



Where the wild things are not: crime preventers and the 2016 Ugandan elections

Rebecca Tapscott

To cite this article: Rebecca Tapscott (2016) Where the wild things are not: crime preventers and the 2016 Ugandan elections, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 10:4, 693-712, DOI: [10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283](https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272283>



© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 01 Feb 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 997



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 6 View citing articles [↗](#)

Where the wild things are not: crime preventers and the 2016 Ugandan elections

Rebecca Tapscott

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

ABSTRACT

In Uganda's 2016 elections, international and national commentators questioned the role that the government's crime preventers – or community police – would play. Many claimed that they would be used “as tools” to rig the elections, intimidate voters, and vote *en masse* for the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime. In contrast, this paper shows that the government never intended the crime preventers to play an explicitly coercive role. Instead, the NRM leadership intentionally structured the crime preventer program as indefinite and fluid, allowing political authorities and citizens to understand the purpose of crime preventers alternately as dangerous tools of the regime, family men in search of work, or patriotic citizens of Uganda. Used interchangeably, these logics – which are described in this paper as ideal-typical categories of political, economic, and social – prevented Ugandans from accurately assessing the program. The resultant uncertainty fragmented organization of crime preventers, civil society, and members of the opposition; limited the government's responsibility for crime preventers; and helped ensure that crime preventers would bolster the strength of the NRM regime in the 2016 elections.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 19 August 2016
Accepted 9 December 2016

KEYWORDS

Community policing;
Uganda; elections; militias;
democracy

In the months before Uganda's February 2016 elections, tensions were high. During the week before the election the police detained the main opposition candidate five times.¹ President Yoweri Museveni's ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), ran election ads featuring skulls from their 1986 battle against the Obote regime to remind the “country that [a] poor choice in the coming election can take the country back to war.”² The NRM secretary general reportedly threatened that protesters would be shot.³ Against this backdrop, the government undertook a massive expansion of its “crime preventer” program, nominally a community policing initiative intended to curb crime in local communities and supplement security during the election. By December 2015, the government reported over 1 million recruits. The program raised concerns for international observers and domestic civil society, many of whom believe that the regime has increasingly relied on intimidation and violence to maintain its rule. Among other indicators, they cite increased expenditure on the military;⁴ militarization of the

CONTACT Rebecca Tapscott  rebecca.tapscott@tufts.edu

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

police;⁵ arrest and detention of opposition candidates on trumped up charges of terrorism, sedition, and treason; intimidation of the judiciary by state security agents (the “Black Mambas”); and suppression of journalistic freedom.⁶

Both the NRM and opposition mobilized crime preventers in pugnacious political rhetoric, pigeonholing them as tools of the ruling regime and “militias” serving political ends. Rumors suggested that five crime preventers would stand guard at each polling station to arrest anyone who caused “chaos.” At the same time, crime preventers were portrayed as “crime promoters” who used their positions to extract resources for personal gain. Despite the alarming rhetoric, the elections were overall peaceful. Although contested, the results placed 30-year incumbent, President Museveni, in office with 60% of the vote.⁷ Crime preventers remained unarmed; they did not systemically intimidate voters or manipulate votes. So why did the Ugandan government⁸ recruit crime preventers? What role did they play in the elections? And why did youth willingly participate in this voluntary program if not for political or material gain?

In contrast to the popular narrative of an increasingly securitized state, I argue that the NRM regime never intended crime preventers to play a physically coercive role in the 2016 elections. Instead, the NRM regime intentionally designed the crime preventer program to be contradictory and indeterminate in order to destabilize and co-opt opposition. To this end, the regime used competing explanations for the program’s purpose, such that it could constantly reframe crime preventers to suit a variety of ends. I examine these narratives as three stylized logics: political, social, and economic. For example, at some moments, political authorities described crime preventers as agents of state violence, at some as benevolent citizens, and at still others as entrepreneurial youth. Political authorities produced and reproduced these logics as a strategy of state governance; through their expectations for and their daily interactions with state actors and crime preventers, society reproduced them as popular logics. This paper examines how multiple logics created an environment of uncertainty and ambiguity, and how this allowed the regime to capitalize on crime preventers while avoiding accountability to program participants, civil society, and international observers. For the regime, the program had the added benefit of directing the energies of unemployed youth into a pro-government program for the duration of the campaign season, thereby limiting youth support for opposition candidates and giving them hope that the ruling regime had their interests at heart. Thus, the crime preventer program may have impacted the outcome of the election by wooing young voters, but not through coercion or violence associated with a political militia.

An examination of the crime preventer program contributes to an understanding of Ugandan politics and conflict studies more generally. The crime preventers provide a lens to understand how the NRM regime uses indeterminacy to undermine citizen organization and the state–society contract during the elections, a time of heightened contestation. In regards to conflict studies, the paper shows that, in addition to examining logics of conflict independently (for example, in the greed versus grievance debate), it is essential to also examine them concurrently to understand how the presence of multiple logics produce or collapse space for citizen organization. While it may be possible to determine that one logic, or mechanism, is more influential than others, the coexistence of multiple logics fundamentally and qualitatively shapes the ground rules in a way that favors those in power.

Based on over 250 interviews conducted in and around Gulu, Pader, and Kampala between 2014 and 2016, I record how the government recruited crime preventers; why youth participated; and what mechanisms the government put in place to maintain control of them. This paper proceeds as follows: first, I present my argument in relation to the literature on political militias and resource distribution; second, I provide context for northern Uganda, civil–military relations, and the formation of the crime preventer program; third, I explain the institutional context for the crime preventer program; fourth, I elaborate political, economic, and social logics, examining how they were employed during the 2016 elections and the implications for crime preventers; fifth, I present a case study of crime preventers’ involvement in electoral politics; sixth, I examine a few other strategies the state employed to control crime preventers; finally, I conclude with a reflection on how the state’s ability to fragment resistance and organize support determine prospects for electoral democracy in Uganda under the NRM regime.

Political, economic, and social logics linking militias to state power

Prevailing explanations for the emergence of auxiliary groups and militias focus on a “political logic” in which violence is organized to seize control of political institutions. As such, local or national political contestation is a key factor determining the emergence of militias.⁹ Evidence for a political logic is plentiful in the literature on militias, describing how militias intimidate voters into supporting the desired candidate.¹⁰ In this view, unconsolidated militias suggest either a political failure or a situation in which the state does not need militias to maintain power. A political logic applied to crime preventers would suggest that the Ugandan government initiated the program to mobilize violence if it appeared that the President would not win re-election by a comfortable margin. Although this is possible, it is only partially supported by available evidence.

