-alter reactions to immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009, Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980, Goldstein and Peters 2014, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Notwithstanding the importance of country-level factors, my goal here is to contribute to the debates on how responses towards immigration change over time from a bottom-up perspective. Therefore, focusing on a single country case helps isolate and identify individual determinants more

precisely since potential confounding at the country level can be assumed to be the same for all citizens.

My case, in this research, is Germany from the beginning of 2000s onwards. This choice is due to both pragmatic data availability reasons and more important substantive concerns for being a particularly relevant case for this study. First, immigrant-native group relations are highly consequential and salient in the German context. This is due in great part to the fact that the country hosts one of the largest stocks of foreign-born residents in Europe and is home to a widely heterogeneous immigrant population (EMN 2016). Moreover, Germany has a diverse and long history of immigration. For instance, certain immigration waves to Germany were predominantly based on shared culture and ancestry, such as in the case of German co-ethnic immigration in the post-1945 period. In comparison, there has also been predominantly economically motivated immigration flows such as in the case of 'guest worker' (*Gastarbeiter)* programmes between 1955-1973. These programmes aimed at attracting temporary workforce with a wide variety of ethnic origins to fill shortages in low and medium-skilled jobs, many of whom have stayed and became a permanent part of the German society (Kolb 2014, Freeman 1995).

In more recent decades, Germany's acceptance of asylum seekers and relatively liberal family migration policies led to a paradoxical scenario of seemingly closed borders with facilitated access points throughout the 80s and 90s (Finotelli and Kolb 2017). More recently, from the 2000s onwards, Germany has reversed its 'no-immigration' policy and replaced it with the goal of attracting higher-skilled immigrants (Kolb 2014). In addition to such third-country immigrant policies, Germany is also one of the leading destination countries within the EU Schengen area of free movement. Therefore, Germany not only holds a large volume of immigrants but also hosts an immigrant population with a wide variation in skills and countries of origin making it an interesting case for this research.

Second, Germany is a suitable context for this study because of the ongoing presence of political entrepreneurs and movements which weaponise immigrant-native group relations. Over the period I study, there have consistently been nativist far-right political actors linking economic grievances and deprivation of natives to the presence and prevalence of foreign-born residents in Germany (Betz 1990, Mudde 2000). While unsuccessful in the federal level of German politics, there are several examples of this type of political actors such as the *National Demokratische Partie Deutschland* (NPD), *Deutsche Volksunion* (DVU),[3] and *Die*

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[3] DVU and NPD merged in 2011.

Republikaner. NPD, for instance, has even been able to get seats in state parliaments in the period between 2004-2011 in Saxony and Mecklenburg. Likewise, *Die Republikaner* was successful in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, particularly in the 90s (Betz 1990). More recently, since 2014, German politics saw the nationwide emergence of an openly anti-immigrant and nativist party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) (Schmitt-Beck 2017). Therefore, if we think of the presence of such political entrepreneurs as a necessary condition for the framework here, then, the German case emerges as a fitting context where numerous and visible political actors have been active in linking economic grievances to ethnic heterogeneity.

Third, Germany is a striking case to study for how in-group threats impact group conflict over time. Like many other post-industrial European economies, there have been significant changes in the post-2000 period altering labour market chances of certain occupational groups differently. From the perspective of occupations, the distribution of the supply and the demand for the routine manual jobs and employment in service sectors have shifted significantly. In particular, deindustrialisation and technological advancements have increasingly widened the gaps among workers exacerbating inequalities for economic security between citizens (Kurer and Palier 2019). Moreover, improvement in educational attainment, increasing valorisation of higher skills, and routinisation have been catalysers for why certain workers have become increasingly worried about their future standing in the job market (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes 2010, Kurer and Palier 2019). Overall, while certain higher-skilled and technically niche occupations have benefited much more from these developments, many others have experienced a dampening in their future economic chances despite the overall improved economic performance in Germany in this century.

Furthermore, there have also been decisive institutional changes in the labour markets and social protection systems, most importantly the 2004/5 Hartz reforms, in my observation period (Palier and Thelen 2010). These reforms have created more employment chances albeit in more insecure conditions making unemployment risks differences an increasingly important matter given declining reliance on traditional 'life-long' permanent contracts (Rehm 2016, 127-128, Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007). Furthermore, despite reforms and recalibration over these decades, German welfare state still operates on a principle of equivalence, which means that the risk of losing employment is of paramount concern making it relevant case to study. This is important to note because, in this case, the loss of employment not only implies the loss of income and earning but also has considerable effects on subsequent social help and public resources available to citizens (Streeck and Trampusch 2005).

3.2 Data

Empirically, an essential requirement for investigating the dynamics of group conflict is to have observations over several years from the same respondents. Therefore, for individual-level data, I am using the German Socioeconomic Panel Survey (SOEP) from 1999 to 2016 (SOEP v33). SOEP is a representative survey of the residential population living in private households in Germany. It is also the only longitudinal study that allows me to operationalise relevant theoretical concepts of interest simultaneously with an adequate temporal scope. The study starts in 1999 since the question item for measuring my outcome of interest is asked from that year onwards. The representativeness and the broad coverage of the survey in terms of both native and foreign-born residents are uniquely helpful for this research. It allows me to calculate the measures of interest with regards to both ethnic competition and in-group threats from a large representative data source.

At the individual level, the sample consists of respondents aged between 16 and 65 who are in work and are active participants of the labour force in Germany.[4] Those who are retired or those in school/in training are excluded from the sample.[5] Moreover, since I am interested in dynamics of group conflict from the perspective of in-group members, I restrict my sample to respondents who are born in Germany and have German citizenship following earlier work (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013). To be able to observe within-individual changes over time, respondents who remained in the survey for at least two waves are considered. To investigate potential issues from panel attrition, I check whether mean differences between respondents who stay in the panel for the full scope and those who remain partially diverge substantially on key covariates of interest. Inspecting these differences reveal little concern, particularly given my outcome of interest. Checking the issue further, I estimate a logistic regression predicting

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[4] Individual-year observations where respondents are unemployed are excluded. This is because the framework refers to, in principle, experiencing risks of economic losses rather than realised losses such as in the case of the unemployed. Extant work, however, has already revealed that becoming unemployed is linked to more negativity towards immigrants (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013). My results are consistent with such earlier studies and the findings presented here do not change if individuals who are unemployed are kept in the sample (occupations of unemployed are coded by forward tracing their last reported occupation at $t-n$), see Table A24.

[5] The self-employed are included in the main sample as active labour force participants. However, their experiences of unemployment risks may be distinct given their independent employment status. Therefore, I replicate my analysis excluding the self-employed from the sample and report that the results do not change, see Table A29.

the probability of attrition for the respondents. I confirm that the likelihood of attrition does not correlate with any of the key variables investigated here, see Table A28.

3.3 Measuring 'in-group' economic threat: relative unemployment risks

In SOEP, there is no direct survey item that captures 'in-group threats' from a subjective perspective of individual relative deprivation and worse-off place in the society. Instead, here, I use an objective measure of relative risk exposure based on occupational unemployment rates calculated using the SOEP sample data. One advantage of this objective measure of economic risks is the lesser degree of concern about endogeneity compared to self-reported evaluations. To operationalise in-group threats, I need information on the socioeconomic risks experienced by workers and the benchmark they use to compare themselves to other natives.

When measuring risks, I adopt Rehm's indicator and use occupationally specific unemployment rates (2016). I calculate unemployment risks within each occupation at 2-digit ISCO-88 disaggregation level for jobs per each year t as indicative of risk exposure for each respondent.[6] By now, this occupational measure and its extensions have been widely evidenced as robust indicators of economic vulnerability and socioeconomic risks (Kurer et al. 2019, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Rovny and Rovny 2017). While absolute occupational unemployment rates indicate risk exposure, we still need a comparison point to know where a certain level of risk exposure puts individuals within the pool of other natives. This point is vital since, theoretically, I argued that natives feel pressured by their relatively weaker position compared to other natives.

To measure in-group threats, I first choose to use a *regional* benchmark at the state (*Länd*) level since there is substantial variation of employment performances between regions in Germany, see for instance Figure A4. If respondents in the same job category benchmark to their own sub-national unit of residence, there would be variation in their perceived in-group threat exposure not indicated well by their occupation only. Taking this into account, for each year t, I capture in-group threats by relativising, i.e. dividing, each occupational unemployment rate by the average unemployment rate in each *Länd* in Germany ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{reg}$). This measure indicates respondents' relative risk exposure level benchmarked to the state where they live, i.e. average unemployment rate at the *Länder* level ($\bar{x}$: 0.78, s: 0.73). As expected, absolute

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[6] See Table A3 for the list of ISCO-88 occupation tasks and Figure A2 for the pooled distribution of relative risks in each 2-digit category.

and relative risk exposure measures correlate very strongly ($r=0.7431$) since relativising is a transformation of these absolute rates into a relational scale.

However, if respondents instead compare themselves to the national average, which is a far more publicised information, and use a benchmark based on the broader national dynamics rather than the employment chances at the state level, then, my measure may not be as accurate. Importantly, my measure may be underestimated in worse-off states and overestimate threats in states that are performing well.[7] Therefore, I alternate my operationalisation of in-group threats, with a national benchmark ($\text{risk}_{\text{occ}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$) ($\bar{x}$: 0.60, s:0.46). Regional and national relativised occupational unemployment rates correlate very strongly as well ($r=0.7541$).

I further validate my measure of in-group threat and ensure that my results are not dependent on such measurement choices.[8] Details of these alternatives, descriptive information, and results of robustness tests are available in the supplementary material, see pp. 5-12. Importantly, from a face validity perspective, jobs which are much more exposed to the externalities of the economic change in the last two decades are worse-off and experience more future uncertainty compared to others in Germany such as salespersons and building, manufacturing, and construction workers. Those who seem to be having a much more secure economic future compared others appear to be those who are employed in higher education and skill demanding training intensive jobs such as the higher-level corporate managerial positions, scientists, and engineers.

3.4 Measuring 'out-group' threats: LMC and FE

When conceptualising ethnic competition, there are two potential ways of defining out-groups. One way would be to demarcate individuals based on citizenship. Another one is to focus on immigration background with an emphasis on being foreign-born. Here, I use the latter broader definition of out-groups since my interest is not in immigrants as newcomers *per se* but as out-group members distinct from native Germans. Moreover, a drawback of using the former civic

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[7] Figures A1, A2, and A3 visualise implications of using either strategy. Occupational risk divisions and the distribution of such economic risks look similar regardless of the benchmark used.

[8] Most importantly, I calculate regionally specific occupational unemployment rates and/or use 1-digit level broader occupational disaggregation.

approach is that it excludes the visibility of ethnic minorities who have over time became German citizens but who may still trigger ethnically motivated competition.[9]

I measure LMC using an occupationally (ISCO-88 2-digits) and state-specific (by each *Länd*) indicator of skills and job tasks which are revealed to be vital in exploring the LMC (Bolet 2020, Dancygier and Walter 2015). In this way, the LMC measure I use indicates the extent to which respondents are exposed to threats of being replaced by immigrants based on their occupations and the state they live in ($\bar{x}$: 11.66, s: 11.47). I measure FE as follows: the share percentage of foreign-born residents who are *below*-median income amongst all foreign-born residents in each state ($\bar{x}$: 63.25, s: 10.91). I use the region-specific median income to specify the share of foreign-born individuals who are below this threshold understood as more likely to be net beneficiaries of public resources.

There are two alternative ways of approaching fiscal exposure. The first one is to use a more visible income threshold for capturing economically weaker foreign-born residents. To do this, I alternate the median-income threshold with having income below the lower quartile of income distribution in each state. Second, another way of looking at FE is to not just focus on the share of lower-income immigrants amongst the foreign-born but instead amongst all lower-income residents in each state. This approach focuses more so on what proportion of the potential beneficiaries consist of out-groups in each state. I report that alternating the measurement of FE does not change the results reported here, see Table A12.[10]

In Germany, immigrant residents are distributed quite heterogeneously across regions since the beginning of the observation period, as presented in Figure 1. Most visibly is the divide between East and West demonstrating far less heterogeneity in the Eastern German states despite increases in Berlin and Brandenburg areas over time. An important observation is that while states such Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia have consistently been more heterogeneous, the extent to which they are also exposed to more fiscal effects of immigration does not follow straightforwardly, see also Figure A10. Instead, potential risks of fiscal exposure were still much higher in the East German states with such stark differences decreasing over time. Likewise, living in a highly heterogeneous state does not necessarily imply that everyone living in the area will be exposed to LMC since the dominant source of

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[9] Replicating my results using a narrower definition of out-groups as only newcomer immigrants (*Ausländer*) reveal no substantive differences, see Table A10.

[10] Further details of these alternative approaches are available in p.16 in the appendix.

variation of LMC rests between occupations.[11] Nevertheless, a relevant picture emerging from Figure 1 is that testing ethnic competition mechanisms by merely looking at the share of immigrant residents hides crucial differences hindering the ability to test such hypotheses.[12]

Figure 1: Distribution of foreign-born resident and fiscal exposure in Germany in 2000 and 2015, by *Länder*

Foreign-born in Germany, 2000
as share % population

Foreign-born in Germany, 2015
as share % population

Below median income immigrant hh, 2000
as share % foreign-born residents

Below median income immigrant hh, 2015
as share % foreign-born residents

3.5 Measuring group conflict

I measure group conflict using a survey item asking respondents' concerns over immigration [*Sorgen Zuwanderung*] formulated as 'Are you concerned (or worried) about immigration to Germany?' with three response options: 'not at all concerned', 'somewhat concerned', 'very

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[11] See Figure A6 and A7 for a comparison of the variation of LMC between occupations and states and Figure A8 demonstrating LMC across occupations in four illustrative states.

[12] While this holds true from both empirical and theoretical perspectives, natives can change their state of residence and indeed occupations are the principle source of LMC regardless of the state. Therefore, I also calculate LMC and FE at the national level revealing that the results are not sensitive to such operationalisation choices, see Table A11.

concerned'. The question has already been used several times to measure anti-immigration and group conflict by previous research (Fitzgerald 2012, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). However, some may argue that the statements going from 'not at all concerned' to being 'very concerned' reflects more so the ascribed importance to the immigration issue, i.e. salience, more so than negative attitudes (Neundorf and Adams 2018). However, the question item refers to 'concerns' about immigration, and thus responses to such question in higher values are likely to be value-laden in the negative direction (McGhee and Neiman 2009).[13]

Notwithstanding the problem with the wording of this question, following earlier work, I sustain that those who choose 'very concerned' reflect negativity towards immigration or at least perceive the issue of immigration as a *problem* (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, 116). Therefore, I binarise the question item, where '1' indicates being 'very concerned with immigration', to measure my dependent variable ($\bar{x}$:0.28, s:0.45). I further establish that this item captures adversity towards ethnic heterogeneity using another SOEP question asking which political party respondents prefer (*Parteipraeferenz*). Respondents who are 'very concerned with immigration' report that they support the nationalist anti-immigrant radical-right parties (Die Republikaner, NPD, DVU or AfD) disproportionately higher than those who are not, see Table A13. Figure 2 plots the mean value of this binarised measure across 16 German states over time, reference line indicates overall mean value each year.

When looking at Figure 2, there is further support suggesting that the variable indicates negative reactions which are much higher in Eastern Germany – a well-documented observation in earlier work (Ireland 1997; Weisskircher 2020). This observation means that the item is not just a measure of salience but instead also captures negativity towards out-groups accurately. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the item has both a stable component between regions that are linked to slow-moving and deeply rooted prejudice towards immigrants and a changing part indicative of dynamic group conflict that I am interested in studying here. Therefore, while I concede that the question item is not ideal for informing outcomes such as policy preferences or specific attitudes targeted at different kinds of immigration, I sustain that it adequately captures both static and dynamic reactions towards immigration.

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[13] For further discussion of this see pp.17-18 in the appendix.

Figure 2: Dynamics of group conflict in Germany, 1999-2016

3.6 Empirical strategy

The paper aims at investigating increasing negativity towards immigration; hence, I choose a two-way binary logistic fixed effects strategy to estimate within individual variation over time (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Individual and year fixed effects remove time-constant confounders and bias due to potential omitted variables (Bell and Jones 2015) and enable studying within-individual changes over time. Moreover, Hausman tests demonstrate the better suitability of fixed effects estimations for consistency of coefficients, see Table A18.[14] Since two-way fixed effects eliminate all time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, the reported coefficients represent the effect of a unit increase of each factor on within-individual changes on the likelihood of being 'very concerned' about immigration. A drawback of fixed effects

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[14] While I primarily use a binarised construction for my outcome variable, I alternate my model estimation strategy using ordered logit estimations preserving the original structure of the question item, see Table A14, and by treating the three-fold answer scale as linear, see Table A15.

models is the inability to estimate time-constant factors given that the variance in the equation is solely within-individuals. This issue is less of a concern here since my theoretically relevant variables are time-variant. Yet, using only within-individual variation increases the risk of Type II error. Therefore, I replicate my findings using random effects estimations revealing substantively the same results for the key variables of interest, see Table A17.

For model specifications, I add several theoretically relevant time-variant covariates.[15] Given the highly debated and evidenced role of education (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013), I include years of *education* respondents had in all model estimations. The fully specified fixed-effects models include variables for *age, income,* and *employment relations*, i.e. whether the respondent is self-employed or has a temporary or permanent work contract. I also control for *job tenure*, i.e. the total number of years respondent has had in her specific job, as longer job tenures can instil economic security distinct from occupational or skill-based factors (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019).

4. Empirical Findings and Discussion

4.1 In-group threats, ethnic competition, and dynamic group conflict

Table 1 presents four fully specified logistic two-way fixed-effects models. I stepwise add my main explanatory variables, i.e. in-group threat, LMC, and FE, to the models to evaluate the three hypotheses formulated above. The results reported in Table 1 are average marginal effects interpreted as the percentage point change in the probability of being '*very concerned about immigration*' by a unit increase on variables shown.[16] Across the board, I find that a unit increase in relative unemployment risk exposure, i.e. in-group threats, increase anti-immigration. In Model 1, a unit increase in risk increases the chances of anti-immigration responses by about 4.1 percentage points. This effect is robust and statistically significant across different model specifications (at $p < 0.001$ level and by at least 2.2 percentage points in magnitude). Using an alternative benchmark, i.e. to the national average, instead of the

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[15] Summary statistics are available in the appendix Table A1 and further details on the variables from SOEP are available in Table A2.
[16] See Table A16 for the log-odds coefficients.

regional unemployment rate reveal substantively the same results, see Table A6. The evidence in Table 1 is in line with the growing literature emphasising individual economic vulnerability conditions as causes of changing adversity towards immigration (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Polavieja 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). It adds to these studies by showing relatively worse-off natives are indeed those who are more prone to becoming more defensive about immigration over time net of ethnic competition.

Table 1: Economic threats and reactions to immigration, logistic fixed effects models

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
In-group threat ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{reg}$)	0.041***	0.031***	0.030***	0.022***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Out-group threat: LMC		0.003***		0.003***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Out-group threat: FE			0.002***	0.002***
			(0.000)	(0.000)
Education	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.003***	0.002***	0.002***	0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Income	0.004**	0.004**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Job Tenure	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Employment status (ref: Permanent)				
Temporary contract	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.006
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Self-employed	-0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Number of observations	91,643	91,643	91,643	91,643
Number of individuals	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,407
Log likelihood	-36291	-36233	-36197	-36136
BIC	72662.62	72556.55	72485.94	72375.51

Note: Binary logistic two-way fixed effects estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Next, in line with the theoretical expectations, both LMC and FE increase chances of being 'very concerned' about immigration. In Model 4, where both ethnic competition factors are considered, a 1 per cent increase in occupational immigrant rates in respondent's state leads to an increase of 0.3 percentage points of negative reactions to immigration. This finding is different from earlier work that has found null effects for LMC hypothesis (Manevska and

Achterberg 2013, Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). I add that testing LMC requires a precise focus on exposure in terms of direct replaceability effects rather than broader skill competition (Bolet 2020, Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017, Finseraas, Roed, and Schone 2017, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Ortega and Polavieja 2012). Likewise, a 1 per cent increase in the share of lower-income immigrants in the state of the residence increases anti-immigration reaction by 0.2 percentage points. While contextual effects of the number of immigrants in host countries are undetermined in earlier work (Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017), exposure to the potential adverse fiscal impact of immigration increases negativity.

Altogether, these findings suggest that economic threats are non-negligible predictors of dynamic group conflict. Importantly, the effects of in-group and out-group threats are robust to more conservative empirical tests that further take away between-state variation and between-occupation variation. I also rule out the potential threat that the results are driven by stark between-state differences of attitudes towards out-groups.[17] Likewise, the results are robust to removing between-occupational group variation and solely isolating within-individual changes in each occupational group, see Table A19.[18]

When looking at the effect of education in Table 1, I corroborate earlier studies warning against overemphasising education as a predictor of the dynamics of group conflict (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016).[19] Since working-age individuals do no vary over time in terms of their educational attainment, education seems to not play any role here in discerning the dynamic component of group conflict. Increasing age and income also raise the probability of being 'very concerned' with immigration. Importantly, one potential criticism of my model specification could be the argument that individuals may have quite different perceptions of their economic well-being when considering their objective income. In this respect, if an economic vulnerability argument (at large) holds, increasing dissatisfaction with household income should, nevertheless, increase anti-immigration. Not shown here, I add subjective household income satisfaction and find that, as expected, increasing dissatisfaction

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[17] I replicate the models in Table 1 using both fixed-effects and random-effects estimations and add region fixed effects revealing that the effects of both in-group and out-group threats are robust, see Table A19. I also split the sample and estimate my models only for West Germany and only for East Germany. Overall, the results support the argument that in-group and out-groups are distinct from regional differences of group relations, see Table A23.

[18] Beyond occupations, controlling for the industry that the respondents work in as another indicator of employment chance do not change the results presented here, see Table A30.

[19] The effects of both types of economic threats remain robust in different sub-samples of above or below median educational attainment, see Table A23.

with household income leads to an increased likelihood of defensiveness towards immigration. The results do not change when this covariate is included in the models, see Table A30. [20]

Given that the measurement scales vary across my main theoretical variables of interest, it is difficult to make comparisons about the influence of in-group and out-group threats in terms of their role in predicting attitudes. To do so, I make use of an alternative strategy and estimate linear predictions of anti-immigration responses at different values of in-group and out-group threats. The predictions are made using the same specification in Model 4 with an estimated using a linear fixed-effects model instead of logistic regression, see Table A20. While the results are the same, the linear estimation presents a more intuitive way of presenting the outcome. Figures 3a-3c below plot these linear predictions of anti-immigration reactions. The top two panels (a) and (b) visualise the predictions for LMC and FE, respectively, and panel (c) focuses on the in-group threat.

Figure 3: Predicted anti-immigration reactions and economic threats, 95% CIs

(a) % Labour market competition

(b) % Fiscal exposure

(c) In-group threat (relative risk exposure)

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
[20] To further rule out the possibility that the effects of economic threats are dependent on current income and social status, I estimate my results across sub-samples of four social classes using Oesch's 4-fold categorisation (2006): upper and lower middle class and skilled and unskilled working class groups revealing substantively the same results, see Table A22.

When looking at in-group threats, compared to having half the risk exposure than the regional average, being exposed to double increases anti-immigration by about 0.05 points. While such a difference is small in magnitude, the effects of economic threat on increasing anti-immigration are nevertheless robust and non-negligible.[21] Importantly, this is particularly true if we consider that the response variable is on a binary scale with an overall mean of 0.28 and the fact that estimations are calculated using within-individual variation only. When looking at LMC, there is also about 0.05 points of differences in anti-immigration reactions if we compare the lower (3.7%) and higher (16.28 %) quartile values of LMC exposure. When considering the substantive effect of FE, it is necessary to note that the median value of FE is about 63%. An intuitive comparison for this variable, therefore, is to consider the difference between a state where half (50%) of the foreign-born are below-median income versus one where this share is 75%. This contrast seems to predict a little under 0.05 points differences on the binarised DV as well. Notwithstanding the modest effect sizes, the results provide robust evidence for two widely debated factors of group relations in previous literature.

Moving forward, I argued that unequal risk exposure driven discontent within majority groups alone could increase anti-immigration regardless of ethnic competition. If this holds, then, I should find that higher relative unemployment risks increase anti-immigration at different configurations of LMC and FE. This evidence, then, can help discern why we observe rising reactions towards immigrants, even in areas where natives are not particularly exposed to higher FE or LMC. To evaluate this, I estimate Model 1 at four different conditions by dividing the sample into high *versus* low LMC and FE using the observed median values of each factor, see Table A21.[22] Figure 4 (a) to (d) show the average marginal effects of in-group threats and other relevant variables across these four conditions.

When looking at the models predicting anti-immigrant reactions at different levels of LMC, the effect of in-group threats is robust with stable effect magnitudes in both conditions. Next, when looking at the models at different levels of FE, I also confirm that the effect of in-group threats is not dependent on FE both in terms of predictability and effect size. While the results are similar across both FE conditions and the high LMC case, the effect of in-group threat is higher in the low LMC condition. This result can be thought as further evidence suggesting that LMC and in-group threats are distinct.[23] Just to present an intuitive way of

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[21] See also Figure A13 demonstrating the same point using instead the national performance as the benchmark.

[22] I determine higher and lower LMC and FE conditions using median the values for each variable (8.54% for LMC and 63.19% for FE) in my sample.

[23] This is an important point because both LMC and in-group threats are calculated using occupationally specific measures. So, they are expected to correlate to some extent given that occupations that are more at-risk correlate with those that are often taken up by immigrants, particularly at the lower skill level. However, as illustrated in Figure 4, the role of in-group

thinking, on average, the effect of in-group cleavages seems to be more important on increasing defensiveness towards immigration for workers exposed to low LMC such as a teacher in Bavaria or Hamburg compared to workers who are already exposed to high LMC such as a construction worker in the same states. Across all four models, we see that the effect of education, income, and job tenure are not significant at p<0.05 level - except for education in low FE condition and in the expected direction.

Figure 4: Average marginal effects of in-group threats at different ethnic competition conditions, 95% CIs

4.2 Subjective economic worries and in-group threats

My main analysis provided evidence supporting the theoretical framework of the paper. I established that in-group threats increase adverse reactions towards immigration and that they are distinct from the ethnic competition. However, there are two critical issues that I would like to address further to strengthen the underlying assumptions and the explanatory logics I put forward when linking in-group threats to increasing anti-immigration.

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threats remains robust when models are fitted separately into two subsamples of low and high LMC exposure.

The first relationship I focus on is whether having higher in-group threats is indeed an accurate predictor of feeling more economically anxious. Such a link is important because I proposed that relative deprivation and increasing adverse reactions towards immigration operate through a logic of future uncertainty. While there is no exact survey item that can measure perceived in-group threats in SOEP, there are three questions that target different types of perceived economic vulnerabilities. The first question I use for this purpose is the self-reported worries of respondents related to their job security [*Sorgen Arbeitsplatzsicherheit*] formulated as 'Are you concerned about: Job security?' with three response options: 'not at all concerned', 'somewhat concerned', 'very concerned'. I binarise this item where '1' indicates being 'very concerned with job security'. The second question is about the perceived chances of finding a comparable job in the future [*Chancen geeignete Stelle zu finden*] with three response options: 'easy', 'difficult', 'almost impossible'. I binarise this item where '1' means' difficult' and 'almost impossible' indicative of perceived hardship. While the first two items emphasise job-related economic worries, the third question focuses on income [*Sorgen Um Ihre eigene wirtschaftliche Situation*]. It is formulated as respondents' concern over their own personal finances. I binarise the item with three response options: 'not at all concerned', 'somewhat concerned', 'very concerned' to indicate '1' as being 'very concerned'.

To assess the first issue, then, I estimate binary logistic random-effects models and test whether in-group threats predict these subjective economic worries using the three survey items separately.[24] In these estimations, I use both within and between individual variation models here because, theoretically, a great deal of the variation in terms of economic insecurities are due to differences between individuals.[25] Table A25 reports the results of these models and Figure 5 visualises the average marginal effects only for the variables of interest. Figure 5 reveals that higher in-group threat is related to the greater perceived difficulty in finding a new job by about 4 percentage points, see panel (a). It also correlates with being more likely to be worried about job insecurity with an effect about 1,5 percentage points, see panel (b) and more worries about income by about 1 percentage points, see panel (c). When looking at other relevant covariates, income and education seem to be related to lower perceived economic vulnerability as expected. While having longer tenure in a job predicts fewer worries about employment and income security, it is positively correlated with respondents feeling that it

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[24] All models include education, income, job tenure, age, employment status as well as region and occupation dummies.

[25] Fixed-effects models taking away all between respondent variations lead to the same results related to the issue studied here, see Table A25.

would be difficult for them to find a new position in the future. This result makes sense when considering that being out of the job market for an extended period can worsen the job market prospects of such individuals. Overall, the evidence in Figure 5 supports the underlying argument of the theoretical framework that having higher unemployment risk exposure than other natives is a robust predictor of perceptions of being in an economically vulnerable state.[26]

Figure 5: In-group threats and subjective economic risks, AMEs (95% CIs)

(a) AMEs 'Difficulty Finding Job'   (b) AMEs 'Worry: Job Insecurity'   (c) AMEs 'Worry: Personal Finances'

The second issue I focus on is to check whether the in-group threat becomes unpredictive when such subjective assessments of potential hardship are controlled for in the models. If so, it means that the relative risk measure does not capture much more than these *absolute* economic concerns. However, if not, this would lend some evidence to the argument that relative unemployment risks are not just manifestations of job and income insecurities but also capture relative deprivation and perceived unfair position amongst natives. Addressing this, I replicate the Model 4 in Table 1 with fixed-effects estimations which predict increasing anti-immigration reactions and add each subjective assessments of economic vulnerability to the model, respectively. Table A27 reports the full estimation results and Figure 6 visualises the AMEs of the variables of interest.

Even when perceived absolute economic vulnerability is considered, a unit increase in in-group threats worsens reactions to immigration. Across the board, becoming worried about economic security increases defensiveness towards immigration. It seems that there is still a role for in-group threats even when not only the economic effects of immigration but also the

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[26] I alternate this specification by adding LMC and FE and report that the effect of in-group threats remain robust, see Table A26.

absolute assessments of worries about the future are considered. Unsurprisingly, these perceived hardship variables have a substantively important role in altering the chances of being very concerned with immigration. For instance, going from not being worried about job security or personal finances, to perceiving difficulties in these matters increases defensiveness towards immigration by about 10 percentage points, see panels (b) and (c).[27]

Figure 6: Subjective economic risks and reactions towards immigration, AMEs (95%CIs)

(a) AMEs "Anti-immigration"   (b) AMEs "Anti-immigration"   (c) AMEs "Anti-immigration"

4.3 Cross-sectional evidence from ALLBUS

Finally, despite its numerous empirical advantages in identifying the effects of in- and out-group threats on immigration attitudes over time, the question items in SOEP have limitations in terms of capturing theoretical concepts of interest. The first limitation is the inability to assess whether a logic of feeling unfairly worse-off compared to others in the country is indeed predicted using the relative occupational unemployment rates. The second limitation in the SOEP data is the formulation of the outcome variable as worries/concerns about immigration rather than explicitly referring to exclusionary attitudes or prejudice as more direct manifestations of group conflict. To address these limitations, to strengthen the validity of my measurements, and to triangulate my evidence, I turn to a cross-sectional data source: German

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[27] The effects of all other covariates remain the same as presented in Table 1.

General Social Survey (ALLBUS) (GESIS 2020). ALLBUS is a nationally representative survey study of the adult German population covering all federal states.[28]

I use the cumulative ALLBUS data and restrict my analysis to when the first regular ALLBUS wave has been conducted in the post-reunification period. This way, I can focus on a period from 1992 to 2016[29] (every two years) and apply the same sampling strategy at the individual levels as my longitudinal analysis.[30] The list of all the variables used, summary statistics, and question item details are available in Table A31. First, I aim to establish that relative unemployment risk exposure indeed predicts individual relative deprivation and being unfairly worse-off. For my objective in-group threat measure, I take the occupation and region-specific in-group threat variable I calculated using SOEP and match this to ALLBUS respondents by each year, region, and occupation category at the 2-digit level. I measure *subjective relative deprivation* with the following question item: 'In comparison to how others live here in Germany: Do you think you get your fair share, more than your fair share, a little less, or a lot less?' To facilitate the interpretation of this item, I binarise it to indicate perceptions of getting 'a little less' and 'a lot less' than fair share as '1' and the other two as 0 ($\bar{x}$:0.43, s:0.50). All models include control variables for employment status, sex, age, income, education, whether the respondent lives in East or West Germany, and the size of the municipality respondents live in as an indicator of the urban versus rural divide. Table 2 reports the fully specified multi-level models predicting perceived relative deprivation of respondents in Germany.

Since respondents are nested in years, states, and occupations, I estimate four-level hierarchical linear models taking into account this structure of my data, see Table A32 for the full table of results.[31] To the fully specified Model 1, Model 2 adds subjective placement of individuals on the left-right scale since this may confound evaluations of position and fairness due to partisanship. Model 3 adds state and year fixed effects to remove confounding due to differences across years and the state of residence. Finally, Model 4 includes the unemployed respondents in the sample as they are the most likely to report higher levels of deprivation. In

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[28] Additional information on the data is available in the technical report by GESIS: https://www.gesis.org/en/allbus/contents-search/study-profiles-1980-to-2018/cumulation-1980-2016-1

[29] Within this period, I exclude 1994 and 2012 waves because the subjective relative deprivation item is not asked in these two survey years.

[30] Restricting the temporal scope to 1999-2016 matching the SOEP coverage makes no difference in the results.

[31] I also use an alternative strategy using a binary logistic estimation with state and year fixed effects reporting that the results are not sensitive to modelling choices, see Table A34.

line with my theoretical expectations, Table 2 shows that going from lower relative unemployment risk exposure to higher is correlated with feeling unfairly deprived compared to others in Germany. Notably, both the *p-values* and the sizes of the coefficients of in-group threats are remarkably robust to alternative specifications.

Table 2: In-group threat and subjective relative deprivation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
In-group threat	0.045***	0.047***	0.049***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Year FE	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	Y	Y
Constant	0.447***	0.434***	0.439***	0.466***
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.073)
Observations	11,311	10,966	10,966	12,508
Log likelihood	-7218	-6985	-6964	-7821

Note: Data is from the cumulative ALLBUS 1992-2016. Four-level linear hierarchical model results presented. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Finally, to address the second issue that is related to my outcome variable, I triangulate my results from the longitudinal analysis using an arguably more suitable measure of group conflict available from the ALLBUS waves in 1996, 2006, and 2016. For my dependent variable, I construct an indicator similar to the those in previous studies focusing on group conflict theory (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009, Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, Semyonov et al. 2004, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009). The indicator is composed of the following three variables: demands for inclusion or exclusion related to the job markets (*'When jobs become scarce, foreigners living in Germany should be sent back'*), concerning social rights (*'Foreigners living in Germany should have the same right to social assistance as the Germans'*), and pertaining to political rights (*'Foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited from engaging in any political activity in Germany'*) and report strong internal correlation (*alpha*= 0.65). I scale the index to vary from 0 to 1 for an intuitive interpretation of the coefficients ($\bar{x}$:0.36, *s*:0.26).

For an alternative way of testing my theoretical framework, here, moving beyond objective measures of LMC and FE in the longitudinal analysis, I use responses that directly

pertain to perceived LMC and FE.[32] ALLBUS includes two question items capturing whether respondents agree with the statements that *'foreigners take jobs away from Germans'* and that *'foreigners living in Germany are a burden to the social security'*. The items are scaled to vary from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate more perceieved LMC and FE reported by respondents. Using these variables allow me to have a more conservative test of the relationship between in-group threats and exclusionary attitudes since these subjective LMC and FE items are well-correlated with the outcome. In addition to these, I can also explicitly account for the cultural threat perceptions reported by respondents using the question on whether respondents agree that foreigners *'enrich the culture in Germany'*, going from 0 indicating completely agree to 6 indicating not at all. Table 3 presents fully specified[33] four-level hierarchical linear model estimations where exclusionary attitudes capturing group conflict is the dependent variable, see Table A35.

Table 3: In-group threat, relative deprivation, and exclusionary attitudes

	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
Subjective relative deprivation	0.047***	0.021**		
	(0.008)	(0.007)		
In-group threat (*objective*)			0.030***	0.015*
			(0.007)	(0.006)
Subjective LMC		0.036***		0.036***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Subjective FE		0.035***		0.033***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Cultural threat	0.046***	0.029***	0.048***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.236**	0.111t	0.162*	0.089
	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.073)
Year & State Fixed effects	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	3,734	3,717	3,413	3,396
Log likelihood	426.7	834.1	416.5	771.0

Note: Data is from 1996, 2006, and 2016 waves of ALLBUS. Four-level linear hierarchical model results presented. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

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[32] I replicate the results presented in Table 3 using the objective LMC and FE calculations as well based on the measures used in the longitudinal analysis by matching the data calculated using the SOEP. Substantively, there are no changes in the results, see Table A37.

[33] All models include employment status, sex, age, income, education, east *versus* west Germany, and the size of the municipality of residence variables.

The first two models show the relationship between perceived relative deprivation and exclusionary attitudes. Next, the last two models present the relationship between the objective measurement of in-group threats using relative unemployment risks triangulating the findings from the SOEP analysis. As shown in Table 3, be it measured using the objective relative unemployment risk indicator or using the perceived relative deprivation item, being relatively worse-off amongst other Germans has a robust and significant relationship with more exclusionary attitudes. Subjective reports of ethnic competition and cultural threats all correlate positively with more conflictual views of immigration in Germany as theoretically expected.[34] Overall, the cross-sectional evidence from ALLBUS triangulates the findings from the longitudinal study and increases the leverage of the theoretical framework emphasising the role of inequalities within natives as a robust predictor of negativity towards immigration.

5. Conclusion

This paper provided a novel theoretical approach to the study of group conflict theory and comprehensive analysis of the economic grievances that shape native *versus* immigrant relations in the past two decades. While previous findings have been mixed concerning the evidence of economically motivated immigration attitudes (Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), the analysis here showed that increasing ethnic competition raise adversity towards immigration. Furthermore, breaking from similar studies (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Polavieja 2016), I presented that unemployment risk inequalities and subsequent relative deprivation are not just another ethnically motivated economic threat effect. I showed how having worse-off economic prospects amongst other natives functions as an independent channel increasing defensiveness towards immigrants. In this way, the paper contributes evidence of an economic threat factor, other than immigration, i.e. unemployment risk inequality as a fundamental root cause of worsening group relations.

The analysis has implications for our understanding of how natives' reactions towards immigration are shaped. This study adds to the ongoing work in the migration studies, public opinion, and comparative political economy literatures. First, I revisit the group conflict theory,

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[34] I check the predictability of objective LMC and FE on cross-sectional differences of subjective perceptions of ethnic competition. The findings suggest that economic effects of immigration, i.e. LMC and FE, as measured here accurately predict the subjective evaluations at conventional levels of statistical significance, see Table A39.

from a perspective of risk-based cleavages within the natives. The novel theoretical contribution of this study is that I bring together insights from individual relative deprivation (Runciman 1966, Smith and Pettigrew 2015) and group conflict theory (Blumer 1958, Blalock 1967). I argue that deepening inequalities of future uncertainty as a result of decisive labour market restructuring and occupational change, technological development, and growing economic globalisation in post-industrial European host societies, shape immigration attitudes to a remarkable extent.

Second, the findings confirm that perceiving an unfairly worse-off economic risk position is positively correlated with more exclusionary attitudes towards immigration. Using political economy theoretical frameworks on demands for insurance and risk (Rehm 2016, Rehm, Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012, Walter 2017), I proposed some explanation as to why increasing in-group threats may worsen group relations. I suggested that effects of globalisation and occupational change underpinned increasing tension between natives and immigrants from the perspective of an individual fear of 'coming last' at home compared to others (Kuziemko et al. 2014). I proposed that personal individual psychological processes due to relative deprivation and political messaging may be underpinning how grievances resulting from inequalities of economic prospects end up as backlash against immigration. However, while the analysis provides robust evidence for the observable links between in-group threats and negativity towards immigration using a variety of different measurement and methodological strategies, it does not trace these underlying mechanisms. Future studies can focus on these precise channels and study how messaging from a top-down perspective or individual cognition establish immigration as a source of risk and threats to socioeconomic stability even in the absence of much ethnic competition.

Third, unlike previous work, the paper adopts an encompassing approach to studying group conflict and economic threat paying careful empirical and conceptual attention to each distinct channel. While there have been many sophisticated assessments of the group conflict theory (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Semyonov et al. 2004), studies often focus on a single aspect of the framework, such as concentrating on FE, LMC, or broader economic risks. This joint approach allows me to isolate each potential effect separately and add evidence confirming that LMC and FE on the one hand and in-group threats on the other shape dynamics of group relations. To the best of my knowledge, the analysis here is one of the first in combining occupationally and regionally-specific empirical tests of these widely debated sources of economic threats.

Relatedly, the study adds to the existing work on the implications of LMC in the literature (Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Dancygier and Walter 2015). The analysis provided evidence of a positive relationship between increasing anti-immigration and more competition with immigrants at the job markets from an occupational substation risk and regional perspective. This finding brings new evidence to such a widely debated hypothesis proposing empirical corrections in line with the recent work on the topic (Sides and Citrin 2007, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Bolet 2020). Likewise, the study provides evidence in line with the work characterising FE as a relevant channel in shaping adversity towards immigration (Facchini and Mayda 2009). A limitation of the analysis is that I could not further untangle different FE mechanisms, i.e. crowding-out and public financing. While such a focus would require theorisation and empirical analysis well beyond the scope of this research, future studies can gauge how this broad umbrella of 'fiscal exposure' threats function in different contexts and for citizens with varying socioeconomic characteristics.

Fourth, the paper adds to the evidence that when talking about increasing adversity towards immigration, future uncertainty plays an important role (Pardos-Prado 2020, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). I emphasise that despite persistent cross-sectional differences along the lines of education or socio-cultural characteristics between citizens when determining their prejudice towards foreigners, there is nevertheless a dynamics component of such reactions (Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013, Olzak 1995, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009). Importantly, the evidence in this paper linking increasing risk exposure and rising inter-group tensions lends further explanation to understanding these changes. The analysis echoes earlier scepticism about the role of education in predicting the dynamics of group conflict and subsequent political behaviour in recent decades (Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). In such a way, the argument here can be extended to understanding why parties advocating issue ownership of the immigration policy area have experienced a rise in voter support in this period. Importantly, future studies should investigate whether these relative unemployment risks indeed predict systematic differences in voting patterns and changes in party choices over time for European citizens. Further research is needed to specifically untangle how nativist parties may have a cyclical role in attributing the economic grievances and perceived worries towards immigration, and then, also benefiting from such exclusionary demands in elections.

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Title: 'Economic Motivations, Labour Market Institutions, and Immigration Policy Preferences'

Abstract:

In this paper, I investigate the relationship between occupation-specific unemployment risk exposure and immigration policy preferences at different labour market institutional contexts in Europe. Differently from earlier work, I argue that labour market policy institutions, namely unemployment compensation and employment protection legislation, condition the relationship between risk and immigration policy preferences. The paper brings together insights from comparative political economy and migration studies to understand the micro-foundations of immigration policy demands and to disentangle the relationship between institutions and tolerance for more openness. I theorise preferences for immigration policy as *ex-ante* state intervention demands linked to a logic of securing the future position. Empirically, I estimate hierarchical models using European Social Survey data from 2002 to 2012 in 16 European countries. The evidence reveals a significant economic threat effect indicated by the occupational unemployment risk exposure associated with more restrictive immigration policy demands. Labour market institutions alter risk-based policy preference differences between citizens. In line with an exclusiveness logic of containing and protecting the privileges of native workers, the effect of unemployment risk is attenuated in more regulated labour market contexts. In the same vein, more inclusive and expansive compensation regimes heighten the positive relationship between unemployment risks and more restrictive preferences. Overall, the article proposes an original multi-level theoretical framework and robust evidence which add to existing work on the study of economic interests and the relationship between labour market institutions and immigration policy preferences.

1. Introduction

To what extent economic motivations shape immigration policy preferences? Do labour market institutions attenuate or widen risk-based intolerance differences amongst citizens? In the last two decades, many European countries have struggled with transforming existing immigration policy regimes to match current societal dynamics and labour markets, such as in the cases of Germany, Spain, and Greece (Finotelli and Kolb 2017, Triandafyllidou 2015). While restriction efforts towards the so-called 'unwanted' immigrants have so far been successful from a governance perspective (Castles 2004), a critical challenge has been intense contestation from citizens when

such proposals aim at designing more permissive immigration policies (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009). In this paper, to make sense of this scepticism towards more open immigration policies from an economic perspective, I examine the relationship between unemployment risks and immigration policy demands across different institutional contexts in Europe.

Prior work has already documented that economic vulnerability predicts more defensive responses towards immigration (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Polavieja 2016, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016). These studies have put major corrections to debates relegating the role of economic motivations in favour of cultural grievances in shaping immigration policy preferences (Valentino et al. 2017, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015). Yet, while there is a wealth of evidence on the link between economic vulnerabilities and restrictiveness demands, theoretical and empirical emphasis has so far been at the individual-level considerations along without taking into account critical institutional factors that can shape them - with few notable exceptions (Pardos-Prado 2020, Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016). Furthermore, existing evidence on the direct link between welfare and labour market institutions and tolerance for immigration is mixed whether contexts with generosity or protection promote or obstruct more tolerance (Facchini and Mayda 2009, Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012, Boräng 2015, Razin and Sadka 2000, van Oorschot and Uunk 2007). Hence, we still do not know much about whether these institutions play a role in shaping and how economic insecurity may play out differently between countries in shaping immigration policy preferences.

These are critical omissions because institutions, particularly the labour market institutional context, are evidenced to condition economic worries and their subsequent effects on political demands (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Mau, Mewes, and Schöneck 2012, Paskov and Koster 2014). Therefore, on the one hand, the questions of *whether* and *on what basis* economic vulnerabilities operate differently under different institutional contexts in shaping immigration policy preferences remain unanswered. On the other hand, it is undetermined in terms of *how* and *in what direction* institutions function in heightening or alleviating economically motivated scepticism towards immigration. In this paper, to address these shortcomings, I put forward an original micro-macro theoretical framework discerning the extent to which economically motivated grievances of citizens influence their immigration policy preferences under different labour market institutional contexts. I delineate the effect of institutions and focus on employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment compensation generosity (UCG). Taking stock of

the political economy literature on risk and insurance demands (Rehm 2016, Alt and Iversen 2017), I propose an insurance-based logic to thinking of the link between economic vulnerabilities and immigration policy demands. In this way, I highlight an alternative way of thinking of immigration policy preferences as demands for an *ex-ante* form of state intervention reducing future uncertainty like redistributive or compensatory policy demands (Anderson and Pontusson 2007, Moene and Wallerstein 2001). I expect that workers who experience higher risks of future losses will demand more closure and should resist against open immigration policies.

The novel theoretical and empirical contribution of the paper is that when investigating the conditioning effects of EPL and UCG, I propose two distinct logics for how they may be shaping risk-based differences in immigration policy preferences. I theoretically link more regulatory labour markets (*high* EPL) and less decommodifying and more particularistic compensation systems (*low* UCG) (Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux 1999, van Oorschot and Uunk 2007) with a *logic of exclusivity* in labour market institutions. Conversely, more flexible and activation oriented labour markets (*low* EPL) or more comprehensive and universal unemployment compensation programmes (*high* UCG) imply a *logic of inclusiveness* (Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015, Boeri 2011, Chung and van Oorschot 2011). In either case, I test *whether* and, if so, in *what direction* such institutional contexts condition risk-based restrictiveness demands amongst citizens. Citing evidence from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2012 and employing a random-slope hierarchical linear modelling strategy, I find that higher restrictiveness demands are positively associated with more unemployment risk and that labour market institutions significantly shape this relationship. Notably, the effect of relatively higher unemployment risk exposure is heightened at stronger UCG conditions. In contrast, the link between risk and immigration policy preferences is weaker in contexts with stronger EPL regulation. The findings, thus, suggest that the relationship between economic vulnerability and immigration preferences is less consequential in more exclusive labour market institutional regimes. This evidence is in line with the idea of a risk-attenuating role of an exclusiveness logic in institutions which contain and protect the privileged position of native workers and are less inclusive towards immigrants concerning access to socio-economic rights.

