Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping

Elke Krahmann & Anna Leander

Published online: 02 Jan 2019.

Submit your article to this journal ⤤

Article views: 221

View Crossmark data ⤤

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

⊘ OPEN ACCESS | Check for updates

Contracting Security: Markets in the Making of MONUSCO Peacekeeping

Elke Krahmann [iD] [a] and Anna Leander[b]

[a]Department of Political Science, University of Kiel, Kiel, Germany; [b]Department of International Relations and Political Science, The Graduate Institute, Genève, Switzerland

ABSTRACT
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are increasingly contracted to provide security in international peacekeeping missions. Yet, we know very little about the practical implications of this development. How do PMSCs reinforce and shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for UN missions and their host populations? To answer these questions, we explore the operational, representative and regulatory security practices in the UN operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). Our findings show how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign security practices can have unintended negative consequences. Specifically, we observe that the participation of security firms in MONUSCO's security management contributes to three developments: the differentiation of security between staff and locals, the hardening of MONUSCO's security posture, and the perpetuation of insecurity through the emergence of a local security economy. Contracted security is thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians and facilitate a sustainable peace.

The contracting of commercial military and security services in support of multilateral peacekeeping operations has been one of the focal points of the contestations surrounding the rapid growth of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs). For early advocates of privatized military services, the potential of drawing on markets to create peace was a key consideration. In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, Doug Brooks, then president of an industry organization called the International Peace Operations Association, argued that the world did have the option to 'write a check to end a war' and that contemporary military companies were more like the 'messiah' than the 'mercenary'.[1] Inversely, for those critical of privatization the

---

spectre of a market that would make wars by proxy not only an abstract possibility, but a common reality was extremely worrying.[2] The strong normative overtones of this discussion brought former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan to the conclusion that the world was 'not ready to privatize of peace'.[3]

Paradoxically, the normativity of the debate has hampered academic and public engagement with security contracting in the context of peacekeeping operations. While contracting has been taking place in UN missions we have very limited knowledge of its practical implications in the field. It took until 2010 for the UN Working Group on Mercenaries to report in an official UN document that the UN itself was 'using the services of private military and security personnel in some of the conflict zones in which it is engaged'.[4] This admission started a wave of institutional self-reflection.[5] It also paved the way for the adoption of new UN guidelines for armed and, later, also unarmed security contractors.[6] However, the UN's reports and guidelines remain narrowly focussed and technical, skirting the broader issue of how contracting may contribute to reconfiguring security within peacekeeping.[7] The academic and political literature, on the other hand, has been focussed on normative questions and debates over matters of principle, such as the morality of hiring PMSCs or problems with the transparency, accountability and control over military and security contractors in multilateral peace and stability operations.[8]

In this article, we seek to steer clear of the Scylla of narrow technicality and the Charybdis of normative generality. Instead we analyze empirically the implications of security contracting for UN peacekeeping, specifically for the security it provides. By doing so, we aim to answer two questions: How do contractors shape security management within UN peacekeeping operations, and what are the consequences for the security of mission staff and host populations? These questions call for two caveats. First, they do not explain the perceived failures of UN peacekeeping, generally, or MONUSCO,[9] specifically, but aim to increase our understanding of the role

---

[1]Brooks, *Messiahs or Mercenaries?*; Brooks, "Write a Cheque, End a War."

[2]Bures, "Private Military Companies"; Spearin, "Between Public Peacekeepers and Private Forces."

[3]Annan, "The Secretary-General Reflects on 'Intervention.'"

[4]UN, *Use of Mercenaries*, 10 (accessed 2 June 2015).

[5]UN, *Use of Private Security. Report of the Secretary-General* (accessed 2 June, 2015); UN, *Reports on the Department of Safety and Security* (accessed 2 June, 2015).

[6]UN, *UN Security Management. Security Management System; UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual.* As of 2016, the UN has also developed draft guidelines for the use of unarmed security companies. See http://www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/23rd%20IASMN%20final%20report_11_03_2016.pdf (accessed 22 August 2016).

[7]Krahmann, "The UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards."

[8]Pattison, "Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect"; Pattison, *The Morality of Private War*; Pingeot, *Dangerous Partnership*; Pingeot, *Contracting Insecurity*; Spearin, "Between Public Peacekeepers and Private Forces"; Bures, "Private Military Companies."

[9]Williams, "Lessons Unlearned"; Koko, "MONUC and the Quest"; Holt and Berkman, "Protecting Civilians"; Clark, "UN Peacekeeping."

that security contracting may play in giving rise to such assessments. Second, the effects of contracting cannot be separated analytically from broader UN security management processes and structures. We, therefore, approach these questions from a practice theoretical perspective. This perspective is particularly fruitful for our analysis for three main reasons. The focus on practices allows us to investigate the meshing of public and private security management in UN peacekeeping in three forms of practices: operation, representation and regulation.[10] Second, adopting this approach allows us to recognize that seemingly mundane, uncontroversial practices can have as serious consequences as the extreme behaviour and scandals that are commonly the focus of debates about PMSCs. Finally, practice theory makes it possible to acknowledge that the effects of UN security contracting cannot be conceived in terms of direct and singular causality. Rather, like speech acts,[11] bureaucratic processes,[12] images,[13] artefacts,[14] or technologies[15] constitute, re-produce, enact, or perform security so do the hybrid security practices described above.[16] Practices re-produce how interests are defined, how situations are made sense of, and what strategies appear fruitful to the UN mission staff and the security contractors they rely on. Our analysis directs attention to how the everyday, complex, contested and fragmented practices of operation, representation and regulation surrounding the employment of PMSCs in UN peace and stability missions contribute to reproducing not only security, but also insecurity. The overall argument we make is that security contracting is involved in rendering MONUSCO's practices ever less capable of producing what the organization and its mandate would like to achieve: increased security for UN Staff and for the local population.

Contribution and Method

By investigating the role of PMSCs in MONUSCO's security practices this article illustrates how practice theory can contribute new insights to two strands of literature. One concerns the contracting of security in regional

---

[10]Practice theoretical approaches in their many variants engage reflexively with the implications of categories or category effects as Bourdieu ("Authorized Language," 164) puts it and hence make these effects and the categories themselves endogenous rather than exogenous to the analysis. This makes it possible to explore the evolving "fields", assemblages and/or regimes of knowledge practice (Leander, "Understanding US National Intelligence").

[11]Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization."

[12]Bigo et al., *Mapping of the Field.*

[13]Weber, "Encountering Violence."

[14]Leander, "What Do Codes of Conduct Do?"; Leander, "Technological Agency."

[15]Amoore, *The Politics of Possibility.*

[16]Reproduce, enact and preform have all been used to conceptualize securitization. This is not to claim that they are generally the same. Obviously, they are anchored in different theoretical traditions and therefore have different connotations and meanings.

conflicts and multilateral interventions. The other regards the marketization of UN peacekeeping.