In addition to a political logic, I propose two alternative logics for how militias and militarization shape state power: an “economic logic” and a “social logic.” An economic logic suggests that people participate in militias as a livelihood strategy or to pursue economic ends.¹¹ In the case of crime preventers in Uganda, an economic logic draws attention to the militarization and securitization of the economy, which produces an environment in which the security sector presents the most viable opportunities for employment. Access to such livelihoods are contingent on supporting the regime. A social logic suggests that people participate in militias out of a sense of social responsibility, social hierarchy, or personal preference for militaristic activities. A social logic draws attention to military symbols and rhetoric, which signify power in Uganda’s militarized society.¹²

In contrast to a political logic, economic and social logics suggest that militias can emerge in contexts of low to moderate electoral competition or when a militarized state needs new pathways to distribute resources and/or bolster popularity. This suggests that in some cases, the state may intentionally create diffuse and/or unthreatening militarized organizations to strengthen control of the population through economic or social avenues. In addition, militarization teaches discipline and obedience, which can be leveraged as support for the ruling regime. Thus, military training for civilians benefits the state even in the absence of militias. Considering these logics, I argue that Uganda’s crime preventers were never intended primarily to intimidate voters through violence. Rather, from the outset, the program was a means to extend patronage to marginalized and

disenfranchised youth who might otherwise support the opposition, as well as to develop a sense of admiration for the militarized NRM state through trainings and initiation ceremonies for the masses.

Despite the ways that militias can strengthen state power, militias also present a principal-agent problem that make them a potential threat to state stability. Training and arming young people, and connecting them to agents of state power whether in the military, police, or administration, gives participants tools to make claims on the state. I argue that the Ugandan state managed this risk by employing economic, political and social logics simultaneously. Various authorities framed crime preventers with a political logic, as purveyors of violence for the NRM state; others framed them with an economic logic, as aspirational youth working for short-term payoffs or longer-term employment opportunities; still others suggested they were motivated by a social logic, as patriotic citizens of Uganda. The many cases when state agents failed to deliver on promises reinforced unpredictability, precluding crime preventers from organizing around a given logic and demanding follow-through. Similarly, civilians were unable to determine whether crime preventers were tools of the regime or upstanding community members, thereby weakening critiques of the program.

In part, the regime was able to successfully deploy these logics because of a long history of civilian militias, militarization, and political indoctrination under the NRM's semi-authoritarian militarized regime, and as a logical extension of Uganda's militarized neopatrimonial system. The following analysis presents a view of Ugandan democracy that diverges from orthodox notions of development and good governance. It illustrates that the NRM regime owes much of its success to its ability to organize support while fragmenting resistance. This has been achieved largely through a system of rewards and punishments in a context of uncertainty. This uncertainty precludes the formation of a state-society contract, instead pressuring citizens to accept less than optimal opportunities.¹³

Context for crime preventers and electoral violence in the 2016 elections

Civilian militias have long been a part of Uganda's political landscape. When Museveni seized power in 1986, a series of rebel groups emerged, including the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north, the West Nile Bank Front in the northwest, and later, the Allied Democratic Forces in the west.¹⁴ In response, the government deployed military troops and recruited civilians as auxiliary forces, or local defense units (LDUs). There is loose legal provision for such organizations, including the 1994 Police Act, which provides for auxiliary forces, Article 17 of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, which requires able-bodied citizens to undergo military trainings and render national service when necessary, and the 2005 UPDF Act, providing for "auxiliary forces, state security organizations, and such other citizens of Uganda as have undergone military training," including home guards, LDUs and vigilantes.¹⁵ Although LDUs were typically poorly trained, poorly armed, and poorly compensated, they were often sent into battle. While participation was formally voluntary, many youth faced political and economic pressures to join LDUs, including accusations of rebel affiliation if they declined.¹⁶

In the north, insurgency raged from 1986 until approximately 2006. Approximately 1.8 million people were forcibly relocated to internally displaced people's camps,¹⁷ where they remained vulnerable to rebel attacks.¹⁸ Additional civilian forces were recruited and

named for their region of origin, including the Arrow Boys in Teso, *Amuka* (rhinoceros) in Lango, and the Elephant Brigade in Acholi. Participants were frequently recruited into Home Guards, who received light military training and helped defend the camps. Many Home Guards were recruited into LDUs. Although most respondents affirm this loose hierarchy of irregular civilian militias, others describe Arrow Boys, Home Guards, and LDUs as indistinguishable in form and function. Maja Janmyr reflects “government authorities deliberately created a climate of confusion when it came to the management and supervision of these forces.”¹⁹

Uganda has a history of forceful regime change, whether via military coup or civil war.²⁰ The first multi-party elections under the NRM were held in 2006, 20 years after Museveni installed himself as president, and just as conflict in the north was coming to a standstill. Election violence, particularly arbitrary arrest of opposition candidates, was a common characteristic of Uganda’s elections. From 2001 on, civilian militias, such as the Kalangala Action Plan, Kiboko Squad, and Black Mambas, were formed to threaten and intimidate voters in elections.²¹ Respondents recounted how young men wielding sticks could appear on the street and beat anyone they presumed to be in the opposition. The police claimed no knowledge of the groups while respondents reported that they often saw police and militia members together.

Another military training called *chaka mchaka*, described as a “civil politico-military indoctrination closely linked to the NRM,”²² has long been used to mobilize support and shape electoral outcomes. In particular, “cadres” (program graduates) were asked to be the eyes and ears of the party to help mobilize support for the NRM. Cecilie Lanken Verma writes that the cadres

were mobilised to be on duty throughout the campaigns, having been given or promised different subsidies or salaries, and some had been told to prepare for the more radical measures of harassing the opposition, obstructing political rallies, and preparing for possible fighting during and after election day. The “political education” of the young population in the period before and during the elections was thus a crucial tool in the campaigning, and the cadres became crucial instruments in the NRM’s attempts to secure its position post-elections.²³

In 1996, the interim electoral commission suspended *chaka mchaka* in response to international concerns that the program was a tool of political propaganda. However, Museveni reinstated the program as a part of a strategy to “consolidate stability” in Uganda; it took on an “increasingly compulsory character” and was used to mobilize support for the NRM before the 2001 elections.²⁴ In 2007, Museveni declared that all able-bodied citizens should attend the program, and before the 2011 elections, the government increased recruitment to *chaka mchaka*, presumably for the explanations detailed above.²⁵

The NRM government has also enrolled the judiciary and police in suppressing resistance. In 2011, a number of opposition candidates and supporters were arrested on charges of treason and sedition.²⁶ In the 2016 election cycle, the Public Order Management Act was regularly invoked to disrupt opposition rallies and deploy riot police armed with tear gas and rubber bullets.²⁷ Presidential candidates were required to travel with a convoy of heavily armed police officers, which a journalist suggested was meant to help the government keep tabs on the candidates’ whereabouts and activities, rather than to protect them. On election day, the government shut down social media ostensibly to

prevent rumor mongering. Members of the opposition speculated that the shutdown was designed to prevent reporting on election fraud. During the President's inauguration on 12 May 2016 media were banned from covering protests.²⁸ Violence and intimidation are par for the course in Uganda's elections, making the moderate behavior of crime preventers particularly counter-intuitive.