The paper has three main contributions. First, the article provides a risk-based theoretical framework and an occupation-specific and nationally benchmarked empirical indicator to discerning intolerance towards permissive immigration policy in Europe adding to ongoing

debates in mass politics of immigration from a political economy perspective (Pardos-Prado 2020, Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Polavieja 2016). I argue and show that workers who are worse-off in terms of facing future economic uncertainty are more immigration averse. Second, the paper adopts a careful conceptualisation and empirical investigation of labour market institutional contexts in shaping economically motivated immigration policy preferences. Breaking from earlier work (Crepaz and Damron 2009, van Oorschot and Uunk 2007), I focus on conditioning rather than direct effects bringing new evidence to existing debates in the political economy of migration literature. Third, I theorise the risk shaping roles of institutions from a perspective of constructing inclusive or exclusive logics in host societies differently from existing accounts in the study of welfare attitudes (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Paskov and Koster 2014, Chung and van Oorschot 2011) and the political behaviour literature (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019). In this way, the paper brings forward a new approach to examining how labour market institutional contexts relate to policy preferences specific to the immigration issue area.

2. Economic Motivations and Immigration Policy Preferences in the Literature

In recent years, responding to the empirical evidence contesting the role of economic motivations in shaping natives' responses towards immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, Valentino et al. 2017), there has been a much-needed reappraisal of the study of material determinants. Thanks to such efforts, we know by now that economic vulnerability vis-à-vis the volatilities of labour markets predict more restrictive immigration policy positions (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Dancygier and Walter 2015, Polavieja 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Kevins and Lightman 2020). Adaptability to the labour market changes in the past two decades and strength of the position and value faced with the risk-prone post-industrial capitalist markets emerge as decisive consideration when thinking of individual decision making regarding openness (Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Goldstein and Peters 2014). However, even though there have been significant improvements in the study of economic motivations and immigration policy preferences, there are several aspects of existing work that

deserve further research attention. In this paper, I identify three areas where I aim to make contributions to the current literature.

First, interestingly, earlier work in the field has had limited engagement with the political economy research revealing that self-interested economic grievances are rooted in prospects and not just current hardship (Kurer et al. 2019, Mutz 2018). This influential argument has been the centre of attention in many contemporary studies of welfare attitudes and political behaviour (Rehm 2016, Anderson and Pontusson 2007, Mutz 2018, Kurer 2020). However, only in recent years and fewer studies focused on this crucial link of forward-looking motivations as roots for shaping immigration policy preferences (Polavieja 2016, Pardos-Prado 2020, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016). Importantly, workers who do not suffer from lack of prosperity in absolute terms, have stable jobs, or have no direct competition with immigrants are also prone to developing harsher stances on immigration policy (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Put differently, *prospective* loss rather than *actual* hardship seems to have a primary economic role when it comes to immigration policy preferences.

One of the most critical concerns in terms of future hardship is the risk of losing employment. This implication is because of the encompassing consequences of unemployment on social status, income, benefit entitlements, and even health implications both in the long and in the short term of a citizen's life cycle (Brand 2015, Clark, Georgellis, and Sanfey 2001). Given how vital and distressing it can be to have such worries, almost all European states provide a certain degree of insurance against these risks. In this respect, social policies act as *ex-post* interventions signalling a state's ability to protect workers in risk-prone capitalist economies (Esping-Andersen 1990, Moene and Wallerstein 2001). At the heart of this function is the idea of correction and compensation for those who are in fear of losing their job, income, and subsequent future status (Anderson and Pontusson 2007). Therefore, as widely evidenced in earlier work, there are more demands for insurance amongst individuals exposed to relatively higher unemployment risks (Alt and Iversen 2017, Rehm 2016). Based on this logic, then, these grievances can also be though to explain lower tolerance for immigration. It is possible to argue that risk-based cleavages may not only determine state intervention demands concerning domestic economic and social policy but also for immigration policy. In such a way, immigration policy can be viewed as insuring future status from an *ex-ante* perspective, i.e. by preventing additional uncertainty from entering home

labour markets. Yet, so far, there have been relatively little effort in thinking of the link between economic uncertainties and restrictiveness demands from a framework of insurance.

Second, suppose we can think of immigration policy preferences as risk-based ex-ante insurance demands. In that case, such economic vulnerabilities and insecurities may be shaped by the contexts in which they are experienced. Apart from a few notable exceptions (Pardos-Prado 2020, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016), however, we know little about how economic risks operate under different institutional contexts in shaping responses to immigration. Macro-economic conditions and the demographic composition of host societies have been the centre of research attention in this respect (Polavieja 2016, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018, Bearce and Roosevelt 2019). Yet, institutional contexts have received relatively less attention regarding their role in shaping citizen preferences for immigration. This shortcoming is due in significant part to the fact that the study of immigration policy preferences and the empirical investigation of the role of labour market institutions have long remained separate (Paskov and Koster 2014, Chung and Mau 2014, Anderson and Pontusson 2007).

Moreover, research studying the macro-level determinants of immigration policy preferences emphasised institutions only as environmental factors rather than how they may instead have a conditioning role in shaping individual economic motivations (Crepaz and Damron 2009, Razin and Sadka 2000). These are notable omissions because the links between risks and insurance demands from state interventions are well-evidenced to vary depending on institutional design (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Paskov and Koster 2014). This evidence, thus, calls for the necessity of taking such institutional contexts into more careful consideration when studying the economic basis of immigration policy preferences in cross-national comparative designs.

Third, distinct from their direct effects, contextual characteristics can shape individual-level outcomes by moderating the strength or the direction of a lower-level relationship (Heisig and Schaeffer 2019). In this respect, most emblematically, the question of whether inclusive welfare state institutions improve or worsen citizens' tolerance for immigration has long been debated in the field of the political economy of migration. Existing studies from a perspective of norms and social trust found that inclusive and expansive welfare regimes are associated with more tolerance and favourability towards openness (Crepaz and Damron 2009, Sainsbury 2006, Boräng 2015). From a different vein, highlighting the fiscal exposure of welfare states, scholars suggested that precisely due to the generous and protective nature of institutions, individuals develop an

aversion towards immigration based on a perceived burden logic (Gerber et al. 2017, Naumann, Stoetzer, and Pietrantuono 2018, Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). And yet, this framework of institutional contexts and policy preferences have not been explored concerning conditioning rather than direct effects. While the direct impacts of institutions may be undetermined, they may have a substantive role to play by conditioning the link between risk exposure and demanding less immigration. Focusing on this aspect provides a valuable opportunity to theorise and test the implications of institutional contexts in uniting or further dividing risk-based differences towards openness.

3. Immigration Policy Preferences in Context: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

My main argument rests on the idea that higher unemployment risk exposure positively correlates with intolerance towards permissive immigration policies. Therefore, the paper is most similar to earlier work on policy preferences towards immigration with an emphasis on the role of future economic prospects (Dancygier and Walter 2015, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Polavieja 2016, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). However, if there is such a link between restrictive immigration policy demands and exposure to unemployment risk, then it is insufficient to think of individuals abstracted from their economic and institutional environments. On the one hand, the same absolute level of risk exposure can mean different positions within each country at any given time point (Kurer et al. 2019). Therefore, a careful conceptualisation of economic vulnerability is needed to inform us of the disproportionality of unemployment status risks experienced by certain groups (Rehm 2016). On the other hand, *ex-post* state interventions can also influence the link between economic risks and immigration policy preferences by dividing further or uniting such risk-based insurance demands (Korpi and Palme 1998, Gingrich and Ansell 2012). These two logics jointly inform the micro-macro theoretical framework of immigration policy preferences I develop here.

3.1 Restrictive immigration policy as insurance for facing more uncertainty
The first part of the theoretical framework is on familiar ground. Those exposed to higher potential losses compared to others see themselves in more need of insurance (Rehm 2016, Alt and Iversen

2017). Thus, from a material self-interest point of view, knowing whether an individual is more (or less) risk exposed is critical in determining who will have more substantive interests in demanding restrictive immigration policies. However, if we were to think of such risk-based demand differences from a perspective of temporal or cross-national comparison, then, the same level of absolute unemployment risk in one country may not automatically indicate the same in another. This is because unemployment risks are not distributed in the same way across countries and can change over time. Rehm demonstrates that risk pools can be more homogenous where different groups are closer to each other meaning that citizens are not strikingly different concerning their future economic security (2016, 26-27). Conversely, certain unemployment risk distributions can be far more uneven, suggesting that specific groups have much worse prospects given the dynamics of employment growth (or retention) in domestic labour markets. Precisely because of this, when thinking of a risk-based insurance logic in understanding immigration policy preferences, knowing the extent to which an individual is performing vis-à-vis others in her society becomes theoretically relevant.

This idea of being worse-off compared to other groups, i.e. 'horizontal inequalities' within countries has been evidenced as vital in determining political responses and protest behaviour as well as inter-ethnic conflict (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004, Kurer et al. 2019). Likewise, studies already demonstrated that relative unemployment risks as a distinct source of economic vulnerability predicting political responses (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019). To be sure, this does not mean that the absolute unemployment risks may not also predict and inform on risk exposure and insurance demands. However, for this framework, I emphasise that a relative formulation of economic vulnerability theoretically motivates the extent to which such risk exposure may develop into restrictiveness demands to insure for the worse-off position in the society (Vanneman and Pettigrew 1972, Alt and Iversen 2017). Therefore, my first hypothesis focuses on this individual-level effect of being exposed to relatively higher unemployment risks on higher restrictiveness demands leading to the following expectation:

> **Hypothesis 1**: Individuals exposed to relatively higher unemployment risks at home demand more restrictive immigration policies.

3.2 Exclusionary vs inclusionary logic of labour market institutions

If individual immigration policy preferences are rooted in insurance demands, then, these risk-based differences can be altered by institutional contexts that protect and compensate against such vulnerabilities (Korpi and Palme 1998). While there is a multitude of labour market regulations, such as collective wage-bargaining arrangements and social investment policies, in this paper, I focus on two institutions: employment protection legislation (EPL) and unemployment compensation programmes (UCG). These institutions with immediate and short-to-mid-term consequences for the likelihood and terms of unemployment demonstrably influential in conditioning economic risks (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016). Although earlier work studies these institutions operating in the same direction in conditioning risks (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Paskov and Koster 2014, Mau, Mewes, and Schöneck 2012), I hold that such arguments are not directly transferable to the context of immigration policy. Breaking with existing literature, (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016, Crepaz and Damron 2009, Paskov and Koster 2014), I theorise how these different labour market institutions may create distinct inclusiveness or exclusiveness logics. Subsequently, I formulate expectations with regards to how institutional contexts may alleviate risk-based restrictiveness demands.

Stronger EPL enhances divisions by further deepening employment status cleavages between citizens and shapes political demands accordingly (Rueda 2005, 2008). Therefore, it may be straightforward to argue that more rigid institutional contexts further deepen immigration policy demand differences between workers. However, labour market regulations do not just divide citizens. They are also instrumental in demarcating between immigrants and natives through rigid wage structures and rules of entry into jobs (Anderson 2010). Relatively higher *versus* lower risk exposed workers may have more deep-seated cleavages on social policy or redistribution preferences in more regulated labour markets (Boeri and van Ours 2008). However, from a perspective of the privileged position of natives in more regulated markets, we can also think of the role of EPL differently.

EPL determines the extent to which opportunities for lower-wage, short-term, and more precarious jobs are available in host societies (Pardos-Prado 2020, Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux 1999). In this respect, in strongly regulated and more rigid labour markets, such opportunities are fewer. Importantly, even when in highly skilled jobs, immigrants are disproportionately employed in shorter-term and more flexible employment (Kogan 2011). Therefore, immigrants are far more

likely to find irregular employment conditions where the terms are undesirable to most natives when labour markets are more regulated such as in the cases of Italy, Portugal, Spain or Greece (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999, Pardos-Prado 2020). In such contexts, then, natives may perceive restriction of immigration policy as less of an insurance matter since immigrants already face costly rules of entry into regular employment which makes it less concerning for natives in terms of wage deflation or potential dismissal. In this way, more regulated labour markets can be though as relating to the idea of a more exclusionary and well-demarcated institutional design favouring natives over newcomers. Put more simply, the fear of additional risks introduced by immigration may be less critical in highly regulated markets. In such cases of stronger regulation, then, employment legislation may attenuate the effect of unemployment risks in predicting immigration policy preferences. This logic of exclusivity at higher EPL leads to the following conditioning hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 2a:** Stronger employment regulation attenuates the effect of risk exposure on immigration policy preferences (*exclusiveness logic*).

However, contrary to an exclusionary logic benefiting native workers by raising barriers of entry for immigrants, a different mechanism of inclusion may operate, instead, in alleviating the importance of unemployment risks when it comes to immigration policy preferences. Depending on the EPL conditions at a country, citizens have different chances of job loss and, importantly, the likelihood of re-entering the labour market in case of unemployment (Boeri and van Ours 2008, Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015). In this respect, strong regulations are often at odds with employment growth and activating more workers (Wulfgramm and Fervers 2015). Therefore, it is possible to think of higher EPL as creating worse conditions for finding a new job in case of unemployment and increasing the possibility of longer-term unemployment spells due to rigid regulations. Conversely, less regulated labour markets present more chances of re-entering the job market if the risk of unemployment indeed becomes realised (Boeri 2011). In this way, the potential risk of losing employment seems less punishing for those facing uncertainty due to lower chances of long-term unemployment and higher turnover in the job markets. Therefore, less regulation may reduce the strength of the relationship between unemployment risks and demands for restrictions due to higher vulnerability. Then, contrary to the logic of exclusiveness in attenuating risk-based intolerance, I put forward a competing expectation for a smaller role for

unemployment risks in more flexible labour markets leading to the following conditioning hypothesis :

> **Hypothesis 2b:** Less regulated labour market conditions attenuate the effect of risk exposure on immigration policy preferences (*inclusiveness logic*).

Likewise, the cost and conditions of unemployment can look vastly different based on the governing rules, universality, and expansiveness of compensation programmes (Anderson and Pontusson 2007, Chung and van Oorschot 2011). This outcome is related to the idea of decommodification, i.e. having the possibility for workers to obtain a livelihood regardless of market forces, which varies across different institutional contexts and influence living and working conditions of citizens in capitalist democracies (Esping-Andersen 1990). Stronger decommodification homogenises risks and can reduce the role of unemployment risks in citizens' lives (Korpi and Palme 1998, Esping-Andersen 1990). Therefore, if *ex-post* institutional interventions are already compensating for unemployment risks, then, they may have less of an effect in shaping immigration policy preferences from an insurance perspective. Through this idea of solidaristic compensation (Crepaz and Damron 2009), risk-based differences in policy preferences may be less critical at more decommodifying institutional contexts. Put differently, in countries where more generous and compensatory unemployment insurance exists; such inclusivity in the institutional framework may close risk-based preference divides in demands for immigration policy (Paskov and Koster 2014, Chung and Mau 2014). This logic leads me to formulate the following conditioning hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3a:** More generous compensation attenuates the effect of risk exposure on immigration policy preferences (*inclusiveness logic*).

And yet, since immigration policy inherently relates to the introduction of further heterogeneity in labour markets, such an inclusiveness logic link may not necessarily hold for alleviating the effect of risk. Conversely, there may even be more dramatic differences in countries where risks are shared under more compensatory institutions. In such contexts, there is less social categorisation not only within citizens themselves - but also between immigrants and natives as well (Esping-Andersen 1990, Sainsbury 2006). This means that preferences towards welcoming more

participants into these shared economic resources can be starkly different between the higher and the lower risk exposed (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007, Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016). Relatively higher risk-exposed are much more likely to be users of such compensatory resources; thus, they may have strong reactions against permissive immigration policy sharply diverging from the better-off.

Moreover, empirical evidence from the welfare chauvinism and deservingness studies reveal that natives not only perceive immigrants as disproportionate users of such compensatory resources but also view them as less deserving (van Oorschot 2006, Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012). From this competing perspective, then, precisely due to more socialisation and inclusion, strongly decommodifying contexts may relate to more profound cleavages based on risk exposure. Since these institutions have lower conditions, facilitated access, and more generosity; overall, the effect of risk exposure will be more critical in determining the differences between those who are willing to accept more potential users *versus* others. In sum, risk-based differences in restrictiveness demands may be broader in more generous and decommodifying institutional contexts. Accordingly, I formulate the following competing hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 3b:** More generous compensation further divides risk-based immigration policy preferences (*exclusiveness logic*).

Overall, I formulate two sets of competing hypotheses regarding the role of employment protection regulations and compensation generosity. While I expect both institutions to have conditioning roles on unemployment risks, the direction of these effects is undetermined taking stock of earlier work as discussed above. Importantly, I put forward that stronger EPL and stronger UCG do not automatically imply the same logics of when understanding their role in alleviating the link between unemployment risks and intolerance. While *high* EPL and *low* UCG are theoretically linked to a *logic of exclusivity* in institutions, *low* EPL and *high* UCG imply a *logic of inclusiveness*. In this way, I propose theoretical explanations as to how such conditioning effects operate.

Finally, there is one other matter worth discussing here. So far, I hypothesised relationships applicable to all workers regardless of their employment status. However, such an approach is indeed blind to precarity within societal groups precisely on such a basis (Marx and Picot 2020).

This issue is crucial because workers have systematically different immigration policy preferences based on their contract type and how they engage with labour market institutions (Rueda 2005). For instance, workers in precarious jobs are often eligible for lower compensation rates and may be disproportionately vulnerable in rigid markets. And yet, I sustain that in such a framework of future risks rather than status, any given worker can have a prospective contract type. Nevertheless, I concede that disregarding such potential differences can hide important differences that can potentially bias my results and subsequent conclusions. Therefore, I empirically evaluate whether hypothesised conditioning effects vary based on employment contract not to overlook a potentially critical factor altering the relationships discussed here.

4. Data and Methodology

To test my hypotheses, I collect data from three different kinds of sources. First, I use the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) waves for each country in my sample to calculate relative occupational unemployment risk exposure for different groups. Second, I gather comparative country-level data to measure institutional context and other theoretically relevant macro-level variables. Third, I use the European Social Survey (ESS) to operationalise individual-level variables. Combining these data, I end up with a pooled cross-sectional hierarchical dataset. Given the theoretical focus on active workers' position in the labour market and the risk of being unemployed instead of the unemployment status, I select all employed respondents following similar previous work (Polavieja 2016, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). Therefore, at the individual level, the analysis is restricted to actively employed citizens.[1]

Regarding geographical scope, the cases I study should, at a minimum, be comparable in terms of historical exposure and experience with immigration and institutions. Based on this, I exclude Central and Eastern European cases.[2] My sample includes 16 countries from Western, Northern,

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[1] The sample includes both native citizens and naturalised citizens with an immigration background. I include naturalised citizens since as they are also influential in policymaking. However, they may have systematically distinct immigration policy preferences from natives. Therefore, to assess the hypotheses more narrowly, I replicate my results by restricting the sample to citizens without an immigration background, see Table A32.

[2] Among other countries in ESS waves, I further exclude Luxembourg, Cyprus, and Iceland based on geographic and demographic comparability and Israel, Turkey, Ukraine, and Russia to ensure comparability of social and political institutions.

and Southern Europe, see Figure 1 below. I cover all available ESS waves where comparative data on my key measures are available temporally. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to ESS waves from 2002 to 2012, where all context level covariates are lagged by one-year to respect time ordering. This temporal scope is driven by practical limitations which I detail below and discuss how I aim to maximise the temporal coverage. Overall, this leaves me with 76 country-year units.[3] At the individual level, in fully specified models, the average number of observations in each country-year unit is 740 (min: 288, max: 1,186).

4.1 Measuring the labour market institutional context

At the national level, the two main variables are institutional unemployment compensation programmes and employment regulations. First, I measure compensation generosity using the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2017). This dataset provides an unemployment compensation generosity (UCG) index composed of five items: the generosity of replacement rates, qualification conditions, entitlement duration, waiting period before the reception of benefit, and the share of the workforce covered. Higher values on the index mean that the institutions are more generous and expansive ($\bar{x}$: 10.87, s: 2.02). This measure has been widely used and validated as an indicator of measuring the programmatic aspects of the unemployment insurance and decommodification (Crepaz and Damron 2009). One drawback of using this data is due to its temporal coverage up to 2011. However, comparable datasets of welfare state characteristics have either less detailed information on compensation systems not allowing the measure to be replicated in the same way or contain fewer time points and frequency. In the appendix, pp.15-17, I further discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the measurement strategy I chose here.[4]

Next, I measure regulation in the labour markets using the *employment protection legislation* (EPL) indices collected by the OECD (2018). OECD provides measures for the EPL

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[3] See Table A1 for further details of the sample. The total country-year cases are also determined by the lack of ESS data in several years for some such as Austria and Italy and the lack of ELFS data to calculate occupationally disaggregated risk measures in some years such as in France and Norway.

[4] Wherever possible, I replicate my analysis using social expenditure as a fiscal proxy to cover an extended period similar to some of the earlier work (Anderson and Pontusson 2007, Chung and Mau 2014, Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016), see Table A9.

for both regular and temporary contracts available up to 2013. The EPL index for regular contracts captures the procedures, repercussions, and costs involved in dismissals. EPL index for temporary workers covers regulations for fixed work concerning the types of arrangements and duration that are allowed, see pp. 17-19 in the appendix for further details and discussion on the index items. Higher values on the index reflect more rigidity and protection ($\bar{x}$: 1.99, s: 0.73). I combine the two indices for permanent and fixed contracts using an average measure of labour market regulations similar to previous work using this data (Gingrich and Ansell 2012, Mau, Mewes, and Schöneck 2012). I use this strategy, on the one hand, because despite an individual's status at any given time, workers may perceive potential changes in employment status in the future. Given the theoretical emphasis prospective position and risk, I choose to apply a comprehensive measurement of EPL capturing both types of employment. One the other hand, regulations for either contract type can have implications on the theoretical logics proposed concerning the inclusive and exclusive institutional contexts. However, ensuring that my results are not dependent on this measurement strategy, I replicate my estimations with the EPL indicators included in the models separately as well, see Table A10.

Figure 1 visualises the distribution of the two institutional measures from 2000 until 2012, where bars visualise UCG and lines represent EPL over time. The dominant variation in my sample lies in cross-sectional differences across institutional contexts and not within changes over time. There are several theoretically relevant observations of note here. First, in the period under study, there seems to be limited within-country variation in the level of UCG with few notable exceptions such as Sweden and Denmark. In both cases of higher decommodification, the strength of UCG seems to have declined around 2008. Next, EPL is also relatively slow-moving over time apart from countries with higher baselines such as Greece, Portugal, and Italy converging towards the regional average. It appears that while there are critical cross-sectional differences between European democracies, over time, variation across institutional contexts is limited for most cases in my observation period. Since I am primarily interested in testing risk-based differences at different cross-sectional conditions but do not focus on changes over time, the low variation in these variables over time and the shorter temporal scope of the design is less crucial concerns for the study.

Finally, looking at the two institutions jointly shows that Norway seems to be a case of simultaneously strong EPL and UCG at the contextual level whereas liberal welfare regimes, i.e.

Ireland and the United Kingdom seem to have both weaker compensation and less regulation. It is important to note that high UCG and low EPL also co-exist such as in the case of Switzerland and *vice versa* in Greece, where there is more rigid regulation with markedly lower compensatory policies. These observations further underpin the justification to consider both institutions as indicative of labour market contexts within the scope of the framework of this research.

Figure 1: Variation of EPL and UCG over time, 2000-2012

4.2 Measuring economic vulnerability using occupational unemployment risk exposure

For my primary individual-level independent variable, unemployment risk exposure, I draw on the European Labour Force Survey series (Eurostat 2018). In line with the theoretical emphasis in capturing economic vulnerability from a risk-based and relative perspective, I measure unemployment risk exposure disaggregated by occupational job categories relative to the average national performance. In the first step, I calculate occupational unemployment rates in each of the nine one-digit ISCO work categories at a given time point t. By now, this unemployment risk-

based approach to capturing economic grievances have become commonplace in earlier work (Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016). An advantage of occupational groups as indicators of economic motivations is the fact that they capture education, skill composition, and labour market socialisation of workers simultaneously (Dancygier and Walter 2015). They also present a cognitively facilitated manner of informing workers of their position about the aggregate trends (Oesch 2006). Moreover, these occupationally rooted objective risk measures are robustly linked to subjective insecurities and job market worries (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019), see also pp. 25-26 in the appendix.

In the second step, I use the national unemployment rate as the benchmark to determine the relative risk exposure of individuals at any given country-year context similar to earlier work (Kurer et al. 2019). While this transformation does not necessarily distort occupational differences across unemployment risks, it provides a useful empirical tool for evaluating the position of each group within their own country. Therefore, it is a better indicator to capture economic vulnerability in such a cross-sectional design in terms of comparability as an indicator of risk exposure. I divide each nine occupational unemployment percentage rates at time t by the national unemployment percentage rate at t obtaining ratios of risk for each of the occupations I relative to the national employment performance:

$$\text{Relative risk exposure}_{it} = (\text{Occupational unemployment rate}_{it}) / (\text{National unemployment rate}_t)$$

The nine occupations I consider are 'Managers' (1), 'Professionals' (2), 'Technicians and associate professionals' (3), 'Clerical support workers' (4), 'Service and sales workers' (5), 'Skilled agriculture, forestry, and fishery workers' (6), 'Craft related trades workers' (7), 'Plant operators and assemblers' (8), and 'Elementary occupations' (9). The relative unemployment risk exposure is on a continuous scale where '1' indicates no difference between the occupational and national unemployment rates. Values higher than '1' mean that the worker is worse off than the average worker and values lower than '1' indicate that the worker is better off in terms of risk exposure ($\bar{x}$: 0.92, s: 0.45).[5] I choose to use broader group aggregation based on 1-digit job categories to maximise data availability across countries over time and to ensure comparability of risk exposure

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[5] Further discussion of the measurement of economic vulnerabilities using occupationally specific relative occupational risks, see pp. 21-24 in the appendix.

levels before and after 2010 where ISCO-88 series are no longer used and instead ISCO-08 categories were created. However, to check for the validity of my measurement strategy, I also calculate risks in 2-digit more fine-grained occupational job categories. I conduct a series of sensitivity checks revealing that the choice between 1-digit or 2-digit ISCO codes is inconsequential to the main findings presented, see pp.26-27 in the appendix. Figure 2 visualises average risk exposure levels of each of the nine occupations over the 2002-2012 period by each country.

Figure 2: Mean relative unemployment risk exposure in job categories by country, 2002-2012

Figure 2 shows that there is indeed a variation of the distribution of the relative risks across job categories between different countries. For instance, in Italy, unskilled workers are far more disproportionately risk exposed, just about twice as much than an average worker. In contrast, this seems to be far less striking in some other cases such as in the Netherlands and Norway. As expected, the average risk exposure is much lower for occupations requiring more education and training, in line with the previous research on the topic (Rehm 2016). And yet, these differences

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vary across countries. For instance, in countries such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, higher-skilled occupations are relatively less shielded than in other countries. Notably, manual workers and lower-skilled jobs are exposed to the highest relative risk exposure. However, service and sales sector workers and clerical tasks also seem to be doing worse-off further emphasising the polarisation along these lines of secure and insecure job categories in the past decades.

4.3 Measuring immigration policy preferences

The individual-level data on my dependent variable come from the first six waves (2002-2012) of the European Social Survey (ESS 2019). ESS is a high-quality survey project used widely in earlier research on this topic. It is also particularly well-suited in measuring immigration policy preferences because it includes three different questions items available across all waves targeting this outcome of interest. These three question items ask the extent to which the respondents prefer to *allow* 'many', 'some', 'a few', or 'no' immigrants into the country from the following groups: 'people with same race or ethnic group as most of the country', 'people with a different race or ethnic group as most of the country', and 'people from the poorer countries outside Europe'. Following earlier work using these very strongly correlated items (Pardos-Prado 2020, Davidov and Meuleman 2012), I construct an additive index variable (Cronbach's alpha: 0.904). I scale the index to vary from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate preferences for less permissive immigration policy ($\bar{x}$: 1.31, s: 0.76).[6] Between 2002-2012, there is substantial variation across job groups in different country contexts regarding average immigration policy preferences, see Figure A15, which is the crucial variation under study here.

While the question items represent critical dimensions in terms of wealth and ethnicity, they do not specify the skill characteristics of immigrants. Despite changing tides in the last decade, the most substantial volume of immigration to most advanced European countries are still majority low-skilled (Dumont, Spielvogel, and Widmaier 2010). Therefore, it is safest to assume that the respondents answer on this basis. This assumption is less of a theoretical concern here because immigration policy preferences are conceptualised as a proxy insurance demand relevant for increasing uncertainty for all native workers regardless of their direct skill competition with

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[6] For more details on each item, further justification of this measurement, and alternative constructions of the outcome revealing no substantive differences in the results, see pp. 27-33 in the appendix.

immigrants. Nevertheless, the extent to which such direct ethnic competition may interfere with testing the risk-insurance logic tested here, I take a similar position to Bearce and Roosevelt (2019, 899). I sustain that if any of the respondents do think of an immigrant not confirming to this assumption, it will work against the economic motivations logic tested here.

On the one hand, if the low skilled respondents think of high skilled immigration, this can deflate the risk effect, since they may have weaker restriction demands due to perception of higher-skilled immigration as less of an insurance problem. On the other hand, if high skilled respondents, often with lower risk exposure, perceive immigration as highly skilled, this may still weaken risk-based differences. Although this evidence is contested (Bolet 2020, Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013), some earlier work showed that labour market competition with immigrants is less important amongst the high-skilled natives (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015).

By and large, the lowest restriction demands are found in Sweden and Norway whereas restrictiveness demands are most substantial in Greece and Portugal, see Figure A14. While there is some variation within countries over time, this seems to be limited and less critical compared to cross-national differences. It is also of note that there is no specific trend of increasing or decreasing trends in intolerance for open immigration policies in this period, neither after the 2008 recession nor the 2010 Eurozone crisis.

4.4 Empirical strategy

For my main empirical models, I run two-level hierarchical linear regressions using an asymptotic likelihood approach with a random-slope specification. This multi-level modelling strategy allows me to partition the residual variance at country-year and individual-levels and to analyse micro and macro-level determinants simultaneously (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012). I use random-slope specifications meaning that I estimate country-year specific slopes for the coefficient of relative risk exposure to test the hypothesised cross-level interactions appropriately. I choose a random-slope specification over the simpler random-intercept model for three reasons. First, I argue and hypothesise that risk exposure will have different effects across various conditions. Therefore, assuming one coefficient for risk fails to take this into account, resulting in a mismatch between theory and testing. Second, except for *hypothesis 1*, all theoretical expectations refer to cross-level interaction terms, such as between risk and EPL and risk and UCG. Methodological literature on cross-level hierarchical models reports that not including a random slope for the

lower-level variable, i.e. the relative risk this case, have a severe anti-conservative bias in estimations resulting in Type I errors (Heisig and Schaeffer 2019). Finally, likelihood ratio tests between random-intercept and random-slope specifications of null models demonstrate that there is a meaningful difference between these models, making it worthwhile to estimate the additional random-slope term in my data.

The primary analysis here comes from two-level hierarchical linear regressions, where individuals are nested in 76 country-year units. The most obvious advantage and my rationale for using country-year units are to maximise the number of level-2 observations reducing potential Type II errors. This issue is particularly salient here since I am interested in testing cross-level interaction terms. Moreover, I estimate a complex model with additional parameters of random slope and slope-intercept covariances; thus, maximising sample size at the higher unit avoids losing statistical power. And yet, research demonstrates that not specifying country and year levels separately may be another source of potential bias in estimates (Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother 2016). Weighing the merits and limitations of both approaches, I favour nesting respondents in country-year clusters. However, I specify my models also as three-level hierarchical models (individuals nested in countries and years) and four-level models (individuals nested in occupations, countries, and years) revealing substantively the same results, see Table A22 and A23 in the appendix. Moreover, I conduct further checks for my model specifications by using restricted maximum likelihood estimations suited to adjust for the sensitivity due to small level-2 size in multi-level models (Elff et al. 2020), see Table A21.

The variance partition coefficient indicates that quite a substantial portion of the variance, about 12 %, in immigration policy demands is due to differences between country-year units, see Table A19. Since I am most interested in cross-sectional variation between countries instead of within-country changes over time, I avoid including country and year fixed effects in my models which would take away much of the variance that I aim to capture in my models. However, I replicate my results using country and year fixed effects, revealing that the results are robust to removing unobserved confounders at the country and year levels, see Table A20. To minimise underlying assumptions about the relationship between random intercepts and random slopes, I set them as independent meaning that I allow for variances to be different across country-year units. For further discussion of the empirical strategy I choose here and the presentation of null models and country-year random effects, see pp.33-37 in the appendix.

4.5 Model specification

I start my analysis by stepwise adding, first, individual covariates, then contextual level variables, and lastly, the interaction terms one by one. Given the relevance of employment contract type for the hypothesised relationship, I control for whether respondents hold a *permanent employment contract* as opposed to having a temporary contract or no contract. In addition to risk exposure and employment status, I add several theoretically relevant exogenous individual-level variables in my models (Mayda 2006, Gerber et al. 2017). Importantly, I control for the years of *education* respondents had. I also consider *sex*, *religiosity,* whether the respondent is a *member of a trade union*, and respondents' *age* distinguished in three categories: 'between 18 to 34 years old', 'between 35 to 50 years old' and 'between 51 to 65 years old'. Since my sample includes naturalised citizens, I control for whether the respondents have an immigration background. To capture the *economic well-being* of respondents related to their income, I use the self-reported evaluations of their income following earlier work on the topic (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). The question asks the respondents how they feel about living with their current income ranging from 'very difficult' to 'living comfortably'.[7] I also control for the type of *residential area* that the respondents live in with the following options: big city, suburbs, small city, village, or home in the countryside. Summary statistics of the individual-level covariates are available in Table A2. While I do not include potentially endogenous subjective attitudes and partisanship characteristics in the main models presented here, to alleviate concerns related to whether such factors are confounding variables to the relationships I study, I also include some of these variables and report that their inclusion or exclusion do not change the results, see appendix pp.40-42.

At the contextual level, I add two relevant covariates using the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2017), see Table A3 for summary statistics of country-level covariates. Given the emphasis in earlier work, I control for *economic growth* measured as the gross domestic product (GDP) growth from previous year capturing performance. Besides, I also measure the *share of immigrant stock* at the country-year level as a percentage of the total population indicative of ethnic heterogeneity (OECD 2018). Overall, I estimate the following model and alternate my model specification for testing each of the cross-level interaction terms, respectively:

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[7] Alternating this measure with objective household income do not change the results, see Table 24.

Immigration policy preferences$_{ij}$ = β_1 relative risk$_{ij}$ + (β_2 …+ β_{10} Level-1 Covariates$_{ij}$)

$+ \beta_{11}$ EPL$_j$ + β_{12} UCG$_j$ + (β_{13} + β_{14} Level-2 Covariates$_j$)

$+ \beta_{15}$ relative risk x UCG$_{ij}$ + u$_{0j}$ + u$_{1j}$ relative risk + e$_{ij}$

It is worth emphasising that the effect of level-2 institutional variables on individual-level preferences are estimated in two ways. First, the direct effects of institutions are represented by coefficients predicting the average impact of each institution on all citizens *(β_{11}* and *$\beta_{12})$*. These report whether there is, on average, higher or lower restrictiveness demands systematically different based on EPL or UCG levels. These coefficients are not the central relationships of interest in this paper. Instead, indirect effects of institutions, are estimated in the cross-level interaction terms (i.e. *β_{15}*). They reflect the conditional effect coefficients of relative risk based on institutions as formulated in the theoretical framework.

Finally, potentially influencing the relationship I assess here, I also check whether the hypothesised effects hold for both permanent and temporary contracted workers. This logic implies a three-way interaction term between employment contract status, risk, and institutions. Therefore, using the basis of the formula above, I add three-way interaction terms to evaluate this issue. Given the complexity of three-way interaction terms, another option would be to split my sample into temporary and permanent workers and keep with the strategy of using two-way interaction terms instead. While such models are more parsimonious, split-sample analyses lead to the loss of statistical power. I conduct my investigations using both strategies revealing that the results presented here are not sensitive to these empirical choices, see pp 12-15 in the appendix.

5. Empirical Findings and Discussion

I begin by presenting my findings from the multi-level model estimations testing direct and indirect effects of unemployment risk and labour market institutions. Table 1 shows the coefficients of independent variables of interest, see Table A4 for full estimation results. Model 1 is specified only with individual-level covariates, whereas Model 2 adds EPL and UCG and Model 3 includes contextual control variables as well. Model 4 and Model 5 add interaction terms to the fully specified model between risk and UCG and risk and EPL, respectively.

5.1 Direct effects of unemployment risk and institutional context

The results in Table 1 (*Models 1-3*) reveal that the positive relationship between unemployment risk exposure and opposition towards more open immigration policy preferences is remarkably consistent. Relatively higher risk exposure is positively associated with less permissive immigration policy preferences at $p<0.001$ level finding robust evidence for the relative risk hypothesis (*hypothesis 1*). There is a systematic divide of immigration policy preferences amongst workers based on their relative unemployment risk exposure. This finding adds to the growing literature on how future uncertainties are crucial determinants in understanding discontent towards open immigration policies (Polavieja 2016, Pardos-Prado 2020, Pecoraro and Ruedin 2016, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Kaihovaara and Im 2020). Conditional on other covariates at means, there is a predicted difference of policy preferences about 0.2 points when comparing respondents at one standard deviation above and below average ($\bar{x}$ +/- 0.45) relative risk exposure. Since the dependent variable here is on a scale from 0 to 3, this seems to be a non-negligible difference. [8]

Turning to the *direct* effects of institutions, Model 2 and Model 3 reveal that, on average, there is a higher tolerance for openness as we go from weaker unemployment compensation, such as in Italy and United Kingdom, to stronger, such as in Norway and Switzerland. Conversely, it seems that, on average, restrictiveness demands are higher in more regulated labour markets, such as Greece, France, and Portugal. These direct effects of these contextual variables, however, do not systematically predict differences in immigration policy preferences reaching above conventional levels of significance in Model 3 and when adding further relevant country-level covariates, see pp. 42-43 in the appendix. This result is unsurprising given the mixed evidence in the existing literature on the direct effects of welfare state institutions. Nevertheless, the direction of the coefficients seems to be in line with some of the earlier work arguing for a direct role of generous and inclusive welfare states in fostering more tolerant political responses (Crepaz and Damron 2009, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019). However, these direct effects do not robustly predict preferences at conventional levels of statistical significance. Moreover, it is important to underline here that such results do not tell us how institutional contexts change the impact of risk but only inform on the average direct relationship between UCG or EPL and preferences.

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[8] Figure A1 visualises this relationship revealing that as we go from lower to higher unemployment risk exposure, the predicted immigration policy demands are systematically more restrictive.

Table 1: Economic motivations, labour market institutions and immigration policy preferences, direct and indirect effects

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
				Cross-level interaction models	
Relative risk	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)
Permanent contract	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Woman	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age (ref: 18-34 y/o)					
35-50 y/o	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
51-64 y/o	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Years of education	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Union member	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Foreign-born	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
UCG		-0.02t	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
EPL		0.06t	0.04	0.04	0.10*
		(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Economic growth		-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Share % of foreign-born			-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
UCG*Relative risk				0.01**	
				(0.005)	
EPL*Relative risk					-0.04**
					(0.014)
Constant	1.53***	1.65***	1.73***	1.93***	1.61***
	(0.038)	(0.142)	(0.147)	(0.164)	(0.153)
Number of respondents	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
Number of country-years	76	76	76	76	76
Within country-year variance	0.4624	.04624	0.4624	0.4624	0.4624
Between country-year variance	0.0716	0.0591	0.0552	0.0537	0.0550
Log likelihood	-58271	-58267	-58266	-58262	-58262

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Next, if there is evidence in line with the expectations of the paper, I should see that there are substantial differences in the slope of risk by country-years. To check this, I inspect the country-year specific slopes of relative risk revealing considerable variation across contexts, see Figure A2. The predicted random slopes across country-years are in line with the proposition that risk-based differences are distinct under different conditions. For instance, in about all waves, risk has steeper slopes in Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany, whereas the slope of risk is flatter in Greece, Finland, Norway, and Ireland. Just by looking at these slope differences seem to suggest that risk-based differences in preference divides are more pronounced in decommodifying institutional contexts. In contrast, in less regulated settings, the effect appears to be smaller in line with an exclusionary logic. The question is whether these institutional contexts can indeed significantly predict such differences.

Before turning to the interaction effects in Model 4 and Model 5, I report that all other individual covariates are in expected directions given actual work (Pardos-Prado 2020, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2018). As expected, women, younger citizens, those who live urban areas and more educated, union members, those perceiving less hardship regarding their income, and citizens with an immigration background are systematically less sceptical towards open immigration policies. One result of note here is that those with permanent employment contracts significantly differ from temporary workers in demanding more restriction. This finding further emphasises that status and prospects do not function the same way. The positive link between permanent employment can be made sense of in two ways. First, despite being more securely employed, these citizens may see themselves as 'stuck' in their position faced with incoming risks and changing labour; thus demanding more restrictions (Antonucci et al. 2017). Second, this result may be related to a cohort effect where systematic differences based on gender and age underpin instead may explain preference cleavages between temporary or permanent workers. The disproportionate presence of older and male workers into permanent contracts can be through to explain such this positive coefficient (Schwander and Häusermann 2013). I check whether the direct link between unemployment risks and policy preferences are altered by contract type and see that there is no interaction effect between risk exposure and contract type in shaping these preferences, see Table A6.

5.2 Exclusivity in labour market institutions alleviate the effect of risk exposure

If there is a conditioning effect of institutions, first and foremost, the models should return statistically significant interaction terms between risk and UCG, in Model 4, and risk and EPL, in Model 5. Moreover, if my theoretical framework can be supported, the direction of these two interaction terms should go in opposite directions. While high EPL and low UCG create more exclusive contexts, high UCG and low EPL relate to more inclusive labour markets. Finally, if there is evidence of an exclusiveness logic in attenuating the effect of risk, we should see a positive interaction term between UCG and risk and a negative interaction term between EPL and risk. In contrast, the opposite would suggest evidence for an inclusiveness logic in reducing risk-based differences.

The findings in Table 1 reveal that the conditioning effects of UCG and EPL are both statistically significant, at $p<0.01$ level. The positive interaction term between UCG and risk means that as we go from less compensatory institutional design to more, risk-based differences in immigration policy preferences become larger. Next, the interaction term between EPL and risk is negative meaning that as we go from less regulated labour markets to more regulated contexts, the effect of unemployment risk is weaker. In line with the exclusivity logic, these results mean that unemployment risks are less important where there are stronger labour market regulations and more particularistic compensation. To substantively interpret these interaction terms, Figure 3 visualises the average marginal effects of risk across the range of different EPL and UCG contexts in my sample.

The left panel in Figure 3 presents the average marginal effects of unemployment risk exposure on immigration policy preferences conditional on UCG and the histogram plots the distribution of UCG in the sample. The strength of the risk effect increases in more compensatory contexts, where institutions are more generous and solidaristic. This finding means that immigration policy preferences are more divided because of unemployment risks if UCG institutions are more inclusive, making them more likely to benefit not only the natives but also immigrants. This can be thought of as related to the perception of incoming immigrants as disproportionate users of these programmes (Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012, van Oorschot 2006). Since more users can increase potential competition for these compensation resources, the less secure and risk exposed workers are especially sceptical towards permissive immigration policies, thereby, unemployment risk effects are higher in more inclusive UCG contexts. The

collectivisation of risks and easier access to these compensation benefits heighten polarisation on the issue of immigration policy because of unemployment risks finding evidence in line with some of the arguments in the welfare chauvinism literature (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007, van Oorschot 2006).

Figure 3: AMEs of relative risk on immigration preferences conditional on institutional contexts, 95% CIs


The right panel in Figure 3 presents the conditional effect of risk by employment protection regulations. The impact of risk on more restrictive policy preferences is less important as we go from less regulated to more regulated labour markets. Once more, I should underline that this is not to suggest that in more regulated labour markets, there are fewer restrictiveness demands on average but rather that risk-based preference differences are smaller. This finding is in line with some of the political economy research demonstrating a risk-mitigating role for EPL in fostering security (Mau, Mewes, and Schöneck 2012, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019, Anderson and

Pontusson 2007). Overall, inspecting the risk conditioning effects of UCG and EPL, I find evidence for an exclusivity logic in attenuating the link between risk and intolerance.

Lastly, Figure 4 plots the predicted relationship between risk and immigration policy preferences under different institutional contexts to have a better grasp of the mitigating roles of UCG and EPL. I chose the high and low cut-off values as representative of the lower and upper quartile values of the institutional variables. In Figure 4 panel (a), I plot the predicted relationship between immigration policy preferences and relative unemployment risk for contexts with high UCG score such as the Netherlands or Belgium and countries with low UCG score such the United Kingdom or Italy. The visualised relationships reveal that in both high and low UCG conditions, there is a robust positive relationship between higher risk and less tolerant immigration policy preferences. Here, we can also see that the direct (rather than conditioning) effect of UCG is not statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ level as the confidence intervals between high and low UCG conditions overlap. While, on average, there is less tolerance for open immigration policies in low UCG contexts, there is more polarisation of preferences between relatively higher and lower risk exposed social groups in the high UCG conditions, i.e. steeper slopes at high UCG.

Figure 4: Immigration policy preferences and risk exposure in context, 95% CIs

The right panel (b) in Figure 4 plots the same predicted relationship, but this time it focuses on different high and low EPL conditions. In both contexts, the relationship between risk and preferences is positive and predicts more restrictive policy preferences at higher risk exposure. When EPL is low, such as in cases like Switzerland or Ireland, risk-based differences in preferences are steeper than in the high EPL conditions, such as in Spain or France. Indeed, the change in predicted policy preferences across risk exposure is visibly flatter in the strong EPL condition revealing a risk-attenuating logic in more rigid labour markets. As presented in Table 1, although not statistically significant, the direct (on average) effect of higher EPL is correlated with more scepticism towards open. In sum, the picture emerging from Figure 4 supports the evidence from Figure 3. They suggest that risk-based polarisation in immigration policy preferences is less critical if the labour markets are more challenging to enter and highly demarcated and less inclusive and more particularistic in terms of compensation.

5.3 Robustness and sensitivity checks

As Figure 1 presented, there are several country cases in my sample, which are typical cases of an inclusiveness or exclusiveness logic if we think of EPL and UCG together. Most emblematically Greece but also Italy and Spain exemplify characteristics of an exclusive and demarcated context combining high EPL and low UCG simultaneously.[9] Likewise, Switzerland and to a lesser extent, Austria and the Netherlands constitute illustrative cases for the inclusivity logic with low EPL and high UCG. Therefore, an implication of the theoretical framework here is that the combinations of these institutional characteristics simultaneously should work in conditioning risk in the expected directions. If the risk-attenuating role of exclusive institutional contexts holds, I should see indeed see a steeper slope of risk in '*low* EPL and *high* UCG' (*inclusive*) cases. In contrast, this effect should be attenuated in the '*high* EPL and *low* UCG' (*exclusive*) cases. To assess this, I include a three-way interaction term between EPL, UCG, and risk and predict the relationship between risk and immigration policy preferences in these two opposing conditions. The results further confirm

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[9] See also Figure A8 visualising these combinations using two-way scatter plots for each year studies here.

the risk-attenuating effect of contexts where there are more exclusive institutions in line with the evidence from the primary analysis.

One other important question is whether these findings hold for workers independent of their contract status. While I argued that employment contract type is an undeniable source of economic concern within risk groups, in the scope of a risk-insurance framework for immigration policies, their influence should not change the relationships I study here. To empirically evaluate this claim, I introduce three-way interaction terms between relative risk, employment contract type, and each institution. The results, see Table A7, suggest that there are no systematic differences in these conditioning effects based on the employment contract type. While these three-way interaction terms remain to be above conventional levels of significance, I note that the risk-heightening role of generous UCG is more critical for temporary workers, see Figure A4. This result makes sense since they are arguably the most economically vulnerable groups (higher risk, temporary contract) and the most likely users of these resources and, thus, much more strongly oppose further immigration in more inclusive institutional conditions.

