@article{Norfolk:296063,
      recid = {296063},
      author = {Norfolk, Daniel},
      title = {No good deed goes undisputed property relations &  insurgency in the periphery},
      publisher = {Graduate Institute of International and Development  Studies},
      address = {Geneva. 2018},
      number = {BOOK},
      pages = {VII, 465 p.},
      year = {2018},
      abstract = {Scholars of insurgency agree that agency is located in  both centre and periphery, in both the private and the  political spheres. This study attempts to connect these  sites by concentrating on the structuring power of  property. Rather than asking why groups rebel against the  state, I ask how they rebel. Specifically, I ask how  pre-existing social relationships shape alliance formation  in cases of rural insurgency. Alliance formation is crucial  in any insurgency, because it is rare that a single social  collective has the capacity to independently challenge the  state. It is even more important in the rural context,  where most insurgency foments, due to the logistical  obstacles to mobilizing a sparse population for collective  action. Under these circumstances, the alliances forged to  contest state authority have an immediate impact on the  ability to do so. Yet, we know very little about the  modalities linking distinct actors, structures, and  objectives. I argue that variation in insurgent alliance  formation is heavily influenced by the social structural  conduits and constraints formed by local property  relations. In order to test this argument, I develop a  deductive model that theorizes how insurgent alliances are  formed by the interaction between supralocal (political  sphere) territorial expansion of centralizing authorities  and local (private sphere) property relations in the  periphery. The model is tested in nine empirical cases of  insurgency in three geographical regions.},
      url = {http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/296063},
}