Creating the crime preventers

The Uganda Police Force has regularly been described as a politicized and militarized institution that uses excess violence for political ends.²⁹ The Inspector General of Police (IGP) Kale Kayihura joined Museveni's bush war in 1982, and remains a close ally to the president.³⁰ Kayihura is said to have spearheaded the crime preventer program in its current form in 2014, linking the National Crime Preventer Forum (NCPF), an organization for university students to gain knowledge of police practices, with a large-scale local recruitment of crime preventers across the country.³¹ The government attempted to recruit 30 crime preventers in each of Uganda's 56,000 villages for a force of nearly 1.5 million.³² Many argue that these statistics were inflated to intimidate political opposition; however, more accurate numbers are difficult to glean because crime preventer coordinators dutifully filled rosters with names whether those listed were active participants or not. To manage the surge of crime preventers, the NCPF developed an institutional structure resembling the police, with coordinators at the village, parish, sub-county, district, and sub-regional levels. Leadership of the NCPF openly voiced their support for the President and the NRM,³³ explaining that Kayihura and Museveni were their patrons.³⁴

Despite an emerging institutional structure, the crime preventers' mandate remained vague and at times contradictory. While some insisted that crime preventers were meant to do nothing more than provide intelligence to police, others asserted they could take police reports, guard detainees, make arrests, and carry out other police duties. During my research, I observed crime preventers tasked with a variety of police responsibilities, including manning police desks and making arrests in the community. One NGO employee, who provided human rights trainings for crime preventers before the 2016 inter-agency condemnation of the program, reflected on the fluid role of crime preventers:

In 2011, the crime preventers turned into Special Police Constables [police officers on contract]. When they came back from six months of training they were uniformed and you could not tell who was who ... When circumstances call for it, they [the authorities] just change the uniforms around. The police know who is who, but for us, everyone is in uniform ... Unless someone tells me who is behind the uniform, we can't know.³⁵

Crime preventers were recruited before the 2011 Ugandan elections and received a few months of training before the police provided them with uniforms and batons and ordered them to patrol. Some of those who helped with the elections received a one-time payment of approximately 300,000 Ugandan shillings (approximately 125 US dollars in February 2011³⁶) for their work and additional training to become Special Police Constables. Reportedly, some climbed the ranks and became fully incorporated into the Police Force, while others were retrenched, often without notice or explanation.

Respondents widely concurred that crime preventers were recruited at least in part to provide additional security during the 2016 election. One police officer explained that crime preventers were needed to provide elections-related intelligence:

It is the time of politics. We are going for elections. We expect a lot of work. If there are people close to us, who are used to the police, that will help us The policy is very clear – crime preventers is voluntary, and it is the work of every Ugandan citizen. Their work is just to bring information. It will be cheap for us – they inform on people who are planning things.³⁷

The relationship between crime preventers and the police appears intentionally vague. Although crime preventers were frequently trained by police at police posts, helped support police patrols and, by some accounts, occasionally donned police uniforms, a police officer in charge of community policing claimed that his knowledge of their activities was limited. He said, “We try to keep some distance, because [crime preventers] only help us. They have their own structure ... The community thinks crime preventers are doing the work of police, and we want to dispel that.”³⁸ Many respondents suggested that this helps the government maintain plausible deniability of their relationship to auxiliary forces, such that NRM politicians can claim credit when auxiliary security actors such as crime preventers do good work and disown them if they are caught committing crimes, such as tampering with the election.³⁹

Shifting logics: political, economic, and social

Crime preventers were defined variously as militias loyal to the state, as economic actors struggling to support their families, and as patriotic citizens in a militarized society. The simultaneous application and, at times, contradictory implications of these three logics made crime preventers difficult to categorize. The three logics proposed here – political, economic, and social – overlap and are at times difficult to distinguish. Each can be applied independently of the others, and all can function simultaneously. This is part of what makes the three logics convincing as alternative or concurrent explanations. In turn, this makes the purpose of crime preventers slippery, and prone to manipulation. Examining all three logics shows that the NRM regime never intended crime preventers to adhere to a solely political logic – rather, the program was produced with all three logics in mind, thereby keeping its purpose vague and limiting the regime’s accountability.

Political logic: government militias and coercive tools of the regime

A “political logic” emphasizes coercion in relation to political contestation, framing crime preventers as violent tools of the NRM regime to secure the election. This logic was popularly presented in media coverage of the 2016 Ugandan elections, and is supported by theory on the emergence of militias.⁴⁰ A political logic draws attention to bellicose trainings and rhetoric, as well as strategies to build crime preventers’ loyalty to state agencies by, for example, distinguishing crime preventers from civilians and giving them the responsibility to police members of their community. A political logic also draws attention to rumors that crime preventers would be armed and would intimidate and arrest unruly voters on election day. Given Uganda’s history with other political militias, it is easy to adopt this viewpoint on the basis of the following evidence.

The crime preventer program was designed to align the interests of participants with the success of the NRM regime. For example, trainings and subsequent activities developed a relationship between the recruit and the government. As one crime preventer explained:

With the force, once you join, they tell you that the first priority is to keep secrets and be disciplined. With the force, it is command. That is the most important thing. When the government gives you that knowledge, they will never leave you.⁴¹

These perceptions were further strengthened through the daily activities of crime preventers in the months before the 2016 elections. In Gulu, the police discouraged crime preventers from attending opposition rallies; although, at times, individuals were asked to do so as undercover intelligence agents. More often, crime preventers attended NRM rallies wearing civilian clothes or NRM paraphernalia, ostensibly to provide security and intelligence. To other bystanders, these crime preventers appeared to be participants in the rally. One crime preventer explained, “Differentiating crime preventers from civilians is difficult, because they are all in yellow. If you’re not wearing yellow [the color of the NRM], you will not even get tea.”⁴² Thus, crime preventers are simultaneously defined as individuals connected to the system, and as unidentifiable within the community. This made them potentially omnipresent.

Potential omnipresence proved an effective tool to discipline communities. Police officers and crime preventer leadership emphasized that after training, crime preventers should return to their villages and provide intelligence and information to government officials in the security sector. Many argued that crime preventers could introduce efficiencies because they know the community members and their proclivities. Thus, crime preventers can be understood as an extension of the state’s security apparatus, helping produce the perception that the state has eyes and ears everywhere, even in the most remote parts of the country.

Along with acting as government informants, crime preventers were given other responsibilities that made them unpopular in the community, like arresting gamblers and idlers. One crime preventer explained that he did not feel safe in his community because of his work.

Even my friends, they didn’t like me because they say for us we are capturing people, gamblers. Whether I am doing it or not, they say I am the commander, you are instructing them to go and do the work. I am not happy every day. The work which I’ve entered in is not good at all. My life is not safe.⁴³

This sentiment was widely expressed among crime preventers with whom I spoke. Respondents explained they continued because they had started, giving the impression that loss of relationships in the community was a sunk cost that could not be recovered, intensifying their commitment to attaining success from the crime preventer program.