In addition to the checks mentioned earlier, I also run additional sensitivity and diagnostic tests which I briefly summarise below and present the full results in the appendix. First, all models pass relevant diagnostic tests for the multi-level cross-level interaction models (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), see pp.36-37 in the appendix, particularly with regards to the potential influential outliers at the higher level in cross-level interactions models. Second, I include additional individual-level characteristics of respondents which can be argued to confound the relationship between risk and higher demands for *ex-ante* insurance. Importantly, I alternate my measure of subjective satisfaction with household income with an objective level of income. Next, as a potentially relevant socio-tropic view of economic vulnerability, I control for respondent's satisfaction with the current state of the country's economy (dissatisfied vs satisfied), see Table A24. I rule out the possibility that considering the ideological partisanship and individuals' attitudes towards redistribution and provision on insurance at large do not remove the relevance of objective unemployment risks.

Perhaps more importantly, pre-existing individual prejudices towards immigration do not confound the relationships I assess here. I add controls for reported attitudes of respondents using relevant ESS question items, see Table A25. Importantly, I check whether economic and cultural threat positions towards immigration and specific job and fiscal l competition due to the economic

effects of immigration change the estimation results. In addition to these measures, I also calculate occupation-specific immigrant employment rates and capture potential job market threats from an objective perspective using OECD's DIOC database, see Table A26 and 27 for further details. Overall, I find that these alternative specifications do not change the results.

Third, removing all country and year level unobserved heterogeneity with the inclusion of fixed effects reveal no substantive changes in the results, see Table A20. Nevertheless, my results do not change when level-2 covariates that are potentially influential on risks or insurance demands such as economic openness and budget deficit are considered (Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009, Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016), see Table A30. Moreover, I also control for the baseline of existing immigration policy regime governance in each country at a given time point, see Table A31. Finally, traditionally right-leaning governments have a stricter stance on immigration. In contrast, the opposite holds for the left, which may have a confounding top-down effect on the relationships I study here, see Table A29. I also check the robustness of my estimations by accounting for union density and unemployment rates, see Table A28, and find that the results do not change with the inclusion of other level-2 variables.

6. Conclusion

This paper explored the extent to which risk-based economic vulnerabilities relate to restrictive immigration policy demands in Europe. Empirically, I combine occupationally specific unemployment risk exposure calculated using the European Labour Force Survey with individual-level data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2012. I find that workers facing relatively higher future uncertainty are more sceptical towards immigration. Providing a new micro-macro theoretical framework of economic motivations and labour market institutions, I test my hypotheses using hierarchical models with cross-level interactions terms across 16 advanced European democracies. The results suggest strong evidence for the conditioning roles of employment protection regulations and unemployment compensation regimes in shaping the effect of unemployment on policy preferences. Notably, more exclusionary institutional conditions, i.e.

more regulated labour markets and less generous and individualised compensatory schemes attenuate unemployment risk effects.

The paper adds to the ongoing work finding an important role for future status over current conditions in shaping the ways in the politics of immigration is problematised for different workers (Polavieja 2016, Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019). Previous studies have sought to demonstrate this as a result of labour market dualisation, increasing routinisation of specific tasks, and the fact that some jobs are much more so at the risk of being off-shored to another country (Pardos-Prado 2020, Kaihovaara and Im 2020, Kevins and Lightman 2020, Dancygier and Walter 2015). These empirical efforts have already led to corrections in current debates that it is neither just the economic effects of immigration nor socio-cultural cleavages that shape immigration policy preferences. Likewise, focusing on broader unemployment risks due to global and domestic economic changes and not just the economic effects of immigration, I showed that economic vulnerability is positively correlated with demands for restrictiveness.

To make sense of this link between higher risk and more restrictiveness demands, I proposed an original way of thinking of immigration policies as *ex-ante* interventions by the state for security provision. I show that the decision-making of citizens distinctly relates to where they are compared to others in their country in terms of future economic security. The evidence here falls in line with the studies from welfare attitudes and political responsiveness literature that emphasise the role of the unequal distribution of risks in shaping political demands and behaviour of citizens (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019, Alt and Iversen 2017). Moreover, the findings provide evidence that no matter what the specific cause may be that destabilises the prospects of citizens, there is a remarkable demand for the insuring role of having closure in the borders. Yet, this has little resemblance of a cultural backlash against immigration but rather relate to insurance demands relating to the economic transformation and prevalent globalisation in these past two decades (Walter 2017, Korpi and Palme 2003).

I reconcile the contradictory findings of earlier work on the institutional basis of permissiveness proposing a conditioning framework on immigration policy preferences (van Oorschot and Uunk 2007, Crepaz and Damron 2009, Razin and Sadka 2000, Reeskens and van Oorschot 2012, Sainsbury 2006). The results suggest that there is indeed something to the argument that, on average, more inclusive institutional societies such as Sweden and Norway are more tolerant towards immigration compared to countries with more individualised risks such as

Portugal and Greece (Crepaz and Damron 2009, Sainsbury 2006, Boräng 2015). However, in addition to not being statistically predictive, this focus on average effects masks how risk-based cleavages function differently due to these institutions. Instead, I add to the work studying economic motivations of immigration policy preferences at different conditions (Jaime-Castillo, Marques-Perales, and Alvarez-Galvez 2016, Kevins and Lightman 2020, Pardos-Prado 2020). The effect of risk on more restrictiveness demands is lower in more regulatory and less decommodifying settings. Moreover, the evidence here is in line with recent criticism (Bearce and Roosevelt 2019, Kevins and Lightman 2020) about the experimental work that studies the link between economic motivations and responses to immigration focusing on single country cases. Indeed, I find that certain country contexts are more conducive to risk-based differences in immigration policy preferences. Therefore, ignoring such environmental differences can lead to inappropriately relegating the role of economic motivations.

The results of the analysis also shed further light on the study of the politics of immigration in Europe. On the one hand, it seems that the boundaries between insiders *versus* outsiders in more rigid employment regulations that make it harder for newcomers to enter job markets (Rueda 2014, Boeri 2011, Boeri and van Ours 2008) have spill-over effects. These more rigid institutions seem to be also related to establishing boundaries between immigrants *versus* natives, as evidenced in highly ethnically dualised labour markets in Spain and Greece (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango 1999). This finding is in line with recent work showing that the effect higher ethnic job competition on more restrictiveness demands is conditioned by the dualisation conditions in the labour markets (Pardos-Prado 2020). On the other hand, the risk-heightening role of more generosity in compensation seems to be indicative of a strong perceived crowding-out effect when compensation programs are more generous and universal such as in the cases of Switzerland and Austria. Citizens become more polarised with regards to the politics of immigration, mainly based on their economically weaker position in their home labour markets (Facchini and Mayda 2009). Putting these results together, the risk-attenuating role of more exclusive contexts adds another layer to understanding as to why negative politicisation of immigration based on economic grievances has been more successful in the cases from Western Europe as opposed to the Southern European countries.

It is important to note that the analysis has several limitations. First, the paper cannot study whether the pace and magnitude of changes to these institutions differently impact economic

motivations. While a longitudinal analysis is beyond the scope of this article, future studies can focus on changes in institutional contexts and test whether such dynamics differently alter risk-based preferential differences using case studies and more extended temporal scope. Next, while I take several steps in maximising my observation period, due to lack of data in key variables of interest, the study is restricted to the period from 2002 to 2012. Therefore, I cannot examine much of the institutional contexts and vulnerabilities in the aftermath of a post-recession Europe or after the negatively politicised humanitarian crisis in the latter part of the 2010s.

Finally, given the cross-sectional and observational nature of the data, the paper does not make causal arguments. Likewise, the question items available for measuring the outcome of interest do not allow formulations and theorisations for testing specific types of immigration policies (such as family, labour, or humanitarian migration) or precise characteristics of incoming immigrants. While these have not been central concerns in this study, there are numerous areas in which survey experimental research can extend the research focus of this paper. For instance, one such way focusing on a relatively understudied aspect would be to more precisely assess whether specific configurations of immigration policy designs and different dimensions of such packages influence the acceptability of such proposals for the risk-exposed citizens.

Despite these caveats, the analysis here provides new answers to why permissive immigration policymaking has been difficult in the past decades. I find evidence suggesting that citizens' restrictiveness demands differ not just based on their relative vulnerabilities in their societies but that the labour market institutional contexts condition the extent to which such economic grievances are strongly directed towards the immigration policy.

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Title: 'What Drives the Economically Vulnerable to Vote for the Radical-right? Socio-economic Risk Exposure and the Role of Exclusionary Security Provision'

Abstract:

In recent European elections, there has been an undeniable decline of the mainstream vote in favour of the radical-right, particularly amongst the economically vulnerable voters. This outcome is in no small part related to worries over labour market vulnerability and economic, not just predominantly cultural, motivations of voters. In this paper, I argue that the electoral sympathy for the radical right is linked to voter attitudes favouring an exclusionary provision of economic resources, i.e. restricting labour market and welfare access for immigrants. I contend that those who are exposed to a relatively higher risk of losing their jobs and income vote for radical right-wing parties sympathising with such nativist economic agendas. Using data from 2002 to 2018 for 14 European countries and 34 different radical right-wing parties (RRWPs), I test these expectations. The results show that while economic motivations play a smaller role for the habitual RRWP voters, risk-based differences explain the electoral choices for RRWPs compared to other political options. Importantly, higher socio-economic risk exposure positively correlates with both higher chances of RRWP vote and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants. The paper proposes corrections to current academic debates and media discourses that highlight cultural cleavages and suggests that the new exclusive and nativist security appeals of the radical-right may instead be underpinning the growing appeal of the radical-right for the European electorate.

1. Introduction

This article investigates two related questions. First, what is the economic basis of the radical-right wing party (RRWP) voting in the last two decades? Second, if these economic motivations are indeed relevant, what makes RRWP agendas more attractive over other parties? Rising voter support for RRWPs is one of the most critical challenges facing political and social institutions of advanced democracies. The increasing prominence of such parties in many Western democracies has led to a wider academic interest on the topic with bottom-up theories emphasising voter characteristics (Arzheimer 2012, Burgoon et al. 2019, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020, Oesch and Rennwald 2018) and supply-side analyses of the political party agendas and discourses (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Rovny

and Polk 2019, Rovny 2013, Stockemer and Barisione 2017, de Lange 2007). From both perspectives, existing literature proposes competing explanations as to why we observe such an increasing vote potential for these parties, especially from economically vulnerable citizens who are traditionally represented by social-democratic parties.

When explaining the electoral losses for the mainstream left, earlier work emphasised that class lines in political behaviour have splintered due to the widening gaps of economic interests (Oesch and Rennwald 2018, Rueda 2005). In contrast, others argue that the cultural authoritarianism of the working class became unsustainable with the socially progressive and inclusive policies of the left-wing (Norris and Inglehart 2019, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Ivarsflaten 2008). Today, the latter sociocultural argument has gained significant traction because of the apparent attitudinal divergence between the higher educated white-collar professionals of today's left-wing electorate and the voter base of the RRWPs (Ford and Goodwin 2010). However, while constituting the key relative advantage of RRWP platforms, scepticism with regards to immigration is not just a cultural issue (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Billiet, Meuleman, and Dewitte 2014). Furthermore, such a distinction of economic or culturally motivated electoral behaviour underscores the intersection of status anxiety and socio-economic risks principally motivating the vote choices in twenty-first century (Gidron and Hall 2017, Kurer 2020, Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018).

I contend that, so far, scholars have unduly attributed homogeneity to the radical-right electorate when studying either economic or cultural motivations. Likewise, supply-side theoretical debates concerning whether RRWPs have made economic shifts towards the left or simply blurred their previously right-wing and liberal positions to make themselves appealing to a broader voter base (Rovny and Polk 2019, Ivaldi 2015). Despite growing evidence for the relevance of nativist economic policy proposals in RRWP agendas for their vote potential (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Lefkoridi and Michel 2014), much of the existing work attributed a cultural role for the political programmes in the immigration issues area (Rydgren 2008, Norris and Inglehart 2019). However, it does not necessarily follow that all grievances leading to sympathising with the RRWPs are rooted in considerations related to the effects of immigration.

In this paper, I take stock of earlier work emphasising the heterogeneity of RRWP voter motivations (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020, Stockemer,

Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020). Respectively, I consider the electoral base of the radical-right vote as heterogeneous and composed of two groups. In one part, certain voters are identified by their polarised negative sentiments towards immigration, lower education, or political partisanship (Arzheimer 2012), which constitute the core of the RRWP support habitually voting these parties. Yet, fluctuations we observe in such electorate are unlikely to be explained only by these stable voter characteristics (Finseraas, Roed, and Schone 2017). Instead, taking stock of work in political economy (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019), I argue that voters who experience higher risks of socio-economic status loss are more likely to become RRWP voters. In this way, I propose that there is a second and non-negligible group of voter sympathizing with these parties based on economic motivations. In the context of scarce jobs and welfare resources, RRWPs managed to appeal to such 'sympathiser votes' by relying on a proxy provision of selective future security through the exclusion of immigrants and minorities (Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011, Mudde 1999, Magni 2020). Put differently, for economically motivated sympathiser voters, RRWPs are an attractive choice based on *protection* vis-à-vis the mainstream right and based on *exclusion* vis-à-vis the left. By using such a strategy, RRWPs preserved their core electorate while simultaneously gaining sympathiser voters.

I test my arguments using cross-national comparative data from the nine waves of the European Social Survey and the European Labour Force Survey covering the last two decades (2002-2018) for 14 advanced European democracies and 34 different RRWPs. The analyses reveal robust evidence for a positive relationship between relatively higher socio-economic risk exposure and voting for RRWPs. I find that while socio-economic anxieties are positively related to the RRWP vote, these economic motivations are predictive only for the sympathiser voters. Importantly, using typical characteristics such as educational, attitudinal, and ideological cleavages, I find that that for the culturally motivated RRWP voters, unemployment risk exposure makes little difference in predicting vote choices. However, risk exposure increases the probability of an RRWP vote for most of the European electorate. The evidence is congruent with the proposition that distinct motives are underpinning RRWP votes in the past two decades.

The paper contributes to some of the most widely debated issues in comparative politics and electoral studies by proposing a bottom-up theoretical framework. Theoretically, I suggest that RRWPs are successful in competing on the grounds of economic demands at times of these risk inequalities discerning the flight of votes from the mainstream parties, particularly from the

left-wing based on a selective rather than a universal demand for protection. Empirically, I construct an original dataset of relative socio-economic risks expanding the scope of recent work in risk inequalities and relative deprivation (Rehm 2016, Burgoon et al. 2019) and contributing to the ongoing measurement efforts of economic grievances (Marx and Picot 2020, Kurer et al. 2019). I demonstrate that occupationally specific unemployment rate benchmarked to the national performance is a robust indicator of job and income insecurity predicting political behaviour in this century.

2. Why are Radical Right-wing Parties Appealing to Economically Vulnerable Voters?

In the beginning, I clarify that what I mean by an RRWP, which is closest to the approach from Betz (1994, Swank and Betz 2003). In this respect, two defining aspects of RRWPs, i.e. nativist critique of existing institutions and protectionist policies concerning internationalisation, distinguish them from the mainstream parties (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). While populist tactics can be practical tools for the political agenda of the radical right, they are not a necessary condition (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019). On the one hand, RRWPs are characterised by their nativist political agenda emphasising nationalism and intolerance both in the economic and in the cultural dimensions (Mudde 2007, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019). RRWPs oppose existing political institutions from an angle of prioritising native interests and grievances (de Lange 2007) and present simple culprits, i.e. immigration, Europe, or minorities, to voter grievances (Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003). In particular, RRWPs promote and normalise social inequalities that are rooted in ethnic differences and criticise the existing system and institutions for not favouring native interests (Derks 2006, Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011). This last point is a key divergence point of RRWPs from other parties, more crucially from the left, substantially adding to their electoral competitiveness in the context of economic vulnerability and disillusionment with mainstream politics.

2.1 Supply-side of the RRWP vote and economic motivations

It is well-understood that the old radical-right 'winning formula' combining culturally authoritarian values with economic liberalism no longer holds given the current variety of RRWP positions (Kitschelt 1995, de Lange 2007). Some suggest that the success of RRWPs in the 21st century lies in their ability to co-opt mainstream redistributive and protective positions which made them more appealing to a broader mass electorate (Ivaldi 2015). In contrast, an alternative stream of the literature put forward that the changes we observe from the 'old formula' are ideological position-blurring in the economic dimension more so than shifting (Rovny and Polk 2019, Rovny 2013). And yet, such approaches unduly distinguish redistributive and welfare policy positions of RRWPs from their nativism and tough stances on immigration. The vast majority of RRWPs indeed improved their electoral chances at the very least by moving from their economically liberal views to a more nationalist and security-oriented position (Mughan, Bean, and McAllister 2003, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019). However, RRWPs place neither social insurance nor employment growth as central topics in their political agendas (Mudde 1999). Therefore, an ideological trade-off still exists when voters choose RRWPs over other political options, particularly if we consider the weak policy performance of most RRWPs when in government (Afonso 2015, Heinisch 2003). What, then, plays a role in the attractiveness of RRWP agendas for a broader electorate?

While abstaining from a clear position in the economic dimension, RRWPs propose exclusive protection by pointing the finger at the 'undeserving' others for the reduced protective capacity of the state, which became a *de facto* economic proposition of RRWPs distinguishing them from other parties in the political competition (Grande, Schwarzbözlb, and Fatkeb 2019). For the most part, RRWPs are selective on whom to exclude, i.e. immigrants, and what to protect, i.e. increasingly scarce jobs and benefits for the 'deserving' citizens, in matters related to the welfare state (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012, Lefkoridi and Michel 2014). In this way, RRWPs have been able to preserve their existing voter base, while at the same time boosting their favourability from a material perspective. Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that in recent years RRWP supporters have diverse interests leading them to support the RRWP agendas and that cultural motivation are not the be-all and end-all of the RRWP support (Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020).

Therefore, the ability of RRWPs in mobilising these economic grievances hinges on the use of economic nationalism as a narrative of protecting native interests and providing a selective form of solidarity (Stockemer and Barisione 2017). Demands for redistribution and protection increase in situations of heightened job or income insecurity which is expected to match the supply of policies from the left-wing political families (Margalit 2013, Moene and Wallerstein 2001). However, recent work has proposed a critical refinement demonstrating that by eroding beliefs and expectations of social mobility, increasing economic inequality in these past decades has generated a 'selective' demand for solidarity emphasising attractiveness of policies that not only increase protection but only target a selected group of citizens (Magni 2020).

2.2 Demand-side of the RRWP vote and economic motivations

Studies on the RRWP vote are ostensibly divided on *who* these new radical-right voters are and whether their cultural (Ford and Goodwin 2010, Norris and Inglehart 2019, Ivarsflaten 2008) or economic (Arzheimer 2009, Burgoon et al. 2019) grievances trump over the other. Existing work, by and large, agrees that older voters, right-wing partisans, authoritarian and nativist value orientations, and importantly, anti-immigration attitudes are typical predictors of higher chances of being an RRWP voter (Arzheimer 2012). However, such stable characteristics of voters are difficult to reconcile with the election results pointing to a decline of the mainstream vote in favour of the radical-right, particularly amongst the economically vulnerable working-class voters (Rovny and Rovny 2017, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). It seems that the constituency of the left-wing parties has increasingly been populated with middle-class higher educated professionals with fewer common interests with the working-class voters in economic matters. In contrast, scholars have instead observed a turn towards increasing working-class base in the RRWP electorate (Beramendi et al. 2015, Gingrich and Häuserman 2015, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). This state of the debates leaves several questions unanswered as to what type of grievances motivate these 'atypical' voters of the RRWPs and to what extent such dynamics are relevant within the electoral base of the RRWPs (Mudde 1999, 186-187).

Today the need for preservation, be it economic or cultural, is challenged by borderless cross-cutting risks. Such risks are not only limited to increasing ethnic heterogeneity and new cultural norms but are much more so concretely related to growing inequalities and rapidly changing production systems (Beck 2006, Ekberg 2007). Therefore, political behaviour driven

by uncertainty in today's societies does not lend itself to be parsed neatly into either inherently economic or cultural divisions as previous studies have attempted (Norris and Inglehart 2019, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Bornschier and Kriesi 2013). Instead, one of the most intuitive explanatory frameworks relies on pessimistic future expectations rather than current economic hardship (Kurer 2020). These studies argue that longing for nostalgic depictions of lost prosperity and pessimism regarding the future but not always actual losses drive voters to choose RRWPs over other options from an economic self-interest perspective (Mutz 2018, Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018, Engler and Weisstanner 2020). By bringing economic and cultural self-perceptions together through a framework of social exclusion, Gidron and Hall (2019) report that those who perceive themselves in a worse-off status compared to others are more likely to choose radical parties. Such evidence is supported by research revealing that those who are just about getting by (and not only those experiencing economic hardship) and those in jobs that are particularly vulnerable to becoming redundant (and not necessarily the unemployed) vote for RRWPs (Kurer 2020, Antonucci et al. 2017).

Overall, beyond whether it is cultural or economic, two things are distinct regarding the RRWP electorate. These voters are fearful of an unknown future for which they feel unprepared and unprotected for. Moreover, their current economic state is less predictive of how they will vote given these challenges. Then, to what extent economic motivations predict the RRWP vote in the last two decades? To address this, I develop a bottom-up argument of the radical-right vote focusing on RRWP vote rooted in unequal socio-economic risks and subsequent demands for an exclusive provider of security and insurance for citizens.

3. Heterogeneous Motivations, Exclusionary Security, and the Radical-right Vote

The main argument of the framework here does not challenge existing evidence in the comparative politics literature related to how relative economic deprivation and socio-economic risk predict RRWP voting in recent decades (Burgoon et al. 2019, Gest, Reny, and Mayer 2018, Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Instead, I aim to add to the theoretical and empirical relevance of economic vulnerability and the politics of immigration in electoral behaviour. I draw on spatial

theories of voting, which understand party choices as representative of the closest political option that maximises the political preferences and interests of voters (Downs 1957, Stokes 1963). In this way, rather than voting based on group attachments, such as class or ideological partisanship only, vote choices are understood as flexible depending on the options and the policies offered by political parties in the competition space (Meguid 2008). Relatedly, taking stock of existing work on electoral studies and party politics (Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011, Lefkoridi and Michel 2014, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019), I argue that the new RRWP formula with an emphasis on exclusionary security and the nativist welfare state has been a significant draw for RRWPs combining both immigration and economic policy dimensions simultaneously. This can explain the ability of radical-right parties in mobilising economically rooted grievances instead of left-wing party families, which emphasise redistribution and protection from an egalitarian perspective. Therefore, in one part, I focus on investigating the heterogeneity amongst the RRWP electorate in the last two decades and, in another part, I aim to clarify the logic of economically motivated RRWP vote choice.

3.1 Heterogeneity within the RRWP electorate of this century

In the first part, I consider RRWP voters composed of citizens with different motivations (Mudde 1999, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020, Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020). Here, moving beyond earlier work focusing only on the effects of immigration and the emphasis on cultural vs economic interests, I distinguish RRWP voters of the past two decades in a two-fold manner; *habitual* (or core/partisan) and *sympathiser* voters. Depending on whether a voter is a habitual voter of any political party, economic motivations may have little relevance in predicting their electoral choices (Meltzer and Vellrath 1975). Importantly, for the core electorate of the RRWPs, who are evidenced to support such parties due to their emphasis on anti-immigration, authoritarianism, and strong nativist identity (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Downes and Loveless 2018, Norris and Inglehart 2019), material interests can have little relevance in predicting their vote choices.

I should clarify here that I use the terms *habitual* or *sympathiser* to indicate different cross-sectional motivations of voter groups within the RRWP electorate rather than imply dynamics. When I refer to the *habitual* voters of the RRWPs, this is to identify voters for whom the motivation to vote for these parties are understood to be linked to, among others, ethnic threat

(cultural or economic) and partisanship in line with earlier work (Arzheimer 2012, Rydgren 2008). Instead, voter group broadly labelled as *sympathisers* refer to those RRWP voters who are expected to be motivated by their experience of unequal economic chances and pessimism towards their future in the society (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019, Steenvoorden and Harteveld 2018, Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Precisely, for these voters, higher socio-economic risks should predict their votes for RRWPs. While this framework can be extended to imply that these sympathiser groups constitute those switching to the RRWPs, the focus in this paper is on between-voter differences in RRWP support motivations across different country and year contexts rather than within-individual changes in voting behaviour.

The 'typical' RRWP voters have so far been argued to be consistently identified by scepticism about the economic and cultural effects of immigration, lower education, and those with strong right-wing partisan identification in choosing to vote for RRWPs (Arzheimer 2012). Voters may select RRWPs for strong ideological reasons and uncompromising ethnocentric attitudes towards immigrants (Ivarsflaten 2008). This logic implies that when considering how economic motivations may relate to RRWP vote, it is essential to distinguish that citizens who have characteristics typically in line with the core RRWP electorate. Therefore, in line with the discussion above, I propose that ego-centric economic motivations are less predictive of the RRWP vote choices of the habitual voter group leading to the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 1** *(habitual voter hypothesis):* The role of economic motivations will be less decisive for the habitual radical-right voter.

More concretely, socio-economic risks should be less predictive for voters with a higher level of subjective economic threat from immigration (***Hypothesis 1a***), a higher level of cultural threat from immigration (***Hypothesis 1b***), lower education (***Hypothesis 1c***), right-wing ideological identification (***Hypothesis 1d***). Yet, it does not directly follow that this should hold for all RRWP voters. (Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020, Beramendi et al. 2015). This statement is particularly true if we think of the explosive increase in the radical-right voters in the last two decades. In his respect, it is more difficult to reconcile the idea that these culturally motivated conventional voters are the *only* ones supporting RRWPs. Moreover, even though there are other attitudinal cleavages, such as the self-reported placements with regards to universalism or authoritarianism, that can predict the RRWP vote (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013), much of this is

highly correlated with the educational profiles and partisanship of voters (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018). Therefore, they are less helpful when discerning different groups and motivations amongst the RRWP electorate. In this respect, transcending the analysis of these habitual voters and their motivations, I suggest that economic grievances also have a considerable role in discerning RRWP voter success in the past decades.

The theoretical framework adds to the work highlighting that immigration positions alone do not explain the recent changes in the RRWP electorate (Mudde 1999, Derks 2006). Instead, recent studies have shown that perceptions of economic resource scarcity, future uncertainty in societies, and unequal chances of preserving socio-economic status and security in the future seem to lead to political demands aligned with the new policy formula of RRWPs (Magni 2020, Kurer 2020, Engler and Weisstanner 2020). Changing economic strategies of the radical-right by moving towards an inegalitarian provision of security matched the demands of a broader section of the electorate, who are materially motivated. Moreover, such economic grievances may have roots not only in the potential consequences of immigration but also in the unequal distribution of economic chances and risks associated with possible losses due to the economic effects of technological advancements and globalisation (Kurer 2020, Antonucci et al. 2017).

In light of the evidence on the importance of real or perceived future losses rather than current actual hardship in RRWP voting (Antonucci et al. 2017, Kurer et al. 2019, Mutz 2018), I conceptualise economic vulnerability from a risk-based perspective rather than static indicators of education, class or income. In terms of identifying how such risks are distributed amongst the electorate, I focus on the objective risk of job loss (Rehm 2016). When workers worry about losing their jobs or do lose their job, this has a distinct effect on how they see themselves in society, altering their political responses (Anderson and Pontusson 2007). The potential risk of losing employment captures consequences for socio-economic vulnerability both in the immediate and in the short-term due to income and status loss, withdrawal from social life, adverse effects in the family and personal life. It also has far-reaching long-term consequences affecting future earnings and wealth. Therefore, job loss risk relates to both a real objective economic loss but is also a reliable indicator of perceived subjective status loss with strong emotional responses attached to it (Brand 2015).

Considering such risks of unemployment, however, makes the issue of using absolute measures of vulnerability problematic both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, Foley

(1967) demonstrated that the preferred redistribution level of citizens is determined not by their absolute wages but by where they fall within the income distribution. Indeed, recent evidence adds to this and demonstrates a robust link between such unequally distributed economic risks and political demands and responses (Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016) linked to worsening subjective well-being (Smith and Pettigrew 2015). On the one hand, figuring out who may be likely to benefit from social protection or less immigration necessitates identifying who is vulnerable and exposed to higher risk in each context. On the other hand, occupational groups are rooted in economic interests, skill, class, and education characteristics simultaneously. Therefore, relatively higher occupational job loss risk within the country is a correlate of who will feel as they are on the wrong side of the changes resulting from the economic and social transformations in the recent decades (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Gidron and Hall 2017). Empirically, to grasp what it means to have a certain level of risk in each country in a given period, it is necessary to focus on the distribution of such threats as a whole in each context rather than absolute indicators (Burgoon et al. 2019, Milanovic 2000). Therefore, in comparative studies, job loss risks as economic vulnerabilities should be examined with the contexts through which they are born from with benchmarks determining the relative position of citizens.

Exposure to these unjust higher socio-economic risk leads to a two-fold demand for insurance to compensate but in such a way that not only redistributes and protects but also one would adjust for these risks only in favour of the in-groups (Magni 2020, Blumer 1958). Citizens who are relatively worse-off in terms of risks bear fears of falling even further behind in the future motivating them to draw social boundaries between themselves and others for which immigrants become the natural 'other' in the society (Kuziemko et al. 2014). While demanding more equality and protection to correct for their unfairly behind position at home labour markets, relatively more vulnerable voters have exclusivity demands related to who reaps the benefits of these equalising efforts (Elchardus and Spruyt 2012, Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). This specific demand profile moves them from the mainstream right due to lack of emphasis in security provision and inequality correction while at the same time distances them from the left, both mainstream and radical, due to their lack of focus on exclusion leading to the following hypothesis:

> **Hypothesis 2** *(sympathy voter hypothesis)*: Citizens exposed to relatively higher economic risk will be more likely to vote for RRWPs over other options.

3.2 Exclusionary security and the new RRWP formula

So far, I argued that relatively more risk exposed voters will choose to vote for radical-right wing parties based on preserving their prospective status (Kurer et al. 2019, Burgoon et al. 2019). In this second part, I turn to discuss the 'new' programmatic appeal of RRWPs for these relatively worse-off risk exposed citizens. I argue that the new RRWP agenda of exclusionary security provision, i.e. nativist protection over domestic resources such as jobs and welfare, is crucial in understanding how these parties have been able to attract economically vulnerable voters. More specifically, the emphasis on exclusionary security, i.e. job security and social protection measures exclusive to natives, shifted RRWP positions from the economic right to the centre (or even further left). At the same time, their ownership of the anti-immigrant stance allowed them to preserve their competitive edge in the cultural so-called second dimension (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019). Therefore, based on a spatial logic of voting, this means that for the higher risk exposed citizens, RRWPs presented the closest policy offering matching both their need for insurance and demands for exclusivity simultaneously (Magni 2020). To be sure, this is not to suggest that economically vulnerable voters *only* demand a restriction of welfare access for immigrants. Indeed, the more risk exposed voters demand more security overall (Rehm 2016, Anderson and Pontusson 2007). However, here, I discuss how growing welfare scarcity, labour market dualisation, and inequalities made exclusionary security plausible and attractive over other political options.

Blaming immigration and minority groups to appeal to the economic grievances of citizens has long been an economically costless way of the radical-right for reaching out to voters (Rydgren 2008, Ivarsflaten 2008). Yet, sharing jobs and resources with immigrants were not solely responsible for altering the future status security perceptions of the workforce in the past decades. The disappearance of critical elements of the post-war safety nets led to the erosion of the egalitarian and solidarity-based welfare consensus undermining the basis of social citizenship and institutional values of equality and solidarity (Lefkoridi and Michel 2014). I argue that gradually sharing more socio-economic privileges with non-citizens at times of growing economic uncertainty and unevenly distributed economic chances underpinned grievances towards governments (Derks 2006, Magni 2020). Thus, the simultaneous occurrence of such developments in the past decades provided a prime opportunity for RRWPs.

Citizens who seek protection due to their relatively higher risk exposed position seem to face a fundamental tension of interests with voting for mainstream right or left-wing parties (Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011). This is because they perceive promoting solidarity and compensation *only* with native workers as maximising their chances of conserving socio-economic status under such current conditions of inequality of chances and growing risk (Magni 2020). Therefore, RRWPs became an attractive option even for those who do not identify with radical-right ideologies or nativism but instead see their status disproportionately at risk in their society. RRWPs benefited from this tension between a demand for exclusive security and the distrust towards the incumbent parties distinguishing themselves from both the mainstream and radical left-wing and mainstream right-wing parties in improving their electoral chances (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018, Elchardus and Spruyt 2012). Overall, I contend that such a link between the radical-right agendas and socio-economic risk explains the economic motivations underpinning the RRWP vote in advanced democracies. Based on this logic, I formulate the following *exclusionary security hypothesis*:

> **Hypothesis 3**: Citizens exposed to relatively higher economic risk will have a more exclusionary view of who should benefit from domestic resources underpinning their economic motivations of voting for RRWPs.

4. Empirical Analysis

For the analysis, I use nine waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002 to 2018 (every two years), across 14 countries. Issue-specific waves of the ESS provide data for assessing the two dimensions of the exclusionary security agenda of the RRWPs. At the individual level, all active labour market participants of working age (18-65) are included if they hold the citizenship of their country of residence and are eligible to vote in national elections.[1] I

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[1] There are two important issues of note related to the sample at the individual level. First, I consider all employed workers and unemployed respondents actively looking for employment for whom data on their last occupation is available in my sample. I highlight, however, that the framework of socio-economic risks implies a prospective rather than realised loss. In this respect, the unemployed have already *lost* their status. Since I would like to present a

construct the dependent variable by coding the responses to the ESS question item 'Which party did you vote for in the last general election?' into five options. The choices I code are the four main party families; radical or mainstream left- or right-wing parties, and another category for *other* parties that are outside of these four categories. This is important since taking into account the full set of political choices across the party competition is necessary for estimating parameters that are reliable and unbiased in vote choice models (Whitten and Palmer 1996). Table A2 details the party coding strategy I used for my dependent variable. I triangulate my coding using the party family classifications from the ParlGov dataset (Döring and Manow 2016) and other notable research on the topic (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018, Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018, Marks et al. 2015). Relatedly, I exclude respondents who report to have not turned out to limit the model as a comparison of voters with voters rather than include voters and non-voters.[2] This choice is because economic and cultural motivations influence turning out behaviour differently from vote choices (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013).

I sample countries, first, by comparability of economic and political dynamics as advanced post-industrial democracies and development of party competition spaces and welfare state institutions. Countries should also be comparable in terms of exposure to immigration, cultural heterogeneity, and globalisation. Therefore, I exclude the Central and Eastern European countries from my sample. To correctly estimate the probability of RRWP choice given the other four options, I include all country-years where an RRWP appears as an option in the set of choices in the relevant ESS item. Based on this, I exclude Ireland and Spain,[3] as well as several waves from Sweden and the United Kingdom in which the survey item does not include RRWP as an option in the question. Overall, the analysis covers 34 different RRWPs from 85 country-

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comprehensive account of the economic voting motivations, I keep all active workforce participants. However, strictly following a framework of risks, a suitable approach could be restricting the sample only to the employed workers. Ensuring that my sampling does not drive my results, I exclude the unemployed respondents and report that my results do not change, see Table A49. Second, resampling by excluding the self-employed due to their relatively independent status also does not change the results, see Table A39.

[2] Keeping non-voter respondents in the sample and using 'no turnout' as a sixth option of political behaviour do not change the findings of this study, see pp.50-55 in the appendix.

[3] One thing of note is that VOX in Spain has significantly increased its voters in recent years but does not appear in my sample. This is because, along with Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal, Spain's data from the latest ESS wave fielded in 2018 and early 2019 have not yet been released at time of this analysis (15 May 2020).

year units, as presented in Table 1.[4] Even though the paper is interested in testing a bottom-up theory, there are two critical considerations related to the supply-side dynamics at the country and political party levels.

Table 1: Parties coded as belonging to the RRWP family in the sample 2002-2018[5]

Country	Party Names (RRWP parties coded & Country-years included in the sample)
Austria	**FPÖ** (2002-2006, 2014-2018); **BZÖ** (2006, 2014-2016)
Belgium	**VB** (2002-2018); **FN** (2002-2018); **PP** (2010-2018)
Switzerland	**SVP/UDC** (2002-2018); **SD** (2002-2012); **FP** (2002-2006) **Lega dei Ticinesi** (2002-2018); **MCG** (2012-2014, 2018); **PNS/PNOS** (2012)
Germany	**Die Republikaner** (2002-2012); **NPD/DVU** (2002-2008); **AfD** (2014-2018); **NPD** (2010-2018)
Denmark	**DF** (2002-2014); **FP** (2002-2006)
Finland	**True Finns** (2002-2018); **SKS** (2010); **Change 2011** (2012-2014)
France	**FN** (2012-2018); **MPF** (2012-2016)
Greece	**LAOS** (2004, 2008-2010); **Golden Dawn** (2010)
Italy	**Lega Nord** (2012, 2018); **CasaPound Italia** (2018)
Netherlands	**List Pim Fortuyn** (2008)**; PVV** (2008-2018); **FvD** (2018)
Norway	**FrP** (2002-2010)
Portugal	**PNR** (2002-2016)
Sweden	**SD** (2010-2016)
United Kingdom	**BNP** (2006); **UKIP** (2006, 2014-2018)

The first is concerning the variation in the political and electoral institutions. If there are insurmountable institutional constraints preventing entry of a new party into the political space, this would mean that it is impossible to observe and assess the implications of the theory. The geographical focus of the paper is on European countries with long histories of democratic politics and mostly proportional representation systems, with only a few exceptions. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume there are no cases where the entry of a new party or the emergence of a smaller party is institutional impossible. Even if this assumption does not hold, mainstream conservative parties will possibly absorb these voters, who would have otherwise been preferring an RRWP within the framework of this paper. Alternatively, voters may not turn out at all if there no viable option matching their exclusionary protectionist demands.

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[4] Further details of the sample are available in Table A4. Tables A5-A7 present the distribution of respondents' vote choices and parties they 'feel closest to' in the ESS sample.

[5] See Table A50 for the full versions of the party names abbreviated here.

Since the theoretical framework of the paper refers specifically to the probability of voting for RRWPs given all other options, in the absence of an RRWP in the question item, it is not possible to construct the dependent variable to match this interest. However, I deal with such potential selection bias at the country-year level by replicating my findings using a full sample of countries and waves with or without RRWPs in the political competition and use not turning out as the reference category.[6] I confirm that my results are not sample dependent using resampling by jackknife standard errors, i.e. replicating models by dropping one country-year at a time, see Table A36, and with bootstrapped standard errors calculated by replications in country-year and country-year-occupation clusters, see Table A37 and A38.

The second consideration relates to the supply-side characteristics at the political party level. The sampled RRWPs include new radical-right parties such as the *Alternative für Deutschland (*AfD*),* more conventional ones such as the *Front National (*FN*)*, as well as those who made it to the government like the *Schweizerische Volkspartei (*SVP*).* While some of these use populist political strategies more than others, all of them advance the extreme right-wing agenda with a strong emphasis on nativism and anti-immigration policies as theorised in the framework of the paper. In addition to the evidence in earlier work (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Lefkoridi and Michel 2014), using the Chapel Hill expert survey data on party positions, I confirm that positions on economic policy positions are similar between mainstream right and RRWPs. Also, over time, in cases such as in Denmark and Finland, RRWPs have adopted much more redistributive stances that are closer to the centre-left. Importantly, both weighted and unweighted by salience, there are marked cleavages on immigration policy positions between RRWPs and other parties (Beramendi et al. 2015, Marks et al. 2015).[7]

Chapel Hill data on the supply-side of the political competition, thus, reveal that while RRWPs undoubtedly propose the most exclusionary and nativist policy agendas, there is heterogeneity on the level of security they provide in the economic axis. Therefore, the analysis constitutes a hard test for the exclusionary security hypothesis because there is variation across

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[6] Higher risk decreases chances for all other options in favour of not turning out except for RRWPs, see Table A22. This lends some support to the idea that economic risks may simultaneously lead to either not turning out or voting for RRWP. While outside of the scope of this study, this is presumably a great deal related to the specific offers of RRWPs in each country and can be explored in further research.

[7] See pp. 23-27 in the appendix for an overview.

my RRWP cases and because I do not exclude an RRWP case if it has not adjusted its redistributive politics as much as others. For instance, my sample includes cases such as the AfD or the UK Independence Party (UKIP) with a lower degree of emphasis on security. Such cases at the level of the RRWP policy supply can potentially underestimate the economically motivated relationships tested here. However, in the observation period, the trend is that even typically economically liberal nativist parties such as the FN have turned away from endorsing less state intervention to emphasising exclusive solidarity reserved for natives only (Stockemer and Barisione 2017). In this way, the results of this comparative cross-sectional pooled analysis of demand-side dynamics should be read as tested under the conditions of an 'on average' supply of exclusive security at the party level.

Finally, since both within and across survey waves, ESS interview dates fluctuate between two years, I also match survey wave *t*, with objective job loss risk measures from *t-1* and replicate my results, see Table A35. Another, perhaps more important, issue to consider is regarding the construction of the ESS voting question, which does not ask future vote intentions but instead how respondents voted in the last general election. I collect data across all country-year waves and match the risk measure variables to the exact year of which the previous general election was held. This alternative approach reflects the risk exposure of respondents at the time of the election year. I replicate my estimations using the variables of risk matched to the exact election year finding the same results.[8] Related to such issues of time-ordering and retrospective question item in the ESS, I replicate my main findings using the ESS item asking which party respondents feel closest at the given year of the survey. All results presented for the behavioural voting measure reveal the same results using this attitudinal political closeness measure to a party family, see pp.55-56 in the appendix.

4.1 Relative unemployment risks and economic insecurity

I draw on data from the European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) to build a dataset for measuring job loss risks disaggregated by 1-digit and 2-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88/ISCO-08) categories applying and extending the strategy in existing research (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019). Accordingly, first, I calculate the share percentage of

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[8] See Table A10 for closest previous election year for each wave and Table A34 for the results.

unemployment rates within each occupation task category for each year and in each country following earlier work. Since I am primarily interested in capturing the risk structure of respondents employed in a specific job at a given *year* in a given *country* context, I preserve the variation of the task groups without classifying them into class, gender, age groups, or other theoretical aggregations.

Rehm reports that there is little difference between using 2-digit more fine-grained codes to the 1-digit ones in terms of outcome and measurement (2016). There are, however, two advantages of calculating economic risk at 1-digit occupational level. First, 1-digit occupational classification ensures comparability of measurement over the period that I study since occupational codes are broken in time-series due to ISCO re-categorisation in 2008.[9] Second, the use of 1-digit level minimises missingness, coming from the ELFS samples, and avoids inferences based on small cell calculations. To check the sensitivity of my results on these measurement differences, I calculate both 2-digit and 1-digit occupational unemployment rates using the ELFS waves and confirm that the two measures are very strongly correlated.[10] I present my main findings using the 1-digit thicker aggregation of jobs into major task groups. I replicate the results presented here with more fine-grained 2-digit occupational unemployment rates and reveal that the results do not change, see pp. 47-49 in the appendix. Results from the 2-digit codes further confirm that the effect of risk is not only due to its correlation to larger social class categorisations. The strategy here is line with approaches that aim to inspect socio-economic risks through occupationally rooted social class group categories as well (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, Oesch and Rennwald 2018). In addition to the theoretical advantages of occupational risk-based measures, using continuous risk levels as opposed to categorical indicators add another layer to our knowledge on what about occupational categories may be related to political responses from a channel of socio-economic risks.

The nine ISCO categories I consider are as follows: Managers (1), Professionals (2), Technicians and associate professionals (3), Clerical support workers (4), Service and sales workers (5), Skilled agriculture, forestry, and fishery workers (6), Craft related trades workers (7), Plant operators and assemblers (8), Elementary occupations (9), see Figure 1. Calculating the occupational unemployment rates of individuals is the first step of measuring the relative socio-

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[9] See details of the different occupational categorisations in Table A8 and Table A9.
[10] See pp 21-22 in the appendix.

economic risk exposure of an individual in any given context. In the next step, I relativise my risk measure by obtaining the ratio of occupational unemployment rates at a given year t to the national average unemployment rate in that same t similar to earlier work on the political consequences of economic risk inequalities (Kurer et al. 2019). Thus, as well as nested in their country and year context, respondents' occupational category at a given year and country determine their relative risk exposure ($\bar{x}$: 0.87, s: 0.42). I link the ELFS data to ESS by taking each respondent's occupation and country in each year wave and match with the occupational relative unemployment risk exposure variables I calculate at the 1-digit or 2-digit ISCO levels.

Figure 1: Distribution of relative unemployment risk exposure across occupations

Figure 1 presents the country-year pooled occupational relative socio-economic risks. First, risk exposure at the two ends of the distribution correlates with the educational attainment, and broadly class, in job categories. The three occupations on top requiring at least a higher education degree is relatively more shielded from the risk of unemployment compared to the bottom skilled and unskilled manual work occupations. Second, while higher skill-level occupations, such as managers, professionals, and associate professionals display a right-skewed

distribution, the lower skill occupations, such as plant operators, assemblers, and elementary occupations, have a more dispersed distribution. This picture is in line with the previous findings regarding the heterogeneity of political behaviour, particularly at the lower end of the socio-economic distribution (Gingrich and Häuserman 2015, Rovny and Rovny 2017). Third, in the case of clerical, service, and lower-skilled workers, more than half of the citizens, seem to be doing worse off compared to their country average. Thus, there is a significant critical mass of voters working in jobs experiencing higher unemployment risk relative to the average performance.

An observable distinction regarding the distribution of risk pools across country contexts relates to how risks are evenly or more unequally distributed within countries, see Figure A1. There is even dispersion of relative risk in countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and Ireland, where the average unemployment rates are higher in the first place. I note that both Spain and Ireland are two countries that are excluded from the sample because they do not have a comparable radical-right party in their political competition space. On the contrary, contexts with lower unemployment rates on average such as Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden have a much more skewed distribution of risks. In these cases where the majority enjoys a relatively secure position, an unlucky few disproportionately experience exposure to the risk of losing their jobs. Importantly, such inequality of prospects persists, despite the prosperous, on average, job market conditions in their country. This descriptive picture is of note, given the recent findings revealing that suffering economic vulnerability in well-off contexts deepens the importance of such economic grievances giving way to a higher likelihood of radicalisation in party choices (Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018).

Is such relative unemployment risk exposure a good measure to capture job and income insecurity, creating more pessimistic status expectations? Assessing whether voters are indeed able to pinpoint to the specific national or occupational level unemployment rates is well-beyond the scope of this research. However, I sustain that the relative risk position of a job compared to the average worker is a good predictor of identifying citizens who are higher in economic anxieties. With or without benchmarks, occupationally rooted unemployment risks are well-established as good predictors of socio-economic risks and economic grievances (Rehm 2016, Kurer et al. 2019, Rovny and Rovny 2017). To establish further in my sample, I use OLS estimations with country and year fixed effects predicting subjective job and income security of

voters using rotating waves from the ESS.[11]   Figure 2 presents the average marginal effects of these covariates on the higher job and income insecurity perceived by voters, see Table A11 for the table of results.

Figure 2: Relative unemployment risk exposure and subjective economic insecurity, 95 % CIs

Note: Reference group for employment status is 'permanent contract', for the age variable it is '35-50 years old', and for the area of residence it is 'big city'.

Figure 2 reveals that even when accounting for the differences in the employment status, education, income, and the type of area respondents live in, relative risk exposure is positively associated with subjective feelings of job insecurity.[12] Beyond just related to jobs being relatively worse-off in the risk distribution is also predictive of subjective perception of losing income. This can also be thought to influence such respondents to believe that they will

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[11] 'Job is not secure' item is from 2004 and 2010 waves. The other two items are from 2008 and 2016 waves.

[12] The model predicting the item 'job is not secure' excludes the unemployed respondents since the question is irrelevant for them due to their current state of job loss.

potentially have to rely on the social protection and compensation measures provided by the state in the future. Altogether, a higher risk exposure seems to be associated with about 0.20 percentage points higher subjective socio-economic anxiety. These results are in line with the assumptions that at higher levels of relative risk exposure, voters perceive their future economic status as more insecure and worry about their projected income and employment status.

4.2 Relative unemployment risk exposure and electoral behaviour

Next, to test my first two hypotheses, I estimate multinomial logistic regressions with five choice outcomes. In addition to relative risk exposure, I stepwise add theoretically relevant covariates of vote choice.[13] The first set of alternative explanations are related to the socio-demographic characteristics of voters: whether respondents are unemployed and employed with a temporary or unlimited work contract, age, gender, union membership, income, immigration background, subjective assessment of how respondents feel about their household income and, years of education.[14] Next, I add theoretically relevant subjective attitudes available all waves, including political interest and religiosity. I construct a measure for redistribution preferences using the following question item asking the extent to which the respondents agree with the statement that 'the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels' measured on a five-point scale from 0 to 4.

