1 Production and uses of expertise by international bureaucracies

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This edited volume aims to advance existing research on the production and use of specialized knowledge by international bureaucracies.[1] Given the complexity, technicality and apparent apolitical character of the issues dealt with in global governance arenas, "evidence-based" policy-making has imposed itself as the best way of evaluating the risks and consequences of political action in global arenas. Although this turn has also taken place at the domestic level, international organizations have, in the absence of alternative, democratic, modes of legitimation, heartily adopted this approach to policy-making. International bureaucrats insist that their policies and programs are "evidence-based," "rational," and founded on neutral expertise. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for instance spells out its "core values" on its web page and lists "objective" at the top of its inventory, boasting that its "analyses and recommendations are independent and evidence-based."[2] For international bureaucrats, resorting to the use of expert knowledge can indeed represent an efficient means of orienting political action, while keeping the appearance of the rational, apolitical character of the policies they promote.

Since Weber, who argued, at the beginning of the last century, that bureaucratic administration means the "exercise of power by way of knowledge,"[3] it has become commonplace for sociologists and political scientists alike to evoke the crucial role of expertise as an instrument of bureaucratic power and influence. Scholars of public policy, public administration and European Union (EU) politics have pointed to the

multifold ways in which expert knowledge can be mobilized in policy-making processes, as "ammunition" for substantiating organizational preferences, a tool of legitimation, or a mechanism of symbolic authority.[4] In the literature on international organizations however, little is said about how, why, and when international bureaucrats use expert knowledge and where that knowledge comes from. While the role of knowledge as a constitutive element of bureaucratic authority has been captured, we lack understanding of why and how it is produced and mobilized by international bureaucrats.

Specialized, or "expert" knowledge is understood here as "the forms of codified knowledge that are either produced by specialists (as indicated by qualifications or institutional affiliation); or which involve specialist or technical methods, equipment or accumulated knowledge that is generally assumed to require skills and experience not possessed by professional administrators" (Boswell's definition, in this volume). Of course what constitutes expert knowledge is itself the object of negotiation amongst relevant stakeholders in a given issue domain. Policy-makers and knowledge actors themselves may vie and compete to assert their own conceptions of what constitutes valid knowledge and a good specialist. Thus, while acknowledging that the "expertization" of knowledge is itself political, the volume focuses on types of knowledge that are perceived, by international bureaucrats and the transnational actors which interact with them, as technical, specialized and as such, as a reliable foundation for policy action.

Questions and contribution

The lack of research on international bureaucracies and expertise has to do, first and foremost, with the predominance of a state-centric perspective in International Relations (IR) until recently. Cox and Jacobson[5] made an early attempt to introduce a framework for mapping inputs (influence) and outputs (policy) in international organizations (IOs). In doing so they provided us with a better understanding of IOs as international actors, but their conclusions, however, tend to reduce international bureaucratic behavior to the compulsions of powerful states, revealing much about political process and delegation while providing few insights regarding the mobilization of expertise within international secretariats. Disappointment with the performance of international organizations throughout the 1980s resulted in powerful states threatening to disengage—and much of the academic world did. The first significant attempt to resuscitate Cox and Jacobson's agenda came at the end of the Cold War with Ernst B. Haas' *When Knowledge*

is Power. Haas shed light on how "invisible colleges" of like-minded professionals from different disciplines could, at times, influence international organizations, which however remain fundamentally habit driven.[6] Ultimately, Haas offers a typology of IO change, not a theory that can account for the mobilization or production of expertise.

From the 1990s onwards, IR scholarship became more interested in the role of knowledge in international politics. Coined by Foucault[7] and adapted by Holzner and Marx,[8] the epistemic communities concept entered the mainstream of IR scholarship with the 1992 special edition of *International Organization* edited by Peter M. Haas. The approach shifts away from IO problem-solving to focus on more diffuse, transnational networks of knowledge production. Because they identify causal relationships on given policy problems, epistemic communities influence the policy process. The epistemic communities approach has stimulated a new and fruitful research program[9] and more recent works have tried to identify the scope conditions for science to influence policy. Haas and Stevens[10] have for instance analyzed more than 30 existing international environmental regimes that involve scientific bodies in order to determine what conditions enable scientific knowledge and epistemic communities to influence policy-making. The question addressed by this research program, has, essentially been that of whether experts are relevant actors in international decision-making and the circumstances under which science influences policy.[11]