Other activities further bolstered the public impression that crime preventers were being used to manipulate the elections. Rumors circulated that they were enrolled to doctor the voter registration list, and that they would be armed for patrols during the elections. In a conversation about what would theoretically happen when voters, having been covertly removed from the voter registration list, arrived at their designated polling station to vote, one crime preventer told me:

When someone has come [to the polling station] and you don't [have] his name [on your list], send him to another polling station. [Tell him] "You first go and check there in a good manner, don't be rude. Maybe your name is not here, because there is some mistake from the Headquarter. For us, we don't know. We are just guarding. Sorry" ... That one is going to make a lot of confusion. People will be very many. You [the voter] will be confused. They are going to stop [voting] at 4pm exactly. They will confuse you until four. And we will say "sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry."⁴⁴

This kind of confusion did not occur on election day – but the image of five armed crime preventers manning every polling station, politely offering to redirect disgruntled voters and threatening to arrest anyone who protested, painted an alarming picture.

State authorities and opposition politicians alike fanned these flames. The IGP implied that crime preventers would be armed and should prepare to work with the military in case of an emergency:

"We shall not hand over power to the opposition to destabilize the peace which we fought for," Kayihura said at the passing out of crime preventers. He, instead, urged the crime preventers to get ready for war. "We are going to change you from having sticks to rifles and get ready to defend this country in case of any attack," he said. "The constitution gives police powers to protect the nation in case there is war and I want you to get prepared for this; anytime, we shall call on you."⁴⁵

Opposition candidates likened crime preventers to genocidaires or civilian militias, and condemned their involvement in the election:

Mr Mbabazi [an opposition candidate] said crime preventers are not part of the Uganda police force as prescribed by law, adding that plans to arm them makes them a political militia meant to create an atmosphere conducive for violence ... "You can see the connection of what Ms Lumumba [the Secretary General of the NRM] said on shooting Ugandans dead and Gen Kayihura on arming the crime preventers, this is a dangerous and serious plan. These similar sentiments caused bloodshed in Rwanda and now Burundi and we surely don't want to see it here in Uganda," Mr Mbabazi said.⁴⁶

This rhetoric shaped expectations of crime preventers and civilians, who expressed fear that if the president was not re-elected, he could call up crime preventers and train them to serve as auxiliary troops to retake power in the country. Some also argue that the Ugandan government has intentionally established a fragmented and hierarchical security system to prevent organization among security organs.⁴⁷ Crime preventer coordinators – or "commanders" – explained that they received instructions from headquarters, which may not have been shared with local police or other security actors. In this view, crime preventers represent yet another grouping of security personnel established to counterbalance other branches of the armed forces.

Economic logic: economic opportunists and family men

An "economic logic" emphasizes security work as a potential livelihood strategy and narrates crime preventers as unemployed and opportunistic youth. An economic logic was commonly employed by participants in crime preventers as well as government officials; however, it was not a significant part of the media's narrative of crime preventers. An economic logic draws attention to narratives of security work as an important livelihood strategy; to ongoing and systemic poverty and marginalization; and to the NRM state's

militarized neo-patrimonial system of wealth distribution, which dictates that those who participate in the security sector will have better access to state resources than those who do not. It also emphasizes the many promises made to crime preventers of employment, access to capital, and material rewards in exchange for participation.

An economic logic may be particularly salient in northern Uganda. Acholis have long been politically and socially constructed as “military ethnocracy,” strengthening a popular association between security work and economic welfare.⁴⁸ One crime preventer explained, “If you fear to join the army it will be hard to get a job. You should be with a strong heart and go join the army.”⁴⁹ Only 24% of employed youth receive wages for their work.⁵⁰ Thus, salaried jobs with the government are highly coveted, whether in civil service or security services. This logic is particularly salient in a cultural context where men face unwavering expectations that they will provide economically for their families.⁵¹

The NRM regime has always relied on the military to distribute resources. For example, in 1989, the government formed the National Enterprises Corporation, a “parastatal body set up by the Ministry of Defence principally to organise defence personnel for productive functions.”⁵² More recently, the President placed control of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) under the military, in an initiative referred to as “Operation Wealth Creation.”⁵³ The same logic of repurposing public resources to reward service was used to bolster the crime preventers. A member of the NCPF explained that crime preventers finalized Memorandums of Understanding with Operation Wealth Creation, NAADS, and the Youth Livelihood Program to “give priority to crime preventers.” Another crime preventer also working at the NCPF in Kampala explained that they were developing partnerships with government entities to procure contracts, which would provide work opportunities for crime preventers:

We are developing partners at the ministries, the prime minister’s office, KCCA [Kampala Central City Authority] ... We are all in touch, and all agree to help provide for crime preventers ... They give us projects, and we run them and then benefit. [*For example ... ?*] The Ministry of Health had an immunization campaign. The crime preventers will monitor the program. The Ministry will facilitate transport, airtime and with any extra funds they can give a simple allowance.⁵⁴

The government’s promises of trainings, job opportunities, access to credit, and material incentives further bolstered the notion that the crime preventer program could constitute a reasonable livelihood strategy. A police officer described crime preventers as a program to provide youth with skills to use loans productively:

There is going to be another training soon on economic empowerment, because crime preventers have no jobs. So the government wants to give them programs and some projects to run, but first they have to get training. Otherwise, you may give them money and they will drink it.⁵⁵

Crime preventer leadership also used rhetoric of income generation and empowerment, describing the program as a way to instill economic skills in participants through in-person trainings and capacity building. One member of the NCPF leadership explained that he thinks of youth as “enslaved” because they are poor and disempowered:

Youth are slaves, being over utilized because [they] cannot make [their] own income and be independent. So we bring them financial activities. I want to put crime preventers to the next level. We want to bring the whole country in – thirty-five million should be crime preventers. We mobilize people into a visible cause.⁵⁶

Publicly, police and government officials emphasized the voluntary nature of crime preventers. In private meetings, they insinuated that participants would be rewarded for their work after the President's re-election. A police officer in Kampala explained that participating in crime preventers could improve one's chances of getting a job with the police in the future: "[T]hose with qualifications have the upper hand to join the police or military. Your CV is improved if you volunteer ... we already know you. Even in the United Nations that is what they do."⁵⁷

Another economic perk for crime preventers is access to credit, primarily through Savings and Credit Co-Operatives (SACCO). The crime preventers' SACCO, *Mwangaza*,⁵⁸ was started in 2015, reporting 5672 members in October and thousands more joining in the months before the election. Participants contributed 17,000 Ugandan shillings to join (approximately 4.50 US dollars in October 2015). Limited and contradictory information fostered expectations that all participants would receive access to free loans. Moreover, during previous election campaigns, politicians have made large donations to SACCOs across the country.⁵⁹ This may have further raised crime preventers' hopes.