Private security studies is a flourishing field.[17] Early research focussed on the emergence of so-called 'mercenary' companies like Sandline International and Executive Outcomes and their active participation in hostilities in Sierra Leone and Angola.[18] It expanded significantly following the extensive use of PMSCs by the United States military during the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the well-known Blackwater incident.[19] Today, military and security contracting has become widespread among industrialized nations, including not only the United States and the United Kingdom, but also a growing number of continental European countries.[20] Questions about the legitimacy, regulation, transparency, accountability and control of PMSCs have figured centrally in these studies. However, with the expansion of commercial security services to ever-new areas, such as border control, banking and cybersecurity, the questions have also changed.[21] How do nationality, gender and public-private assemblages govern the international market for private military and security services?[22] Moreover, what are the practical implications of the marketization of security? While the literature is exceedingly diverse, it has demonstrated across contexts that contracting security is *not* simply a matter of shifting who provides security services. Contracting changes how and what kind of security is provided, to whom and on what terms.[23] However, there are also significant gaps in the private security studies literature. A major gap concerns the employment of PMSCs by international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and the European Union. Research about the extent, practices and consequences of security contracting by international organizations, specifically the hire of PMSCs by UN peacekeeping operations, is still in its infancy.[24] As noted above, several publications on UN security contracting address fundamental and ethical questions. Little do we know empirically about how the involvement of PMSCs in UN peacekeeping impacts on the security of the missions and host populations. This article aims to close this gap.

---

[17]Abrahamsen and Leander, *Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies.*
[18]Cilliers and Mason, *Peace, Profit or Plunder?*; Francis, "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone"; Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability."
[19]Avant, *The Market for Force*; Krahmann, *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*; Kinsey, *Corporate Soldiers*; Stanger, *One Nation under Contract.*
[20]Leander, *Commercialising Security in Europe.*
[21]Bures and Carrapico, *Security Privatization*; Dunn, "Cyber Security and Private Actors"; Thumala et al., "A Tainted Trade?"; Joachim and Schneiker, "Of 'True Professionals'"; Schütze, "Simulating, Marketing, and Playing War."
[22]Eicher, *Gender and Private Security*; Williams, "Global Security Assemblages"; Leander, "The Politics of Whitelisting."
[23]Krahmann, "Security"; Krahmann, "Beck and Beyond"; Leander, "The Market for Force."
[24]Østensen, "In the Business of Peace"; Pingeot, *Dangerous Partnership*; Pingeot, *Contracting Insecurity*; Krahmann, "NATO Contracting in Afghanistan"; Krahmann and Friesendorf, *The Role of Private Security Companies.*

By addressing this question, we also add to the analysis of marketization in the context of multilateral humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping operations more broadly. There is ample discussion of the creation and unintended consequences of markets in the humanitarian field. Markets are refashioning the funding of NGOs, the careers of their employees and their interactions with surrounding societies.[25] UN missions are giving rise to 'peacekeeping economies' where sex, security and domestic services are sold to international staff and peacekeepers.[26] However, the significance of security contracting by UN agencies is often neglected.[27] Fassin, for example, posits a 'three way relationship' between the military forces, the victims and the NGOs in humanitarian missions, leaving out the place of markets and companies.[28] By investigating the UN's collaboration with PMSCs we illustrate how the organization contributes to creating regional security industries and how this, in turn, shapes local perceptions of humanitarian and stability operations.

As our case study, we have selected the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, 2010-) because it is one of the longest and largest UN peacekeeping operations to date.[29] Moreover, studies of security provision in the DRC indicated that commercial security plays a central role, for example, around extractive industries, residential housing areas or villages.[30] This made it seem likely that the same would hold for MONUSCO's security management. To investigate the operational, representational and regulatory security practices involving PMSCs and their implications we draw on a heterogeneous archive, including primary sources such as UN documents, manuals, budgets, as well as interviews. In addition, we examine secondary material such as the accounts of ethnographic field work, reports by NGOs active in the region and relevant academic, policy-oriented articles and reports.[31]

---

[25]Cooley and Ron, "The NGO Scramble."

[26]Jennings and Bøås, "Transactions and Interactions"; Aning and Edu-Afful, "Unintended Impacts"; Jennings "Service, Sex and Security."

[27]Autesserre, Peaceland.

[28]Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, chapter title and 227.

[29]MONUSCO succeeded the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 1999–2010) with an extended mandate. See UN Security Council (2010) Resolution 1925, S-RES-1925, 28 May.

[30]Schouten, "Political Topographies"; Hönke, Transnational Companies and Security Governance; De Goede, Private and Public Security; Higate and Utas, Private Security in Africa.

[31]We are in other words offering an ethnographic account that is not based on long termed sustained fieldwork but that is increasingly common form of research for documenting practices. To distinguish it from classical field-work based ethnographies Johns (Non-Legality in International Law, 21–6) refers to it as "quasi-ethnography". Considering how common it has become also in ethnography and anthropology we would be less willing to add the quasi qualifier as this reproduces a static and conservative rendering of ethnographic method (Czarniawska, "Why I Think Shadowing"; Gupta and Ferguson, "Discipline and Practice").

Our findings highlight how seemingly uncontroversial, even benign operational, representational and regulatory practices can have unintended negative consequences. In contrast to the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, security contracting in MONUSCO takes the form of local and unarmed security guards. Its operational and representational security practices are focussed on the protection of UN compounds. The use of PMSCs is regulated through UN guidelines and local laws. However, the implications of these mundane and responsible practices for the kind of security that MONUSCO provides are surprisingly problematic. We observe that UN security contracting contributes in important ways not only to the differentiation and hardening of security, but also to the perpetuation of insecurity in UN peacekeeping. PMSCs are thus involved in reproducing forms of security that are in some ways diametrically opposed to the aims of the mission to protect civilians, reduce the place of armed insecurity and facilitate a sustainable peace.[32]

MONUSCO's Security Contracting Practices

We begin our account by examining how contracting has become part and parcel of MONUSCO's security management. To do so, we distinguish between three areas of practices: operational security provision, representational security practices and practices regarding the regulation of security services.

Providing Security

In MONUSCO, as in other complex humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, security contracting is essential to the operation. It deals with tasks that, often, overstretched UN peacekeeping forces cannot or will not take on. How security is contracted is shaped by UN Security Risk Management policies in which security has steadily gained importance since the decision of the UN to switch from a policy of 'when to leave' to one of 'how to stay'.[33] The scale and implications of security contracting for MONUSCO are easily overlooked. Security contracts are not immediately visible in UN procurement information, and their weight in the contracting total is relatively small. To support MONUC and its successor mission, MONUSCO, the UN awarded purchase orders amounting to a total value of US$ 642 million between 2006 and 2015.[34] The number of security services and

---

[32]See UN, "MONUSCO Background." For a discussion of the mission's aims see Boutellis, "From Crisis to Reform"; Clark, "UN Peacekeeping"; Holt and Berkman, "Protecting Civilians on the Ground"; Koko, "MONUC and the Quest."
[33]UN, *CEB – United Nations System*, 8; UN, *Comprehensive Report*, 4–5.
[34]UN, *Procurement Division*; UN, *UNDP – United Nations System*.

security equipment purchase orders awarded ranged between 7 and 20 per year in the same period with a total value of about US\$ 37 million. Although the share of security contracting to total contracting has quadrupled between 2006 and 2015, increasing from around 2.6% for MONUC to above 11.3% for MONUSCO, it appears limited compared to other budget items.

