TY  - GEN
AB  - We investigate changes in competition in the Dutch notary profession after a partial deregulation of the market for notary services enforced by the 1999 Dutch Notary Act. This reform liberalized prices and relieved many entry barriers in the profession, while keeping the professional standard in place. We use the concept of entry thresholds developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) to infer on the effect of entry on competition before and after the regulatory reform. We find that entry affects conduct in the Dutch notary profession as a second notary office in a market requires a much larger market size than a monopoly office to be profitable, suggesting that profit margins drop with entry. Yet, we find no significant differences between entry thresholds ratios before and after the regulatory reform.Wediscuss potential explanations for the sluggishness of entry in the profession and implications for policy.
AU  - Noailly, Joëlle
AU  - Nahuis, Richard
DA  - 2010
ID  - 294940
L1  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf
L1  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf?subformat=pdfa
L2  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf
L2  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf?subformat=pdfa
L4  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf
L4  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf?subformat=pdfa
LK  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf
LK  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf?subformat=pdfa
N2  - We investigate changes in competition in the Dutch notary profession after a partial deregulation of the market for notary services enforced by the 1999 Dutch Notary Act. This reform liberalized prices and relieved many entry barriers in the profession, while keeping the professional standard in place. We use the concept of entry thresholds developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) to infer on the effect of entry on competition before and after the regulatory reform. We find that entry affects conduct in the Dutch notary profession as a second notary office in a market requires a much larger market size than a monopoly office to be profitable, suggesting that profit margins drop with entry. Yet, we find no significant differences between entry thresholds ratios before and after the regulatory reform.Wediscuss potential explanations for the sluggishness of entry in the profession and implications for policy.
PY  - 2010
T1  - Entry and competition in the Dutch notary profession
TI  - Entry and competition in the Dutch notary profession
UR  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf
UR  - https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/294940/files/1-s2.0-S0144818809000738-main.pdf?subformat=pdfa
Y1  - 2010
ER  -