

Report

Preventing Violence through Inclusion: From Building Political Momentum to Sustaining Peace



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The Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (IPTI) is dedicated to evidence-based research and its transfer to policy and practice. The objective of the Initiative is to support sustainable peace by providing expertise and information on the inclusion of diverse actors in peace and transition processes. This expertise draws on the largest qualitative database of inclusive peace and political reform processes globally. The Initiative is part of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and is led by Dr. Thania Paffenholz.

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| Acronyms

CEH	Commission for Historical Clarification (Guatemala)
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Nepal)
CTSP	Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (Mali)
CSOs	civil society organizations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)
EU	European Union
GFA	Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland)
IHEID	Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
IPTI	Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative
MPNP	Multi Party Negotiation Process
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RHEMI	Recovery of Historical Memory Project (Guatemala)
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN Women	United Nations Women

| Executive Summary

This study analyzes when, how, and under what conditions the inclusion of a broad range of actors in peace and political transition processes contributes to the prevention of violence and armed conflict. It has been produced as a contribution to the United Nations–World Bank Study “Pathways to Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict.” Within the framework of UNSCR 2282 on Sustaining Peace, we use a broad definition of prevention that includes attempts to prevent the outbreak, continuation, escalation, or recurrence of violence.¹

The study provides a comparative qualitative analysis of three globally unique qualitative datasets, comprised of more than 40 in-depth qualitative case studies of inclusive peace and transition processes, compiled by the Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (IPTI), Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva.

Drawing on IPTI’s previous analytical work, the study analyzes how inclusion takes place through a range of **inclusion modalities**, through which actors beyond the main conflict parties can affect peace and transition processes. The inclusion modalities identified were: broader direct representation at the negotiation table, observer status, consultations, inclusive commissions, high-level problem-solving workshops, public decision-making, and mass action.

Overall, we found that inclusion plays an important role in preventing violence. Importantly, *how* inclusion contributes to prevention depends on the **kind of violence** and relatedly, the nature of political processes. We also found that the causal processes that prevent or reduce violence differ at the **early stages** of the prevention attempt and during the **transitional processes** that follow, as well as according to **conflict type**. Our findings therefore suggest that a combination of different inclusion modalities is important for sustaining peace, thus indicating the merit of sequenced inclusion.

In cases characterized by **popular protests** and incipient violent conflict, inclusion contributes to prevention by creating political momentum through which violence can be averted or reduced. When governments responded to protest-related violence through inclusive negotiation formats to jointly discuss the country’s future, grievances voiced on the street were transferred into formal processes. This helped to prevent or reduce violence.

¹ United Nations Security Council, “S/RES/2282. Adopted by the Security Council at Its 7680th Meeting, on 27 April 2016” (2016); World Bank and United Nations, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Main Messages and Emerging Policy Directions,” (Washington D.C., World Bank, 2017).

During **armed conflicts**, violence can initially be reduced through broadly inclusive negotiations, and in some instances relatively exclusive but representative elite deals. However, an early-stage reduction of violence did not guarantee sustainable peace in the longer term. For maintaining reduced levels of violence, the inclusion of actors beyond the principle conflict parties plays a critical supportive role.

Moreover, inclusion contributes to peaceful transition processes in two main ways, depending on their **design** and **mandate**. Firstly, through Inclusive Commissions **mandated to monitor or address violence**. Secondly, through formalized bodies that **address the causes of violence** by implementing comprehensive political reform processes. Inclusion mattered most when the implementing bodies addressed grievances (e.g. political or economic inequality), thus aiming to resolve violence by building inclusive institutions.

Importantly, the study found little evidence that inclusion in and of itself helps to tackle violence. Rather, the **representativeness** and **independence of included actors** influence the degree to which inclusive bodies can prevent and reduce violence. If all stakeholders in a conflict are represented, causes of conflict are more likely to be addressed and levels of violence reduced in a sustainable manner. The independence of included actors from the main conflict parties also affects whether the modalities function smoothly and contribute to successful prevention.

Moreover, the study identified a set of domestic, regional, and international factors that either support or constrain the effectiveness of inclusion in preventing violence. Such factors include the role and behavior of elites, civil society, hardliners, regional powers, women's influence in negotiations, as well as international diplomacy and technical assistance. Our analysis suggests that inclusive peace and political transition processes can contribute to the prevention of violence when they are timely and included actors are sufficiently representative and independent, and when processes are supported by a favorable domestic, regional, and international environment.

| 1. Introduction

Despite a long-term historical trend towards a more peaceful world, the last five years have seen a sharp rise in the number of active conflicts and conflict-related deaths.² The promise of the popular protest movements that spawned the Arab Spring, which demanded inclusive political institutions, have in many countries been shattered through ongoing, and often protracted, armed conflicts and wars, armed violence or continued insecurity. Moreover, countries that had undergone transitions to democracy since the end of the Cold War, many of which had previously witnessed the violent breakdown of authoritarian regimes, are currently undergoing democratic reversal processes.³ Even established democracies are increasingly being challenged by populist forces. The struggle for inclusive political institutions and violent conflict are thus closely related. Processes of political liberalization often coincide with an increase in armed violence. However, when institutions and political processes are conducted in a more inclusive manner, the risk of armed violence is likely to decrease as the established political order is capable of addressing and managing causes of conflict without resorting to violence.⁴

The World Bank and the UN have undertaken a joint study on the relationship between national development policies and approaches, international assistance, and the prevention of violent conflict.⁵ This joint study is set within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals, in particular Goal 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies, as well as UNSCR 2282 on Sustaining Peace, which calls for greater coherence between diplomatic, development, and security efforts to prevent violence. This merits a particular focus on the role of inclusion in the prevention of violent conflict.

The present study discusses how inclusive peace and political transition processes contribute to preventing violence. It analyses when, how, and under what conditions the inclusion of a broad range of actors in peace and political transition processes contributes to the prevention of violent conflict, and thus to sustained peace. We focus on political processes that span from the initial halting of violence to the successful implementation

² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP" (Uppsala University), accessed 20 October 2017, www.ucdp.uu.se.

³ Larry Diamond, "Facing Up to the Democratic Recession," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 141-55.

⁴ Håvard Hegre, "Democracy and Armed Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (2014): 159-72; Shinichi Takeuchi, "Political Liberalization or Armed Conflicts? Political Changes in Post-Cold War Africa," *The Developing Economies*, 45, no. 2 (2007): 172-93; United Nations, "Inclusive Development Critical for Preventing Conflict, Speakers Emphasize, as Security Council Debates Maintenance of International Peace, Security," accessed 25 October 2017, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11740.doc.htm>.

⁵ World Bank and United Nations. "Pathways for Peace," previews findings from the full study, which will be published in 2018.

of a political agreement. Of particular interest is the element of inclusion during these processes, and its relationship with the desired outcome of preventing violence. The study particularly examines how the inclusion of actors other than the principal conflict parties can contribute to prevention outcomes during political negotiations and their implementation. In line with the UN's recent resolutions on Sustaining Peace,⁶ in this study prevention is defined broadly as involving attempts to prevent the outbreak, continuation, escalation, or recurrence of violence.

IPTI has developed three interlinked globally unique qualitative datasets with more than 40 in-depth qualitative case studies of inclusive peace and transition processes.⁷ The processes contained in IPTI's three datasets include peace processes, National Dialogues, as well as constitution-making and political reform processes that often form part of long-term political transitions. These processes can variously be analyzed as attempts to prevent the occurrence, escalation or recurrence of violence. Contributing to the emerging global prevention agenda, this study presents the outcomes of a qualitative cross-case comparison of prevention attempts across IPTI's datasets. It asks how inclusion contributes to the prevention of violence, and thus sheds light on the complex relationship between inclusion and sustained peace.

The study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 provides a short conceptual discussion of inclusion, as well as an introduction to the typology of inclusion modalities on which this study is based. This is followed by a short elaboration of our methodology in Chapter 3. The remainder of the study presents findings on the relationship between inclusion and prevention. Chapter 4 broadly discusses our overall findings regarding the role played by inclusion in the prevention of violent conflict. Chapter 5 analyzes processes through which various inclusion modalities played a constitutive role for halting violence at the early stages of the prevention attempt, and Chapter 6 focuses on inclusion during transition processes that take place over a longer period of time, thus contributing to sustained peace. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses important factors that support or constrain the ability of included actors to contribute to prevention, such as civil society composition, the role of elites, hardliners, and the armed forces, as well as women's influence and the relevance of the regional and international context.

⁶ United Nations General Assembly, "A/RES/70/262. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 April 2016" (2016).

⁷ The biggest dataset is IPTI's Broadening Participation dataset comprising currently 43 case studies of inclusive negotiations; the dataset further includes a sub-dataset on the role of women in peace and transition negotiations comprising 28 cases. IPTI's third dataset is the Civil Society and Peacebuilding dataset comprising 13 in-depth long-term country case studies.

| 2. Inclusion: A Brief Literature Review

A growing body of scholarly literature has examined the link between inclusion and the prevention of violence, mostly taking an actor-oriented approach. While most research examines the effects of including or excluding armed actors, spoilers, and hardliners, a number of studies have shed light on the inclusion of civil society groups such as women's organizations, or other actors that are not the principle conflict parties.

Unsurprisingly, a growing body of literature suggests that including armed actors in peace processes is pivotal for preventing violence. Nilsson has studied the impact of including all armed parties to a conflict in peace negotiations on the duration of peace between the signatory parties in the ensuing agreement.⁸ Her study found that even in instances where excluded rebel groups continue to engage in conflict, this does not affect the likelihood that signatories to the agreement will resume violence. The inclusion of so-called spoilers in negotiation processes has been found to increase the likelihood of reaching and sustaining peace under certain conditions.⁹ Stedman, Nilsson, and Söderberg Kovacs have argued that the decision to include or exclude a spoiler depends on the context of a conflict, including the political commitment of the pro-peace parties.¹⁰ Importantly, violence committed during the implementation of peace agreements stems almost twice as often from parties excluded from the agreement as from included parties.¹¹ However, spoilers may be responsive to inclusion if their spoiling is intended to extract rents or concessions from the process.¹² Moreover, a more inclusive process can help to manage spoilers by creating more widespread support for the peace process and thus making it more difficult to undermine.¹³ What is more, a number of studies suggest that inclusive peace processes reduce the incentives for spoiler violence to emerge in the first place.¹⁴

⁸ Desirée Nilsson, "Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 4 (2008): 479-95.

⁹ Spoilers are defined by Stedman (1997) as "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it". Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (1997): 5.

¹⁰ Stedman, "Spoiler Problems," 5-53; Desirée Nilsson and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, "Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace Processes," *International Studies Review* 13, no. 4 (2011): 606-26.

¹¹ Andrew G. Reiter, "Fighting Over Peace: Spoilers, Peace Agreements, and the Strategic Use of Violence" (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2011), 89.

¹² Stedman, "Spoiler Problems," 11.

¹³ Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs, "Revisiting an Elusive Concept," 622.

¹⁴ Lisa Blaydes and Jennifer De Maio, "Spoiling the Peace? Peace Process Exclusivity and Political Violence in North-Central Africa," *Civil Wars* 12, no. 1-2 (2010): 3-28; Juliette R. Shedd, "When Peace Agreements Create Spoilers: The Russo-Chechen Agreement of 1996," *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (2008): 93-105; Malin Brenk and Hans van de Veen, "Development: No Development without Peace," in *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society*, ed. Paul van Tongeren et al. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 394-413.

Furthermore, the inclusion of additional actors beyond the main armed groups can have a positive effect on the reaching and sustaining of peace agreements: the violence-preventing effects of inclusion at the elite level have largely been demonstrated by the literature on power sharing, which illustrates that the distribution of political power across competing groups reduces the risk of violent conflict.¹⁵ However, only including armed groups that have sufficient military power “creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an appealing option” and may encourage groups to escalate violence to gain access to the negotiation.¹⁶ Inclusion that goes beyond elite deals is therefore of the utmost importance. Nilsson and Wanis-St. John and Kew have studied the impact of including civil society in peace negotiations, and found that civil society inclusion is associated with a greater durability of peace agreements.¹⁷ Moreover, broad-based inclusion can also be beneficial for the peace process itself. Firstly, including more groups in the process can contribute to the representation of the interests of these groups in the process. For unarmed actors, broader inclusion sends the message that violence is not the only path to political representation.

The inclusion of unarmed actors may also generate greater legitimacy and broader public support for the process, as well as for the resulting agreement. This may be because unarmed actors are stronger advocates for the common good than the representatives of armed groups, who may be more interested in the distribution of power and rents in the post-peace settlement order. Moreover, unarmed actors may be more likely to address the underlying causes of the conflict.¹⁸ Engaging civil society in the various stages of the peace process can promote higher levels of accountability among the conflict parties, as well as a sense that the negotiations have greater legitimacy, which can in turn lead to a shift in public opinion about the process.¹⁹ Studies have highlighted that civil society organizations can offer expertise and local knowledge, and, for instance, support mediators by providing contextual analysis or acting as the institutional memories

¹⁵ Pippa Norris, *Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work?* (New York: NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

¹⁶ Denis M. Tull and Andreas Mehler, “The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa,” *African Affairs* 104, no. 416 (2005): 376.

¹⁷ Desirée Nilsson, “Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace,” *International Interactions* 38, no. 2 (2012): 243–66; Anthony Wanis-St. John, “Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” *International Negotiation* 13, no. 1 (2008): 1–9.

¹⁸ Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Catherine Barnes, “Weaving the Web: Civil-Society Roles in Working with Conflict and Building Peace,” in *People Building Peace II, Successful Stories of Civil Society*, ed. Paul van Tongeren, et al. (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 7–24.

¹⁹ Wanis-St. John, “Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society,” 1–9; David Lanz, “Who Gets a Seat at the Table? A Framework for Understanding the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Peace Negotiations,” *International Negotiation* 16, no. 2 (2011): 275–95; Cynthia J. Chataway, “Track II Diplomacy: From a Track I Perspective,” *Negotiation Journal* 14, no. 3 (1998): 269–87.

of the peace process. This can be especially important in unclear conflict environments in which mediators can get caught up in, and confused by, conflicting agendas.²⁰

Moving away from an actor-only approach discussing inclusion and exclusion, Paffenholz has developed a typology of the various modalities through which additional actors can be included in negotiation processes and the implementation of negotiated agreements.²¹

The seven modalities are:²²

1 | **Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table.** This takes place as part of so-called track one negotiations and can be achieved by including more actors in the main negotiation delegations, by enlarging the number of negotiation delegations at the table, or else by including almost all relevant constituencies within society through a broad-based format such as a National Dialogue.

2 | **Observer Status.** Observers are permitted to be present in most or all sessions of a negotiation, or specific working groups, however they are usually not allowed to speak formally, nor do they have any decision-making power.

