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The Institutional "Hinge": How the End of the Cold War Conditioned Canadian, Russian, and Swiss IR Scholarship

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Abstract: Major international events contribute to guiding IR scholarship's interests, yet it remains surprisingly unexplored how transformative political events affect international relations as an academic field. This article focuses on the linkage between key global moments and the institutional factors that condition IR scholarship, focusing on the important yet under-explored intervening elements in the interrelation between political events and academic practice. The article defines the utility of such focus and illustrates it with case studies of three central parties to the Cold War conflict: Russia as representative of the Eastern bloc, Canada of the Western alliance, and Switzerland as a neutral polity. This article shows how institutional factors such as funding schemes, the marketization of education, and the creation of new IR departments operate as effective "hinges" exerting significant influence over the ways scholars develop ideas about international relations.

Resumen: Los principales eventos internacionales contribuyen a guiar los intereses de los académicos de las relaciones internacionales; aún así, la manera en que los eventos políticos transformativos afectan las relaciones internacionales como campo académico sigue siendo un terreno sorprendentemente inexplorado. Este artículo se centra en la conexión entre momentos mundiales clave y los factores institucionales que condicionan a los académicos de las relaciones internacionales, y hace hincapié en los importantes, si bien insuficientemente explorados, elementos intervinientes en la interrelación entre los eventos políticos y la práctica académica. En el artículo se define la utilidad de un enfoque de estas características y se la ilustra por medio de estudios de casos de tres partes centrales del conflicto de la Guerra Fría: Rusia, como representante del bloque oriental; Canadá, de la alianza occidental; y Suiza, como sistema gubernamental neutral. En este artículo se muestra cómo los factores institucionales como los esquemas de financiamiento, la marketización de la educación y la creación de nuevos departamentos de relaciones internacionales operan como «bisagras» eficaces que ejercen una influencia considerable

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sobre la forma en que los académicos desarrollan ideas sobre las relaciones internacionales.

Extrait: Les événements internationaux majeurs contribuent à guider les intérêts du domaine des RI, mais il est étonnant de constater comme les événements politiques transformateurs affectant les relations internationales, en tant que domaine universitaire, sont restés un territoire inconnu. Cet article se concentre sur le lien entre les événements mondiaux clés et les facteurs institutionnels qui conditionnent le domaine d'étude des RI, en axant les recherches sur les éléments d'intervention importants mais largement inconnus dans l'interrelation entre les événements politiques et la pratique universitaire. L'article définit l'utilité de cet axe de recherche et l'illustre avec des études de cas de trois parties centrales ayant pris part au conflit de la Guerre froide: la Russie comme représentante du bloc de l'est, le Canada comme représentant de l'alliance occidentale et la Suisse comme entité politique neutre. Cet article montre comment les facteurs institutionnels comme les systèmes de financement, la commercialisation de l'enseignement et la création de nouveaux départements RI agissent comme des «charnières» efficaces exerçant une influence importante sur la manière dont les spécialistes développent leurs idées sur les relations internationales.

Keywords: history of international relations, sociology, Russian IR, Swiss IR, Canadian IR, Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was a globally shared international event, an event that became one of the main symbols representing the end of the Cold War. In the academic field of international relations (IR[1]), attention quickly focused on the implications of this political change on interstate relations. Whether Western European nations would start to balance their American ally, for instance, became a discussion in point and so was the question of what new global fault lines would open up once the East-West confrontation dissolved (Mearsheimer 1990; Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1993). In contrast to this focus on "practical" international relations, much less attention was directed to how the end of the Cold War affected the production and teaching of "scholarly" international relations. While there exist retrospective discussions of how the end of the Cold War caught the discipline by surprise (Goldmann and Allan 1995; Lebow and Risse-Kappen 1995), the question of how **the** key global event influenced the inner workings and organization of IR research and teaching in the medium-term went largely ignored in the following years.

Three decades later, analyses of the linkage between political events and IR scholarship are still rare, recent advances in the sociology of international relations notwithstanding (Gofas, Hamati-Ataya, and Onuf 2018). Although it is widely accepted today that IR scholarship itself is influenced by major international events (Buzan and Lawson 2014; Booth 2017), it remains insufficiently explored how these events affect the scholarly field. This problem is intriguing because there exist significant differences in the ways major international transformations, like those associated with the end of the Cold War, influenced IR communities standing in and acting out of different positions during this transformation period. Thus, while we know *that* the end of the Cold War was experienced differently in different

[1] In this article, the acronym "IR" will denote the academic discipline associated with particular countries featured in this article. Thus, the article refers to "Russian IR," "Canadian IR," "Swiss IR," and so on. This departs from the standard *International Studies Perspectives* style guide in which "IR" is used only as an adjective. This departure is necessary for the flow of this article.

countries—given their various positions in the international system of the time, such as members of the Eastern Bloc, the Western Alliance, or the neutral polities—we need to explore how associated changes were translated into specific academic contexts. That is, we must investigate in more detail *how* such influence operates.

This article seeks to extend the analytical gaze of the sociology of IR research beyond disciplinary and ideational trends in IR scholarship (such as debates around new or existing theories), toward the study of the broader professional contexts of scholarly development. The institutional incorporation of major political events into local scholarly systems is a key element of this extension (Grenier and Hagmann 2016). This is warranted because globally shared events, such as the end of the Cold War, not only influence subjects and discourses in international relations, but also are mediated by local and institutional factors whose distinctive configurations are complicit in mediating political changes at a professional level. We use the metaphor of a "hinge" in this article to illustrate how institutions transmit or transpose dynamics initiated in the broader political sphere into higher education systems and thus influence the academic organization and debates among scholars in different IR circles.

This argument and metaphor contribute to a more refined understanding of international relations as a socioprofessional field of practice, not the least because the process in focus largely has been overlooked by the pertinent literature. Although recent works on the sociology and history of international relations provide significant contributions on multiple fronts, investigating elements such as teaching (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014) or the discipline's global "multisitedness" (Tickner and Waever 2009), it is no exaggeration to state that they predominantly focus on the influence of intellectual factors on the evolution of international relations. More often than not, they focus on factors internal to the scholarly field, such as scholarly debates and competition among individual researchers to explain theoretical developments and innovations in the study of international relations. Schmidt (1994, 349), for instance, famously argued that a focus on the "intellectual roots from which [the field] evolved" helps us understand the evolution of IR scholarship. His and much of the critical historiography scholarship that has emerged since concentrate on the debates among scholars to understand what theories, concepts, and main perspectives emerged and came to the center of attention in the field—often with an empirical focus on the first half of the twentieth century (e.g., Thies 2002; Ashworth 2006).