For perceived threats from immigration, I use two items, one focusing on economic and another on cultural threats where each item scales go from 0 to 10, higher values indicating more negativity. For cultural threat, I use the following 'would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?' item. For economic threat, I use the question of whether respondents think 'it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries'. I account for partisanship using subjective placement on a left-right scale. Lastly, given such emphasis in RRWPs, I consider distrust in politicians and control for respondent's self-reported evaluations of the satisfaction with the state of country's economy, democracy, government, and preferences for

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[13] Table A3 presents the details of the question items used in the analysis.
[14] Alternating the measurement of education in years with categorical educational attainment does not alter the results, see Table A42.

an authoritarian government (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018).[15] All estimations include country and year fixed effects to remove confounding and account for the unobserved heterogeneity between countries and periods.[16] I use robust country, year, and occupation clustered standard errors considering the nested structure of the data.

At each step of the estimations, I find a strong correlation between those who are exposed to relatively higher unemployment risks and voting for RRWPs over other options, see tables A12 and A13 for full results. Table 2 presents the percentage change in the odds of RRWP voting for a standard deviation increase in theoretically relevant covariates estimated from the fully specified voting behaviour model. There are three crucial findings in Table 2. First, a standard deviation increase in relative risk exposure is associated with higher odds of an RRWP vote compared to *centre-right* by 21.3 per cent, *centre-left* by 13.1 per cent, *radical-left* by 13.3, and *other* party families by 29.5, when all relevant covariates and political attitudes are accounted for. These results support the main argument of the paper concerning economically motivated RRWP voters. Both the magnitude and the predictiveness of these associations are substantial and comparable to the effects of income, education, other theoretically relevant political attitudes in RRWP voting studies (van Hauwaert and van Kessel 2018, Rydgren 2008).

Second, the findings from Table 2 reveal that RRWPs are successful in blurring their position on the ideological left-right scale and redistributive policy gaining voters at the expense of the mainstream right. Higher demands for more redistribution correlate with increased odds of being an RRWP voter compared to the mainstream right by 22.1 per cent. This result seems to imply that the decline of the mainstream right vote in the last two decades may not just be due to the nativist arguments of the radical-right but also relate to their lack of competitiveness in the economic dimension as well. Ideologically, however, though placement towards the right is not a predictor between the mainstream and radical right, a substantial ideological distinction holds for RRWP voters as opposed to left-wing options.

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[15] See Table A1 the summary statistics in the sample.

[16] I replicate the country and year fixed effects models using country-year dummies instead and find that the results do not change, see Table A33.

Table 2: Percentage Δ in odds of RRWP voting (pairwise contrasts) for a standard deviation increase in theoretically relevant covariates

RRWP vs…	*Centre-right*		*Center-left*		*RLWP*		*Other*	
	% Δ	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**
Relative risk	21.3	0.000	13.1	0.000	13.3	0.005	29.5	0.000
Economic threat	37.4	0.000	44.6	0.000	54.3	0.000	64.7	0.000
Cultural threat	46.3	0.000	55.6	0.000	66.0	0.000	75.7	0.000
Pro-redistribution	22.1	0.000	-6.8	0.012	-25.5	0.000	0.3	0.907
Education	-19.9	0.000	-13.5	0.000	-22.9	0.000	-33.1	0.000
Income	-10.5	0.000	-2.3	0.459	12.6	0.001	4.4	0.169
Left-right scale	-1.0	0.813	375.5	0.000	750.1	0.000	186.0	0.000
Religiosity	-21.4	0.000	-9.7	0.000	10.7	0.003	-17.3	0.000
Authoritarianism	11.2	0.000	9.4	0.000	13.8	0.000	33.4	0.000
Distrust in *politicians*	18.5	0.000	28.6	0.000	14.4	0.002	17.1	0.000
Dissatisfaction w/*economy*	-3.6	0.276	-7.0	0.044	-5.8	0.168	1.0	0.784
Dissatisfaction w/*democracy*	25.9	0.000	40.4	0.000	8.7	0.054	22.3	0.000
Dissatisfaction w/*gov't*	28.8	0.000	4.6	0.298	-6.6	0.224	3.0	0.508
Political interest	-6.2	0.006	-0.7	0.795	-8.3	0.009	-7.2	0.005

Number of individuals: 39,824 Log-likelihood: -43907

Consistent with the idea of *typical* RRWP voter, perceived economic and cultural threats from immigration increase the odds of voting for an RRWP. As argued, this is how RRWPs distinguish themselves from other options. These results are congruent with the proposition that RRWPs brand themselves as the providers of security on both economic and cultural grounds protecting citizens from the effects of immigration. As expected, authoritarian values, distrust in politicians, and dissatisfaction with democracy predict higher voters for RRWPs. Interestingly, while perceived economic threats from immigration predict RRWP vote in line with much of the earlier work (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020), those dissatisfied with the national economy as a socio-tropic evaluation seem to favour mainstream left-wing parties instead**.**

To inspect the substantive effect of relative risk more closely, panel (a) in Figure 3 presents the predicted probability of RRWP vote over relative risk exposure. Figure 3 visualises that the probability of an RRWP vote for someone with half the risk than the national average is about 3 per cent. Comparatively, this probability is just about more than 6 per cent for someone with double the risk than the average. While the size of this effect of risk seems small, it is nevertheless considerable. Despite their growing electoral appeal, it is plausible that the new

'sympathiser' RRWP voters still comprise a small part of the whole voter population (Stockemer, Halikiopoulou, and Vlandas 2020, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020). Accordingly, a 3 per cent change in the probability over this socio-economic risk measure, indicate a non-negligible economic factor predicting these votes even when related alternative elements of the radical-right voters are included in my models.

Figure 3: Relative unemployment risk exposure and RRWP vote probability, 95% CIs

(a) Predicted probability of RRWP vote and relative risk
(b) Distribution of the AMEs of relative risk

While average the marginal effects reflect the change in the probability of becoming an RRWP voter with a standard deviation increase diverging from an otherwise average voter, they do not tell us the whole story. Since I am interested in untangling for whom self-interested economic motivations are relevant and for whom this is inconsequential, I investigate the marginal effects of risk exposure across the sample. To that end, I visualise the distribution of the marginal effects of relative risk for each respondent in the sample. The left panel (b) in Figure 3 shows that relative risk exposure positively correlates with the RRWP vote chances differently from zero across the sample. As expected, the importance of such an economically motivated factor

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varies, with an average of about 1 per cent increase per each standard deviation increase in relative risk.[17] Overall, while the magnitude of the effect of risk is indeed small, the predicted AMEs of risk exposure is robust across this sample. The relatively smaller effect size of economic grievances is not surprising given earlier work (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2020) and does not go against the argument of the paper. Factors identifying typical RRWP supporters such as education, partisanship, and attitudes towards immigration are the largest in magnitude. However, even when considering such these motivations, there seems to be a role for having relatively higher socio-economic risk exposure as a robust predictor of the RRWP vote.

As Figure 3 presented, the relevance of economic risk varies across the electorate in line with the theoretical framework. To assess this more precisely, I estimate the effect of risk conditioned by the *habitual* RRWP voter characteristics, which are revealed here as robust and sizeable predictors of this behaviour, i.e. economic and cultural threat from immigration, low education and right-wing partisanship. Figure 4 plots the average marginal effects of relative risk on the probability of RRWP vote conditioned by these voter characteristics to disentangle the role of economic voters across the sympathiser and habitual voters of RRWPs, see p.35 in the appendix for the full tables of results. Figure 4 displays consistent evidence with the theoretical propositions of the paper related to the heterogeneity of motivations in the recent radical-right vote electorate.

Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4 show evidence suggesting that while risk exposure correlates with higher chances of an RRWP vote, it is not predictive of the RRWP vote for respondents expressing high levels of economic and cultural threat due to immigration. Conversely, for those with the most tolerant and moderate attitudes towards immigration, risk exposure predicts more chances of an RRWP vote regardless of their lack of ethnocentrism and intense prejudice. Therefore, if we consider those at the higher end of the immigration threat attitudes as the *habitual* or *partisan* RRWP voters, then, the evidence in Figure 4, supports the idea of heterogeneity of motivations in the RRWP electorate. The results seem to support the argument that relatively higher socio-economic risk exposure plays a non-negligible role in

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[17] Moreover, I further confirm that objective and subjective measures of risk and economic insecurity operate in the same direction corroborating the results presented here related to the link between socio-economic risk and RRWP voting, see Table A14.

predicting RRWP supporters, except for those with strong anti-immigration attitudes in the first place.[18]

Figure 4: AMEs of relative risk on RRWP vote across respondent characteristics, 95% CIs

The observations from panels (a) and (b) are corroborated when considering lower education as a determining factor of the typical RRWP electorate (Arzheimer 2012, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2018). The panel (c) in Figure 4 reveals that roughly around and below primary school education, about ten years of study, risk exposure does not predict the RRWP vote in line with the *habitual* voter hypothesis. Hence, this educational gap and subsequent social and cultural implications are strong indicators of the RRWP vote yielding risk unpredictive. Yet, for those with higher than ten years of educational attainment, constituting the majority in Europe, a

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[18] See also Figure A11 visualizing that these economic and cultural threat are most important for voters with low socio-economic risk exposure with their effects decreasing as we move from relative best-off workers to the worst-off.

higher risk is positively associated with a higher RRWP vote probability. Thus, consistent with the theoretical framework, I find that the predictive role of unemployment risks is less critical for voters with less than ten years of schooling. Likewise, panel (d) reveals that across all subjective ideological positions, relative risk has a positive marginal effect on the RRWP vote. While markedly smaller than in the right-wing end, the relationship holds even for those with far-left ideological identification. Importantly, the uncertainty of the effect of risk expands as we move from more left-wing voters to those with right-wing identification.[19] This result makes sense when considering that some economically vulnerable voters with right-wing partisanship may still turn to mainstream right-wing or other parties in specific country contexts depending on the supply-side of the RRWP proposals.

4.3 Does the exclusionary security policy work for RRWPs?

The paper proposed that the sympathy for the RRWPs based on risk exposure is related to the exclusionary security proposals of the RRWP political agenda. Thus, to test the exclusive security hypothesis underpinning the argument of the paper, I turn to the two issue-specific waves of the ESS from 2002 and 2014 on immigration. First, I explore whether relative unemployment risk is associated with exclusionary attitudes, (a) in the job market and (b) in welfare provision. I measure the two dimensions of these attitudes using the following items on a 0-10 scale:

- *Fiscal threat*: 'On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in [to health and welfare service] or put in more than they take out?' ($\bar{x}$: 5.44 s: 2.10)

- *Labour market threat*: 'Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?' ($\bar{x}$: 4.84 s: 1.98)

Using simple fully specified OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects, I confirm that those who are exposed to relatively higher risks systematically perceive immigrants as a burden to the welfare system and as bring in competition to the labour markets. Table A19 presents the

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[19] Ideology has, by and large, the same effect across the range of relative risk exposure, see Figure A11.

full results, and Figure 5 below visualises the effect of risk exposure and other theoretically relevant covariates on these two attitudes. The results in Figure 5 provide evidence for the exclusive security hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) suggesting that there is indeed a link between the idea of perceiving a potential benefit from excluding non-citizens from domestic resources and being more risk exposure. Being more risk exposed is correlated with higher fiscal threat attitudes by about 0.3 percentage points, whereas it is associated with higher job market threat by about 0.2 percentage points.

Figure 5: Risk and exclusionary security attitudes, AMEs (95% CIs)

Finally, do these exclusionary security attitudes predict a higher likelihood for an RRWP vote given other options? If this proposed link holds, I expect to see a significant relationship between these attitudes and the RRWP vote. Accordingly, I estimate multinomial logistic models to assess the relevance of these attitudes in predicting the RRWP vote. The vote choice models are identical to the specification as in the primary analysis. The findings in Table 3 have two relevant implications. Model 1 includes the fiscal threat dimension, and Model 2 includes the

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labour market threat dimension in the vote choice models. I choose to estimate these relationships in separate regressions since these dimensions are very strongly correlated. The results presented in Table 3 support precisely the logic that there is a positive relationship between stronger demand for exclusionary security and the RRWP vote, see Table A16 and A17 for the full results.

The results in Model 1 suggests that fiscal arguments in RRWP's political arsenal may be more critical for their success in garnering sympathy from citizens and distinguishing themselves from all other political options. This evidence also supports the argument that while RRWPs do not propose economic policies competing with left-wing parties in the conventional redistributive politics, they can edge them out through this passive provision of welfare by exclusion. These results are in line with much of the discussion in the literature on welfare chauvinism and exclusionary solidarity (Lefkoridi and Michel 2014, Magni 2020, Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011). Second, the argument widely sensationalised as 'immigrants taking away jobs' seems to be less predictive of choice between RRWPs and left-wing parties. However, a difference still holds for competing vis-à-vis the centre-right parties and other parties outside of the four main party families.[20]

Table 3: Percentage Δ in odds of RRWP voting (pairwise contrasts) for a standard deviation increase in exclusive security attitudes

RRWP vs…	*Center-right*		*Center-left*		*RLWP*		*Other*	
	% Δ	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**	**% Δ**	**P>|z|**
Model 1								
Fiscal threat	16.3	0.001	18.8	0.000	27.5	0.000	31.4	0.000
N: 13,739 Log likelihood: -17604.94 BIC: 36972.57								
Model 2								
Labour market threat	13.9	0.011	8.6	0.125	8.5	0.249	19.5	0.001
N: 13, 842 Log likelihood: -17698.8 BIC: 37161.66								

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[20] I also explore the conditional effects of risk based on these exclusionary security attitudes since these attitudes are strongly correlated with the economic and cultural threat variables, see Table A20 and Figure A15. I confirm that risk correlates with a higher probability of RRWP voter except for those with polarised views on either dimension.

Lastly, the framework here implies that the link between these exclusionary attitudes and the RRWP vote established over time through the supply-side adjustments. Therefore, their effects should be more substantial later in my observation period in 2014. Accordingly, I estimate the same models as in Table 3 in 2002 and 2014 rather than adopting a pooled approach, see Table A18. The results show that while fiscal competition is predictive in both years, it has a substantively bigger effect in attracting RRWP voters to in 2014 compared to 2002, see Figure A12. For job competition, while predictive of the RRWP vote in 2014, its positive effect on higher RRWP vote is not significant at the p<0.05 level, see Figure A13. Overall, I find evidence that the effectiveness of the nativist security appeal has become more important in 2014 compared to 2002.

4.4 Robustness and sensitivity

I conduct several empirical tests and diagnostics to check for the robustness of the results presented in the main analysis. First, as one of the core assumptions of the discrete choice non-linear estimations, I evaluate the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The tests reveal the suitability of this estimation and that the pairwise options in the outcome should not be collapsed (Long and Freese 2014, 407-411), see Table A21. Further, a binarised version of the dependent variable (1= RRWP vote, 0=all other options) supports the conclusions of the results presented here, see Table A40. Second, for my analysis, I exclude the use of a multi-level estimation strategy. Despite a sample of 85 country-year units, I have only 14 independent country-level observations, which is about the minimum size required for reliable inferences (Maas and Hox 2003). However, since the theoretical framework of the paper refers neither to country-year level variables nor cross-level interactions, there is neither theoretical nor empirical strong justification to use a multi-level modelling strategy. However, I replicate my results using hierarchical models explicitly modelling the nested structure in my data, see Table A41.

Third, I consider the possibility that the link between occupational risk and vote choice is confounded by the actual number of immigrant employment in each task. To check for this issue, I including a variable measuring the occupational immigrant rates in each occupation in my models and report that the results do not change, see Table A46. Fourth, given that it can alter employment opportunities and income trajectories, I account for the type of *residential area* of the respondents, see Table A47. Fifth, the relative unemployment risk measure is exogenous to

individual personality traits. However, such *personality characteristics* of voters should also be considered since the propensity to vote for an RRWP may be affected by voters' willingness to vote for a party with unknown and contested societal consequences (Kam 2012), see Table A43. Sixth, in 2007, the free movement and mobility area has been extended to the new member states of the EU. This development has increased both the actual number of economically motivated immigration and the salience of the issue from a fiscal and job competition perspective. Since my data is pooled, I explicitly account for this period effect by adding a pre- and post-2007 dummy variable testing whether this period effect conditions the socio-economic risk effects, see Table A84. Lastly, I account for *attitudes towards EU integration* and alternate my measure of *political distrust* given their links to the radical-right vote, see Table A44 and A45. Overall, I observe no substantive changes in the results presented in the analysis.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

To what extent and on what grounds voters in need of more protection and security vote for the radical-right? The study focused on the micro-level predictors of the RRWP vote and compared cross-sectional differences in electoral behaviour in different contexts at different periods. Based on my analysis of 14 advanced European democracies across the last two decades, economic motivations of voters, captured by their relatively higher risk exposure robustly correlate with voting for RRWPs. Importantly, these material self-interest considerations are less critical for the partisan and culturally motivated voters of RRWPs. These findings highlight the importance of recognising the heterogeneity that makes up the electorate of RRWPs in this century. The results provided evidence revealing that preferences for an exclusive provision of economic resources make policy agendas of RRWPs more attractive than other parties. In line with this proposition, I find that higher risk correlates with both jobs- and welfare-related threat perception distinguishing appeal of the radical-right parties for the economically vulnerable.

The paper makes several contributions to the existing comparative politics, electoral studies, and political economy literature. The analysis puts caution to the ongoing debates of RRWP success that rely heavily on an assumed surge of nativism and sociocultural cleavages (Bornschier and Kriesi 2013, Norris and Inglehart 2019, Ford and Goodwin 2010). Instead, the

findings suggest the insecurities of individuals in the labour markets have a non-negligible role in predicting the attractiveness of RRWPs in advanced democracies. I argue and find that exposure to the risk of losing socio-economic status is relevant precisely for voters that are not habitual radical-right voters. While evident cultural cleavages exist, substantive economic motivations rooted in less secure future trajectories and being worse-off amongst others at home predict radical-right voting in recent decades in line with the current work on the topic (Engler and Weisstanner 2020, Kurer 2020, Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). I confirm that these attitudes are prevalent amongst the relatively more risk exposed voters. This finding implies that cross-pressured by increasing inequalities and lagging compensation, the more risk exposed voters are prone to perceiving exclusionary security as a viable policy option for their grievances.

The study sheds light on the crisis of mainstream parties, and more importantly, the decline of left-wing politics in the last two decades, by bridging immigration and welfare politics. Based on the findings here, from a spatial perspective, it is possible to argue that the electoral losses faced by the social-democrats particularly from the economically vulnerable working-class voters may be explained by their inability to provide nativist protection. These voters simultaneously demand equalizing measures and market corrections for their worse-off position in their country while perceiving outside groups as threats to the viability of these resources and sources of further uncertainty (Derks 2006, Achterberg, Houtman, and Derks 2011). Therefore, the paper cautions that attributing all immigration-related matters to a cultural dimension obscures the very real economic overtones of the RRWP agenda on welfare matters (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, 2020). Unfulfilled compensation demands faced with growing uncertainty and inequality appear to be decisive for the economically motivated RRWP electorate sympathising with exclusionary security (Magni 2020).

The empirical contributions of the study also add to broader political economy debates on the role of labour market vulnerabilities in politics (Marx and Picot 2020, Rovny and Rovny 2017). I make use of the European Labour Force Survey waves to calculate the relative occupational unemployment rates in European democracies both in one-digit and more fine-grained two-digit job major task group categories. This adds to and extends recent efforts in improving the measurement and conceptualisation of economic grievances and political responses (Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016). I show that relativised risk exposure based on occupational unemployment rates benchmarked to the national performance is a robust indicator

of future income and job insecurity. I argued that this measure is a good fit for comparative cross-sectional and over time research where each respondent is explicitly placed within the distribution of risk in the context that they live in rather than their insular position.

The theoretical framework of the paper rested on the idea that through a strategical manoeuvre of distancing themselves from liberal positions in the economic dimension, RRWPs edged out the mainstream right-wing. Instead, they adopted an exclusive and nativist security agenda allowing them to gain ground compared to the left-wing parties. This logic is arguably one of the essential channels by which the relatively more risk exposed became part of the electoral base of the RRWPs. However, while the paper focuses on voting probabilities based on observational survey data, it is an important question to ask from which parties the *sympathy* voters came from and if (or when) such sympathiser voters could become loyal supporters of RRWPs. Based on the findings here, higher economic risks should also be decisive in discerning switches to the RRWPs in the last decades. By using longitudinal panel data, future work can precisely study whether relatively higher socio-economic risks cause voters to switch back and forth between the radical-right and other parties over time.

While the analysis here focuses on bottom-up determinants, another issue to investigate further is whether having a competitor in the political space, specifically on exclusionary economic grounds affects the vote potential of RRWPs. In other words, if there is a competing exclusionary security provider, does that inhibit RRWP success? From the analysis here, one may think that the answer could be yes. However, recent evidence reveals that adopting a tough stance on immigration is not a fruitful strategy for mainstream left-wing parties. It appears that emphasising immigration issue in a negative light more so helps the non-incumbent mainstream right-wing parties (Downes and Loveless 2018, Spoon and Klüver 2020). Moreover, it is unclear as to what extent left-wing parties electorally can make credible claims on strict immigration policies without experiencing losses within *their* core electorate.

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Conclusion

1. Reviewing the Argument and Evidence

Today, there is almost a universal trend of the rising importance of immigration as a political issue and the popularity of exclusionary positions leveraged by radical right-wing parties. Despite the current upsurge in the politicisation of immigration and nativist reactions, immigration is an undeniable reality of European countries. However, once immovable objects of protection and security, welfare states of the twenty-first century are transformed, altering their capacity in preserving the economic security of their citizens. Moreover, the rapid transformation of the production regimes in European economies has left many workers worried about their future in the labour markets. How can we politically make sense of these complex realities in today's advanced democracies? The extant scholarship has addressed how the political economies of welfare states and immigration are politically connected (Crepaz 2008, Crepaz and Damron 2009, Pardos-Prado 2020, Burgoon and Rooduijn 2020). Yet, few studies have systematically examined the tension of economic insecurity and tolerance towards heterogeneity from a perspective of rising inequalities. This project has sought to fill such existing gaps by clarifying *on what basis*, *under what conditions*, and *which* political reactions stem from the politics of welfare and immigration at this period of economic transformations and globalisation.

Throughout each of the three papers, I focused on shedding light on how socio-economic inequalities shape states' policymaking capacity on immigration and the political reactions of citizens. When exposed to anxieties about future economic status risks, citizens are much more likely to fear immigration and be intolerant towards more ethnic heterogeneity. Empirical evaluations revealed that increasing unemployment risk inequalities, rather than a predisposition of anti-immigrant attitudes and socio-cultural differences, drove politics of immigration in the past two decades. I have argued that understanding the dynamics of group relations, by revisiting the group conflict theory, can help us make sense of the growing dominance of the issue in European politics. I had expected and empirically demonstrated that relatively higher socio-economic risk is positively associated with the increasing anti-immigrant sentiment. I find that this relationship holds across class and education cleavages and, more importantly, net of ethnic competition. I

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evaluated and confirmed that there is a robust and non-negligible link between relatively higher unemployment risk exposure and subjective economic threats, work-related anxieties, and worsened perceptions of future chances in the labour markets, driving fears about immigration.

But worsening immigrant-native relations and attitudinal changes are only part of the story. In terms of political and observable implications, I argued that precisely because of the uncertain nature of immigration in terms of consequences, relatively more risk-exposed citizens demand closure and limitation of immigration, which they perceive as introducing competitors for economic resources once exclusive to citizens only. Through cross-sectional comparative analyses in different European contexts and periods, I revealed that citizens are likely to demand more restriction and exclusivity if they are relatively more exposed to risks, arguably to secure themselves against future uncertainties and potential losses. I identified two key labour market institutions, employment protection and unemployment insurance, which can, in turn, alleviate or heighten these worries. Importantly, I find that more exclusive and particularistic labour market institutional contexts, which I linked to more regulated protection legislation and less decommodifying compensation schemes, seem to attenuate this risk-based economic threat effect on restrictiveness demands. If welfare-based compensation and restrictive policies with regards to immigration are two demands of the risk exposed citizens, their political behaviour may also reflect such policies. My analysis of the demand-side of the electoral behaviour seemed to support just that.

I argued that risk-exposed workers might be turning to radical-right parties in the last two decades, not because of a clear-cut xenophobic position or nationalism, but instead based on economic motivations. Radical-right parties, differently from other options in the supply-side, adjusted their economically liberal stances to a much more interventionist position and strongly advocated *ex-ante* insurance against immigration. I have demonstrated that this logic plays out, revealing a positive relationship between a relatively higher risk of losing socio-economic status and vote choice for radical-right parties. I have shown that there is an apparent heterogeneity of motivations within the electoral base of the radical-right between the habitual voters of these parties regardless of economic risk and those who vote precisely to insure themselves against future threats and uncertainty. Once unemployment risk inequalities are emphasised, the logic of radical-right party voting on economic motivations holds for a substantial part of the electorate in Europe in the past two decades. Several theoretical and policy implications flow from the central

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arguments and the results of the project. Below I discuss these contributions to the debates on the politics of immigration, politics of welfare, and party politics.

2. Implications for Immigration Politics

The project adds to the debates on the politics of immigration on four critical grounds. First, the results signal good and bad news for the future sustainability of ethnic heterogeneity in European democracies. From a positive perspective, if worries about immigration break out over time and change temporally, what we observe today in terms of rising concerns may likely be passing. Indeed, the analysis of the German case revealed that the current upsurge of negativity towards immigration is not new. The data showed similarly elevated levels of scepticism towards immigration around the mid-2000s. However, this was followed by a downward trend in negativity until 2013. For now, we do not know if we have hit the ceiling of rising negativity towards immigration and its position as a problem in European societies. However, experience provides some evidence suggesting that it may be and that a decline may follow such heightened opposition to immigration. On the contrary, however, there is also reason to think that the outlook may not be so positive. I argued and showed that such worsening of group relations correlates with increasing socio-economic inequalities. When viewed in this light, current period and future decades are structurally different from the early 2000s and are strikingly more risk-prone and uncertain. This idea suggests that if unequal risk distribution persists or gets worse, we may not have reached the ceiling of tension between immigrants and natives in European democracies yet.

It is highly notable that, notwithstanding the demographic shock of humanitarian immigrants post-2013, much of this rising tension has occurred in the absence of large-scale economic immigration or particularly threatening opening up of the border to non-European immigrants. Instead, European countries have become quite selective in terms of which immigrants they allow entry and settlement. Notably, they prioritise immigrants with higher income and human capital and those individuals that can bring economic and cultural added value to the host society. Considering that we see such a downturn of tolerance and backlash against immigration even in this reality supports the argument that the politics of immigration are now intimately linked to economic grievances that have little to do with immigration. The results of

this project, indeed, seem to support this view. Supposing it is right that natives are reactive towards immigration driven by their status anxieties and relatively worse-off position, further insecurities and inequalities can make immigration even more negatively politicised if these anxieties are left unchecked. In this way, we are in a place to explain not only individual differences but also shed some light on the politicisation of immigration even in areas with little ethnic heterogeneity, such as the case of Northern England in the Brexit vote. Either way, mitigating the sustainability of immigration and tolerance in host societies seem to rely on policymaking and emphasis on correcting for the unequal risk position of citizens.

This implication, of course, comes with a caveat and under the assumption that another policy issue like immigration similar in its effects on economic insecurity does not come along depressing the *relative* importance of immigration as a political issue weaponised by the far-right as the source of economic grievances. In this respect, I analysed immigration alone without comparing it to other matters. Moreover, due to the limitations of data availability, I studied *anti-immigration attitudes* and group relations separate from the *issue salience* of *immigration*. Importantly, positions and the salience of any given issue arguably jointly determine its political relevance and subsequent behavioural implications (Dennison 2019). Therefore, this is a particularly essential matter that future research should address. Furthermore, and on this front, future research can expand the analysis in this project by investigating dynamics of the immigration issue area within a broader context and relative to other policies with implications on the prospective status and relative deprivation of citizens such as trade, taxation, redistribution, and EU regional integration policies.

Another limitation of the project is regarding the single country case study I used in establishing the causal link between increasing risks with increasing negative attitudes. Germany is a representative case of the Western European dynamics in terms of the relationship between unemployment risks and reactions towards immigration. Yet, it is also a case with particularly good economic performance in these last decades. Moreover, it is a case where workers with higher education and skill sets that can keep up with the digitalisation and internationalisation of economic production are particularly well-off. Inevitably, then, despite the lack of increasing unemployment rates, certain occupations seem to be distinctly left out. Therefore, it would be well worth to expand the inquiry of this project from a longitudinal perspective to other representative cases of the European regions, most importantly focusing on the Southern European countries with

a lesser degree of economic growth but also fewer immigrants, as well as the more liberal economic contexts such as the UK or Switzerland with substantial ethnic heterogeneity.

Second, and related to the role of state interventions in shaping politics of immigration, one proposition of this project is that creating more chances for employment without chipping away from existing protection seems to be one of the most significant opportunities of welfare states. Existing work has already debated these issues within the scope of labour market dualisation and inside-outsider politics suggesting states have several options in shaping political reactions and economic worries. Through post-income market corrections, governments can lower the cost of job loss by providing non-market income. Another option would be to provide prospective security through policies that improve job market chances and reducing precarity cleavages in the labour markets. Importantly, it seems that there should be more political attention to levelling the playing field and paying attention to workers who have been adversely affected by the occupational changes in the past two decades. The project showed that these choices are not only essential for welfare politics and vote choices, as demonstrated in earlier work but have crucial implications for immigration politics today and potentially for the future.

If regardless of contract type, more regulated labour market conditions alleviate the link between risk and intolerance for all workers, reforming such institutions requires careful considerations. The analysis here showed that in such contexts of protected employment security demarcating rigid entry rules, there are less strong restrictiveness demands *vis-à-vis* immigrants and polarisation due to socio-economic risk exposure. This finding is not to suggest that more regulation in the labour markets is the solution. However, if the direction of post-industrial economies is to have fewer permanent contracts, then workers require at a minimum adequate protection against market shocks and arbitrary job losses lowering the pressure on their future anxieties.

Third, the analysis points to the fact that policymaking and political agendas on immigration and immigrant rights need to be reconsidered as a series of trade-offs. Related to sharing jobs with immigrants, I identify that factors shaping immigration-related worries, exclusivity demands, and subsequent political choices are beyond education, ideology, or social class. Even the highly educated are pressured by status anxiety, which makes them likely to sympathise with politics proposing exclusion. One straightforward way of tackling this matter,

therefore, could be to tailor immigration policies that can satisfy market demands with a supply of foreign workers that do not raise uncertainty for workers at home.

The analysis of the project shows not only that economic risk inequalities are different channels of a threat than the ethnic competition, but also that natives are reactive towards being more exposed to ethnic competition regardless of education or income. These results depart from earlier studies finding no support for labour market competition and mixed evidence for fiscal exposure (Tingley 2013, Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). This project, thus, also counters the current narrative that highly skilled workers are on-demand and maybe welcome everywhere. Determining the individuals and groups for whom such threats are relevant requires an occupation- and region-specific focus which often went unnoticed in earlier evidence. Therefore, identifying labour shortages at different skill levels and for various types of jobs in the destination country from a realistic approach that neither underestimates the demand from the market nor the citizens' anxieties towards such risks may be the most fruitful way forward. From an empirical perspective, when understanding and targeting ethnically rooted economic competition, future research should focus on local sub-national factors and in line with the evidence discussed in this project. Indeed, based on the evidence from my analysis, assessing the proposition of out-group threats and fine-grained theoretical hypotheses related to jobs and fiscal competition necessitates more direct identification of the individuals and groups that are exposed to these threats.

Besides, and quite importantly, removing the veil of complexity and a mixed bag of rules and regulation in the immigration policy regimes across European democracies could be a step forward in reconciling how citizens view immigration as an economic reality. Informing the public and streamlining the immigration processes with reforms may reduce the anxiety and potential uncertainty attached to it. This direction in policymaking could, in part, reduce the possible leverage of fearmongering on what is essentially an economic issue at hand.

Fourth, turning to the question of sharing, not just jobs but also social protection, more recognition is needed again in alleviating concerns. It is unlikely to expect no reaction from citizens when the picture seems to be that more people are coming to share economic resources that are receding, becoming rarer and less encompassing over time. The analysis of the project showed that exposure to the potential crowding-out and financial burden effects of immigration on the social benefits significantly motivate negativity towards immigrants. Such relationships lead to the popularity of an exclusionary provision of security, opening the way for radical-right parties to

legitimise their political claims. Therefore, either sharing of resources needs to be restricted, or the perception of new-comers and their entitlement need to be readjusted. For both normative and pragmatic economic reasons, however, limiting non-citizens from accessing jobs and welfare resources is unrealistic and undesirable.

As a conceivable way to think of the latter proposition, then, I find evidence suggesting that sharing welfare resources seems to be more of a trigger and winning point for the radical-right agendas. These results can be viewed as a point of departure, and necessary principles and regulations can be implemented to improve the rules of sharing welfare and social protection with non-citizens. However, citizen preferences towards sharing jobs, welfare resources, or any other material goods of the host society are unlikely to be orthogonal. Therefore, to precisely argue how these policies should look, the next step in this inquiry would be to investigate the relative importance of these dimensions and what matters for citizens in the design of immigration policymaking. Because, if we understand that how citizens feel economically insecure is not only shaped by welfare but also immigration, similarly careful attention should be devoted to the design of immigration policies governing this issue.

3. Implications for Welfare Politics

The project also has two main implications more specific to welfare politics. The debates on the racialisation of welfare politics and a critique of existing welfare studies based on race and minorities have long existed (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). This project pushes for this need to take the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and welfare politics more seriously. More concretely, if we think of welfare states and immigration together, we need better answers to questions about the basis and justification of social protection. The analysis here revealed the importance of the budgetary and distributional issues of who should get what and how concerning welfare politics as highly consequential in determining reactions to immigration as well. Moreover, answering questions about the purpose of insurance and protection in labour markets and precisely defining *'who'* gets *'what'* is necessary to strengthen economic security systems which seem to be highly relevant for the political responses of citizens in this century. These issues are critical because of two main reasons: (1) all workers do not have access to the same kinds of

insurance and protection, *and* (2) even the foundational dimensions of welfare institutions in preserving the status of workers are challenged due to recalibration and demands for excluding certain groups from these systems.

New cleavages across the workforce on socio-demographic and employment trajectory fronts and recalibration in welfare states necessitate a clear and definite answer to these questions whilst incorporating immigrants into these debates. On a surface reading, it seems that natives are irreversibly against welfare rights for immigrants given the rising share of votes for the radical-right. However, it is possible to think of the current analysis of these reactions as a point of departure for the restructuring of welfare politics in the future. Perhaps this is most crystallised in the evidence revealing that rather than more expansive and universal unemployment compensation schemes, conditions with more particularistic institutional contexts attenuate the link between economic threats and immigration policy preferences. Indeed, current tension between welfare and immigration politics may be in considerable part stemming from and shaped by welfare institutions and how they function which are based on rules established far earlier than the reality of immigration.

Importantly, when the pie of welfare spending could not keep up with increasing risks and uncertainty in this period, citizens turned to demands for allowing fewer people to share whatever resources they had. And yet, even in such testing times for group relations, studies reveal that there is neither a wholesale downturn in attitudes towards immigrants nor an apparent rise in xenophobia in advanced European democracies (Dennison and Geddes 2019). Regardless of what the dominant focus of solidarity is, i.e. market, state, or corporatist, or the extent to which states compensate and decommodify their workers, immigration has the potential of becoming an integral and functioning part of these institutions when and if necessary adjustments to these institutions can be made.

Based on the analysis here, it would be advisable to conduct such rethinking precisely in a way that would not trigger heightened anxiety and perceptions of losing privilege due to others. Here, the analysis identified that improved perceptions of future economic chances and employment protection could alleviate immigration concerns and related political reactions. While it is outside of the scope of the investigation in this project, it is possible to speculate based on what we know on welfare chauvinism literature that institutional practices of reciprocity and contribution systems seem to be more apt for facing the racialised welfare dynamics of this century. Therefore, reciprocal economic resource sharing and provision of secure employment chances for

the workforce may indeed offset some of these antagonistic forces between immigration and welfare politics.

Second, if political responses are exogenous to objective socio-economic risk exposure and institutions can shape how these risks operate, a strong argument can be made regarding the ability of welfare politics in altering the state of immigration politics as well. However, the challenges that we face now within welfare politics are budgetary constraints and changing coalitions that supported earlier welfare arrangements. Based on the evidence from this project, there could be two ways in which the evolution of welfare politics may determine the political reactions to immigration and political choice. Unequal job growth in the labour markets and recession of jobs in routine manual and service jobs made it more difficult to for an ever-expanding section of citizens to perceive a positive job market trajectory and future status. These developments have affected not only the working-class or the socio-economically weak but the whole workforce. In this respect, states either need to retrain and replace the economically vulnerable or intervene in the markets correcting for the job growth or bring back more permanent and secure employment contracts. Given how unlikely it is to perform the latter, providing insurance for the future may rely upon the social investments and active labour market corrections (and the success thereof), which may determine the political and societal outcomes in the next decades.

One could further investigate whether the social investment and activation policies eventually stimulate their intended outcomes and, more relevant to status anxieties, change the perceptions about future chances for the citizens. This inquiry would add another layer of understanding to the institutional bases of shaping restrictiveness demands. Alternatively, since the risk of unemployment and status loss directly relates to income loss, it would also be interesting to think of whether private insurance can counter some of the tensions born from co-existence of citizens and non-citizens in a shrinking spending landscape. In the other direction, removing commodifying pressures entirely through the introduction of basic minimum income may also be a viable option to pursue addressing socio-economic inequalities and related anxieties and group conflict reactions.

However, there may be yet another challenge. I study socio-economic risks as an encompassing risk and outlook covering both subjective and material concerns about status, income, wages, and other related entitlements. And yet, if socio-economic status-related grievances are firmly attached to working in any occupation and being active in the labour market distinct from economic

interests, basic minimum income may not be enough in alleviating status anxieties and grievances of citizens. This project provided a systematic analysis of the effects of compensation schemes and employment regulation as institutional factors. However, there are still various other welfare and labour market institutions in terms of potential implications that could be explored in future cross-sectional and case studies. Another future research agenda, therefore, could be devoted to exploring the impacts of different welfare policy options and whether and how these various directions of welfare politics shape objective and subjective socio-economic anxieties and subsequent political reactions.

4. Implications for Party and Electoral Politics

The project also sheds light on party politics and electoral behaviour in the last two decades. First, there is reason to be hopeful for normalisation of party politics if the tension of immigration at a time of rising socio-economic inequality and economic insecurity can be addressed. Acknowledging the heterogeneity within the electorate and the fact that not all radical-right voters are xenophobic or nationalistic by predisposition is a first step in correcting widespread public and media assumptions about these individuals. A second step would be to improve our understanding of how individual citizens can be grouped as 'losers' of recent developments of globalisation and economic restructuring. I show that these 'losers' are neither homogeneous nor exclusively make up the electoral base of the radical-right. The main takeaway from the framework and the project argues that a common denominator of the radical-right voters in the past two decades is instead exposure to relatively higher socio-economic status loss risks and worse future outlook. However, there is still a part of the radical-right electorate for whom the motivations underpinning electoral behaviour rests on xenophobic attitudes and partisanship rather than economic motives.

Moving to the party politics, a third step, then, is to establish which types of policies and platforms address the demands of relatively worse-off voters, making them sympathise with a specific party. I found that perceptions of resource scarcity and subsequent preferences for exclusivity, combining a highly salient matter of immigration and compensatory protection, seem to be a common thread for the risk exposed voters choosing radical-right platforms. While the project did not centre on the supply-side dynamics, there is evidence suggesting that an

exclusionary view of the material resources underpin radical-right success. To be able to bring forth more definitive evidence to indicate the effectiveness of these policy packages combining exclusion of resources with compensatory protection, future studies can focus on the variation of radical-right agendas within the party competition space and electoral success. Furthermore, experimental evidence can gauge the trade-offs citizens may face when shifting their vote to a radical-right political party and what kind of issues are relatively more important in doing such a switch. Given the turbulence in party politics across Europe in these decades, discerning party switches seems to be a vital issue in exploring the political behaviour of a heterogeneous electorate.

Next, what do the results of the project mean for the chances of mainstream parties in the future? In terms of attracting these economically motivated voters, the mainstream right seems to be locked in a disadvantageous position. Since there are deepening economic insecurities, parties advocating more economic openness and less compensation seem to have a bleak electoral outcome. However, what makes things even more difficult for them perhaps is the fact that taking strict and nativist immigration positions may not always work in favour of all mainstream parties in terms of electoral gains (Downes and Loveless 2018). This outcome is arguably due to the lack of credibility on these fronts of limiting immigration for the incumbent mainstream parties. Yet, taking ownership of the issue of immigration does seem to be one way of undercutting the narrative of the radical-right from the perspective of the mainstream right parties. An informative research agenda in this topic, therefore, could be to explore national party spaces over time and cross-sectionally further regarding issue ownership of immigration between radical and mainstream right-wing parties and subsequent electoral consequences. In this respect, studies can also investigate under what conditions and on what grounds existing RRWP voter bases may switch back to support a mainstream right political party.

Turning to the other side of mainstream politics, the results of this project seem to suggest a potentially more positive outlook for left-wing social-democrat parties. In most electoral spaces, mainstream left-wing parties have lost much of their electoral base due in part to the alienation of the working-class, which shifted to other parties due to a lack of an encompassing agenda protecting all workers. Yet, if exclusionary security demands do indeed explain part of this flight, there could be an opportunity for left-wing social democratic parties. These parties can become more responsive and compensatory to such needs of protection both against the market and potentially uncertain international factors such as immigration. This idea is in line with one of the

main arguments of the project which proposed that linking all immigration-related concerns to xenophobia or identity politics is a surface level diagnosis to a much more chronic problem of economic insecurity.

Furthermore, despite the notable exception of the successful change of the Danish socialist party in capturing welfare chauvinism in the political competition, there is evidence showing that emphasising anti-immigration does not add to the electoral competitiveness of these parties. Instead, social-democrat parties can embrace pragmatic and economically grounded immigration policies and subsequent rights attached without relying on populist tactics to gain back the electorate they lost to radical-right parties. If citizens' economic worries heighten the politicisation of immigration in a negative light, in line with the evidence here, they are not always going to prefer closure and exclusion towards immigration if they are otherwise protected and compensated.

Finally, based on the evidence of this project, the degrees of exclusive security demands and immigration politics are fundamental in explaining the electoral and party politics of today. The economic resources argument and electoral politics analysis of the project is focused exclusively on the national level. And yet, voting for the radical-right at the sub-national and European parliamentary elections existed far longer than the widespread phenomenon we observe today. Indeed, even before such seismic success of the radical-right at the national legislative elections, many established radical-right parties have been making remarkable strides at the local elections. Importantly, it would be well worthwhile to extend the results of this study and to evaluate this argument of relative deprivation of prospective chances within countries, focusing on regional differences. In this new research focus, studies can investigate elections at the sub-national level, i.e. local municipal or provincial elections, where radical-right parties are often more successful in many places in Europe.

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APPENDIX A

Supplementary Material for
'Group Conflict Theory Revisited: Unemployment Risk Exposure, In-Group Threats, and Reactions to Immigration'

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Table A1: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis, SOEP (1999-2016)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-immigration reactions	166,623	.2788931	.4484562	0	1
Measurement of in-group threat					
Relative risk exposure level ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{reg}$)	179,807	.7849006	.7339704	0	14.67
Relative risk exposure level ($risk_{occ}/\bar{x}_{nat}$)	179,807	.6029318	.4552348	0	9.829661
Measurement of out-group threats					
Fiscal exposure	179,807	63.24816	10.91355	0	100
Labour market competition	179,807	11.65787	11.46522	0	85.71429
Education	179,807	12.83176	2.72434	7	18
Income (in deciles)	179,807	6.910215	2.590307	1	10
Age	179,807	42.43591	11.1001	16	65
Tenure	179,807	11.04523	10.15794	0	58
Permanent contract	179,807	.7682904	.4219256	0	1
Temporary contract	179,807	.1179987	.3226075	0	1
Self-employed	179,807	.1137108	.3174606	0	1
Household income satisfaction	176,952	6.634031	2.128769	0	10
Political interest	167,654	1.352416	.7848019	0	3
East Germany	179,807	.2548455	.4357755	0	1
Difficulty finding job	166,680	.7569474	.4289279	0	1
Worries about job security	174,905	.1206941	.3257724	0	1
Worries about personal finance	179,290	.1765575	.3812949	0	1

Note: Employment relations variable is coded and treated categorically with the baseline as being employed with a permanent contract.

Table A2: Variables used from SOEP

Measured variable	Item in SOEP	Scale
Immigration worries	plj0046	2-very concerned, 1-somewhat, 0-not concerned at all (recoded)
Occupation	pgisco88	ISCO-88 job categories
Labour force status	pglfs	11-Working, 6-Not working unemployed (recoded to specify active workforce participants and unemployment/employment status)
Contract type	plb0037	1- permanent, 2-temporary, 3-self-employed (recoded)
Worry about job insecurity	plh0042	2-very concerned, 1-somewhat, 0-not concerned at all (recoded)
Difficulty of finding a new job	plb0443	1-difficult/almost impossible, 0-easy (recoded)
Worry about personal finances	plh0033	2-very concerned, 1-somewhat, 0-not concerned at all (recoded)
Age	gebjahr / syear	Age of respondents
German citizen	pgnation	1-German citizen, 0-Other nationality (recoded) 1-men, 2-women
Immigration status	germborn	0-Native (born in Germany or immigration before 1949), 1- Immigration after 1949
Länder	l11101	Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen, Rhineland-Pfalz, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria, Saarland, Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia
Income (net income last month)	hghinc	Monthly household net income in Euros (recoded in 10 categories)
Education	pgbilzeit	Years of education respondents had
Tenure	plb0036	Year since respondent is with the current employer
East-West Germany	l11102	0-West, 1-West
Industry	e11106	1-digit industry code of individual's occupation: 1-agriculture, 2-energy, 3-mining, 4- manufacturing, 5-construction, 6.trade, 7-transport, 8-bank and insurance, 9- services
Satisfaction w/household income	plh0175	0-10 (lower to higher satisfaction)
Socio-economic class	Coding from Oesch	1-upper middle class, 2-lower middle class, 3-skilled working-class, 4-unskilled working class
Political interest	plh0007	0-not at all, 1-not that strong, 2-a lot, 3-very strong (recoded)

Further details and checks for in-group threat measure

**Table A3:** ISCO-88 1-digit and 2-digit occupational job task categorisation

1	**Major Group: Legislators, Senior Officials, and Managers**
11	Legislators and senior officials
12	Corporate managers
13	Managers of small enterprises
2	**Major Group: Professionals**
21	Physical, mathematical, and engineering science professionals
22	Life science and health professionals
23	Teaching professionals
24	Other professionals (such as business professionals, accountants, lawyers, judges, social scientists etc.)
3	**Major Group: Technicians and Associate Professionals**
31	Physical and engineering science associate professionals
32	Life science and health associate professionals
33	Teaching associate professionals
34	Other associate professionals (such as finance and sales associate professionals, buyers, trade brokers, legal and related business associate professionals etc.)
4	**Major Group: Clerks**
41	Office clerks
42	Customer service clerks
5	**Major Group: Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers**
51	Personal and protective services workers
52	Models, salespersons and demonstrators
6	**Major Group: Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers**
61	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
7	**Major Group: Craft and Related Trade Workers**
71	Extraction and building trades workers
72	Metal, machinery, and related trades workers
73	Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers
74	Other craft and related trades workers (such as food processing and related trade workers, tailors, textile cutters, wood treaters etc.)
8	**Major Group: Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers**
81	Stationary plant and related operators
82	Machine operators and assemblers
83	Drivers and mobile plant operators
9	**Major Group: Elementary Occupations**
91	Sales and services elementary occupations
92	Agricultural, fishery and related labourer
93	Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport

Figure A1: Occupational unemployment rates across occupations, 1999-2016

Aveage occupational unemployment rates (1999-2016)

Figure A2.1: Distribution of relative risk across occupations, pooled (11-24)

Relative risk (=Occupational unemployment rate/Regional average unemployment rate)

**Figure A2.2**: Distribution of relative risk across occupations, pooled (31-52)

Relative risk (=Occupational unemployment rate/Regional average unemployment rate)

Figure A2.3: Distribution of relative risk across occupations, pooled (61-74)

Relative risk (=Occupational unemployment rate/Regional average unemployment rate)

Figure A2.4: Distribution of relative risk across occupations, pooled (81-93)

Relative risk (=Occupational unemployment rate/Regional average unemployment rate)

Table A4: Correlations between absolute and relative measurements of unemployment risk

	risk_{occ} 2dg	risk_{occ} 1dg	$\text{risk}_{occ\ 2\text{-}dgt}/\bar{x}_{reg}$	$\text{risk}_{occ\ 2\text{-}dgt}/\bar{x}_{nat}$	$\text{risk}_{occ\ 1\text{-}dig}/\bar{x}_{nat}$
Absolute unem. Rate (risk_{occ} 2-digit)	1.0000				
Absolute unem. Rate (risk_{occ} 1-digit)	0.8712	1.0000			
$\text{risk}_{occ\ 2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{reg}$	0.7431	0.6651	1.0000		
$\text{risk}_{occ\ 2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$	0.9853	0.8530	0.7541	1.0000	
$\text{risk}_{occ\ 1\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$	0.8558	0.9824	0.6768	0.8683	1.0000

Note: Calculations based on SOEP data, 1999-2016

Figure A3: Distribution of in-group threats (1999-2016), at four *Länder*

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
Figure A4: Regional unemployment rates within Germany by *Länder*, 2000 & 2015

Unemployment rate (%), 2000   Unemployment rate (%), 2015

As mentioned in the manuscript, I use alternative ways of measuring 'in-group threats' in order to ensure that the results are not sensitive to operationalisation differences. The *first one* is related to using an alternative benchmark of national unemployment rates instead of regional average ($risk_{occ\ 2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$).