Crime preventers were also given material incentives: for example, coordinators at the district and division levels were given motorcycles. Formally, the bikes were meant to help mobilize crime preventers for activities and transport suspects to and from the police; however, it was widely reported that crime preventers used them for their personal activities, including starting motorcycle taxi businesses.⁶⁰ Police in Kampala and Gulu confirmed that there was no rule precluding this, so long as the bikes were not damaged. Other smaller perks were offered for participation in political rallies. For example, the day of the President's nomination, buses full of youth dressed in yellow, whooping and cheering, filled the streets in Kampala. One crime preventer explained:

We went to Kololo for the president's nomination. We went as supporters, and we all put yellow. The DPC [District Police Commissioner] said the president wants to talk to the crime preventers. I thought, "the president needs to tell us something important." They provided transport from and to. [We were told] those who went will get 500,000 shillings each. Then we were told to stand for the rally and listen to the speech. He was for nomination. They told us, "you should be happy, you will be paid for it. Sing, dance and wave – your 500,000 [shillings] is coming."⁶¹

Because there is no clarity on who is at a rally to get paid, and who is there out of genuine support for the candidate – and indeed, sometimes there is no substantive difference – the ploy appears to be effective building popularity for a candidate.

Many crime preventers were explicit that their interest was purely economic. One crime preventer said:

All I want is the loan they promise to give us, that's why I keep hanging on. If I can invest into a good business, I'll start pulling out [of crime preventers] after returning all the loan. I have been doing graphic designs. I want to open a music studio with my younger brother's son ... Then a gym of course ... There are very many things I can do for a living, it's just [lack of] capital [that limits me].⁶²

The crime preventer program gained recruits due to the very economic marginalization its leaders condemned. The perception that the only jobs available are in the security sector combined with funneling state funding to crime preventers, promising jobs, access to credit, and material rewards for participants, incentivized youth to join the program under a logic of economic advancement.

Social logic: patriotic citizens in a militarized society

A “social logic” emphasizes patriotism and character within a broader context of Uganda’s militarized society, narrating crime preventers as active and engaged citizens invested in the country’s future. A social logic draws attention to crime preventer trainings that resembled other government-sponsored military trainings for civilians, like *chaka mchaka*, as well as rhetoric framing the program as a patriotic duty. A social logic was further reinforced through the deployment of crime preventers at state functions such as the Police Centennial, NRM Liberation Day, and Independence Day celebrations. Focusing on these trainings and activities frames the program as a tool to socialize and militarize the population, making crime preventers quiescent subjects under the militarized NRM regime.

Crime preventer trainings were loosely modeled on police and military trainings. However, because there were no formalized directives on what should be taught or how, each trainer was left to determine his⁶³ own curriculum. Trainings at village and sub-county levels emphasized marching, but also included military drills and military culture, such as songs, Swahili commands,⁶⁴ and saluting, as well as ad hoc lessons in patriotism and law enforcement. Trainings were frequently held in fields, where community members could observe the youth marching and saluting for hours on end, producing a clear image of crime preventer as military man. The trainings emphasized discipline, obedience, and respect for state authorities. One police officer explained:

We teach [crime preventers] discipline – for example, when I say “stand easy,” you don’t ask “why?”; when I say “turn right” you don’t ask, “why?” And we teach them rudimentary military skills, especially parade. You know us security people like parade. And how to greet and pay compliments to authorities. Basically, respect for the forces.⁶⁵

This kind of training naturalizes a command hierarchy, teaching recruits to obey orders and ask questions later, if at all. In Uganda, military training is widely accepted as a basis for building character and organizing society. One opposition MP told me that the idea of crime preventers was good, but the participants needed more training and financial support to prevent them from becoming criminals. He elaborated: “I really feel the recruitment of the crime preventers ... is for the better of the community. It is not necessarily militarizing; it is in case something happens in the future. I feel that is very healthy.”⁶⁶ Numerous other opposition politicians concurred that although the NRM’s implementation of crime preventers was deficient, the overall concept was good. At a local level, many believe that military acumen is needed to lead the country and manage Uganda’s unruly population. Politicians leverage this belief, emphasizing their experience in the military symbolically and rhetorically. Military training further embeds this belief in the imaginations of the population, who are encouraged to see the world in a binary of chaos versus order, specifically focusing on security threats to the state.

A police officer argued that crime preventers were motivated by patriotism: “We don’t encourage them to wear uniforms because they are supposed to be in the community and promote economic empowerment, patriotism and rule of law.”⁶⁷ When pressed on the perception that crime preventers were a tool of the ruling regime, he elaborated the link between patriotism and the ruling regime:

It’s true, the crime preventers can think they are supposed to support the NRM. When you support a system which is in place in providing security, you feel you are a part of that system. By volunteering to support the government in security, they [crime preventers] feel that they are a part of that family. That’s when the perception comes ... Then [in the trainings] they also discuss the different governments of Uganda, what they have done, their achievements ... The training is really about all the good things that the country did – but people see that it is this government who organized the training so it must mean that you should support that party. That’s where the idea comes from.⁶⁸

In a context where state, party, and government are fused and the military and regime are interconnected, it is difficult to discern which activities serve the country, and which serve the party. A social logic brings this to the fore.

Case study: manipulation at Karuma Bridge

The following case study provides an example of how all three logics can simultaneously be applied to crime preventers’ activities, how this made it difficult to assess their role in the 2016 elections, and therefore difficult to attribute blame or hold authorities accountable for any wrong-doing. The case describes a protest where the participation of crime preventers was framed variously as political, economic, and social by different individuals at different times. The concurrent use of these framings helped authorities minimize their responsibility for crime preventers’ activities, while simultaneously contributing to the notion of crime preventers as a fluid and undefined institution.

On 10 July 2015, opposition MP Odongo Otto organized a rally to protest the presidential nomination of John Patrick Amama Mbabazi. Otto mobilized 400 youth to block Mbabazi from entering the northern region, uniting around accusations that Mbabazi had stolen 1.4 billion Ugandan shillings from the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) during his tenure as Prime Minister. The funds had been designated to reconstruct the north after the LRA conflict.⁶⁹ Local and national news media covered the demonstration; however, there was no confrontation as Mbabazi delayed his consultations seemingly for unrelated reasons.⁷⁰

The following day, crime preventers from Gulu raised a complaint: they had been “tricked” into joining the rally. They said that police officers had notified them that there would be a three-month training at the Police Training School in Masindi. Instead, the crime preventers were driven 65 kilometers from Gulu, told to disembark and don T-shirts with a red “x” through Mbabazi’s initials (JPAM) and the slogan “Why buy a Benz of 600 million with PRDP money?” (Figure 1).