Sociological works, by contrast, often consider wider factors but are also limited in scope. Jørgensen (2000) and Breitenbauch (2013), for example, link intellectual innovations in international relations to broader cultural, political, and linguistic configurations within which scholars are situated. Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2007) discuss the dependence of local IR work—specifically Russian IR—on Western approaches in general and US research in particular. These scholars mainly advance arguments associated with local intellectual traditions and perceptions, however. Only to a limited degree do they address wider external changes and the institutional factors mediating these. One of the few works touching on these factors more systematically is that of Kristensen and Nielsen (2013), who mobilize Collins (1998) to analyze microlevel interactions—competition, opposition, and alignment among individual scholars—in Chinese IR circles. Seen their way, political and institutional factors are not unimportant. Yet these are seen to exert merely indirect influence on IR scholarship, such as by means of affecting the material conditions of intellectual work. As a result, internal factors such as competition and alignment remain "the primary drivers of innovation [in theories and other scholarly ideas]" (Kristensen and Nielsen 2013, 20), operating as the forces that influence IR scholarship most directly.

Despite their merits, current works thus give limited attention to the ways distinctive political changes affect the development of scholarly ideas in differently

situated and configured IR circles.[2] In this article, we argue that a dedicated focus on institutional factors helps us to understand better how globally shared external changes—that is, changes happening outside the academic and higher education fields—and internal scholarly dynamics are interlinked. When studying higher education institutions in more detail, we suggest, one can identify how institutional factors operate as "hinges" of sorts, translating dynamics originating from wider societal and political context into theoretical innovation and debates animating international relations locally. This argument is illustrated by case comparisons centering on the end of the Cold War as the reference event and three different (at the time) nationally organized IR circles—Russia, Canada and Switzerland—into which that global political occurrence was mediated. The three cases are representative of the key political blocs of the time. As core members of either the Eastern Bloc, the Western Alliance, or the neutrals respectively, Russian (Soviet), Canadian, and Swiss IR occupied and acted out of paradigmatically dissimilar positions after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Their respective long-term occupation of specific roles in the international system not only defined their IR circles' heritage, but also the new relative and relational options that opened up to them. In each instance, a vibrant IR community had to adapt to changing conditions during the period associated with the end of the Cold War, and as the empirical narrative below shows, their respective institutional higher education configurations had important roles to play in terms of how they adapted.

This case selection also entails two additional benefits. The first is that it brings in additional vantage points to the study of international relations than those commonly utilized in the existing literature. Instead of looking at the United States and/or the United Kingdom and generalizing to wider developments in international relations per se, this article's cases and comparative research logic allow for a better-situated and sociologically sensitive perspective on disciplinary mechanisms and dynamics. Such a contribution adds to ongoing efforts to provincialize international relations (i.e., to contextualize the historiography of international relations to the multiplicity of sites and epochs in which it evolved) (Chakrabarty 2000; Tickner and Waever 2009). The second benefit of the focus on Russia, Canada, and Switzerland is to help advance research on IR circles that are still poorly documented or that can be difficult to access for English-speaking IR circles. Evolutions in Russian IR, for instance, were laid out by a comprehensive overview in a *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* special issue edited by Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2007), writers who also published studies on the theme in English elsewhere (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007, 2010). Many important reflections on Russian IR have come from scholars such as Lebedeva (2004), Sergunin (2005), and Tyulin (1997, 2005). Important themes among their debates are the dynamics and limits of the post–Cold War "westernization" of Russian IR and attempts by Russian scholars to (re)create original Russian schools of thought.

Canadian IR, by contrast, has been the object of a smaller handful of reflections written in French or English, work that often emphasizes Canadian IR's difference from US "mainstream IR." Nossal (2000), for instance, assesses the paradoxical effects of the "Canadianization" of international relations through the hiring of more Canadian scholars, and Neufeld and Healy (2001) assessed its orientation to critical theory. Cox and Nossal (2009) highlight the effects of Canada's geo-linguistic heritage on local international relations, and Grenier and Sjolander (2013) highlight its variations in IR teaching. Lastly, work on Swiss IR is even more limited than in the case of Canada, even though the small country hosts some sizable IR schools. There exists one comprehensive book chapter by Bocco, Jütersonke, and Stucki (2013) on the sociology and history of international

[2] Just as the global spread of Keynesian ideas in the post-WWII period cannot be understood without taking into consideration different institutional settings at the national level (Hall 1989).

relations in Switzerland and a few other publications that examine the broader context of political science in the country. These works discuss how Swiss IR has been conditioned by linguistic differences, multicultural orientation, and neutrality policy and thus offer productive insights to the study of international relations writ large. But, these texts published in German or French (and sometimes Italian) get little recognition internationally (e.g., Armingeon 1997; Voutat 2010).

How do institutional factors influence the way international events affect local scholarly arenas? To study developments in the three cases, the article uses an interpretive research methodology centering on the qualitative study of documentary sources in each case and IR circle (Soss 2006; Yanow 2006; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). The empirical narratives center on the end of the Cold War in a broader sense (i.e., the period of the mid-1980s to the late 1990s). Methodologically, it primarily rests on a systematic examination of a broad array of academic and governmental sources and, secondarily, on oral history (i.e., interviews with senior local IR figures that, as contemporary witnesses and long-term observers, are able to add further detail and contextualization to the translation process described in this article). The article is organized into three main sections: the first section details the analytical framework of our comparative analysis; the second presents the empirical results of our study of Russian, Canadian, and Swiss IR; and the conclusion reflects on the main findings, as well as the benefits and implications of the perspective offered in the article.

