This thesis consists of four essays in the economics of conflict and crime. Each independent essay examines the causes and consequences of violence along two dimensions: organized armed groups and interpersonal violence. The first essay investigates the causal link between the cash finances of armed groups and their subsequent violent activities, in the context of the Maoist insurgency following the Indian Banknote Demonetization in November 2016. Results suggest a reduction in violence and an increase in surrenders, highlighting the role of economic incentives driving the Maoist insurgency. The second essay examines the role of the Indian Maoist insurgency on resource misallocation, by disrupting firms’ activities through the provision of intermediate inputs. The results show large distortions, not only in conflict-affected districts, but across the entire country. The third essay provides real-time evidence on the impact of covid-19 restrictions policies on conflicts globally. Results show that imposing a nation-wide shutdown reduces the incidence and intensity of conflict, driven by battles, protests and violence against civilians. Significant cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of restriction policies on conflict is shown with respect to country characteristics. The fourth essay links domestic violence and the labor market conditions of partners within a household. Results suggest that increase in intimate partner violence is associated with lower individual wages, and when the wage of the perpetrator is decreasing relative to the victim. Heterogeneous effects arise for different levels of wealth and for individual characteristics.