However, these figures downplay the actual scale of security contracting in two ways. The figures only include contracts explicitly classified as 'security services' and 'security equipment', while prime contracts for multiple services with security components or contracts for security equipment, involving maintenance, operation or use, are listed under other headings. Second, since UN peacekeeping missions do not have dedicated security service budgets, security expenses are frequently 'hidden' in other parts of the budget. Even if the published data did account more fully for the security contracting taking place, the figures would probably seem comparatively small because services are inexpensive compared to more costly budget items, such as construction and real-life support.

A more comprehensive way of assessing the importance of security contracting in MONUSCO is to consider the extent to which it has become part of operational practices. Due to the assignment of high risk levels to specific regions in the DRC, security has become a fundamental requirement. It is structured into concentric circles with distinct security practices, responsibilities and effects. Occasionally UN premises are co-located with individual peacekeeping contingents and hence benefit from their protection. Since co-location with military contingents contributes to blurring the boundaries between the UN's civilian and military operations, many civilian UN agencies consider a degree of separation from the peacekeeping contingents beneficial for their operations. Most UN premises are therefore not co-located with the military components of the mission. Peacekeeping contingents typically refuse to carry out guarding duties at these locations, and local police or national military forces are not allowed within their inner circle. The consequence is that individual UN operations and agencies usually award their own security contracts and pay for security from whatever budgets they have available. Providing security for UN missions has turned into a major obligation, warranted by the security risks facing staff. UN staff in Goma for example, has been 'obliged to hire private security at their homes and offices and are only allowed to move through the highly-secured spaces of Goma'.[35]

Another feature, which characterizes the operational practices of MONUSCO, is that security contracting is distinctly local. As Table 1 demonstrates, only two of the five biggest security contractors, Nowar and HESCO, are non-regional and they both provide specialized equipment, such as military technology or protective barriers. The protective security companies are

---

[35]Schouten, "Political Topographies", 70.

Table 1 . Main security contractors (2006–2015).

Top 5	Value USD	Top 5	No. contracts
KK Security Congo SPRL / Rwanda SARL	15,730,058	KK Security Congo SPRL / Rwanda SARL	33
Delta Protection SPRL	14,601,190	Delta Protection SPRL	24
Magenya-Protection & Gardiennage	4,382,271	Magenya-Protection & Gardiennage	12
Hesco Bastion Limited (US)	1,337,262	Ultimate Security LTD	9
Askar Security Services Limited (Uganda)	491,634	*Nowar Security Equipment GmbH* (DE)	5

Note: Non-regional companies in italics.

all African, and their security guards are reportedly local.[36] The explanations for this include a range of things such as the fact that regional and local employees are cost competitive, interested in working in the area, and that they had the 'local knowledge', 'competence' and networks necessary to provide security effectively. There is also an articulated UN policy of 'local preference' intended to favour the local economy.

Finally, the local character of security contracting is reinforced by a close involvement of security firms with the local armed and police forces that provide security at the outer circle. By law, security guards in the DRC must be unarmed. This means that security contractors often make arrangements with public police or military forces so that they can be called upon when there is a need. Usually, private security companies set up arrangements for paying, training and/or equipping a specifically dedicated group within the public forces that they can draw upon.[37] As Mr. Sebera of the Kenyan security company KK Security explained, 'We pay an extra "tax" so that way we are sure that there are people [from the public armed forces/police] who will work with us … We train them to make sure they understand our way of working and have the competencies we expect from them'.[38]

In sum, the way security contracting is inscribed in MONUSCO's operational practices are as distant as they could possibly be from the image of the international Blackwater guards shooting their way through a crowded Nisour Square in Baghdad while protecting VIPs. In the DRC, security contracting is mainly unarmed, local and low key. At the same time, it has become part of every aspect and activity of a UN that is focussed on 'how to stay' in a hostile environment in order to carry out its peacekeeping mission and humanitarian work.

---

[36]These conclusions were confirmed in interviews in which we were told that MONUSCO had only awarded security guarding contracts to six local or regional companies: KK Security (DRC), Magenya-Protection & Gardiennage (DRC), Ultimate Security (United Republic of Tanzania), Saracen Uganda (Uganda), Askar Security Services (Uganda) and Delta Protection (DRC). Interview with OCHA staff, New York, 3 April 2014.

[37]For more detailed accounts of how these arrangements work, see De Goede, *Private and Public Security*.

[38]Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.

Representing Deterrence

Contracted security has also become part and parcel of the way the UN mission is representing itself, that is of its representational practices. Security contractors protect the mission and in so doing become a very visible part of it. Indeed, UN policies expect private security guards to provide 'a visible deterrent to potential attackers (raising their perceived risk from targeting the protected target)'.[39] This introduces a deep-seated ambiguity at the heart of MONUSCO's representational practices. While deterrence is wanted to avoid the use of force, it presents a visual image of distrust and violence to the outside world. Deterrence takes effect and is made visible specifically in the presentation of security guards and the spaces reserved for the mission. As Schouten observes 'security guards in military-looking outfits bar anything that does not look like a 4×4 jeep from entering barb-wired, watch-towered and fenced humanitarian spaces'.[40] While the companies emphasize the non-violent nature of their security practices, backed up by training, technologies and local knowledge, they indicate that they are *also* capable of responding by using force if this should prove necessary. A photo on the homepage of Askar Security, for example, shows rows of security guards, dressed in dark blue uniforms, marching in what looks like a military parade. Together with the name of the company – Askar means soldier in Arabic and Swahili – the image leaves little doubt that the company can respond with force. Deterrence is also apparent in the public space into which the mission extends through the presence of its staff or offices. As a reporter writes from Goma, where MONUSCO has an important base: '[the entrance to the city] is guarded with an eye towards maximum intimidation, and despite its reputation for bribery and lawlessness, the airport is ringed with symbols of authority […] the inner perimeter is surrounded by security guards, high walls and barbed wire'.[41]

Finally, deterrence and distrust run through the UN's representations of its local security environment and security contractors in the online security training course, which all UN staff travelling or working in the field are obliged to take. On the one hand, the training recalls the violence that makes deterrence and prudence necessary and justifies contracted security. 'We face ongoing dangers to our personal safety and security and are at substantial risk of being targeted because of our heightened visibility as representatives of the international community', argues the security course, showing the photo of a room with a smashed window and turned over shelves, like after a blast.[42] On the other hand, the material communicates a deep-seated

---

[39]UN, *UN Security Management System. Security Management*, 4.
[40]Schouten, "Political Topographies", 70.
[41]Rosen, "A Day in the DRC."
[42]UN, BSITF II, Module 1 – Introduction: Why This Course?

distrust of the local population and public security forces as well as the UN's own contracted security guards. 'Remember, you are responsible and accountable for your safety and security'.[43] An illustrative story tells of a UN officer and his driver being taken hostage by 'guards' at a refugee camp.[44] The message is that neither local police and armed forces nor the civilians, which the UN seeks to help, can be trusted. The online course teaches that even the local driver, house keeper, hotel receptionist and private security guard have to be watched because their behaviour can endanger the UN staff by being unconcerned or idle.[45]

In short, MONUSCO's security contracting is deeply enmeshed with visible representations of deterrence. Deterrence as representational practice is always about recalling the threats, violence, insecurity and anxiety that make deterrence necessary. It takes over and dominates the communication of the, by law unarmed, security contractors in the DRC in ways reproducing a schizophrenic image of the mission which, although MONUSCO is there to embody security and stability, manifests a fundamental distrust vis-a-vis their local surroundings.

