Introduction

Reconceptualizing Diasporas and National Identities in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1850–1950

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> What's the recipe for a Turk? Take the 25 de Março Street cocktail shaker and put in a Syrian, an Armenian, a Persian, an Egyptian, a Kurd. Shake it up really well and—boom—out comes a Turk.
>
> Guilherme de Almeida, 1929

Migrations to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1850–1950

Even though Latin America has been a continent primarily of emigration during the last decades, historically the region has been one of mass immigration. One aim of this book is to provide an overview of the history of migrations to Latin America between 1850 and 1950. In contrast to much of the previous scholarship, this volume does so by specifically examining the interaction between transnational migrations and the formation of national identities. Building on the fields of migration studies and nationalism theory, neither the nation-states from which migrants came nor those to which they moved are seen as preexisting but are rather in a continual processes of being (re)defined. By analyzing these processes from a comparative angle, the book seeks to engage Latin American and Caribbean history more firmly with recent approaches to the history of global migrations at the height of the worldwide spread of nationalism. In order to make room for examining less-studied groups such as the Chinese, and for analyzing the long-term repercussions of immigration to Latin America,

the book chooses the unusual time frame of 1850–1950 instead of the more common 1870–1930, the period during which the largest numbers of foreign immigrants arrived.

Although the well-known arrival of conquistadors and African slaves during the period of the Iberian empires had turned Latin America, strictly speaking, into a region of "immigration" well before the period studied in this volume, the inflow of peoples between 1850 and 1950 (concentrated especially in the six decades after 1870) was quantitatively unprecedented, embedded within a larger set of global migrations, of which those across the Atlantic were only the best known.[1] The main destinations within Latin America were, in descending order, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Uruguay, and Chile. Roughly 4 million immigrants settled permanently in Argentina between 1870 and 1930, 2 million to 3 million in Brazil, and perhaps 1 million in Cuba and 300,000 in Uruguay. Since in some countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, the preexisting population was small, the relative impact of these immigrations was sometimes greater than the impact of immigrations to the United States. Uruguay's population grew sevenfold in the second half of the nineteenth century, and Argentina's quadrupled, mainly due to immigration.[2] As was the case in the United States, Europe furnished the greatest numbers of immigrants in Latin America, with Italy and Spain being the two most important sending countries in quantitative terms, followed by a number of other European countries, such as Portugal, Germany, the British Isles, and France. In addition, especially after World War I, there were growing numbers of Eastern Europeans, among them many Jews, migrating to Latin America just as they did to the United States.

But Europe was by no means the only sending region of migrants to Latin America. From the 1850s Chinese workers went to Cuba, other Caribbean countries, and Peru. After 1900 Peru and especially Brazil began to receive significant numbers of Japanese. Middle Easterners, mainly from today's Lebanon and Syria, arrived in virtually all Latin American countries, and in especially large numbers in Argentina and Brazil. Armenians, too, came to settle in cities such as Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and Montevideo. Migrants from the British West Indies, often working for North American railway or fruit companies, began to form significant, if marginalized, parts of the populations of countries such as Costa Rica, Panama, and Ecuador, while many Haitians went to neighboring Cuba. Colonial Caribbean countries, meanwhile, saw the mass arrival of Asian indentured laborers, who altered the population structure of Surinam, British Guiana, and Trinidad.

Furthermore, migrations within Latin America, both internal and between countries, often neighboring ones, set in on a larger scale, leading to the growth of urban centers such as Mexico City, São Paulo, or Buenos Aires, the latter two of which had initially expanded mainly due to transatlantic migrations. All these movements had far-reaching impacts on the national identities of virtually all Latin American countries, which at the same time were being constructed and continually renegotiated.

Although the broadest population movements are well known to specialists, the histories of the many migrations into Latin America and the Caribbean between 1850 and 1950 remain understudied when compared to the parallel experience of the United States. While there are countless studies of individual migrations, much of the literature on the topic is compartmentalized into individual case studies. In spite of a body of comparative scholarship slowly building up,[3] a large proportion of studies, many of which are written by the descendants of immigrants themselves, continue to focus on one "ethnic" or "national" group within one receiving nation-state because of a lack of funds for cross-national research in Latin American universities and the ongoing weight of methodological nationalism both within Latin America and among historians outside the region, who tend to be specialized in individual national histories. As a consequence of this as well as the overwhelming global power of Anglo-American academe in terms of theory-building, Latin American migratory histories have had a limited impact compared to those of the United States. Though in declining measure, theoretical models derived from the Chicago School of sociology—especially the opposition between "assimilation" and "pluralism"—continue to be the framework in which historical migration to Latin America is mostly being discussed. Since mass migration to Latin America declined sharply from 1930, the scholarship on historical migrations to Latin America, eventually left to historians alone, has been less influenced by more recent theoretical models than by the historiography on migration to the United States, where, due to ongoing immigration, disciplines other than history continued to influence the methods and approaches of migration studies. This disjunction is all the more regrettable because the nature of Latin America's immigration histories can tell us a great deal about migratory processes more generally. Building on a growing literature that complicates straightforward assumptions about the relationship between migrations and national identities, this book seeks to contribute to redressing this problem.

Migration Studies and Theories of Nationalism

One obstacle to setting this right is that, in spite of their obvious relatedness, migration studies and theories of nationalism have developed in a curious separation from one another. The major paradigms of migration studies were long informed by the experience of migration to the United States, in particular the so-called second wave that set in around 1890 and brought primarily Southern and Eastern Europeans to North America. From the 1920s the Chicago School of sociology dominated the field for several decades by studying the "assimilation" of these immigrants into American society. Although the ideas of this school were not monolithic internally, most of the scholars associated with it—ranging from Robert E. Park and W. I. Thomas to Louis Wirth and Milton Gordon—studied the degree to which immigrants retained or gave up their cultural baggage in the process of fusing into what was frequently called the "American mainstream."[4] The thrust of the underlying assumptions was that immigrants should and eventually would shed their old-world habits in order to achieve social upward mobility as well as to allow for the creation of a viable American identity.

From the 1960s such arguments were challenged by a new generation of migration scholars, sometimes called "pluralists" or "retentionists." Although, ironically, "assimilation" as understood by the Chicago School had by then arguably become a reality of American society, the pluralists proclaimed that assimilation was neither realistic nor desirable.[5] Instead of focusing on macro social developments and statistics, which appeared to corroborate the decline of the importance of distinctions based on ethnic origin, these authors concentrated on the micro level of migratory chains and networks, which they found helped the survival of the immigrants' and their descendants' cultural and ethnic particularities. It was no coincidence that this paradigm change in migration studies came alongside the civil rights movement and a general upsurge in identity politics. Being a backlash against earlier assumptions of Anglo-conformity, the writings of "pluralists" sometimes stressed the "roots" of immigrants and "ethnics" as if these were primordial and unchangeable.[6] Yet both "assimilationists" and "pluralists" spent little time on conceptualizing the "mainstream." This shortcoming has been pointed out in relation to the Chicago School, but it can also be extended to its "pluralist" challengers.[7] The problem could well be attributed to a much broader one identified by Nina Glick Schiller and Andreas Wimmer—namely, the blind eye of mainstream sociology for

the rise and ongoing importance of nationalism owing to an implicit and unacknowledged methodological nationalism.[8]

Thinking about the "mainstream" was left to a different field of study: that of nationalism. Similarly to migration studies, theories of nationalism have been bedeviled by a dichotomy, dividing "constructivists" or "modernists" such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Eric Hobsbawm from "primordialists," "perennialists" or "ethno-symbolists" such as Anthony Smith. Whereas the former have insisted that nations are "invented" or "imagined" and that "it is nationalism which engenders nations and not the other way round," the latter have typically stressed that such inventions are restricted by the available "raw material" from which nationalism is built and that "a state's ethnic core shapes the character and boundaries of a nation."[9] Ironically, the constructivist viewpoint in theories of nationalism predominated in the 1970s and '80s, precisely at the time when the arguably more primordially inclined "retentionists" seemed to be carrying the day in migration studies. Communication between these fields was minimal, further limited by disciplinary boundaries (the best-known migration scholars were often sociologists, while the major theorists of nationalism came more often from history, political science, or anthropology) as well as geographical separation (migration studies were dominated by American academics, while British-based scholars made a greater impact in theories of nationalism).