The Institutional "Hinge" as Research Focus

The metaphor of the institutional "hinge" is premised on Waever's (1998) three-tier model of the sociology of international relations. According to Wæver, international relations as a scholarly practice is codetermined by three layers. There is a sociological layer that influences the development of international relations in specific geo-cultural contexts and is related to the main features of the society and polity in which it is produced (e.g., cultural and intellectual styles, political ideologies and traditions of political thought, the organization of the state, state-society relations, and general foreign policy orientations). The sociological layer accounts for changes that occur beyond the academic and higher education fields, in the broader societal and regional context. The institutional layer then points to the organization of social scientific entities. As an analytical focal point, it includes dimensions such as the definition of the social sciences, material conditions of teaching and research, or disciplinary patterning. The second layer in Waever's model focuses on the forces that directly pertain to the organization of higher education and research institutions and practices, such as funding, publications, and disciplinary structures. The intellectual layer, finally, relates to the analytical activities of IR scholars themselves and more precisely to the intellectual debates, conceptual innovation, and theoretical traditions associated with the discipline in a particular context. It concentrates on what we usually conceive as the ideational or intertextual content of academic work and exchanges.

Waever's model provides a productive introductory template for thinking about the constitution and organization of scholarly knowledge, but needs to be specified further in order to make research operational (Grenier and Hagmann 2016). Indeed, while the model presents different focal points for assessing the development of IR scholarship, it leaves their interrelationships unclear and provides too comprehensive a model for detailed empirical research. With a view to operationalizing Waever's three-tier model, we thus draw on Kristensen and Nielsen's (2013) ideas of direct and indirect linkages. As noted earlier, their analysis shows how the Chinese state's increasing resources led to a material improvement of the Chinese scholar's institutional conditions, a feature that then enabled Chinese scholars to dedicate



Figure 1. The institutional "hinge" in the mediation of political events.

more time to intellectual debates and theoretical innovation. Seen this way, political and institutional factors merely exert "indirect influence" on IR scholarly work. This understanding of the "influence mechanism" is useful in the analysis of institutional factors—issues such as organizational configurations, material conditions, and funding—which are touched on only tangentially by Kristensen and Nielsen. We suggest that the relation between external political change and reconfiguration of local IR scholarship can be understood as a process that is mediated by institutional factors, and this enables empirical research in the wider three-tier model of IR scholarship. Figure 1 illustrates this focus and renames the layers to avoid confusion and demarcate our model's differentiation from Waever's. It also moves from layers to factors and specifies their interrelations. As a probe into the relations between the three components, this isolates one specific relationship at play in the sociology of international relations. In doing so, our model does not give a full account of all possible interrelations and feedback loops, but usefully specifies and foregrounds the relevance of institutional factors as important "hinges" between political and intellectual factors, making parts of the wider model amendable to application to comparative empirical casework in different countries.

The next section examines the political, institutional, and intellectual factors as they were (re)configured in Russia, Canada, and Switzerland during the period associated with the end of the Cold War, as well as the relations of influence working through them. Drawing on a broader trinational research project and attentive to space limitations, the case studies only identify traits and dynamics that appear as the most relevant to the argument in this article. To enable structured comparative examination across the three cases, we delimit the political factors relevant to each case's respective international positioning and foreign policy directions; institutional factors relevant to the organization of research and teaching institutions, as well as the financing of research; and intellectual factors relevant to theoretical and methodological debates, as well as new thematic traditions and trends.

Ideational Turnover of Soviet-Russian IR at the End of the Cold War

Political Changes In and Around Russia

In Russian historiography, 1986 is identified with a central shift in Soviet foreign policy. The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Vienna Meeting had a major influence on Soviet domestic debates about democratization and human rights—*Perestroika* and *Glasnost'* were announced just one year later. Gorbachev's new political thinking also presented novel approaches to international relations according to which the Soviet Union, with the United States, would attempt a transformation of the confrontational model of bipolarity into a

cooperative one (Bordachev 2003). By the late 1980s, the Soviet Union ceased to control the political regimes in the Socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which led to the wave of regime transformations and the reunification of the two German Republics in 1990, and the proclamation of the end of the Cold War in the 1990 CSCE Paris Charter. The Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were dismantled by 1991, and the Soviet Union collapsed in December of that same year.

After the Soviet collapse, Russia inherited its status of nuclear superpower and permanent member of the UN Security Council. However, painful domestic political and economic reforms and the need to fight against separatism greatly impaired Russia's ability to project the power associated with such status. Apart from the inherited UN Security Council seat, Russia did not quickly gain membership in "prestigious" international organizations like the G7 or the World Trade Organization. This is why, in Russia, the first half of the 1990s is associated with a weak international positioning for Russia, which can be explained by unconditional concessions made to the West in order to become part of the Western democratic community. In Russian public consciousness, then, the late 1980s and the early 1990s is a period associated with *Glasnost'* and freedom of speech—but also with poor economic conditions and intense political instability. The second half of the 1990s brought disillusionments and a turn toward Russian national interests, including higher attention to China and India as international partners.

Institutional Configurations and Changes in Russia

To understand how these broader political factors affected the intellectual development of Russian IR, it is important to mind the institutional (re)configuration of higher education in the country at the time. To start with, from the mid-1980s through the 1990s, the study of international relations in Russia experienced significant budgetary cuts; these were experienced by the higher education system in general and by the government-sponsored think tanks associated with the Russian Academy of Science (such as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations). Some new initiatives resulted from the political changes in the Soviet Union, such as the Institute of Europe within the Soviet Academy of Science system in 1987.[3] However, the poor economic performance of the Soviet Union and then Russia in the 1990s led to a critical underfunding of the higher education system. In consequence, a significant number of Russian academics left universities for business or tried to combine as many academic and research positions as possible to obtain a decent income (Tyulin 2005). Indicative of the severity of the situation at the time, the institutes affiliated with the Russian Academy of Science sought to survive by renting out their properties to businesses in the 1990s (and up until the early 2000s). Government support and grants only resumed in the mid-2000s. Also, poor economic conditions resulted in few new student enrolments in the 1990s, which explains why there is now a generation gap in Russian IR and political science. Today, most IR professors are in their late-50s and hence more senior, whereas the next generation of scholars tends to be in their mid-30s.

