Resistance to the regulation of common water: resources in rural Tunisia

We examine the effect of the introduction of uniform water charging for aquifer management and provide evidence using a survey-based choice experiment of agricultural water users in rural Tunisia. Theoretically, we show that the implementation of the proposed second-best regulation would result both in efficiency gains and in distributional effects in favor of small landholders. Empirically, we find that resistance to the introduction of an effective water-charging regime is greatest among the largest landholders. Resistance to the regulation of common resources may be rooted in the manner in which heterogeneity might determine the distributional impact of different management regimes.

Publication year:
In: Land Economics 91, no 3(2015), p 435-459

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 Record created 2016-03-15, last modified 2019-08-05

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