In *Rules for the World*, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore bring our focus back to IOs as international actors in their own right. To them, expertise constitutes bureaucratic authority.[12] Following Weber, Barnett and Finnemore argue that "rational-legal authority thus constitutes IOs in the sense that it gives them a specific form (bureaucracy) and empowers them to act in specific ways (general, impersonal rule-making)."[13] The ability of international secretariats to present themselves as impersonal and neutral is, therefore, central to the assertion of their authority, and the use of expert knowledge plays a central role in this regard. More recently Reinalda and Verbeek have also argued that international bureaucracies are most influential when they monopolize expert knowledge.[14] Jinnah, in her book *Post-Treaty Politics* provides an exploration of how international secretariats use expertise (both substantive expertise about environmental policy and also institutional expertise about how global governance operates) to manage and expand into the gray area that exists where international organizations' jurisdictions or mandates overlap.[15] But this research program is still emerging, and some questions remain. Building upon these insights, the volume sets to answer three sets of queries.

First, why and how do international bureaucrats deploy specialized knowledge in policy-making? While, as explained above, existing accounts have suggested that the use of expert knowledge is central to international bureaucracies' assertion of their authority, a more specific conceptualization of their different ways of using knowledge is lacking. Is expert knowledge used instrumentally to adjust policy outputs; more symbolically to assert the organizations' epistemic authority; strategically to justify their jurisdiction into new policy domains, build their capacity to act or boost certain claims; or as a means to depoliticize contentious policy issues? Does this vary depending on the type of issue, organization, or the nature of their intervention? While some of these different uses of expertise might overlap in practice, there is a need to at least analytically distinguish between different modes of knowledge mobilization.

Second, how is the expert knowledge used by international bureaucrats produced? By whom? In which arenas? How does knowledge travel from its locus of production towards international bureaucrats? IR scholarship has essentially looked at these questions through the lens of the epistemic communities approach,[16] which assumes that under conditions of uncertainty, an epistemic community can generate a definition of interests by illuminating certain dimensions of an issue, from which actors deduce their preferences. From this perspective, expert knowledge feeds into policy by identifying and framing issues and ultimately the decisions of international policy-makers. But other dynamics might be in operation. International bureaucrats are capable of strategic behavior and may try to shape processes of knowledge production in order to meet their policy or institutional objectives. And ultimately processes of knowledge production and diffusion might simply be more diffuse and intractable. Given this, how can we best attempt to retrace and make sense of processes of knowledge production by international bureaucrats and the web of actors with which they interact?

And third, what forms of knowledge are used by international bureaucracies, and with what kinds of implications? Which types of knowledge are seen as authoritative, and why? International bureaucracies have rolled out new ways of observing, measuring and evaluating performance, through targets, indicators, league tables and benchmarking. Organizations such as the OECD, the European Commission, the World Bank, or the World Health Organization (WHO) have extensively resorted to such tools. Are quantitative forms of knowledge favored because they make claims to impartiality easier? Are indicators and new forms of benchmarking used deliberately in order to "technicalize" and depoliticize issues? Or should this turn be

examined within a broader paradigmatic shift that has imported methods of policy-making and evaluation from the private sector?

In answering these questions, the volume makes a key contribution to our understanding of "evidence-policy-making," international bureaucracies' self-proclaimed core policy-making mode.

International bureaucracies as strategic actors within a given environment

The volume builds upon an existing body of work that has drawn attention to the authority of international bureaucracies.[17] At the core of this research agenda is the assumption that international secretariats can act as autonomous and independent actors. Barnett and Finnemore[18] see bureaucracies as distinct organizational forms, which have to be understood as the products of a rationalizing process of the exercise of power. The authority of international bureaucracies, in this light, derives from the perception of an apparent rational-legal process of administration. Building upon these insights, existing research has shown that the international secretariats of IOs, due to their bureaucratic nature, have a certain room for maneuver to act autonomously. Despite the fact that member states delineate their mandates and provide them with funding, international bureaucracies are able to find ways to expand their missions and promote what they see as good policy.[19] A number of scholars have indeed shed light on the propensity of international bureaucrats to devise various sorts of strategies to maximize their autonomy. Recent research has painted a fresh portrait of international bureaucrats generously interpreting their mandates, buffering barriers to state monitoring,[20] shielding themselves from external pressures by increasing their independent revenue base, seeking out alliances with actors that support their agendas[21] and even promoting the creation of new IOs with fewer possibilities of control for member states.[22]