3 | **Consultations.** Consultations can be used to gather opinion from a larger set of constituents, to discover facts, or to create consensus. They can be officially endorsed and part of the negotiation or can be unofficial, as well as broad-based and public or more elite-centered.

4 | **Inclusive Commissions.** These enjoy formal standing prior to and during negotiations or play a crucial role in the implementation phase.

5 | **High-level Problem-solving Workshops.** These workshops are unofficial and generally not publicized. They bring together representatives close to the leaders of the conflict parties, and offer them a space for discussion without the pressure to reach agreement.

6 | **Public Decision-making.** Peace agreements and constitutions can be submitted to ratification through popular referenda. They seek to provide democratic legitimacy to the process, ensuring public support and the sustainability of the agreement.

7 | **Mass Action.** Mass protests or strikes are another modality by which

²⁰ Barnes, "Weaving the Web," 7-24; Thania Paffenholz, "Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment," in *Civil Society and Peacebuilding*, ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 43-64; Thania Paffenholz, "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Beyond the Inclusion-Exclusion Dichotomy," *Negotiation Journal* 30, no. 1 (2014): 69-91.

²¹ Paffenholz, "Civil Society and Peace Negotiations," 69-91.

²² The "Broadening Participation" project originally contained nine inclusion modalities which consisted of 1) Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table; 2) Observer Status; 3) Official Consultations; 4) Consultations; 5) Inclusive Commissions; 6) High-level Problem-solving Workshops; 7) Public Participation; 8) Public Decision-making; and 9) Mass Action. However, in light of new research, the various consultative fora were grouped under a single category which reduced the number of inclusion modalities to seven.

actors can include themselves in a process, by making their voices heard and raising grievances or preferences related to a conflict or political transition. Mass Action can occur before, during, or after violent conflict or a political crisis.

This study draws on Paffenholz' framework in order to discuss the relationship between inclusion and the prevention of violent conflict across our dataset. We use the inclusion modalities as a heuristic in order to develop a nuanced analysis of what type of inclusion by which type of actors in which phase of the peace process contributed to the prevention of armed violence. The next section outlines our methodological approach.

| 3. Methodology

The objective of this study is to examine how inclusion contributes to the prevention of violence and to sustained peace. To this end, we analyze 47 prevention attempts reconstructed from IPTI's datasets. A prevention attempt is understood as a political process initiated with the aim of preventing violence and consisting of one or more inclusion modalities. We define prevention attempts as inclusive if they involve actors beyond the principal negotiation parties. We understand the latter as those actors with an independent veto power over the negotiations due to their control over the means of violence. In armed conflicts this is usually the government and its main armed contenders. Included actors were defined as any groups aside from these principal negotiating parties taking part in one or more of the inclusion modalities presented in Chapter 2. Generally, the cases in IPTI's datasets document the inclusion of previously excluded non-state-armed groups, political parties including the unarmed opposition, civil society, women's groups, youth, as well as faith-based and traditional actors. In line with the typology of the seven modalities of inclusion sketched out in Chapter 2, we have asked when, how, and under what conditions each of the modalities can contribute to the prevention of violent conflict. In line with UNSCR 2282, we employ a broad definition of prevention, which includes all efforts to avert "the outbreak, escalation, recurrence or continuation of violent conflict." Such a political process usually entails bringing conflict parties into a negotiation process that is set up to reduce or end armed violence and address its causes. The above definition hints at the fact that prevention attempts can take place in different phases of a conflict's lifespan. We have therefore clustered the processes in our datasets into three categories of prevention attempts that each comprised activities aimed at averting violence. The three categories are differentiated by levels of violence and types of violence, the latter defined by its causes, dynamics, and the actors involved. The three attempts aim at either:

- (1) the prevention of the outbreak of violence, comprising activities to avert a new type of large-scale violence that has not existed before, or*
- (2) the prevention of the continuation or escalation of violence,²³ comprising activities to avert the continuation or escalation of a pre-existing type of violence, or*
- (3) the prevention of the recurrence of violence, comprising activities to avert a type of violence that has historically taken place, has ceased, but is in danger of renewed eruption.*

²³ Slightly diverting from the clustering of prevention in the definition provided in UNSCR 2282, we have grouped these two prevention attempts together because post-facto, it has proven difficult in most cases to differentiate between activities aimed at preventing the escalation of violence and those aimed at preventing its continuation.

In total, we have identified 47 prevention attempts across our datasets. Six of these are attempts to prevent the outbreak of conflict, 30 are attempts to prevent the escalation or continuation of violence, and 11 are attempts to prevent the recurrence of violence. Re-clustering our dataset according to the three types of prevention attempts defined above meant that some countries in our datasets contained several prevention attempts. This is the case, for example, when a country experienced first a political process aimed at preventing the continuation or escalation of violence in a country—i.e. a process taking place during a violent conflict—which was clustered as a case of preventing the continuation or escalation of violence, followed by another prevention attempt, aimed at preventing the recurrence of the same violent conflict, taking place in the post-war implementation period. In such a case, we have coded two prevention attempts, given the fact violence had ceased in the intervening period. Our analysis focuses on violent conflict in the context of disputes over government or territory at the national or subnational level.²⁴ Moreover, we specifically use the term armed conflict with regard to conflicts that have resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths and involve at least one organized non-state armed group.²⁵ For reasons of parsimony we have measured levels of violence through the UCDP Database, which documents battle-related deaths.²⁶

IPTI's datasets contain negotiation and transition processes selected with a purposive sampling strategy intended to capture a variety of inclusive peace negotiations and political transitions that have taken place in the post-Cold War era.²⁷ Our selection covers a range of geographic regions and varies according to violence type and intensity, the diversity of actors involved, modalities of inclusion, stage of conflict cycle, and time period. Some countries feature more than one negotiation case as they have experienced successive negotiations or several distinct prevention attempts, which allowed for intra-country comparisons. Overall, IPTI's datasets provide findings on different types of peacemaking, constitution-making, and major political reforms and analyze the role played by a variety of actors during these transition processes.

²⁴ Our analysis thus excludes non-political interpersonal violence, such as domestic violence. In some instances, however, we highlight criminal violence, if it is the result of political processes.

²⁵ Following Wallensteen and Sollenberg, we define an armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict, 1989-2000,” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001): 643.

²⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “UCDP.”

²⁷ IPTI datasets do not contain exclusion cases, where, for example, negotiations only included conflict parties, as the aim of our research is to better understand the *inclusive nature* of negotiation processes and the different forms inclusion can take (represented in the modalities framework). However, we account for variations in the way that inclusion manifests itself across our cases through the analysis of modalities' independence and representativeness, as described below.

Given the limited size of the datasets and the selection of cases, we cannot claim that our datasets provide a representative sample of prevention processes globally. However, through an inductive analysis guided by the existing literature on inclusion in peace processes, the datasets enable us to develop claims about the relationship between inclusion and prevention. We first aimed to identify general patterns across the dataset through a systematic qualitative coding and counts. Based on these indicative patterns we then used intra-case process tracing and structured comparisons to shed light on important context factors that lead to variations across the dataset. In terms of comparative method, we thus do not follow a positivist comparative design that aims to produce law-like generalizations. Rather, comparisons help us to highlight important complexities across the dataset.

Drawing on previous research conducted by IPTI in the framework of the Broadening Participation project, we have conducted this analysis based on the key finding that while inclusion plays a significant role in relation to negotiating and implementing political agreements, the effectiveness of inclusion depends on important additional factors. We have therefore analyzed the 47 prevention attempts to ask how the seven inclusion modalities affected prevention outcomes, and further, how additional factors impacted their effectiveness. Of course, many other factors are likely to influence levels of violence and sustainable peace without a direct impact on any of the inclusion modalities. In our analysis we therefore aim to either account for them or hold them stable through structured comparisons.

We base claims about the effectiveness of inclusion modalities first of all on intra-case process tracing and thus on intra-case causality. The comparisons between cases then help us to elaborate on these findings in greater detail. We have asked whether specific factors co-occur with a prevention outcome across various cases that are otherwise relatively different, or whether the presence or absence of specific factors can help to explain variation in a prevention outcome across various cases that are otherwise relatively similar. We compare across relatively inclusive cases, aiming to account for both the impact of inclusion modalities on levels of violence, as well as important other factors that either influence violence directly or indirectly through the inclusion modalities. Our analysis thus draws on a combination of counts, intra-case process tracing, as well as on structured comparisons between cases.

However, any single type of modality does not have the same capacity to prevent violence across cases, i.e. a High-level Problem-solving Workshop may successfully reduce levels of violence in a given case A but it may fail to do so in a given case B. This is largely due to the fact that the effectiveness of each modality depends on a large variety of interrelated factors, which can

be both endogenous and exogenous to the modalities. These factors are discussed in Chapter 6 of this study. Importantly, we do not presume that endogenous and exogenous factors are independent from one another. In most cases, endogenous factors are influenced by the exogenous political environment in which inclusion modalities take place, and particularly by factors stemming from the domestic and international environment.

Our analysis was conducted in several steps. We first considered that any of the inclusion modalities can directly or indirectly contribute to the prevention of violence, in the latter case through setting up or supporting another modality. We also examined potentially negative ambivalent effects that the modalities may have on violence. In line with these considerations, we have coded the effectiveness of modalities on levels of violence and causes of conflict according to a 5-point qualitative scale, differentiating between a direct positive effect; a somewhat positive effect;²⁸ an ambivalent effect; no effect; and a negative effect. This differentiation informs our analysis; it highlights that the effectiveness of the various inclusion modalities should be thought of relationally: no single modality suffices to prevent violence; rather it is a combination of modalities that may initially halt violence, and then prevent its continuation or recurrence. Consequently, we also found it fruitful to differentiate between initial effects on levels of violence, i.e. effects that could be observed at the early stages of a prevention attempt, and effects that influenced levels of violence thereafter and over a longer period of time, often as part of a transitional process. Our analysis will account for these sequential dynamics, which in most cases involve several modalities.

We furthermore found that the composition of included actors may differ between two or more modalities of the same type, and we examined the composition of actors, finding that the independence and representativeness of the included actors influences prevention outcomes. We measured the representativeness of an inclusion modality by the extent to which the sum of included actors spoke and acted on behalf of all stakeholders to the conflict. Moreover, we asked whether the included actors were relatively independent and able to act without pressure from government and all armed parties to the conflict, and whether this influenced the effectiveness of inclusion modalities. Representativeness and independence were rated on a simple high-medium-low scale.

In order to better assess the role played by inclusion in sustaining peace, we also deemed it pivotal to discuss to what degree a reduction of violence was achieved through addressing causes of conflict, or whether other factors, such as increasingly authoritarian and repressive state structures,

²⁸ This category contains effects that are indirect or less pronounced, for example because they require a further intervening factor to materialize.

also contributed to this effect. We therefore coded the causes of conflict along a simple, inductively-derived typology, differentiating between causes related to political inequality, the nature of political institutions, weakness of political institutions, economic inequality, ethnicity/citizenship, natural resources, the regional environment, the international environment, and military or security-related factors. Moreover, we accounted for alternative explanations related to the international, regional, and domestic environment in each case.

Finally, we queried our data for evidence that the domestic, regional, and international environment influenced the effectiveness of inclusion modalities. In the course of our analysis, we grouped these factors according to a number of cross-cutting themes, such as the composition and involvement of civil society, the influence of women, elite co-optation and resistance, the role of hardliners and armed forces, as well as the regional and international environment, discussed in Chapter 6. The coding for exogenous factors was conducted in an open and inductive fashion, in order to account for the multiplicity of conditions that can determine the effectiveness of any given modality.


| 4. Overall Results

Inclusion plays a significant role in the prevention of violence. It contributes to both the initial halting of violent conflict, as well as to sustained efforts to prevent its escalation or recurrence. We found a crucial difference between processes within which inclusion modalities contribute to prevention at the early stages of a prevention attempt, and processes within which they initially sustain prevention achievements and then contribute to prevention over a longer period of time. During the early stages, inclusion plays a constitutive role in halting violence by creating momentum through which violence can be prevented or reduced. Thereafter, we found that a combination of inclusion modalities are instrumental in setting up and implementing inclusive political transitions through which causes of conflict can be addressed and further violence prevented. Another important differentiation pertains to the levels and types of violence. In fact, preventing violence related to mass protests generally requires a high level of inclusion, while violence related to ongoing armed conflicts can initially be reduced through relatively exclusive but representative negotiation formats, which subsequently need to be followed by broader inclusion if prevention effects are to be sustained. The results are discussed in greater detail below.

We have queried our data for evidence that any of the seven inclusion modalities identified in each of the cases contributed to a reduction of violence. Out of a total of 118 modalities that we documented in total across the 47 prevention attempts, 22 modalities had a clearly positive effect on reducing levels of violence in the early stage of the prevention attempt, and 16 contributed to preventing violence during consecutive efforts to prevent an escalation or return to violence. 36 inclusion modalities had a more mixed, but still evidently positive effect on preventing levels of violence early on, while this is the case for 47 inclusion modalities which played a role in sustained efforts to prevent violence that formed part of political transitions. Overall, 78 out of 118 inclusion modalities, i.e. almost two-thirds²⁹ contributed to a reduction of violence either through early or through consecutive efforts (see Chart 1).

²⁹ These modalities either had a direct positive effect, a somewhat positive effect, or an ambivalent effect.

Chart 1. Modalities' Effectiveness in Reducing Violence in the Early Phase of a Prevention Attempt and During Political Transitions



In the early stages of a prevention attempt, various inclusion modalities are constitutive in halting violent conflict by creating momentum through which levels of violence can be reduced. Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table, and, to a lesser extent, Consultations and High-level Problem-solving Workshops play a pivotal role. Importantly, broad-based inclusion is particularly relevant in the prevention of the occurrence or escalation of violence related to popular protests. In these situations, inclusive negotiations that involve a broad range of stakeholders can be instrumental in transferring the voicing of grievances from the street into formalized processes.

In cases with high levels of violence, we similarly found that modalities which enable broadly inclusive arrangements played a crucial supportive role in building momentum. Yet, in some cases the continuation or escalation of violence could initially be prevented through relatively exclusive negotiations or deals. In such cases, achieving a reduction of violence did not initially necessitate broad-based participation, as the inclusion of the main armed groups in the negotiations was sufficient to generate initial momentum to halt violence. However, such arrangements only contributed to a sustainable reduction of violence if they were followed by broader participation beyond the main conflict parties.