Just as the most influential authors on migrations showed little concern to conceptualize nationalism, the most-read scholars of nationalism rarely had a major interest in migrations.[10] Although theorists of nationalism such as Anderson, Craig Calhoun, or Elie Kedourie studied how the idea of the nation—what Anderson has called the "modular" form of nationalism—traveled around the globe, they related these movements to intellectual transfers rather than the mass flows of peoples that interested students of migration.[11] Moreover, as Rogers Brubaker has remarked, an overriding concern with the *origins* of nations and nationalism gave rise to an implicit tendency, even among constructivists, to see nations as relatively stable entities once they had been invented by nationalists.[12] If migrants did come into the picture, their role was that of real or potential challengers of an already existing national identity.

Over the last two decades, the dichotomous structuring of both migration studies and nationalism theories has largely been worn away. Migration scholars who had been trying to reappraise the concept of "assimilation" are now stressing that this term cannot be understood without granting

serious attention to the transformations of the "mainstream" as a result of migrations.[13] Numerous studies have shown that, depending on context-specific variables, there is no strict opposition between the retention of ethnic networks and the adjustment into receiving societies. In many instances ethnic networks worked as promoters of, not as obstacles to, assimilation.[14] Nor was there a straightforward relationship between the declining importance of ethnic distinctions and socioeconomic upward mobility.[15] Historians of migrations, including those to Latin America, have moved away from privileging either macro social phenomena or a micro approach. By integrating the two, they have arrived at more nuanced interpretations of how migrations were open-ended processes shaped by conditions in a number of interlinked localities instead of a definite movement from one place to another with a fixed outcome.[16] In theories of nationalism, the old divide between "perennialists" and "constructivists" has survived to this day. But when it comes to concrete historical studies, most scholars would now pursue a combined approach that examines the interaction between the efforts of the state and intellectuals to forge national identities and the popular customs that they belabor.[17]

Parallel to the development of theoretically more open frameworks, historical studies of both immigrations and the formation of national identities in Latin America have expanded enormously over the last decades. Nonetheless, in both fields the dearth of historical scholarship on Latin America in comparison to other world regions and, particularly, the limited impact of studies on the region's history on theory-building continue to be rightfully lamented. The major theorists of nationalism have relegated Latin America to a few uneasy footnotes, admitting that its history may sit uncomfortably with their overarching frameworks. But this has rarely impelled them to question their models.[18] Likewise, the region's immigration history has usually at best served as a counterexample to the North American case with which it has been compared in terms of the relative "integration" of immigrants into the receiving societies. As summarized by Eduardo Míguez, the most prominent argument has been that "it is likely that the integration of immigrants into the local society was faster and more successful in many of the migrant flows that arrived in Spanish and Portuguese America than in their North American counterparts."[19] Regardless of whether one concurs with this statement (or whether an agreement can be reached on what "integration" and "successful" mean), the contribution of studies on historical immigrations into Latin America to the conceptual tools of migration studies has been minimal.

More problematically still, notwithstanding the changes within both fields of study during recent decades, when immigration and nationalism have been studied together, the pair has usually been conceptualized in a binary opposition, where nationalism is almost equated with nativism and xenophobia. Apart from the exacerbating factor of the divide between migration studies and nationalism theories, three interrelated reasons are responsible for this tendency: first, the predominant focus in historical migration studies on the second wave of migrations to the United States and its related history of negative prejudice against immigrants perceived as ethnically different; second, contemporary public debates on immigration, especially in Europe and the United States, with their usual concentration on the question of the extent to which immigrants "fit" into presumably preexisting "national identities"; and third, partially a result of all the above, a frequent implicit narrowing down of the very term "migration" in scholarly as well as wider public debates to those migrations that cross national boundaries and are seen as culturally very different. The problem, therefore, is not a specifically Latin American one.[20]

Yet, if (European) immigrants to Latin America were—as much of the historiography comparing North America and South America has it—more often met with positive rather than negative prejudice, and if immigrant incorporation coincided with the clearer formulation of national identities across the region rather than succeeding it, then Latin American history might help complicate any plain dichotomy between migration and national identity. Historians of nationalism and national identity constructions in Latin America are in fact lamenting that there is too little transnational work in their field and that "we need to know far more about the international context in which national identities evolved, about the transfer of people, ideas and images in both directions."[21] Yet, in spite of such demands, most scholars continue to be steeped and interested in *either* migrations *or* the study of nationalism, and when attempts have been made to combine the two, this was done mostly through an opposition between migrations and national identities.

Interactions between Transnational Migrations and Constructions of National Identities in Latin America

To be sure, there are countless Latin American examples of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and types of nationalism that advocated assimilationist policies toward immigrant communities and their descendants. Many

of the contributions to this volume testify to the recurrence of prejudice against immigrants as outsiders. Although in the mid-nineteenth century many Latin American political elites were enthusiastic about "civilizing" or "whitening" their countries through European immigration, they grew more skeptical over time as results failed to yield the envisaged outcomes. As the chapters by Stefan Rinke and Frederik Schulze show, this change in attitudes affected even those who initially had been among the most coveted groups to "whiten" Latin American countries, such as the Germans. In the eyes of Brazilian elites, Germans turned into dangerously isolationist aliens, especially during World War I. Jeane DeLaney's contribution in this volume on Argentine elites' attitudes toward immigration reveals a similar change over time. The writer-statesman Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, for example, was a fervent advocate of (ideally northern) European immigration in the 1850s and '60s, but by the 1880s he railed against the "Italianization" of Argentina.[22] Against the background of anarchist political activities, the Argentine government of Julio A. Roca passed a residency law in 1902 allowing for the easier expulsion of foreigners.[23] In several countries, various forms of anti-Semitism developed alongside right-wing Catholic nationalisms, erupting in serious ethnic violence during Argentina's so-called tragic week in 1919.[24]