But international bureaucracies do not act in a vacuum. They are surrounded by their environment and this affects their activities. Traditional IR approaches conceive of the international environment as defined by states, either singularly powerful states, coalitions of states, or competing blocs and alliances.[23] Constructivist theories, for their part, treat international bureaucracies as constituted by their environment, demonstrating how shifts in regulatory, epistemic, and normative patterns shape their formal structure, goals, rules, and standards of appropriateness.[24] The focus is on the "socially constructed normative worlds in which organizations exist," emphasizing the social rules, standards of appropriateness, and models of legitimacy.[25]

The perspective adopted here conceives international bureaucracies as strategic actors which can be constrained by their environment, either materially or culturally. International bureaucracies act strategically and try to enhance or protect their autonomy, but they do so within a given environment—conceived as the web of actors which interact with international secretariats: states, but also transnational actors, such as firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), epistemic communities, and individual experts and scientists. These actors can relate to one another in more or less structured ways (networks, public-private partnerships, or more *ad hoc* forms of interactions) and constitute the milieu in which international bureaucracies evolve. They constrain and influence international bureaucratic action in two ways. First, they can affect the resources available to international bureaucracies. An obvious example is the ability of states to cut international secretariats' budgets, but other constraints can consist of the need for international bureaucrats to rely on external actors as constituencies of support or as providers of specialized knowledge which they do not have "in-house." Second, these actors can affect the activities of international bureaucracies in more subtle ways, by pushing certain issues on top of global agendas, framing policy problems or simply providing them with the data they need to elaborate their policies.

Interactions between international bureaucracies and their environment influences the way they mobilize knowledge, but also how that very knowledge they use is produced. The environment in which international bureaucracies exist creates the need for international bureaucracies to legitimize their actions, gather support from specific constituencies, maintain their budget and their raison d'être as international decision-making arenas. It also shapes the way they see issue problems and produce the knowledge they need to understand these very problems, as detailed below.

Modes of knowledge mobilization

Scholars of public policy, public administration, and EU politics have pointed to the manifold ways in which expert knowledge can be mobilized in policy-making processes, as "ammunition" for substantiating organizational preferences, a means of assigning blame and responsibility, or as a mechanism of symbolic authority.[26] From this perspective, expertise serves purposive political actors or organizations.[27] Research on the relationship between expertise and policy has also stressed the essential role played by knowledge as a means of enhancing the legitimacy of an organization or agency.[28] These works

have provided us with great insights into modes of knowledge mobilization by policy-makers or organizations, and some contributions to this volume build upon these in order to understand what specific modes of knowledge utilization international bureaucracies resort to.

Informing and guiding policy

International bureaucrats may resort to expertise in order to inform and guide policy. Because they deal with highly complex and often technical issues, international decision-makers are highly dependent on science and technology for determining the risks and consequences associated with political action. Political debates in such areas become far more susceptible to influence from science.[29] Defining epistemic communities as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge"[30] within that domain, Haas argues that the more complex and ambiguous the policy problems, the greater their entrepreneurial role in policy. Policy ambiguity creates uncertainty in decision-makers' minds, and as a result they seek for information to inform their choices.[31] This search enables an epistemic community to provide information that excludes or enhances different alternatives. When issues are highly complex, expertise looms large as a source of information and as a point of reference for policy debates.

Legitimizing action

The literature on expertise and policy has also pointed out that expert knowledge plays an essential role as a legitimation mechanism for policy choices in the absence (or weak presence) of democratic sources of legitimacy.[32] This is particularly relevant for international bureaucracies which, as sites of executive and technocratic governance, resort to output-based legitimation strategies. For Nanz and Steffek, "well-informed and consensus-seeking discussions in expert committees that are embedded in international decision-making procedures has been suggested as an effective remedy to the legitimacy problem of international governance."[33] Thus, international bureaucrats can use expert knowledge in order to endow their choices with what has been described as "epistemic authority."[34] The function of expert knowledge consists, here, in making policies seem well-founded and based on "indisputable" information and analysis. The perception that the bureaucrats possess reliable, relevant and detailed knowledge creates confidence that their proposals are well founded.