Moreover, in political transitions that take place over a longer period of time, a number of inclusion modalities, such as Inclusive Commissions and Public Decision-making, proved instrumental. Overall, inclusion modalities can contribute to more sustainable transition processes in two different ways: firstly, they can tackle violence directly, particularly in the form of Inclusive Commissions with a respective mandate. Such examples include ceasefire commissions, peace commissions, or peace and reconciliation commissions which monitor levels of violence, facilitate local peace deals, fight impunity, or implement reconciliation processes. Secondly, different inclusion modalities can contribute to preventing a return to violence by addressing the causes of conflict. Importantly, we also found that prevention outcomes were most sustained if the inclusion modalities were able to address popular grievances related to political inequality and the nature of political institutions. In this context, Public Decision-making, mainly in the form of referenda, also proved instrumental for strengthening public support for the transitional process.

One further important finding is that the design and mandate of inclusion modalities determines their ability to address levels of violence. Some modalities tend to appear during the early phases of the prevention attempt, such as Direct Representation, Observer Status, Consultations, and Problem-solving Workshops, while Inclusive Commissions and Referenda mostly appear later on. Moreover, while some of the modalities are designed and mandated to reduce violence directly, other modalities are intended to reduce violence only indirectly. Inclusive Commissions can take many different forms and can have direct and indirect effects. For instance, an Inclusive Commission tasked with monitoring ceasefire provisions can directly contribute to reducing violence, while an Inclusive Commission mandated to draft a new constitution that forms part of a transitional process would only indirectly contribute to reducing violence if and when the new constitution can address the underlying causes of conflict. Moreover, Inclusive Commissions beget their preventive capacity

mostly during political transitions that help to sustain low levels of violence. This can be explained by the relatively long time this modality takes to produce outcomes, which enables in-depth engagement with contextualized problems. Inclusive Commissions often address issues deemed too contentious to broach during negotiations that take place during an ongoing conflict, such as truth and reconciliation, land rights, and constitution-making.

Finally, we found that the representativeness and independence of actors included through these modalities matters greatly. In both inclusive and relatively exclusive negotiation formats, representativeness is crucial for creating momentum that halts violence. Inclusive formats should broadly include all stakeholders to the conflict, while in exclusive formats an arrangement through which all armed or main political groups are represented may suffice at first, if followed up by broader inclusion to sustain preventive effects. Furthermore, the more representative the actors in the inclusion modalities are, the more likely the modalities are to address some of the causes that underpin violence.

In addition, the level of independence of included actors from the main conflict parties is important for successful prevention attempts. Interestingly, both too little and too large a degree of independence can decrease the effectiveness of inclusion modalities. For example, we found that included civil society actors, when aligned with conflict parties, are not likely to play a constructive role. However, we also found that when included actors hold strong positions that cannot be reconciled with those of the main conflict parties, this may lead to politicization and deadlock.

Overall, these findings suggest that successful prevention attempts often include a combination of inclusion modalities that operate over an extended period (see Chart 1 above). Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table and other negotiation forms such as High-level Problem-solving Workshops can create momentum for peace through which violence is initially halted and during which the main causes of conflict may be discussed. These are often accompanied or followed by activities that strengthen the legitimacy of processes, such as Consultations and Public Decision-making. Finally, the sustainability of any agreement will ideally be guaranteed through long-term implementation mechanisms such as Inclusive Commissions, forming part of comprehensive political reform processes aimed at creating political institutions that can manage conflicts peacefully. Nevertheless it is important to note that the relationship between inclusion and the prevention of violence is not always straightforward: while inclusion can reduce levels of violence, failed inclusive processes can result in increased levels of violence, for example if they lead to renewed tensions or grievances through which the conflict actors can justify a return to arms.

In addition, the study found that external factors are important in determining the effectiveness of inclusion modalities:

- Civil society often plays a crucial role in inclusive prevention attempts. Yet, this role depends on the space available for civil society to act independently, which is often determined by the overall political climate, as well as by the severity of the conflict. The legitimacy that civil society organizations enjoy among the local population is another crucial factor. This is particularly significant for professional civil society organizations that often implement internationally-funded projects that may fail to represent the interests of the affected population. In addition, when civil society groups and movements enjoy legitimacy, they can also prove instrumental in initiating or supporting mass protests that often give rise to inclusive prevention attempts.
- One further factor that influences the effectiveness of modalities in preventing violent conflict is the behavior of political, economic, and social elites. We found that an elite bias considerably affects the representativeness of modalities through, for example, selection procedures that often lead to the inclusion of a standard set of actors. In addition, elites often sustain stronger ties to one or more conflict parties, thus reducing the independence of modalities and affecting which conflict causes are addressed in a prevention attempt. Moreover, governments often exercise considerable influence on inclusive processes, through selection criteria, co-opting or capturing inclusion modalities, or agenda setting.
- Hardliner inclusion is an important factor for the effectiveness of modalities to end or prevent violent conflict. Hardliners can be armed actors or non-armed groups lobbying for intransigent positions to pursue economic, political, or military interests. In general, the existence of hardliners poses a considerable challenge to prevention attempts and particularly to the design of inclusion modalities.
- Military actors, such as national armed forces, can enable or constrain the effectiveness of inclusion modalities during peace and transition processes. In some cases, armed forces have initiated transition processes and pushed for the introduction of certain modalities of inclusion. But in cases where the military has a long history of involvement in civilian affairs, it has often attempted to control and spoil inclusive processes or ignore their outcomes.

- The influence of women in inclusion modalities has in many cases not only proved significant for the overall prevention outcomes, but also for heeding gender-specific aspects of violence. We found that the influence of women depends on, inter alia, gender quotas, broad coalitions between women bridging factional divides, independent women's delegations present during negotiations, the traditional standing of women in conflict-affected societies, as well as on international support.
- International organizations as well as influential foreign governments frequently influence inclusive prevention attempts and the effectiveness of inclusion modalities through a combination of diplomacy and technical assistance. For example, international actors may facilitate discussions between conflict parties, push for the inclusion or exclusion of actors, or influence the setup of inclusion modalities. Alternatively, they may provide financial means, facilities, and training that supports the prevention attempt.

Overall, summarizing the findings discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 below, we found that inclusive processes can successfully contribute to the prevention of violent conflict when they are supported through a favorable domestic, regional, and international environment.

| 5. Building Momentum for Peace

This chapter discusses how inclusion modalities can play a crucial role in building momentum that halts violence in the early stages of the prevention attempt. We differentiate between cases involving violence related to popular protests and cases involving violence related to ongoing armed conflict. By comparing the effectiveness of modalities in reducing levels of violence at an initial stage, we found that some modalities are more effective than others (see Chart 1).

To this end, we conducted several counts to compare the relative effectiveness of modalities across the dataset, comparing the modalities with a *direct positive* effect and a *somewhat positive* effect. A comparison of the modalities with a *direct positive* effect shows that Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table has the most pronounced positive effect on levels of violence in the early stages of the prevention attempt (11 out of 22 cases in which the modality occurs).³⁰ Other modalities are comparatively less effective: Consultations in 4 out of 27 cases, Inclusive Commissions in 3 out of 22 cases, High-level Problem-solving workshops in 0 out of 9 cases, and Public Decision-making in 1 out of 13 cases.³¹ Additionally, comparing modalities with a *somewhat positive* effect on violence, Direct Representation also scores relatively highly, with a *direct positive* effect in 5 out of 22 cases. In comparison, Consultations scored *somewhat positive* in 9 out of 27 cases, Inclusive Commissions in 2 out of 22 cases, High-level Problem-solving Workshops in 5 out of 9 cases, and Public Decision-making in 3 out of 13 cases. If we collate modalities with a *direct positive* and a *somewhat positive* effect, three modalities stand out: Direct Representation is the most effective modality for initially reducing violence (16 out of 22 cases), followed by Consultations (13 out of 27 cases) and High-level Problem-solving Workshops (5 out of 9 cases).

We explain the relative effectiveness of these three modalities of inclusion—Direct Representation, High-level Problem-solving Workshops, and Consultations—in terms of their ability to build momentum for peace, by offering the included parties avenues to voice their interests and grievances through non-violent means and a path to a negotiated solution to the conflict.

The concept of momentum captures a complex causal relationship that contributes to a reduction of violence.³² While several other factors may

³⁰ In two additional cases, the data were insufficient to judge the modalities' initial impact on levels of violence. Therefore, here and henceforth, only modalities with sufficient data to judge their effect are counted.

³¹ Mass protests often have an ambivalent or indirect effect on violence. This is discussed in greater detail below in Chapter 5.1. on Civil Society actors.

³² Therefore, by definition, it does not apply to cases in which the prevention attempt aims at the non-recurrence of violence.

matter for building momentum, our analysis suggests that in many cases, a combination of the various inclusion modalities play a constitutive role. Particularly, Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table is of pivotal importance in most cases, while Consultations play a valuable supporting role. High-level Problem-solving Workshops in contrast prove less effective but have some effect in a number of cases. A common feature of the three modalities is their provision of a platform that offers opportunities to the conflict parties to pursue their interests without resorting to force.

In this chapter, we differentiate between cases characterized by popular protests on the one hand, and cases of armed conflict on the other. In the former group of cases, levels of violence are comparably low at the onset of the prevention attempt, and the inclusion modalities aim to prevent either the occurrence of violence or its escalation. In the latter set of cases, levels of violence are relatively high at the onset of the prevention attempt, and the inclusion modalities aim to prevent either the further escalation of violence or its continuation. This differentiation is important, as in cases with large-scale violence an initial reduction of violence can already be achieved through relatively exclusive negotiation formats, which only involve the major armed groups. However, these effects can only be sustained if followed by more inclusive arrangements (see Chapter 7). In contrast, preventing violence during popular protests requires a much more broad-based process early on, involving all stakeholders to the conflict.³³

5.1. Building Momentum during Popular Protests

This section discusses how broad-based inclusion proved particularly important in cases where violence was a consequence of popular protest movements seeking to be represented in political decision-making. In many cases, mass protests led to violence that was either initiated or perpetrated by state security forces, such as in Egypt, South Africa, Togo (both cases), as well as in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.³⁴ In five out of seven cases characterized by the attempt to prevent the occurrence of violence in the context of such protests, Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table provided an efficient way of transferring the voicing of grievances from the street to the negotiation table. Violence was reduced or halted either because the negotiations led to an abating of violent protests, a reduction of violent repression of the protests by armed forces, or both. Mali (National Dialogue), Benin and Togo (both cases), and Nepal constitute particularly good examples for building momentum for an initial reduction of violence during popular protests. The governments of all four countries faced a

³³ Some cases, such as Yemen, are a combination of both mass protests and large-scale violence.

³⁴ In eight cases, protests occurred without any significant protest-related violence, namely Benin, Cyprus, Liberia, Macedonia, Mexico, Northern Ireland GFA, and Sri Lanka.

legitimacy crisis that was by and large the result of failed economic reform processes, corruption, and authoritarian rule. Popular discontent was initially channeled through mass protest that periodically turned violent. However in all cases, violence significantly decreased once these grievances could be voiced in representative negotiation formats.

A comparison of the Togo and Mali National Dialogues suggests that while other important factors may contribute to creating momentum that halts violence, Direct Representation plays a crucial constitutive role. In Togo, protests successfully challenged the bloodless coup d'état of Faure Gnassingbé, who acceded to power after his father, long-term President Gnassingbé Eyadéma died in February 2005. The protests forced him to step down after only three weeks, and led to elections soon after, which he nevertheless won. Widespread opposition protests followed these elections, leading to negotiations between representatives of the government, civil society groups, and opposition political parties, which began on 10 August 2006. Government and opposition political parties signed the Global Political Agreement in Lomé on 21 August 2006.³⁵ From 2005 to 2006, levels of violence decreased sharply, from 800 deaths in 2005 to almost no deaths in 2006.³⁶ This can be attributed to increased opportunities for participation in political life, thus channeling the expression of grievances into the political system non-violently.

In Mali an urban popular protest movement demanded an end to the authoritarian Second Republic in 1991, including through a general strike. The political protests turned violent in March 1991, and military officers undertook a coup against the incumbent president. This period of violence was followed by an inclusive National Conference held from July to August 1991 to negotiate an end to the authoritarian Second Republic and to prevent a looming civil war.³⁷ Overall, the activities grouped around the National Dialogue reduced political grievances stemming from authoritarian rule and led to a reduction of violence in urban areas. In 1992, the Third Republic was officially proclaimed, followed by a constitutional process and parliamentary elections. As the chart below suggests, levels of violence related to the popular protests fell back to zero in 1993, the year after this prevention attempt.³⁸

³⁵ Adewale Banjo, "The Politics of Succession Crisis in West Africa: The Case of Togo," *International Journal on World Peace*, no. 2 (2008): 33.


³⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Togo," accessed 18 October 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/461>.

³⁷ Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu, "The Role of the National Conference in the Transition to Democracy in Africa: The Cases of Benin and Mali," *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 21, no. 1/2 (1993): 44-50.

³⁸ Nzouankeu. "The Role," 44-50. However, Mali again witnessed high levels of violence in 1994, related to the Tuareg rebellion. We discuss this stark increase in levels of violence in a separate case further below. The Tuareg rebellion was also the reason behind most of the armed violence documented by UCDP for the year 1990.

Chart 2. Inclusion Modalities and Levels of Violence before and after the Mali National Dialogue, 1988-1997^{39 40}

MALI (National Dialogue) 1988 - 1997



Yet, there are also risks associated with the inclusion of actors at the negotiation table. In the worst case scenario, biased representation may even increase levels of violence, if one of the conflict parties perceives this as a political affront. In the case of Egypt, for example, the Constituent Assembly held from September to November 2012 was dominated by representatives of Islamist groups. In consequence, many liberal, left-wing, and social democratic parties boycotted the Assembly as well as the respective Consultations.⁴¹ This aggravated political tensions in the country, leading to a new wave of protests which generated more violence.⁴²


³⁹ In this case, the number of conflict-related deaths only takes into account the deaths that resulted from popular protests demanding democracy and the removal from power of President Moussa Traoré.

⁴⁰ In this and the following graphs, counts of conflict-related deaths are taken from the UCDP. The plotted modalities serve as an approximate representation of processes that have often consisted of several efforts of the same modality. The charts do not claim to depict all relevant political processes through which violence has been averted.

⁴¹ Reuters, "Liberals Boycott Egypt's Constitutional Assembly," *Jerusalem Post*, 24 March 2012.

⁴² The Guardian, "Protesters Across Egypt Call for Mohamed Morsi to Go," *The Guardian*, 30 June 2013.