The majority of chapters in this volume also mention that by the 1930s governments enacted laws to curb the entry of migrants.[25] Even long before then, discriminatory legislation existed in some places. As early as 1890, the supposedly liberal Uruguayan state enacted a law that tried to stimulate the immigration of Europeans but specifically forbade the entry of Africans, Asians, and "Gypsies," which had little effect in practice because none of these three groups intended to migrate to Uruguay in large numbers at the time. The measures of the 1930s, however, did affect many immigrants. The authoritarian regime of Brazil led by Getúlio Vargas, dealt with by Schulze, was a typical case, trying to "Brazilianize" immigrants already in the country, for example, by closing down foreign-language schools and outlawing "foreign" organizations, such as Zionist political associations.[26] Unsurprisingly, migrants perceived as religiously, racially, or ethnically "different" or "inferior" according to globally circulating ideas about race were targeted more than others, as becomes particularly clear in the chapters by Lara Putnam and Nicola Foote, which both deal with migrants from the British Caribbean. In the 1930s the Cuban governments of Ramón Grau San Martín and Fulgencio Batista deported more than 25,000 Haitians in an attempt to "Cubanize" the labor force.[27] Postrevolutionary Mexico—whether

in spite, because, or regardless of its limited number of immigrants—witnessed a great deal of working-class and peasant xenophobia directed especially against the Spanish and the Chinese but also against Arabs, who were accused of "suck[ing] the few available resources" (*chupan las pocas economías*)—a xenophobia addressed by Jürgen Buchenau and Kathy Lopez in this volume.[28] As Buchenau underlines in his chapter on Mexico, the notion of an unchangingly xenophilic Latin America versus a xenophobic North America has to be treated with great caution. In many instances national identities were construed or mobilized in opposition to migrations.

However, the contributions to this volume as a whole, in addition to an ever-growing number of studies, also show that the increasing movement of peoples, and with them goods and ideas, into Latin America—engaging flows in the opposite direction as well as within Latin America and on to other places—interacted with the global spread of nationalism and ideas about nationhood in much more complicated ways than any simple compilation of anti-immigrant sentiments would suggest. On the one hand, it could be argued that it was only through conceptualizing the world as one divided into nations that migrations really became understood as such. As even the most superficial survey of the field of migration studies as well as public debates will quickly reveal, the very term "migration" has for a long time almost been equated with "inter*national*" or "trans*national*" migration. The world's leading journal in the field, the *International Migration Review*, is mainly concerned with movements of peoples crossing national boundaries. There are studies of other migrations, labeled "internal," but these are typically left to demographers, sociologists, or historians working within the framework of individual nation-states. In a sense, therefore, it was nationalism that made migrations visible. Moreover, migratory flows themselves can be determined by various forms of nationalism. Exclusionary or discriminatory nationalisms can work as "push factors." The drawing and establishment of national boundaries, in turn, can sometimes work as "pull factors," as they did in those cases where migrants specifically went to border areas for economic purposes such as smuggling—undermining but sometimes unintentionally consolidating these boundaries. The Chinese in northern Mexico and southern Peru (who were particularly targeted in xenophobic attacks, according to Lopez in this volume) were an example of this.[29]

On the other hand, migrations made and reshaped national imaginaries and nationalisms because they involved sweeping global demographic shifts. As José Moya has underlined, the unprecedented scale of movements

of people across the Atlantic easily exceeded the grip of policymakers in any particular nation-state trying either to kindle or to withhold them.[30] Many transnational migrations were preceded (and followed) by what in hindsight has been classified as "internal" migration, modifying the social fabric and the economies as well as the national imaginaries of the sending areas. They were also intimately interwoven with large-scale migrations across national boundaries in the larger supranational sending areas, for example, Europe or the Caribbean.[31] In the receiving context of the Americas, wide-ranging and hardly controllable changes were brought about. The former colonial peripheries (such as Argentina, Uruguay, southern Brazil or the northern and western parts of the United States) were transformed into the economically most dynamic regions of the hemisphere, while the economic heartlands of the former colonies based on mining or plantations (from the southern United States via Haiti, central Mexico, and Peru to the Brazilian northeast) declined. Those areas where many migrants went became more urbanized and industrialized—and vice versa; migrants went to the urbanizing and industrializing regions. Lara Putnam's argument in this volume—that mass migration in the Caribbean, at least until the turn of the century, was driven by economic forces rather than by the racial fantasies of intellectual or political elites—could easily be extended to most of the cases studied in this book.

These large-scale movements had far-reaching implications for the construction of national identities, both in international comparison—with some countries construed as more "modern," "white," or "dynamic" than others, which were cast as "backward" or "racially inferior"—and by internally reshuffling imagined boundaries of centers and peripheries. The question of whether a country's national identity was coded as primarily "ethnic" or "civic," if one wants to work with this classic distinction in studies of nationalism, was as closely related to migratory flows as it was to the question of whether the state preceded nationalism or vice versa, as Rogers Brubaker has argued in his comparative study of citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany.[32] Most European sending countries adopted one form or another of the jus sanguinis (conferment of citizenship based on descent) in order not to lose their overseas denizens, while virtually all American countries adhered to the jus soli (citizenship based on place of birth), which led to frequent diplomatic conflicts.[33] The point may sound banal today, but it is still worth making: the mass movements of people preceded the formation of national identities—Putnam's Caribbean in

this volume being a clear case in point—as often as they followed on its heels.

The significance of migratory flows for the construction of national identities, however, did not always correlate directly with their size. For Mexico, Jürgen Buchenau has convincingly pointed out that "small numbers" could have a "big impact."[34] Some of the most illuminating studies to analyze the intersection between migrations and national identities concern smaller groups, a good example of which is migrants from the Middle East. Steven Hyland's chapter in this book shows particularly well how migrants from that region debated the constant (re)drawing of imperial, colonial, or national boundaries in their home countries. Although the first immigrants from Arab lands to Brazil were Moroccan Jews in the wake of the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859–60, in both Argentina and Brazil immigrants from Arab countries from the 1890s were summarily called "Turks" (*turcos*) because they mainly came from the Ottoman Empire. This category included Arab Christians and (fewer) Muslims from today's Lebanon and Syria, and Jews from across the Ottoman Empire as well as Armenians but hardly any people who today or in historical settings other than Latin America would be labeled Turks. Depending on their place of origin and ethnic and religious factors, these migrants and their descendants subsequently "acquired" other identities: Armenians understandably (and successfully) disentangled themselves from the term "*turco*," as did many Jews, especially after the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948, while Arab Christians and Muslims became "Syrian-Lebanese" in Argentina and Brazil, "Palestinians" in Honduras, and "Lebanese" in Mexico and Ecuador.[35]

In virtually all other areas of origin, too, the nationality of the emigrants was open to negotiation before and after migration. In Brazil and especially Peru a large proportion of "the Japanese" were not necessarily regarded as such in Honshū, since many came from Okinawa, which had been colonized by the Meiji Empire only in 1879. The islands' inhabitants underwent a forced "Japanization" from 1890 onward, perhaps contributing to emigration, but in itself undertaken by the authorities with an eye on how overseas Okinawans might fit into Japan's imperial political designs.[36] Many of Argentina's "Germans," especially in the province of Entre Ríos, came from the lower Volga area of Russia, where they had settled since the late eighteenth century.[37] The "nationality" of the few thousand Cape Verdeans who went to Argentina between the 1920s and 1940s was hard to establish for immigration officials, too, even if their passports unmistakably

identified them as Portuguese. Making their appearance in Foote's and Putnam's chapters, the more numerous Anglophone West Indians who spread across the Hispanic Caribbean between 1900 and 1930 of course did so as British subjects—in contrast to Haitians, who seem to have suffered heavier discrimination in part because they lacked this link to the British crown.[38]