In this context, research opportunities were clearly limited for Russian IR scholars. During the 1990s, opportunities mainly came from the establishment of the first Russian and foreign private foundations in the country, which made external and foreign funding available. The development of IR studies in Russian regions, mostly within the context of private research centers, became possible largely due to grants from these foundations (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2005). This led to the development of IR study programs in Russian universities beyond Moscow and a certain decentralization of IR teaching with new schools emerging in cities

[3] The promotion of a common European home in the late 1980s led to the establishment of the Institute.

such as Nizhny Novgorod, Kazan, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Vladivostok. These centers primarily emulated the education programs of the existing IR centers, the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in particular. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also established the Scientific Coordination Centre as to facilitate cooperation among these new IR institutions across the country (Pokhlebkin 1992), but its impact on innovation was limited given the lack of resources and the copy-paste approach to IR teaching in the provinces. On the positive side, the system of research funding, which did not exist before the collapse of the Soviet Union, led to the diversification of funding sources and hence a larger IR research agenda, increased competition among scholars, and a higher quality of research.

In the 1990s, there was an increasing demand for specialists in international relations, which provided some resources for IR education. However, this demand for new IR experts mostly came from business, while government positions were not attractive for graduates because of low salaries. This increased demand for IR specialists eventually influenced the organization of IR research and teaching, as it prompted regional universities to look for new approaches and international partnerships to raise the competitiveness of their schools. The low domestic mobility of IR researchers and lack of resources from the state also inhibited the development of internal connections and joint projects. Underfunding destroyed the Soviet system of educational exchanges and internships, as well as professional training for midcareer university professionals, and it gave way to a self-organization of local research and teaching communities. In such an institutional environment, Russian IR scholars mainly cooperated with foreign universities as opposed to working with each other during the 1990s. This process fostered the creation of regional specializations in nonmetropolitan universities and programs such as Kazan' Federal University, which built strong connections with universities in the Islamic world, or the Far Eastern Federal University, which focused on the Asia-Pacific area.

By the end of the 1990s, further institutional changes contributed to the reorganization and professionalization of IR research and teaching in Russia. The Soviet Political Science Association had already turned into the Russian Political Science Association in 1991. But, it was the Russian International Studies Association, founded in 1999, that created significant new opportunities for IR scholars from all over Russia to meet and exchange ideas. The number of Russian academic IR journals also increased significantly in the late 1990s and 2000s.[4] However, still today almost all IR journals in Russia are published either by universities or by institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. They are often treated as in-house journals and, as such, their authors usually come from the same institution that publishes the journal. Few journals such as *Polis* in political science and *Mezhdunarodnye Protsessy* ("*International Trends*") in IR thus function as true national platforms for discussion about IR thinking in Russia (Istomin and Baykov 2013), fostering intellectual exchange across a wider space.

Intellectual Debates and Structure in Russian IR

During the 1970–1980s, a Marxist-Leninist systemic approach to international relations was actively promoted in the Soviet Union (Tyulin 1997). The 1990s, by contrast, was associated with a period of full-scale crisis throughout the social sciences in Russia, as the Marxist-Leninist paradigm became outdated overnight. This drastic situation had an important effect on international relations in Russia. At some point, Russian scholars were left summarizing foundational texts (and later, more recent IR publications) from Western IR. Looking for new theoretical and methodological approaches, they thus sought to "anchor" a novel understanding

[4] Many of which were included into international databases, such as Scopus or the Web of Science, in the 2010s.

of international relations. The ability to introduce Western theories became a useful tool in the wider institutional context of scholarly competition, scarce state resources, academic decentralization, and the push for international links and funding. Tsygankov (1996) was one of the first who provided a description and analysis of the main Western IR theories in Russia. With his textbook, he established a first position in the new academic debate among Russian IR scholars. Following this trend, Russian IR scholars diversified their pedagogical philosophies, primarily by introducing Western theories and methods during the first half of the 1990s.

Describing this adaptation process, Bogaturov (2000) describes the 1990s as a decade dominated by "the assimilation paradigm" in Russian IR. Questioning the recent reconfiguration of Russia IR scholarship, which was conditioned by the institutional dynamics of the late and post–Cold War years itself, he offered another position in this new field of ideas, arguing that Russian IR could flourish by adding explanations of non-Western realities to existing IR knowledge. Opposing the mere importation of ideas from Western sources by Russian IR scholars, Bogaturov argues that Russian IR could provide something that Western-originated theories could not. Later, a number of Russian scholars became skeptical about the necessity to create a national IR theory (Alekseeva and Lebedeva 2016).

Nevertheless, the theoretical debates and thematic orientations in Russian IR studies remained focused on strategic studies or Russian relations with NATO during the 1990s, with a strong influence from the fields of history and diplomacy. Studies of the United Nations or other multilateral organizations developed mostly in the field of international security. Globalization studies became popular in the late 1990s, but mostly from an economic perspective and in relation to the process of Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. The interest in regionalism emerged later. It is also by the late 1990s and early 2000s that Russian scholars started developing increasingly diverse theoretical approaches. For example, some Russian IR scholars focused on the study of world politics as a complex politics involving states, international organizations, and nonstate actors that was changing the political organization of the world (Lebedeva 2003). The theme of a multipolar world order also became prominent in Russian IR studies (Primakov 1996; Torkunov and Simonia 2015).

Unsurprisingly, Russian IR is the case among the three examined in this article on which political changes associated with the end of the Cold War had the greatest impact. As the center of the political earthquake that was the end of the Cold War, political changes provoked the temporary collapse of the state and a profound need to replace the former Marxist-Leninist state ideology that undergirded the study of IR in the country. At the institutional level, this resulted in significant budgetary reductions for public services, higher education, and, consequently, IR research and teaching. In parallel, Russian and foreign private foundations emerged across the country during the 1990s, assisting the emergence of new centers dedicated to the study of international relations. These centers furthered regional specializations and a growing number of international partnerships. With limited resources and a need to find new ideational foundations for international relations, Russian scholars started importing Western IR theories during the early 1990s, especially in the content of IR courses and textbooks. It is only by the late 1990s and early 2000s that Russian IR scholars could develop genuinely new theories and approaches to the intellectual debates associated with IR.