Chart 3. Inclusion Modalities and Levels of Violence in Egypt, 2008-2017



5.2. Building Momentum during On-going Armed Conflicts

In cases characterized by ongoing armed conflict, we similarly found that broadly inclusive negotiations can lead to initial momentum for reducing violence. However, we found that in some cases of on-going armed conflict, relatively exclusive negotiation formats involving only the main armed groups are able to create initial momentum toward reducing violence. Yet, sustaining these effects over a longer period of time is only successful if early efforts involving a limited number of armed groups are directly followed by broad-based inclusion either at the negotiation table or through other additional modalities, such as National Dialogues, Inclusive Commissions, and Consultations, which address the underlying causes of conflict in long-term political transitions (see Chapter 7). In these cases, where Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table is limited to the principle armed factions, we found that even these need to be sufficiently representative of the major parties to the conflict in order to have even an initial violence-reducing effect. This can be explained by the fact that

negotiations between armed groups can serve to build confidence, address immediate security concerns, or to negotiate ceasefires as a condition for continued negotiation. However, once initial success in reducing violence has been achieved, broader inclusion of stakeholders beyond the principal conflict parties is needed to sustain the momentum for peace. While at times, exclusive and inclusive formats have successfully operated in parallel, the unwillingness of the principal conflict parties to broaden the process may be a sign that the momentum is unlikely to last.

An example of the merit of relatively exclusive negotiations at the beginning of a prevention attempt, after which low levels of violence were sustained by broad-based inclusion, is the peace process in PNG, which experienced a decade of war in the region of Bougainville. Following several failed attempts to foster peace, confidential pre-negotiations that included primarily military factions were organized in 1997 to develop trust between the leadership of the major conflict parties as well as to establish communication between the main protagonists and to address their security concerns.⁴³ The pre-negotiations led to the Burnham Dialogues, starting in July 1997, involving chiefs, religious leaders, and women's groups.⁴⁴ Violence had largely ceased before the start of the Dialogues and this arguably provided a sense of security for other actors to be more proactively involved. Several rounds of talks resulted in the signing of the Lincoln Agreement in January 1998 that led to an extended period of truce and during which conflict parties agreed to cooperate to foster a peaceful solution to the conflict. A comprehensive peace agreement was finally signed in August 2001, resulting from a process that was overall broadly inclusive and representative.⁴⁵

Notably, representation matters even in relatively exclusive negotiations involving only armed groups during on-going armed conflict. In the case of Bougainville, one of the hardline factions around Francis Ona chose not to take part in the Burnham Dialogues, which arguably made it easier to reach an agreement.⁴⁶ However, our data suggest that in most cases of armed conflict, when inclusion modalities are only limitedly representative they are likely to fail to reduce violence even in the early stages of the prevention attempt, as the excluded conflict parties may choose to return to violence. For instance, during the Arusha Negotiations to end the Burundian civil war (1998–2000), it proved particularly difficult to keep all actors on board,

⁴³ Anthony J. Regan, *Phases of the Negotiation Process* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002), 33–34.

⁴⁴ Robert Tapi, "From Burnham to Buin. Sowing the Seeds of Peace in the Land of the Snow-Capped Mountains," in *Weaving Consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville Peace Process* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002), 26.

⁴⁵ Tapi, "Weaving Consensus"; Regan, "Phases".

⁴⁶ See also Chapter 7.3.

as some of the military factions demanded to be represented in their own delegations and split from the political parties included at the negotiation table.⁴⁷ This request was refused by the chief negotiator, who chose to exclude these groups to avoid further complications. As a result, these military groups decided to resort to renewed violence, and levels of violence only reduced after a separate ceasefire agreement was signed with these previously excluded groups.⁴⁸ This suggests that exclusive negotiations can only succeed if attended by all of the principal conflict parties that wish to be present around the negotiating table.

Moreover, when the principle conflict parties are unwilling to participate in more inclusive negotiation formats this may indicate that they are not committed to a peaceful solution of conflict. An initial halting of violence—for example based on a ceasefire agreement—may in such cases be followed by renewed escalation. In Aceh, for example, the limitedly inclusive track one negotiations conducted in January 2000 between the conflict parties were critical for preparing the so-called “Humanitarian Pause” agreement signed between the principal conflict parties in May 2000, providing for a ceasefire and humanitarian assistance. This led to a dramatic drop in the levels of violence. However, the agreement did not resolve the underlying causes of conflict. Importantly, the armed groups involved in the agreement were relatively hostile to civil society participation. While representatives of Acehnese NGOs and civil society were invited to the workshop due to the insistence of the mediating institution Humanitarian Dialogue, they only played a limited role. The agreement broke within months of its operationalization, as the conflict parties accused each other of tactical maneuvering, rearmed, and returned to armed conflict. This case illustrates that ceasefire deals negotiated principally between the major conflict parties are often insufficient for sustaining low levels of violence over a longer period of time, if they do not open up to more inclusive processes that address causes of conflict and thus sustainably avert violence (see also Chapter 6).

Indeed, we found that even at the early stages of a prevention attempt, inclusion modalities can make important contributions to building momentum to halt violence, for example, by bringing armed groups to the negotiation table, holding parties accountable and committed, or by generating the necessary public support for agreements. Beyond cases of relatively exclusive, but representative, elite deals, followed by broad-based inclusion, we also found cases of on-going armed conflicts in which inclusion beyond the principle armed groups played an important

⁴⁷ Patricia Daley, “The Burundi Peace Negotiations: An African Experience of Peace-making,” *Review of African Political Economy* 34, no. 112 (2007): 341.

⁴⁸ Daley. “The Burundi Peace Negotiations,” 346.

supporting role in the prevention attempts and contributed to creating momentum for peace. In El Salvador, for instance, track one negotiations included representatives of the private sector. This group supported the negotiations between the government and a coalition of non-state armed groups in effectively reaching a ceasefire and peace agreement, leading to an immediate reduction of violence.⁴⁹ This case demonstrates particularly well that inclusion modalities can play a pivotal role in bringing armed groups to the negotiation table, thus reducing levels of violence at the early stages of the prevention attempt.⁵⁰

In some cases, broad-based participation has also proven instrumental by creating public support for peace processes or agreements, particularly through modalities that go beyond Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table. In cases where the principal conflict parties are committed to ending violence through inclusive negotiations, further modalities can help to strengthen the momentum for peace. Consultations can also play an important role in strengthening public support for the cessation of violence, particularly if they occur in conjunction with or directly follow track one negotiations. For example, in order to end the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali that started in 1990, a National Pact was signed in 1992. In order to promote the agreement and sustain the peace process, representatives of the national government attended several so-called inter-community meetings at which the various causes of the conflict were discussed. These consultations helped to inform the participants about the content of the National Pact and assured them that its implementation was under way, thus providing political support to the national-level transition process that aimed at reducing violence.⁵¹ Similarly, in South Africa, consultations held by members of Parliament after the first non-racial elections in 1994 increased public support for the transition process and informed the work of various post-agreement implementation mechanisms that were designed to bring an end to the armed violence related to the struggle against the Apartheid regime.⁵² In both cases, consultations provided important backing for national-level processes and guaranteed that the momentum to halt violence endured.


⁴⁹ Angelika Rettberg, *Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study: El Salvador* (International Alert, 2006).

⁵⁰ However, the negotiations did not sustainably resolve the causes of conflict, mainly related to economic inequality. See Chapter 6.2.

⁵¹ Robin-Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf, *A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1998), 109.

⁵² South African History Online, "Chapter 13: The Public Participation Process," Text, South African History Online, accessed 18 October 2017, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-13-public-participation-process>.


Chart 4. Inclusion Modalities and Levels of Violence in South Africa, 1988-1997



A more equivocal example is the peace process between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from October 2012 until late 2014, which was characterized by multiple inclusion modalities that took inter alia the form of Inclusive Commissions and High-level Problem-solving Workshops, which generated public interest and broad support for the peace process. Increased public support for the peace process also helped to maintain a ceasefire between the Turkish Government and the PKK throughout 2013.⁵³ Nonetheless, levels of violence increased sharply again in 2014, as the chart below shows, mainly due to the Turkish-government's changing position regarding the Kurdish question as a result of the conflict in Syria. This example points to a further important factor: the principal parties' willingness to resolve the conflict through non-violent means. While broad-based inclusion may reduce levels of violence in the early stages of a prevention attempt, any achievements in this respect can easily be rolled back by belligerent conflict parties. This is particularly true when the latter use negotiation processes as a tactical pause for re-armament, making it impossible to sustain low levels of violence. This suggests that if the conflict parties are not committed to the process, then broad-based inclusion may not be able to make a difference.

⁵³ Jenna Krajeski, "Peace Comes to Turkey," *The New York Times*, 24 March 2013.

Chart 5. Inclusion Modalities and Levels of Violence in Turkey, 2006-2015 ⁵⁴



The Turkish-Kurdish peace process also clearly illustrates that High-level Problem-solving Workshops are far less effective at reducing violence than Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table. Indeed, none of the nine Workshops in our sample had a strongly positive effect on reduced levels of violence, while five had a somewhat positive effect. This has largely to do with the limited mandate and outputs of these bodies, and the fact that they are often overshadowed by political events or dynamics. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian Geneva Initiative may have influenced Israel's policy in the Gaza strip during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, but this influence was arguably low. Moreover, in the year in which the Inter-Tajik Dialogue concluded, levels of violence drastically decreased,⁵⁵ yet this was most likely due to the consolidation of Tajikistan's authoritarian regime rather than the impact of the Dialogue.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ In this case, the modality "Mass Action" took place sporadically over the time period indicated in the chart.

⁵⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Tajikistan," accessed 18 October 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/702>.

⁵⁶ Anna Matveeva, "Tajikistan: Stability First," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (2009): 163-86.

| 6. Sustaining Peace through Inclusive Political Transitions

Once armed conflict or protest-related violence has been initially halted, the various inclusion modalities can also play an important role in political transitions that seek to prevent a continuation or recurrence of violence. In the following we discuss how the inclusion modalities can contribute to such transition processes in two different ways: firstly, by tackling violence directly, mainly through Inclusive Commissions with a respective mandate; and secondly, indirectly through a variety of bodies that contribute to addressing the causes of violent conflict.

As with the initial reduction of violence at the early stages of the prevention attempt, design and mandate matter considerably for a modality's ability to reduce violence during inclusive transitions. Some modalities only play an indirect role, such as Consultations producing outputs that will inform track one negotiations or public referenda that are held to foster public support and legitimacy for a peace agreement. Inclusive Commissions also often contribute to reducing violence indirectly, for example through mandates that aim to resolve the underlying causes of conflict. However, they can also directly aim to keep levels of violence low, such as in the case of ceasefire commissions, peace commissions, or peace and reconciliation commissions.

Comparing across all cases, we also found that over a longer period of time, on average the modalities' effectiveness in reducing violence becomes less pronounced. For instance, out of 11 cases of Direct Representation that immediately achieved a positive effect on reduced levels of violence at an early stage of the prevention attempt, only three cases had a positive effect in the transitional process that followed, and six had a less pronounced or indirect positive effect. This is indicative of the difficulty of sustaining political transitions and preventing violence over a longer period of time. However, our data also suggest that a combination of different modalities is important for sustaining peace in the long run. Many modalities develop their effectiveness only over a longer time period, such as Inclusive Commissions that often have more complex and extensive mandates that need time to be implemented. These modalities are of particular importance for sustaining prevention outcomes over a longer period of time, as they form part of comprehensive political reform processes aimed at creating political institutions through which conflicts can be resolved and managed peacefully.

6.1. Tackling Violence Directly

We have found that some modalities are intentionally mandated and designed to reduce or prevent violent conflict directly, notably Inclusive Commissions. Across the dataset, Inclusive Commissions exhibit relatively low effectiveness in reducing violence in the early phase of the prevention attempt: they have a positive or somewhat positive effect in only five of 22 instances and had no observable effect in 13 instances. In the course of the transition process, however, the ratio increases to 11 out of 22, and the number of modalities with no effects decreases to seven. Depending on design and mandate, Inclusive Commissions therefore seem to be better suited for preventing the continuation or escalation of violence in the long run, for example if they are tasked with facilitating peace processes, monitoring peace agreements, mitigating or adjudicating conflicts, or carrying out truth and reconciliation processes. While Inclusive Commissions can tackle violence directly, they often only develop their effectiveness over a longer period of time.

Kenya and South Africa serve as particularly illustrative examples. In both cases, Inclusive Commissions were tasked with implementing various aspects of the peace agreements and with addressing long-term grievances within society to prevent the recurrence of violence and create a more just society. Both countries established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which heard and recorded testimonies of human rights violations, as well as commissions that set up mechanisms to address violence at the local level. In South Africa, a large number of commissions were created in the course of the transition process, many of which were set up to prevent violence. These included a National Peace Committee, Regional Peace Committees and Local Peace Committees, tasked with monitoring the levels of violence, the implementation of the peace agreement, and promoting peace and reconciliation. Moreover, a Commission of Inquiry was tasked with analyzing the historical causes of violence. In South Africa, two legal institutions were also created to reduce violence, the Special Criminal Courts and the Justices of the Peace.⁵⁷ In Kenya, The National Cohesion and Integration Commission directly contributed to the prevention of violence by mediating a number of peace deals between local communities that had clashed with one another in the post-election violence. The commission was also tasked with developing solutions for a number of historical grievances related to violent conflict, including the inequitable distribution of resources, historical injustices and the exclusion of segments of Kenyan society.⁵⁸ Moreover, in both cases, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and/or Commissions of

⁵⁷ Chris Spies, *South Africa's National Peace Accord: Its Structures and Functions* (Conciliation Resources, 2002).

⁵⁸ National Cohesion and Integration Commission, "Mandate of the Commission," About Us: Mandate, accessed 18 October 2017, <http://www.cohesion.or.ke/index.php/about-us/mandate>.

Inquiry were set up and tasked with investigating human rights violations that had occurred during the conflict.

The participation in these various commissions by and large involved all political parties and a variety of social groups. This broad-based participation was crucial for their success: for South Africa, we found evidence that these commissions increased the trust between the state agencies, judicial institutions, and the non-Afrikaner population and thus contributed to long-term political stability. In a comparable way the commissions in Kenya fostered a climate of accountability in the first years after the crisis, which made the occurrence of violence less likely. This suggests that besides the technical mandate of these modalities, inclusion itself played a pivotal role in these various Commissions' ability to reduce violence.

6.2. Addressing the Causes of Conflict

We moreover found that levels of violence were sustainably reduced in cases where Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table provided a basis for a political transition through which many of the underlying causes of conflict could be addressed. Here, Inclusive Commissions play an important role, which in 15 out of 18 cases contributed to resolving the causes of conflict. In many cases, this also involved the drafting of a new constitution. Furthermore, Public Decision-making, mainly in the form of referenda, also proved particularly successful in strengthening public support during the transition processes.