Many viewed the protest as political maneuvering by the NRM and Otto, in which crime preventers were collateral damage, instrumentalized for political ends. One elected politician explained that a political logic motivated the entire endeavor:

[After Mbabazi announced his candidacy] the Movement got in touch with some individuals in the opposition in northern Uganda – one is honourable Odongo Otto. Otto was given



Figure 1. Front and back of T-shirt distributed to crime preventers and others who attended the Karuma Bridge rally. Source: Holly Porter, 22 July 2015. © Holly Porter. Reproduced by permission of Holly Porter.

money [by the NRM] ... Where did he get money to hire six buses from, trucks for carrying people? He took over 400 youth. He fed them. He gave them over 20,000 each to return on. Where does he get over four million to spend? ... The people he took were crime preventers. The police lied to crime preventers that they were taken for further training in Masindi. They [the crime preventers] went on radio; they were very bitter ... The most disturbing part is, how do the police mobilize such people, don't tell them the truth and allow a political leader to use them in a wrong way?⁷¹

Others narrate crime preventers as independent citizens who knowingly participated in the rally, following their political convictions. One crime preventer coordinator explained participation in the Karuma Bridge rally:

The fact remains that the crime preventers are not supposed to have political affiliation. On the other hand, all these people who have been recruited into crime preventers ... have different [political] parties ... In case there is a rally for FDC that is organized, most of the crime preventers who are FDC tend to be present at the forefront ... The rule for the crime preventers is that you should be neutral. You should be solidly a crime preventer. When you want to participate in politics, leave crime preventers. When politics is over then you can come back to crime preventers.⁷²

Thus, Otto used crime preventers for a political logic, while leaning on a social logic to mobilize youth (whether crime preventers or other citizens) and subsequently narrate their participation as voluntary civic engagement. This narrative places responsibility for political activity on individual crime preventers rather than party agents or politicians.

Government officials and police generally narrated crime preventers' participation (and subsequent complaints) as economic opportunism, and used this as a rationale to sideline them. When crime preventers planned to march up to Gulu's Central Police Station to demand an apology for their poor treatment, the police threatened to tear-gas them. When crime preventers then went to the media, the police threatened them with jail time. Crime preventers were similarly unsuccessful when they attempted to gain representation in a non-state forum: they went to a human rights NGO, which advised they go to the Department of Labour to complain about unpaid work. Reflecting on this, another crime preventer said: "But they are not government employees, so they were left

hanging.”⁷³ Thus, framing crime preventers as economically motivated effectively sidelined their claims.

Continually reframing the actions of crime preventers with various logics – political, social, and economic – allowed authorities to rescind any responsibility they might have had for the organization and its members. For example, the police explained the activities of crime preventers through an economic logic, thereby suggesting that crime preventers participated purely out of self-interest and that the state had no responsibility for them; representatives of crime preventers suggested they were operating under a social or civilian logic, such that their service to the state should be recognized both by the state and society; and opposition politicians applied a political logic, distancing crime preventers from opposition (and thus much of society in the north) and suggesting that the NRM regime should be responsible for them. The co-existence of multiple logics allowed politicians to mobilize crime preventers for overtly political activities and then claim that crime preventers were acting in self-interest, whether out of economic opportunism or patriotism.

Producing manageable instability through competing logics

In addition to these three logics, the ruling regime employed ancillary strategies to ensure that crime preventers would remain loyal to the NRM. These strategies included maintaining personalized oversight of crime preventers; limiting their training and access to weapons; and isolating crime preventers from other sources of support such as their communities, opposition politicians, or NGOs, who might have influenced their activities or loyalties. The structure of the crime preventer program, with the NCPF at the center and a tiered system of oversight, facilitated direct control of all the program activities by people close to President and IGP. Rumors suggested that the individuals holding top leadership positions were the IGP’s children.⁷⁴

Additionally, the leadership of NCPF saw the program as a stepping stone for their future careers. Some NCPF leadership explained that they want to continue working with crime preventers after the elections, while others readily expressed their political ambitions, reasoning that leadership within the NCPF provides access to the masses, along with opportunities for networking with elites. While older politicians were frustrated with Museveni’s refusal to leave power, leadership of the NCPF was young enough that they are guaranteed to see transition within their expected lifetimes – unlike their predecessors, they had the flexibility to bide their time and wait for the right moment to enter politics.

In addition to close oversight of the program, crime preventers did not learn skills that could have made them a concrete threat to the state. Instead of military techniques, their trainings emphasized military culture, patriotism, and marching. One newly recruited Special Police Constable described crime preventers as a “baby class.”⁷⁵ Indeed, aside from a few sporadic reports, crime preventers were generally not allowed to handle guns; instead they carried wooden sticks resembling weapons during practices, and remained unarmed at other times. Moreover, as an undefined entity, crime preventers were constantly kept in a precarious situation such that they struggled to be considered a part of the system for which they were working. They were promised payment that was always deferred; many were arbitrarily excluded from promotions (for example,

recruitment of special election constables to help with the election); and those who spoke to journalists were threatened with arrest or detention.

Conclusion: where the wild things are not

The study illustrates that the focus on political contestation as the key variable in determining the creation of militias overestimates the role of overt coercion for political ends and underestimates the causal relevance of socio-economic systems and resource distribution. The emergence of crime preventers in advance of Uganda's 2016 national elections was as much a result of Uganda's militarized neo-patrimonial system and society as it was a response to political contestation. Additionally, by alternately framing crime preventers as auxiliary forces defined by access to violence; as economic opportunists seeking access to livelihoods; and as upstanding citizens performing their patriotic duty, the state produced crime preventers as a fluid and undefined group, thereby limiting the regime's accountability for crime preventers' actions.

The ruling regime employed a host of additional strategies to maintain control of the crime preventer program even though it was populated by disenfranchised and marginalized young men, a demographic that is stereotypically oppositional, opportunistic, and prone to violence. The NRM managed the inherent risk of the program by making the position of crime preventers precarious, maintaining structured and personalized oversight of the program, limiting their training and resources, and fostering their dependence on the state relative to their communities, NGOs and opposition politicians.

In the 2016 elections, juxtaposing these competing narratives facilitated large-scale recruitment to the crime preventers, thereby helping the NRM control and curry favor with a potentially dangerous segment of the population – young, unemployed, and marginalized youth. This juxtaposition also made it difficult for observers to determine whether crime preventers were a threat to the electoral process or simply citizens actively engaged in providing security. This analysis highlights that the vague and poorly defined nature of crime preventers served a purpose, strengthening the position of the central state by allowing it to manipulate political, social and economic logics simultaneously. This made it difficult for crime preventers, civilians, and international observers to organize around a clear set of concerns and demands. Overall, the crime preventer program appears to have been a successful strategy to win votes and placate the Ugandan population during what might otherwise have been an extremely contentious and potentially violent election cycle. Along with many well-documented strategies such as intimidation, patronage, and administrative redistricting that the NRM regime has employed to bolster its longevity, its production of multiple and contradictory narratives to define crime preventers helped to derail political opposition and created another obstacle to meaningful democratic participation.