The *second one* is based on replicating the same results using 1-digit larger aggregation of occupational groups. In addition to checking for sensitivity, this alternative operationalisation allows me to use thicker groups of measurement where missingness is lower ensuring each group's sampled respondents is much higher than in 2-digit level ($risk_{occ\ 1\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$), here I show relative to the national average but 1-digit measurement relative to the regional average reveals substantively the same results as well.

Third, some may argue that occupational risks should already be measured at the regional level with a much more narrowly focus on local labour market dynamics. While this measure has some merit in precision in local dynamics, it risks ignoring the fact that most native workers may not think of their prospects only in local terms. Moreover, from an empirical perspective calculating such occupationally specific unemployment rate within each state raises measurement error risks even in such nationally representative survey such as the SOEP, particularly in capturing risks at the 2-digit level. Therefore, in my main results, I favour occupationally specific unemployment risks calculated at the national level. However, I also calculate such an operationalisation of risk relative to the regional average ($reg.risk_{occ\ 2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{reg}$) or native average ($reg.risk_{occ\ 2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$), see Table A5.

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Table A5: Correlations across different measurement of in-group threat

	$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$	$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 1-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$	$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$	1.0000				
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.7541	1.0000			
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 1-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.6768	0.8683	1.0000		
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$	0.4484	0.5836	0.5206	1.0000	
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.1428	0.5692	0.4941	0.7908	1.0000

Note: Calculations based on SOEP data, 1999-2016

Table A6: Negative responses to immigration and alternative measures of in-group threat

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.255***			
	(0.028)			
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 1-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$		0.360***		
		(0.033)		
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$			0.060***	
			(0.014)	
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$				0.070***
				(0.014)
LMC	0.014***	0.013***	0.017***	0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
FE	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	91,643	91,643	91,643	91,643
Number of individuals	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,407
Log likelihood	-36121	-36102	-36152	-36149

Note: All models are specified as in Model 4 in Table 1 with two-way fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A7: Subjective difficulty in finding a job and alternative measures of in-group threat

DV: Difficulty finding job	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.273***			
	(0.033)			
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 1-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$		0.304***		
		(0.037)		
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$			0.112***	
			(0.018)	
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$				0.106***
				(0.017)
Observations	76,184	76,184	76,184	76,184
Number of individuals	10,459	10,459	10,459	10,459
Log likelihood	-28704	-28705	-28718	-28718

Note: All models are specified as in Model A25 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A8: Worrying about job insecurity and alternative measures of in-group threat

DV: Worried about job security	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$	0.312***			
	(0.032)			
$\text{risk}_{\text{occ 1-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$		0.353***		
		(0.038)		
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{nat}}$			0.096***	
			(0.016)	
$\text{reg.risk}_{\text{occ 2-digit}}/\bar{x}_{\text{reg}}$				0.099***
				(0.017)
Observations	64,577	64,577	64,577	64,577
Number of individuals	8,046	8,046	8,046	8,046
Log likelihood	-22465	-22468	-22493	-22494

Note: All models are specified as in Model A25 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A9: Worrying about the personal economic situation and alternative measures of in-group threat

DV: Worried about personal finances	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$risk_{occ\,2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$	0.305***			
	(0.028)			
$risk_{occ\,1\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$		0.336***		
		(0.032)		
$reg.risk_{occ\,2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{nat}$			0.074***	
			(0.014)	
$reg.risk_{occ\,2\text{-}digit}/\bar{x}_{reg}$				0.079***
				(0.015)
Observations	81,348	81,348	81,348	81,348
Number of individuals	10,219	10,219	10,219	10,219
Log likelihood	-30432	-30436	-30476	-30475

Note: All models are specified as in Model A25 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Sensitivity checks on the measurements of out-group threats

Figure A6: LMC across occupations, broad and narrow definitions of out-groups

Figure A7: LMC across *Länder*, broad and narrow definitions of out-groups

Figure A8: LMC across 4 *Länder* by occupation groups

Figure A9: FE across *Länder*, broad and narrow definitions of out-groups

Figure A10: FE across *Länder* in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015

Table A10 - Negative responses to immigration and alternative measures of out-group threat- I

	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-group threat	0.128***	0.177***	0.116***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
LMC (non-citizens)	0.021***		0.021***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
FE (non-citizens)		0.011***	0.010***
		(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	91,643	87,735	87,735
Number of individuals	11,407	11,162	11,162
Log likelihood	-36201	-34567	-34482

Note: FE and LMC are calculated using citizenship (instead of immigration background) as the basis of determining out-groups. All models are fully specified as in Table 1 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

While I concentrate on the regionally specific LMC and FE, some may argue that these mechanisms may instead have aggregate effects. Since both natives and immigrants can move to another state, it is possible to argue that either of these threats and most importantly LMC should nevertheless be relevant at the national level. While this is plausible, residential mobility in Germany is lower than in most comparable Western European societies (Sanchez and Andrews 2011). Moreover, individual perceptions and information on the extent to which they are competing for jobs with out-groups may still be rooted in their experience at the sub-national level where the visibility of this competition is much higher due to direct exposure.

Likewise, there are several reasons why fiscal exposure at the national level may be important. One particularly relevant reason is due to German fiscal unity and redistribution system. Indeed, even though certain states have lower shares of fiscal exposure, they may nevertheless experience an effect of fiscal exposure since pooled resources from states do get transferred to other states. This means that it does not necessarily follow that individuals would only be concerned with their immediate area or state when thinking of financing burdens of crowding out by out-groups. Based on these considerations, then, in addition to regionally specific LMC and FE calculations, I replicate my measurements at the nationally aggregated level and find that my results do not change, see Table A11 below.

Table A11 – Negative responses to immigration and alternative measures of in-group threat- II

	(1)	(2)	(3)
In-group threat	0.121***	0.118***	0.071***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
LMC (at the national level)	0.025***		0.019***
	(0.002)		(0.002)
FE (at the national level)		0.116***	0.112***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	91,643	91,643	91,643
Number of individuals	11,407	11,407	11,407
Log likelihood	-36161	-35570	-35503

Note: FE and LMC are calculated at the national level. This means that LMC indicates the share percentage of foreign-born employed in each 2-digit occupational category across Germany. FE, thus, means the share percentage of below-median income foreign-born residents in Germany amongst all foreign-born residents in each year. All models are fully specified as in Table 1 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A12: Negative responses to immigration and alternative measures of fiscal exposure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-group threat	0.141***	0.176***	0.181***	0.130***	0.174***	0.124***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
FE-1 (*within* all below median residents)	0.045***	0.048***				
	(0.001)	(0.001)				
FE-2 (using LQ-I)			0.011***	0.011***		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
FE-3 (using LQ-II)					0.014***	0.013***
					(0.001)	(0.001)
LMC -regional		-0.010***		0.014***		0.013***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Observations	91,643	91,643	91,643	91,643	87,735	87,735
Number of individuals	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,162	11,162
Log likelihood	-35266	-35241	-36145	-36089	-34490	-34439

Note: FE-1 is the share % of below-median foreign-born amongst all below-median residents in each state. FE-2 is the share % foreign-born who are below lower quartile amongst the foreign-born in the state. FE-3 is the same as FE-2 but defines out-groups on the basis of citizenship instead. Models are fully specified as in Table 1 with two-way fixed effects. Random effects specification reveals substantively the same results. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Note on the measurement of the DV

Political attitudes, policy preferences, and issue salience are not identical responses even though they are often understood as similar indicators of an underlying tolerance (or intolerance) towards ethnic heterogeneity (Dennison 2019, Druckman and Lupia 2000). Attitudes are ways in which individuals position themselves on an issue, whereas policy preferences reflect in what direction and what type of policy intervention voters demand. If we assume that citizens demand policies aligned with their personal attitudes, such opinions and subsequent policy preferences are expected to correlate to a greater extent. Nevertheless, issue salience remains as a distinct subjective response. It refers to the importance ascribed to the immigration issue rather than what position citizens take on the matter or what type of policies they demand (Budge 2015). While attitudes are evidenced to be stable or slow-moving over time (Goldstein and Peters 2014, Kustov, Laaker, and Reller 2019), issue salience fluctuates both in short and in the long-term periods (Hatton 2017, Neundorf and Adams 2018).

Salience is often thought as a weight component of policy preferences or attitudes in determining how citizens shape their political responses towards an issue, particularly with respect to voting. Put differently, higher salience of immigration for an individual does not necessarily follow from this individual having a strongly anti-immigration sentiment. On this regard Wleizen, for example, argues that formulations of salience using 'most important problem' has distinct and mostly negative connotations arguably relating those with more scepticism to often be placed on the higher end of the scale (2005). Therefore, I argue that while it is not so straightforward to distinguish whether the question item I use relates to negative responses or salience only, the item captures an important part of negative reactions, which can be understood as negatively connotated worries and concerns about immigration. Indeed, the German original word "*Sorgen*" is not neutral and implies negatively loaded worries and concerns. Therefore, while I concede that the item is not the best way of measuring group conflict, I sustain that this measure is adequate in capturing negative responses to immigration by the natives.

Figure A11 below displays the percentages of respondents transitioning between the answer options from *t-1* to *t* and has two important implications. First, as expected, while the dominant trend of reported importance of immigration seems to be remaining in the choice from previous year making the item quite similar to capturing attitudinal dimensions, just about less than forty per cent of the observations change their answer. More strikingly is that there are even transitions from highest to lowest responses within one-year and *vice versa*. Second, this indicates that given that the paper is interested in capturing dynamics of such changes, there is indeed adequate within respondent related to capturing dynamics of group conflict. Furthermore, I also check how the respondents are distributed using a more explicit measure of negativity towards immigration based on which party respondents feel closest to and their worries about immigration. If the indicator captures an important degree of the negativity and scepticism towards immigration rather than simply the salience, those responding as feeling very concerned about immigration

should be more represented in feeling close to far-right and nationalist political parties. In the sample there is AfD and Republikaner in the response options.

**Figure A11:** Transitions across responses within individuals, from *t-1*

Table A13: Table of worries about immigration and closest political party

DV:	0	1	Total
Left (SDP&Grün&Link)	40,456	8,799	49,255
%	82.14	17.86	100.00
Right (Cons&Lib -CDU/CSU)	25,696	11,205	36,901
%	69.63	30.37	100.00
Far-right &Nationalist	**321**	**1,694**	**2,015**
%	**15.93**	**84.07**	**100.00**
Other parties	973	524	1,497
%	65.00	35.00	100.00
Total	67,446	22,222	89,668
%	75.22	24.78	100.00

1= Very concerned about immigration, 0= Somewhat or not at all concerned about immigration

Table A14: Ordered logistic estimating models predicting immigration reactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat	1.235***	1.178***	1.228***	1.170***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	0.758***	0.763***	0.757***	0.761***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	1.012***	1.011***	1.012***	1.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Temporary	0.890***	0.890***	0.891***	0.891***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Self-employed	0.904***	0.913***	0.902***	0.911***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Income	0.987***	0.985***	0.986***	0.983***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Job Tenure	0.998t	0.998t	0.998t	0.998t
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
LMC		1.009***		1.009***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
FE			1.010***	1.010***
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant				
Observations	166,623	166,623	166,623	166,623
Number of individuals	31,904	31,904	31,904	31,904
Log likelihood	-144568	-144506	-144411	-144348

Note: The ordered logistic estimations presented are from random-effects models, including both within and between individual variation on the outcome variable. Individual clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A15: Linear models predicting immigration attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Random effects		Fixed effects	
In-group threat	0.051***	0.038***	0.055***	0.038***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	-0.067***	-0.066***	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	0.003***	0.003***	0.000	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Temporary	-0.028***	-0.028***	-0.002	-0.000
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Self-employed	-0.025***	-0.023***	-0.006	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Income	-0.003***	-0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Job tenure	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
LMC		0.002***		0.004***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
FE		0.002***		0.003***
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Constant	1.707***	1.548***	0.908***	0.803***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Observations	166,623	166,623	166,623	166,623
Number of individuals	31,904	31,904	31,904	31,904
RMSE	0.530	0.529	0.529	0.528

Note: The alternative construction of the dependent variable uses the question item with its original three-fold scale and estimates models using a linear model. Individual clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

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Tables of results presented in the main analysis

Table A16: Main table of results as presented in Table 1, log odds coefficients

	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
In-group threat	0.191***	0.138***	0.181***	0.126***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Education	-0.013	-0.011	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age	0.016***	0.009***	0.014***	0.008**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.026	0.029	0.030	0.034
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Self-employed	-0.009	0.004	-0.013	-0.000
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Income	0.017**	0.016**	0.017**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Job tenure	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
LMC		0.014***		0.014***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
FE			0.010***	0.011***
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	91,643	91,643	91,643	91,643
Number of individuals	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,407
Log likelihood	-36291	-36233	-36197	-36136

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A12: AMEs of covariates presented in Table 1

Table A17: Models in Table 1 estimated using random-effects specifications

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-grop threat (occupat. relative risk exposure)	0.160***	0.101***	0.154***	0.095***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Education	-0.305***	-0.298***	-0.308***	-0.301***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age	0.013***	0.012***	0.013***	0.012***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Temporary	-0.074*	-0.074*	-0.074*	-0.074*
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Self-employed	-0.098**	-0.085**	-0.100**	-0.087**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Income	-0.018***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.023***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Job tenure	-0.004**	-0.003*	-0.004*	-0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
LMC		0.011***		0.011***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
FE			0.011***	0.011***
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.726***	1.612***	1.112***	0.990***
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Observations	166,623	166,623	166,623	166,623
Number of individuals	31,904	31,904	31,904	31,904
Log likelihood	-78081	-78023	-77973	-77914

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A18: Hausman test results comparing Model 4

	(b) coefficient	(B) coefficient	(b-B)	
	FE	RE	Difference	S.E.
In-group threat	.126402	.0948842	.0315178	.009418
Education	-.0127373	-.3006183	.2878809	.0189831
Age	.0077048	.012011	-.0043062	.0021256
Temporary	.0338396	-.0738003	.1076399	.0176665
Self-employed	-.0002576	-.0870958	.0868383	.0221202
Income	.0153689	-.0229532	.0383221	.0035991
Tenure	-.00121	-.003402	.002192	.0015021
LMC	.0143991	.0109053	.0034938	.0008438
FE	.0105883	.010669	-.0000806	.0002583

chi2(9)=386.20   Prob>chi2=0.000

b = consistent under Ho and Ha; B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho

Ho: Difference in coefficients not systematic. **Result**: Differences in coefficients are systematic between RE and FE specifications.

Table A19: Random and fixed effects models using occupation and region dummies

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Relative risk	0.148***	0.129***	0.068***	0.201***	0.180***	0.208***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)
Education	-0.296***	-0.011	-0.273***	-0.020	-0.283***	-0.018
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.021)
Age	0.010***	0.008**	0.012***	0.007**	0.011***	0.007**
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Temporary	-0.092**	0.032	-0.062*	0.027	-0.084**	0.024
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Self-employed	-0.067*	0.001	-0.098**	-0.013	-0.073*	-0.013
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.040)
Income	-0.010*	0.016**	-0.020***	0.014*	-0.012**	0.014*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Job Tenure	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003t	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
LMC	0.017***	0.014***	0.010***	0.020***	0.019***	0.020***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
FE	0.010***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
RE/FE	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Occupation (2-digit) dummy	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region dummy	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Constant	0.332*		0.246		-0.060	
	(0.129)		(0.338)		(0.346)	
Observations	166,623	91,643	164,693	90,301	164,693	90,301
Number of individuals	31,904	11,407	31,754	11,284	31,754	11,284
Log likelihood	-77672	-36125	-76923	-35529	-76691	-35516

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A20: Linear replication of Table 1, as used for Figure 3 and Figure A13

	Risk measure benchmarked to the national average	Risk measure benchmarked to the national average
In-group threat (relative risk)	0.037***	0.018***
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Education	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age	0.001**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Temporary	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)

Self-employed	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Income	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Job Tenure	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
LMC	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
FE	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	0.112***	0.125***
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Observations	166,623	166,623
Number of individuals	31,904	31,904
Loglikelihood	-41952	-41977
RMSE	0.346	0.346

Note: The linear estimation here uses the binarised dependent variable and uses a linear modelling strategy. Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A21: Reactions towards immigration, by FE and LMC conditions, Figure 4

	(Low LMC)	(High LMC)	(Low FE)	(High FE)
In-group threats	0.233***	0.185***	0.114***	0.236***
	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Education	-0.012	0.011	-0.062*	0.029
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.037)
Age	-0.013**	0.031***	-0.024***	0.057***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Temporary	0.036	0.059	-0.048	0.103t
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.054)
Self-employed	0.059	-0.014	-0.008	0.015
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Income	-0.000	0.025**	0.013	0.015t
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Job tenure	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Observations	39,913	41,770	33,796	38,598
Number of individuals	5,626	6,674	6,381	6,984
Log likelihood	-15808	-16388	-13033	-14786

Note: Estimated from using the model specification in Model 1 in Table 1. Alternating the specification using random effects, adding LMC or FE in relevant models or adding further region or occupation dummies do not change the results presented here. Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A13: Predicted anti-immigration reactions and economic threats, 95 CIs

Table A22: Reactions towards immigration, by social class (Model 4)

	(Upper-middle-class)	(Lower-middle class)	(Skilled workers)	(Low-skilled workers)
In-group threat	0.438**	0.680***	0.150***	0.094*
	(0.137)	(0.068)	(0.029)	(0.037)
Education	0.005	-0.022	-0.004	0.025
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.102)
Age	0.012	-0.001	0.006	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.009)
Temporary	0.007	0.040	0.015	0.065
	(0.122)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.097)
Self-employed	0.041	-0.025	0.040	0.000
	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.068)	(0.119)
Income	0.002	0.019t	0.014	0.026
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Job Tenure	0.004	0.002	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.008)
FE	0.016***	0.012***	0.010***	0.011***

	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
LMC	0.031***	0.031***	0.021***	0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Observations	12,612	22,774	33,292	10,274
Number of individuals	1,845	3,367	5,036	1,802
Log likelihood	-4628	-8822	-13281	-3957

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A23: Results from low and high education & East/West Germany subsamples

	(Low education)	(High education)	(East Germany)	(West Germany)
In-group threat	0.107***	0.164***	0.378***	0.108***
	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.080)	(0.019)
Age	0.013**	0.004	-0.007	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.062	0.054	-0.035	0.086*
	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.042)
Self-employed	-0.136*	0.089t	0.009	-0.010
	(0.063)	(0.051)	(0.089)	(0.044)
income	0.023*	0.012t	0.009	0.018**
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)
Job Tenure	-0.004	0.001	-0.005	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
FE	0.012***	0.011***	0.006***	0.039***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
LMC	0.009***	0.020***	0.055***	0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)
Observations	30,985	59,196	25,397	65,709
Number of individuals	4,198	7,203	3,087	8,351
Log likelihood	-12573	-22909	-10109	-25656

Note: High low education cut-offs by median value Clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A24: Reactions towards immigration and economic threats, unemployed included in the sample

	(RE)	(RE)	(FE)	(FE)
In-group threat	0.156***	0.093***	0.181***	0.120***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Education	-0.305***	-0.299***	-0.011	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Age	0.012***	0.011***	0.015***	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Temporary	-0.056t	-0.056t	0.046	0.053
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Self-employed	-0.094**	-0.083**	-0.013	-0.004
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Unemployed	0.175***	0.179***	0.106*	0.109**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Income	-0.019***	-0.024***	0.017**	0.015**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
LMC		0.011***		0.014***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
FE		0.010***		0.010***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Constant	1.757***	1.056***		
	(0.090)	(0.099)		
Observations	175,539	175,539	98,930	98,930
Number of individuals	32,324	32,324	11,991	11,991
Log likelihood	-82844	-82671	-39399	-39237

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1
RE: Random-effects estimation, FE: Fixed-effects estimation

Table A25: In-group threats and subjective economic worries

	Random Effects (Between)			Fixed Effects (Within)		
	Difficulty finding job	Worry: Job insecurity	Worry: Personal Finance	Difficulty finding job	Worry: Job insecurity	Worry: Personal Finance
In-group threat	0.358***	0.209***	0.093***	0.069***	0.118***	0.116***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Education	-0.152***	-0.130***	-0.137***	-0.066***	0.065**	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Age	0.072***	-0.001	0.006***	0.041***	-0.062***	-0.008**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.452***	1.012***	0.390***	0.426***	0.939***	0.372***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Self-employed	-0.144***	0.136**	0.394***	-0.056	0.319***	0.367***
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Income	-0.049***	-0.123***	-0.185***	-0.003	-0.060***	-0.134***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Job Tenure	0.042***	-0.006***	-0.018***	0.032***	0.030***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Region FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Occupation FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Observations	160,740	160,740	160,740	73,158	59,757	72,383
# of individuals	31,667	31,667	31,667	10,215	7,659	9,511
Log likelihood	-65974	-48777	-60592	-27538	-20998	-27168

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

When looking at other covariates in fixed-effects models, income seems to be reducing economic worries whereas being employed in a job longer increases job-related concerns. This makes sense when considering evidence showing that experiencing threats to socio-economic position due to occupational and economic changes has been the most prominent amongst not for those who have lost their jobs but instead have been 'stuck' in certain jobs and experience threats (Kurer 2020, Antonucci et al. 2017). Moreover, having longer tenure in a job can indeed lead to respondents feeling that it would be difficult for them to find a job in the future since they have been out of the job market for a longer period. Finally, while education does not have a significant effect on worries about income, more education reduces the perception of difficulty in finding a new job in the future. Interestingly, an additional year of education increases job insecurity potentially due in most part to the idea of more awareness of labour market conditions at increasing education or a potential reverse causality effect of those with higher job insecurity seeking more education

leading to such within-individual changes.

Table A26: In and out-group threats and subjective economic worries

	Difficulty finding job	Worry: Job insecurity	Worry: Personal Finance	Difficulty finding job	Worry: Job insecurity	Worry: Personal Finance
In-group threat	0.200***	0.205***	0.153***	0.171***	0.179***	0.184***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Education	-0.161***	-0.167***	-0.178***	-0.076***	0.063*	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Age	0.071***	-0.000	0.009***	0.052***	-0.057***	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.455***	1.000***	0.388***	0.417***	0.938***	0.370***
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Self-employed	-0.214***	0.071t	0.370***	-0.075t	0.306***	0.350***
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Income	-0.049***	-0.141***	-0.201***	-0.001	-0.059***	-0.133***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Job Tenure	0.043***	-0.008***	-0.022***	0.031***	0.029***	0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
LMC	-0.035***	-0.023***	-0.014***	-0.024***	-0.018***	-0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
FE	0.006***	0.002**	0.006***	0.006***	0.002*	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.752***	-0.137	0.604***			
	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.108)			
Fixed/Random	RE	RE	RE	FE	FE	FE
Observations	162,053	162,053	162,053	73,158	59,757	72,383
Number of individ.	31,732	31,732	31,732	10,215	7,659	9,511
Log likelihood	-66928	-49743	-61388	-27388	-20944	-27064

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$
RE: Random-effects estimation, FE: Fixed-effects estimation

While fiscal exposure seems to be positively linked to increasing subjective economic worries, higher LMC is correlated with less within individuals. This means that a unit increase in fiscal exposure increases perceived economic vulnerabilities. Conversely, the decreasing effect of LMC on economic worries can be made sense of if we consider that increasing immigration to occupations often occurs in more economically better-off states in the case studied here. This is in line with the argument of the paper that economic grievances of natives which are related to their perceived economic vulnerabilities unrelated to immigration such as the in-group threats studied here are a distinct channel from LMC. Figure A14 below visualises the AMEs of the theoretically relevant covariates of interest predicted from the fixed-effects models in Table A26.

Figure A14: In-group threats, out-group threats, and perceived economic vulnerability

(a)AMEs "Diff.Finding Job"   (b)AMEs "Worry: Job Security"   (c) AMEs "Worry: Personal Finance"

Table A27: In-group threats, out-group threats, and anti-immigration responses

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
In-group threat	0.139***	0.135***	0.133***	0.113***	0.107***	0.104***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education	-0.011	-0.016	-0.014	-0.011	-0.015	-0.013
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Age	-0.019***	-0.016***	-0.018***	-0.021***	-0.018***	-0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.024	-0.028	0.004	0.026	-0.026	0.006
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Self-employed	0.002	-0.014	-0.022	0.006	-0.009	-0.018
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Income	0.011t	0.014*	0.018**	0.010t	0.014*	0.018**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Job tenure	-0.004t	-0.005*	-0.004t	-0.004	-0.005*	-0.004t
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Subj. difficulty finding job	0.078**			0.083**		
	(0.028)			(0.028)		
Worry: job security		0.506***			0.510***	
		(0.028)			(0.028)	
Worry: personal finances			0.459***			0.463***
			(0.025)			(0.025)
FE				0.003***	0.003***	0.003***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
LMC				0.007***	0.008***	0.008***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	77,742	77,742	77,742	77,742	77,742	77,742
Number of individuals	9,938	9,938	9,938	9,938	9,938	9,938
Log likelihood	-30834	-30676	-30667	-30815	-30655	-30647

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A28: Panel Effects and Attrition Probability

	Non-attrition (participant all 1999-2016)		Attrition (not in the panel at least once)	
	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
'Very concerned about immigration'	.3006524	.4585561	.2765909	.4473139
Relative risk level	.7406157	.6941213	.7892211	.7376026
Education	12.85553	2.541668	12.82945	2.741506
Income	7.048426	2.378528	6.896731	2.609663
Age	44.68736	7.950615	42.21626	11.33682
LMC	10.38742	10.75052	11.78182	11.52512
FE	63.49643	12.27235	63.22394	10.77154
Tenure	13.63705	9.48912	10.79236	10.18562
Difficulty finding job	.8461334	.3608328	.7480856	.4341138
Job insecurity worry	.1558897	.3627621	.1785771	.382999
Personal finance worry	.1052296	.3068589	.122219	.3275396

	Pr(attrition)
Pr (attrition)	1.0000
DV	-0.0545
Subjective job insecurity	-0.0629
Worry about personal finances	-0.0548
Subjective difficulty in finding a job	-0.1238

Note: Probability of attrition is estimated using logistic regression with individual clustered standard errors. Social class, education, income, state of residence, civil status, age and employment relations are added as covariates in estimating the attribution probability.

Other robustness and sensitivity checks

Table A29: Replication of results excluding the self-employed respondents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat	0.170***	0.101***	0.203***	0.133***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Education	-0.307***	-0.303***	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Age	0.014***	0.013***	0.019***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Temporary	-0.087**	-0.088**	0.018	0.027
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Job Tenure	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.001	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	-0.022***	-0.027***	0.017**	0.015*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
LMC		0.011***		0.015***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
FE		0.011***		0.011***
		(0.001)		(0.001)
Constant	1.762***	1.019***		
	(0.097)	(0.108)		
Observations	147,294	147,294	80,002	80,002
Number of individuals	29,663	29,663	10,366	10,366
Log likelihood	-69813	-69655	-31704	-31558

Note: All models are specified using two-way fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A30: Additional control variables

	Controlling for subjective income satisfaction	Controlling for political interest	The model includes dummies for the industry respondents work in
In-group threat	0.124***	0.126***	0.129***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Household income satisfaction	-0.044***		
	(0.005)		
Political interest		0.101***	
		(0.017)	
Education	-0.009	-0.014	-0.021
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Age	0.007**	0.008**	0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Temporary	0.024	0.035	0.019
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Self-employed	-0.003	0.001	0.008
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Income	0.025***	0.015**	0.015*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Job tenure	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
LMC	0.014***	0.014***	0.015***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
FE	0.010***	0.010***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	89,948	91,539	85,741
Number of individuals	11,223	11,402	10,866
Log likelihood	-35455	-36083	-33714

Note: All models are specified using two-way fixed effects. Coefficients of the industry dummy variable are not shown here. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Cross-sectional analysis using ALLBUS

Table A31: Variables used in the cross-sectional ALLBUS analysis, 1992-2016

Variables (var name in ALLBUS)	Definition/Item used in ALLBUS	Mean	Std.Dev.	Years available
In-group threat: Relative deprivation (id01)	In comparison to how others live here in Germany: Do you think you get your *fair* share, *more than your fair* share, a *little less*, or a *lot less*? (binary recoded; 1 = a little and a lot less)	0.433	0.496	All years except 1994 & 2012
In group threat: Objective relative risk exposure (SOEP) -I	Calculated from SOEP – relative to the regional average	0.895	0.893	All years
In group threat: Objective relative risk exposure (SOEP) -II	Calculated from SOEP – relative to the national average	0.668	0.456	All years
Measuring group conflict: Exclusionary views index				
Economic exclusion[a] (ma02)	When jobs become scarce, foreigners living in Germany should go home send back (1-not at all,7- completely agree)	2.953	1.891	1996, 2006, 2016
Social rights exclusion[a] (ma06)	Foreigners living in Germany should have the same right to social assistance and other social benefits as the Germans (1-not at all,7- completely agree)	3.610	2.057	1996, 2006, 2016
Political exclusion[a] (ma03)	Foreigners living in Germany should be prohibited from engaging in any political activity in Germany (1-not at all,7- completely agree)	3.051	2.083	1996, 2006, 2016
Exclusionary view index (PCA)	Using the three items: ma02, ma06, ma03, scaled to vary from 0-1	0.356	0.261	1996, 2006, 2016
Attitudinal measures				
Left-right placement (pa01)	Many people use the terms 'left' and 'right' when it comes to different political Label settings. If you think of your think your own political views, where would you classify these views on this scale? (left 1 to the right 10)	4.014	1.703	All waves
Labour market competition (mp06)	To what extent you agree with the [following] statement about foreigners: The take jobs away from Germans (0-not at all,6- completely agree)	2.143	1.818	1996, 2006, 2016
Fiscal exposure (mp02)	To what extent you agree with the [following] statement about foreigners: The foreigners living in Germany are a burden to the *Soziale Netz* (0-not at all,6- completely agree)	2.911	1.864	1996, 2006, 2016
Cultural threat (mp03)	To what extent you agree with the [following] statement about foreigners:	2.779	1.809	1996, 2006, 2016

	They enrich the culture in Germany (6-not at all,0- completely agree)			
Socio-economic & Demographic characteristics				
Education (iscd975)	5 ISCED categories: 1=Elementary (0.34 %) , 2=Lower Secondary (5.51 %), 3=Upper Secondary (48.36%), 4=Post-Secondary (6.62%), 5=Tertiary Education (39.18%)			All waves
Employment status (work)	1=Full day employed (83.49%) 2=Half day employed (14.90 %) 3= Side job (1.60%) *[4=Not in occupation/unemployed (excluded)]*			All waves
Gender (sex)	1= Woman	0.435		All waves
Income (hhinc)	Household income per capita	2788.74	1905.51	All waves
Age (age)	In years	41.791	11.401	All waves
East/West Germany (eastwest)	1=East Germany (*Neue Bundesländer*)	0.342		All waves
Size of the municipal area of residence (gkpol)	Treated as continuous: 0= Bis 1.999 residents 1= 2.000 - 4.999 residents 2= 5.000 - 19.999 residents 3= 20.000 - 49.999 residents 4= 50.000 - 99.999 residents 5=100.000 - 499.999 residents 6= 500.000 residents and more	2.935	1.880	All waves
State of residence (land)	16 *Länder* – current state of residence			All waves

Note: Data from ALLBUS is publicly available from GESIS: https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/sdesc2.asp?no=5274&db=e&doi=10.4232/1.13395

The original wording of all questions can be found in the cumulative study codebook (in German): Horst Baumann und Sarah Thiesen. 2020 GESIS-Variable Reports Nr. 2020|05 ALLBUS-Kumulation 1980-2018 – Variable Report Studien-Nr. 5274 (04/2020) https://search.gesis.org/research_data/ZA5274

a: Original scales are 1 (Don't agree at all) -7 (Totally agree). The three items are rescaled to indicate more exclusionary views at higher values.

Table A32: Full estimation results of the models presented in Table 2

DV: Subjective relative deprivation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the ***regional*** average)	0.045***	0.047***	0.049***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Employment status (*Ref: Full-time work*)				
Half-time	-0.019	-0.018	-0.018	-0.016
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Side job	0.005	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Not in occupation/unemployed				0.111***
				(0.013)
Woman	0.022*	0.018t	0.018t	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Age	0.001t	0.001*	0.001t	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (*Ref: Elementary*)				
Lower secondary	0.034	0.041	0.041	0.023
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.063)
Upper secondary	-0.022	-0.016	-0.014	-0.032
	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.062)
Post-secondary	-0.109	-0.101	-0.100	-0.118t
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.064)
Tertiary	-0.154*	-0.146t	-0.142t	-0.154*
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.062)
Income	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.290***	0.294***	0.178***	0.171***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.046)	(0.041)
Left-right scale		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	0.447***	0.434***	0.439***	0.466***
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.073)
Year FE	N	N	Y	Y
Region FE	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	11,311	10,966	10,966	12,508
Number of groups	10	10	10	10
Log likelihood	-7218	-6985	-6964	-7821

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A33: Table 2 with alternative risk measure, the national benchmark for in-group threats

DV: Subjective relative deprivation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the ***national*** average)	0.108***	0.114***	0.116***	0.105***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Employment status (*Ref: Full-time work*)				
Half-time	-0.023t	-0.022	-0.023t	-0.021
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Side job	-0.001	-0.018	-0.017	-0.017
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Not in occupation/unemployed				0.101***
				(0.013)
Woman	0.030**	0.026**	0.027**	0.022*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Age	0.001t	0.001t	0.001t	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education (*Ref: Elementary*)				
Lower secondary	0.039	0.046	0.045	0.029
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.063)
Upper secondary	-0.009	-0.004	-0.004	-0.020
	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.061)
Post-secondary	-0.086	-0.079	-0.079	-0.097
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.064)
Tertiary	-0.123t	-0.114	-0.113	-0.126*
	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.062)
Income	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.254***	0.256***	0.179***	0.173***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Left-right scale		-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	0.400***	0.389***	0.406***	0.436***
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(0.072)
Year FE	N	N	Y	Y
Region FE	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	11,311	10,966	10,966	12,508
Number of groups	10	10	10	10
Log likelihood	-7197	-6962	-6941	-7799

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients are presented. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A34: Replication of Table 2 with non-hierarchical logistic regression with state and year dummy

DV: Subjective relative deprivation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the *regional* average)	0.153***	0.135***		
	(0.031)	(0.030)		
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the *national* average)			0.457***	0.436***
			(0.057)	(0.053)
Employment status (Ref: Full-time work)				
Half-time	-0.099	-0.084	-0.121t	-0.108t
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Side job	-0.134	-0.131	-0.154	-0.152
	(0.163)	(0.163)	(0.164)	(0.163)
Not in occupation/unemployed		0.450***		0.416***
		(0.069)		(0.070)
Woman	0.065	0.049	0.109*	0.095*
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Age	0.004*	0.003t	0.004*	0.003t
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.020	-0.014	-0.015	-0.009
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Education (Ref: Elementary)				
Lower secondary	0.206	0.132	0.245	0.177
	(0.355)	(0.311)	(0.354)	(0.313)
Upper secondary	-0.007	-0.095	0.064	-0.013
	(0.347)	(0.304)	(0.345)	(0.306)
Post-secondary	-0.376	-0.471	-0.253	-0.335
	(0.356)	(0.314)	(0.354)	(0.316)
Tertiary	-0.548	-0.616*	-0.394	-0.449
	(0.349)	(0.307)	(0.348)	(0.309)
Income	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.716***	0.716***	0.735***	0.737***
	(0.210)	(0.192)	(0.212)	(0.193)
Left-right scale	0.002	0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Constant	0.017	0.185	-0.215	-0.083
	(0.388)	(0.345)	(0.387)	(0.347)
Observations	10,966	12,508	10,966	12,508
Log likelihood	-6573	-7387	-6552	-7363

Note: All models include state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A35: Full estimation results of the models presented in Table 3

DV: Exclusionary attitudes index	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Subjective relative deprivation	0.047***	0.021**		
	(0.008)	(0.007)		
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the ***regional*** average)			0.030***	0.015*
			(0.007)	(0.006)
LMC (subjective/perceived)		0.036***		0.036***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
FE (subjective/perceived)		0.035***		0.033***
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Cultural threat	0.046***	0.029***	0.048***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Employment status (Ref: Full-time work)				
Half-time	-0.001	-0.010	-0.000	-0.010
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Side job	-0.006	0.009	-0.021	-0.001
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Woman	0.026**	0.015*	0.035***	0.022**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (Ref: Elementary)				
Lower secondary	-0.115	-0.083	-0.067	-0.073
	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Upper secondary	-0.146*	-0.099	-0.096	-0.089
	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Post-secondary	-0.189**	-0.131*	-0.142t	-0.126t
	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Tertiary	-0.204**	-0.140*	-0.148t	-0.128t
	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.077)	(0.069)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.009***	-0.006**	-0.007**	-0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.077*	0.012	0.075*	0.006
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Left-right scale	0.031***	0.020***	0.030***	0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.236**	0.111t	0.162*	0.089
	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.073)
Observations	3,734	3,717	3,413	3,396
Log likelihood	426.7	834.1	416.5	771.0

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients. All models include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A36: Exclusionary attitudes and objective in-group threat, using alternative national benchmark

DV: Exclusionary attitudes index	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the *national* average)	0.081***	0.037***	0.032***	0.031***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
LMC (subjective/perceived)		0.040***	0.036***	0.034***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
FE (subjective/perceived)		0.039***	0.033***	0.035***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Cultural threat			0.030***	0.030***
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.259**	0.136t	0.077	0.015
	(0.086)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.067)
Observations	3,420	3,402	3,396	3,865
Number of groups	3	3	3	3
Log likelihood	205.0	676.1	773.5	813.2

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients. All models are fully specified as in Table 4 in Table 35 and include state and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A37: Further sensitivity checks on results presented in Table 3

DV: Exclusionary attitudes index	(1) *Occupation dummy included*	(2) *Objective measure of LMC*	(3) *Objective measure of FE*
Subjective relative deprivation	0.019**	0.044***	0.044***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
LMC (subjective/perceived)	0.036***		
	(0.002)		
FE (subjective/perceived)	0.034***		
	(0.002)		
LMC (objective)		0.001***	
		(0.000)	
FE (objective)			-0.000
			(0.000)
Cultural threat	0.028***	0.046***	0.047***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

Employment status (ref: Full time)			
Half-time	-0.007	0.005	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Side-job	0.006	-0.022	-0.014
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Woman	0.031***	0.033***	0.029***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (Ref: Elementary)			
Lower secondary	-0.072	-0.059	-0.070
	(0.064)	(0.078)	(0.078)
Upper secondary	-0.080	-0.083	-0.094
	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Post-secondary	-0.108t	-0.129t	-0.147t
	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.077)
Tertiary	-0.105	-0.136t	-0.152*
	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.006**	-0.010***	-0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	-0.000*	-0.000*	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.011	0.076***	0.053***
	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Left right scale	0.020***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.115	0.160*	0.213**
	(0.099)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Observations	3,717	3,360	3,295
Occupation FE	Y	N	N
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Region FE	Y	N	N
Log likelihood	865.5	403.1	400.4

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A38: Table 3 replicated with the unemployed respondents included in the sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Subjective relative deprivation	0.052***	0.024***		
	(0.008)	(0.007)		
In-group threat (unemployment risk exposure relative to the *regional* average)			0.032***	0.017**
			(0.006)	(0.006)
Employment status (Ref: Full-time work)				
Half-time	-0.003	-0.012	-0.002	-0.011
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Side job	-0.007	0.008	-0.023	-0.002
	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Not in occupation/unemployed	0.018	0.004	0.027*	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Woman	0.027***	0.014*	0.037***	0.021**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Age	0.002***	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Education (Ref: Elementary)				
Lower secondary	-0.033	-0.044	0.030	-0.025
	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.064)
Upper secondary	-0.073	-0.066	-0.007	-0.044
	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.063)
Post-secondary	-0.118t	-0.100t	-0.055	-0.082
	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.064)
Tertiary	-0.133*	-0.107t	-0.061	-0.083
	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.063)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.006**	-0.004*	-0.005*	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Income	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.087**	0.021	0.079*	0.009
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Left-right scale	0.031***	0.020***	0.032***	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.141*	0.066	0.047	0.026
	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.067)
Observations	4,251	4,228	3,888	3,865
Region FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log likelihood	406.6	868.0	405.6	811.3

Note: Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A39: Predicting perceived ethnic competition using objective LMC and FE calculated using SOEP

	DV: Subjective LMC	DV: Subjective FE	DV: Subjective LMC	DV: Subjective FE
LMC (objective)	0.010***		0.008**	
	(0.002)		(0.003)	
FE (objective)		0.004t		0.004t
		(0.002)		(0.002)
In-group threat (risk exposure relative to the **regional** average)			0.144**	0.183***
			(0.049)	(0.044)
Cultural threat	0.240***	0.285***	0.239***	0.281***
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Employment status (Ref: Full time work)				
Half-time	0.101	0.088	0.091	0.079
	(0.084)	(0.087)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Side job	-0.149	-0.359	-0.144	-0.356
	(0.236)	(0.250)	(0.236)	(0.249)
Not in occupation/unemployed	0.446***	0.092	0.445***	0.095
	(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.091)
Woman	0.216***	0.190**	0.234***	0.218***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Age	0.005*	0.009***	0.005*	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education (Ref: Elementary)				
Lower secondary	0.530	0.995t	0.551	1.035t
	(0.525)	(0.545)	(0.524)	(0.544)
Upper secondary	0.213	0.807	0.254	0.888t
	(0.516)	(0.534)	(0.515)	(0.534)
Post-secondary	0.015	0.631	0.079	0.760
	(0.525)	(0.543)	(0.525)	(0.543)
Tertiary	-0.153	0.592	-0.067	0.742
	(0.518)	(0.536)	(0.518)	(0.536)
Size of the municipality of residence	-0.033*	-0.042**	-0.032*	-0.043**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	-0.000*	-0.000t	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
East Germany	0.656***	0.636***	0.714***	0.757***
	(0.086)	(0.066)	(0.088)	(0.072)
Left-right scale	0.138***	0.180***	0.136***	0.177***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)

Year (Ref: 1996)				
2006	-0.346***	0.122	-0.357***	0.146t
	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.084)
2016	-1.085***	-0.118	-1.065***	-0.085
	(0.095)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.091)
Constant	0.856	-0.060	0.657	-0.380
	(0.538)	(0.562)	(0.541)	(0.566)
Observations	3,939	3,835	3,934	3,835
Log likelihood	-7502	-7431	-7485	-7423

Note: It is important and of note, here, to report that while previous work has often argued that natives often overestimate the actual number of immigrants in their country, from an ethnic competition perspective, objective LMC and FE seem to be significantly predicting subjective perceptions as well.

Four-level hierarchical linear model estimation coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

APPENDIX B

Supplementary Material for

'Economic Motivations, Labour Market Institutions, and Immigration Policy Preferences'

Table of Contents:

Table A1: Sample used in the analysis by country and year (ESS waves 1-6)

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	TOTAL
Austria	787	730	945	*	*	*	2,462
Belgium	674	670	711	701	654	697	4,107
Switzerland	720	793	650	637	547	574	3,921
Germany	1,036	971	997	1,057	1,186	1,142	6,389
Denmark	721	680	711	694	654	682	4,142
Spain	435	532	670	878	618	**	3,133
Finland	877	865	814	974	702	889	5,121
France	**	**	**	**	**	761	761
United Kingdom	809	710	959	922	860	742	5,002
Greece	460	518	*	710	593	*	2,281
Ireland	639	771	510	508	608	701	3,737
Italy	350	*	*	*	*	288	638
Netherlands	**	**	**	732	717	719	2,168
Norway	1,040	892	901	809	768	**	4,410
Portugal	488	614	718	670	561	607	3,658
Sweden	**	926	952	920	662	817	4,277
TOTAL	9,036	9,672	9,538	10,212	9,130	8,619	56,207

*Not surveyed by the ESS. **Dropped due to missingness on key independent variables.

Table A2: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis, Level-1 covariates

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Immigration policy preferences (DV)	56,207	1.311853	.7550539	0	3
Relative risk (1-digit)	56,207	.9294813	.4451725	.0898762	2.546677
Relative risk (2-digit)	51,270	.7475839	.458459	0	7.621302
Permanent contract	56,207	.8304837	.3752106	0	1
Religiosity	56,207	4.286334	2.800676	0	10
Woman	56,207	.493515	.4999624	0	1
Education	56,207	13.56399	3.836584	0	56
Foreign-born	56,207	.0519686	.2219657	0	1
Union membership	56,207	.5380647	.4985534	0	1
Additional variables used for alternative model specifications					
Dissatisfaction with nat. economy	55,820	4.975045	2.439413	0	10
Occupational immigrant share	53,787	11.14911	7.252032	.0704563	51.65999
Economic immigrant threat	55,354	4.806861	2.294215	0	10
Redistribution attitudes	55,828	2.70968	1.052158	0	4
Income (in deciles)	46,009	6.990697	2.287481	1	10
Left-right ideology	52,136	4.965302	1.956329	0	10
Absolute risk	56,207	6.933382	4.640621	. 6169035	33.11433
Subjective job insecurity	21,823	1.099253	1.014671	0	3
Job market threat	15,123	5.246049	2.06153	0	10
Fiscal exposure threat	14,962	5.739139	2.206153	0	10

Note: Age, area of residence and subjective well-being variables are treated as categorical variables, see frequency tables for the categories in these variables below.

Type of residential are respondents live in	Frequency	Percentage
A big city	9,412	16.75
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	9,030	16.07
Town or small city	17,197	30.60
Country village	15,994	28.46
Farm or home in countryside	4,574	8.14
Total	56,207	100.00

Subjective economic well-being *(how comfortable or difficult it is to live with current income?)*	Frequency	Percentage
Comfortable	25,551	45.46
Coping	5,800	10.32
Difficult	1,090	1.94
Very difficult	25,551	45.46
Total	56,207	100.00

Age	Frequency	Percentage
18-34 y/o	16,742	29.79
35-50 y/o	24,840	44.19
51-65 y/o	14,625	26.02
Total	56,207	100.00

Table A3: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis, Level-2 covariates

Variables	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
Unemployment compensation generosity	10.86889	2.02272	4.9	14.5
Employment protection legislation (aggregate index)	1.990912	.7297719	.7559524	3.775794
Employment protection legislation (regular contract)	2.31314	.7406581	1.261905	4.583333
Employment protection legislation (temporary contract)	1.668685	.9670502	.25	4.75
Immigrant stock share as % of population	10.33515	4.774891	2.631189	26.50116
Economic growth (real GDP growth)	1.294091	2.863568	-8.26904	6.021016
Additional country level variables used in the analysis				
Union density (%)	39.93555	21.44777	7.727812	77.20857
Unemployment rate (%)	6.884235	2.80307	2.49	17.86
Total share of social expenditure (%)	24.07027	3.514781	14.023	31.032
Budget deficit	-.92247	5.671852	-15.1328	17.11308
Economic openness	86.79408	33.43885	46.4972	188.4104
Immigration policy regime	.3271713	.128981	.1914352	.803588
Labour migration policy regime	.4097557	.1444111	.2520833	1
Strength of right-wing parties in gov't (%)	36.94831	35.18762	0	100
Strength of left-wing parties in gov't (%)	41.28037	37.7578	0	100

Note: All additional country-level covariates are measured using the Comparative Political Data Set by Armingeon et. al. (2017) except for budget deficit immigration policy regime variables.