It is striking that all cases in which Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table achieved a reduction of violence are cases where popular democratization movements called for political reforms, as seen in Mali, Togo (2005) and Benin. These three cases were also characterized by comparatively uncomplicated transitions that were accompanied by comprehensive political reforms. Consequently these processes addressed at least some of the political grievances that had triggered mass protest-related violence in the first place. In these cases, institutions of transitional governance were either created through one or more of the inclusion modalities, or the modalities formed part of a transitional governance arrangement.

Importantly, we found that in many cases the representativeness of negotiations very likely impacted their ability to address causes of conflict. This is particularly the case for Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table, which gives participants a voice during the negotiations. Across the 13 instances in which we rated Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table as being highly representative of all stakeholders to the conflict, all but

one had either a positive or a somewhat positive effect on reducing levels of violence in the early stage of the prevention attempt as well as in the long run. Moreover, 12 out of 13 either had a positive or a somewhat positive effect on addressing the causes of conflict. The same pattern exists for Inclusive Commissions: 9 out of the 12 highly representative Commissions contributed to resolving the causes of conflict, while their effectiveness was much more mixed for modalities that were less representative. This suggests that across the dataset, the more representative these modalities are, the more likely they are to address causes of conflict and affect levels of violence over a longer period of time. However, Consultations constitute one important exception. Out of the 27 Consultations which we documented in the dataset, 23 contributed to resolving the causes of conflict. The representativeness of these consultations seems to matter less than in the case of Direct Representation and Inclusive Commissions, as both highly representative and moderately representative Consultations contributed to resolving the causes of conflict.

In South Africa, for example, the Multi Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) launched in 1993 involved all political parties and pursued the objective of drafting an interim constitution that would pave the way for a new political system.⁵⁹ This process was successful in generating and sustaining broad-based popular support for the political transition. Moreover, its inclusive nature guaranteed that conflicting interests could be negotiated and reconciled through these institutions, and conflict causes addressed through a comprehensive reform of South Africa's political institutions and the abolishment of the Apartheid system. In addition, Consultations were held after the first non-racial democratic elections in 1994. In a country-wide process, all parliamentary representatives visited their respective constituencies in order to listen to the demands and proposals of the electorate.⁶⁰ This inclusion modality thus already engaged the institutions of the emerging political system, helped to foster their legitimacy and strengthened their efforts to address causes of conflict. Furthermore, a so-called "Whites-only" referendum had strategically been held in advance of the MPNP, in order to guarantee the buy-in of white South Africans.⁶¹ This illustrates the instrumentality of Public Decision-making for increasing the legitimacy of the transition process.

Benin offers another example of an inclusive transition process, where the National Conference held in 1990 initiated a political transition by creating

⁵⁹ South African History Online, "How SA Emerged as a Democracy from the Crises of the 1990s," Settlement, accessed 18 October 2017, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/negotiations-toward-new-south-africa-grade-12-2>.

⁶⁰ South African History Online, "Chapter 13: The Public Participation Process."

⁶¹ South African History Online, "The 1992 Whites Only Referendum 'For' or 'Against' a Negotiated Constitution," Topic, accessed 18 October 2017, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/1992-whites-only-referendum-or-against-negotiated-constitution>.

a number of institutions, including the so-called High Council of the Republic, acting as a parliament, the Office of Prime Minister, and a National Commission mandated to draft a new constitution and initiate important political reforms.⁶² These succeeded in addressing the underlying causes of the country's political crisis, including a defunct economic policy and political instability resulting from a combination of corruption, nepotism and governmental repression. Moreover, a public referendum on the constitution was held in December 1991.⁶³ Overall, the process was very inclusive, involving a wide range of both independent and representative actors from the pre-negotiation to the implementation phase and granting influence inter alia to students, teachers, civil servants and trade unions, and members of the diaspora, who participated in protests as well as in the National Conference.⁶⁴ The transition process manifestly improved the political climate and led to a reduction of violence over a longer period of time.

We also found that Consultations can play an important role in sustaining political transitions by increasing the inclusiveness of the process through the provision of mechanisms via which a broader spectrum of stakeholders can voice their concerns. Consultations that reach out to various interest groups seem to be a particularly helpful tool for guaranteeing representation throughout the overall prevention attempt, as they feed the information back into other modalities and put specific topics onto the negotiation agenda. In parallel to the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference held in Eldoret, Kenya, for instance, three separate consultations were held to bring concerns of different constituents, including the business community⁶⁵ and women's groups,⁶⁶ to the negotiation table.

In contrast, cases in which the inclusion modalities failed to address the underlying causes of conflict witnessed a return to violence that may at least be partly attributed to limited inclusion. In the case of El Salvador, for example, the limited effectiveness of the modalities in addressing causes of conflict could be clearly attributed to the absence of important stakeholders, particularly an inclusive process limited to the private sector, which ensured that causes of conflict related to socio-economic inequality

⁶² Constitution Making for Peace, "A.2 Benin [1990]," Case Study Items, accessed 18 October 2017, <http://constitutionmakingforpeace.org/case-studies-items/a-2-benin-1990/>.

⁶³ Constitution Making for Peace. "A.2 Benin."

⁶⁴ Rachel M. Gisselquist, "Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin," *Democratization* 15, no. 4 (2008): 789-814.

⁶⁵ Somali Business Council, "Statement on the Promotion of Peace and Reconciliation in Somalia," accessed 18 October 2017, <https://www.banadir.com/somali.htm.shtml>.

⁶⁶ Aweys Warsame Yusuf, *Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study: Somalia* (International Alert, n.d.).

remained off the agenda.⁶⁷ Although the private sector representatives included in the track one negotiations did initially contribute to a reduction of violence by supporting the negotiations, this group played an overall detrimental role in the peace process. While the peace agreement stipulated a comprehensive reform of the security sector and thus addressed the immediate causes of conflict, it did not resolve the underlying causes of conflict related to socio-economic inequality.⁶⁸ Consequently, while armed violence had initially slumped, it gradually returned to wartime levels in the years following the negotiations, taking the form of criminal violence perpetrated by unemployed youth.

A further negative example is Yemen, where the National Dialogue Process initially halted violence, partly due to broad-based Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table that created initial momentum for peace, as described above.⁶⁹ The reduction of violence was also due to a peace agreement negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council in November 2011 and the stepping down of President Saleh, which led to a drop in state-based violence.⁷⁰ However, the subsequent National Dialogue additionally succeeded in keeping all groups committed to the deal and to halting their armed activities during the process. It was also designed to address the underlying causes of conflict, such as questions related to the devolution of power within the Yemeni state, which it however failed to achieve. This failure can partly be attributed to the biased selection of representatives from the South where a secessionist movement had emerged in the years before the establishment of the National Dialogue.⁷¹ While an agreement was reached, it was not implemented and the Dialogue was followed by a drastic increase of violence and a return to civil war.⁷²

Besides their representativeness, we also found that the independence of actors influences the effectiveness of modalities. In Nepal, after ten years of armed conflict between a Monarchist government and Maoist insurgents, widespread mass demonstrations took place in 2006 leading to the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Maoists and the government in November 2006.⁷³ As a result of the CPA, a Constituent

⁶⁷ Rettberg, *Local Business, Local Peace*, 325.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 325.

⁶⁹ Saif Hassan, *Yemen: National Dialogue Conference: Managing Peaceful Change?* (Conciliation Resources, 2014).

⁷⁰ Nasr Taha Mustafa, "Yemen's Transitional Phase and Future Remain Murky," *Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East*, 13 June 2012.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Yemen (North Yemen)," accessed 18 October 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/678>.

⁷³ Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Nepalese General Strike to Protest Monarchic Rule," accessed 18 October 2017, <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/nepalese-general-strike-protest-monarchic-rule-2006>.

Assembly was created to inter alia deal with issues of state restructuring. The Assembly ensured a broad inclusion of members by having quota on women and minority groups.⁷⁴ In addition to the Assembly, the Interim Constitution from 2007 mandated a Commission on State Restructuring including academics, ethnic activists, and experts. The Commission was set up in 2011 to give recommendations on federal state structure to the Constituent Assembly. However, as members were selected by each of the four largest parties, their independence was limited, and consequently their work was never taken seriously by the members of the Constituent Assembly.⁷⁵ The reform process became increasingly politicized, leading to an escalation of tensions between ethnic groups.⁷⁶ For instance, in May 2012 there were clashes between ethnic minority groups who favored different forms of federalism.⁷⁷ While the inclusive body was not responsible for the violence, it also failed to mitigate or prevent it.

Importantly, preventing a continuation or recurrence of violence also depends on which causes have been addressed by the modalities. We have found that the modalities were most successful in preventing violence when they contributed to addressing grievances regarding political inequality and the nature of political institutions. In Mali, for instance, the National Conference held in reaction to violent protests in 1990 and 1991 directly addressed political grievances that stemmed from decades of authoritarian rule and demands for multi-party democracy. The outcomes of the Conference were translated into a new constitution, containing provisions for multiparty democracy and civic rights.⁷⁸ Moreover, an Inclusive Commission—the Commission for Social, Economic and Cultural Affairs, originally founded in 1988—was mandated to account for the problems faced by Malian society. The Commission was composed of representatives of trade unions, associations and socio-professional groups, communities, the diaspora, and senior state officials with relevant expertise, and was tasked with the role of a permanent follow-up mechanism. Inter alia, the National Dialogue process led to an increase in the number of political parties, thus indicating a relatively successful process of political liberalization.

Finally, we found that in the 11 cases where the inclusion modalities could have contributed to the prevention of recurring violence, inclusion modalities

⁷⁴ ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, "Nepal: Constituent Assembly Elections," accessed 18 October 2017, <http://aceproject.org/today/feature-articles/nepal-constituent-assembly-elections-2008>.

⁷⁵ International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Peace Process: The Endgame Nears* (Kathmandu/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011).

⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, *Nepal's Constitution (I): Evolution Not Revolution* (International Crisis Group, 2012).

⁷⁷ UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Nepal, *Monthly Update: May 2012* (UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Nepal, 2012).

⁷⁸ Jaimie Bleck, *Countries at the Crossroads 2011: Mali* (Freedom House, 2011).

were significantly less effective compared with the other two prevention categories. This effect is partly due to a coding bias associated with the lack of immediate violence at the beginning of such a prevention attempt, for example in cases of frozen conflicts, and the resulting difficulties of measuring a reduction of violence. However, the modalities were also less effective in addressing causes of conflict in these cases. One plausible explanation may be the lack of high levels of violence and the extended time scale over which the prevention attempt takes place, namely after violent conflict has already ended, and sometimes during the implementation phase of a previous peace process. This arguably puts less pressure on the included actors to comply and accept compromise. In this context, as will be discussed in Chapters 7.3. and 7.4. below, influential actors may seek to reclaim the power they were obliged to share with others in previously inclusive negotiation formats by undermining the implementation of inclusive agreements, and may be disinclined to continue addressing causes of conflict that in many cases are intertwined with their grip on power.

| 7. Factors for Effective Inclusion

This chapter discusses the most important factors influencing the effectiveness of inclusion modalities in preventing violence. While inclusion matters for preventing violent conflict, its effectiveness is conditioned by several factors that differ from case to case. Importantly, we limit our discussion to factors that either directly affect inclusion, and particularly the representativeness and independence of included actors, or the capacity of included actors to contribute to violence prevention.

The discussion of factors is organized around the following themes: civil society groups, elite co-optation and resistance, the role of hardliners, the role of armed forces, women's influence, and the relevance of the international and regional environment. Many of these themes can be related to specific aggregated groups or institutions that are relevant to prevention attempts, such as civil society, elites, or armed forces. However, this is not to say that we analyze any of these groups or institutions as homogenous actors. Rather, we discuss important aspects related to these groups, such as the ways through which they influence inclusion and the context that impacts on their influence.

Many of the factors are also closely related. For example, the composition and quality of civil society in any given case relates to elite behavior and their willingness or intention to co-opt participants of inclusive processes. Women's groups form an important subcategory of civil society, and hardliners may also at times be part of the civic realm. Moreover, international and regional policies and technical assistance may both constrain and enable inclusion modalities, for example through providing funding to civil society organizations, and thus influencing the capacity of included actors to contribute to the prevention of violent conflict.

7.1. Civil Society Composition

Civil society has often contributed positively to peace and transition processes, as ample research and practice have shown. By supporting negotiations and implementation processes, civil society groups often play a crucial role in inclusive prevention attempts. Of particular relevance here are civil society's functions of monitoring, advocacy, and facilitation. However, the extent to which these functions can be performed heavily depends on the case-specific context, including the space available for civil society to act which influences its overall effectiveness. The main contextual factors that enable or constrain civil society involvement in peace processes are: the behavior and composition of civil society itself; the level and duration of violence; the behavior of state institutions, particularly the security sector;

legal requirements for civil society to act; and the influence of external political actors and donors.⁷⁹

To understand civil society's role in inclusive prevention attempts, it is crucial to differentiate between professional civil society organizations (CSOs) that mostly implement internationally funded development, humanitarian, peacebuilding, or human rights projects, and civil society organizations and associations that conduct their activities on the basis of nationally or locally emerging interests and agendas, such as workers' unions, farmers' collectives, or churches and other faith-based associations. The former tend to have small local constituencies and are usually accountable to international donors rather than the broader domestic public.

Professional CSOs have in many cases positively contributed to prevention outcomes. Particularly in inclusion modalities that form part of political transitions, they may contribute to resolving the causes of conflict, for example through advocating for, and supporting political and economic reforms, or the implementation of human rights standards, including through analysis and research. Professional CSOs may also be involved in the monitoring of implementation processes. Their strong links to international actors can also be crucial in generating international attention and pressure, as was the case in Kenya in 2008.

However, representatives of professional CSOs not only display a strong urban bias, but often form part of the urban elite that lacks grounding in and exchange with the local population, especially in remote areas.⁸⁰ This may lead to a lack of connectedness with the realities of daily life of the rural or poor parts of population. For instance, in the Doha negotiations on the Darfur armed conflict, civil society representatives that were approved by the Government of Sudan were predominantly urban and elite-biased, and were thus arguably not informed about the situation in Darfur's rural areas.⁸¹ Similarly, in the Afghan peace process, representatives of civil society mainly consisted of professional NGOs, which lacked a local base anywhere but in the most urban and protected areas.⁸²

The participation of small circles of elite civil society groups may not yield significant representation of other stakeholders to the conflict, leading to a lack of legitimacy of civil society representation, which can negatively

⁷⁹ Paffenholz. "Civil Society and Peacebuilding," 347-59

⁸⁰ See also Chapter 5.3.

⁸¹ Theodore Murphy and Jérôme Tubiana, *Civil Society in Darfur: The Missing Peace* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), 9.