Delayed Refocusing of Canadian IR at the End of the Cold War

Political Changes In and Around Canada

Canada offers further—and different—insights into how institutional factors affect the evolution of international relations, this time in the case of IR circles deeply

embedded in the Western Alliance. The Canadian economy and defense have been integrated particularly closely with that of the United States since World War II. In 1983, the newly elected Conservative Canadian government manifested its intention to renew this relationship by being a "better ally" to the United States and in order to reduce the bilateral tensions that had developed in previous years. Pursuing such an orientation until the end of the 1980s, Canadian foreign policy remained underwritten by Cold War assumptions as illustrated by the 1987 *White Paper on Defense*, which denounced the Soviet threat to Canada (Michaud and Nossal 2001, 13). As a consequence, strategic issues remained preeminent in Canadian foreign policy during the 1980s.

The main change in the Canadian international positioning between the end of the 1980s and mid-1990s is associated with a recentering of Canadian foreign, commercial, and economic interests toward the United States and the Americas more broadly. Canadian diplomatic efforts were refocused on the American continent as "the end of the Cold War diminishe[d] Canadian influence in Europe and result[ed] in a turn toward the Americas [in terms of trade and foreign policies]."[5] This dynamic was also illustrated by Canada's formal joining of the Organization of American States and the repatriation of almost all Canadian troops from Europe at the beginning of the 1990s. This change can be explained by the broad acceptance by Canadian policy-makers of a "new world order" centered on American leadership in the years that followed the end of the Cold War. This interpretation of the state of international affairs after the Cold War was exemplified by Canada's participation in the US-led coalition that intervened in Kuwait against Iraqi troops in 1991. While this political shift reinforced the central role of the United States on the new global stage, it was also motivated by powerful integrative forces at the continental level. These forces were well exemplified by the active efforts of Canada, underway since the mid-1980s, to conclude a free trade agreement with the United States—a process that eventually also included Mexico in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.

Canada's foreign policy was also characterized by initiatives to promote human rights and democratic principles in and outside of the country. For instance, the Canadian government actively endorsed the fight against apartheid in South Africa (Michaud and Nossal 2001). Democratic principles were also stressed in the conduct of foreign policy. There was an emphasis on security sector reform in Central and Eastern Europe (Hatto 2002), and increasing efforts were made to involve civil society in the very making of Canadian foreign policy. A significant revamping of the country's foreign policy was delayed until the second half of the 1990s and the introduction of Canada's human security agenda, however. This new agenda was underwritten by a vision of international security that gave greater consideration to the security of civilians in international conflicts. This, in turn, was embodied in the Ottawa Process, which led to the adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997. While these are significant foreign policy changes, their impact on Canadian IR was delayed until the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, given the peculiar institutional configurations that prevailed in higher education at the time.

Institutional Configurations and Changes in Canada

Effectively, one can identify two major institutional factors that had significant influence over Canadian IR during the period associated with the end of the Cold War—budget cuts in the higher education sector and the gap between Canadian foreign policy-makers and IR scholars. Changes in the financial context had a strong effect on the working conditions of Canadian social scientists and IR scholars in

[5] Personal communication, Gordon Mace, telephone interview, June 5, 2017.

that period.[6] Since the 1970s, the federal government had frozen the level of transfer payments to the provinces for higher education until 1995 (Buchbinder and Rajagopal 1993). These cuts were largely transmitted to universities by the provincial governments. It is also during this period that the main federal agency subsidizing IR research in Canada, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, started implementing increasing limitations on the funding of social science research (Neufeld 2017). While these new conditions did not remove all existing sources of funding for research on foreign policy and international relations (such as the Chairs on Security and Defense funded by the Department of National Defense), they significantly limited the number of new hiring and institutional opportunities in Canadian IR. These changes pushed for a marketization of higher education and academic research, a long-term liberalization process of the Canadian state and economy.

Beyond budgetary issues, limited contacts between IR scholars and policy-makers affected the scholarly field. As one Canadian IR scholar underlines, a dual process contributed to this communication gap at that time, as both "academia and policy-makers had gone through a specialization process, which resulted in fewer contacts between the two worlds."[7] On one side, there was a professionalization of IR research and teaching involving an increasingly stringent orientation of IR scholars toward more strictly scientific and academic concerns; this process reduced the number of opportunities for engaging with wider audiences.[8] This situation was fueled as well by the "critical turn" in Canadian IR during that period, which made scholars cautious of being too closely entangled with the policy world.[9] On the side, Canadian policy-makers had become decreasingly dependent on scholars, as they turned toward other actors—such as private think tanks and policy institutes[10]—to obtain policy-related analyses and advice on emerging international issues.

Given these developments, major institutional changes in Canadian IR were delayed until the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, new hiring—while limited—helped increase the number of women in the field and advance new theoretical approaches and debates in Canadian IR. In terms of the organization of research and teaching, Canadian IR had also followed, by then, a dual process of standardization and diversification, where international relations became organized as a subfield of political science, while it also became more interdisciplinary.[11] Moreover, Canadian IR scholars became more active in developing North American and international research networks, as a growing number joined the International Studies Association, which lead to the creation of a Canadian section in the same-named association in the early 2000s (ISA-Canada). By the late 1990s and early 2000s, these organizational changes and new financial resources translated into the establishment of new (interdisciplinary) institutes dedicated to the study of international relations in Canadian universities.[12] This expanded the number of courses, programs, and positions with an international dimension across the country.

[6] Personal communication, Gordon Mace, telephone interview, June 5, 2017.

[7] Personal communication, Andrew Cooper, telephone interview, June 1, 2017.

[8] This can be illustrated by the decline of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in the following years, which was fostering a decentralized yet significant network of scholars, policy-makers, and broader public interested in international affairs through academic and policy-oriented publications, regional offices, and regular meetings at regional and national levels. Personal communication, Louis Bélanger, Québec, June 25, 2017.

[9] Personal communication. David Black, telephone interview, June 6, 2017.

[10] Such as the North-South Institute or the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

[11] Personal communication, David Haglund, telephone interview, November 23, 2016.