The roughly 12,000 Irish who settled permanently in Argentina during the nineteenth century also came as British subjects, but in contrast to both West Indians in Spanish America and the Irish in the United States, they were subsumed under the label "English" (*ingleses*) by many Argentines—an etiquette that they increasingly rejected from the 1880s as nationalism surged back home, but that they also learned to use creatively when it promised socioeconomic benefits.[39] Conversely, one could debate whether the roughly 270,000 Spaniards who came to Cuba during the nineteenth century should be classified under the rubric of "transnational migrations" since Cuba was still a Spanish colony then. The 60,000 who arrived between 1800 and 1850, to be sure, were "transnational" migrants in the sense that they came mainly from recently independent Spanish American countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela. Between 1850 and 1898, in turn, many came as soldiers from the Iberian Peninsula to fight against Cuban aspirations for independence.[40]

Skeptics may dismiss such examples as fascinating yet quantitatively minor exceptions. They should be reminded, however, that virtually all the "nation-states" that sent migrants to Latin America between 1850 and 1950 were themselves being formed or at least (re)negotiated and contested. Before 1861 and 1871, respectively, "Italians" and "Germans" did not arrive as such, but as Ligurians, Piedmontese, Bavarians, and so forth. The "French" who in the second half of the nineteenth century came in large numbers to Argentina and Uruguay were mainly from the Basque Country, and if their marriage patterns (in Uruguay) are anything to go by, they socialized with other Basques, including those from across the Franco-Spanish border.[41] The "Spanish" who went to Argentina, Cuba, and Uruguay in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were primarily Galicians (around 65 percent of the total), Basques, Catalans, and Canary Islanders (in Cuba and Uruguay) whose "Spanishness" was as questionable as the quandary's solution adopted by "Argentines," "Cubans," and "Uruguayans," who for reasons of simplicity resorted to using the shorthand *gallegos* for all of them.[42] These Latin American nationalities may well be put in quotation marks, too, since by the beginning of World War I, over half of the populations of Argentina and Uruguay were first- and second-generation immigrants

while Cuba, besides containing a large immigrant contingent, had until recently itself been that "most faithful island" pertaining to Spain.

Moreover, migrants constantly crossed boundaries within Latin America. As Lara Putnam reminds us in her chapter, in some Latin American countries the largest groups of foreigners in the early twentieth century came from neighboring republics. But classic immigration countries in South America also saw much cross-border movement. Uruguay, which an Italian diplomat in the 1890s doubted was "anything more than a bridge between the ocean and Argentina" (though a heavily frequented one), was a particularly clear case in point.[43] In 1908, 18,600 "Argentines" and 27,800 "Brazilians" lived in Uruguay, but their parents (especially parents of Argentines) were mainly Europeans, while a few of Uruguay's Spanish citizens were born in Cuba. Most of those listed as U.S. citizens who married in Montevideo during the first three decades of the twentieth century had at least one parent born either in Italy or Spanish America, or else came from Puerto Rico.[44] In turn, around 100,000 Uruguayans—almost a tenth of the country's population—lived in Argentina in 1907.[45] As a consequence of such movements, Italian sources rarely differentiated between the River Plate countries until after the unification of Italy.[46] But in people's minds, even the distinction between North America and South America may have been blurred at times. "America" meant rather different things in different regions of Italy, depending on where emigrants went to *fare l'America*. German emigration records did not distinguish between Argentina and Brazil, both Südamerika, until World War I.[47] Only once clearer information spread through the networks formed by the migratory process did the contours of American nation-states become more precise in European people's minds.

Migrations also contributed to the establishment, (re)drawing, and consolidation of national boundaries on a less imaginary level. In the Caribbean, where nation-states formed only during or after the century at which this volume looks, this was especially clear. But even with regard to continental Latin America, the political map of 1850 looked different from that of 1950. Changes concerned especially the interior borders of South America pertaining to areas that were difficult to access and claimed by various neighboring countries. In other places, such as the Caribbean lands of Central American countries or the southern parts of Argentina and Chile populated by indigenous peoples, certain territories formally belonged to the nation-state, but they were barely integrated into the nation's social, economic, cultural, and political life. State- or company-fostered

transnational migrations frequently played a crucial role in the "nationalization" of such territories. After the 1860s, Germans, Swiss, and others were attracted to southern Chile and a Welsh community began to settle in Argentine Patagonia, partly as a result of state attempts to diminish the weight of indigenous populations.[48] In the course of the Amazonian rubber boom, a highly multinational workforce, including laborers from various Asian, European, and British Caribbean countries (especially Barbadians) helped to "Brazilianize" the infrastructure of territories whose status was previously disputed or formally belonged to Spanish American countries.[49] Something similar could be said about marginal areas of Costa Rica or Panama, mentioned by Foote and Putnam.

Several chapters in this volume highlight that wars constituted an important litmus test for migrations as well as debates around nationality. Even if the relative absence of border conflicts, separatist movements, and international wars in Latin America in comparison to other world regions is sometimes noted by scholars of nationalism, they were intimately connected to nation-building and the formation of national myths, with immigrants frequently wound up in them.[50] In her chapter comparing Chinese immigrants in three Latin American countries, Kathy Lopez demonstrates that the participation of Chinese in the Cuban war of independence earned them a more favorable position in Cuban society than was the case in Peru, where many Chinese were associated with Chile during the War of the Pacific, or in the heated climate of revolutionary Mexico. The restrictions of German community life during World War I, outlined by Rinke and Schulze, are another good example. In the Chaco War of 1932–35, which resulted in Bolivia having to cede large swathes of territory to Paraguay, German-speaking Mennonites who had recently come from Canada and Russia proved a crucial factor in swaying the war's outcome.[51] By then, immigrants had long become actors in the national life of most Latin American countries.

Diaspora Nationalisms and Homeland Relations

Another issue to consider is that of "diaspora nationalism" or "long-distance nationalism," which Steven Hyland and I deal with in this volume. Its study, with the classic diasporic cases of Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and to some extent Chinese and Indian expatriates in mind, was advocated already by Gellner as a peculiar case where a national identity is construed without a state fostering nationalization through education and where, as

a result, the idea of the nation becomes particularly imaginary and deterritorialized.[52] The term "diaspora" has been popularized enormously in the last two decades to include a majority of migrant communities. If the most commonly applied yardsticks are taken, most of Latin America's immigrant communities between 1850 and 1950 could indeed be called "diasporas": they all were dispersed over several nation-states, even though the element of trauma and forcefulness in this dispersal obviously varied; they all developed some sort of awareness of themselves as a community distinct from others surrounding them, combined with varying degrees of boundary maintenance; and there was longing for a real or imagined homeland.[53] One might lament that through the proliferation of the term "diaspora" it loses its specificity to describe those who might now be called "victim diasporas." But the term's heuristic benefit is that we gain a greater deal of sensitivity to the multisited nature of transnational connections of migrants and their relationship with an imagined or real homeland, both factors that historiographies focusing exclusively on the nation-state have obscured.