Regulating Responsibly

Last, but not least, contracting has generated a layer of regulatory practices which have come to characterize MONUSCO's security management. Regulation of its security contractors is a core concern for the UN. It has linked the mission to a decentralized and fragmented web of rules and regulations, including formal UN regulations, the contracting practices of individual UN agencies, national and international laws, and voluntary international principles and codes of conduct guiding security contracting.

The sensitivity surrounding the hiring of armed security guards in conflict contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan has made the UN increasingly attentive to the regulation of contract security staff. Following years with rather vague requirements that 'the guards shall be properly trained and licensed, in accordance with local law, to perform security services, including but not limited to, the carrying of firearms',[46] the UN adopted extensive new 'Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies' in 2012 and expanded its regulations to unarmed guards in 2016.[47]

However, to be effective, regulatory standards must be reflected in the work and organization of the contracted security companies. MONUSCO has

---

[43]UN, BSITF II, Module 7 – Your Personal Safety: Security Awareness and Prevention.
[44]UN, BSITF II, Module 7 – Your Personal Safety: Case Study – Hostage Taking.
[45]UN, BSITF II, Module 7 – Your Personal Safety: Watching the Watchers.
[46]UN, *United Nations Field Security Handbook*, 0–4.
[47]UN, *UN Security Management. Security Management Operations; UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual; Draft Guidelines for the Use of Unarmed Security Companies.*

placed the responsibility for training and equipment with the contractors. This is not to say that the mission has disregarded its responsibilities. On the contrary, the UN has sought to pressure companies into living up to strict regulatory standards. In addition to being as specific as possible with regards to requirements in the contracts, UN security officers also control the suitability of security companies through references from previous clients, general background checks and by verifying a company's ability to vet, select, train, supervise, equip and manage a guard force. The new UN regulations have provided additional guidance and standards, for example, in the form of training subjects, lists for new recruits, and guards in service.[48] When a UN security contractor was convicted for criminal association by a DRC court in 2015, the UN police component of MONUSCO carried out a two-day 'training session for 200 agents, representing twelve private security companies'.[49]

The pressure to comply with UN requirements as well as national and international regulations is reflected in the care all the companies take in flagging that they are managing their activities properly and professionally. The main MONUSCO security contractors claim that they follow Congolese law, international training programmes and provide services in conformity with International Standards Organization (ISO) standards. Some companies such as KK Security, Askar Security and Delta Protection even signed up to the voluntary International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) to underscore the point.[50]

Despite these efforts, the regulation of PMSCs is not always effective. In addition to the weaknesses within the UN guidelines, international and Congolese law as well as industry self-regulation discussed in the literature,[51] the fragmentation and devolution of security contractor regulation present major problems for MONUSCO because they entail a decentralization of regulatory responsibility. Not only the Congolese government and multiple UN agencies, but also the security companies themselves, are responsible for implementing security standards within MONUSCO. This is causing tensions when the behaviour of companies is questioned and criticized. Although the local population generally reports that the behaviour of UN security contractors is professional and courteous, the contracting of local security firms is sometimes alleged to feed into the informality and corruption of the local economy.[52] There is a tradition to work according to a 'wink, wink and nudge, nudge' logic where 'people give contracts and jobs to their friends'.[53] Moreover, as

[48]Ibid., 9.
[49]UN, *Use of Private Security*.
[50]ICoCA, Membership, https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?private_security_companies=companies&op=Search&view_type=list&form_id=_search_for_members_filter_form.
[51]Chesterman and Lehnardt, *From Mercenaries to Market*; Krahmann, "The UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards"; DeWinter-Schmitt, *Montreux Five Years On*.
[52]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.

in the rest of the world, local and regional PMSCs invite influential personalities to their boards, with the consequence that some companies have been linked to controversial political or armed groups.[54] One example is the inclusion of Modest Makabusa on the board of KK Security. The Makabusa family has close connections with the Rwandan government and groups that are sponsored by it.[55] Similarly, Kellen Kayonga, co-founder of Askar Security, is the sister-in-law of General Salim Saleh, a younger brother of President Yoweri Museveni, who has set up a system of family rule in Uganda.[56]

As the preceding discussion of the operational, representational and regulatory practices shows, security contractors play a major role in the UN's security management in the DRC. Security firms protect the innermost of MONUSCO's concentric circles of security, collaborate with police and armed forces to secure the outer perimeters, support the UN's strategy of visible deterrence and are expected to assist the UN in regulating security in a responsible, but decentralized fashion. In the next section, we reflect on the implications of these practices for security in the DRC.

Security Implications in the DRC

MONUSCO's security contractors are enmeshed in operational, representational and regulatory security management practices of the organizations and these have major implications for security in the DRC. Specifically, we observe three effects: the differentiation of security, the hardening of the MONUSCO's security posture and the perpetuating of insecurity.

Differentiating Security

Foremost, the preceding practices are contributing to a differentiation of security in the sense of rending the security of some far more important than that of others. As has been pointed out in the literature, this is an almost inevitable consequence of turning security into a service to be bought and sold in markets.[57] Only some can pay for security and benefit from it. In the DRC, it is primarily the inhabitants of 'Peaceland', i.e. UN staff, who can afford and have access to security.[58] Security contracting within MONUSCO reinforces and helps to enact the tendency of the UN to seal its missions off from local populations in ways that clearly signal the superior significance of the UN's own security. MONUSCO and its staff are

---

[53]Interview with Doug Brooks, Consultant, former Director of ISOA, 5 March 2014.
[54]For a discussion of these networks in general terms see Oder, "Understanding the Complexities" or Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory*.
[55]Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory*.
[56]*The Independent*, "Family Rule in Uganda."
[57]Krahmann, "Security: Collective Good"; Leander, "The Market for Force".
[58]Autesserre, *Conflict Resolution*.

increasingly finding themselves in fortified compounds and private residencies with high walls, barbed wire, protective glazing, few public entrances and adjacent watchtowers. In this they follow the trend of other international missions across the world towards 'bunkerization'.[59]

Contracted security plays a central yet mostly neglected role in bringing about this trend.[60] Security companies usually design the risk scenarios and develop the response plans.[61] They also tend to provide the equipment and staff necessary to carry them out. PMSCs are increasingly involved in setting the standards for how much security of what kind is warranted.[62] The result is an increasingly dense wall of security around anyone who can afford to pay for it, including humanitarian missions such as MONUSCO. The local security guards form a protective belt around what increasingly appears as bunkers, as well described in work on security provision in these contexts.[63] The security contractors impose a range of strictly regulated security routines at the gates. Anyone wishing access to the mission has to provide a well-founded purpose and only after verification is allowed entry into the compound where those whose security is clearly prioritized reside.