[12] For instance, the Liu Institute for Global Issues was created at the University of British Columbia in 1998 and the Montreal Institute of International Studies at University of Quebec in Montreal in 2002.

Intellectual Debates and Structure in Canadian IR

The end of the Cold War corresponds with several important developments in Canadian IR, most of which were closely associated with intellectual trends in IR scholarship in the United States. However, the end of the Cold War also accentuated certain preexisting theoretical, methodological, and thematic trends that had begun well before that period. One of the main trends was an increasing challenge to the dominance of realism in the study of international relations and foreign policy. Emergent perspectives also put a stronger emphasis on scholarly independence. They were less directly concerned with providing policy advice to practitioners and as such can be seen an intellectual effect of the professionalization of IR scholarship. This process was primarily associated with the rise of constructivism, but also reflected the decreasing pertinence of the distinction between "high" and "low politics" in thinking about international relations. Further, it accompanied the emergence of alternative theoretical approaches, such as bureaucratic politics and liberal institutionalism that had already questioned the preeminent status of realism in international relations.[13]

At the same time, critical and post-positivist scholars challenged the dominance of rationalism and (neo)positivism in Canadian IR. While it is important to recall that conventional positivist science had never been particularly forceful in Canadian IR—especially when compared to the influence it had South of the (Canadian) border (Nossal 2000)—a diversity of nonmainstream approaches received growing attention in Canadian IR by the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. This trajectory might also have been driven by the desire of a new generation of Canadian IR scholars to differentiate itself from predecessors, as some senior observers suggest.[14] More directly yet, the increasing importance and diffusion of critical approaches in Canadian IR can be interpreted as the result of a growing sense of specificity, distance to, and difference from international relations in the United States—a sense that was also institutionalized through ISA-Canada. In practice, this trend saw a growing number of critical Canadian IR scholars use and propagate themes related to international political economy, feminist, post-positivist and neo-Gramscian approaches (Stienstra 1994; Gill 1995), influenced particularly strongly by Cox (1981)—a circumstance that also indicates the specific ways in which the so-called "third great debate" was translated into Canadian IR scholarship.[15]

In thematic terms, the preeminence of strategic issues was increasingly challenged by a focus on economic, trading, and financial issues in Canadian IR, which had been introduced in the late 1970s into the broader field of international relations.[16] While related institutional changes were largely delayed until the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, given poor funding for new research and teaching initiatives, these intellectual trends reinforced the interest in international political economy and themes such as globalization, regionalism, and governance—enough to turn "globalization" into an academic buzzword in Canadian IR scholarship during the 1990s.[17] Overall, however, the majority of theoretical, methodological, and thematic trends that animated the debates among Canadian IR scholars during that period existed prior to the end of the Cold War, which accelerated rather than generated them.

The influence of the end of the Cold War on Canadian IR was thus limited, while institutional factors and the political decisions driving them had a more far-reaching impact on its development. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the

[13] Personal communication, Gordon Mace, telephone interview, June 5, 2017.

[14] Personal communication, David Black, telephone interview, June 6, 2017.

[15] For a recent examination of these trends in Canadian IR, see Grenier and Turenne Sjolander (2013).

[16] Previous works illustrating this attention include Keohane and Nye (1977) and Rosenau (1980).

[17] Personal communication, Stéphane Paquin, Montréal, May 29, 2017.

budgetary restrictions across the Canadian higher education sector and the disconnect between Canadian IR scholars and Canadian policy-makers had, as institutional factors, important roles to play in limiting the influence of global political changes on Canadian IR scholarship. While relatively new themes and approaches flourished in Canadian IR during the 1990s, these trends did not appear to have been directly motivated by the political changes associated with the end of the Cold War. Instead, they seem to have been incentivized, in large measure, by intellectual competition and debates internal to the scholarly field. Seen so, the Canadian case exemplifies how the influence of political changes on the development of IR scholarship can be limited by the more direct impact of changing institutional condition. Institutional factors may also make external political events affect local scholarship in delayed ways.

Expansion and Internationalization in Swiss IR at the End of the Cold War

Political Changes In and Around Switzerland

Switzerland offers a third case of how institutional factors mediate external political changes into local international relations. Unlike either Russia or Canada, Swiss foreign policy traditionally rested (as it still does today) on armed neutrality (i.e., the strategic avoidance of military alliances paired with forceful investments in autonomous defense). In practice, however, Swiss diplomacy operated with a peculiar yet locally meaningful differentiation of foreign relations since the early 1950s. "Political" forms of cooperation (such as alliances) were seen as entangling the nation in others' power politics and thus would undermine the neutrality status of the country. "Technical" cooperation (global trade, participation in universal organizations, and so on) was deemed unproblematic and thus actively pursued. Technical cooperation was also complemented with important humanitarian aid, mediation, and development aid efforts.

This particular foreign policy outlook rested on a self-image according to which Switzerland was peaceful and committed to human development, whereas major powers promoted violence, suffering, and colonialism. Until the 1980s, this reading of international affairs was not open to debate in the domestic political arena (Hagmann 2010). Gaullism, Ostpolitik, and the Helsinki Process gradually affected this vision and the actions it allowed; diluted bloc politics reduced the need for strict neutrality. At the same time, the 1980s brought increasing awareness of collective global challenges, such as pollution, transnational crime, and economic instability. These emerging concepts made international "political" cooperation more acceptable, neutrality policy notwithstanding. In addition, a widely perceived need for more robust international recognition of Switzerland's neutrality stance drove foreign policy-making in the 1980s. As membership in international organizations expanded, Swiss foreign policy became more difficult to justify. Authorities thus sought to bolster Swiss neutrality by multiplying national contributions to international concerns, making particularly strong efforts in arbitration and human rights law. Lastly, foreign, trade, and defense policies also became more important and active matters of public and private sector policy-making by the late 1980s. Whereas foreign affairs had long been under the strong control of the federal government, new issues such as UN membership and trade agreements became subject to much broader public debate and interest group concern.