Diasporic nationalisms engage many different and shifting types of identity constructions. First, in the host societies, they interact (or don't interact) with the various identities—regional, national, supranational, religious, ethnic, or racial—of co-migrants who come to be construed as co-nationals, co-ethnics, and so forth. Zionism, discussed in passing by Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein in this volume, is perhaps the best-known case of diasporic nationalism. But it has also been shown that Sicilians or Calabrians really became "Italians" in the Americas (as well as "Americans" or New Yorkers or Argentines or *porteños*), even if they mainly migrated there after the unification of Italy. This process happened in part through heteroreferential adscription, as in the common discrimination as "dagoes" in the United States or in the slightly less malign gringos and *tanos* of the River Plate. But this process also worked through a gradual replacement of regional attachments (to "Neapolitan" associations or newspapers, for instance) with national ones ("Italian"). This becoming national in the diaspora was frequently kindled through external events, such as World War I.[54]

Campanilismo (the Italian word for emotional attachment to the local bell tower) or *Kleinstaaterei* (German for the division into small states of what should be, according to the term's implication, a larger nation-state) are often seen as competitors or obstacles to a unified "national identity" in such contexts. But subnational regionalism and nationalism frequently interacted in mutually reinforcing ways. As José Moya has shown, Basques

and Catalans may have involuntarily turned into *gallegos* upon arrival in Buenos Aires, but the myriad of their regionally based associations actually formed the bedrock for the emergence of a more unified "Spanish" associationist culture too.[55] In some cases this process occurred because administrative deals with national (e.g., Italian or Spanish) authorities were more practical and they were able to provide a greater deal of protection and rights than associations based on regional origin. In other instances the very fact of living abroad reinforced a common sense of belonging among groups that were earlier stratified along regional divisions.

Second, diasporic nationalisms invariably engaged constructions of national identity in the homeland regardless of whether this existed as a nation-state or not. Again, the Jewish diaspora's role in the foundation of Israel and the ensuing Middle East conflict or the Armenian diaspora's importance in the country's independence and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh are only the best known of a great many possible examples. One important driving force in diaspora-homeland connections was that, contrary to common perceptions of migrations as straightforward and definite movements from one nation-state to another, they always involved much return migration (on average probably nearly 50 percent for the migrations discussed in this volume) as well as back and forth movements and on-migrations, all within much larger circuits.[56] As scholars are becoming increasingly aware of this multisitedness, issues such as the transnational dimensions of Giuseppe Mazzini's ideas, including in Latin America, or the importance of Giuseppe Garibaldi's stay in South America for the unification of Italy are increasingly being researched.[57]

Chinese diaspora nationalism is another good case. Sun Yat-sen, who founded his Revive China Society in Hawaii in 1894, had a keen interest in the exploitation of Chinese Coolies in Peru and Cuba, as revealed by his library, which contained books based on the testimonies of returnees. Famously, he called the overseas Chinese "the mother of the revolution [of 1911]." A seminal Chinese nationalist tract from 1903 referred to Cuba as evidence that "fellow countrymen" were "ill-treated abroad." Although the overwhelming majority of Chinese in Latin America at the time came from Canton, forms of nationalism derived from the diasporic experience gained an ever widening spatial circulation back in China.[58] The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, in turn, was founded in Lebanon in 1932 by Antun Saadeh upon his return from São Paulo, where he had developed a nationalist consciousness in part through engagement with the texts of German

Romanticism as well as more recent race theories of the extreme right.[59] The living conditions of German immigrants in southern Brazil in turn buoyed the imagination of ethnic nationalists in the German Empire, who were in search of a traditional ideal untainted by the supposedly corrupting forces of modernity they believed were plaguing central Europe.[60] During the Weimar Republic (in varying degrees and depending on the political conjunctures at home) and the Third Reich (far more aggressively), German policymakers sought to galvanize "their" communities together with Latin American intellectual elites for Germany's political aims in Europe, usually in contradistinction to anything perceived as "French."[61] The Italian fascist state also directed propaganda efforts toward "its" diaspora, with especially intense efforts surrounding the Italian-Ethiopian war of 1935, as my own chapter outlines.[62]

Third, owing to the multidirectional movements of diasporas, diasporic nationalisms tend to promote or at least interact with the creation of supra- or pan-national identities, which are usually based on linguistic, religious, ethnic, or racial criteria. In fact, diasporic nationalism and pan-nationalism are often close relatives, so a clear-cut distinction between them is difficult to establish. It could be argued that the nationalism of the African diaspora, if it has ever existed in the singular, is much the same as pan-Africanism—if by this latter term we do not refer primarily to attempts to create supranational political structures uniting African nation-states. Latin America is not usually treated as a privileged site for the study of pan-African ideas since there exists an ongoing perception (or myth, if we prefer) that, in comparison to the United States or the Anglophone Caribbean, the national identities of African Latin Americans—as Brazilians, Colombians, or Cubans—trumped their racial identities.[63] Regardless of whether one shares this understanding or not, Latin America unquestionably mattered for the history of pan-Africanism. Marcus Garvey's travels to Costa Rica and Panama between 1910 and 1912 exerted a crucial influence on the development of his ideas as well as his Universal Negro Improvement Association, which—as Lara Putnam and Nicola Foote both discuss—opened branches in most Hispanic Caribbean countries in the 1910s. Many of its members, including Garvey himself, meanwhile, learned to draw on the resource of their British citizenship (perhaps not quite a pan-national but in hindsight arguably transnational identity) when this appeared to be useful. The disappointing results of this strategy then helped discredit British colonialism in Jamaica or Barbados, where many migrant

workers returned in the 1930s, coinciding with the stirring of pan-African solidarities and anticolonialism that the war in Ethiopia provoked in this setting (not to mention the earlier impact of the Harlem Renaissance).[64]

A pan-national concept that is of particular interest here is that of hispanidad. After first being used by a Spanish priest in Buenos Aires in 1926, the concept came to rally a long-existing pan-Hispanic nationalism, which was popularized by the right-wing Catholic intellectual Ramiro de Maeztu, who had served as Spain's ambassador to Argentina from 1928 to 1931, through his 1934 book, *Defensa de la hispanidad*. The celebrations of October 12 (the day on which Columbus first landed in the Americas) in many Spanish-speaking countries were subsequently labeled as Día de la hispanidad. Although the concept was nourished by earlier ideals of *hispanoamericanismo*, the repercussions of the Spanish civil war added a marked association of the term with the extreme nationalist right and with Catholicism in different settings. In Peru it served to lodge a distinction between right-wing *hispanistas* and left-wing *indigenistas*. In Argentina it was (paradoxically, one might think) always used in opposition to "cosmopolitanism" and sometimes tied into anti-Semitism or invoked as a counterweight to "Italianization," as Jeane DeLaney shows in her chapter in this volume.[65]

All of these examples demonstrate that national identities were not formulated only in opposition to migrations but rather in their course. Various identities—including those coded as national—oftentimes overlapped rather than excluded each other. Contrary to what some Chicago School theorists would make us believe, there was no strict correlation between the degree of "assimilation" or "integration" and socioeconomic upward mobility. Nor did "culturally similar" immigrants necessarily assimilate more easily or fully. If this had been the case, on the basis of concepts such as hispanidad, one would have to assume Spanish immigrants to be more "assimilated," "adjusted," or "integrated" than others in Spanish America, and the Portuguese to blend "more successfully" with Brazilians than other immigrants. However, the Spanish and the Portuguese often scored higher than others on the paradigmatic proxies for exclusion and separateness, such as levels of in-marriage, residential segregation, propensity to crime, or socioeconomic marginalization, all of which have been and continue to be seen by policymakers and much of the public at large as inimical to "integration" and the formulation of a "cohesive" national identity. Thus, in spite of their heavily male sex ratio, Portuguese immigrants in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Brazil in-married more often, were poorer

on average, and more often imprisoned than most other "foreigners." On those same criteria as well as residence patterns, Montevideo's Spanish were more "excluded" than its Italians. Nonetheless, travelers described the city as "typically" Spanish, and in the writings of local social chroniclers the label "immigration" itself seemed to be reserved for non-Spanish-speaking groups.[66]