On the outside, beyond the protected area, is the Congolese population whose security MOUNSCO is supposed to ensure and who are reportedly empowered by the mission. The local population, however, is unambiguously excluded from the safe areas of the privileged, at least in normal times. When violence becomes immediate and pressing, citizens are sometimes given access to the compounds or force themselves into them, with the consequence that these become shelters of sorts. Thus, Protection Gateway reports:

> UN peacekeeping compounds, bases and their environs – no matter how rudimentary or ill-prepared – often become the site for impromptu camps and *de facto* 'safe areas' in times of crisis when vulnerable civilians gravitate towards them seeking the protection and sanctuary of the UN.[64]

This is sometimes advanced as one of the justifications for and potential advantages of these bunker-like structures. However, the access to privileged security is temporary, uncertain and fragile. The bunkerized compounds are designed mainly for safeguarding MONUSCO and mission staff from the threats of its surroundings. For locals in Bukavu, where the UN has a major base, it is clear that the contracted security guards are only there to

---

[59]Duffield, "Risk Management."
[60]It is surprising that even detailed analysis of this trend and its implications overlook the significance of companies and markets in generating it. Lisa Smirl for example does not delve on the companies that make and market that cars, compounds and hotels she argues is re-shaping humanitarianism. Smirl, *Spaces of Aid*.
[61]Krahmann, "Beck and Beyond."
[62]Leander, "The Politics of Legal Arrangements."
[63]Hönke, *Transnational Companies*; Schouten, "Political Topographies."
[64]Hunt, "Peacekeepers and the Protection."

defend the mission and that they contribute nothing to the protection of Congolese citizens.[65]

This differentiation of security has contributed to a negative image of the UN in regions of the DRC with high levels of violence.[66] It has also weakened MONUSCO's ability to carry out its mission and even posed dangers to it. In the province Bandundu, 68% of the population did not feel safe even with the presence of UN.[67] In Ituri, a village with a large MONUSCO base, a man reported: 'We don't really have any relationship with them [MONUSCO] because we don't have any contact with them. They come here to secure us from the war, but they always come late'.[68] In Bukavu, some citizens had the impression that the UN was mainly concerned with its own safety and less with that of the local population.[69]

The resentment among Congolese citizens is such that it sometimes ushers in attacks on the UN mission. In 2008, protesters threw stones and rocks at the fortified MONUSCO headquarters in Goma, described earlier in this article. They also assembled outside three other UN compounds in eastern Congo because they believed that UN peacekeeping forces had not done enough to protect civilians against rebel leader, Laurent Nkunda, when he attempted to seize the city.[70] In 2012 there were again 'protests against perceived U.N. inaction' after the M23 rebel movement took Goma.[71] One newspaper reported that 'Across the east of the country, angry mobs surrounded U.N. positions, threw stones at aid workers and burned U.N. compounds. Asked what they thought of MONUSCO, a group of young men standing by the shore of Lake Kivu in Goma cried out in unison: "Useless"'.[72] In sum, the differentiation between UN staff and local civilians, which is reproduced through MONUSCO security contracting and the associated operational, representational and regulatory practices, has major consequences for how security is experienced in the DRC.

Hardening Security

MONUSCO's security management practices have also contributed to a hardening of security where technology and gear occupy a central place. The contracting of security reinforces this development by making available the sophisticated equipment that peacekeeping contingents from, mostly,

---

[65]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
[66]For regular surveys among populations in the Kivus on their security and MONUC/MONUSCO's role, see Oxfam, "Waking the Devil," Oxfam, "Women and Children First"; Oxfam, "We Are Entirely Exploitable"; Oxfam, "Commodities of War"; Oxfam, "In the Balance."
[67]BERCI, "Peacekeeping Operations," 18.
[68]Oxfam, *Commodities of War*, 18.
[69]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
[70]*CBC News*, "UN Helicopters Sent."
[71]*Al Jazeera*, "UN Test Combat Brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo."
[72]Hatcher and Perry, "Defining Peacekeeping Downward."

poorer countries do not have. Moreover, the security industry actively promotes the acquisition of innovative technologies for its own profit-motivated reasons since equipment is usually much more expensive than services. In the DRC, the hardening of security is also tied to the need of unarmed security contractors to deter risks by means of visible and operational references to the possibility to use or to call in the use of force. One mechanism through which this is taking place is through the way contracting has upgraded the technology and equipment of the local police forces. Contracted security guards in the DRC have paid, trained and equipped police units so that they can provide harder forms of security when and if needed. Equally central are the less obvious processes of security hardening. The deterrence approach has resulted in something akin to a race for the best defensive security equipment. The omnipresent towers, armoured vehicles, and surveillance drones are the visible expression. Even more banally, security contractors wear militarized uniforms to impress their deterrence function on their surroundings. The uniforms have to be different from those of the military or police forces as well as from those of the UN peacekeeping contingents. However, they usually mimic a military style and they are of considerable importance for the contractors. 'You would not believe how important these uniforms are. It seems as one the key reasons for people to work […] I think it is about status. You become a someone with a bit of power'[73] was one observer's view on it.

The presence of uniformed contractors certainly reinforces the emphasis on a gadgetized, technologized security that recalls and makes possible to call up more forceful forms of paramilitary security. A striking example of the extent to which security has hardened is the faith placed in the potential of the first 'humanitarian drone' leased from the Italian firm Selex ES belonging to the Finmeccanica group.[74] It is operated by 'international crews and drone consultants, some of them American veterans, [who] have moved to Goma to work as contractors'.[75] The five drones are supposed to be deployed to help MONUSCO monitor the terrain so that it can more effectively intervene when necessary. Besides relaying information about what is happening in an inaccessible terrain, the local population is to be educated about the fact that it is now being observed and therefore can no longer act with impunity. This drone policy enshrines the hardening of security. The population is observed at distance and recast as suspect of horrific violence in the inaccessible conditions of the jungle that justify keeping it at arms-length. The educational programme intended to inculcate restraint but also to counter this casting has yet to be implemented let alone have a demonstrable effect.[76]

---

[73]Interview with Thomas Mandrup, Assistant Professor, Institute for Strategy of the Danish Defence Academy, 28 February 2014.
[74]Mackey, "Let Slip the Drones of Peace."
[75]Oakford, "Drones, Drones, Everywhere."

The faith placed in the 'humanitarian drone' in spite of this, as well as the investment in it in the first place, is a strong indicator of the status technologies, and especially defensive technologies, have come to occupy in security practices.

The hardening of security accentuates the differentiation of security discussed above. In addition, the contracting of hard security redistributes resources, focus and energy towards commercial technology and gear rather than soft skills, information exchanges and the management of good relations with the civilian population. A common complaint among the Congolese is thus the lack of direct engagement between the UN and locals, which contributes to the slowness of MONUSCO responses to attacks. The growing reliance on security technologies supports this approach of providing security at a distance. Moreover, the implications of defensive, security and surveillance technologies for basic rights, privacy and politics and the possible need to regulate these, that are intensely discussed elsewhere, have received little attention from MONUSCO.