⁸² Kaja Borchgrevink and Krisitan Berg Harpviken, "Afghanistan: Civil Society Between Modernity and Tradition," in *Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*, ed. Thania Paffenholz (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 235-58.

affect popular support for a peace process established through inclusive mechanisms. The conflict in Mali offers an instructive example: while a peace deal was effectively forged in the National Conference in 1991, the subsequent Inclusive Commissions addressed only grievances voiced by urban-based civil society.⁸³ The exclusion of rural constituents and their concerns fed into the concurrent Tuareg rebellion from 1990 onward, which could only be resolved through systematic Consultations with and between local constituencies and conflict parties not represented in the 1991 National Conference.⁸⁴ A further example is provided by Liberia following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003, where after a conflict over economic and political control, conflict parties, political parties and civil society representatives, by and large picked by President Charles Taylor, effectively divided influential and lucrative leadership positions in the transitional government and large public corporations among themselves.

In the worst case scenario, powerful civil society actors may also be detrimental to prevention attempts. Their influence on civil society may also take the form of heading popular pro-war movements, as witnessed in Sri Lanka and Rwanda. These movements championed ethnically exclusive visions of society, led by influential ethnic and political elites strongly rooted in local forms of civil society. In Sri Lanka, this pressure shifted the political atmosphere towards favoring a military solution over continued negotiations, which resulted in an unprecedented military offensive that caused a massive peak in conflict-related deaths in 2009.⁸⁵ In Rwanda, a circle of Hutu extremists became increasingly radicalized and ultimately played a major role in the 1994 genocide, in which both civilian and military actors took part.⁸⁶

International actors often exert pressure on the main conflict parties to allow for more broad-based inclusion of civil society groups. However, this may not always be a recipe for peace. Such a strategy may undermine local accountability, particularly if civil society inclusion in a peace process has predominantly been achieved through international rather than local pressure. In Afghanistan for instance, liberal human rights organizations were identified with Western conflict parties and thus struggled to gain a hold outside of urban centers.⁸⁷ Being identified as foreign agents also increasingly hampered the pro-peace movement in Sri Lanka from the early

⁸³ Kaare Lode, *Mali's Peace Process: Context, Analysis and Evaluation* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002).

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Sri Lanka," accessed 18 October 2017, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/780>.

⁸⁶ Regine Andersen, "How Multilateral Development Assistance Triggered the Conflict in Rwanda," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (2000): 441-56.

⁸⁷ Borchgrevink and Harpviken, "Afghanistan."

2000s onward due to its increasing dependence on financial and diplomatic support from Western donors and international organizations. Western donors' aid for pro-peace NGOs sparked outrage about alleged Western conspiracies and reinforced the position of Sinhalese pro-war hardliners.⁸⁸

However, in the early stages of cases of low-intensity or localized conflicts or even before armed conflict occurs, civil society actors can significantly constructively influence the way in which political crises are dealt with, for example by advocating for international attention, as was the case in Kenya, or through preparing and organizing mass action, as seen in Benin, Egypt, Mali, Togo (1991 and 2005), or Yemen. In cases of prolonged conflict, however, physical insecurity, shrinking economic resources, polarization, and decreasing social cohesion can have highly detrimental effects on grassroots as well as organized civil society, with examples including Aceh, Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, among others. The longer and the more severely civil society is affected by these challenging conditions, and the more repression, intimidation, and co-optation diminish its independence from the principal conflict parties, the less likely it is to be able to contribute to a reduction of violence. Under Charles Taylor's rule for example, the freedom of civil society actors was severely limited through prosecution, and they thus remained closely associated with political parties and less able to voice their concerns independently.⁸⁹

The ability and willingness of civil society actors to play a role independently of the major conflict parties, as well as conflict parties' willingness to accept input from independent actors, affects the quality and effectiveness of agreements forged through inclusion modalities. In the case of Aceh, civil society actors participating in the peace process faced repression from the military and rebels alike.⁹⁰ In Darfur, local civil society actors included in consultations were preselected by the local power holders and effectively forced to defend these power holders' interests rather than the needs of the local populations they were ostensibly there to represent.⁹¹ In both of these cases, this kind of interference weakened the independence of civil society representatives and limited their ability to provide critical input. This resulted in continued mistrust between conflict parties and contributed to

⁸⁸ Austin Fernando, *My Belly Is White* (Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications, Sri Lanka, 2008); Neil DeVotta, *Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka* (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2007); Oliver Walton, "Conflict, Peacebuilding and NGO Legitimacy: National NGOs in Sri Lanka," *Conflict, Security & Development* 8, no. 1 (2008): 133-67.

⁸⁹ Peter J. Pham, "A Nation Long Forlorn: Liberia's Journey from Civil War toward Civil Society," accessed 19 October 2017, http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol6iss4/art_1.htm.

⁹⁰ Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia, "The Assessment Report in Aceh: The Role of Civil Society in Conflict Transformation," Content October-December 2002, accessed 19 October 2017, <http://www.rep.usm.my/index.php/en/seacsn/about-seacsn/32-bulletin/content-october-december-2002/213-the-assessment-report-in-aceh-the-role-of-civil-society-in-conflict-transformation?showall=1>.

⁹¹ Murphy and Tubiana, *Civil Society in Darfur*.

the lack of implementation of the negotiated agreements. However, we also found that civil society representatives may voluntarily align themselves with conflict parties, as was the case in the Sun City Negotiations for the DRC. This negatively affected the representativeness of included actors, and the negotiations resulted in a power-sharing agreement that benefitted first and foremost the conflict parties while neglecting civilian victims of the conflict.

Civil society can also play an important role in peace and transition processes through organizing Mass Action. Prevention attempts in which Mass Action took place overall had more inclusion modalities with positive effects on reducing levels of violence, on addressing conflict causes, and on the overall process. Especially in cases of political reform and transition, Mass Action was often crucial in producing the necessary pressure on governments to allow for Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table, particularly in the cases with National Dialogues. As seen in the cases of Benin, Egypt, Mali, Nepal, Togo (both cases), and Yemen, popular protests can prove crucial in pushing for political reforms and thus initiating inclusive transitions. Furthermore, Mass Action can successfully exert pressure against further military operations in situations of incipient violence, as mass protests in Chiapas, Mexico have repeatedly shown.⁹² Yet, the success of protests depends on government responsiveness. For instance, during the Somalia National Peace Conference process in Eldoret, protests against rising violence remained ineffective because they attracted little support from Somali political circles, even though the organizations enjoyed strong societal support.

In order to reach and implement agreements in cases where Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table was achieved as a result of Mass Action, strong coalitions among local political and civil society actors, as well as in some cases in conjunction with the international community, seem to be crucial. The cases of Benin, Nepal and Mali provide positive examples of strong coalitions among diverse oppositional actors that managed to obtain significant concessions from the ruling elites. On the other hand, Togo (1991) holds as a negative example, as oppositional factions with Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table could not agree on overarching demands to issue to the government. Rather, each focused on their own issues and interests, which weakened their position and allowed Gnassingbé Eyadéma to reassert his authoritarian rule, effectively closing the window of opportunity for democratization.⁹³

⁹² Tim Golden, "Mexico Offers an Amnesty to Rebels as They Retreat," *The New York Times*, 7 January 1994; Anthony DePalma, "Mexico Orders Cease-Fire and Offers Rebels Amnesty," *The New York Times*, 13 January 1994.

⁹³ Andrew Manley, *Togo: After Eyadéma* (WriteNet, 2003).

7.2. Elite Conduct

Evidence suggests that one key factor that influences the level of inclusion as well as the effectiveness of inclusion modalities in preventing violent conflict is the conduct of political, economic, and social elites, i.e. those actors who wield a disproportionate amount of power and influence in a country. Many of the actors in inclusive processes are part of such elites in one way or another. While this may vary from modality to modality, it is most often the case for actors accorded Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table, or those who take part in Inclusive Commissions or High-level Problem-solving Workshops. However, even if conducted country-wide and at the local level, Consultations also often only engage a standard set of actors, such as civil society or community representatives, traditional authorities, elders, or the educated and literate. In contrast, Public Referenda and Mass Action are by design less prone to elite bias, since they are usually much more broad-based and inclusive.

Besides detrimental effects on representativeness, bias towards those close to elites may influence the effectiveness of modalities as elites may sustain stronger ties to one or more conflict parties than the average population, which may limit their independence, but at the same time increase their influence. Furthermore, elite influence also tends to affect which conflict causes are addressed in a prevention attempt and which remain unaddressed, in particular if elites' interests are at stake.

Elites can either buy into a process and thus support it, or resist it for their own objectives. In some cases involved elites are generally supportive of peace processes and do not significantly constrain efforts to address causes of conflict through inclusive processes. In Bougainville, for example, most elders and chiefs positively contributed to building a stable system ready to pursue independence by political means. In Mali, when protests against the authoritarian regime turned increasingly violent in March 1991, high-ranking military officials undertook a coup against the regime of General Traoré, and thereby joined into a coalition with the urban civil society elite demanding democratization and an end to corruption.⁹⁴ In other cases, however, elites showed no interest in ending a conflict, such as during the peace process in Aceh that started in 2000, where military officials feared losing their economic influence on the island.⁹⁵ Similarly, FARC leaders during the Colombian peace process in the early 2000s were eager to preserve their influence on the drug market and thus opposed a peace deal

⁹⁴ Jane Turrittin, "Mali: People Topple Traoré," *Review of African Political Economy* 18, no. 52 (1991): 97-103.

⁹⁵ Damien Kingsbury, *Peace in Aceh: A Personal Account of the Helsinki Peace Process* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006).

to some degree.⁹⁶ This dynamic is most common in political transitions in which previous political elites try to resist change. This was the case with Gnassingbé Eyadéma, President of Togo, who undermined and reversed the democratization process initiated by the National Conference in 1991.⁹⁷

If, due to strong diplomatic or popular pressure, elites cannot derail political transitions in line with their interests during the negotiation phase, they may seek to undermine the implementation of the resulting agreements once local and/or international pressure and attention has subsided. This phenomenon can also take the form of governments strategically supporting inclusive process in order to temper local pressure or garner international support, while covertly aiming to consolidate control and authoritarian rule, with detrimental effects on the prevention outcome. In Darfur, for example, the Government of Sudan participated in a formally inclusive process in order to respond to international pressure while simultaneously freeing military capacity needed for a separate war in other parts of the country. In Eritrea, after gaining independence from Ethiopia in 1993, a series of publicly embraced consultations organized to inform the constitution-making process diverted attention from the parallel establishment of a military dictatorship by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, which has since banned all forms of political activity and abolished the drafted constitution.⁹⁸

In yet other cases, elites try, and sometimes manage to co-opt or capture inclusion modalities and whole processes to frame the outcome to suit their narrow economic or political interests. Governments and the political elites controlling them can do so first of all by influencing access to inclusion modalities, that is, through manipulating the representativeness and independence of included actors or groups. Among other cases, this happened in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, where the facilitator of the Consultations and a High-level Problem-solving Workshop, the Schlaining Process, consulted the governments of the respective conflict parties before confirming the inclusion of potential participants in the Process in order to ensure the continued willingness of the conflict parties to be represented in the Process at an official level.⁹⁹ This effectively limited the independence of included actors.¹⁰⁰ While this list is far from exhaustive, Liberia and Darfur

⁹⁶ Giselle Lopez, "The Colombian Civil War Potential for Justice in a Culture of Violence," *Jackson School of International Studies - Policy Brief 2*, no. 1 (2011): 6-22.

⁹⁷ Manley, *After Eyadema*.

⁹⁸ Debessay Hedru, "Eritrea: Transition to Dictatorship, 1991-2003," *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97 (2003): 435-44.

⁹⁹ Paata Zakareishvili, "The Schlaining Process: A Georgian Perspective," in *Mediation and Dialogue in the South Caucasus - A Reflection on 15 Years of Conflict Transformation Initiatives*, ed. Batal Kobakhia et al. (International Alert, 2012), 108-18.

¹⁰⁰ Jonathan Cohen, "The Schlaining Process," in *Mediation and Dialogue in the South Caucasus - A Reflection on 15 Years of Conflict Transformation Initiatives*, ed. Batal Kobakhia et al. (International Alert, 2012), 62-98.

represent further examples of power-holders significantly restricting access to inclusion modalities in order to control the outcome of a peace process.

Other cases exhibit evidence of a tempering or outright manipulation of the modalities' outputs by influential elites. In such cases, modalities or the whole peace process may still succeed in initially lowering levels of violence, but causes remain by and large unaddressed, thus reducing the likelihood of a sustainable reduction of violence. The recurrence of violence in El Salvador and Guatemala perpetrated by criminal gangs and motivated by extreme economic inequality, are such examples.¹⁰¹ In El Salvador, economic elites, as the only included actors besides the conflict parties oriented the peace process towards addressing the conflict predominantly from a security perspective, while neglecting the conditions of economic inequality under which it developed.¹⁰² In Guatemala, military elites used terror against civil society representatives organized in the Grand National Dialogue and in other inclusion modalities, and successfully undermined the accords that had the greatest potential for social change. These were never implemented due to, among other factors, strong resistance from the army, business groups, and other actors favoring the status quo. In both cases, the resulting reforms of the security sector, while temporarily lowering levels of violence, did not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. This led to a resumption of violence in the form of gang violence, and in the Guatemalan case also provoked continued, politically-motivated violence against civil society actors.

In Fiji, the military-backed regime flatly rejected the Inclusive Commission's draft constitution in early 2013, and instead wrote its own version behind closed doors.¹⁰³ While levels of violence remain low in Fiji, the military-backed government continues to act in oppressive ways on the basis of various decrees restricting public meetings, the right to form political parties, and freedoms of association and expression. A similar phenomenon occurred in Afghanistan during the constitution-making process in 2003-2004, where the internationally supported political elites both strongly regulated access to the inclusive Constitutional Loya Jirga and subsequently rejected the inclusively developed draft constitution, presenting their own draft at the last minute.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ John-Andrew McNeish and Oscar López Rivera, "The Ugly Poetics of Violence in Post-Accord Guatemala," *Forum for Development Studies* 36, no. 1 (2009): 49-77; Mayra Buvinic, et al. *La Violencia En América Latina Y El Caribe: Un Marco de Referencia Para La Acción* (Washington D.C.: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, 2000).

¹⁰² Rettberg, *Local Business, Local Peace*.

¹⁰³ Human Rights Watch, "Fiji: Revise Draft Constitution to Protect Rights," News, accessed 19 October 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/04/fiji-revise-draft-constitution-protect-rights>.

¹⁰⁴ Astri Suhrke, et al. *Conflictual Peacebuilding: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn* (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2004); International Crisis Group, *Afghanistan's Flawed Constitutional Process*, 2003.