Union density is measured as the net union membership as a proportion wage and salary earners in employment. *Unemployment rate* is the percentage of unemployment amongst civilian labour force. *Total share of social expenditure* is measured as the total public and mandatory private social expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The *strength of left-wing or right-wing parties in gov't* (%) is indicated by the right-wing (or left-wing) parties' seat share in cabinet, measured in percentage of the total seat share of all governing parties (weighted by the number of days in office in a given year). *Economic openness* is measured as total trade (sum of import and export) as a percentage of GDP, in current prices.

Budget deficit variable is from the OECD database measured as the balance of income and expenditure of government, including capital income and capital expenditures. *Overall migration policy regime* and *labour migration policy regime* variables are measured using the IMPIC database conceptualised as 'the government's statements of what it intends to do or not do (including laws, regulations, decisions or orders) in regards to the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens residing in the country' (Helbling et al. 2017, 82). The IMPIC measures are only available up to 2010. Higher values indicate more restrictive policy regime contexts. For further details, see http://www.impic-project.eu/data/

Main Empirical Analysis

Table A4: Full table of results as presented in Table 1

	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)	(M5)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)
Permanent contract	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Woman	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age (*ref: 18-34 years old*)					
35-50 years old	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
51-64 years old	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Religiosity	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Union member	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Foreign born	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Subjective well-being (*ref: Comfortable*)					
Coping	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Difficult	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Very difficult	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Residential area (*ref: Big city*)					
Suburbs or outskirts of big city	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Town or small city	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Country village	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Farm or home in countryside	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
UCG		-0.02t	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
EPL		0.06t	0.04	0.04	0.10*
		(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.039)
Economic growth		-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Share of foreign-born			-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
UCG*Relative risk				0.01**	
				(0.005)	
EPL*Relative risk					-0.04**
					(0.014)
Constant	1.53***	1.65***	1.73***	1.93***	1.61***
	(0.038)	(0.142)	(0.147)	(0.164)	(0.153)
Number of respondents	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
Number of country-years	76	76	76	76	76
Within country-year variance	.462371	.462376	.462375	.462362	.462357
Between country-year variance	.071603	.059135	.055236	.053647	.054968
Slope variation	.004797	.004742	.004754	.004082	.004214
Intercept-slope covariation	-.012120	-.009781	-.008957	-.007822	-.008496
Log likelihood	-58271	-58267	-58266	-58262	-58262

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations, Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A1: Predicted immigration policy preferences and risk exposure

Note: Predictions presented with 95% CIs using Model 3 in Table A4. The histogram visualises the distribution of relative risk in the sample.

Table A5: Predicted immigration preferences across relative risk exposure levels

Values of relative risk at…	Prediction	Standard error	z	p>z	95%CI	
0	1.14365	.0282008	40.55	0.000	1.088377	1.198923
0.5	1.237878	.0254859	48.57	0.000	1.187926	1.287829
1	1.332105	.023801	55.97	0.000	1.285456	1.378754
1.5	1.426333	.0233699	61.03	0.000	1.380529	1.472137
2	1.52056	.0242597	62.68	0.000	1.473012	1.568109
2.5	1.614788	.0263367	61.31	0.000	1.563169	1.666407

Note: The visualisation in Figure A1 is based on the predictions presented here.

Figure A2.1: Mean slope of relative risk by country-year- I

Mean Slope of Risk by Country-Year

Figure A2.2: Mean slope of relative risk by country-year- II

Mean Slope of Risk by Country-Year

Note: Slope variations visualised are estimated using Model 3 in Table A4.

Figure A3.1: Linear predictions of immigration preferences and risk by country 2002 &2004

Figure A3.2: Linear predictions of immigration preferences and risk by country 2006 & 2008

Figure A3.3: Linear predictions of immigration preferences and risk by country 2010 & 2012

Table A6: Multi-level models estimating the effect of risk conditional on and across sub-samples of employment contract type

	Temporary worker sample	Permanent worker sample	Full sample
Relative risk	0.18***	0.19***	0.18***
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Permanent contract			0.01
			(0.018)
Temporary contract*Risk			0.00
			(0.000)
Permanent Contract*Risk			0.01
			(0.016)
Constant	1.53***	1.55***	1.54***
	(0.058)	(0.038)	(0.040)
Observations	9,528	46,679	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-10482	-47784	-58271

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A7: 3-way interaction terms between risk, employment status, and institutional context

	(1)	(2)
Relative risk	-0.01	0.25***
	(0.088)	(0.044)
Permanent contract	-0.09	-0.02
	(0.098)	(0.049)
UCG	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.015)	(0.011)
EPL	0.04	0.08*
	(0.033)	(0.043)
Temporary*Relative risk	0.00	0.00
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Permanent*Relative risk	0.08	0.01
	(0.087)	(0.044)
Relative risk*UCG	0.02*	
	(0.008)	
Temporary*UCG	0.00	
	(0.000)	
Permanent*UCG	0.01	
	(0.009)	
Temporary*UCG*Relative risk	0.00	
	(0.000)	
Permanent*UCG * Relative risk	-0.01	
	(0.008)	
Relative risk *EPL		-0.03t
		(0.020)
Temporary *EPL		0.00
		(0.000)
Permanent*EPL		0.02
		(0.024)
Temporary *EPL * Relative risk		0.00
		(0.000)
Permanent *EPL * Relative risk		-0.00
		(0.020)
Constant	2.03***	1.64***
	(0.182)	(0.157)
Observations	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76
Log likelihood	-58261	-58261

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A8: Conditional effects of risk and immigration policy preferences, sub-sample estimations by employment contract type

	Temporary contract worker subsample		Permanent contract worker subsample	
Relative risk	-0.07	0.25***	0.06	0.25***
	(0.090)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.030)
UCG	-0.05***	-0.03**	-0.03*	-0.02*
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
EPL	0.06t	0.09*	0.06t	0.08*
	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)
UCG*Relative risk	0.02**		0.01*	
	(0.008)		(0.005)	
EPL*Relative risk		-0.04t		-0.03t
		(0.019)		(0.014)
Constant	2.06***	1.77***	1.89***	1.80***
	(0.178)	(0.164)	(0.160)	(0.159)
Observations	9,528	9,528	46,679	46,679
N at level-2	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-10470	-10473	-47781	-47783

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Figure A4: UCG conditional effect of risk across employment contract types

Figure A5: EPL conditional effect of risk across employment contract types

Note on the measurement of labour market institutions

Below I discuss further details of the measurement strategies I used to capture the institutional context in labour markets. For each institution, I first describe the indicators I used and their advantages over other comparable approaches. Next, I discuss additional checks of measurement validity and sensitivity I performed using alternative strategies. In addition to Figure 1 in the manuscript, Figure A8 provides a comprehensive look at how these two measures look like in each country within the observation period 2002-2012.

Unemployment compensation generosity

Earlier work in political economy have used various empirical strategies in capturing the welfare state – and more specifically the compensatory dimension with regards to unemployment insurance and decommodification (Nelson et al. 2020, Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2017). Perhaps the most well-known is the regime-based typology established by Esping-Andersen, which has later been expanded to include additional types (1990, Arts and Gelissen 2002). However, while these regime-based approaches indeed distinguish the variation across decommodification and stratification and are available for a wide variety of

cases, they hide important differences both between and within countries. This means that it is not possible to distinguish between specifically targeted unemployment compensation policy differences between countries when using broad welfare regime categories.

Another popular strategy for measuring compensation has been based on expenditure. Using either the share percentage of social expenditure (or spending specifically on unemployment compensation policies) has an important advantage of being available for a wide coverage both across countries and temporally (Nelson et al. 2020). However, it has important drawbacks making it less useful in this research. First, social spending is highly dependent on macroeconomic shocks and systemic changes in the labour markets. This makes it less of an institutional and programmatic indicator of decommodification and generosity. Instead, it is more of an indicator capturing both demand and supply of compensation simultaneously. Moreover, changes in this measure are highly volatile, whereas institutions are rather stable. Indeed, the reduced unemployment compensation spending is more, so an indicator of job growth, demographic changes, economic climate and do not necessarily describe institutional policy design.

Based on these considerations, I choose to measure institutional context of compensatory interventions using a strategy that can inform on both programmatic and generosity dimensions simultaneously using data from Comparative Welfare Entitlement Project (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto 2017, Scruggs 2014). The project compiles data of institutional generosity on unemployment compensation policies from 1970 to 2011 for advanced developed democracies. It provides data for every year, making it the most comprehensive and frequent comparable data available with the widest temporal and geographical coverage.

The unemployment insurance policies cover all national insurance policies available without income testing. The indicator of unemployment generosity uses five items: replacement rates, benefit duration (in weeks), benefit qualification (in weeks), waiting days, and insurance coverage. Replacement rates are calculated for an average production worker in the manufacturing sector who is 40 years old, has been working for the 20 years preceding the loss of income or the benefit period. The indicator accounts for two household types; single (with no dependents and children) and a four-person household (with one dependent spouse and two children), taken as averaged. Replacement rates are calculated by annualising the benefit for an initial six-month spell of unemployment. Benefit duration is defined as the maximum weeks of benefit available. Qualifying period captures the weeks of employment needed to qualify for benefit in question and waiting days inform on the number of days prior to unemployment that the worker needs to wait before the benefits start. Coverage is the share of the labour force insured for benefits in the country in the given year. Overall, I use the indicator calculated by the CWED project using the following formula below. Further details of the coding rules and measurement are available in Lyle Scruggs (2014). *Social Welfare Generosity Scores in CWED 2: A Methodological Genealogy*. CWED Working Paper 01, February 2014.

Figure A6: Calculation of the UCG indicator from CWED

$$(\text{Program generosity score})_{knt} = [2*z(\text{Benefit Replacement rate}_{knt}) + z(\ln(\text{Benefit Duration weeks}_{knt})) + z(\ln(\text{Benefit Qualification weeks}_{knt}) + z(\text{Waiting days}_{knt}) + 12.5]*\text{Insurance Coverage}_{knt}$$

Since this indicator is only available up to 2011, I restrict my analysis using this indicator to the 2002-2012 ESS waves, given the one-year lag I apply to respect time-ordering. The only exception is Switzerland, where data is only available until 2010, and I use the latest data point for 2012 as well. This generosity index has been used in a large number of empirical studies in the field of comparative political economy, see http://cwed2.org/publications.php, for instance for a large volume of publications using this data to measure institutional generosity. The only other established comparative data source on welfare institutions is the Social Citizenship Indicator Project, currently updated as the SEID dataset, which has a similar temporal and geographical coverage with data available every five years. While this data is available until 2014/2015, it is less desirable since it drastically reduces the detail of information within cases. Even though the cross-sectional variation between country contexts is more important in this research, obscuring potential within-country changes can lead to a misleading interpretation of findings. More practically, it would lead to unduly matching the same data point for several European Social Survey waves when CWED indicator is able to inform for each wave for each country distinctly. The SPIN project also has additional indicators potentially relevant to the research, most importantly, the "Out of Work Benefits" data (OUTWB). However, this systematic data collection effort is limited in scope, only focused on information on replacement rates across different income levels and is available for 2011, neither extending the temporal coverage nor the substance of the measure I use from CWED.

Overall, although there have been significant improvements in the measurement of institutional generosity, for the purpose of this research, CWED appears to be the best choice given its important advantages. The biggest disadvantage of this data is its limited temporal scope. To extend the temporal scope of the empirical evaluation and to have an alternative measure of generosity, I alternate the unemployment compensation measure using a welfare spending-based indicator. Since data for the other key institution of interest, i.e. employment protection legislation, is available for up to 2013, I can extend my research by one additional ESS wave. This means that I test my hypotheses using ESS waves 2002-2014 when I alternate the CWED measure with an aggregated social expenditure indicator. These estimations reveal substantively the same results as the main findings, see Table A9 below.

Employment protection legislation

To measure regulations in the labour markets related to employment protection, I use OECD's index for protection against job loss for temporary and permanent workers available up to 2013 (version 1&2). These indicators have been used widely in earlier work (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019, Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2019, Mau, Mewes, and Schöneck 2012, Gingrich and

Ansell 2012). Figure A7 below presents the detailed items and their weights in each indicator item. While the strictness indicator clearly captures job protection regulations and measures for permanent/regular contract workers, it is less obvious in the case of temporary work regulations. And yet, the temporary worker indicator has information on the extent to which temporary and precarious working conditions can be used by employers in any given country. This has important implications for the turnover and re-employment rates as well as the likelihood of having either employment type in any given country. Moreover, this gives us important information also from the perspective of the permanent/regularly-employed workers in that it determines how such contracts are distributed in the labour markets and what their chances look like in the labour markets in case of a job loss. Therefore, in line with the theoretical framework of this research, these two indicators are both crucial and jointly inform on the labour market institutional context from an employment protection regulation perspective. Thus, while it is true that the index tells less about the conditions of temporary employment, the two indicators are relevant for shaping the environment for temporary and permanent employment regulations in each context.

Figure A7: Details of the EPL indices from OECD

Table 2 Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular workers), summary indicator weights

Level 1 Scale 0-6	Level 2 Scale 0-6	Level 3 Scale 0-6	Level 4 Scale 0-6		Version 1 & 2 weights	Version 3 weights
Individual and collective dismissals – regular workers (EPRC)	Individual dismissals – regular workers (EPR) (version 2 & 3: **5/7**) (version 1: **1**)	Procedural inconveniences (**1/3**)	1. Notification procedures		(1/2)	(1/2)
			2. Delay to start a notice		(1/2)	(1/2)
		Notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals (**1/3**)	3. Notice period after	9 months	(1/7)	(1/7)
				4 years	(1/7)	(1/7)
				20 years	(1/7)	(1/7)
			4. Severance pay after	9 months	(4/21)	(4/21)
				4 years	(4/21)	(4/21)
				20 years	(4/21)	(4/21)
		Difficulty of dismissal (**1/3**)	5. Definition of unfair dismissal		(1/4)	(1/5)
			6. Trial period		(1/4)	(1/5)
			7. Compensation		(1/4)	(1/5)
			8. Reinstatement		(1/4)	(1/5)
			9. Maximum time for claim		--	(1/5)
	Additional provisions for collective dismissals (EPC) (version 2 &3: **2/7**) (version 1: **0**)		18. Definition of collective dismissal		(1/4)	(1/4)
			19. Additional notification requirements		(1/4)	(1/4)
			20. Additional delays involved		(1/4)	(1/4)
			21. Other special costs to employers		(1/4)	(1/4)

Table 3 Strictness of employment protection – temporary contracts, summary indicator weights

Level 1 & 2 Scale 0-6	Level 3 Scale 0-6	Level 4 Scale 0-6	Version 1 & 2 weights	Version 3 weights
Temporary contracts (EPT)	Fixed term contracts (EPFTC) (**1/2**)	10. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts	(1/2)	(1/2)
		11. Maximum number of successive contracts	(1/4)	(1/4)
		12. Maximum cumulated duration	(1/4)	(1/4)
	Temporary work agency employment (EPTWA) (**1/2**)	13. Types of work for which is legal	(1/2)	(1/3)
		14. Restrictions on number of renewals	(1/4)	(1/6)
		15. Maximum cumulated duration	(1/4)	(1/6)
		16. Authorisation and reporting	--	(1/6)
		17. Equal treatment	--	(1/6)

Note: Tables are provided by OECD and are available at https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/EPL-Methodology.pdf

Given these considerations, I take two further steps to ensure the validity of my measurement and to check that the results are not driven by the choices I made on this indicator. First, the third version of the temporary contract indicator has additional information about the equal treatment between temporary and permanent contract, arguably improving the index in terms of capturing regulations and protections available for irregular work contracts. However, this version is only available from 2008 and is only about 1/6 weighted in the whole index. Indeed, the latest and earlier versions are very strongly correlated ($r= 0.9787$) obviating the rationale using the new index at the cost of losing important temporal coverage. Second, in either case, it can be argued that there is the risk that the aggregation of the two indicators mask important differences in the way in which temporary and permanent employment regulations have distinct conditioning effects with regards to risk. Therefore, I also include these two indicators separately and replicate my models. The results reveal substantively the same results, see Table A10.

Figure A8: Two-way plot of UCG and EPL for countries in the sample each year, 2000-2011

Table A9: Testing conditioning hypotheses using an alternative measure of compensation

2002-2014	(1)	(2)	(3)
EPL	0.05t	0.10**	0.05t
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Relative risk	0.15***	0.22***	-0.09t
	(0.009)	(0.025)	(0.052)
EPL*Relative risk		-0.03**	
		(0.012)	
Social expenditure share (%)	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.03***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Social expenditure* Relative risk			0.01***
			(0.002)
Constant	2.02***	1.93***	2.32***
	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.183)
Observations	103,289	103,289	103,289
N at level-2	89	89	89
Log likelihood	-109497	-109493	-109487

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A10: Testing conditioning hypotheses by using EPL indices separately

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.19***	0.19***	0.25***	0.23***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.033)	(0.019)
UCG	-0.02*	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.02*	-0.03*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
EPL – regular contracts	0.03		-0.01	0.04	
	(0.035)		(0.038)	(0.036)	
EPL- temporary contracts		0.06*	0.06*		0.07*
		(0.027)	(0.029)		(0.027)
EPL-reg*Relative risk				-0.03t	
				(0.014)	
EPL-temp*Relative risk					-0.02*
					(0.009)
Constant	1.90***	1.88***	1.90***	1.87***	1.86***
	(0.172)	(0.138)	(0.168)	(0.174)	(0.138)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-58274	-58272	-58272	-58272	-58268

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Further discussion of economic vulnerability measured as relative unemployment risks

While it theoretically and empirically improves the concept and measurement link, this is not to suggest that relative risk exposure is at odds with the previously used indicators of absolute risk assessment. The relative risk exposure measure used in this paper very strongly correlates (r=0.7310) with absolute occupational unemployment rates as used in earlier work by Rehm (2016). Since relativisation of absolute risk transforms the measure into a ratio where 1 indicates an equal risk to the average, within country-year contexts, it does not alter the risk distribution across occupations. An occupation category with high occupational unemployment rates is likely to be placed relatively higher in risk exposure, see Figure A9 and Figure A10, which visualises this idea. However, what this measure more accurately captures is whether there is significant inequality of unemployment risk exposure distribution in the country.

Indeed, even if there are improvements in an economy which may improve employment growth in many branches of occupational tasks, it does not necessarily follow that such effects of growth will be equally distributed. Therefore, while absolute measures are insensitive to such inequalities, relativisation to a national benchmark is a simple way of ensuring both temporal and cross-sectional comparability of risk-based empirical approaches. Through this relativisation, it is possible to capture whether a country's average unemployment rates are driven solely by one occupational group making that occupation doubly exposed to risk to others or whether we see a more smooth and normal distribution of risks across occupations.

Related to the country-level pooled differences, as visualised in Figure A11 and A12 below, the shape of the distribution of risks vary across countries. For instance, there is even dispersion of relative risk in countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece, and Ireland, where the average unemployment rates are higher in the first place. Here, it should be noted that both Spain and Ireland are two countries that are excluded from the sample because they do not have a comparable radical-right party in their political competition space. On the contrary, contexts with lower unemployment rates on average such as Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden have a much more skewed distribution of risks where the majority enjoys a relatively secure position and an unlucky few disproportionately experience the exposure to the risk of losing their jobs despite the good economic conditions in their country on average.

Figure A9: Density plot of relative risk exposure across occupations, pooled by country-year (2002-2012)


Figure A10: Density plot of absolute risk exposure across occupations, pooled by country-year (2002-2012)

**Figure A11**: Plot of relative risk exposure, pooled by occupation-year

Figure A12: Plot of absolute risk exposure, pooled by occupation-year

As a way of strengthening the arguments for the measurement validity of occupational relative unemployment risks as an indicator of economic vulnerability, I investigate convergent and discriminant validity of the relative risk. Using simple power correlations, I check whether relative risk exposure (a) associates in the expected direction to theoretically relevant items and (b) does not strongly correlate with question items that it is expected not to be related. Table A11 below demonstrates that occupationally specific relative risk exposure is overall positively correlated with higher subjective perceptions of replaceability of a worker and the level of education as expected. It is indeed negatively correlated with perceived job security, higher assessment of ability to find a similar job in case of unemployment, longer job tenure, commitment to current work given the link between perceptions of vulnerability and expected losses in the future. Compared to indicators in the discriminant validity column, chosen as not to be expected to be related to relative risk exposure, all indicators correlate far less. These selected indicators for discriminant validity have almost no association with the relative risk measure as indicated by the *r* coefficients in the last column.

Table A11: Convergent and discriminant validity of relative risk

Convergent validity	Correlations (Pearson's r)	Discriminant validity	Correlations (Pearson's r)
Education	-0.3856*	Satisfaction with health services	-0.0402*
Subjective job insecurity [a]	0.1463*	Worry over home burglary [c]	-0.0266
Ability to find a similar job easily [b]	-0.0728*	Subjective belief in the likelihood of terror attack in Europe [d]	0.0331*
Replaceability of worker in position [a]	0.1393*	Subjective belief in the likelihood of terror attack in own country [d]	-0.0309*
Job tenure (years in employment)	-0.0748*	Praying regularity	-0.0509*
Thinking of work matters outside of work [a]	-0.2295*	Important to follow traditions and customs	-0.0540*
		Important to behave properly	-0.0464*
		Important to be loyal and devote to friends	0.0396*

[a]Available in 2004 and 2010 waves. [b]Available in 2002 and 2004 waves. [c] Available in 2006, 2008, and 2010. [d] Available in 2006 and 2008.
All correlations are estimated at least of significance level 95%.

Moreover, I further test whether objective measurement of risk exposure indeed predicts subjective economic insecurities, I fit a simple linear fixed-effects model and using ESS item on job security (jbscr) asking the question only available in ESS waves from 2004 and 2010; 'Please tell me how true each of the following statements is about your current job, My job is secure…'. The answer options are on a four-choice scale from with choices of 'Not at all true', 'A little true', 'Quite true', and 'Very true'. The results in Table A12 confirm the validity of the objective risk exposure measure as an indicator of socio-economic status loss risk using both absolute or relative occupational risk revealing a positive relationship with more subjective

insecurity at higher values of exposure in line with the wealth of evidence supporting this point(Kurer et al. 2019, Rehm 2016).

Table A12: Linear fixed effects models of risk exposure and subjective insecurity

	DV: Current job is insecure	
Absolute risk (*Occupational unemployment rate*)	0.02***	
	(0.002)	
Relative risk (*Occupational unemployment rates relative to the national average*)		0.14***
		(0.018)
Permanent contract	-0.51***	-0.51***
	(0.020)	(0.020)
Woman	-0.02t	-0.02t
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Age (*ref: 18-34 y/o*)		
35-50 *y/o*	0.04**	0.04**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
51-64 *y/o*	-0.05**	-0.06**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Education	-0.00	-0.00t
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Union member	-0.04*	-0.04**
	(0.016)	(0.016)
Foreign born	0.05*	0.06**
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Subjective well-being (*ref: Comfortable*)		
Coping	0.20***	0.21***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Difficult	0.39***	0.41***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Very difficult	0.58***	0.60***
	(0.052)	(0.052)
Residential area (*ref: Big city*)		
Suburbs or outskirts of a big city	-0.02	
	(0.024)	
Town or small city	-0.03t	
	(0.021)	
Country village	-0.01	
	(0.021)	
Farm or home in the countryside	-0.06*	
	(0.029)	
Constant	1.31***	1.31***
	(0.055)	(0.057)
Observations	19,994	19,994
Log likelihood	-26974	-27045
Adjusted R2	0.133	0.129
RMSE	0.933	0.936

Note: Country and year fixed effects are included in both models. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

There are two critical advantages of calculating economic risk at 1-digit occupational levels in terms of measurement validity. 1-digit occupational classification ensures comparability of measurement over time pre- and post-2010 since 2-digit level series of occupational codes are broken in time-series due to ISCO re-categorisation in 2008. The use of 1-digit level minimises missingness, mainly resulting from the lower number of sampled unemployed respondents in ELFS samples and avoids inferences based on small cell calculations in each country at a given time. This concern is significant, given that the theoretical focus of the paper is to test cross-level interactions between level-1 and level-2 variables necessitating sufficient degrees of freedom and statistical power.

Table A13 and A14 below replicate the multi-level estimations using a measure of risk with 2-digit disaggregation instead. I also test the relative risk hypothesis beyond the 2002-2012 temporal scope given that while the data on institutional context is restricted, I have data on risk exposure until 2017 calculated using ELFS data available. Table A13 below is fully specified with individual-level variables as in main models and includes country and year fixed effects to remove confounding due to context. Replicating both the direct and conditional effect hypotheses discussed in the manuscript using a 2-digit indicator of risk reveals that there are no substantive differences compared to the results presented in the main findings.

Table A13: Relative risk and immigration policy preferences, replicated using alternative risk measure

Sample from 2002 to 2018	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Relative risk (1-digit)	0.15***	0.15***		
	(0.008)	(0.008)		
Relative risk (2-digit)			0.11***	0.11***
			(0.009)	(0.009)
Permanent contract	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	1.65***	1.65***	1.73***	1.73***
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Observations	129,455	129,455	121,095	121,095
N at level-2	112	112	106	106
Log likelihood	-137435	-137435	-129594	-129594

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

One difference here compared to the results presented in the manuscript is presented in Model 3 in Table A14 is regarding the conditioning effect between UCG and relative risk which reaches above conventional levels of significance when replicated using a 2-digit measure of risk. However, as discussed above, testing these interaction terms are very much prone to Type II errors. Therefore, such difference may be driven by the loss of some cases due to missingness in the 2-digit level risk measures. Indeed, when an alternative measure of compensation, i.e. social expenditure, with broader data coverage is used which expands the temporal scope by just one year in Model 6, the findings seem to be precisely in line with those presented in the

main results. I also plot the average marginal effects and predicted immigration preferences replicating the figures in the manuscript (not shown here, all available from the author if needed) revealing that there are no differences in using 1-digit or 2-digit occupational risk measures in terms of its implications on the theory tested here.

Table A14: Conditional effects of relative risk on immigration policy preferences, replicated using an alternative measure of risk

	(2000-2012)			(2002-2014)		
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Relative risk (2-digit)	0.15***	0.13*	0.21***	0.12***	0.19***	-0.04
	(0.012)	(0.064)	(0.032)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.064)
EPL	0.06t	0.06t	0.09*	0.07*	0.11***	0.07*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.029)
EPL*Relative risk (2-digit)			-0.03*		-0.04**	
			(0.015)		(0.013)	
UCG	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02			
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)			
Social Expenditure (%)				-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
				(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
UCG*Relative risk (2-digit)		0.00				0.01*
		(0.006)				(0.003)
Social Exp. *Relative risk (2-digit)						
Constant	1.83***	1.85***	1.77***	2.18***	2.11***	2.32***
	(0.165)	(0.177)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.169)	(0.177)
Observations	51,270	51,270	51,270	95,008	95,008	95,008
N at level-2	71	71	71	83	83	83
Log likelihood	-53699	-53699	-53697	-101689	-101684	-101686

Note: *Note*: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4 Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Note on the measurement of immigration policy preferences

To construct my dependent variable of "immigration policy preferences", I use three very strongly correlated items, see Table A15 below. This means that these three questions jointly capture the latent concept of immigration policy preferences reasonably well as similarly used in earlier research (Pardos-Prado 2020). And yet, three issues about this strategy are worth further discussion.

First, as Figure A13 presents, amongst these highly correlated items the question item referring specifically to "immigration from culturally and ethnically similar countries" receive more support across all cases, although there is some variation. Moreover, despite the empirical justification for an index of these three items, there may also be reasons on theoretical grounds since culturally similar immigrants may indeed be perceived in a disproportionately positive light. Therefore, to ensure that my results are not sensitive to the composition of the indicator

variable, I exclude this item and re-estimate my results, see Table A16 where there are no changes in the results.

Table A15: Inter-item details for the questions used in the dependent variable

Factor loadings of each question item on the created index based on principal component analysis:

Variable item	Factor 1	Uniqueness
"Immigration from culturally and ethnically similar countries."	0.8004	0.3594
"Immigration from culturally and ethnically different countries."	0.9131	0.1662
"Immigration from poor countries outside Europe."	0.8610	0.2585

Correlations of each question item (Pearson's *r* reported below):

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3
"Immigration from culturally and ethnically similar countries" (item 1)	1.0		
"Immigration from culturally and ethnically different countries" (item 2)	0.7675	1.0	
"Immigration from poor countries outside Europe" (item 3)	0.6898	0.8295	1.0

Figure A13: Average "opposition to immigration" across countries for each question item

AT: 1.31402, 1.60338, 1.59718
BE: 1.18715, 1.49387, 1.48845
CH: .968548, 1.31004, 1.33413
DE: 1.01862, 1.38805, 1.44084
DK: .949395, 1.39784, 1.52984
ES: 1.39771, 1.47011, 1.4721
FI: 1.27946, 1.59457, 1.68988
FR: 1.27913, 1.48141, 1.57686
GB: 1.38668, 1.5853, 1.66438
GR: 1.61395, 2.1031, 2.13112
IE: 1.19423, 1.39116, 1.42713
IT: 1.13462, 1.28083, 1.28647
NL: 1.29957, 1.41202, 1.50435
NO: .999412, 1.28388, 1.29212
PT: 1.75057, 1.83752, 1.87489
SE: .764722, .848997, .8663

culturally & ethnically similar countries
culturally & ethnically diff. countries
poorer non-EU countries

Second, in my primary analysis, I use a simple additive index in constructing my dependent variable. However, another way of building such an index is through component analysis followed by oblique rotation and then creating an index based on this principle component analysis. Table A16 below reveal that such a different measurement approach is also inconsequential to the results.

Table A16: Direct and indirect effects of risk on immigration policy preferences, using alternative measures of the DV-I

| | Alternative DV-I | | | Alternative DV-II | | |
	Additive index excluding item on culturally and ethnically similar immigration			Constructing the DV using PCA		
Relative risk	0.19***	0.06	0.26***	0.23***	0.06	0.33***
	(0.012)	(0.055)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.064)	(0.036)
UCG	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01*			0.02**	
		(0.005)			(0.006)	
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.09*	0.05	0.05	0.12*
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.048)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04*			-0.05**
			(0.014)			(0.017)
Constant	1.86***	2.02***	1.76***	0.50**	0.73***	0.36t
	(0.163)	(0.175)	(0.167)	(0.184)	(0.203)	(0.190)
Observations	56,372	56,372	56,372	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-61858	-61855	-61855	-70345	-70341	-70341

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Third, in addition to these three items of policy preferences available all waves, there are three other immigration-related questions in the ESS which are asked every year. These items are the following (I recode all items in the same direction where higher values indicate more negativity):

'Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?' (0) Enriched – (10) Undermined

'Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?' (0) Good – (10) Bad

'Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?' (0) Better – (10) Worse

I choose to exclude these questions from my dependent variable based on both theoretical and empirical considerations. Theoretically, some earlier research has combined these three attitudinal questions with policy preferences in capturing responses towards immigration (Polavieja 2016). However, the three items I use in my DV explicitly refer to incoming

immigration, while the latter three questions focus on the perceived effects of immigration. I concede that in both sets of items, it is possible to capture a certain degree of opposition and scepticism regarding immigration. However, for theoretical and simple face validity reasons, I do not include these items in my DV and sustain that these are not theoretically interchangeable or the same. Empirically, these six items are indeed correlated. However, results from a simple principle factor analysis suggest that while there is some inter-item correlation between these six questions, the two sets of questions load differently into two distinct items, see Table A17 below. Therefore, I conclude that there are both theoretical and empirical justifications for not putting these items in one index for capturing immigration policy preferences. Nevertheless, to ensure comparability with earlier studies that used a range of these strategies and to alleviate concerns of sensitivity to such choices, I replicate my main models using an alternative construction of the dependent variable which includes all six items. The results presented in Table A18 below reveal that the results do not change when immigration policy preferences are measured using these additional dimensions as well.

Table A17: Factor loadings of additional question items on immigration in the ESS

Variable item	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Accepting immigration from *same*	0.7510	-0.2722	0.3620
Accepting immigration from *different*	0.8692	-0.2892	0.1609
Accepting immigration from *poor*	0.8182	-0.2682	0.2586
Immigration good/bad for the *economy*	0.6941	0.2799	0.4398
Immigration good/bad for the *culture*	0.7101	0.3297	0.3871
Immigration good/bad *in general* for the country	0.7427	0.3323	0.3380

Table A18: Direct and indirect effects of risk on immigration policy preferences, using alternative measures of the DV -II

	(1)	(2)	(3)
UCG	-0.03t	-0.05**	-0.03t
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Relative risk	0.25***	0.09	0.38***
	(0.015)	(0.070)	(0.038)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01*	
		(0.006)	
EPL	0.06	0.06	0.14**
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.049)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.06***
			(0.018)
Constant	0.58**	0.78***	0.40*
	(0.190)	(0.210)	(0.196)
Observations	54,510	54,510	54,510
N at level-2	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-68130	-68127	-68124

Note: 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations fully specified as Model 3 in Table A4
Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Finally, Figure A14 visualises the overtime and cross-national variation of mean immigration policy preferences in each country and Figures A15.1, A15.2, and A15.3, below visualise the average immigration policy preferences across *nine* occupation groups across different countries pooled over time between 2000-2012. These figures indeed reveal that while certainly between-country average differences across occupations are of note, there is an important variation of average immigration policy preferences for specific job groups between different country contexts. These variations further justify the use of random-slope modelling to explore the relationship between risk and immigration policy preferences under different conditions.

**Figure A14:** Average immigration policy preferences across countries, 2002-2012

**Figure A15.1**: Average immigration policy preferences across countries by occupations- I

Figure A15.2: Average immigration policy preferences across countries by occupations -II

Figure A15.3: Average immigration policy preferences across countries by occupations -III

Note on model choice and null models

As my primary empirical strategy, I use random-slope random-intercept two-level hierarchical models allowing the coefficient of relative risk to vary across country-year conditions both in slope and intercept. This choice is based on both theoretical and empirical reasons. First, theoretically, the paper argues that risk exposure effects on immigration policy preferences vary across different institutional conditions. This means that testing such hypotheses necessitate cross-level interaction terms between level-1 variable relative risk and level-2 variables capturing institutions. Second, using European Social Survey data and based on simulations, methodological research investigating specifications of cross-level interactions has revealed that not introducing level-1 cross-level interacted variable as a random-slope overestimates t-ratio of the interaction term by about average of 42 per cent (Heisig and Schaeffer 2019). This means that testing cross-level interactions without random-slope specifications can lead to severe risks of Type I errors.

Moreover, Table A19 presents the comparison of the null hierarchical and non-hierarchical estimation, and the random intercept and the random slope estimation of the relative risk covariate side by side. The likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that the models estimating the effect of relative risk varying randomly across country-years is the better fit for the data over non-multilevel or other multi-level model strategies strengthening the argument to use a random-slope model. This also means that while the overall mean immigration policy

preferences across all country-years are about 1.00, country-year effects indeed alter the average immigration policy preference in each context. Based on the intraclass correlation/variance partition coefficient that about 11-12 per cent of the variance in immigration policy preferences can be attributed to differences between country-year conditions.

Table A19: Result of the null model of immigration policy preferences

	Null Non-MLM	Null MLM	Random intercept	Random slope
Relative Risk			0.34***	0.44***
			(0.007)	(0.020)
Constant	1.31***	1.33***	1.00***	1.01***
	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.033)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	-	76	76	76
Within country-year variance	.5700962	.5035551	.4820059	.4809332
Between country-year variance	-	.0685611	.0550224	.0702843
Slope variation	-	-	-	.0057529
Intercept-slope covariance	-	-	-	-.0105351
VPC (ICC)		0.1198377	0.1024573	0.1275074
Log likelihood	-63961.514	-60648.066	-59412.283	-59383.904

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$.

To country-year effects in the null random slope model, Figure A16.1 and 16.2 presents the ranked residuals revealing that, on average, being in a particular country context at a given year indeed influences preferences. First, the country-year random effects in the rank-ordered figure reveal that no country-year context has a disproportionately influential random effect on preferences, all fall within +/- 0.5. Moreover, while some contexts such as Switzerland and Denmark (all waves) have negative residuals on the overall average of demanding more restrictive immigration policies, country-year contexts such as Greece and Austria have positive country-year residuals. Overall, such evidence also supports the need to study immigration policy preferences and variation in such demands considering both individual-level and between country-year level factors simultaneously.

Figure A16.1: Mean random effects of country-year contexts on immigration policy preferences – I

Figure A16.2: Mean random effects of country-year contexts on immigration policy preferences - II

Moving to inspect the intercept-slope correlation (-.5239197) further Figure A17 plots this covariance in the null model. Indeed, in all my model specifications, I allow slope and intercept to have unstructured/uncorrelated shape relaxing assumptions about their inter-dependence. Here, I find that intercept and slope of country-years are correlated in the negative direction. This result indicates that in country-year waves where there is higher than average restrictiveness demands (above-average values on the dependent variable), there is a flatter-than-average slope of relative risk exposure. Figure A17 also allows identifying how the country-cases in my sample look. For instance, in the top left quadrant are country-years with lower than average restrictive immigration policy preferences but those with a higher than average increase in such demands due to relative risk. Conversely, the bottom right quadrant show country-years with above-average restrictiveness demands where the slope of such a relationship is less than average. Likelihood ratio tests also confirm that the addition of parameter for intercept-slope covariance is empirically worthwhile.

Figure A17: Intercept-slope covariance of the null random slope model

Finally, I also check whether my cross-level interaction results are being driven by an influential outlier case at a higher level. The procedures presented here are computed using the 'mlt' package (Moehring and Schmidt 2013). The two-way interaction model of employment protection legislation gives a significant interaction effect between the country-level variable EPL and the individual-level variable relative risk (cross-level interaction). The model suggests that the negative impact of relative risk becomes weaker if EPL is higher. Relatedly,

Figure A18 shows that no cases appear to be influential in this relationship, except for Belgium in 2010. I repeat the estimation, excluding this potential outlier, and the results show that the presented results are not sensitive to the exclusion of such cases. I repeat this procedure for two-way interactions with compensation generosity, see Figure A19, and other model estimation results presented using cross-level interactions.

Figure A18: Outlier detection diagnostic on two-way cross-level interaction model with EPL

Figure A19: Outlier detection diagnostic on two-way cross-level interaction model with UCG

Other sensitivity checks and alternative model specifications

Table A20: Determinants of immigration policy preferences, multi-level estimations with fixed effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.19***	0.04	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.025)
UCG	-0.03*	-0.03**	-0.03*	0.04**	0.03*	0.04**
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01**			0.01***	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
EPL	0.06t	0.06t	0.08*	0.13*	0.13*	0.15**
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.054)	(0.055)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.03**			-0.04**
			(0.013)			(0.012)
Constant	1.86***	1.92***	1.83***	0.87***	0.94***	0.82***
	(0.172)	(0.173)	(0.173)	(0.190)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Country fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log likelihood	-58272	-58268	-58269	-58178	-58172	-58173

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A21: Hierarchical restricted maximum likelihood and clustered standard error estimations of immigration preferences

	Restricted likelihood (RMLE) estimations			Robust country-year standard errors		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UCG	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03t	-0.03
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.052)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.040)	(0.027)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01**			0.01***	
		(0.005)			(0.004)	
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.10*	0.06t	0.06t	0.08*
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.038)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.03**
			(0.014)			(0.012)
Constant	1.73***	1.93***	1.61***	1.83***	1.89***	1.80***
	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.158)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.173)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-58349	-58349	-58348	-58272	-58268	-58269

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A22: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences using three and four-level hierarchical models, random slope

Random slope	3-level hierarchical estimations			4-level hierarchical estimations		
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.18***	0.06	0.24***
	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.048)	(0.028)
UCG	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.02t	-0.03**	-0.02t
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01**			0.01*	
		(0.005)			(0.004)	
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.10*	0.05	0.05	0.08*
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.03*
			(0.014)			(0.013)
Constant	1.73***	1.93***	1.61***	1.75***	1.86***	1.69***
	(0.147)	(0.164)	(0.153)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.151)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
Number of years	6	6	6	6	6	6
Number of country-year	76	76	76	76	76	76
Number of country-year-occ.	-	-	-	682	682	682
Log likelihood	-58266	-58262	-58262	-58191	-58188	-58189

Note: Fully specified 3-level and 4-level linear hierarchical model estimations with the slope of risk varying in each country and year unit. 3-level models are individuals nested in countries nested in years and 4-level models nest individuals in occupations in countries in each ESS wave. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A23: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences using three and four-level hierarchical models, random intercept

	3-level hierarchical estimations			4-level hierarchical estimations		
UCG	-0.02t	-0.03**	-0.02*	-0.02t	-0.03**	-0.02t
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.06t	0.25***	0.18***	0.06	0.24***
	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.048)	(0.028)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01***			0.01*	
		(0.003)			(0.004)	
EPL	0.05	0.05	0.08*	0.05	0.05	0.08*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.036)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.03***			-0.03*
			(0.009)			(0.013)
Constant	1.78***	1.90***	1.73***	1.75***	1.86***	1.69***
	(0.148)	(0.152)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.156)	(0.151)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
Number of years	6	6	6	6	6	6
Number of country-year	76	76	76	76	76	76
Number of country-year-occ.	-	-	-	682	682	682
Log likelihood	-58289	-58282	-58283	-58191	-58188	-58189

Note: Fully specified 3-level and 4-level linear hierarchical model estimations. 3-level models are individuals nested in countries nested in years and 4-level models nest individuals in occupations in countries in each ESS wave. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A24: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for objective income and satisfaction w/national economy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Household income	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Dissatisfaction w/economy				0.03***	0.03***	0.03***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.03	0.27***	0.19***	0.06	0.26***
	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.034)	(0.011)	(0.049)	(0.028)
UCG	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.01
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.09*	0.02	0.02	0.08*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.037)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01**			0.01**	
		(0.005)			(0.004)	
EPL* Relative risk			-0.04*			-0.04**
			(0.016)			(0.013)
Constant	1.88***	2.09***	1.76***	1.57***	1.75***	1.45***
	(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.160)	(0.141)	(0.157)	(0.146)
Observations	46,033	46,033	46,033	55,820	55,820	55,820
N at level-2	74	74	74	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-47124	-47120	-47121	-57611	-57608	-57608

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A25: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for ideology and welfare attitudes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left right scale	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***			
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)			
Pro-redistribution				-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.03***
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.11*	0.26***	0.19***	0.06	0.27***
	(0.011)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.011)	(0.052)	(0.029)
UCG	-0.02t	-0.03*	-0.02t	-0.02t	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01t			0.01**	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
EPL	0.05	0.05	0.11**	0.05	0.05	0.11**
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.03**			-0.04**
			(0.013)			(0.014)
Constant	1.35***	1.49***	1.22***	1.81***	2.01***	1.68***
	(0.144)	(0.167)	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.165)	(0.154)
Observations	52,136	52,136	52,136	55,828	55,828	55,828
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-52516	-52515	-52513	-57770	-57767	-57766

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A26: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences and direct effects of risk controlling for ethnic competition

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Subjective economic threat of immigration[a]	0.15***			
	(0.001)			
Occupational immigrant share		-0.00		
		(0.001)		
Subjective fiscal competition[b]			0.09***	
			(0.003)	
Subjective job competition[c]				0.11***
				(0.004)
Relative risk	0.10***	0.19***	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.021)
UCG	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.020)
EPL	0.07*	0.04	0.10t	0.06
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.050)	(0.055)
Constant	0.71***	1.68***	1.00***	1.08***
	(0.128)	(0.149)	(0.292)	(0.321)
Observations	55,519	53,787	8,797	8,873
N at level-2	76	73	13	13

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$
a: Immigration bad for country's economy **b**: Immigrants take out more than they put into taxes and services **c**: Immigrants take jobs away in the country

Table A27: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences and conditioning effects of controlling for ethnic competition

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Subjective economic threat of immigration[a]	0.15***	0.15***		
	(0.001)	(0.001)		
Occupational immigrant share			-0.00	-0.00
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Relative risk	0.02	0.12***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.055)	(0.030)
UCG	-0.02t	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.01
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.012)
EPL	0.07*	0.08*	0.04	0.09*
	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)
UCG* Relative risk	0.01*		0.01**	
	(0.004)		(0.005)	
EPL*Relative risk		-0.01		-0.04*
		(0.011)		(0.014)
Constant	0.83***	0.68***	1.89***	1.57***
	(0.140)	(0.132)	(0.167)	(0.154)
Observations	55,519	55,519	53,787	53,787
N at level-2	76	76	73	73

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A28: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for the unemployment rate and union density

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Unemployment rate	0.01	0.01	0.01			
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)			
Union density				-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.053)	(0.029)
UCG	-0.01	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02*	-0.01
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01**			0.01**	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
EPL	0.03	0.03	0.09*	-0.01	-0.01	0.04
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.037)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.04**
			(0.014)			(0.014)
Constant	1.63***	1.83***	1.51***	2.03***	2.22***	1.92***
	(0.174)	(0.189)	(0.178)	(0.151)	(0.167)	(0.156)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	55,614	55,614	55,614
N at level-2	76	76	76	75	75	75
Log likelihood	-58265	-58262	-58262	-57552	-57548	-57548

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A29: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for government partisanship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Strength of left-wing parties	0.00	0.00	0.00			
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)			
Strength of right-wing parties				-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
UCG	-0.02t	-0.04**	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01**			0.01**	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.09*	0.04	0.04	0.09*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.039)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.04**
			(0.014)			(0.014)
Constant	1.71***	1.91***	1.58***	1.77***	1.97***	1.65***
	(0.145)	(0.164)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.171)	(0.160)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-58265	-58261	-58261	-58266	-58262	-58262

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A30: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for the budget deficit and economic openness

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Budget deficit	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***			
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)			
UCG	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.05	0.26***	0.19***	0.05	0.26***
	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)	(0.011)	(0.051)	(0.029)
UCG* Relative risk		0.01**			0.01**	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
EPL	0.02	0.02	0.08*	0.04	0.04	0.10*
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.04**
			(0.014)			(0.014)
Economic openness				0.00	0.00	0.00
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.52***	1.72***	1.41***	1.72***	1.93***	1.60***
	(0.139)	(0.157)	(0.145)	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.158)
Observations	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207	56,207
N at level-2	76	76	76	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-58257	-58253	-58253	-58266	-58262	-58262

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A31: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences controlling for the immigration policy regime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Immigration policy regime	0.63**	0.64**	0.64**			
	(0.201)	(0.200)	(0.201)			
Labour migration policy				0.02	0.02	0.03
				(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.186)
UCG	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.02	0.27***	0.19***	0.02	0.27***
	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.031)	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.031)
UCG*Relative risk		0.02**			0.02**	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
EPL	0.11***	0.11***	0.13***	0.08*	0.08*	0.11**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**			-0.04**
			(0.014)			(0.014)
Constant	1.56***	1.62***	1.52***	1.97***	2.04***	1.93***
	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.205)	(0.204)	(0.205)	(0.205)
Observations	47,588	47,588	47,588	47,588	47,588	47,588
N at level-2	64	64	64	64	64	64
Log likelihood	-49394	-49389	-49390	-49398	-49394	-49394

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A32: Multi-level estimations of immigration preferences excluding the foreign-born citizens from the sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Relative risk	0.19***	0.06	0.28***
	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.030)
UCG	-0.02	-0.04**	-0.02
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
UCG*Relative risk		0.01*	
		(0.005)	
EPL	0.04	0.04	0.10**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)
EPL*Relative risk			-0.04**
			(0.014)
Constant	1.77***	1.95***	1.65***
	(0.151)	(0.166)	(0.156)
Observations	53,286	53,286	53,286
N at level-2	76	76	76
Log likelihood	-55263	-55260	-55259

Note: Fully specified 2-level linear hierarchical model estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

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APPENDIX C

Supplementary Material for

'What Drives the Economically Vulnerable to Vote for the Radical-right? Socioeconomic Risk Exposure and the Role of Exclusionary Security Provision'

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Table A1: Summary statistics of variables used in the analysis

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Relative unemployment risk exposure (1-digit)	.8661425	.4175827	.0956095	2.388375
Relative unemployment risk exposure (2-digit)	.7016488	.448107	0	8.403341
Economic attitudes of immigration	4.507608	2.234656	0	10
Cultural attitudes of immigration	3.708668	2.33315	0	10
Pro-redistribution attitudes	2.671806	1.077497	0	4
Employment status				
Temporary employed	.1146796	.3186389	0	1
Unemployed	.0474337	.2125674	0	1
Education (in years)	14.25151	3.760205	0	51
Foreign-born	.0491663	.2162179	0	1
Father foreign-born	.0814082	.2734644	0	1
Mother foreign-born	.0795751	.2706377	0	1
Age				
18-34	.2397298	.4269239	0	1
51-64	.3139564	.4641047	0	1
Union member	.5784954	.4938062	0	1
Woman	.4740106	.4993304	0	1
Income	6.952491	2.372194	1	10
Subjective economic status				
Coping	.4286611	.4948908	0	1
Difficult	.0849237	.2787716	0	1
Very Difficult	.0186571	.1353125	0	1
Left-right scale (political partisanship)	4.957362	2.067038	0	10
Religiosity	4.179666	2.874989	0	10
Political interest	1.747966	.7834856	0	3
Authoritarianism	3.357046	1.20856	0	5
Dissatisfaction with economy	4.430821	2.26183	0	10
Dissatisfaction with democracy	3.882081	2.236603	0	10
Dissatisfaction with government	5.21369	2.250343	0	10
Distrust in politicians	5.574377	2.159474	0	10
Fiscal threat	5.442973	2.101464	0	10
Jobs threat	4.838353	1.980919	0	10

Note: Union membership, sex, and immigrant background variables are coded binary (0-1). **Age** is measured as a nominal variable with three categories (18-34, 35-50, and 51-65 years old). **Subjective economic/income status** is measured as a nominal variable with four categories (Comfortable, coping, difficult, very difficult). **Employment status** is measured as a categorical variable (unemployed, temporary employed, permanent contract).