International affairs thus became more important and debatable in Switzerland by the 1990s, and the end of the Cold War contributed to this process. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact accompanied a notable reduction in defense spending in the country, and it put into question the need for neutrality. Swiss officials did yet not equate the Soviet Union's demise with a necessarily more peaceful future, for great powers still were viewed skeptically. To Swiss officials, history and the

post-WWII settlements showed all too well that "big countries" such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States were not unconditional supporters of neutrality and self-determination, even if they shared liberal values with the Swiss Confederation. The fall of the Berlin Wall thus offered no "end of history" to the Swiss. Indeed, economic globalization and European integration had much more direct effects on the Swiss system, for these provided more immediate policy challenges to the country. Major sectors of the Swiss economy acquired global interests at the time and needed integration into and protection by collective trade, production, and litigation rules. At the same time, continental governance frameworks advanced particularly rapidly. As the European Community countries developed ever more powerful governance regimes, Switzerland was forced to reevaluate its relations with Europe, its quintessential cultural, economic, and political partner.

The coexistence of neutralist, internationalist, and sovereigntist perspectives on world politics made this process unexpectedly difficult in the early 1990s. The presence of competing ideas about the country's position in world politics resulted in major foreign policy initiatives adopted by narrow electoral margins and fragile political alliances. UN membership and adherence to the European Economic Area, for instance, were rejected in 1986 and 1992, respectively, but NATO's Partnership for Peace program was joined in 1995. Peacekeepers were sent abroad in the late 1990s following acceptance of the idea that international stabilization missions may, indeed, be beneficial to Switzerland. Yet the peacekeepers' armament remained denied for years to come, and the United Nations was not joined until 2002. Bilateral trade treaties with Brussels were negotiated and Schengen was joined in 2009, but NATO and EU membership remained nonissues. In the Swiss post–Cold War context, then, European, collective security, global trade, and superpower questions were all intimately interlinked but not in a consistent direction.

Institutional Configurations and Changes in Switzerland

IR teaching and research expanded quickly across Switzerland in the 1980s and 1990s. There had been long-standing interdisciplinary IR expertise in Geneva since the 1920s, given the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and the founding of the Graduate Institute there in 1927. Various international relations and political science programs were established in the francophone parts of the country by the 1960s and 1970s. However, the Swiss German parts—and thus also the great majority—of the country developed this specialization only in the 1980s and 1990s (Bocco, Jütersonke, and Stucki 2013). Given the need for a better grasp of (polarizing) domestic and (integrating) European political processes, expansion and funding of political science research and teaching came to be seen as particularly valuable by that time, leading to the inauguration of numerous new political science departments at Swiss German universities (Linder 1996, 4). Only in select cases were dedicated IR chairs established, however, and if so usually subsumed to political science.[18]

The disciplinary expansion of Swiss IR thus evolved in a distinctive institutional context. Although new positions were created, the academic system remained modeled as a "chair system" at Swiss-German universities, where one senior scholar organizes the research efforts of his or (rarely) her team. This process catered to a mainstreaming of international relations, for only one scholar represented IR expertise at any given university (*the* chair-holder), and that person was usually recruited from a scholarly "median position" (i.e., close to the dominant research paradigm). Beyond professorial appointments, this system also affected academic reproduction: PhD students were tied rather narrowly to the thematic and

[18] Tellingly, there exists no national IR network but there is an IR Working Group within the Swiss Political Science Association (Gottraux, Schoderet, and Voutat 2004).

methodological preferences of the chair-holder. Temporary postdocs, senior researcher, and lecturer positions, by contrast, multiplied rapidly and overproportionately compared to professorial appointments (Armingeon 1997; Voutat 2010). These were fueled by an expanding reservoir of competitive public research funds, whose formal management was yet subsumed to chair-holders—a feature that again reinforced the system's disciplining logics.[19]

Importantly, the university itself became subject to new public management logics in the 1980s and 1990s. Universities acquired budgetary autonomy, but the Swiss government also began to influence them in more focused ways as research funds were distributed directly through the Swiss National Science Foundation. Instead of creating more positions at universities themselves, national project ("soft") money was offered in larger quantities. Authorities sought to foster competition among universities and raise research quality with this funding. Incidentally, however, they created a powerful instrument to "orient" research, for the government decided on the thematic content of the largest funding packages, the multi-year large-scale consortiums.[20] Reflective of the new public policy concerns mentioned earlier, funded research was directed to the study of Swiss foreign policy, North-South relations, trade policy, democracy, and migration. The government also supported mediation programs with research components like Swisspeace and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, founded respectively in 1988 and 1999.

In parallel, there was also an expansion of IR-related research supported by individual ministries. In dedicated multiyear programs, these arrangements created thematic focal points (such as on development aid, mediation, or trade) at specific universities. Overall, the maintenance of the chair system, paired with rapidly increasing funding and large research programs, produced a research system with few independent positions. This also led to a pronounced internationalization of IR research, a characteristic driven by rapidly increasing mobility requirements and the high wages offered by Swiss institutions. In 2014, a mere 43 percent of the permanent (professorial) positions in Switzerland (across all disciplines) were occupied by Swiss nationals, making the Swiss academic system by far the most internationalized in the entire OECD region (SNF Horizonte 2014).

Intellectual Debates and Structures in Swiss IR

Because of the factors discussed above, Swiss IR experienced a rapid but distinct form of expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thematically, it was increasingly oriented towards interest of the public administration: European politics and trade. IR research began to focus strongly on international political economy themes, in part because trade and Europe offered more promising and pressing research avenues than security, a domain within which neutrality continued to forestall significantly new policies. Institutionally, international relations expanded rapidly, especially at Swiss German universities where it was subsumed to political science. Aided by disciplining logics inherent in the "reinforced" Swiss German chair system, Swiss IR gradually turned to the dominant rationalist epistemology and quantitative methodology of political science. International relations was more interdisciplinary and proximate to international organizations in Geneva and some francophone universities, but it became more disciplinary and "scientistic" elsewhere in the country (Gottraux, Schoderet, and Voutat 2004; Bocco, Jütersonke, and Stucki 2013). This penchant was accentuated by the development of an IR program at ETH Zürich,

[19] Between 1970 and 1995, the average age for becoming a political science faculty member in Switzerland—and thus obtaining a permanent work contract—rose from 37 to 45 years. Professorial political science positions rose from 19 in 1986 to 25 in 1991 (Armingeon 1997; Voutat 2010).