Conversely, perhaps because they felt they had to, ostensibly "more different" groups were often keen to stress the cultural similarities between their home regions and the receiving society. For example, as political developments in the Middle East, mediated through what Brubaker has called "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs," began to stimulate pan-Arab feelings in Latin America's Syrian and Lebanese communities, the same "entrepreneurs" construed genealogies between Arab and Hispanic or Portuguese culture, in the process drawing on concepts such as hispanidad, or, as happened in Argentina in the 1950s and '60s, seeking to engage Catholic and anti-Semitic strands of nationalism.[67] Diasporic nationalisms therefore need not be construed in opposition to nationalisms of the host countries. Again, this can happen as DeLaney and Schulze suggest in their contributions. The chapters, however, provide many examples of compatibility or mutual reinforcements of various kinds of national identification. My own chapter, for instance, underlines the close overlaps between Italian Risorgimento exiles and nineteenth-century nation-building in the Rio de la Plata. Jeff Lesser and Raanan Rein mention Zionism as a vehicle to become Argentine since it gave Jews the kind of homeland that other Argentines—of Italian, Spanish, Portuguese descent—had too. Kathy Lopez shows in her chapter how Chinese immigrants and their descendants in Cuba sought to construe analogies between the Cuban independence hero Carlos Manuel de Céspedes and "their" national hero Sun Yat-sen.

Migrations and Comparison

Such manifold and varying relationships between migrations and the (re) reformulation of nationalisms in their global embedding must lead us to reconceptualize clean oppositions and dichotomies. Borrowing Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller's words, such rethinking indicates "that the incorporation of individuals into nation-states and the maintenance of transnational connections are not contradictory social processes. . . . Migrant incorporation into a new land and transnational connections to a homeland or to dispersed networks of family, compatriots, or persons who share

a religious or ethnic identity can occur at the same time and reinforce each other."[68] There was not "less" nationality A if there was "more" nationality B, but rather there was often "more" A *and* B as a result of migrations. As demanded by Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein for the study of Jewish Latin Americans, the "nation" can and should still retain "a prominent position" in studies of such connections. Like ethnicity, religion, race, or gender, "nation" is one—and an important—"piece within a broader identity mosaic," whose constituent elements can be mutually exclusive but also compatible or reciprocally reinforcing.[69]

The very term "transnational," the use of which in social sciences and the humanities has risen spectacularly in recent years, serves us well as a starting point to think about how national identities were themselves formed only in the process of being transgressed. As Kiran Patel has underlined, the concept should not tempt us into a "postnational, historically teleological wishful thinking that seeks to abolish nationalism and nation-states altogether by denying their importance as subject matters of analysis." After all, "the very logic of the term" implies that "the nation-state or an elaborated national consciousness represent a certain point of reference."[70] Bringing to the fore the case of immigration to Latin America, the aim of this volume, therefore, is not to minimize the historical importance of nation-states and national identities but rather to conceptualize them as "processual," undermined but equally importantly constituted through movements and shifts that crossed their boundaries. "Transnational" communities were "transnational" only because they engaged with national boundaries. For this purpose, the authors present the insights that can be gleaned from migration studies and from nationalism theories together.[71]

While recent developments in the discipline of history, with its newfound interest in far-flung global connections and flows, have doubtless contributed a great deal to complicating previous master narratives about the world's division into nation-states, they have arguably been weaker in postulating structural and causal factors leading to change than earlier theoretical models such as modernization theory, which is often cast as its archenemy. Yet the search for causation might still be seen as part and parcel of the historian's job. In order to prevent the danger of the history of migrations and national identities from falling apart into an infinite number of anecdotally fascinating but explanatorily weak series of connections and spreads without specific spatial grounding, each of the chapters of this volume adopts an explicitly comparative angle—whether by comparing different communities within one setting or a community that has become

coded as such in different settings. The volume thereby seeks to meet a frequently made but rarely implemented demand of historians of both migrations and nationalism for a comparative framework.[72] The goal, to be sure, is not merely additive but is to compare systematically similarities and differences between cases in order learn cumulatively about the relative weight of structural variables in shaping outcomes. In other words, a transnational perspective is not seen as a deadly antidote to the alleged ills that some proponents of transnational history believe to have detected in historical comparison but is instead a necessary, complementary element.[73] Because of its *longue durée* history of overlapping, blending, and competing national identities through migrations, the study of such movements in Latin America between 1850 and 1950 can make an especially interesting contribution to an emergent field of study thus defined.[74]

This volume is therefore divided into two parts that are designed to cover the history of immigration in Latin America and the Caribbean as comprehensively as possible and to test different ways of how comparison can further our understanding of this historical topic. The first part—consisting of chapters by Lara Putnam, Jürgen Buchenau, Jeane DeLaney, and Frederik Schulze—deals with geographical contexts, comparing various immigrant groups within that space. Putnam surveys the entangled histories of in- and out-migration in the circum-Caribbean. Since she concentrates on the British Caribbean, her chapter provides a welcome example of a context where the very term "nation" grew in importance only during or after the period of mass migration. Buchenau focuses on the untypical case of Mexico, drawing out examples of both xenophilia and xenophobia, which appeared to be rather often a popular affair directed against relatively wealthy immigrants in the Mexican context. Jeane DeLaney scrutinizes the changing attitudes of Argentine elites toward immigrants, which informed the rise of Argentine cultural nationalism from around 1880 onward, while Frederik Schulze contrasts various nationalisms enmeshed in southern Brazil—that of German and Japanese immigrants and that of Brazilian elites that over time became wary of immigration.

The second part, consisting of six chapters, looks at one "group" in different settings. In their contribution on Jews in Brazil and Argentina, Jeffrey Lesser and Raanan Rein put forward a forceful argument against the myth of Jewish exceptionalism—or, indeed, the exceptionalism of any immigrant group. Fitting well with some of the arguments made in this introduction, they stress that being Jewish did not usually mean being less Argentine or Brazilian in any way. Stefan Rinke, meanwhile, concentrates on a particular

moment in the history of German Latin Americans—mainly in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. During World War I, Rinke demonstrates, they were subjected to various degrees of hostility, most notably in Brazil. The chapter is a useful reminder that community identity does not necessarily decline with the length of stay in the host country but can be powerfully reinforced due to external pressures. Kathy Lopez compares the history of Chinese immigrants in Cuba, Mexico, and Peru. While she stresses that they were subjected to discrimination in all three contexts, due to hemispherically circulating discourses about the "yellow peril," there were also significant differences. Her chapter is thus a showcase of how the attribution of certain characteristics to a particular group interacts with the political embedding in different settings.

Nicola Foote builds on this theme in her assessment of the experiences of British Caribbean immigrants in Latin America. Drawing on the often neglected case studies of Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela in addition to the more familiar examples of Central America and Cuba, her chapter highlights how the critical contribution British West Indians made to nationalist modernization projects was complicated by the negative ideologies associated with blackness as well as by the close connection of Caribbean migrants to imperialist powers—exacerbated in many cases by forms of diasporic nationalisms that emphasized a "British" identity and that foregrounded the English language and Protestant religions. Her chapter underlines the tragic consequences of racism and xenophobia at the level of lived experience but demonstrates that even exclusionary and discriminatory nationalisms were shaped and informed by the actions of migrants themselves, who were not passive agents in the process of identity formation.