7.3. The Role of Hardliners

Hardliner participation is an important factor for the effectiveness of inclusion modalities to end or prevent violent conflict. Hardliners can either be armed groups pursuing agendas or maintaining stances that are incommensurate with the compromise needed for the political settlement of a conflict, or non-armed groups lobbying or pressuring armed actors towards such intransigent positions. Hardliners may use different violent and non-violent means to undermine peace processes for multiple reasons, and to varying degrees. They either seek to advance their specific interests in a peace process, or to undermine any political solution to a conflict whatsoever if they advocate a military approach. While their inclusion may at times be necessary in order to prevent them from becoming spoilers to any future agreement, it may complicate negotiations by giving rise to the need to seek compromise between disparate positions.

Hardliners may pursue a variety of interests and agendas. These can concern economic interests, such as militaries benefiting from illicit trade under the occupation in Aceh, or the pursuit of radical ethno-nationalist agendas, such as the Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka, ethnic Kyrgyz radicals, Hutu extremists in Rwanda, or the 'Real IRA' in Northern Ireland. The existence of hardliners poses a considerable threat to the design of inclusion modalities. We found that the challenge here is to get the level of inclusion right: there is no simple, linear relationship between the level of hardliner inclusion and the effectiveness of modalities.

Moreover, violence perpetrated by hardliners, such as military campaigns (Aceh, Afghanistan), assassinations (Colombia), bombing campaigns (Northern Ireland), or massacres (South Africa, Rwanda) sometimes also triggers violent reactions from the targeted groups. Yet, we found that such events, even if they cause temporary disturbances, do not always succeed in negatively affecting the course of the negotiations or their inclusive nature. For example, in Northern Ireland, repeated acts of violence by the paramilitary group the 'Real IRA' in the lead-up to the Good Friday Agreement did not prevent the signing or the implementation of the Agreement. Additionally, the Omagh bombing committed after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which killed 29 people, failed to derail the implementation of the agreement and was widely condemned by all political parties in Northern Ireland, which remained committed to the inclusive nature of the process.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Colleen Sullivan, "Real Irish Republican Army: Irish Military Organization," Topic, accessed 19 October 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Real-Irish-Republican-Army>.

In the case of Northern Ireland, hardliner inclusion could potentially have reduced the risk of violence or indeed prevented violence. Initial track one negotiations leading to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 lacked the participation of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which refused to sit down at the negotiating table with the Irish Republican Party Sinn Fein. Despite a successful referendum on the peace agreement, between 1998 and 2006 splinter paramilitary organizations from both Republican and Loyalist communities opposed the peace process and continued armed operations.¹⁰⁶ It required another round of negotiations, leading to the St. Andrews agreement of 2006 and this time including the DUP, to secure the achievements of the peace process.

In contrast, in South Africa the CODESA II negotiations failed partly because of the Boipatong massacre committed by the Inkatha Freedom Party.¹⁰⁷ This party had taken part in previous rounds of negotiations, but did not participate in CODESA I and II as it did not agree with the stance of the African National Congress. Moreover, the presence of other hardliner groups at the negotiation table worsened the political climate and led to the stalling and subsequent breakdown of the process. Nonetheless, after a temporary period of deadlock, the overall process continued with the limitedly inclusive MPNP. In Rwanda, on the other hand, violence carried out by a movement of Hutu extremists opposing the peace negotiations succeeded in undermining the whole process through a terror campaign including riots, massacres, and assassinations, which contributed to a significant escalation of the conflict and paved the way for the 1994 genocide.¹⁰⁸

The case of Afghanistan highlights the dilemma hardliners pose to negotiations especially acutely. While the inclusion of the Taliban in the negotiations and thus engaging them in dialogue could have lowered levels of violence, negotiations may have become more complicated due to vastly diverging positions on future political and societal institutions. Yet, the result of the peace process shows that ignoring main conflict parties, even considering the danger that they may take hardliner positions, undermines the possibility of building lasting peace, irrespective of the otherwise inclusive nature of a process.

Conversely, there are also cases in which the self-exclusion of an armed hardliner faction led to reduced violence, such as in PNG Bougainville: the

¹⁰⁶ Paul Arthur and Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, "Democratic Unionist Party: History, Policy, & Structure," Topic, accessed 19 October 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Unionist-Party>.

¹⁰⁷ South African History Online, "Boipatong Massacre - 17 June 1992," Topic, accessed 19 October 2017, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/boipatong-massacre-17-june-1992>.

¹⁰⁸ Andersen, "Multilateral Development Assistance," 441-56

inclusion of armed factions associated with the Me'ekamui, the population group claiming rights to land, economic resources, and political authority in Bougainville, would in all probability have led to at least a stalling of the process, if not its failure. Nevertheless, this self-exclusion resulted in a context in which a main cause of the conflict, namely property rights over a large copper mine, has still not been resolved to date.¹⁰⁹ This situation has significantly impeded the island's economic recovery, which in turn has led to at least one localized violent conflict, in the south of the island in 2005.

Hardliner intervention in peace processes through non-military means also leads to mixed effects. In some cases, they did so as participants in specific modalities or as outsiders, with the goal of either sabotaging a peace process or shaping the content of agreements according to their positions. An example of hardliners intervening peacefully within modalities is the successful intervention of business actors in El Salvador, who as the only included non-armed actors managed to forge an agreement, but one which had mixed results, as discussed above.¹¹⁰ The pro-war Mass Actions in Sri Lanka¹¹¹ and Macedonia¹¹² provide examples of peaceful hardliner interventions calling for an end to negotiations and a military solution to the conflict, in other words for escalation.

7.4. The Role of Armed Forces

Across our cases we found that armed actors such as national armed forces can enable or constrain the effectiveness of inclusion modalities during peace and transition processes. This section discusses some such cases but only focuses on processes in which military actors had a direct impact on the effectiveness of the modalities.¹¹³ Overall, we found that in a small number of cases, armed forces initiated transition processes and pushed for the introduction of certain modalities of inclusion, thus playing a critical role in the prevention attempt. In others, however, particularly when the military had a long history of involvement in civilian affairs, armed forces attempted to control and spoil inclusive processes or ignored their outcomes, which often rendered their inclusive elements meaningless.

¹⁰⁹ John Braithwaite et al., *Reconciliation and Architectures of Commitment: Dequencing Peace in Bougainville* (Canberra, A.C.T.: ANU E Press, 2010).

¹¹⁰ Rettberg, *Local Business, Local Peace*.

¹¹¹ Camilla Orjuela, "Sri Lanka: Peace Activists and Nationalists," ed. Thania Paffenholz (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2010), 297–320.

¹¹² John Phillips, *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*, 1st Edition (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003).

¹¹³ There are, of course, a large number of other means through which military actors can affect levels of violence, but accounting for them would go beyond the scope of this study.

In some cases, the military was instrumental in initiating transition processes and inclusion modalities, as exemplified by Mali: following the military-led overthrow of General Traoré in March 1991, the Malian army negotiated with the Opposition Coordination Committee—a civilian body which had protested against General Traoré—to create the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP). The CTSP, which included military and civilian officials led the transition and set up a National Dialogue which took into account the perspectives of Malians from various regions and diverse religious, political, and professional backgrounds. Ultimately the National Dialogue resulted in a new constitution and a charter for political parties which were ratified by the CTSP.¹¹⁴

We also found that in countries where the military has had a long history of involvement in political affairs, armed forces sometimes launched inclusive transition initiatives, but either controlled or ignored their outcomes, thus compromising the prevention attempt. These can be considered cases of elite co-optation (see Chapter 7.2 above). Inclusive transition processes of this type have generally been set up to appease popular protests and provide a façade for continued military rule. For instance, in Egypt following the 2011 ousting of President Mubarak, the Armed Council and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) called for a National Dialogue that would take into account views of a diverse set of Egyptians, with the aim of reconciling Egyptian society. Yet, the benefits of inclusion were restricted by the armed forces which deprived the National Dialogue of any meaningful decision-making power and controlled the outcome of the discussions. In Fiji, the military-backed government launched a Constitutional Review Commission to draft a new constitution which took into account Fijians' opinions. But given the Commission's wish to reduce the role of the armed forces in politics, the military-backed government rejected the Commission's draft and instead passed its own version, written behind closed doors.¹¹⁵ Moreover, in Togo in 1991, long-standing president Gnassingbé Eyadéma who enjoyed the support of the army set up a National Dialogue to satisfy the demands of protestors and the public. This national conference resulted in a legal framework for a presidential multiparty system, but President Eyadéma refused to implement it and remained in power until his death in 2005.¹¹⁶

In addition, we found that in some cases where the military was a powerful political actor, the armed forces attempted to spoil negotiations. While they did not always aim to affect the inclusive nature of negotiations,

¹¹⁴ Christophe Daum and Céline Le Guay, "Le Mali, sa démocratisation et ses émigrés," *Hommes et Migrations* 1256, no. 1 (2005): 103-14.

¹¹⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Revise Draft Constitution."

¹¹⁶ John R. Heilbrunn, "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 31, no. 2 (1993): 298.

armed forces often succeeded in influencing peace processes by, for example, refusing to participate in certain rounds of the discussions or by contradicting the rules of the agreement on the ground. In Aceh, for instance, key military officials remained influential in politics during and after the peace process and refused to collaborate with the new civilian government; they regularly violated agreements by refusing to retreat from certain posts and intimidated the Joint Security Committee which was set up to implement the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.¹¹⁷ In Guatemala, the military had refused to negotiate with armed groups for many years as it sought to defeat them militarily. When the government initiated talks with armed groups, the military attempted to destabilize the peace negotiations by boycotting the National Dialogue¹¹⁸ and later not cooperating with the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH). In addition, the army allegedly assassinated Bishop Juan Gerardi who headed the Recovery of Historical Memory project (RHEMI) that compiled thousands of testimonies documenting various human rights abuses.¹¹⁹

7.5. Women's Influence

Women's groups, while part of civil society, deserve special attention as they have traditionally been the most marginalized actors during peace and transition processes. The influence of women differs from one inclusion modality to another. For example, when gender equality provisions are introduced in Inclusive Commissions, women have more influence over the peace agreement. However, in High-level Problem-solving Workshops, women tend to be underrepresented and less able to exert influence, except in workshops specifically designed to address their groups' grievances. Importantly, in line with Paffenholz' work, we have found that women's presence in inclusion modalities does not necessarily lead to women exerting significant influence over these processes. Rather, influence depends on, inter alia, broad coalitions between women bridging factional divides, women's quotas across delegations in combination with independent women's delegations to negotiations, as well as the traditional standing of women and women's groups in conflict-affected societies. Overall, we found that women's influence was higher when they overcame their differences and presented their grievances either as a coalition or through an independent women's delegation in negotiations.

Women's quotas, as part of the selection criteria for negotiation delegations, have proven effective in enlarging women's representation at the table.

¹¹⁷ Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch, *The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed* (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2003).

¹¹⁸ Enrique Alvarez and Tania Palencia Prado, *Guatemala's Peace Process: Context, Analysis and Evaluation* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2002).

¹¹⁹ Raul Molina Mejia, "The Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala," *Social Justice* 4, no. 78 (1999): 64.

However, quotas alone did not automatically lead to increased women's influence, as loyalties to other identities, such as conflict or political party, region, ideology, ethnicity or religion shaped the behavior of women delegates. Such was the case in Nepal, where women had played a significant role in the conflict with Maoist groups.¹²⁰ Although the electoral system included quotas for women, they were not able to build a strong coalition around their shared identity as women which could have trumped other, divisive identities. Their lack of joint positioning in the process meant that despite significant representation in the negotiation delegations, women did not achieve liberation from oppressive social, cultural, and religious structures. However, when women were able to overcome divisions and build coalitions we found that this significantly increased their influence. For example, in the 2008 Kenyan negotiations following post-election violence, Graça Machel, a member of the African Union mediation team, pushed women to overcome their differences to great effect.¹²¹ Conversely, in Yemen where women benefitted from a 30 percent quota in the National Dialogue as well as an independent women's delegation, they did not form a unified group and rarely voted as a block, thus failing to pass many of the issues of joint concern to them.

Moreover, women had a much better chance of exerting influence at the negotiation table when they had their own independent women-only delegation, or when they were able to strategically coordinate among women across delegations in order to advance common interests, such as by formulating joint positions on key issues and/or by forming unified women's coalitions across formal delegations. In the Somalia Djibouti process, for example, nearly 100 women took the unprecedented step of establishing a "Sixth Clan" of women to vote in a block to ensure their participation in the process.¹²² In a high-level problem-solving workshop in the DRC, 64 female delegates from different parties were brought together by the organizing groups. At the beginning of the workshop, the participants resolutely represented their 'group' or party position, but over the course of the following four days, positions softened, with women abandoning party alliances and working together towards a common agenda. As with other civil society actors, when women were merely granted observer status, they could rarely influence the process.

Within Consultations, women were also most influential when they were able to formulate joint positions on key issues. These were often presented

¹²⁰ Satya Shrestha-Schipper, "Women's Participation in the People's War in Jumla," *European Bulletin of Himalayan Research* 33-34 (2009-2008): 105-22.

¹²¹ Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, *Women in Peace & Transition Processes: Kenya (2008-2013)* (Geneva: Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative (The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2016).

¹²² Deborah M. Timmons, *The Sixth Clan: Women Organise for Peace in Somalia: A Review of Published Literature* (Geneva: University for Peace, 2004).

in concise documents to explain women's demands to the main negotiating parties, which then were either formally obliged or informally pressured to consider this input in the drafting of a final peace agreement. The success of the Women's Consultative Group in Kenya during the negotiations to address the post-election violence in 2008 provides a positive example for a joint women's position that substantially influenced the talks in demanding truth, justice and accountability as well as a gender perspective and the investigation of gender-based violence.¹²³ In addition, in post-agreement Commissions, women's inclusion was mostly the result of gender-sensitive provisions already written into the peace agreement. We found that in instances where explicit gender equality provisions (such as specific quotas) had been introduced during the early stages of the process, women's participation in all Commissions across all phases of a peace process was able to influence the language of a final peace agreement.

Women were found to be highly underrepresented in High-level Problem-solving Workshops. Exceptions to this general finding occurred when workshops were specifically designed for women, as a means of overcoming any political tensions and grievances. Such cases often resulted in the formulation of joint positions, which then increased women's overall influence. In cases of Public Decision-making through referenda on negotiated peace agreements or new constitutions, women were sometimes successful in launching a public campaign in favor of approving a peace deal (i.e. Northern Ireland). More than any other group, women performed Mass Action campaigns explicitly in favor of peace deals. They pressured conflict parties to start negotiations and sign peace deals, such as in Liberia¹²⁴ or the DRC,¹²⁵ where women groups effectively blocked the exits of negotiation venues to force the conflicting parties to sign an agreement.