[20] In the early 1990s, 75 percent of SNSF funds given to political scientists ran through the National Research Programmes, the Sustainable Public Procurement, and the National Centres of Competence in Research and directed to topics of governmental choice.

the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. Natural science logics had an important influence on social scientists at that technical university, and they became inserted ever more widely into the national IR community through collaborations, postdoc placements, and the propagation of technology-reliant research (such as Big Data analysis later).

The narrowing of Swiss IR to rationalist and quantitative international relations was not uniform by the 1990s, however. Older IR professors often remained attracted to historical and interdisciplinary approaches. Also there were pockets of Marxist political science and international relations at francophone and development-oriented institutes. Still, with Swiss German universities dominating national international relations, changes at the political level gradually channeled Swiss IR to a restrained if not singular epistemology and methodology. This development was so pronounced by the 2000s that IR teaching at Swiss German universities became more rationalist and quantitative than many IR schools in the United States (Hagmann and Biersteker 2014). A senior Zürich-based IR professor authoritatively described the situation as one in which no qualitative researcher could be appointed an IR professor in Switzerland. Publications in US-based political science journals became the primary indicator of IR excellence in this process, and even SNSF grant applications had to be written in English—although English is not one of the four national languages of Switzerland.

Swiss IR hence went through important changes during the period associated with the end of the Cold War. Unlike the Russian case, however, this process did not imply a complete turnover of the field's ideational foundations. Rather, acting out of the particular neutral position of the country, the process resulted in an expansion and internationalization of Swiss IR, which also became subordinated in methodological and epistemological terms to an American brand of political science. This transformation is explained by particular institutional factors, notably increasing federal guidance of scholarly work paired with an indirect reinforcement of the chair system, which limited the diversity of actors to which new funding and opportunities could be channeled. Thanks to changes at the political level, Swiss IR scholarship thrived in the 1990s, but its effects on intellectual discussions were strongly conditioned by the country's institutional choices.

Conclusion

Our brief comparative analysis illustrates the "hinge" mechanism by which institutional factors mediate global political changes into the development of scholarly ideas. Case comparisons show, as Table 1 presents, that major, globally experienced political change—such as the end of the Cold War—does not affect local IRs uniformly. Instead, such change can have surprisingly different effects across the transnational landscape of international relations depending on the way these changes are mediated by research and teaching institutions in different national contexts. Even though more research is needed to illustrate why the "hinges" came to operate in the precise ways they did, this study shows that institutional factors play important mediating roles between broader political events and local intellectual debates and disciplinary development. This insight lends weight to the argument that the institutional embedding of international relations—its configuration, evolution, and varieties—should be addressed more consistently in works on the sociology of international relations (Grenier and Hagmann 2016).

Beyond this broader analytical point, the examination of the Russian, Canadian, and Swiss contexts is also interesting for substantive insights. The case comparisons show similarities and differences in the role of institutional factors and development of IR studies. For example, the subordination of IR to political science appears to be a common trend across the three cases (especially in Canada and Switzerland), which should have significant long-term effects on the opportunities available to IR

Table 1. Configurations and institutional "hinges" in Russia, Canada, and Switzerland

	Russia	Canada	Switzerland
Political factors International positioning, foreign policy	Collapse of state (USSR) and state ideology, economic problems and political instability throughout the 1990s	Refocus on North America, delays in renewing foreign policy, human security agenda in the second half of 1990s	Necessity of international cooperation in the context of European Integration and transnational threats and trade
Institutional factors Organization of research and teaching, budgetary issues	Major budgetary reductions, new private foundations, IR centers, and partnerships with foreign universities, new associations, and journals	Budgetary reductions, few contacts between scholars and policymakers, standardized in political science with interdisciplinary trends	Increased funding, IR expanded across universities but also subordinated to political science, directed research and reinforcement of chair system
Intellectual factors Theoretical, methodological, and thematic debates	Marxism-Leninism is abandoned, western IR theories introduced, debates about Russian IR theory emerge, focus on strategic studies, United Nations, and (late 1990s) globalization	Challenges to realism, especially from constructivism, more critical and post-positivist approaches, increasing focus on international political economy and globalization	Focus on trade and Europe, rationalist epistemology; and quantitative methods in Swiss German universities, interdisciplinary IR in Geneva
"Hinge" functions Translation of political to intellectual factors by institutional elements	Poor funding, pluralization and autonomization of research, and increased cooperation with foreign universities leads to import of Western theories in the 1990s and, in reaction, a "Russification" of intellectual debates	Professionalization and distancing from foreign policy practice foster diffusion of alternative approaches and sense of specificity, whereas budgetary restrictions delay analytical and theoretical change	Changing financial and thematic control by public sector over research, combined with reinforced chair system and subordination to political science facilitates epistemological and methodological narrowing

scholars and the content of IR scholarship. Regional specialization along linguistic lines and thematic or geographical focus were also noticeably similar across our cases, which may affect the coherence of national fields and characterizations of international relations and the way IR scholarship is developed. Our historical perspective on the three cases underlines how the effects of political changes can follow different temporalities, as new trends and theoretical innovations spread according to different institutional contexts and constraints. This is so in all three cases, each of which depicts a different kind of sequencing.

While this article showcases the mediating role of institutions and thus improves our understanding of the development of IR scholarship, its contribution is nevertheless only a first attempt at applying the conceptualization of a "hinge" to cross-country comparison. A study of more recent changes in the evolution of international relations, for example, would need to address transnational mobility and networks more directly since the national focus of the case studies in this article, albeit appropriate to the historical epoch in focus here, will be difficult to maintain. Transnational staffing, funding, and institutions, such as the European International Studies Association, World International Studies Committee, and the International Studies Association, evolved and gained more weight in recent years, connecting more national IR circles with one another. Similarly, further research is required on higher education systems and research logics in political and economic contexts beyond Northern countries, in authoritarian polities, and perhaps also in privatized education settings. Complexifying and contextualizing research on the evolution of international relations is and remains a key necessity in order to avoid universalizing IR narratives.

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