Boswell, in this volume, explains that because international bureaucracies operate in unpoliticized areas, and tend to orient their actions towards their peer group, or policy community, generally composed of expert, technocratic actors and organizations, they can sustain a highly specialized, technical, or scientific mode of justification which is targeted at other experts in the field. Because their "audience" places value on scientific and technical information, they are "keen to derive legitimacy through demonstrating their technical competence and the sound knowledge base of their decisions." In this sense, international bureaucracies' mode of knowledge utilization is shaped by their environment, and most crucially the expectations of key actors on which the organization is dependent.

Depoliticizing action

International bureaucrats can use expertise in order to uphold the appearance of the apolitical character of their actions. For Barnett and Finnemore,[35] it is by invoking their grip on relevant, technical and "objective" expertise that international bureaucracies can better claim to be unfolding apolitical and neutral policy programs. The authority of expertise rests indeed on assumptions about scientific rationality. Of course the use of quantified knowledge, such as benchmarks and indicators, facilitate these claims to impartiality, but other forms of expert knowledge can also reintroduce technicity into given debates. Policymakers often find it very comfortable to define decisions as technical rather than political, because, as argued by Nelkin, "debate over technical alternatives need not weight conflicting interests, but only the relative effectiveness of various approaches for resolving an immediate problem."[36] Thus, resorting to the use of expertise can be an efficient way of technicalizing policy issues and thus justifying the creep of technocratic decision-making over new domains. Littoz-Monnet in this volume, shows that even in value-based domains such as bioethics, expertise can be used to technicalize issues.[37]

Substantiating policy positions

On some occasions decision-makers may use research in order to back their own positions. From this perspective, expertise serves purposive political actors. When expertise is used in order to support particular policy programmes we can observe a "politicisation of expertise,"[38] which then becomes "ammunition for the side that finds its conclusions congenial or supportive."[39] Cannon, in this volume, gives a different

twist to this well-known argument, by showing that at the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, experts themselves can proactively mobilize the knowledge they have produced and directly engage in the policy process. At the policy negotiation stage however, it is international bureaucrats that seek out experts and researchers and use their knowledge in a variety of ways.

Minimizing institutional insecurity

International bureaucracies want to survive and be secure.[40] Although IOs have a relatively low mortality rate, they are concerned about their relevance and having sufficient resources to carry out their goals. Building their expertise in a given issue domain can help international bureaucracies to stabilize and even expand into new areas. Freeman and Sturdy, in this volume, show that much of the authority of international organizations rests upon their ability to generate and disseminate comparative knowledge about policies and their impact in different countries. Littoz-Monnet, also in this volume, argues for her part that if international secretariats succeed in recruiting relevant experts and mobilizing existing expert communities in a given sector, this will boost their relevance and their ability to expand their missions to new issue domains.[41] The ownership of expertise can be an important tool in this respect, because it gives bureaucrats the capacity to develop policy instruments in complex and highly technical policy areas.

Processes of knowledge production

Expert-shaped policy

From this perspective, policy-makers face a great degree of uncertainty as a result of the increasingly complex and technical nature of global governance issues. This state of uncertainty increases the incentives for policy-makers to consult epistemic communities, especially when a crisis occurs.[42] As a result, experts who can provide interpretation are in a pivotal position. Scientific experts develop ideas, ways of seeing specific issues and identify workable solutions for policy problems. Through their advice, epistemic communities can shape the way decision-makers see their interests and preferences.

But the way scientists contribute to shaping global governance issues can vary greatly. Scientists do not necessarily act as cohesive communities. Sometimes it can be individual scholars who work on given

issues, define how it should be understood, and bring specific problems to public attention (Cannon, this volume). The contribution of scientists to international governance can also be more institutionalized via the setting up of science panels, which act as boundary organizations in between science and politics. Since the mid-1970s, science panels have indeed been appended to international environmental regimes, and act as central repositories of expertise. But Haas reveals to us that for such panels to be effective, they must be institutionalized and enjoy regular, instead of *ad hoc*, access to decision-makers, be staffed by disciplinary experts selected by international secretariats, and enjoy control over their own schedules. When experts from the civil society were also appointed within such panels, this reduced their effectiveness, pointing to the persistent authority of epistemic expertise understood in a traditional sense, despite all the lofty rhetoric, in policy circles and in the media, about the need to involve citizens and "lay experts" in governance debates. Thus, experts' qualifications, as well the way they interact with policy-makers (in more or less institutionalized ways) are key to explaining their influence.