Perpetuating Insecurity

MONUSCO's policy of contracting local and regional security firms also plays a role in the perpetuation of insecurity in the DRC. Security has come to occupy a core and expanding place in the local economy and hence the livelihood of local populations becomes invested in insecurity. 'We provide jobs to locals' as the director of one security company put it.[77] Also local populations view UN security contracting as an important source of employment.[78]

Most obviously security contracting sustains and bolsters the position of the security profession. For one, some security professionals are drawn from the local armed forces and police and hence facilitate an expansion of the number of people working with security. The public forces also often depend, directly and indirectly, on payment from security companies who rely on their services as they cannot themselves carry weapons or engage in law enforcement. This contributes to the upgrading of the forces as well as the maintenance of a force larger than would otherwise have been the case. However, it also raises questions about the interdependence between the public security forces, which are considered corrupt by many Congolese, and MONUSCO.[79] Most controversially, the local security industry recruits people who have gained their experience from or retain connections to the many armed groups in the region. This is an obvious concern because armed groups and their members can finance themselves through this

---

[76]Crowe, "United Nations' Drones"; African Spotlight. "UN Drone Crashes."
[77]Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.
[78]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
[79]Ibid.

market. The UN therefore forbids the employment of members of armed groups of any kind by its contractors. However, the rules for vetting are strict but also difficult to implement. In the DRC, there are many armed groups with fluid structures and changing memberships. They do not provide discharge papers, which are essential in a context where many people move between the various armed groups and civilian life. Even the discharge papers that exist are unreliable, including those documenting participation in the CONADER or UEPNDDR programmes.[80] Security companies, try to compensate for this. They work with the national intelligence agency (Agence Nationale de Renseignements[81]), which keeps lists of people that security companies can use when vetting new staff. However, these lists are often incomplete. The most common way of recruitment is to rely on reputation and networks. As a company representative explains: 'We have to rely on our local managers. They know who people are'.[82]

In addition, security companies compete for project funding and contracts with other organizations that work in the region. Security companies may not only try to attract donor funding for security projects, rather than for example healthcare and education, but they also increasingly compete for humanitarian projects with NGOs.[83] The overall outcome is that security is not only competing with other sectors, but also expanding into them, taking over their staff and activities. An excellent example of this is the security company named 'Human Dignity in the World'. It was established Jean-Luc Mutukumbali, formerly interpreter for MONUC/MONUSCO and member of parliament in Kinshasa.[84]

Security contracting creates a market for old and new security professionals perpetuating the role of insecurity in the livelihood of many people the DRC. Considering their central place in this economy, the UN Missions have not been aloof of this development. Although Congolese citizens comment positively on the employment opportunities provided by UN security contracting, some are also sceptical of the long-term implications of this development.[85] Not only will the jobs be lost again with the end of MOUNSCO creating renewed insecurity, the intermeshing of private and public security forces is also a major factor reproducing insecurity because of corruption and partisanship in the struggle between political groups and candidates. As one local

---

[80]CONADER claimed to have demobilized around 116.000 people and the UEPNDDR has the declared ambition of demobilizing another 150.000. CONADER (Commission Nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion) was active 2003–2007; UEPNDDR (l'Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion) replaced it in 2007. In addition to this come the reinsertions taking place outside these national level structures.
[81]National Intelligence Agency.
[82]Interview with Eddy Sebera, KK Security Regional Manager, 6 March 2014.
[83]Interviews with Maria Eriksson Baaz, Senior Researcher Nordic Africa Institute, 3 March 2014, and Thomas Mandrup, Assistant Professor, Institute for Strategy of the Danish Defence Academy, 28 February 2014.
[84]Interview with Jason Stearns, Graduate Student, Yale University, 5 March 2014.
[85]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.

argues, instead of fighting for security, the security services defend insecurity. They are no better than the army or the FARDC. Another agrees, it is difficult to say that these companies are worse than the police or the FARDC. They all generate insecurity at times.[86]

Conclusion

MONUSCO's security contracting is seemingly unspectacular and responsible. It draws on unarmed and local companies; it focusses on visible deterrence; and it is accompanied by multiple levels of regulation. Yet, the operational, representational and regulatory practices encompassing contractors are supporting UN security management in the DRC in ways that are deeply problematic. MONUSCO contracting and security management practices are contributing to differentiating security in a manner that places the local civilians at the bottom and international staff at the top. In addition, security firms have promoted and enabled a hardening the UN's security approach by accentuating the focus on technology and gear while diminishing direct relations with local citizens. Finally, the UN's policy of contracting locally is perpetuating insecurity by generating an economy around the provision of protective services.

The unintentional implications of these developments for the security of the Congolese population are considerable. The open differentiation and implicit distrust expressed in the operations and visible representations of contracted security in MONUSCO provide additional grounds for the alienation of the local population. Many Congolese citizens have the impression that MONUSCO is failing even in its basic mandate to protect civilians.[87] Moreover, by hiring regional security firms with the intention of generating jobs for the local economy, the UN is facilitating a security industry that, due to fragmented and decentralized regulation, perpetuates insecurity by offering employment to the former members of armed groups or by holding connections with autocratic families. Arguably, the UN has a responsibility to ensure the safety of its staff and peacekeepers. However, the preceding practices support security management processes and structures which not only place the security of the UN mission above its mandate to safeguard the local population, but also operate in ways that unintentionally undermine the security of the latter.

In sum, the example of MONUSCO shows that the centrality and implications of security contracting for UN peacekeeping and the marketization of humanitarian missions have so far been underestimated. In the absence

---

[86]Interviews with local civilians, Bukavu, October 2015.
[87]Vinck and Pham, "Searching for Lasting Peace," 53; Oxfam, "Waking the Devil", Oxfam, "Women and Children First"; Oxfam, "We Are Entirely Exploitable"; Oxfam, "Commodities of War"; Oxfam, "In the Balance."

of major international scandals involving UN security contractors, the literature has focussed on largely abstract normative and technical debates. It has missed the fact that UN security contracting is already a significant part in UN missions and its peacekeeping economies. The lack of dedicated security budgets conceals the growing role of PMSCs in peacekeeping missions. As our article shows, in the field the enmeshing and potentially negative consequences of hiring local security firms for UN security management become evident. Even if the practices involving security contracting are only one of many reasons for the perceived failure of MONUSCO, it is something that the UN can control and change. Precisely because this is not true of so many of the other processes that shape UN peacekeeping, the insights presented in this article are particularly important.

Disclosure Statement

Funding

ORCID

Elke Krahmann http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6524-2022

Bibliography

Abrahamsen, Rita, and Anna Leander, eds., *Routledge Handbook of Private Security Studies*. London: Routledge, 2016.

Adler, Emanuel, and Vicent Pouliot. "International Practices: Introduction and Framework." In *International Practices*, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vicent Pouliot, 3–35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

African Spotlight. "UN drone crashes in DR Congo." January 15, 2004.

Al Jazeera. "UN Tests Combat Brigade in Democratic Republic of Congo." September 6, 2013. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/5/un-tests-combat-brigadeindemocraticrepublicofcongo.html.

Amoore, Louise. *The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013.

Aning, Kwesi, and Fiifi Edu-Afful. "Unintended Impacts and the Gendered Consequences of Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia." *International Peacekeeping* 20, no. 1 (2013): 17–32.