Finally, Steven Hyland's chapter and my own chapter deal more specifically with diasporic nationalisms, focusing on the Syrian-Lebanese and the Italian case, respectively. Hyland's contribution, in particular, stresses the heterogeneity of diasporic nationalisms among Arab communities in Latin America. Given the fragmented religious, ethnic, and political landscape of the post-Ottoman Levant, migrants in Latin America debated fiercely over what political course their homelands should take. If Schulze's chapter emphasizes the social heterogeneity of immigrant groups, Hyland's underlines that their visions of national identity were just as multifarious. My own contribution adopts a similar view but highlights the long-term role of migratory flows and demographics. Comparing diasporic nationalisms among Italians in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, I arrive at the conclusion

that the timing of migration played a crucial role in determining the politics of Italian communities in the Americas.

Notes

Epigraph: Guilherme de Almeida, quoted in Lesser, "(Re)Creating Ethnicity," 58.

1. For a concise overview, see McKeown, "Global Migration." A useful survey of the height of migrations from Europe to the Americas is Nugent, *Crossings*.

2. Figures vary widely. For an overview, see Sánchez Albornoz, "Population of Latin America, 1850–1930," 130, who probably overstates the numbers. Moya gives higher figures about the destination of European emigrants, but these exclude return migration (*Cousins and Strangers*, 46).

3. Much of this scholarship is comparative in the sense of edited volumes or special issues of journals in which each article treats specific, usually nationally framed, cases: e.g., Klich and Lesser, *Arab and Jewish Immigrants*; Fausto, *Fazer a América*; Baily and Míguez, *Mass Migration*; Anderson and Lee, *Displacements and Diasporas*; Lesser and Rein, *Rethinking Jewish-Latin Americans*; and the special issues of *Americas* 53, no. 1 (1996), on Middle Easterners; *Caribbean Studies* 31, no. 3 (2003), on Garveyism in the Hispanic Caribbean; *Latin American Perspectives* 31, no. 3 (2004), on East Asians; *Hispanic American Historical Review* 86, no. 1 (2006), on various groups in various countries; and *Portuguese Studies Review* 14, no. 2 (2006), on the Portuguese. In turn, monographs that are in themselves explicitly comparative remain rare. The most important are Baily, *Immigrants*; Franzina, *L'America gringa*; McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks*; and Masterson and Funada-Classen, *Japanese in Latin America*. The study of different groups within one national setting is still less frequent in the English-language scholarship. Exceptions are Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity*; and Goebel, "*Gauchos*, *Gringos* and *Gallegos*." While there are plenty of studies in languages other than English, some of which compare various groups within one national setting (a good survey on the best-known case—Argentina—is Devoto, *Historia de la inmigración*), the Latin American scholarship comparing different settings within Latin America beyond one nation-state remains extremely thin. As this overview underlines, the comparative literature has a bias toward smaller immigrant communities that are perceived as more "exotic" on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. An important precursor of much of the scholarship mentioned here was the short survey by Mörner, *Adventurers and Proletarians*.

4. The best-known works are Park and Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*; Wirth, *Ghetto*; Warner and Srole, *Social Systems*; and Gordon, *Assimilation*.

5. The classic formulation of this idea can be found in Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*.

6. An extreme, more autobiographical or political than scholarly example is Novak, *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*. In hindsight, this book's methodological nationalism, with its square focus on U.S. (identity) politics, is as striking as its ethnic essentialism. The author's irate denial of "Americanization," in my view, makes for a peculiarly "American" book, arguably bespeaking an acculturation of sorts.

7. E.g., Persons, *Ethnic Studies at Chicago*, 87–89; and Kazal, "Revisiting Assimilation," 446.

8. Wimmer and Glick Schiller, "Methodological Nationalism."

9. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 55; Smith, *National Identity*, 39; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; and Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention of Tradition*.

10. Of course, there were always prominent exceptions—for example, John Higham or, for Argentina, Sam Baily—but even they have usually treated nationalism/nativism and migrations in separate studies: Baily, *Labor, Nationalism, and Politics* and Baily, *Immigrants*. A fruitful attempt truly to integrate the two fields in Latin American history are the writings by Lesser, especially his *Negotiating National Identity*, although it is arguably more indebted to cultural or intellectual history than to social history.

11. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 81; Calhoun, *Nationalism*; and Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, 1–152.

12. Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism," 28–30.

13. E.g., Brubaker, "The Return of Assimilation?"; and Alba and Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream*.

14. Such findings are summarized by Gans, "Toward a Reconciliation."

15. An important article for this thesis is Portes and Zhou, "New Second Generation."

16. A good example is Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*.

17. For Spanish American history, see the discussion in Miller, *In the Shadow*, esp. 32–42.

18. Colom González, "La imaginación nacional"; and Miller, "Historiography of Nationalism," esp. 203–7, both make this observation.

19. Míguez, "Introduction: Foreign Mass Migration," xxii. The classic North American–South American comparison is between Italians in the United States and Argentina: Klein, "Integration of Italians"; and Baily, *Immigrants*.

20. Even sophisticated works such as Portes and Rumbaut, *Immigrant America*, since their aim is "focusing on major aspects of the adaptation experience" (34), suffer from a lack of conceptual interest in nationalism, discussing it mainly as nativism (346–49). A classic in Latin American history from such a perspective is Solberg, *Immigration and Nationalism*.

21. Miller, "Historiography of Nationalism," 216.

22. Sarmiento, *Conflicto y armonía*. On anxieties about Argentina's "Italianization" more generally, see Bertoni, *Patriotas*.

23. Costanzo, *Los indeseables*.

24. See Lvovich, *Nacionalismo y antisemitismo*, ch. 3. A good hemispheric comparison is Tucci Carneiro, *O anti-semitismo*.

25. Some of these measures were similar to the Immigration Act of 1924 in the United States, but most of them were passed after 1930, when the global economic crisis had already significantly reduced the number of immigrants anyway. There were, however, many mutual influences across countries of the Americas in directing migratory flows and legislation; see Bejarano, "La inmigración a Cuba."

26. See, e.g., Gertz, *O perigo alemão*; and Lesser, *Welcoming the Undesirables*, 105.

27. Carr, "Identity, Class, and Nation"; and McLeod, "Undesirable Aliens."

28. Alfaro-Velcamp, *So Far from Allah*, 116; on the other cases, see Hu-DeHart, "Racism"; and Yankelevich, "Hispanofobia."

29. On their role as border communities, see Curtis, "Mexicali's Chinatown"; and McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas," 321.

30. Moya connects what he casts as primarily transatlantic migrations to what Kenneth Pomeranz has called the "great divergence," which economically left China to trail behind Europe from around 1800 (Moya, "Continent of Immigrants," 4; Pomeranz, *Great Divergence*). By contrast, McKeown, in "Global Migration," points to the sizeable movement of peoples across Asia.

31. A well-known case is that of the Italians, who until the 1870s and after World War I in their majority went to other European countries but in between primarily went to the Americas. See, generally, Gabaccia, *Italy's Many Diasporas*.

32. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood*, 1–17. Brubaker later dismissed the whole distinction, however, in "Manichean Myth."