Notes

1. Marima, "Uganda Elections."
2. Wandera and Kolyangha, "Luweero Tells NRM to Stop Skulls Campaign Adverts."
3. Wesonga, "Uganda."
4. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*, 40–7.

5. Kagoro, *Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda*.
6. Carbone, *No-Party Democracy?*, 83–7.
7. Kron, “Yoweri Museveni, Uganda’s President, Wins a Widely Criticized Election.”
8. In Uganda, state, party and government are highly intertwined. Unless stated otherwise, I use them synonymously in this paper, along with the term “ruling regime,” to refer to the NRM government.
9. Raleigh, “Pragmatic and Promiscuous.”
10. Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*; Straus, “It’s Sheer Horror Here.”
11. Collier and Hoeffler, “High-Value Natural Resources, Development, and Conflict” and Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*.
12. Kagoro, *Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda*.
13. Tapscott, “The Government Has Long Hands.”
14. Day and Reno, “In Harm’s Way.”
15. Janmyr, “Recruiting Internally Displaced Persons into Civil Militias,” 208, 217.
16. *Ibid.*, 211.
17. Joireman, Sawyer, and Wilhoit, “A Different Way Home.”
18. Statistics are contested. For a full background on the history and context of the conflict, see Branch, *Displacing Human Rights*; Finnström, *Living with Bad Surroundings*; and Dolan, *Social Torture*.
19. Janmyr, “Recruiting Internally Displaced Persons into Civil Militias,” 219.
20. Kagoro, *Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda*, 1.
21. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2008 – Uganda” and Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Kalangala Action Plan.”
22. Perrot, Lafargue, and Makara, “Looking Back at the 2011 Multiparty Elections in Uganda,” 19.
23. Lanken Verma, “Guns and Tricks,” 86.
24. *Ibid.*, 63–4.
25. Perrot, Lafargue, and Makara, “Looking Back at the 2011 Multiparty Elections in Uganda,” 19.
26. Bagala, “Walk to Work.”
27. Human Rights Watch, “Uganda.”
28. Paul, “Uganda’s Covert Censorship.”
29. Kagoro, *Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda*.
30. Kwiringira, “Uganda.”
31. Crime preventers have long been a part of the government’s community policing strategy. Baker, in “Multi-choice Policing in Uganda,” writes about Crime Prevention Panels that started as early as 1993, which reportedly trained tens of thousands of participants in the law of Uganda and legal procedure.
32. Gaffey, “Who Are Uganda’s Crime Preventers?”
33. “On Patrol with Uganda’s Controversial Crime Preventers.”
34. NCPF Leadership, 4 February 2016. Although the respondent, a leader within the NCPF, claimed that Crime Preventers were non-partisan, he also explained, “We are mostly being facilitated by the sitting government. We cannot do work without them.”
35. NGO worker, 29 September 2015.
36. Throughout, I adjust exchange rates to reflect fluctuating currency value.
37. Police officer, 19 October 2015.
38. Police officer, 14 November 2015.
39. Tapscott, “Local Security and the (Un)making of Public Authority in Gulu, Northern Uganda.”
40. Raleigh, “Pragmatic and Promiscuous.”
41. Crime preventer, 2 February 2016.
42. Crime preventer, 18 November 2015.
43. Crime preventer, 3 February 2016.

44. Crime preventer, 9 February 2016.
45. Taremwa, "Elections."
46. Ocungi, "Crime Preventers Are Political Militia to Disrupt Polls."
47. Khisa, "The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda," 206.
48. Doom and Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message" and Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda*.
49. Crime preventer, 18 November 2015.
50. Ahaibwe and Mbowe, "Youth Unemployment Challenge in Uganda."
51. Dolan, "Collapsing Masculinities and Weak States" and Porter, "Say No to Bad Touches."
52. Owana, "Will NRA-UPDF Soldiers Also Make NAADS Work?"
53. Atibuni, "'Operation Wealth Creation' Should Address Flaws in Naads Programme."
54. NCPF leadership, 5 November 2015.
55. Police officer, 14 November 2015.
56. NCPF leadership, 10 February 2016.
57. Police officer, 5 November 2015.
58. *Mwangaza* is a Swahili word meaning "solution" or "ray of light."
59. Titeca, "The Commercialization of Uganda's 2011 Election."
60. Kolyangha, "Crime Preventers Use Police Motorcycles for Boda Boda Business."
61. Crime preventer, 20 November 2015.
62. Crime preventer, 4 February 2016.
63. During all my research, I did not come across any female trainers for crime preventers.
64. Uganda's police and military use Swahili.
65. Police officer, 6 November 2015.
66. Opposition MP, 23 November 2015.
67. Police officer, 13 February 2016.
68. Police officer, 13 February 2016.
69. Ocungi and Okaba, "MP Otto Leads Anti-Mbabazi Demonstration."
70. Etukuri and Semakula, "Mbabazi Suspends His Country-Wide Consultations."
71. Elected official, 25 September 2015.
72. Crime preventer, 17 November 2015.
73. Crime preventer, 14 September 2015.
74. In my interviews, this rumor was both denied and affirmed by people with first-hand knowledge of the IGP's family. While lower-level crime preventers unanimously believed the rumor, higher-level crime preventers denied it, and said it was merely a reflection of the close relationship between the IGP and this "brilliant" young leader.
75. Special police constable, 13 February 2016.

Acknowledgements

The paper benefited from comments at the Ugandan Regime in the 2016 Elections Workshop at All Souls College, Oxford (2015), as well as detailed feedback from Deval Desai, Holly Porter, Alex de Waal, and Susan Weinstein. I appreciate indispensable research assistance from Raphael Kerali, and thoughtful comments from two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the *Journal of Eastern African Studies*.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding

Support for this article and research was provided by the Justice and Security Research Program at the London School of Economics (funded by the Department for International Development).