Annan, Kofi. "The Secretary-General Reflects on 'Intervention' in Thirty-Fifth Annual Ditchley Foundation Lecture." *Press Release*, SG/SM/6613, June 26, 1998.

Aradau, Claudia, and Jef Huysmans. "Critical Methods in International Relations: The Politics of Techniques, Devices and Acts." *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2014): 596–619.

Autesserre, Séverine. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Avant, Deborah D. *The Market for Force: The Consequences of the Privatization of Security.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Bigo, Didier, Laurent Bonelli, Dario Chi, and Christian Olsson. *Mapping of the Field of the EU Internal Security Agencies.* Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007.

Bourdieu, Pierre. "Authorized Language." In *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. Pierre Bourdieu, 107–16. Oxford: Polity Press, 1991.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society.* Cambridge: Polity, 1999.

Boutellis, Arthur J. "From Crisis to Reform: Peacekeeping Strategies for the Protection of Civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2, no. 3, p.Art.48 (2013): 1–11.

Brooks, Doug. "Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services." *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 4 (2000): 129–44.

Brooks, Doug. "Write a Cheque, End a War: Using Private Military Companies to End African Conflicts." *Conflict Trends*, no. 1 (2000): 33–5.

Bureau d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Consulting International (BERCI). "Peacekeeping Operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Perception of the Population." External Study for the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), November 2015. http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/MONUC%20perception%20of%20population.pdf (accessed January 31, 2014).

Bures, Oldrich, and Helena Carappico, eds. *Security Privatization: How Non-security-related Private Businesses Shape Security Governance.* London: Springer, 2017.

Bures, Oldrich. "Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?" *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 4 (2005): 533–46.

CBC News. "UN Helicopters Sent to Push Back Rebels in Eastern Congo." October 27, 2008.

Chesterman, Simon, and Chia Lehnardt, eds. *From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Cilliers, Jakkie, and Peggy Mason, eds. *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-torn African Societies.* Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

Clark, Janine N. "UN Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Reflections on MONUSCO and Its Contradictory Mandate." *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 3/4 (2011): 363–83.

Cooley, Alexander, and James Ron. "The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action." *International Security* 27, no. 1 (2002): 5–39.

Crowe, Anna. "United Nations' Drones: A Sign of What's to Come?" *Global Research*, March 11, 2014. http://www.globalresearch.ca/united-nations-drones-a-sign-of-whats-to-come/5362412.

Czarniawska, Barbara. "Why I Think Shadowing is the Best Field Technique in Management and Organisation Studies." *Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management* 9, no.1 (2014): 90–3.

De Goede, Meike. *Private and Public Security in Post-War Democratic Republic of Congo*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), 2008.

DeWinter-Schmitt, Rebecca, ed. *Montreux Five Years On: An Analysis of State Efforts to Implement Montreux Document Legal Obligations and Good Practices*. 2013, http://ihrib.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MontreuxFv31.pdf (accessed June 22, 2014).

Duffield, Mark. "Risk Management and the Bunkering of the Aid Industry." *Development Dialogue* April (2012): 21–35.

Dunn, Myriam C. "Cyber Security and Private Actors." In *Handbook of Private Security Studies*, ed. Rita Abrahamsen and Anna Leander, 89–100. London: Routledge, 2016.

Eichler, Maya. *Gender and Private Security in Global Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Fassin, Didier. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present Times*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.

Francis, David J. "Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?" *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1999): 319–38.

Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. "Discipline and Practice: 'The Field' as Site, Method, and Location in Anthropology." In *Anthropological Locations*, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, 1–46. Berkely: University of California Press, 1997.

Hatcher, Jessica Goma, and Alex Perry. "Defining Peacekeeping Downward: The U.N. Debacle in Eastern Congo." *Time*, November 26, 2012.

Higate, Paul, and Mats Utas. *Private Security in Africa: From Global Assemblages to the Everyday*. London: Verso Publishers, 2017.

Holt, Victoria, and Tobias Berkman. "Protecting Civilians on the Ground: MONUC and the Democratic Republic of Congo." In *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*, ed. Victoria Holt and Tobias Berkman, 155–78. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

Hönke, Jana. *Transnational Companies and Security Governance: Hybrid Practices in a Postcolonial World*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Howe, Herbert M. "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36 (1998): 307–31.

Hunt, Charles T. "Peacekeepers and the Protection of Civilians: Realities in the Eastern DRC." *Protection Gateway*, March 15, 2013. http://protectiongateway.com/2013/03/15/peacekeepers-and-the-protection-of-civilians-realities-in-the-eastern-drc/ (accessed June 2, 2015).

International Code of Conduct Association. Membership. https://www.icoca.ch/en/membership?private_security_companies=companies&op=Search&view_type=list&form_id=_search_for_members_filter_form.

Jennings, Kathleen M. "Service, Sex and Security: Gendered Peacekeeping Economies in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *Security Dialogue* 45, no. 4 (2014): 1–18.

Jennings, Kathleen M., and Morten Bøås. "Transactions and Interactions: Everyday Life in the Peacekeeping Economy." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 9, no. 3 (2015): 281–95.

Joachim, Jutta, and Andrea Schneiker. "Of 'True Professionals' and 'Ethical Hero Warriors': A Gender-Discourse Analysis of Private Military and Security Companies. *Security Dialogue* 43 (2012): 495–512.

Johns, Fleur. *Non-Legality in International Law: Unruly Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Koko, Sadiki. "MONUC and the Quest for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessment of a Peacekeeping Mission." *African Security Review* 20, no. 2 (2011): 29–41.

Krahmann, Elke, and Cornelius Friesendorf. *The Role of Private Security Companies (PSCs) in CSDP Missions and Operations*. EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2009-1/Lot6/10, 2011.

Krahmann, Elke. "Security: Collective Good or Commodity?" *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 3 (2008): 379–404.

Krahmann, Elke. *States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Krahmann, Elke. "Beck and Beyond: Selling Security in the World Risk Society." *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 1 (2011): 349–72.

Krahmann, Elke. "The UN Guidelines on the Use of Armed Guards: Recommendations for Improvement." *International Community Law Review* 16, no. 4 (2014): 475–91.

Krahmann, Elke. "NATO Contracting in Afghanistan: The Problem of Principal-Agent Networks." *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (2016): 1401–26.

Leander, Anna, ed. *Commercialising Security in Europe: Political Consequences for Peace Operations*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Leander, Anna. "The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies." *Journal of Peace Research* 42 (2005): 605–22.

Leander, Anna. "The Promises, Problems and Potentials of a Bourdieu Inspired Approach to International Relations." *International Political Sociology* 5, no. 3 (2011): 294–313.

Leander, Anna. "What Do Codes of Conduct Do? Hybrid Constitutionalization and Militarization in Military Markets." *Global Constitutionalism* 1, no. 1 (2012): 91–119.

Leander, Anna. "Technological Agency in the Co-Constitution of Legal Expertise and the US Drone Program." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 26, no. 4 (2013): 811–31.