But Cannon (this volume) also alerts us to the need to distinguish between the different phases of the policy process. She shows that experts and academic researchers play a crucial role either at the "issue definition" stage in collecting evidence about a problem, speaking about an issue and its potential causes and raising "red flags," or at the agenda-setting stage, by becoming advocates of an issue themselves. The way scholars can become activists themselves, by publicizing their research findings and proactively taking them to policy-makers, or more indirectly by making their research available to other advocating actors, such as NGOs, governments, IOs, and the business community, is particularly enlightening. The multiple roles which scholars can endow clearly blurs the line between science, on the one hand, and policy, on the other—as will be further discussed below.

Policy-shaped expertise

The reversed view consists of conceiving policy-makers as strategic actors in processes of knowledge production. From this perspective, international bureaucrats may themselves produce expert knowledge or try to shape the way it is produced in other arenas. They can do so by setting up external expert groups, asking specific questions to consulted experts or control the appointment of experts working for them. They may, for instance, purposefully decide to set up expert groups in order to legitimize their intervention in a new policy domain (Littoz-Monnet,

in this volume). They may also strategically decide on the disciplinary background of the designed experts working for them, or of the new bureaucrats they recruit, depending on the policy agenda they favor. Demortain in this volume points to the way the WHO selected and instituted a certain category of experts—microbiologists—as those who were to be consulted on the issue of food safety. This *de facto* eliminated alternative specialists, who may have looked at the issue from a different perspective and identified other policy solutions. Bureaucrats may also decide to produce certain forms of knowledge, perceived as more authoritative. This is very well illustrated by Berten, also in this volume, who shows how the use of highly technical evaluation and simulation instruments by international bureaucrats makes it easier to facilitate their claims to expertise and to neutrality. From this perspective, bureaucrats are in control of processes of knowledge production, and expertise is instrumentalized either for the pursuit of their agendas, or the furthering of their institutional objectives or yet their quest for legitimacy.

The production of expert knowledge as an iterative process

Finally, instead of assuming either that expertise is first produced and then enters into politics, or that policy-makers fully control processes of knowledge production and orient it in view of pursuing specific interests, a third view consists in seeing expert knowledge as produced through processes of interaction between policy-makers and experts. An important strand of the Science and Technology Studies (STS) literature has already argued that science and politics are irreducible. "Co-production" designates this perpetual and mutually reinforcing dynamic.[43] That knowledge is at once a product and a producer of forms of social life is indeed difficult to deny, but while many scholars have pointed out that knowledge is situated within, and influenced by existing political structures, the modes and mechanisms of interaction between knowledge actors and decision-makers remain blurred.

Conceiving of international bureaucracies as strategic actors within a constraining environment allows us to better capture these interactions. International bureaucrats certainly attempt to act strategically and produce the specialized knowledge which they think they need, but they do so in a given milieu. Bureaucrats often rely on external sources of expertise when they do not have the specialized knowledge they need. Think-tanks, academics, communities of scientists, global regulatory scientific commissions, and even NGOs can act as sites of specialized knowledge production (see for instance Littoz-Monnet, Cannon, and Haas in this volume). These knowledge actors interact

with international bureaucrats in various arenas and reciprocal influence takes place through different pathways. The production of knowledge is usually negotiated amongst different set of actors within international secretariats and in between international secretariats and the web of actors which surround them. Data-gathering also takes place gradually and over time. Intentionality may thus become intractable in processes of knowledge production, given the complexity of the policy process, the density of the interactions amongst all the actors involved in policy and the multiplicity of relevant decision-making venues in a given issue domain. Thus, the knowledge production process is rarely one of linear order from research to decision, or from decision to research, but a set of interconnections and back-and-forthness which cannot be captured by simple causal mechanisms.