Table A2: National parties in the sample coded by party families from 2002-2018

	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	ESS4	ESS5	ESS6	ESS7	ESS8	ESS9
A: Radical right-wing parties (RRWP)									
AT	FPÖ (3)	FPÖ (3)	FPÖ (3), BZÖ (4)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	FPÖ (3), BZÖ (4)	FPÖ (3), BZÖ (4)	FPÖ (3)
BE	VB (8), FN (15)	VB (7), FN (11)	VB (7), FN (11)	VB (7), FN (11)	VB (7), FN (11), PP (15)	VB (7), FN (11), PP (15)	VB (7), FN (11), PP (15)	VB (7), FN (11), PP (15)	VB (7), FN (11), PP (15)
CH	SVP/UDC (4), SD (11), FP (13), Lega dei Ticinesi (15)	SVP/UDC (4), SD (11), FP (13), Lega dei Ticinesi (15)	SVP/UDC (4), SD (11), FP (13), Lega dei Ticinesi (15)	SVP/UDC (4), SD (10), Lega dei Ticinesi (13)	SVP/UDC (4), SD (10), Lega dei Ticinesi (13)	SVP/UDC (1), SD (15), Lega dei Ticinesi (10), MCG (12), PNS/PNOS (17)	SVP/UDC (1), Lega dei Ticinesi (10), MCG (12)	SVP/UDC (1), Lega dei Ticinesi (10)	SVP/UDC (1), Lega dei Ticinesi (10), MCG (12)
DE	Republikaner (6)	Republikaner (6), NPD/DVU (7)	Republikaner (6), NPD/DVU (7)	Republikaner (6), NPD/DVU (7)	Republikaner (6), NPD (7)	Republikaner (6), NPD (7)	AfD (6), NPD (8)	AfD (6), NPD (8)	AfD (6), NPD (8)
DK	DF (6), FP (9)	DF (6), FP (9)	DF (6), FP (9)	DF (5)	DF (5)	DF (5)	DF (5)	*Not in wave*	Data N/A yet
FI	True Finns (5)	True Finns (5)	True Finns (5)	True Finns (5)	True Finns (5), SKS (8), *IKL (7)*	True Finns (4), Change 2011 (7)	True Finns (4), Change 2011 (7)	True Finns (4)	True Finns (4)
FR	FN (3), MNR (7), MPF (8)	FN (3), MNR (7), MPF (8)	FN (3), MNR (7), MPF (8)	FN (3), MNR (5)	FN (3), MNR (5)	FN (2), MPF (5)	FN (2), MPF (8)	FN (2), MPF (8)	FN (11)
UK	-	-	BNP (7), UKIP (8)	-	-	-	UKIP (7)	UKIP (7)	UKIP (7)
GR	-	LAOS (6)	*Not in wave*	LAOS (5)	LAOS (4), Golden Dawn (10)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*
IE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IT	AN (9), LN (11), FT (16)	AN (9), LN (11), FT (16)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	LN (9)	*Not in wave*	LN (9)	LN (9), Casapound Italia (13)

ND	List Pim Fortuyn (4)	List Pim Fortuyn (4)	List Pim Fortuyn (4)	List Pim Fortuyn (4), PVV (11)	PVV (3)	PVV (3)	PVV (3)	PVV (3)	PVV (3), FvD (13)
NO	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)	FrP (8)
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Data N/A yet
SE	-	-	-	-	SD (10)	SD (10)	SD (10)	SD (10)	Data N/A yet
PT	PNR (7)	PNR (7)	PNR (8)	PNR(8)	PNR(8)	PNR(8)	PNR(8)	PNR (11)	Data N/A yet

B: Mainstream/major centre right									
AT	ÖVP (2)	ÖVP (2)	ÖVP (2)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	ÖVP (2)	ÖVP (2)	ÖVP (2)
BE	CVP(2), VLD (5), Vivant (9), PSC (12)	CD & V (2), N-VA (3), VLD (8), Vivant (6), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD & V (2), N-VA (3), VLD (8), Vivant (6), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V + N-VA (2), Open VLD+ Vivant (8), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V (2), N-VA (3), Open VLD (8), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V (2), N-VA (3), Open VLD (8), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V (2), N-VA (3), Open VLD (8), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V (2), N-VA (3), Open VLD (8), CDH (9), MR (12)	CD&V (2), N-VA (3), Open VLD (8), CDH (9), MR (12)
CH	FDP (1), CVP (2)	FDP (1), CVP (2)	FDP (1), CVP (2)	FDP (1), CVP (2)	FDP (1), CVP (2)	FDP (3), CVP (4)	FDP (3), CVP (4)	FDP (3), CVP (4)	FDP (3), CVP (4)
DE	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (2)	CDU/CSU (1)	CDU/CSU (1)	CDU/CSU (1)
DK	Venstre-V (8)	Venstre-V (8)	Venstre-V (8)	Venstre-V (7)	Venstre-V (7)	Venstre-V (7)	Venstre-V (7)	*Not in wave*	Data N/A yet
FI	KOK (1), KESK (4)	KOK (1), KESK (4)	KOK (1), KESK (4)	KOK (1), KESK (4)	KOK (1), KESK (4)	KOK (1), KESK (3)	KOK (1), KESK (3)	KOK (1), KESK (3)	KOK (1), KESK (3)
FR	UMP (12)	UMP (12)	UMP (12)	UMP (11)	UMP (11)	UMP (10)	UMP (10)	UMP (10)	LREM (7), LR (9)
UK	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)	Conservative (1)
GR	ND (2)	ND (2)	*Not in wave*	ND (2)	ND (2)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*
IE	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (1), FG (2)	FF (2), FG (3)	FF (2), FG (3)
IT	Forza Italia (8)	Forza Italia (8)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	PDL (8)	*Not in wave*	PDL (8)	Forza Italia (8), Civia Popolare Lorenzin (4)
ND	CDA (1), VVD (3)	CDA (1), VVD	CDA (1), VVD	CDA (1), VVD	CDA (1), VVD	CDA (4), VVD	CDA (5), VVD	CDA (5), VVD (1)	CDA (5), VVD (1)

	(3)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(1)		
NO	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)	H (7)
ES	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	PP (1)	Data N/A yet
SE	KD (3), Conservatives (5)	KD (3), Conservatives (5)	KD (3), Conservatives (5)	KD (3), Conservatives (5)	KD (3), M (5)	KD (3), M (5)	KD (3), M (5)	KD (3), M (5)	Data N/A yet
PT	PSD (11), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (11), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (10), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (10), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (10), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (10), CDS-PP (2)	PSD (10), CDS-PP (2)	PPD-PSD/CDS-PP - Portugal à Frente (16)	Data N/A yet

C: Mainstream/major centre left								
AT	SPÖ (1)	SPÖ (1)	SPÖ (1)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	SPÖ (1)	SPÖ (1)	SPÖ (1)
BE	SP(3), PS (14)	SP.A-Spirit (5), PS (13)	SP.A-Spirit (5), PS (13)	SP.A-Spirit/Vlaams-Progressiven (5), PS (13)	SP.A (5), PS (13)	SP.A (5), PS (13)	SP.A (5), PS (13)	SP.A (5), PS (13)	SP.A (5), PS (13)
CH	SP/PS (3)	SP/PS (3)	SP/PS (3)	SP/PS (3)	SP/PS (3)	SP/PS (2)	SP/PS (2)	SP/PS (2)	SP/PS (2)
DE	SPD (1)	SPD (1)	SPD (1)	SPD (1)	SPD (1)	SPD (1)	SPD (2)	SPD (2)	SPD (2)
DK	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	Socialdemoktatiet – SD (1)	*Not in wave*	Data N/A yet
FI	SDP (9)	SDP (9)	SDP (9)	SDP (8)	SDP (14)	SDP (13)	SDP (13)	SDP (11)	SDP (11)
FR	PS (10)	PS (10)	PS (10)	PS (8)	PS (8)	PS (9)	PS (9)	PS (9)	PS (5)
UK	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)	Labour (2)
GR	PASOK (1)	PASOK (1)	*Not in wave*	PASOK (1)	PASOK (1)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*
IE	Labour (3)	Labour (3)	Labour (3)	Labour (3)	Labour (5)	Labour (5)	Labour (5)	Labour (6), Social Democrats (8)	Labour (6), Social Democrats (8)
IT	DdS (1), La Margherita (2)	DdS (1), La Margherita (2)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	PD (1)	*Not in wave*	PD (1)	PD (1), +Europe (2), Italia Europa Insieme (3), Liberi e Uguali (6)

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ND	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)	PvdA (2)
NO	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)	A (3)
ES	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	PSOE (2)	Data N/A yet
SE	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	SAP (6)	Data N/A yet
PT	PS (10)	PS (10)	PS (11)	PS (11)	PS (11)	PS (11)	PS (11)	PS (13)	Data N/A yet

	D: Radical left-wing parties (RLWP)								
AT	-	-	KPÖ (7)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	KPÖ (6)	KPÖ (6)	KPÖ (6)
BE	PVDA-AE (7), PTB-UA (16)	-	-	-	PVDA+ (6), PTB (14)	PVDA+ (6), PTB (14)	PVDA+ (6), PTB (14)	PVDA+ (6), PTB (14)	PVDA+ (6), PTB (14)
CH	PdA (9)	PdA (9)	PdA (9)	PdA (7)	PdA (7)	PdA (11), AL/LG (14)	PdA (11), AL/LG (14)	PdA (11)	PdA (11)
DE	PDS (5)	PDS (5)	PDS (5)	PDS (5)	Die Linke/PDS (5)	Die Linke (5)	Die Linke (3)	Die Linke (3)	Die Linke (3)
DK	Red-Green Alliance (10), SF (5)	Red-Green Alliance (10), SF (5)	Red-Green Alliance (10), SF (5)	Red-Green Alliance (9), SF (4)	Red-Green Alliance (9), SF (4)	Red-Green Alliance (9), SF (4)	Red-Green Alliance (9), SF (4)	*Not in wave*	Data N/A yet
FI	VAS (10), SKP (11), KTP (12)	VAS (10), SKP (11), KTP (12)	VAS (10), SKP (11), KTP (12)	VAS (9), SKP (10), KTP (11)	VAS (15), SKP (16), KTP (17), STP (18)	VAS (14), SKP (15), KTP (16), STP (17)	VAS (14), SKP (15), KTP (16), STP (17)	VAS (12), SKP (13), KTP (14), STP (15)	VAS (12), SKP (13), KTP (14), STP (15)
FR	LCR (4), LO (5), MDC (6), PC (9)	LCR (4), LO (5), MDC (6), PC (9)	LCR (4), LO (5), MDC (6), PC (9)	LCR (3), LO (4), PRG (9), PC (7)	LCR (3), LO (4), PRG (9), PC (7)	NPA (4), LO (5), FDG (6), PRG (7)	NPA (4), LO (5), FDG (6), PRG (7)	NPA (4), LO (5), FDG (6), PRG (7)	LO (1), NPA (2), PCF (3), FI (4)
UK	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
GR	KKE (3), SYN (4), DIKKI (5)	KKE (3), SYN (4), DIKKI (5)	*Not in wave*	KKE (3), SYRZIA (4)	KKE (3), SYRZIA (5), ANTAR (12)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*
IE	-	-	-	-	People before	People before	People before	Anti-Austerity	Anti-Austerity

					profit (6), Socialist Party (8), United Left Alliance (9)	profit (6), Socialist Party (8), United Left Alliance (9)	profit (6), Socialist Party (8), United Left Alliance (9)	Alliance - People Before Profit (1), Socialist Party - United Left Alliance (9)	Alliance - People Before Profit (1), Socialist Party - United Left Alliance (9)
IT	CI (3), RC (7)	CI (3), RC (7)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	Mov. 5 Stelle (4), Ingroia (3)	Not surveyed	Mov. 5 Stelle (4), Ingroia (3)	Mov. 5 Stelle (7)
ND	SP (7)	SP (7)	SP (7)	SP (7)	SP (5)	SP (5)	SP (4)	SP (4)	SP (4)
NO	RV (1), SV (2)	RV (1), SV (2)	RV (1), SV (2)	RV (1), SV (2)	Rodt (1), SV (2)	Rodt (1), SV (2)	Rodt (1), SV (2)	Rodt (1), SV (2)	Rodt (1), SV (2)
ES	IU (3)	IU (3)	IU (3)	IU (3)	IU (3)	IU (4)	IU (4)	IU (6), Podemos (4), Unidos Podemos (3)	Data N/A yet
SE	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	V (7)	Data N/A yet
PT	BE (1), PCP/PEV (5), PCTP/MRPP(6), POUS (8)	BE (1), PCP/PEV (5), PCTP/MRPP(6), POUS (8)	BE (1), PCP/PEV (3), PCTP/MRPP(4), POUS (9)	BE (1), PCP/PEV (3), PCTP/MRPP(4), POUS (9)	BE (1), CDU (3), PCTP/MRPP(4), POUS (9)	BE (1), CDU (3), PCTP/MRPP(4), POUS (9)	BE (1), CDU (3), PCTP/MRPP(4), POUS (9)	BE(2), CDU(3), PCTP/MRPP(8), PTP-MAS (1)	Data N/A yet
	E: Other parties (not coded as belonging to one of the four main party families)								
AT	Grüne (4), LIF(5), Others(6)	Grüne (4), LIF (5), Others(6)	Grüne (5), LIF (6), Others (8)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	Grüne (5), NEOS (7), Piratenpartei Österreich (8), Team Stronach (9), Others (10)	Grüne(5), NEOS (7), Piratenpartei Österreich (8), Team Stronach (9), Others (10)	PILZ(4), Grüne(5), NEOS (7), GILT(8), Others(9)
BE	Agalev (1), PNPB (4), VU-	Agalev/Groen (1),	Agalev/Groen (1),	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecke	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecke	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecke	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecke	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecker	Groen (1), Lijst Dedecker

	ID (6), Ecolo (11), PRL-FDF (13), Other (17)	RESIST (4), Ecolo (10), Other (14)	RESIST (4), Ecolo (10), Other (14)	r (4), Ecolo (10), Other (14)	r (4), Ecolo (10), Other (16)	r (4), Ecolo (10), Other (16)	r (4), Ecolo (10), Other (16)	(4), Ecolo (10), Other (16)	(4), Ecolo (10), Defi(16), Other (17)
CH	Liberal Party-LPS (5), ADI (6), PEP (7), PCS (8), Greens (10), UDF (12), ASF (14), Others (16)	Liberal Party-LPS (5), ADI (6), PEP (7), PCS (8), Greens (10), UDF (12), ASF (14), Others (16)	Liberal Party-LPS (5), PEP (7), PCS (8), Greens (10), UDF (12), ASF (14), Others (16)	Liberal Party-LPS (5), PEP (12), PCS (6), Greens (8), Green liberals (9), UDF (11), Others (14)	Liberal Party-LPS (5), PEP (12), PCS (6), Greens (8), Green liberals (9), UDF (11), Others (20)	PEP (8), PCS (13), Greens (5), Green liberals (6), UDF (9), Pirate Party (16), Bourg-Dem Party (7), Others (18)	PEP (8), Greens (5), Green liberals (6), UDF (9), Pirate Party (16), Bourg-Dem Party (7), ASF (15), Others (18)	PEP (8), Greens (5), Green liberals (6), UDF (9), Pirate Party (16), Conservative Dem Party (7), Others (18)	Greens (5), Green liberals (6), Conservative Dem Party (7), EVP (8), UDF (9),Alternative Linke (13), Pirate Party (14), Others (15)
DE	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (3), FDP (4), Other (7)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (3), FDP (4), Other (8)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (3), FDP (4), Other (8)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (3), FDP (4), Other (8)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (3), FDP (4), Other (8)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (4), FDP (5), Pirate Party (8), Other (9)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (4), FDP (5), Pirate Party (7), Other (9)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (4), FDP (5), Pirate Party (7), Other (9)	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (4), FDP (5), Pirate Party (7), Other (9)
DK	RV (2), DKF (3), CD (4), Kristeligt Folkeparti (7), Other (11)	RV (2), DKF (3), CD (4), Kristeligt Folkeparti (7), Other (11)	RV (2), DKF (3), CD (4), Kristendemokraterne (7), Other (11)	RV (2), DKF (3), Kristendemokraterne (6), New alliance (8), Other (10)	RV (2), DKF (3), Kristendemokraterne (6), New alliance (8), Other (10)	RV (2), DKF (3), Kristendemokraterne (6), New alliance (8), Other (10)	RV (2), DKF (3), Kristendemokraterne (6), New alliance (8), Other (10)	*Not in wave*	Data N/A yet
FI	SPP (2), Liberals (3), Christian-Dem (6), VSL (7), Greens (8), NLP (13),	SPP (2), Liberals (3), Christian-Dem (6), VSL (7), Greens	SPP (2), Liberals (3), Christian-Dem (6), VSL (7), Greens	SPP (2), Liberals (3), Christian-Dem (6), Greens (7), Other	SPP (2), Liberals (3), Christian-Dem (6), Greens (13), Senior	SPP (2), Christian-Dem (5), Greens (12), Senior Citizens' Party	SPP (2), Christian-Dem (5), Greens (12), Senior Citizens' Party	SPP (2), Christian-Dem (5), Greens (10), Pirate Party (7), Freedom Party (6),	SPP (2), Christian-Dem (5), Greens (10), Pirate Party (7), Freedom Party (6), Independen t

	Other (14)	(8), NLP (13), Other (14)	(8), NLP (13), Other (14)	(12)	Citizens' Party (9), Joint Responsibility Party (10), Independence Party (11), For the Poor (12), Other (19)	(9), Pirate Party (8), Freedom Party (6), Independence Party (10), For the Poor (11), Other (18)	(9), Pirate Party (8), Freedom Party (6), Independence Party (10), For the Poor (11), Other (18)	Independence Party (8), For the Poor (9), Other (16)	ce Party (8), For the Poor (9), Other (16)
FR	CPNT (1), DL (2), RPF (11), UDF (13), Greens (14), Eco (15), Other (16)	CPNT (1), DL (2), RPF (11), UDF (13), Greens (14), Eco (15), Other (16)	CPNT (1), DL (2), RPF (11), UDF (13), Greens (14), Eco (15), Other (16)	CPNT (1), NC (6), UDF – MoDem (10), Greens (12), Eco (13), Divers gauche (14), Divers droit (15) Other (16)	CPNT (1), NC (6), UDF – MoDem (10), Greens (12), Eco (13), Divers gauche (14), Divers droit (15) Other (16)	NC (1), PR (3), MoDem (11), EELV (12), Eco (13), Other (14)	NC (1), PR (3), MoDem (11), EELV (12), Eco (13), Other (14)	NC (1), PR (3), MoDem (11), EELV (12), Eco (13), Other (14)	EELV (6), MoDEM (8), Debout la France (10), Other (12)
UK	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (7), (11-22) Parties in NIR	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (7), (11-22) Parties in NIR	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), (11-21) Parties in NIR, Other (22)	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (7), (11-22) Parties in NIR	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (7), (11-22) Parties in NIR	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (7), (11-22) Parties in NIR	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), (9-18) Parties in NIR, Other (8)	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), (9-18) Parties in NIR, Other (8)	LibDem (3), SNP (4), Plaid Cymru (5), Green Party (6), Other (8), (9-19) Parties in NIR
GR	Other (6)	Other (7)	*Not in wave*	Greens (6), Other (7)	OP (6), FS (11), KOTES (13), SPITHA	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*

					(14)				
IE	Progressive Democrats (4), Green Party (5), Sinn Fein (6), Independent (7), Other (8)	Progressive Democrats (4), Green Party (5), Sinn Fein (6), Independent (7), Other (8)	Progressive Democrats (4), Green Party (5), Sinn Fein (6), Independent (7), Other (8)	Progressive Democrats (4), Green Party (5), Sinn Fein (6), Independent (7), Other (8)	Green Party (3), Sinn Fein (7), Independent (4), Other (10)	Green Party (3), Sinn Fein (7), Independent (4), Other (10)	Green Party (3), Sinn Fein (7), Independent (4), Other (10)	Green Party (4), Sinn Fein (7), Independent (5), Other (10)	Green Party (4), Sinn Fein (7), Independent (5), Other (10)
IT	Il Girasole (4), SVP(6), CCD-CDU (10), Nuovo PSI (12), Lista di Pietro (13), Democrazia Europea (14), Pannella-Bonino (15), Other (17)	Il Girasole (4), SVP(6), CCD-CDU (10), Nuovo PSI (12), Lista di Pietro (13), Democrazia Europea (14), Pannella-Bonino (15), Other (17)	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	*Not in wave*	SEL (2), Fratelli d'Italia (10), Scelta Civica (5), UDC (6), FLI (7), Radicali Italiani (11), FARE (12), La destra (13), Other (14)	*Not in wave*	SEL (2), Fratelli d'Italia (10), Scelta Civica (5), UDC (6), FLI (7), Radicali Italiani (11), FARE (12), La destra (13), Other (14)	SVP-PATT (5), Fratelli d'Italia (10), UDC (11), Potera al Popolo (12), Other (14)
ND	Democrats '66 (5), Green Left (6), CU (8), LN (9), SGP (10), Other (11)	Democrats '66 (5), Green Left (6), CU (8), LN (9), SGP (10), PvdD (11), Other (12)	Democrats '66 (5), Green Left (6), CU (8), LN (9), SGP (10), Other (11)	Democrats '66 (5), Green Left (6), CU (8), LN (9), SGP (10), PvdD (12), Other (13)	Democrats '66 (6), Green Left (7), CU (8), SGP (9), PvdD (10), TON (11), Other (12)	Democrats '66 (6), Green Left (7), CU (8), SGP (9), PvdD (10), Pirate Party (11), 50 Plus (12) Other (13)	Democrats '66 (6), Green Left (8), CU (7), SGP (9), PvdD (10), 50 Plus (11) Other (16)	Democrats '66 (6), Green Left (8), CU (7), SGP (9), PvdD (10), 50 Plus (11) Other (16)	Democrats '66 (6), Green Left (8), CU (7), SGP (9), PvdD (10), 50 Plus (11), DENK (12), Bij1 (14)

NO	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Other (10)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Green Party (10), Other (11)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Green Party (10), Other (11)	V (4), Krf (5), Sp (6), KYST (9), Green Party (10), Other (11)
ES	CiU (4), ERC (5), ICV (6), PNV (7), EA (8), BNG (9), CC (10), PA (11), CHA (12), Other (68)	CiU (4), ERC (5), ICV (6), PNV (7), EA (8), BNG (9), CC (10), PA (11), CHA (12), NA-BAI (13), Other (74)	CiU (4), ERC (5), ICV (6), PNV (7), EA (8), BNG (9), CC (10), PA (11), CHA (12), NA-BAI (13), Other (74)	CiU (4), ERC (5), PNV (6), BNG (7), CC-PNC (8), NA-BAI (9), UPyD (10), Other (74)	CiU (4), ERC (5), PNV (6), BNG (7), CC-PNC (8), NA-BAI (9), UPyD (10), Other (74)	CiU (3), ERC (8), PNV (7), BNG (9), CC-PNC (10), Compromis-EQUO (11), Foro de Ciudadanos (12), Geroa Bai (13), UPyD (6), Other (14)	CiU (3), ERC (8), PNV (7), BNG (9), CC-PNC (10), Compromis-EQUO (11), Foro de Ciudadanos (12), Geroa Bai (13), UPyD (6), Other (14)	CiU (5), En Comu Podem (7), C-P-EUPV(8), Compromis (9), ERC(10), CDC (11). En Marea (12), EAJ-PNV(13), EH Bildu (14), CC-PCC(15), CC(16), PNC(17), PACMA(18), CUP(19), Other (50)	Data N/A yet
SE	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), Other (8)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), Other (8)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), Other (8)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), Other (8)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), FI (8), Junilistan (9), Other (11)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), FI (8), Piratpartiet (9), Other (11)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), FI (8), Piratpartiet (9), Other (11)	C (1), FP (2), Greens (4), FI (8), Piratpartiet (9), Other (11)	Data N/A yet
PT	MPT (3), PH (4), PPM (9), Other (12)	MPT (3), PH (4), PPM (9), Other (12)	PDA (5), PH (6), PND (7), Other (13)	PDA (5), PH (6), PND (7), Other (13)	PDA (5), PH (6), PND (7), Other (13)	PDA (5), PH (6), PND (7), Other (13)	PDA (5), PH (6), PND (7), Other (13)	PURP(14) PAN (15), PPM(12), MPT (9), Other (18), PPV/CDC (7), JPP (4), LIVRE(5) NC(6), PDR (10)	Data N/A yet

Table A3: Operationalization of control variables used in the analysis

Variable	ESS question item	Scale/Direction Used
Socio-demographic variables		
Employment status	'Do/did you have a work contract of ... limited/unlimited duration?' ; Main activity (paid work/unemployed and looking for a job)	Unemployed, temporary contract, permanent contract
Education	'About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time?'	Continuous (in years)
Immigration background	a. 'Was your mother born in [country]?' b. 'Was your father born in [country]?' c. 'Were you born in [country]?'	*Dummy (a., b., c.)*: Not born in country (1)
Age	'And in what year were you born?' - Age of respondent, calculated	(0) 18-34 years old (1) 35-50 years old (2) 51-65 years old
Income	Household's total net income	10 deciles
Union membership	'Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar organization?'	*Dummy*: Union member (current or in past) (1)
Religiosity	'Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?'	(0) Not at all religious- (10) Very religious
Subjective economic well-being	'Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?'	(1) Living comfortably on present income (2) Coping on present income (3) Difficult on present income (4) Very difficult on present income
Political preferences		
Political partisanship/ideology	'In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?'	(0) Left – (10) Right
Cultural attitudes towards immigration	'Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?' (0) Enriched – (10) Undermined	(0) Positive – (10) Negative attitudes
Economic attitudes towards immigration	'Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?' (0) Good – (10) Bad	(0) Positive – (10) Negative attitudes
Pro-redistribution	'the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'	(0) Disagree strongly - (4) Agree strongly
Satisfaction with economy	'On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]?'	(0) Extremely satisfied- (10) Extremely dissatisfied
Satisfaction with democracy	'And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?'	(0) Extremely satisfied-(10) Extremely dissatisfied
Satisfaction with government	'Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?'	(0) Extremely satisfied- (10) Extremely dissatisfied
Interest in politics	'How interested would you say you are in politics – are you'	(0) Very interested (1) Quite interested (2) Hardly interested

		(3) Not at all interested
Authoritarianism	'Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you… It is important to her/him that the government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.'	(5) Very much like me (4) Like me (3) Somewhat like me (2) A little like me (1) Not like me (0) Not like me at all
Trust in politicians	How much do you personally trust politicians?	(0) No trust at all – (10) Complete trust
Fiscal competition/threat	Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?	(0) Generally take out more- (10) Generally put in more
Jobs competition/threat	Would you say that people who come to live here generally take jobs away from workers in [country], or generally help to create new jobs?	(0) Take jobs away – (10) Create new jobs

Personality traits

Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you…

Important to think new ideas and being creative	
Important to be rich, have money and expensive things	
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities	
Important to show abilities and be admired	
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings	
Important to try new and different things in life	
Important to do what is told and follow rules	
Important to understand different people	
Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention	
Important to have a good time	(6) Very much like me (5) Like me (4) Somewhat like me (3) A little like me (2) Not like me (1) Not like me at all
Important to make own decisions and be free	
Important to help people and care for others well-being	
Important to be successful and that people recognise achievements	
Important to seek adventures and have an exciting life	
Important to behave properly	
Important to get respect from others	
Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close	
Important to care for nature and environment	
Important to follow traditions and customs	

Additional control variables for robustness estimations

Trust in political parties	'…please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust… political parties?'	(0) Complete trust-(10) No trust at all
Trust in parliament	'…please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust…[country]'s parliament?'	(0) Complete trust-(10) No trust at all
Preferences of European integration	'Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position?'	(0) Unification go further - (10) Unification already gone too far

Table A4: Country-year sample (ESS) 2002-2018

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	COUNTRY TOTAL
Austria	384	291	336	*	*	*	387	497	601	2,496
Belgium	414	485	539	560	514	577	574	574	484	4,721
Switzerland	252	327	245	301	229	318	252	322	244	2,490
Germany	745	626	595	716	692	720	887	840	663	6,484
Denmark	556	533	571	580	569	599	560	*	*	3,968
Finland	536	539	351	602	472	695	588	594	513	4,890
France	***	***	***	***	***	527	418	371	344	1,660
Great Britain	**	**	471	**	**	**	463	479	514	1,927
Greece	**	235	*	300	235	*	*	*	*	770
Italy	***	***	*	*	*	165	*	282	323	770
Netherlands	***	***	***	576	515	541	550	468	482	3,132
Norway	690	591	524	618	671	***	***	***	***	3,094
Portugal	186	205	249	148	***	150	216	283	*	1,437
Sweden	**	**	**	**	573	522	449	441	*	1,985
YEAR TOTAL	3,763	3,832	3,881	4,401	4,470	4,814	5,344	5,151	4,168	39,824 observations

Note: Number of observations reported from the full model estimations and refers to the sample used in the main results presented in the sample.

* Not surveyed by the ESS (or data not available yet for the 2018 wave as of the data of this analysis - 15 May 2020).

** No RRWP in question item responses.

*** Excluded due to missing data (France, Netherlands, and Norway have missing data for the years market for occupational unemployment rates data).

Table A5: Frequencies of political behaviour ('party voted for in the last national election') across five options in sample

Dependent Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Radical right	5,486	8.29	8-29
Mainstream (centre) right	23,382	35.35	43.65
Mainstream (centre) left	19,296	29.18	72.82
Radical left	5,602	8.47	81.29
Other	12,371	18.71	100.00
Total	66,137	100.00	

Table A6: Alternative DV-I: Frequencies of political behaviour ('party voted for in the last national election') across six options in sample

Dependent Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Radical right	5,486	6.68	6.68
Mainstream (centre) right	23,382	28.48	35.16
Mainstream (centre) left	19,296	23.50	58.67
Radical left	5,602	6.82	65.49
Other	12,371	15.07	80.56
Did not vote	15,961	19.44	100.00
Total	82,098	100.00	

Table A7: Alternative DV-II: Frequencies of party respondents feel closest to in each wave in sample

Dependent Variable	Frequency	Percentage	Cumulative Percentage
Radical right	4,683	9.55	9.55
Mainstream (centre) right	15,798	32.21	41.75
Mainstream (centre) left	13,717	27.96	69.72
Radical left	5,397	11.00	80.72
Other	9,459	19.28	100.00
Total	49,054	100.00	

Table A8: ISCO-88 1-digit and 2-digit occupational job task categorization (2002-2010)

1	**Major Group: Legislators, Senior Officials, and Managers**
11	Legislators and senior officials
12	Corporate managers
13	Managers of small enterprises
2	**Major Group: Professionals**
21	Physical, mathematical, and engineering science professionals
22	Life science and health professionals
23	Teaching professionals
24	Other professionals (such as business professionals, accountants, lawyers, judges, social scientists etc.)
3	**Major Group: Technicians and Associate Professionals**
31	Physical and engineering science associate professionals
32	Life science and health associate professionals
33	Teaching associate professionals
34	Other associate professionals (such as finance and sales associate professionals, buyers, trade brokers, legal and related business associate professionals etc.)
4	**Major Group: Clerks**
41	Office clerks
42	Customer service clerks
5	**Major Group: Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers**
51	Personal and protective services workers
52	Models, salespersons and demonstrators
6	**Major Group: Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers**
61	Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
7	**Major Group: Craft and Related Trade Workers**
71	Extraction and building trades workers
72	Metal, machinery, and related trades workers
73	Precision, handicraft, craft printing and related trades workers
74	Other craft and related trades workers (such as food processing and related trade workers, tailors, textile cutters, wood treaters etc.)
8	**Major Group: Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers**
81	Stationary plant and related operators
82	Machine operators and assemblers
83	Drivers and mobile plant operators
9	**Major Group: Elementary Occupations**
91	Sales and services elementary occupations
92	Agricultural, fishery and related Labourer
93	Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport

Table A9: ISCO-08 1-digit and 2-digit occupational job task categorization (2012-2018)

1	**Major Group: Legislators, Senior Officials, and Managers**
11	Chief executives, senior officials and legislators
12	Administrative and commercial managers
13	Production and specialized services managers
14	Hospitality, shop and related services managers
2	**Major Group: Professionals**
21	Science and engineering professionals
22	Health professionals
23	Teaching professionals
24	Business and administration professionals
25	Information and communications technology (ICT) professionals
26	Legal, social and cultural professionals
3	**Major Group: Technicians and Associate Professionals**
31	Science and engineering associate professionals
32	Health associate professionals
33	Business and administration associate professionals
34	Policing, legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals
35	Information and communications technicians
4	**Major Group: Clerks**
41	Office clerks
42	Customer services clerks
43	Numerical and Material Recording Clerks
44	Other Clerical Support Workers
5	**Major Group: Service Workers and Shop and Market Sales Workers**
51	Personal Services Workers
52	Sales Workers
53	Personal Care Workers
54	Protective Services Workers
6	**Major Group: Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers**
61	Market-oriented Skilled Agricultural Workers
62	Market-oriented Skilled Forestry, Fishery and Hunting Workers
7	**Major Group: Craft and Related Trade Workers**
71	Building and Related Trades Workers (excluding Electricians)
72	Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers
73	Handicraft and Printing Workers
74	Electrical and Electronic Trades Workers
75	Food Processing, Woodworking, Garment and Other Craft and Related Trades Workers
8	**Major Group: Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers**
81	Stationary Plant and Machine Operators
82	Assemblers
83	Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators
9	**Major Group: Elementary Occupations**
91	Cleaners and Helpers

92	Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Labourers
93	Labourers in Mining, Construction, Manufacturing and Transport
94	Food Preparation Assistants
95	Street and Related Sales and Services Workers
96	Refuse Workers and Other Elementary Workers

Figure A1: Cross-country distributions of relative occupational risk (kernel density)

Figure A2: Distribution of relative occupational risk across years (kernel density)

Figure A3: Measurement validity of relative unemployment risk

Correlation matrix	Relative risk (2-digit)	Relative risk (1-digit)	Relative risk (t-1)	Relative risk (election matched)
Relative risk (2-digit)	1.00			
Relative risk (1-digit)	0.7623	1.00		
Relative risk (t-1)	0.7412	0.9557	1.00	
Relative risk (election matched)	0.7364	0.9463	0.9572	1.00

N= 72,756 observations

Figure A4: Ideological position of political parties on economic issues (1999-2014)

Note: "be": Belgium, "dk": Denmark, "ge": Germany, "gr": Greece", "fr": France, "it": Italy, "nl": Netherlands, "uk": United Kingdom, "aus": Austria, "fin": Finland, "sv": Sweden

Figure A5: Position of political parties on redistribution and immigration policies (2006-2014)

Note: "be": Belgium, "dk": Denmark, "ge": Germany, "gr": Greece", "fr": France, "it": Italy, "nl": Netherlands, "uk": United Kingdom, "aus": Austria, "fin": Finland, "sv": Sweden

Figure A6: Position of political parties on immigration weighted by saliency of the policy (2006-2010)

Position on immigration policy weighted by saliency of immigration policy for the party (10= Strongly favours tough policy)

○ RWPP	● Mainstream right	△ Mainstream left
▲ Radical left	✕ Other	

Note: "be": Belgium, "dk": Denmark, "ge": Germany, "gr": Greece", "fr": France, "it": Italy, "nl": Netherlands, "uk": United Kingdom, "aus": Austria, "fin": Finland, "sv": Sweden

Figure A7: Position of political parties on redistribution weighted by saliency of the policy (2006-2010)

Position on redistribution of wealth weighted by saliency of the redistribution to the party (10=Strongly opposes redistribution)

○ RWPP	● Mainstream right	△ Mainstream left
▲ Radical left	✕ Other	

Figure A8: Overall ideological position of political parties (1999-2014)

Position of the party in terms of overall ideological stance (10=Extreme right, 0= Extreme left)

○ RWPP ● Mainstream right △ Mainstream left
▲ Radical left × Other

Position of the party in terms of overall ideological stance (10=Extreme right, 0= Extreme left)

○ RWPP ● Mainstream right △ Mainstream left
▲ Radical left × Other

Note: "be": Belgium, "dk": Denmark, "ge": Germany, "gr": Greece", "fr": France, "it": Italy, "nl": Netherlands, "uk": United Kingdom, "aus": Austria, "fin": Finland, "sv": Sweden

Figure A9: Position of political parties on economic left-right dimension, 2017 Chapel Hill Flash Expert Survey

Figure A10: Position of political parties on immigration policy, 2017 Chapel Hill Flash Expert Survey

Note: "ger": Germany, "gr": Greece", "fr": France, "it": Italy, "nl": Netherlands, "uk": United Kingdom, "swe": Sweden

Table A10: Closest previous general election for each survey wave and country

Country	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	ESS4	ESS5	ESS6	ESS7	ESS8	ESS9
Austria	1999	2002	2002	2006	2008	2008	2013	2013	2017
Belgium	1999	1999	2003	2007	2007	2010	2010	2014	2014
Switzerland	1999	2003	2003	2007	2007	2011	2011	2015	2015
Germany	1998	2002	2005	2005	2009	2009	2013	2013	2017
Denmark	2001	2001	2005	2007	2007	2011	2011	2015	2015
Finland	1999	2003	2003	2007	2007	2011	2011	2015	2015
France	1997	2002	2002	2007	2007	2007	2012	2012	2017
United Kingdom	2001	2001	2005	2005	2005	2010	2010	2015	2017
Greece	2000	2000	2004	2007	2009	2009	2012	2015	2015
Country	ESS1	ESS2	ESS3	ESS4	ESS5	ESS6	ESS7	ESS8	ESS9
Ireland	1997	2002	2002	2007	2007	2011	2011	2011	2016
Italy	2001	2001	2001	2006	2008	2008	2013	2013	2018
Netherlands	2002	2003	2003	2006	2006	2010	2012	2012	2017
Norway	2001	2001	2005	2005	2009	2009	2013	2013	2017
Spain	2000	2000	2004	2004	2008	2011	2011	2015	2016
Sweden	1998	2002	2002	2006	2006	2010	2010	2014	2018
Portugal	1999	2002	2005	2005	2009	2011	2011	2015	2015

Table of results from model estimations

Table A11: Objective relative unemployment risk and subjective economic insecurity, Figure 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	DV: Job is not secure		DV: Likely unemployed looking for a job		DV: Likely not enough money for household	
Relative risk exposure	0.25***	0.15***	0.34***	0.14***	0.34***	0.14***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)						
Temporary contract		0.53***		0.49***		0.18***
		(0.044)		(0.030)		(0.020)
Unemployed				1.60***		0.62***
				(0.036)		(0.034)
Foreign-born		0.01		0.17***		0.16***
		(0.043)		(0.027)		(0.027)
18-34 years old		-0.05*		-0.00		-0.02
		(0.024)		(0.018)		(0.017)
51-64 years old		-0.13***		-0.07***		-0.13***
		(0.023)		(0.016)		(0.016)
Union member		0.01		-0.04*		0.03t
		(0.027)		(0.017)		(0.016)
Education		-0.01*		-0.01**		-0.01***
		(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Woman		-0.01		-0.03t		0.05***
		(0.021)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Income decile		-0.03***		-0.03***		-0.07***
		(0.006)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Suburbs or outskirts of a big city		-0.03		-0.00		0.03
		(0.033)		(0.024)		(0.022)
Town or small city		-0.04		-0.03t		0.02
		(0.029)		(0.018)		(0.018)
Country village		-0.03		-0.03		0.00
		(0.031)		(0.021)		(0.021)
Farm or home in the countryside		-0.08t		-0.07*		0.01
		(0.043)		(0.031)		(0.032)
Constant	0.83***	1.28***	0.40***	0.87***	0.40***	1.42***
	(0.049)	(0.095)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)
N	13,810	11,146	18,507	13,715	18, 507	13,145
Adjusted R²	0.078	0.104	0.069	0.285	0.168	0.270

Note: OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects and robust clustered standard errors. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old. The models include a categorical variable for the type of area respondents live in (big city-reference, small city, suburbs or the countryside).
M1 and M2 using ESS waves 2004 and 2010, M3-M6 using 2008 and 2016 waves.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A12: Multinomial logistic estimations of voting behaviour and relative risk, bivariate model & stepwise inclusion

Model 1 (Base: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.35***	0.51***	0.47***	0.26***
	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Constant	12.71***	9.55***	0.08***	9.75***
	(1.935)	(1.387)	(0.027)	(1.849)
Observations	57,025	57,025	57,025	57,025
Log likelihood	-76886	-76886	-76886	-76886
BIC	154778.6	154778.6	154778.6	154778.6
Number of clusters	778	778	778	778

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with country and year fixed effects. Country, year, and occupation clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Model 2 (Base: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.48***	0.60***	0.59***	0.40***
	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)				
Temporary contract	0.94	0.89t	1.16t	1.15t
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.096)	(0.082)
Unemployed	0.77**	0.91	1.14	0.93
	(0.074)	(0.085)	(0.121)	(0.094)
Education	1.10***	1.10***	1.16***	1.19***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Foreign born	1.23	1.11	0.90	1.02
	(0.173)	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.156)
Foreign born father	1.10	1.82***	1.63***	1.45**
	(0.127)	(0.204)	(0.237)	(0.171)
Foreign born mother	1.19t	1.50***	1.40*	1.22t
	(0.124)	(0.156)	(0.190)	(0.139)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)				
18-34 y/o	0.85**	0.73***	0.80***	0.98
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.050)	(0.053)
51-64 y/o	1.28***	1.48***	1.47***	1.22***
	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.068)
Woman	1.45***	1.69***	1.85***	1.93***
	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.113)	(0.099)
Income	1.10***	1.01	0.94***	1.00
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	1.17	1.95***	0.01***	0.47***
	(0.244)	(0.385)	(0.004)	(0.104)
Observations	42,978	42,978	42,978	42,978
Log likelihood	-57452	-57452	-57452	-57452
BIC	116311.8	116311.8	116311.8	116311.8
Number of clusters	763	763	763	763

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with country and year fixed effects. Country, year, and occupation clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Model 3 (Base: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.62***	0.77***	0.76**	0.55***
	(0.045)	(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.047)
Economic threat	0.83***	0.82***	0.81***	0.77***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Cultural threat	0.82***	0.74***	0.69***	0.72***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Pro-redistribution	0.79***	1.27***	1.88***	1.09***
	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.068)	(0.027)
Temporary contract	1.01	0.94	1.19*	1.22**
	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.105)	(0.091)
Unemployed	0.81*	0.92	1.12	0.96
	(0.088)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.108)
Education	1.06***	1.05***	1.10***	1.13***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Foreign born	1.07	0.94	0.76	0.87
	(0.152)	(0.138)	(0.135)	(0.136)
Foreign born father	0.98	1.59***	1.40*	1.25t
	(0.114)	(0.181)	(0.212)	(0.150)
Foreign born mother	1.13	1.44***	1.35*	1.13
	(0.122)	(0.159)	(0.197)	(0.136)
18-34	0.87**	0.77***	0.90t	1.03
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.059)
51-64	1.30***	1.47***	1.39***	1.21***
	(0.068)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.069)
Woman	1.53***	1.64***	1.72***	1.94***
	(0.075)	(0.081)	(0.107)	(0.101)
Income	1.06***	0.99	0.93***	0.97*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Constant	29.90***	24.53***	0.05***	14.10***
	(7.072)	(6.003)	(0.022)	(3.528)
Observations	42,189	42,189	42,189	42,189
Log likelihood	-53581	-53581	-53581	-53581
BIC	108695.4	108695.4	108695.4	108695.4
Number of clusters	762	762	762	762

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with country and year fixed effects. Country, year, and occupation clustered standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old. Reference group for employment status is permanent employment contract. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A13: Multinomial logistic estimation of voting behaviour, fully specified model, Table 2

Base: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.74***	0.74**	0.54***
	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.078)	(0.049)
Cultural threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Economic threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.026)
Employment stats (ref: Permanent)				
Temporary contract	1.05	0.96	1.16	1.20*
	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.098)
Unemployed	0.88	0.84	0.83	0.90
	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.112)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Foreign born	0.93	0.88	0.81	0.83
	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.152)	(0.136)
Foreign born father	0.95	1.43**	1.29	1.14
	(0.117)	(0.170)	(0.207)	(0.143)
Foreign born mother	1.10	1.40**	1.35t	1.10
	(0.129)	(0.167)	(0.220)	(0.140)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)				
18-34	0.90t	0.84**	0.98	1.09
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.071)
51-64	1.23***	1.42***	1.21*	1.16*
	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.071)
Woman	1.50***	1.50***	1.67***	1.80***
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.114)	(0.105)
Income	1.05***	1.01	0.95**	0.98
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Union member	0.82***	1.22***	1.35***	0.90t
	(0.044)	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.052)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)				
Coping	0.92	0.99	1.01	0.90t
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.052)
Difficult	0.88	1.24*	1.40**	1.22t
	(0.089)	(0.135)	(0.177)	(0.134)
Very Difficult	0.91	1.04	1.29	0.92
	(0.169)	(0.208)	(0.297)	(0.199)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Religiosity	1.09***	1.04***	0.97**	1.07***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Political interest	1.09**	1.01	1.12**	1.10**
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.037)
Authoritarianism	0.92***	0.93***	0.90***	0.79***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Dissatisfaction w/economy	1.02	1.03*	1.03	1.00

	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy	0.90***	0.86***	0.96t	0.91***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Dissatisfaction w/government	0.89***	0.98	1.03	0.99
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Distrust in politicians	0.92***	0.89***	0.94**	0.93***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Constant	79.55***	3,091.81***	11.97***	657.96***
	(24.243)	(1,034.135)	(6.620)	(215.546)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Log likelihood	-43907	-43907	-43907	-43907
BIC	89847.13	89847.13	89847.13	89847.13
Number of clusters	753	753	753	753

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old; Reference group for employment status has a permanent work contract. Country, year, and occupation clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A14: Subjective insecurity and voting behaviour, log odds coefficients

Model 1	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
'Current job is not secure'	-0.20***	-0.15***	-0.08	-0.15**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.049)
Constant	-0.72t	0.42	-18.53	-1.75***
	(0.370)	(0.368)	(858.892)	(0.395)
Observations	9,339	9,339	9,339	9,339
Log likelihood	-12391	-12391	-12391	-12391

Model 2	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
'Likely unemployed and looking for work next 12 months'	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.09	-0.15**
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.051)
Constant	-1.57***	-0.13	-5.26***	-2.06***
	(0.376)	(0.336)	(0.752)	(0.393)
Observations	11,413	11,413	11,413	11,413
Log likelihood	-15140	-15140	-15140	-15140

Model 3	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
'Likely not enough money for household next 12 months'	-0.32***	-0.20***	-0.03	-0.30***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.066)
Constant	0.57	0.40	-2.64***	-1.03*
	(0.413)	(0.408)	(0.635)	(0.431)
Observations	10,980	10,980	10,980	10,980
Log likelihood	-14553	-14553	-14553	-14553

Note: Log-odds coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification as in Table A11 and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A15: Multinomial logit estimations of interaction effects visualised in Figure 4

Panel (a)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.29***	0.32***	0.30***	0.24***
	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.040)
Economic threat	0.76***	0.73***	0.70***	0.69***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Relative risk*Economic threat	1.14***	1.16***	1.17***	1.15***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.031)
Constant	173.52***	7,322.23***	29.77***	1,483.81***
	(57.089)	(2,581.976)	(17.052)	(506.103)
Log-likelihood	-43885	-43885	-43885	-43885

Panel (b)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.37***	0.39***	0.34***	0.25***
	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.042)
Cultural threat	0.77***	0.73***	0.68***	0.67***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)
Relative risk*Cultural threat	1.10***	1.13***	1.17***	1.17***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.034)
Constant	134.90***	5,829.75***	25.65***	1,364.16***
	(43.114)	(2,024.085)	(14.353)	(461.373)
Log-likelihood	-43882	-43882	-43882	-43882

Panel (c)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.72	0.23***	0.19***	0.23***
	(0.179)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Left right scale	1.02	0.38***	0.27***	0.52***
	(0.047)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.027)
Relative risk*Left right scale	0.98	1.26***	1.34***	1.16***
	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.054)
Constant	75.31***	9,651.85***	44.25***	1,497.03***
	(28.802)	(3,855.165)	(26.082)	(600.646)
Log-likelihood	-43826	-43826	-43826	-43826

Panel (d)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	1.16	1.87*	2.55**	1.32
	(0.268)	(0.455)	(0.779)	(0.375)
Education	1.11***	1.11***	1.17***	1.18***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Relative risk*Education	0.95**	0.93***	0.91***	0.93***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Constant	43.65***	1,296.14***	3.74*	284.16***
	(16.171)	(495.209)	(2.269)	(115.971)
Log-likelihood	-43893	-43893	-43893	-43893

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. The baseline in each model is vote choice for RRWP. Number of observations: 39,824; Number of country-year-occupation clusters: 753 Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0$.