Leander, Anna. "Understanding US National Intelligence: Analyzing Practices to Capture the Chimera." In *The Return of the Public in Global Governance*, ed. Jacqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu, 197–221. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Leander, Anna. "The Politics of Whitelisting: Regulatory Work and Topologies in Commercial Security." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 34, no. 1 (2016): 48–66.

Leander, Anna. "The Politics of Legal Arrangements: The 'Duty of Care' Justifying, Extending and Perpetuating Public in the Private Forms of Protection." *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* (2018), in print.

Mackey, Robert. "Let Slip the Drones of Peace." *The New York Times*, December 3, 2013.

Oakford, Samuel. "Drones, Drones, Everywhere: UN Ramping Up Peacekeeper Surveillance Flights." *Al-Jazeera*, August 27, 2014.

Oder, Sandra A. "Understanding the Complexities of the Democratic Republic of Congo at the Turn of the Decade." *African Security Review* 20, no.2 (2011): 51–5.

Østensen, Åse Gilje. "In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping." *International Peacekeeping*, 20 (2013): 33–47.

Oxfam. *Commodities of War: Communities Speak out on the True Cost of Conflict in Eastern DRC.* November 2012. http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa4/commodities-of-war.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).

Oxfam. *In the Balance: Searching for Protection in Eastern DRC.* January 2014. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp-in-the balance-protection-eastern-drc-270114-en.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).

Oxfam. *Waking the Devil: The Impact of Forced Disarmament on Civilians in the Kivus.* July 2009. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bn-waking-the-devi-drc-0907_4.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).

Oxfam. *'We Are Entirely Exploitable': The Lack of Protection for Civilians in Eastern DRC.* July 2011. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bn-protection-civilians-eastern-drc-2011-en_3.pdf (accessed June 2, 2015).

Pattison, James. "Outsourcing the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and Private Military and Security Companies." *International Theory*, *2*, no. 1 (2010): 1–31.

Pattison, James. *The Morality of Private War. The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Pingeot, Lou. *Contracting Insecurity – Private Military and Security Companies and the Future of the United Nations.* New York: Global Policy Forum and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, June 20, 2014.

Pingeot, Lou. *Dangerous Partnership. Private Military & Security Companies and the UN.* New York: Global Policy Forum and Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, June 2012.

Ringmar, Erik. "The Search for Dialogue as a Hindrance to Understanding: Practices as Inter-Paradigmatic Research Program." *International Theory* 6, no. 1 (2014): 1–27.

Rosen, Armin. "A Day in the DRC." *The Atlantic*, May 21, 2013.

Schouten, Peer. "Political Topographies of Private Security in Sub-Saharan Africa." In *African Engagements – Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multipolar World*, ed. Ton Dietz, Kjell Havnevik, Mayke Kaag, and Terje Oestigaard, 56–83. Leiden: Brill, 2011.

Schütze, Benjamin. "Simulating, Marketing, and Playing War: US-Jordanian Military Collaboration and the Politics of Commercial Security." *Security Dialogue*, forthcoming.

Smirl, Lisa. *Spaces of Aid: How Cars, Compounds and Hotels Shape Humanitarianism.* London, UK: Zed Books Ltd, 2015.

Spearin, Christopher. "Between Public Peacekeepers and Private Forces: Can there be a Third Way?" *International Peacekeeping* 12, no. 2 (2005): 240–52.

Stanger, Allison. *One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

Stearns, Jason. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa.* New York: Public Affairs, 2012.

The Independent. "Family Rule in Uganda." March 11, 2009. https://www.independent.co.ug/family-rule-uganda/ (accessed February 16, 2018).

Thumala, Angélica, Benjamin Goold, and Ian Loader. "A Tainted Trade? Moral Ambivalence and Legitimation Work in the Private Security Industry." *The British Journal of Sociology* 62 (2011): 283–303.

UN. "Kalemie: UNPOL Provides Refresher Training to Agents of Authorized Security Companies." Press Release, 2015. http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=10662&mid=14594&ItemID=21024 (accessed June 23, 2015).

UN. "MONUSCO Background." www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml (accessed January 31, 2014).

UN. "UN News & Media Photo." http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/ (accessed June 2, 2015).

UN. Basic Security in the Field (BSITF II). http://agora.unicef.org/course/info.php?id=589 (accessed June 2, 2015).

UN. *CEB – United Nations System Staff Security and Safety*. April 9, 2009. CEB/2009/HLCM/INF.1. http://www.securitymanagementinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=199&Itemid=32&lang=en (accessed September 2, 2016).

UN. *Comprehensive Report on the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Report of the Secretary General*. A/67/529, 18 October, 2012. http://dag.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/298688/A_67_526-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y (accessed September 2, 2016).

UN. *Procurement Division*. http://www.un.org/depts/ptd (accessed March 30, 2017).

UN. *Reports on the Department of Safety and Security and on the Use of Private Security. Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions*, 2012. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/635/58/PDF/N1263558.pdf?OpenElement (accessed June 2, 2015).

UN. *Security Council – Resolution 1925*, S-RES-1925. May 28, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010) (accessed February 16, 2018).

UN. *UN Security Management System. Security Management Operations Manual. Guidelines on the Use of Armed Security Services from Private Security Companies*, 2012 http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/GuidelinesOnUseOfArmed.ecurityServices.pdf (accessed August 26, 2016).

UN. *UN Security Management System. Security Policy Manual, Chapter IV: Security Management*, 2012. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Mercenaries/WG/StudyPMSC/UNSecurityPolicyManual.pdf (accessed August 31, 2016).

UN. *UNDP – United Nations System – Annual Statistical Report 2006*, New York: UN, 2007. http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/undp_in_action_2006.html (accessed February 16, 2018).

UN. *United Nations Field Security Handbook*, 2006. http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/international_regulation/united_nations/other/un_field_security_handbook.pdf (accessed August 31, 2016).

UN. *Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination*, 2010. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/493/92/PDF/N1049392.pdf?OpenElement (accessed June 2, 2015).

UN. *Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination. Note by the Secretary-General*, 2013. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/432/64/PDF/N1343264.pdf?OpenElement (accessed June 2, 2015).

UN. *Use of Private Security. Report of the Secretary-General*, 2012. http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/561/96/PDF/N1256196.pdf?OpenElement (accessed June 2, 2015).

Vinck, Patrick, and Phuong Phuong Pham. "Searching for Lasting Peace. Population-Based Survey on Perceptions and Attitudes about Peace, Security and Justice in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo." Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and United Nations Development Programme, 2014. www.peacebuildingdata.org/sites/m/pdf/DRC2014_Searching_for_Lasting_Peace.pdf (accessed January 19, 2018).

Wæver, Ole. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Weber, Cynthia. "Encountering Violence: Terrorism and Horrorism in War and Citizenship." *International Political Sociology* 8, no. 3 (2014): 237–55.

Williams, M. "Global Security Assemblages." In *Handbook on Private Military-Security Companies*, ed. Rita Abrahamsen and Anna Leander, 131–40. London: Routledge, 2016.

Williams, Paul D. "Lessons Unlearned: Despite Being the Largest UN Mission, MONUC Has Little Success to Show for it." *Journal of International Peace Operations* 4, no. 4 (2009): 11–14.