References

- Ahaibwe, Gemma, and Swaibu Mbowa. "Youth Unemployment Challenge in Uganda and the Role of Employment Policies in Jobs Creation." *Brookings*. Accessed August 26, 2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/08/26-youth-unemployment-uganda-ahaibwe-mbowa>
- Atibuni, Kefa. "'Operation Wealth Creation' Should Address Flaws in Naads Programme." *Daily Monitor*, January 21, 2015. <http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/Commentary/-Operation-Wealth-Creation--should-address-flaws-in-Naads/-/689364/2596106/-/exejdp/-/index.html>
- Bagala, Andrew. "Walk to Work: 15 A4C Members Facing Treason Charges." *The Daily Monitor*, October 18, 2011.
- Baker, Bruce. "Multi-choice Policing in Uganda." *Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy* 15, no. 1 (2005): 19–41.
- Branch, Adam. *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Carbone, Giovanni. *No-Party Democracy? Ugandan Politics in Comparative Perspective*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008.
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "High-Value Natural Resources, Development, and Conflict: Channels of Causation." In *High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, edited by Päivi Lujala and Siri Aas Rustad, 297–312. London: Earthscan, 2012.
- Davenport, Christian. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Day, Christopher, and William Reno. "In Harm's Way: African Counter-insurgency and Patronage Politics." *Civil Wars* 16, no. 2 (2014): 105–126.
- Dolan, Chris. "Collapsing Masculinities and Weak States: A Case Study of Northern Uganda." In *Masculinities Matter!: Men, Gender and Development*, edited by Frances Cleaver, 57–83. London: Zed Books, 2002.
- Dolan, Chris. *Social Torture: The Case of Northern Uganda, 1986–2006*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.
- Doom, Ruddy, and Koen Vlassenroot. "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda." *African Affairs* 98, no. 390 (1999): 5–36.
- Etukuri, Charles, and John Semakula. "Mbabazi Suspends His Country-Wide Consultations." *New Vision*, July 10, 2015. http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1330151/mbabazi-suspends-country-wide-consultations
- Finnström, Sverker. *Living with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008.
- Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2008 – Uganda." Accessed July 2008. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/487ca269c.html>
- Gaffey, Conor. "Who Are Uganda's Crime Preventers?" *Newsweek*, January 14, 2016. <http://www.newsweek.com/who-are-ugandas-crime-preventers-415704>
- Human Rights Watch. "Uganda: End Police Obstruction of Gatherings." *Human Rights Watch*, October 18, 2015. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/18/uganda-end-police-obstruction-gatherings>
- Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. "Uganda: A Group Called the Kalangala Action Plan; Its Activities and Organizational Structure; Whether It Is Affiliated with the Government." Accessed July 7, 2003. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4e2e26.html>
- Janmyr, Maja. "Recruiting Internally Displaced Persons into Civil Militias: The Case of Northern Uganda." *Nordic Journal of Human Rights* 32, no. 3 (2014): 199–219.
- Joireman, Sandra, Adam Sawyer, and Juliana Wilhoit. "A Different Way Home: Resettlement Patterns in Northern Uganda." *Political Geography* 31 (2012): 197–204.
- Kagoro, Jude. *Militarization in Post-1986 Uganda: Politics, Military and Society Interpretation*. Berlin: Lit, 2015.
- Khisa, Moses. "The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda." *Africa Development* 38, nos. 1&2 (2013): 191–226.

- Kolyangha, Mudangha. "Crime Preventers Use Police Motorcycles for Boda Boda Business." *Daily Monitor*, January 20, 2016.
- Kron, Josh. "Yoweri Museveni, Uganda's President, Wins a Widely Criticized Election." *New York Times*, February 20, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/world/africa/yoweri-museveni-ugandas-president-wins-a-widely-criticized-election.html?_r=0
- Kwiringira, Freddie. "Uganda: Gen. Kayihura – Man in the Storm." *The Independent*, March 14, 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201603141697.html>
- Lanken Verma, Cecilie. *Guns and Tricks: State Becoming and Political Subjectivity in War-Torn Northern Uganda*. Department of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen, 2012.
- Marima, Tendai. "Uganda Elections: Besigye Detained by Police Again." Accessed April 4, 2016. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-elections-besigye-home-detention-160223055948991.html>
- Mazrui, A. *Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy*. London: Sage, 1975.
- Ocungi, Julius. "Crime Preventers Are Political Militia to Disrupt Polls – Mbabazi." *Monitor*, February 9, 2016. <http://mobile.monitor.co.ug/News/Crime-preventers-are-political-militia-to-disrupt-p/-/2466686/3067954/-/format/xhtml/-/lorn7l/-/index.html>
- Ocungi, Julius, and Patrick Okaba. "MP Otto Leads Anti-Mbabazi Demonstration." *Monitor*, July 12, 2015. <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/MP-Otto-leads-antiMbabazi-demo/-/688334/2783784/-/147n20u/-/index.html>
- "On Patrol with Uganda's Controversial Crime Preventers." *AFP*, February 10, 2016. <https://in.news.yahoo.com/patrol-ugandas-controversial-crime-preventers-034502863.html>
- Owana, Tony Geoffrey. "Will NRA-UPDF Soldiers Also Make NAADS Work?" *Tarehe Sita: The People's Army Magazine*, July 2014.
- Paul, Sonia. "Uganda's Covert Censorship." *Foreign Affairs*, May 31, 2016. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/uganda/2016-05-31/ugandas-covert-censorship>
- Perrot, Sandrine, Jérôme Lafargue, and Sabiti Makara. "Looking Back at the 2011 Multiparty Elections in Uganda." In *Elections in a Hybrid Regime: Revisiting the 2011 Ugandan Polls*, edited by Sandrine Perrot, Sabiti Makara, and Jérôme Lafargue 1–34. Kampala: Fountain, 2014.
- Porter, Holly. "'Say No to Bad Touches': Schools, Sexual Identity and Sexual Violence in Northern Uganda." *International Journal of Educational Development* 41 (2015): 271–282. doi:10.1016/j.ijedudev.2014.10.003.
- Raleigh, Clionadh. "Pragmatic and Promiscuous: Explaining the Rise of Competitive Political Militias Across Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60, no. 2 (2016): 283–310.
- Straus, Scott. "'It's Sheer Horror Here': Patterns of Violence During the First Four Months of Côte d'Ivoire's Post-electoral Crisis." *African Affairs* 110, no. 440 (2011): 481–489.
- Tapscott, Rebecca. "The Government Has Long Hands: Institutionalized Arbitrariness and Local Security Initiatives in Northern Uganda." *Development and Change* 48, no. 2 (Forthcoming).
- Tapscott, Rebecca. "Local Security and the (Un)making of Public Authority in Gulu, Northern Uganda." *African Affairs*, 2017. doi:10.1093/afraf/adw040.
- Taremwa, Johnson. "Elections: Rugunda, Kayihura Disagree on Power Transfer." *The Observer*, January 27, 2016. <http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/42315-2016-elections-rugunda-kayihura-disagree-on-power-transfer>
- Tilly, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States*. Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992.
- Titeca, Kristof. "The Commercialization of Uganda's 2011 Election in the Urban Informal Economy: Money, Boda-Bodas and Market Vendors." In *Elections in a Hybrid Regime: Revisiting the 2011 Polls*, edited by Sandrine Perrot, Sabiti Makara, and Jérôme Lafargue, 178–207. Kampala: Fountain, 2014.
- Wandera, Dan, and Mudangha Kolyangha. "Luweero Tells NRM to Stop Skulls Campaign Adverts." Accessed April 4, 2016. <http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/Elections/Luweero-tells-NRM-to-stop-skulls-campaign-adverts/-/859108/3071996/-/13e74dt/-/index.html>
- Wesonga, Nelson. "Uganda: Lumumba Shoot-to-Kill Threat Sparks Outrage." *The Monitor*, January 31, 2016. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201602012356.html>