33. Álvarez, "Latin America and International Law," esp. 305–6. On how understandings and laws of citizenship were made *through* migrations between Argentina, Italy, and Spain, see Cook-Martín, "Soldiers and Wayward Women."

34. Buchenau, "Small Numbers, Great Impact."

35. On Moroccan Jews in the Amazon, see Benchimol, *Eretz Amazônia*; generally, see Klich and Lesser, "'Turco' Immigrants."

36. Apart from Masterson and Funada-Classen, *Japanese in Latin America*, see also, on Japanese immigration in Peru and Brazil, Takenaka, "Japanese in Peru"; Lone, *Japanese Community*; and Lesser, *Searching for Home Abroad*; and especially the article by Mori, "Identity Transformations among Okinawans," 47–66. On the role of Okinawa in Meiji constructions of "Japaneseness," see Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, esp. 26–34.

37. Bosch, "La colonización"; and Albaladejo, "Les descendants des Allemands."

38. Maffia, "La migración caboverdeana"; and McLeod, "Undesirable Aliens."

39. Kelly, *Irish 'Ingleses'*; see also Sábato and Korol, *¿Cómo fue?*.

40. Moya, "Spanish Emigration," 16.

41. Within a sample of 5,056 marriage records compiled from four Uruguayan departments between 1880 and 1930 (see Goebel, "Gauchos, Gringos and Gallegos," 194–96 for the sampling method) there were 67 Basque Frenchmen, of whom 34 married Frenchwomen. Only one of these Frenchwomen was not Basque (compared to 30 percent of non-Basques among the whole sample of Frenchwomen). Of the remaining 33 male French from the Basque Country, 7 married Spanish women (all Basques) and 20 married Uruguayan women, all but 2 of whom had at least one Spanish or French parent. Although the regional origin of the parents could not be ascertained, one would suspect a Basque involvement there too.

42. Moya, "Spanish Emigration," 20.

43. Quoted in Oddone, "La politica e le immagini," 98. Guy Bourdé estimates that about 17 percent of the approximately 7.6 million European arrivals to Buenos Aires between 1857 and 1930 (of whom many left again) came from Montevideo; Bourdé, *Urbanisation et immigration*, 162.

44. *Anuario Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay*; and Goebel, "Gauchos, Gringos and Gallegos."

45. Vanger, *Model Country*, 17.

46. Devoto, "Un caso di migrazione precoce," 15.

47. Nugent, *Crossings*, 66.

48. Blancpain, *Les Allemands*, 450–53; and Williams, "Welsh Settlers."

49. Greenfield, "Barbadians."

50. E.g., Hobsbawm, "Nationalism and National Identity."

51. Hughes, "Logistics," esp. 436–37. The Bolivian campaign in turn was led by the retired German general Hans Kundt; for an introduction to his role in the conflict, see Farcau, *Chaco War*, 87–98.

52. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 101–9. The second term is preferred by Nina Glick Schiller; see "Long-Distance Nationalism."

53. The most important introductions to definitions of the term and its relation with nationalism are Tölölyan, "Rethinking Diaspora(s)"; Cohen, *Global Diasporas*; Brubaker, "'Diaspora' Diaspora"; Gal, Leoussi, and Smith, *Call of the Homeland*; and Bauböck and Faist, *Diaspora and Transnationalism*.

54. E.g., Cinel, *From Italy to San Francisco*, 228–55; and Luconi, *From* Paesani *to White Ethnics*. A good Latin American regional case study is Zanini, *Italianidade*.

55. Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 277–331.

56. For obvious reasons, this is less valid for the classic (victim) diasporas.

57. Bayly and Biagini, *Giuseppe Mazzini*. The general idea is well elaborated by Choate, *Emigrant Nation*.

58. McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks*, 85–99; for the Sun quote, see Lum and Lum, *Sun Yat-sen*, xv; on Sun's library containing the 1860-book *Bitter Society*, see T'sai, "Chinese Emigration," 398; and Tsou and Lust, *Chinese Revolutionary Army*, 73. An important article to stimulate research in this area, though not in relation to Latin America, is Duara, "Transnationalism."

59. Lesser, *Negotiating National Identity*, 62–63; and Schumann, "Nationalism," esp. 601–3.

60. Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation*, 229–78. In an interesting contrast to the predominant view of an "assimilationist" Brazil versus a "pluralist" or segregationist United States, pan-German nationalists loathed the United States, as opposed to Brazil, as a "mass grave of Germandom," due to assimilation; Chickering, *We Men Who Feel Most German*, 88.

61. The literature on these topics, especially the Nazis, is obviously very broad. See, e.g., Rinke, *"Der letzte freie Kontinent"*; Goebel, "Decentring"; Brepohl de Magalhães, *Pangermanismo e nazismo*; Newton, *"Nazi Menace"*; and Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams*.

62. Bertonha, "Italiani nel mondo"; and Scarzanella, *Fascistas en América del Sur*.

63. The comparison of race relations in Brazil and the United States is a classic in the literature at least since the days of the Brazilian intellectual Gilberto Freyre, who, in his 1933 book, *Casa-Grande e Senzala* (The masters and the slaves), favorably compared Brazil's alleged "racial democracy" to North American racism. For a brief overview of mutual Brazilian–U.S. influences see Andrews, "Brazilian Racial Democracy."

64. See the contributions in *Caribbean Studies* 31, no. 3 (2003): Harpelle analyzes how Garvey organized a celebration for King Edward's coronation in Costa Rica ("Cross Currents," 48), and Hill argues that "the returning emigrants were a testament to the failure of imperial citizenship," kindling an anticolonial nationalism that was stirred further by the

war in Ethiopia ("Boundaries of Belonging," 15–16). See also Lewis, *Marcus Garvey*, ch. 7 on Garvey's travels.

65. See, generally, Falcoff and Pike, *Spanish Civil War*; Pérez Herrero and Tabanera, *España-América Latina*; Moya, *Cousins and Strangers*, 332–84; and González Cuevas, *Maeztu*.

66. Klein, "Social and Economic Integration"; Florentino and Machado, "Ensaio"; and Goebel, "*Gauchos*, *Gringos* and *Gallegos*."

67. Lesser, "(Re)Creating Ethnicity," 47–48; and Goebel, "Von der *hispanidad*." On "ethnopolitical entrepreneurs," see Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," 166.

68. Levitt and Glick Schiller, "Conceptualizing Simultaneity," 1003.

69. Lesser and Rein, "Challenging Particularity," 250–51.

70. Patel, "Transatlantische Perspektiven," 628–29.

71. For a similar demand concerning the "processual" character of ethnicity, see Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups"; and for an integrated field of study, see his "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism." In history, such an approach to nationalism is proposed by Duara, "Historicizing National Identity."

72. Green, "L'histoire comparative"; and Stearns, "Nationalisms."

73. The different positions are laid out in the following two articles: Seigel, "Beyond Compare," who appears to want to abolish comparisons with the help of the "transnational turn"; and Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," who argues in favor of an integration of the two. An earlier significant challenge to comparison is Espagne, "Sur les limites."

74. Alba and Nee speculate that racial and ethnic stratifications in the United States in the near future "could begin to resemble in certain aspects those of Latin America" in that "race/ethnicity will lose some of its clear-cut, categorical character," but they do not delve into the history through which these stratifications developed in Latin America (*Remaking the American Mainstream*, 290).