Demortain in this volume, using insights from the field of STS, engages in a critique of the "epistemic community" concept, pointing to the porous and unstable nature of knowledge communities. He proposes that instead of assuming a clear separation between scientists and policy-makers, we could think of a kind of knowledge which he labels "policy knowledge"—and which he defines as the causal relationships established between a given state of the world, a policy intervention and the effects attributed to this intervention on the original problem—that is common to bureaucrats, experts, and diplomats alike. He identifies three ways in which a "loose collective of mobile and polyvalent scientists" contribute to the formation of policy knowledge. First, experts and scientists cross boundaries because they hold multiple roles at the same time, or successively, in different organizations. Second, scientists circulate between various sites and affiliations, in these spaces of interaction between science and international policies. Third, these knowledge communities are themselves loosely coupled. It is in these spaces of interactions between experts and international bureaucracies that policy knowledge is produced. He concludes that an epistemic community is less of a cohesive group with a causal role in policy change, than a label for loose sets of experts that circulate knowledge, control this circulation and successfully claim ownership over this knowledge.

Biersteker, or Stone (both in this volume), also shed light on the impossibility of separating, other than analytically, the realm of expertise with that of policy. They show, in their respective contributions, that international bureaucrats can interact with experts, think-tanks, and other international actors within loose forms of associations which they each coin their own way, as "transnational policy networks" (TPNs) or "transnational policy communities (TPCs)."

Looking at the case of the global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) convened by the World Bank, Stone argues that the TPCs—composed of think-tanks, experts, scientific institutes and international civil servants—which emerge around them act as loci of knowledge production. She proposes that by using the concept of "interpretative community," we can better capture "that the policy knowledge and capacities that are created are not only 'epistemic' but also social, involving discretion and judgment based on bureaucratic expertise" (Stone, in this volume). Thus, TPCs become venues where knowledge used in GRPPs is co-produced, deconstructing the separation often drawn between experts and policy.

Focusing specifically on academic scholars who engage with the policy work conducted by the UN, and drawing from his extensive experience doing policy work in the field of international sanctions, Biersteker shows for his part that scholars indeed interact with international bureaucrats in multiple ways, and that the learning is often mutual. They can interact with international bureaucrats in informal and *ad hoc* ways, when they write policy reports, participate in TPNs, convene seminars and meetings, or through more formal and institutionalized mechanisms, in permanent scientific bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) or within Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The engagement of scholars with policy is not self-evident; it is hindered by structural constraints such as the lack of reward granted for conducting policy work within universities—as well as the trickiness of obtaining funding for "policy-oriented" research projects, practitioners' fear of encouraging politically risky research, differences in work timelines between the policy and the academic worlds, problems of access from both sides (UN data might be confidential, while UN practitioners lack the time to engage with scholarly work), and finally issues of translation, each world having its own expertise and jargon. The separation between science, on the one hand, and policy, on the other, can only be analytical. In practice, the production of expert knowledge takes place within a process of interaction between a web of actors.

Forms of Knowledge

The volume finally sheds light on the forms of knowledge used by international bureaucracies and the implications this may have. This question has already attracted attention from a range of scholars coming from different disciplinary backgrounds, who have focused on the use of quantitative data by international bureaucracies. Davis,

Kingsbury, and Merry have looked at indicators and measurements as technologies of global governance[44] and shown that these tools imbue subjective assessments with objective weight. Grek has added to these insights by focusing on the use of indicators by the OECD, pointing to the use of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) as a governing resource for the EU and the OECD.[45] She shows how through its statistics, reports, and studies, the OECD has achieved a brand that most regard as indisputable, leading to the OECD recommendations being accepted without any debate by politicians. Several contributions in this volume build upon these early contributions, and ask what the implications of using quantifiable data, but also other "tools of governmentability" such as measurement mechanisms inspired by New Public Management, a doctrine that claims that management techniques used in the private sector should be applied to the public one, and can be.

Using Foucault's work on governmentability, Elshiry and Allawattaga reveal the way the OECD has been at the forefront of a transformation of public sector governance and reform, through which nation states and their constituent elements are conceptualized, evaluated, measured, ranked, and ordered for the purposes of global governance. Their chapter analyses the OECD's discourse, as well as its specific "techno-managerial apparatuses of performance measurement and management" (such as indicators, league tables, or evaluation techniques), and shows that the OECD has succeeded in reconceptualizing nation states as "accounting entities" and determining what qualifies as "political efficacy." In this process, the capacity to govern has shifted to technocratic elites in transnational organizations such as the OECD and—ultimately—a technocratization of politics has taken place.

