000292681 001__ 292681 000292681 005__ 20250213113324.0 000292681 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.06.010 000292681 037__ $$aARTICLE 000292681 245__ $$aA common pool theory of supranational deficit ceilings 000292681 269__ $$a2010 000292681 336__ $$aJournal Articles 000292681 520__ $$aThe budget deficit bias is modeled as the result of a domestic common pool problem and of an international externality. Deficits can be used to finance both unproductive and productive public spending. An optimally set supranational deficit ceiling is examined and welfare is compared to the unconstrained outcome and to the case of nationally set deficit ceilings.The supranational deficit ceiling is found to be welfare improving relative to similar national arrangements, but does not fully eliminate the deficit bias unless combined with a domestic fiscal institution allowing for precommitment to productive public spending. 000292681 580__ $$aIn: European Economic Review. - Volume 54(2010), Issue 2, pages 269-278 000292681 700__ $$aKrogstrup, Signe 000292681 700__ $$aWyplosz, Charles 000292681 8564_ $$980d98cea-052b-4751-ba05-192a6c92cb91$$s184113$$uhttps://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/292681/files/EER_Wyplosz_2010.pdf 000292681 8564_ $$915151480-c85a-4d63-8b54-b817f30d19e0$$xpdfa$$s1551500$$uhttps://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/292681/files/EER_Wyplosz_2010.pdf?subformat=pdfa 000292681 901__ $$uInternational Economics Department$$0319285 000292681 909CO $$ooai:repository.graduateinstitute.ch:292681$$pGLOBAL_SET$$pIHEID:Explore 000292681 937__ $$aARTICLE-2015-023 000292681 980__ $$aARTICLE