Figure A11: AMEs of sociotropic immigration attitudes, education, and partisanship across relative socio-economic risk, 95% CIs

Table A16: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour and fiscal dimension of exclusionary security, Table 3 Model 1

Base: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Fiscal threat	0.93**	0.92***	0.89***	0.88***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Cultural threat	0.83***	0.79***	0.77***	0.73***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Pro-redistribution	0.81***	1.05	1.26***	0.99
	(0.032)	(0.048)	(0.078)	(0.047)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)				
Temporary contract	0.78t	0.83	1.02	0.83
	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.187)	(0.118)
Unemployed	0.86	1.05	1.02	0.85
	(0.179)	(0.218)	(0.285)	(0.189)
Education	1.08***	1.04**	1.08**	1.13***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Foreign-born	1.00	1.00	0.76	1.01
	(0.271)	(0.291)	(0.277)	(0.318)
Foreign born father	0.99	1.44	0.88	1.05
	(0.241)	(0.342)	(0.301)	(0.254)
Foreign born mother	0.95	1.18	1.29	0.94

	(0.188)	(0.233)	(0.400)	(0.203)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)				
18-34	1.02	1.01	1.09	1.47**
	(0.112)	(0.115)	(0.166)	(0.174)
51-64	1.18t	1.51***	1.31t	1.29*
	(0.115)	(0.150)	(0.200)	(0.130)
Union member	1.09	1.52***	2.05***	1.17
	(0.102)	(0.157)	(0.255)	(0.122)
Woman	1.34**	1.21t	1.65***	1.61***
	(0.134)	(0.124)	(0.219)	(0.178)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)				
Coping	0.78**	0.84t	0.94	0.92
	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.116)	(0.089)
Difficult	0.61**	0.92	0.84	0.88
	(0.114)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.175)
Very Difficult	0.76	0.65	0.57	0.73
	(0.263)	(0.257)	(0.311)	(0.296)
Left right scale	1.02	0.49***	0.33***	0.64***
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.024)
Religiosity	1.08***	1.01	0.92***	1.06***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Political interest	1.11t	0.99	1.17t	1.13t
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.097)	(0.074)
Authoritarianism	0.88***	0.88***	0.84***	0.75***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.029)
Dissatisfaction w/economy	0.98	1.00	1.02	0.98
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.026)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy	0.88***	0.83***	0.92*	0.90***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Dissatisfaction w/government	0.89***	1.02	1.05	0.96
	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.038)
Distrust in politicians	0.91***	0.87***	0.96	0.93**
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.027)
Constant	65.89***	1,852.97***	5.24t	237.60***
	(28.177)	(836.498)	(5.033)	(115.719)
Observations	11,407	11,407	11,407	11,407
Log likelihood	-12653	-12653	-12653	-12653
Number of clusters	206	206	206	206

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old; Reference group for employment status is having a permanent work contract. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0$.

Table A17 – Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour and jobs threat dimension of exclusionary security, Table 3 Model 2

Base=RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Job threat	0.94*	0.96	0.96	0.91**
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.026)
Cultural threat	0.82***	0.78***	0.75***	0.72***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.06	1.28***	1.00
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.078)	(0.046)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)				
Temporary contract	0.78t	0.84	1.00	0.83
	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.186)	(0.119)
Unemployed	0.86	1.03	0.98	0.83
	(0.181)	(0.218)	(0.280)	(0.188)
Education	1.08***	1.04*	1.07**	1.12***
	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.020)
Foreign born	1.02	1.08	0.74	0.98
	(0.276)	(0.312)	(0.282)	(0.306)
Foreign born father	0.94	1.36	0.82	1.01
	(0.224)	(0.311)	(0.273)	(0.236)
Foreign born mother	1.02	1.26	1.44	1.06
	(0.198)	(0.238)	(0.427)	(0.221)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)				
18-34	1.02	1.00	1.09	1.48***
	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.167)	(0.177)
51-64	1.21*	1.53***	1.31t	1.31**
	(0.119)	(0.153)	(0.205)	(0.136)
Union member	1.09	1.54***	2.04***	1.17
	(0.099)	(0.161)	(0.256)	(0.122)
Woman	1.38**	1.24*	1.67***	1.64***
	(0.136)	(0.125)	(0.222)	(0.185)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)				
Coping	0.79*	0.86	0.98	0.95
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.120)	(0.093)
Difficult	0.62*	0.94	0.89	0.93
	(0.116)	(0.194)	(0.198)	(0.182)
Very Difficult	0.70	0.61	0.52	0.69
	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.284)	(0.272)
Left right scale	1.03	0.49***	0.33***	0.64***
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)
Religiosity	1.08***	1.01	0.92***	1.06***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Political interest	1.10	0.99	1.17t	1.13t
	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.076)
Authoritarianism	0.87***	0.87***	0.83***	0.74***
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Dissatisfaction w/economy	0.98	1.00	1.01	0.97
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.026)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy	0.88***	0.82***	0.91**	0.89***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Dissatisfaction w/government	0.89***	1.02	1.05	0.96
	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.038)

Distrust in politicians	0.91***	0.87***	0.96	0.92**
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.027)
Constant	64.18***	1,700.98***	4.03	224.06***
	(28.366)	(764.968)	(3.895)	(109.214)
Observations	11,479	11,479	11,479	11,479
Log likelihood	-12707	-12707	-12707	-12707
Number of clusters	206	206	206	206

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old; Reference group for employment status is having a permanent work contract. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A18: – Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour and exclusionary security attitudes, 2002 & 2014 waves estimated individually

2002 (Ref: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Fiscal threat	0.96	0.95t	0.93*	0.90*
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.038)
Cultural threat	0.83***	0.80***	0.76***	0.76***
	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.039)
Pro-redistribution	0.89***	1.09*	1.33***	1.10
	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.098)	(0.079)
Left right scale	0.92*	0.44***	0.27***	0.58***
	(0.037)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.032)
Education	1.06t	1.04	1.11*	1.14***
	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.032)
Constant	41.12***	1,379.63***	0.00***	64.20***
	(21.133)	(502.542)	(0.000)	(23.823)
Observations	6,612	6,612	6,612	6,612
# countries	10	10	10	10

2014 (Ref: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Fiscal threat	0.87***	0.87***	0.84***	0.82***
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.009)
Cultural threat	0.81***	0.76***	0.76***	0.70***
	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.051)	(0.029)
Pro-redistribution	0.75***	1.05	1.31**	0.94
	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.112)	(0.052)
Left right scale	1.10	0.49***	0.36***	0.66***
	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.063)
Education	1.08***	1.07**	1.07***	1.14***
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.020)
Constant	26.02***	637.60***	3.63*	105.98***
	(12.085)	(392.161)	(1.881)	(39.495)
Observations	7,264	7,264	7,264	7,264
# countries	12	12	12	12

2002 (Ref: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Jobs threat	0.97	0.98	1.01	0.95
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.048)	(0.033)
Cultural threat	0.83***	0.79***	0.74***	0.75***
	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.040)
Pro-redistribution	0.89***	1.09**	1.32***	1.10
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.105)	(0.071)
Left right scale	0.93t	0.44***	0.27***	0.57***
	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.034)
Education	1.07t	1.04	1.11*	1.14***
	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.033)
Constant	37.02***	1,182.64***	0.00***	53.40***
	(18.233)	(425.270)	(0.000)	(14.849)
Observations	6,651	6,651	6,651	6,651
# countries	10	10	10	10

2014 (Ref: RRWP)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Jobs threat	0.90***	0.92**	0.91*	0.87**
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Cultural threat	0.80***	0.75***	0.73***	0.68***
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.051)	(0.032)
Pro-redistribution	0.76***	1.05	1.34**	0.95
	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.122)	(0.054)
Left right scale	1.09	0.49***	0.36***	0.65***
	(0.083)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Education	1.07***	1.06**	1.06***	1.12***
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Constant	24.59***	586.30***	2.61t	100.97***
	(12.946)	(349.263)	(1.382)	(41.843)
Observations	7,303	7,303	7,303	7,303
# countries	12	12	12	12

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. All estimations include religiosity, employment status, immigration background, age, union membership, gender, subjective economic wellbeing, political interest, political trust variables and country fixed effects. Country clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A12: AMEs predicting RRWP vote, fiscal threat models (each year)

Figure A13: AMEs predicting RRWP vote, job threat models (each year)

Table A19: Fixed effects OLS regressions of exclusionary security attitudes and relative risk

Dependent variable:	*Fiscal* threat Immigrants take away from taxes	*Job* threat Immigrants take jobs away
Relative risk	0.20**	0.27***
	(0.072)	(0.075)
Cultural threat	0.36***	0.33***
	(0.011)	(0.009)
Pro-redistribution	0.03	0.11***
	(0.020)	(0.018)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)		
Temporary contract	0.10t	0.03
	(0.061)	(0.052)
Unemployed	0.10	0.21*
	(0.085)	(0.087)
Education	-0.02**	-0.02***
	(0.007)	(0.005)
Foreign born	-0.25**	-0.36***
	(0.106)	(0.100)
Foreign born father	-0.08	-0.13
	(0.091)	(0.080)
Foreign born mother	-0.32***	-0.15*
	(0.086)	(0.072)
Age (ref: 35-50 years old)		
18-34	0.03	0.01
	(0.045)	(0.044)
51-64	-0.07	-0.01
	(0.042)	(0.040)
Union member	0.06	0.08*
	(0.040)	(0.038)
Woman	0.23***	0.18***
	(0.038)	(0.039)
Income (deciles)	0.04***	-0.00
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)		
Coping	0.14***	0.15***
	(0.037)	(0.035)
Difficult	0.34***	0.55***
	(0.073)	(0.061)
Very Difficult	0.97***	0.92***
	(0.136)	(0.127)
Left right scale	0.07***	0.03**
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Religiosity	-0.03***	-0.03***
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	3.72**	3.66***
	(0.079)	(0.166)
Observations	12,850	12,929
Log likelihood	-26382	-25525
Adjusted R2	0.223	0.270
Number of clusters	178	178

Note: ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Country and year fixed effects OLS regression. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old; Reference group for employment status is having a permanent work contract. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A14: AMEs predicting exclusionary security attitudes, 95% CIs

DV: Fiscal/welfare competition

DV: Job/labour market competition

Note : Estimations used are presented in Table A19. The figures are as presented in Figure 5 in the manuscript.

Table A20: Conditional effects of relative risk and exclusive security demands predicting vote choice

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative unemployment risk	0.53*	0.58	0.40t	0.31**
	(0.168)	(0.193)	(0.198)	(0.121)
Fiscal threat	0.89**	0.86**	0.80**	0.82***
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.045)
Relative risk*Fiscal threat	1.03	1.05	1.11	1.06
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.087)	(0.060)
Constant	214.61***	4,577.8***	19.08**	1,295.5***
	(126.704)	(2,888.916)	(21.507)	(880.983)

N: 9,909, Log likelihood: -10820 Number of clusters: 169

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative unemployment risk	0.41*	0.48t	0.26*	0.21***
	(0.164)	(0.198)	(0.151)	(0.093)
Job threat	0.86*	0.86*	0.78*	0.79***
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.077)	(0.055)
Relative risk*Job threat	1.09	1.10	1.22*	1.15t
	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.114)	(0.082)
Constant	266.86***	5,129.64***	22.43**	1,781.38***
	(172.515)	(3,456.657)	(25.809)	(1,256.556)

N: 9,977, Log likelihood: -10862 Number of clusters: 169

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A15: AMEs of relative risk and exclusive security demands of RRWP choice, 95% CIs

Table A21: Likelihood ratio test for collapsing outcomes testing IIA assumption

Small-Hsiao test of IIA assumption (N = 39, 824)

Ho: Odds (Outcome-J *vs*. Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives – thus a significant test is an evidence against Ho

	chi2	df	P>chi2
RRWP	214.518	192	0.389
Centre-right	253.666	192	0.033
Centre-left	235.371	192	0.001
RLWP	245.790	192	0.038
Other	199.472	192	0.126

While the assumption holds for the outcome of RRWP and Other party voting, the test shows a partial violation of the assumption in the category of outcomes for centre-right, centre-left, and RLWP at p<0.05 level. Therefore, to check whether the grouping of the voting outcomes needs to be collapsed or coded differently, I also conduct a likelihood ratio test for combining alternatives:

LR test for combining alternatives (N = 39,824)

Ho: Pairwise alternatives of the outcome can be collapsed – thus, a significant test statistic means that the pairwise combinations tested cannot be collapsed.

	chi2	df	P>chi2
RRWP & Centre-right	3460.647	47	0.000
RRWP & Centre-left	5413.907	47	0.000
RRWP & RLWP	5577.628	47	0.000
RRWP & Other	4610.129	47	0.000
Centre-right & Centre-left	7722.107	47	0.000
Centre-right & RLWP	7678.063	47	0.000
Centre-right & Other	4920.914	47	0.000
Centre-left & RLWP	2162.754	47	0.000
Centre-left & Other	2958.514	47	0.000
RLWP & Other	3337.645	47	0.000

The test results reveal that neither of the alternatives of the political behaviour outcome should be combined and this holds for all other options category, which violated in the Small-Hsiao test. Below in Table A40, I also use a binarised item further checking whether the results presented in the paper are sensitive to the construction of the dependent variable.

Sensitivity analyses

Table A22: Replication of results using all country-year cases, including those w/o RRWPs in the political competition

Ref: No turnout	RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	1.13	0.72***	0.86**	0.83*	0.64***
	(0.085)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.040)
Economic threat	1.12***	0.99	0.97***	0.94***	0.92***
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Cultural threat	1.17***	1.00	0.97**	0.95***	0.94***
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Pro-redistribution	1.03	0.86***	1.09***	1.34***	1.01
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.017)
Employment status (Ref: Permanent contract)					
Temporary contract	0.80**	0.81***	0.76***	0.87*	0.92t
	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.044)
Unemployed	0.78*	0.69***	0.67***	0.72***	0.75***
	(0.085)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.052)
Education	0.98*	1.04***	1.01**	1.05***	1.08***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Foreign born	0.74*	0.66***	0.67***	0.61***	0.61***
	(0.106)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.052)
Foreign born father	0.60***	0.54***	0.85*	0.75**	0.64***
	(0.066)	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.084)	(0.048)
Foreign born mother	0.67***	0.73***	0.92	0.87	0.74***
	(0.075)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.103)	(0.056)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)					
18-34	0.59***	0.55***	0.51***	0.58***	0.64***
	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.024)
51-64	1.17**	1.44***	1.56***	1.36***	1.34***
	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.058)
Woman	0.80***	1.18***	1.19***	1.31***	1.36***
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.064)	(0.049)
Income	1.05***	1.10***	1.05***	1.00	1.03**
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Union member	1.17**	0.99	1.43***	1.57***	1.10**
	(0.064)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.041)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)					
Coping	0.95	0.88***	0.92*	0.96	0.84***
	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Difficult	0.75**	0.67***	0.86**	0.98	0.83**
	(0.070)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.079)	(0.050)
Very Difficult	0.81	0.77**	0.80*	0.99	0.72**
	(0.135)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.137)	(0.080)
Left right scale	1.46***	1.51***	0.72***	0.55***	0.92***
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Religiosity	1.01	1.09***	1.03***	0.97***	1.06***
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Political interest	1.98***	2.05***	1.91***	2.13***	2.03***
	(0.065)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.049)
Authoritarianism	1.12***	1.03*	1.04***	1.00	0.91***

	1	2	3	4	5
	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.013)
Dissatisfaction w/economy	0.98	1.01	1.01	1.00	0.99
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy	1.03*	0.93***	0.89***	1.00	0.95***
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Dissatisfaction w/government	1.05**	0.96***	1.03*	1.09***	1.05***
	(0.018)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Distrust in politicians	0.99	0.92***	0.89***	0.92***	0.94***
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Constant	0.00***	0.12***	5.99***	0.02***	0.90
	(0.001)	(0.024)	(1.135)	(0.010)	(0.199)
Observations	59,527	59,527	59,527	59,527	59,527
Log likelihood	-75104	-75104	-75104	-75104	-75104
Number of clusters	969	969	969	969	969

Note: Here, I present with a different reference category outcome from RRWP, given that the sample here includes country-years with no RRWP in their political party space. Therefore, an RRWP baseline misrepresents the non-symmetric nature of the outcome. For the same reason, I do not present model identification with an RLWP as the reference category. Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A23: Replication of Figure 2 using 2-digit ISCO categorization

	DV: Job is not secure		DV: Likely unemployed looking for a job		DV: Likely not enough money for household	
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Relative risk (2-digit)	0.27***	0.19***	0.36***	0.16***	0.33***	0.12***
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.020)
Constant	0.86***	1.24***	0.41***	0.89***	0.66***	1.50***
	(0.041)	(0.089)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.032)	(0.057)
Observations	12,032	9,553	17,455	12,815	16,604	12,242
Log likelihood	-16589	-12958	-21906	-14334	-19254	-13061
Adjusted R2	0.078	0.104	0.070	0.289	0.161	0.271
RMSE	0.961	0.941	0.849	0.741	.772	.704

Note: All models include country and year fixed effects. Models 1, 3, and 5 display results of bivariate estimations. Models 2 ,4, and 6 are fully specified using the same strategy in Table A11. Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A24: Replication of fully specified vote choice model using 2-digit ISCO categorization

Ref: RRWP vote	Centre right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk (2-digit)	0.73***	0.86*	0.79*	0.62***
	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.072)	(0.044)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.84***	0.82***	0.79***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.84***	0.82***	0.81***	0.77***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.82***	1.05t	1.28***	0.98
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.06***	1.12***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.48***	0.37***	0.61***
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)
Constant	55.31***	1,952.42***	8.59***	449.36***
	(15.408)	(603.527)	(4.388)	(142.720)
Observations	35,987	35,987	35,987	35,987
Log likelihood	-39503	-39503	-39503	-39503
Number of clusters	2354	2354	2354	2354

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects as in Table 2. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.

Figure A16: Replication of Figure 4 using 2-digit relative risk level, 95% CIs

Table A25: Replication of risk and exclusivity demands at 2-digit occupational risk group level

Dependent variable	Fiscal threat	Job threat
Relative risk (2-digit)	0.15**	0.22***
	(0.060)	(0.064)
Cultural threat	0.35***	0.33***
	(0.010)	(0.010)
Pro-redistribution	0.04**	0.12***
	(0.020)	(0.018)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)		
Temporary contract	0.13**	0.06
	(0.063)	(0.061)
Unemployed	0.01	0.23*
	(0.093)	(0.090)
Education	-0.02***	-0.03***
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Income (deciles)	0.03***	0.00
	(0.001)	(0.009)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)		
Coping	0.14***	0.16***
	(0.041)	(0.040)
Difficult	0.34***	0.59***
	(0.080)	(0.076)
Very Difficult	0.99***	1.00***
	(0.152)	(0.143)
Left right scale	0.08***	0.03**
	(0.011)	(0.011)
Religiosity	-0.04***	-0.04***
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Constant	3.80***	3.74***
	(0.193)	(0.158)
Observations	10,996	11,069
Log likelihood	-22697	-22016
Adjusted R2	0.207	0.248
RMSE	1.909	1.771
Number of clusters	560	560

Note: All models are fully specified, as presented in Table A19. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Country and year fixed effects OLS regression. Country-year-occupation clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A26: Alternative DV-I: Multinomial logistic estimation of political behaviour (including both voters and non-turnout), fully specified model, Table 2

Base: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Relative risk	0.63***	0.74***	0.74**	0.54***	0.95
	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.048)	(0.070)
Cultural threat	0.88***	0.86***	0.84***	0.81***	0.90***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Economic threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.81***	0.79***	0.86***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	0.99	0.98
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Employment stats (ref: Permanent)					
Temporary contract	1.02	0.93	1.11	1.16t	1.27**
	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.102)
Unemployed	0.89	0.86	0.86	0.91	1.35**
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.148)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***	1.02t
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Foreign born	0.91	0.89	0.84	0.85	1.33t
	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.193)
Foreign born father	0.91	1.41**	1.24	1.11	1.62***
	(0.106)	(0.154)	(0.185)	(0.131)	(0.181)
Foreign born mother	1.08	1.37**	1.30t	1.08	1.47***
	(0.122)	(0.153)	(0.197)	(0.132)	(0.167)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)					
18-34	0.92	0.86*	1.00	1.13t	1.63***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.099)
51-64	1.19***	1.37***	1.18*	1.12*	0.88*
	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(0.067)	(0.051)
Woman	1.49***	1.49***	1.66***	1.80***	1.24***
	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.065)
Income	1.05***	1.01	0.96**	0.98	0.95***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Union member	0.84**	1.24***	1.36***	0.92	0.88*
	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.097)	(0.053)	(0.050)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable)					
Coping	0.92	0.97	1.01	0.89*	1.06
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.050)	(0.060)
Difficult	0.88	1.18t	1.33*	1.19t	1.36**
	(0.084)	(0.119)	(0.155)	(0.123)	(0.130)
Very Difficult	0.85	0.98	1.32	0.86	1.29
	(0.144)	(0.175)	(0.268)	(0.171)	(0.214)
Left right scale	1.02	0.49***	0.38***	0.62***	0.68***
	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)

Religiosity	1.08***	1.03**	0.96***	1.06***	0.99
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Political interest	1.05t	0.97	1.08t	1.07*	0.49***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.017)
Authoritarianism	0.92***	0.93***	0.90***	0.79***	0.91***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Dissatisfaction w/economy	1.02	1.03t	1.02	1.00	1.02
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy	0.90***	0.86***	0.97t	0.92***	0.97*
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Dissatisfaction w/government	0.90***	0.99	1.04	0.99	0.96**
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Distrust in politicians	0.93***	0.90***	0.94***	0.93***	1.02
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	68.63***	2,480.6***	9.80***	524.22***	353.33***
	(20.219)	(778.110)	(5.223)	(166.623)	(101.192)
Observations	47,601	47,601	47,601	47,601	47,601
Log likelihood	-60694	-60694	-60694	-60694	-60694
Number of clusters	756	756	756	756	756

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Reference group for age is 35-50 years old; Reference group for employment status is having a permanent work contract. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A27: Alternative DV-I: Subjective insecurity and political behaviour (including both voters and non-turnout), log odds coefficients

Model 1	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
'Current job is not secure'	-0.20***	-0.16***	-0.09	-0.15**	-0.08
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Constant	-0.79*	0.39	-19.42	-1.81***	1.45***
	(0.368)	(0.366)	(1,321.4)	(0.393)	(0.382)
Observations	11,308	11,308	11,308	11,308	11,308
Log likelihood	-16814	-16814	-16814	-16814	-16814

Model 2	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
'Likely unemployed and	-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.09	-0.14**	-0.05
looking for work next 12	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.048)
months'					
Constant	-1.61***	-0.14	-5.26***	-2.10***	0.49t
	(0.378)	(0.340)	(0.766)	(0.398)	(0.296)
Observations	13,908	13,908	13,908	13,908	13,908
Log likelihood	-20683	-20683	-20683	-20683	-20683

Model 3	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
'Likely not enough money for household next 12 months'	-0.29***	-0.18**	-0.02	-0.28***	-0.03
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.062)
	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.112)	(0.103)	(0.093)
Constant	0.47	0.34	-2.69***	-1.13**	0.30
	(0.413)	(0.409)	(0.639)	(0.434)	(0.442)
Observations	13,411	13,411	13,411	13,411	13,411
Log likelihood	-19899	-19899	-19899	-19899	-19899

Note: Log-odds coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification as in Table A14 and country year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A28: Alternative DV-I: Multinomial logit estimations of interaction effects (including both voters and non-turnout)

Panel (a)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Relative risk	0.29***	0.31***	0.28***	0.24***	0.51***
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.070)
Economic threat	0.77***	0.74***	0.71***	0.70***	0.81***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Relative risk*Economic threat	1.14***	1.17***	1.19***	1.15***	1.11***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.024)
Constant	152.74***	6,143.87***	26.42***	1,195.24***	675.21***
	(48.927)	(2,072.194)	(14.837)	(402.365)	(208.635)
Log-likelihood	-60667	-60667	-60667	-60667	-60667

Panel (b)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Relative risk	0.38***	0.39***	0.34***	0.26***	0.61**
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.093)
Cultural threat	0.77***	0.73***	0.68***	0.68***	0.79***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Relative risk*Cultural threat	1.10***	1.13***	1.18***	1.17***	1.08**
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Constant	116.14***	4,727.48***	21.61***	1,070.51***	555.74***
	(36.099)	(1,566.665)	(11.940)	(357.250)	(173.161)
Log-likelihood	-60665	-60665	-60665	-60665	-60665

Panel (c)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Relative risk	0.69	0.23***	0.19***	0.23***	0.53**
	(0.161)	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.123)
Left right scale	1.03	0.39***	0.29***	0.54***	0.62***
	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Relative risk*Left right scale	0.98	1.26***	1.34***	1.16***	1.10**
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.050)	(0.040)
Constant	68.17***	7,843.75***	36.96***	1,195.52***	635.17***
	(24.715)	(2,919.205)	(21.112)	(459.383)	(225.080)
Log-likelihood	-60606	-60606	-60606	-60606	-60606

Panel (d)	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Relative risk	1.28	2.19**	3.02***	1.35	1.69*
	(0.292)	(0.527)	(0.898)	(0.380)	(0.416)
Education	1.11***	1.12***	1.18***	1.19***	1.06**
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Relative risk*Education	0.95***	0.92***	0.90***	0.93***	0.96*
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Constant	34.49***	894.72***	2.61	220.03***	207.61***
	(12.568)	(329.920)	(1.527)	(88.791)	(77.144)
Log-likelihood	-60674	-60674	-60674	-60674	-60674

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. The baseline in each model is vote choice for RRWP. Number of observations: 47,601; Number of country-year-occupation clusters: 756 Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0$.

Table A29 – Alternative DV-I: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour and fiscal threat dimension of exclusionary security, replication of Table 3 Model 1

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Fiscal threat	0.94**	0.93**	0.91**	0.89***	0.94**
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Cultural threat	0.83***	0.80***	0.78***	0.74***	0.85***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.08t	1.29***	1.01	0.98
	(0.031)	(0.045)	(0.074)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Education	1.07***	1.04*	1.07**	1.12***	1.00
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Left right scale	1.04	0.51***	0.36***	0.66***	0.69***
	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Constant	63.2***	1,619.4***	4.8	215.1***	341.3***
	(26.118)	(687.688)	(4.603)	(101.201)	(130.798)
Observations	13,739	13,739	13,739	13,739	13,739
Log likelihood	-17605	-17605	-17605	-17605	-17605
Number of clusters	208	208	208	208	208

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.

Table A30 – Alternative DV- I: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour and jobs threat dimension of exclusionary security, replication of Table 3 Model 2

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other	No Turnout
Job threat	0.95*	0.98	0.99	0.93*	0.99
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Cultural threat	0.83***	0.78***	0.76***	0.72***	0.83***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Pro-redistribution	0.84***	1.09*	1.31***	1.02	0.99
	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.044)	(0.041)
Education	1.07***	1.04*	1.07**	1.12***	1.00
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.015)
Left right scale	1.04	0.51***	0.35***	0.66***	0.69***
	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Constant	57.79***	1,366.2***	3.32	188.53***	302.34***
	(24.598)	(576.987)	(3.233)	(89.298)	(117.664)
Observations	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842	13,842
Log likelihood	-17699	-17699	-17699	-17699	-17699
Number of clusters	208	208	208	208	208

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A31: Alternative DV-II: Multinomial logit model predicting reported subjective closeness to RRWP

DV: Closeness (ref: RRWP)	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.62***	0.77***	0.71***	0.50***
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.038)
Economic threat	0.84***	0.82***	0.79***	0.78***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.82***	0.79***	0.76***	0.74***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.80***	1.08**	1.35***	0.98
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.028)
Education	1.08***	1.06***	1.10***	1.15***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Left right scale	1.03*	0.42***	0.31***	0.56***
	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Constant	136.11***	9,945.74***	24.79***	1,588.31***
	(41.519)	(3,248.764)	(14.588)	(530.529)
Observations	29,359	29,359	29,359	29,359
Log likelihood	-30699	-30699	-30699	-30699

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects as in Table 2. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A32: Alternative DV-II: Exclusive security demands predicting reported closeness to political parties

DV: Closeness (ref: RRWP)	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Fiscal threat	0.91***	0.90***	0.84***	0.87***
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Constant	138.46***	10,072.82***	12.87*	583.79***
	(68.469)	(5,347.687)	(15.716)	(339.066)
Observations	8,585	8,585	8,585	8,585
Log likelihood	-9147	-9147	-9147	-9147
Number of clusters	208	208	208	208

DV: Closeness (ref: RRWP)	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Job threat	0.86***	0.86***	0.83***	0.82***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Constant	154.38***	10,132.51***	12.10*	661.59***
	(77.819)	(5,214.619)	(14.600)	(368.257)
Observations	8,651	8,651	8,651	8,651
Log likelihood	-9210	-9210	-9210	-9210
Number of clusters	208	208	208	208

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. ESS waves 2002 and 2014 used. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Figure A17: Replication of Figure 4 predicting reported subjective closeness to RRWP, 95% CIs

Table A33: Replication of fully specified vote choice model using country-year dummies

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.61***	0.73***	0.71***	0.50***
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.033)
Economic threat	0.86***	0.84***	0.82***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.78***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Pro-redistribution	0.84***	1.10***	1.34***	1.01
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.044)	(0.026)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Left right scale	0.99	0.46***	0.35***	0.59***
	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Constant	28.02***	711.28***	1.56	170.48***
	(7.446)	(201.048)	(1.653)	(51.357)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Log likelihood	-42785	-42785	-42785	-42785

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country-year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A34: Replication of specified vote choice model using risk measures with exact matching to the year of last general election for each country-year wave

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.58***	0.69***	0.67***	0.51***
	(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.050)
Economic threat	0.88***	0.86***	0.83***	0.81***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.84***	0.82***	0.80***	0.78***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.84***	1.08**	1.35***	1.01
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.35***	0.60***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	95.79***	3,664.11***	14.20***	761.72***
	(28.997)	(1,189.876)	(7.959)	(247.251)
Observations	38,941	38,941	38,941	38,941
Log likelihood	-42799	-42799	-42799	-42799
Number of clusters	737	737	737	737

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A35: Replication of specified vote choice model using risk measures from *t-1* per each survey wave

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk *t-1*	0.62***	0.73***	0.69***	0.54***
	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.054)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***	0.78***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.84***	1.08**	1.33***	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.026)
Education	1.06***	1.03***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.35***	0.60***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	84.56***	2,946.97***	13.37***	656.24***
	(26.108)	(973.399)	(7.535)	(219.454)
Observations	38,086	38,086	38,086	38,086
Log likelihood	-41875	-41875	-41875	-41875
Number of clusters	726	726	726	726

Note: Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A36: Jackknife sample multinomial logit estimation of fully specified vote choice model

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.74***	0.74**	0.54***
	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.044)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	1.00
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.029)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Constant	79.55***	3,091.81***	11.97**	657.96***
	(36.812)	(1,616.398)	(10.687)	(302.461)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Log likelihood	-43907	-43907	-43907	-43907
Number of clusters	85	85	85	85

Note: Jack-knife procedure implemented by replicating per each country-year at a time. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A37: Multinomial logistic estimation of voting behaviour with bootstrapped standard errors by country-year clusters (100 reps)

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.74***	0.74***	0.54***
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.065)	(0.034)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	1.00
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Constant	79.55***	3,091.81***	11.97***	657.96***
	(19.333)	(819.081)	(5.231)	(191.932)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Number of strata	85	85	85	85
Confidence level	95	95	95	95

Note: Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A38: Multinomial logistic estimation of voting behaviour with bootstrapped standard errors by country-year-occupation clusters (100 reps)

Ref: RRWP	Centre right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.74***	0.74***	0.54***
	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.035)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	1.00
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.048)	(0.024)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Constant	79.55***	3,091.81***	11.97***	657.96***
	(21.432)	(898.935)	(5.723)	(206.351)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Number of strata	753	753	753	753
Confidence level	95	95	95	95

Note: Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A39: Replication of fully specified vote choice model without the self-employed in the sample

Ref: RRWP	Centre right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.75***	0.74**	0.54***
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.078)	(0.050)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.81***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.31***	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.026)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.12***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Income (deciles)	1.05***	1.01	0.95**	0.98
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.35***	0.60***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	74.24***	2,947.68***	11.64***	620.77***
	(22.813)	(993.487)	(6.445)	(204.902)
Observations	39,280	39,280	39,280	39,280
Log likelihood	-43365	-43365	-43365	-43365
Number of clusters	749	749	749	749

Note: Self-employed respondents are excluded from the sample. Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects as in Table 2. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A40: Replication of fully specified vote choice model using binarised dependent variable

Binary DV *(1=RRWP, 0=All else)*	(M1)	(M2)	(M3)	(M4)
Relative risk	2.23***	1.35***	1.35***	1.42***
	(0.138)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.097)
Employment status (ref: Permanent contract)				
Temporary contract	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.066)
Unemployed	0.95	0.93	0.93	0.97
	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.101)
Foreign born	0.87	0.97	0.97	1.01
	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.142)
Foreign born father	0.63***	0.72**	0.72**	0.80*
	(0.064)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.085)
Foreign born mother	0.70***	0.76**	0.76**	0.79*
	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.083)
Age (ref: 35-50 y/o)				
18-34	0.96	0.93	0.93	0.90*
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.048)
51-64	0.90*	0.85***	0.85***	0.86**
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Woman	0.59***	0.62***	0.62***	0.69***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.033)
Income	0.98**	1.02	1.02	1.00
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Economic threat		1.18***	1.18***	1.15***
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Cultural threat		1.27***	1.27***	1.19***
		(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Pro-redistribution		0.96*	0.96*	1.06*
		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Education		0.95***	0.95***	0.95***
		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Union member		1.05	1.05	1.08
		(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.055)
Subjective well-being (ref: Comfortable				
Coping				1.07
				(0.053)
Difficult				0.89
				(0.080)
Very Difficult				0.94
				(0.148)
Left right scale				1.39***
				(0.020)
Religiosity				0.97***
				(0.007)
Political interest				1.14***
				(0.032)
Authoritarianism				1.11***
				(0.020)
Dissatisfaction w/economy				0.98

				(0.013)
Dissatisfaction w/democracy				1.08***
				(0.015)
Dissatisfaction w/government				1.06***
				(0.016)
Distrust in politicians				1.06***
				(0.013)
Constant	0.05***	0.01***	0.01***	0.00***
	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Observations	52,728	51,434	51,434	47,601
Log likelihood	-11972	-10590	-10590	-9209
Number of clusters	764	764	764	756

Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratio coefficients are presented. Estimations are all with country and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is coded 1=RRWP vote choice and 0=All other party choices and not voting. Alternative coding of the DV where 0 only includes other "vote" choices which limit the models to voters reveal substantively the same results.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0$

Alternative model specifications

Table A41: Multilevel linear estimations of voting for RRWPs

Binary dv linear mixed effects	(RE) RI	(FE) RI	(RE) RS	(FE) RS
Relative risk	0.02*	0.02***	0.03***	0.03***
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Economic threat	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Cultural threat	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***	0.01***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Pro-redistribution	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***	0.00***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Left right scale	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-0.18***	-0.21***	-0.18***	-0.21***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Observations	47,601	47,601	47,601	47,601
Number of groups	756	756	756	756
Log likelihood	569.2	814.1	598.2	833.2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses—multilevel linear estimations using the binarised dependent variable. The respondents are clustered within country, year, and occupation hierarchies. FE: Includes country and year dummies, RE: Does not include country and year dummies. RI: Random intercept model, RS : Random slope model where the slope of relative risk is allowed to vary randomly.
*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0$

Table A42: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour with an alternative measure of education

Base: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.70***	0.82*	0.83t	0.60***
	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.053)
ES-ISCED 0 – N/A	8.81***	6.28***	8.30***	8.02***
	(1.597)	(1.298)	(1.887)	(1.732)
ES-ISCED I	1.31t	1.23	1.12	0.64t
	(0.204)	(0.209)	(0.257)	(0.146)
ES-ISCED IIIb	1.25**	1.03	0.87	1.19
	(0.104)	(0.095)	(0.103)	(0.129)
ES-ISCED IIIa	1.37***	1.07	1.06	1.30*
	(0.126)	(0.106)	(0.129)	(0.153)
ES-ISCED IV	1.67***	1.21t	1.31*	1.77***
	(0.157)	(0.125)	(0.171)	(0.215)
ES-ISCED V1	2.63***	1.83***	2.46***	3.12***
	(0.299)	(0.225)	(0.345)	(0.420)
ES-ISCED V2	3.56***	2.72***	3.10***	5.41***
	(0.483)	(0.394)	(0.517)	(0.836)
ES - ISCED Other	2.67	0.69	0.28	0.76
	(1.700)	(0.479)	(0.304)	(0.580)
Constant	41.34***	1,620.28***	8.16***	692.75***
	(12.322)	(563.271)	(4.518)	(241.087)
Observations	39,855	39,855	39,855	39,855
Log likelihood	-43754	-43754	-43754	-43754
Number of clusters	753	753	753	753

Note: Education measured using 7 ES - ISCED categories of degrees instead of years in education. ES-ISCED I: Less than lower secondary, ES-ISCED II, lower secondary (Reference category), ES-ISCED IIIb, lower-tier upper secondary , ES-ISCED IIIa, upper-tier upper secondary, ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational training, ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, ES-ISCED 0, not possible to harmonise into ES-ISCED. Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A43: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour controlling for personality traits

Base: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.64***	0.75***	0.76**	0.55***
	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.051)
Personality traits variables				
Important to think new ideas and being creative	1.07**	1.07**	1.03	1.01
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Important to be rich, have money and expensive things	0.97	0.99	1.09**	1.08**
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities	0.94*	0.87***	0.76***	0.83***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.024)

Important to show abilities and be admired	1.00	1.01	0.99	0.93**
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.022)
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings	1.01	0.99	1.05t	1.04t
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Important to try new and different things in life	1.01	1.02	1.06t	1.05*
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.026)
Important to do what is told and follow rules	0.99	0.99	1.01	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.021)
Important to understand different people	0.95t	0.93**	0.94	0.96
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention	1.02	1.05*	1.03	1.02
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.024)
Important to have a good time	1.00	0.99	0.98	0.98
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Important to make own decisions and be free	1.02	1.06*	1.09**	1.06*
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.030)
Important to help people and care for others well-being	0.98	1.00	0.96	1.04
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Important to be successful and that people recognize achievements	0.93**	0.96	0.98	1.01
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Important to seek adventures and have an exciting life	1.03	1.04	1.00	1.00
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.026)
Important to behave properly	0.93**	0.95*	1.01	0.95*
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.023)
Important to get respect from others	0.98	0.96t	0.95*	0.96t
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.021)
Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people close	1.07*	1.06	1.15**	1.18***
	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.047)
Important to care for nature and environment	1.04	1.03	0.94	0.77***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Important to follow traditions and customs	0.98	1.03	1.07**	1.11***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Constant	117.04***	3,387.04***	7.69***	502.09***
	(42.561)	(1,345.997)	(4.753)	(195.097)
Observations	39,174	39,174	39,174	39,174
Log likelihood	-42777	-42777	-42777	-42777
Number of clusters	752	752	752	752

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0

Table A44: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour controlling for European integration attitudes

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.64***	0.75**	0.74*	0.53***
	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.055)
Anti-EU	0.89***	0.88***	0.95**	0.87***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Economic threat	0.89***	0.86***	0.82***	0.82***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Cultural threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.81***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.013)
Pro-redistribution	0.82***	1.08**	1.33***	0.99
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.029)
Education	1.06***	1.03***	1.06***	1.10***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Left right scale	1.01	0.48***	0.38***	0.61***
	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Constant	74.80***	3,203.08***	10.63***	649.57***
	(26.252)	(1,156.655)	(6.151)	(237.772)
Observations	31,238	31,238	31,238	31,238
Log likelihood	-34056	-34056	-34056	-34056
Number of clusters	604	604	604	604

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A45: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour using an alternative political distrust measure

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.73***	0.74**	0.55***
	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.078)	(0.052)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.79***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.82***	0.81***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.82***	1.07*	1.32***	0.99
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.01	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Distrust in political parties	0.96**	0.91***	0.95*	0.95**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Constant	43.95***	2,088.12***	9.02***	401.51***
	(14.939)	(725.506)	(5.042)	(141.803)
Observations	36,036	36,036	36,036	36,036
Log likelihood	-39642	-39642	-39642	-39642
Number of clusters	685	685	685	685

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, t $p<0.1$

Table A46: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour controlling for occupational immigration employment

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.60***	0.71**	0.61***	0.49***
	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.056)
Occupational immigrant rate	1.01	1.01	1.03***	1.01
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***	0.78***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.06*	1.32***	1.00
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.01	0.48***	0.37***	0.61***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	66.59***	2,536.01***	8.13***	536.43***
	(21.022)	(875.612)	(4.520)	(181.490)
Observations	38,382	38,382	38,382	38,382
Log likelihood	-42300	-42300	-42300	-42300
Number of clusters	726	726	726	726

Note: I calculated occupationally disaggregated immigrant employment data using the DIOC-OECD database from years 2000/1, 2005, 2010, 2015. I match each wave to the closest previous data available from the DIOC database (ESS 1&2 matched to 2000 data, ESS 3&4 matched to 2005, ESS 5,6 &7 matched to 2010, and ESS 8 & 9 matched with data from 2015.
Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A47: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour controlling for the area of residence

Ref: RRWP	Centre Right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.62***	0.75***	0.76**	0.54***
	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.050)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.81***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07**	1.32***	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.026)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.01	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Residential area (ref: Big city)				
Suburbs or outskirts of a big city	0.94	0.88	0.82t	0.74***

	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.066)
Town or small city	1.11	0.99	0.85t	0.80**
	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.066)
Country village	1.16*	0.85*	0.76**	0.75***
	(0.088)	(0.069)	(0.078)	(0.060)
Farm or home in a countryside	1.32**	0.64***	0.58***	0.89
	(0.142)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.111)
Constant	72.01***	3,382.74***	14.13***	802.19***
	(22.460)	(1,153.924)	(7.866)	(269.109)
Observations	39,814	39,814	39,814	39,814
Log likelihood	-43789	-43789	-43789	-43789
Number of clusters	753	753	753	753

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A48: Multinomial logit estimation of voting behaviour controlling for pre or post-2007 waves

Ref: RRWP	Centre-right	Centre-left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63**	0.76	0.62*	0.49***
	(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.142)	(0.091)
Post-2007	0.41***	0.23***	0.38**	0.31***
	(0.100)	(0.062)	(0.125)	(0.082)
Post-2007*Relative risk	1.01	0.97	1.26	1.15
	(0.172)	(0.180)	(0.317)	(0.242)
Economic threat	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.83***	0.80***	0.79***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.011)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.07*	1.32***	1.00
	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.045)	(0.026)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Left right scale	1.00	0.47***	0.36***	0.60***
	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Constant	80.15***	3,028.61***	14.32***	716.49***
	(26.440)	(1,097.927)	(8.376)	(257.454)
Observations	39,824	39,824	39,824	39,824
Log likelihood	-43903	-43903	-43903	-43903
Number of clusters	753	753	753	753

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A49: Replication of fully specified vote choice model without the unemployed respondents in the sample

Ref: RRWP	Centre right	Centre left	RLWP	Other
Relative risk	0.63***	0.73***	0.70**	0.54***
	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.050)
Economic threat	0.86***	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Cultural threat	0.85***	0.82***	0.80***	0.78***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Pro-redistribution	0.83***	1.08**	1.33***	1.01
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.027)
Education	1.06***	1.04***	1.07***	1.11***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Income (deciles)	1.05***	1.01	0.95***	0.98
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Left right scale	1.00	0.46***	0.35***	0.60***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Religiosity	1.09***	1.03***	0.97**	1.07***
Constant	84.11***	3,377.98***	11.88***	695.28***
	(26.278)	(1,158.381)	(7.154)	(232.905)
Observations	37,935	37,935	37,935	37,935
Log likelihood	-41605	-41605	-41605	-41605
Number of clusters	753	753	753	753

Note: Odds ratio coefficients presented. Estimation with full model specification and country and year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1

Table A50: Full names of RRWPs as abbreviated in the manuscript

Country	Full names of RRWPs *as abbreviated in the manuscript*
Austria	Freedom Party of Austria (*Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* - **FPÖ**)
	Alliance for the Future of Austria (*Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* – **BZÖ**)
Belgium	Flemish Block (*Vlaams Belang*-**VB**)
	National Front Belgium (*Front National*-**FN**)
	People's Party (*Parti Populaire* –**PP**)
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (*Schweizerische Volkspartei*/*Union démocratique du centre* - **SVP/UDC**)
	Swiss Democrats (*Schweizer Demokraten*- **SD**)
	The Freedom Party of Switzerland (*Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz*-**FP**)
	The Ticino League (*Lega dei Ticinesi*)
	The Geneva Citizens' Movement (*Mouvement Citoyens Genevois* - **MCG**)
	Swiss Nationalist Party (*Partei National Orientierter Schweizer*- **PNOS**)
Germany	The Republicans (Die Republikaner)
	The National Democratic Party of Germany (*Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* - **NPD**)
	German People's Union (*Deutsche Volksunion* – **DVU**)
	Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - **AfD**)
Denmark	Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti* - **DF**)
	Freedom Party (*Frihedspartiet*- **FP**)
Finland	True Finns/The Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset)*
	Finnish People's Blue-Whites (*Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset* - **SKS**)
	Change 2011 (*Muutos 2011*)
France	National Front France (*Front National* -**FN**)
	Movement for France (*Mouvement pour la France* - **MPF**)
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (**LAOS**)
	Golden Dawn
Italy	Northern League (*Lega Nord*)
	CasaPound Italia
Netherlands	The Pim Fortuyn List (*List Pim Fortuyn*)
	The Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid* - **PVV**)
	Forum for Democracy (Forum voor Democratie - **FvD)**
Norway	The Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet FrP)
Portugal	National Republican Party (*Partido Nacional Renovador* - **PNR**)
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna* - **SD**)
United Kingdom	British National Party (**BNP**)
	UK Independence Party (**UKIP)**