Berten, for his part, focuses on the use of evaluation and simulation instruments by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). His findings show not only that the use of such instruments by international bureaucracies endows the knowledge they produce with an appearance of neutrality, but also that these instruments have effects of their own and define the policy space of national policy-makers. Most interestingly, he reveals the way international bureaucracies use evaluation and simulation instruments in order to delineate possible directions for social protection programs. This shifts the space within which policy options are evaluated: policy-makers no longer evaluate possible options and programs on the basis of past experience, but on the basis of a virtual reality defined through the fictitious realm of calculation. Like with Elshiry and Allawattaga, the findings point to the independent effects of evaluation and measurement instruments; the tools might be designed by bureaucrats who want more authority

and legitimacy, but their effects go beyond the intended, to frame the way problems are conceived and the kind of policy responses that are seen as both possible, and adequate.

Freeman and Sturdy also decipher the politics concealed behind the use of certain forms of knowledge by international bureaucracies. Focusing on the case of the mental health policies of the WHO, they analyze the way the organization has been positioning itself—along with other international secretariats—as an authoritative producer of comparative data for policy purposes. They show that much of the authority of international organizations rests on their ability to generate and disseminate comparative knowledge about policies and their impact in different countries. The work of data collection from comparison can take different forms: from the accumulation of detailed, context-sensitive case studies of particular local initiatives, to systematic surveys aimed at producing standardized data. In practice, such approaches typically proceed in dialogue with one another: cases and surveys are mutually dependent and reciprocally constructed. But the emphasis placed on one or another approach tends to privilege particular power relations. Attention to case studies favors a bottom-up approach to policy, valuing local experience and expertise; while standardized survey instruments favor top-down and centralized imposition of epistemic norms and political power. The different forms of international comparison thus themselves embody different politics, reflecting the different policy roles and identities that international organizations may adopt in their efforts to achieve coordinated policy action.

Through these contributions we see an evident connection between the use and production of certain forms of knowledge and international bureaucracies' claims to authority. It is because they produce and use knowledge that is both unique (in its comparative form) and highly technical (quantitative and highly specialized) that international bureaucracies can best legitimize their existence, their expansion into new domains, and their specific policies. It is also because they use such knowledge that their role takes a new dimension, and participates in a broader paradigmatic shift, in which efficiency, narrowly defined, grows into the only measure for determining what "good" policy is and policy-making comes to be an essentially technocratic exercise.

Of course, there is another side to the coin. Technical or quantitative knowledge may also be used to denounce specific political problems and in that sense allow for the politicization or re-politicization of given issue domains. Yet, using such knowledge requires very specialized skills, and those actors most likely to action this kind of expertise for political purposes are scientists themselves or expert bureaucrats.

Notes

1 The volume differentiates between "international bureaucracies," which refer to the administration (i.e., the secretariat) of international organizations, and "international organizations," which comprise both the administration and the member states, see: Frank Biermann and Bernd Siebenhüner, ed., *Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).
2 OECD, *The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development*, www.oecd.org/about/.
3 Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1922), 226.
4 Carol H. Weiss, "The Many Meanings of Research Utilization," *Public Administration Review* 39, no. 5 (1979): 426–431; Claudio Radaelli, "The public policy of the European Union: whither politics of expertise?," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 5 (1999): 757–774; Christina Boswell, *The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge. Immigration Policy and Social Research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
5 Robert Cox and Harold Jacobson. eds. *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973).
6 Ernst B. Haas, *When Knowledge is Power* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1991), 44–45.
7 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon, 1970).
8 Burkart Holzner and John H. Marx, *Knowledge Application: The Knowledge System in Society* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1979).
9 See for instance Amy Verdun, "The Role of the Delors Committee in the Creation of EMU: An Epistemic Community?," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 2 (1999): 308–328; Anthony R. Zito, "Epistemic Communities, Collective Entrepreneurship and European Integration," *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 4 (2001): 585–603; Martin Elvins, *Anti-Drugs Policies of the European Union. Transnational Decision-Making and the Politics of Expertise* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003).
10 Peter M. Haas and Casey Stevens, "Organized Science, Usable Knowledge and Multilateral Environmental Governance," in *Governing the Air*, eds. Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011), 125–161.
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