We found that the influence of women's groups in inclusion modalities also depends on a number of factors. Public buy-in, crucial to the success or failure of many peace processes aiming to end civil wars, is influenced by a country's political climate and the attitudes of powerful actors. However, public buy-in can also be created by women's groups themselves, such as in Northern Ireland ahead of the 1998 referendum to approve the Good Friday Peace Agreement, where a large civil society campaign initiated by the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition successfully pushed

¹²³ Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, *Kenya (2008-2013)*.

¹²⁴ Desirée Nilsson, *Crafting a Secure Peace: Evaluating Liberia's Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009).

¹²⁵ Shelly Whitman, "Women and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An Assessment of Their Role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 6, no. 1 (2007): 29-48.

for a positive referendum outcome.¹²⁶ There are other elements that may enhance the influence exerted by women during a peace process, such as the pre-existence of strong and active women's groups or movements; the experience and expertise of these groups, along with the existence of prior commitments regarding the inclusion of women; and networks providing logistical and other forms of support.

7.6. The Regional and International Environment

The analysis of our cases also shows that international actors as well as states from the region in question are often involved in peace and transition processes. These actors usually assert influence through a combination of diplomacy and technical assistance. Outside actors may facilitate discussions between conflict parties, push for the inclusion of more actors or influence the establishment of additional inclusion modalities. Alternatively, they may provide financial means, facilities, and trainings to shape these processes.

Reasons for regional and international involvement can include strategic interests in the state in transition itself, whereby a state might wish to protect economic and military agreements it concluded under the previous regime, or the desire to enhance one's own international standing. For example, South Africa's involvement in Burundi's peace process was partly motivated by its wish to show that African countries were capable of fostering peace agreements.¹²⁷ Along the same lines, Russia's role in peace negotiations in the former territories of the Soviet Union can be perceived as a way to show that its influence in its immediate neighborhood remains strong.

By applying international pressure on governments and conflict parties, international actors have often pushed for the inclusion of more actors in peace and transition processes. In Burundi, for example, following the 1996 coup that restored Pierre Buyoya to power, neighboring countries called for the legalization of political parties and the restoration of the National Assembly. This move paved the way for the inclusion of 17 political parties when the peace negotiations started.¹²⁸ During Tajikistan's peace process, the United Nations advocated for the inclusion of the press as observers during the negotiations.¹²⁹ In the case of Benin in the 1990s, the pressure

¹²⁶ Swanee Hunt and Christina Posa, "Women Waging Peace," *Foreign Policy* (blog), accessed 19 October 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/19/women-waging-peace/>.

¹²⁷ Daley, "The Burundi Peace Negotiation," 333-52.

¹²⁸ Daley, "The Burundi Peace Negotiation," 338; Elizabeth McClintock and T rence Nahimana, "Managing the Tension between Inclusionary and Exclusionary Processes: Building Peace in Burundi," *International Negotiation* 13, no. 1 (2008): 77.

¹²⁹ Elena Rigacci Hay, *Methodology of the Inter-Tajik Negotiation Process* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2001).

applied by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and France forced the government to initiate an inclusive transition process which took the form of a National Dialogue.¹³⁰ Finally, in some cases, influential international players have persuaded groups and individuals to take part, or at least to remain, in the discussions. France, for example, played a prominent role in the period preceding Togo's National Dialogue in 1991, convincing *the Collectif d'Opposition Démocratique*, composed of students, intellectuals, and business individuals, to participate in the National Dialogue.¹³¹

In addition, states and international organizations have contributed to inclusion by facilitating discussions between conflict parties. This is illustrated by Burundi's peace process during which the South African mediator, Nelson Mandela, adopted a more inclusive vision of the discussions compared to his predecessor: he enhanced women's ability to influence the negotiations by pushing for the incorporation of recommendations arising from the All-Party Burundi Women's Peace Conference and meeting with several women who were included in the process as observers. This resulted in a final peace agreement that included half of the women's recommendations. During the peace process in Macedonia in 2001, the European Union pressured hardliner ethnic Macedonians to make concessions and remain part of negotiations, and NATO provided confidence-building measures for this purpose.¹³² However, in a few cases, influential international players have also limited inclusion by restricting the participation of certain actors. Moreover, during the peace negotiations in Bonn in the context of the 2001 Afghan peace process, the international community excluded the Taliban from the negotiations, primarily for normative reasons.

International actors have also influenced negotiations and the effectiveness of inclusion modalities by providing technical support to parties involved in negotiations. In processes that were originally locally initiated, technical assistance can be instrumental. For instance, following the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali, a first round of self-initiated inter-community meetings was conducted to resolve local conflicts. Some of these meetings were also attended by delegations from the national government to strengthen political support for the National Pact signed in April 1992.¹³³ As these meetings proved effective in reducing levels of violence, a second round of meetings was financially and technically supported by various international donors, including the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), as well as

¹³⁰ Kathryn Nwajiaku, "The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 3 (1994): 429-47.

¹³¹ Gordon Cumming, *Aid to Africa: French and British Policies from the Cold War to the New Millennium* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).

¹³² Phillips, *Macedonia*.

¹³³ Lode, *Mali's Peace Process*.

the German, the Swiss and the Canadian governments, through the “Fund for Reconciliation and Peace Consolidation in Northern Mali.” This support made a systematic prevention attempt covering large parts of the country and engaging a variety of stakeholders possible.

In other cases, international actors have established structures that reinforced the participation and influence of certain actors. For example, during the Solomon Islands’ constitution-drafting process, UNDP proved instrumental in organizing consultations in all nine provinces that allowed the public to participate. Ultimately, the opinions collected through consultations were integrated in the draft constitution.¹³⁴ International actors have moreover often provided funding for the creation of inclusion modalities. For instance, during Burundi’s peace process, national consultations were funded by the Swiss and the Austrian Governments as well as several international organizations such as UNDP and the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), in order to gather Burundians’ views on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.¹³⁵ This is further exemplified by the Constitutional Loya Jirga process in Afghanistan, where funding provided by UNDP and other international donors enabled the establishment of the Drafting and Review Commissions. However, in a few cases, the provision of support structures hindered effective inclusion by favoring certain groups over others. For example, during the Emergency Loya Jirga in Afghanistan, the technical assistance provided by the United States and others in the international community to president Karzai’s administration resulted in negotiations which primarily benefitted the government’s positions.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Katy Le Roy, *Public Participation in Constitution-Making: The Pacific Islands* (Interpeace, 2011).

¹³⁵ United Nations, *Rapport Des Consultations Nationales Sur La Mise En Place Des Mécanismes de Justice de Transition Au Burundi* (Bujumbura: United Nations, 2010).

¹³⁶ Suhrke et al. *Conflictual Peacebuilding*.

| 8. Conclusion

This study has examined the relationship between inclusion and the prevention of violence by analyzing 47 cases characterized by a range of inclusion modalities and types of prevention, including attempts to prevent the occurrence, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of violent conflict. We found that inclusion can play an important role in initially halting violence and in sustaining peace during political transitions. Furthermore, we ascertained that the relationship between inclusion and violence prevention is highly complex and conditioned by the range of context-dependent factors discussed throughout this study.

The study has highlighted how the inclusion of actors beyond the main conflict parties can contribute to the prevention of violence. The prevention attempts identified across IPTI's datasets include negotiation processes that have led to a variety of agreements, including peace agreements, national pacts and constitutions. We have shed light on the role of inclusion in reaching and implementing such agreements. The assessment is based on a typology of seven distinct inclusion modalities and an analysis of how each of these can make a specific contribution to violence prevention. Moreover, the study has examined how the combination of various modalities helps to halt violence as well as initiate and contribute to long-term transitions towards less violent political orders by addressing the causes of conflict.

Our main findings are based on a differentiation between initial effects on levels of violence and effects that become manifest over a longer period of time, as we found that the functional requirements—which inclusion modalities need to meet—vary for each time dimension. At the early stages of a prevention attempt inclusion modalities are instrumental for reducing violence if they succeed in building momentum as a result of which the main armed groups halt violence and decide to pursue their interests through political means. This is particularly salient in cases with incipient and low levels of violence related to mass protests. In such situations, the modalities provide negotiation fora in which the conflict parties can pursue their agendas without resorting to arms. While in some cases prevention outcomes can already be achieved through exclusive negotiation formats— if they are representative—that only involve the main conflict parties, we found that more inclusive formats can be of additional benefit if, for example, they involve civil society actors or strategically mobilize the broader population.

Moreover, we found that broad-based inclusion becomes critical for sustaining low levels of violence over a longer period of time. Here, inclusion modalities are instrumental in initiating and implementing complex transition processes through which causes of conflict are addressed and more peaceful political orders are created. We likewise found that the

representativeness and independence of actors included through these modalities matter greatly. High levels of representativeness of inclusion modalities are particularly crucial for addressing many of the causes that underpin violent conflict. Furthermore, if included actors can operate independently from the principle conflict parties, they are more likely to play a constructive role. In many cases, the inclusion of strong and independent civil society actors is important for addressing causes of conflict, while the participation of the wider population is critical for guaranteeing public buy-in and sustaining the legitimacy of transition processes. However, in some cases, the inclusion of hardliner factions may lead to the politicization of inclusive processes and, in the worst case scenario, to a stalling or collapse of the prevention attempt.

We also found that while most prevention cases share common characteristics that have formed the basis of our comparative analysis, each case remains unique in the manifestation of these patterns both in process and outcomes. The findings presented above, particularly regarding the modalities' ability to create momentum and sustain inclusive political transitions that can address causes of conflict, continue to be shaped by several contextual factors relevant in all cases but different in their manifestation in each case, such as the composition of civil society, elite conduct, the role of hardliners and armed forces, women's influence, and the regional and international environment.

The influence of various factors on the overall effectiveness of the inclusion modalities varies from case to case. The study has nonetheless identified strong patterns that suggest that inclusion can contribute to violence prevention through its constitutive role in building momentum that initially halts violence and by tackling violence and addressing causes of conflict over a longer period of time, thus contributing to political transitions that pave the way towards sustainable peace.

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| Annex A: Overview of Cases

	Case Name	Prevention Type	Time Period	Direct Representation at the Negotiation Table	Observer Status	Consultations	Inclusive Commissions	High-level Problem-solving Workshops	Public Decision-making	Mass Action
1	Aceh Peace Negotiation	Continuation/Escalation	1999–2003	•		•				
2	Afghanistan Negotiations and Political Transition	Occurrence	2001–2005	•		•	•			
3	Benin Political Transition	Occurrence	1990–2011	•		•			•	•
4	Burundi Peace Negotiations and Implementation	Continuation/Escalation	1996–2013	•	•	•			•	
5	Colombia Peace Negotiations	Continuation/Escalation	1998–2002			•	•			
6	Cyprus Negotiations	Recurrence	1999–2004						•	•
7	Darfur Peace Negotiations	Continuation/Escalation	2009–2013			•	•			
8	DR Congo Inter-Congolese Dialogue	Continuation/Escalation	1999–2003	•				•		
9	Egypt Political Transition	Recurrence	2011–2013	•		•			•	•
10	El Salvador Peace Negotiations and Implementation	Continuation/Escalation	1990–1994	•		•				
11	El Salvador Peace Negotiations and Implementation	Recurrence	1990–1994				•			
12	Eritrea Constitution Making	Recurrence	1993–1997			•	•			
13	Fiji Political Transition/Constitution Making	Occurrence	2006–2013			•	•			
14	Georgia-Abkhazia UN Negotiations	Recurrence	1997–2007			•		•		
15	Guatemala Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	1989–1999			•				

16	Guatemala Peace Process	Recurrence	1989–1999				•		•	
17	Israel-Palestine Geneva Initiative Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	2003–2013					•		
18	Israel-Palestine Oslo I Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	1991–1995					•		•
19	Kenya Post-election Violence	Continuation/Escalation	2008			•				
20	Kenya Post-election Violence	Recurrence	2009–2013			•	•		•	
21	Kyrgyzstan Political Reforms	Recurrence	2013–2017			•	•			
22	Liberia Peace Agreement and Implementation	Continuation/Escalation	1990–1992	•	•	•	•			•
23	Macedonia Ohrid FA Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	2001–2013					•		•
24	Mali Political Transition	Occurrence	1990–1996	•			•		•	•
25	Northern Mali Peace Negotiation	Continuation/Escalation	1990–1996			•				
26	Mexico Chiapas Uprising and Peace Process	Occurrence	1994–1995							•
27	Mexico Chiapas Uprising and Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	1994–1997	•		•	•		•	
28	Moldova-Transnistria Negotiations	Recurrence	1992–2005			•		•	•	
29	Nepal Peace Agreement and Constitution Making	Continuation/Escalation	2006							•
30	Nepal Peace Agreement and Constitution Making	Recurrence	2008–2012	•			•			
31	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement	Continuation/Escalation	1998–2006	•		•	•		•	•
32	Northern Ireland St. Andrews Agreement	Continuation/Escalation	2006–2006	•						
33	PNG Bougainville Peace Negotiations	Continuation/Escalation	1997–2005	•			•			
34	Rwanda Arusha Peace Accords	Continuation/Escalation	1992–1993							•
35	Solomon Islands Townsville PA and Constitution Making	Continuation/Escalation	2000–2014			•	•			
36	Somalia I National Peace Conference	Continuation/Escalation	1992–1994		•	•	•			
37	Somalia II Djibouti Process	Continuation/Escalation	1999–2001	•		•	•			

38	Somalia III Kenya process National Peace Conference	Continuation/Escalation	2001-2005	•	•	•				•
39	Somaliland Post-independence violence negotiations	Continuation/Escalation	1990-1994	•	•	•				•
40	South Africa Political Transition	Continuation/Escalation	1993-1997	•		•	•		•	•
41	Sri Lanka Ceasefire, Peace Negotiation and Elections	Continuation/Escalation	2000-2004					•		•
42	Tajikistan Peace Negotiations and Implementation	Continuation/Escalation	1994-2000	•	•			•		
43	Tajikistan Peace Negotiations and Implementation	Recurrence	1997-2000				•			
44	Togo Political Transition National Conference	Continuation/Escalation	1993-2000	•					•	•
45	Togo Political Transition Inclusive Dialogue	Occurrence	2006-2006	•			•			•
46	Turkish-Kurdish Peace Process	Continuation/Escalation	2009-2014					•	•	•
47	Yemen Transition National Dialogue	Occurrence	2011-2014	•		•	•			•

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Cover image:

Opposition supporters carrying rocks and wooden sticks protest against a pro-government MP in the Kibera slum of Nairobi, Kenya, 14 June 2016. (AP Photo/Ben Curtis)

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