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EVALUATION REPORTS

The German Civil Peace Service

Case Study of Israel/Palestine



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Case Study of Israel/Palestine

Riccardo Bocco and Paola Taiana

The following report has been commissioned by the Evaluation and Audit Division of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany. The opinions presented in this study are those of independent external experts and do not necessarily reflect the views of BMZ or the people consulted. A summary version of the Synthesis Report is available on the BMZ website (www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/index.html#evaluation).

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Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (German Federal Foreign Office)
ACRI	The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
AGEH	Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Entwicklungshilfe e.V. (Association for Development Cooperation)
ARIJ	Applied Research Institute Jerusalem
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany)
BSV	Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence)
BU	Bethlehem University
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CCDP	Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding
CCRR	Centre for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation
CPS	Civil Peace Service (Ziviler Friedensdienst)
CPS Group	Group of CPS executing agencies (English term for Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst)
CRFJ	Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem (French Research Center of Jerusalem)
CSI	Christian Service International
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAAD	Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (German Academic Exchange Service)
DED ¹	Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service)
DIG	Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft (German Israel Society)
DIZF	Stiftung Deutsch-Israelisches Zukunftsforum (German-Israeli Future Forum Foundation)
DVHL	Deutscher Verein vom Heiligen Lande (German Association of the Holy Land)
EAK	Evangelische Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Betreuung der Kriegsdienstverweigerer (Evangelical Association for the Support of Conscientious Objectors)
EED	Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Service)
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Friedrich Ebert Foundation)
<i>forum</i> ZFD	Civil Peace Service Forum
ZFD Fachkraft CPS expert	
FriEnt	Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungspolitische Friedensarbeit (Working Group on Development and Peace)

¹ DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and 2010, the then names are used in this report.

GTZ ²	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for Technical Cooperation)
GUPT	General Union of Palestinian Teachers
HBS	Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (Heinrich Böll Foundation)
HRD	Human Rights Defenders
IDF	Israeli Defence Forces
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
InWEnt ²	International Weiterbildung und Entwicklung
IUSY	International Union of Socialist Youth
JCW	Jerusalem Center for Women
Jusos	Jungsozialistinnen und Jungsozialisten in der <i>SPD</i> (German SPD Young Socialists organisation)
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)
KfW	KfW Entwicklungsbank (KfW Development Bank)
KURVE Wustrow	KURVE Wustrow, Bildungs- und Begegnungsstätte für gewaltfreie Aktion e.V. (Education and Encounter Centre for Networking in Non-violent Action)
LOWNP	Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace
MAS	Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
MASHAV	Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation
MEND	Middle East Non-violence and Democracy
NDC	NGO Development Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NO'AL	HaNoar HaOved VeHalomed (The Israeli Federation of Working and Studying Youth)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
P2P	People-to-People
PA	Palestinian Authority
PACE	The Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PHRMG	The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PME	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
PNGO	Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisation

² DED, GTZ and InWEnt were merged into the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) on 1 January 2011. As this evaluation was conducted in 2009 and 2010, the then names are used in this report.

PRIME	Peace Research Institute in the Middle East
PSCC	Popular Struggle Coordination Committee
RHR	Rabbis for Human Rights
RLS	Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
UK	United Kingdom
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UPWC	Union of Palestinian Women's Committees
USA	United States of America
WBC	Willy Brandt Center Jerusalem
WFD	Weltfriedensdienst e.V. (World Peace Service)

Executive summary

1. Background

The evaluation of the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) in Israel/Palestine³ is part of a global evaluation of the CPS that took place from June 2009 to January 2011.

The CPS was founded in 1999 as an instrument of the German Government for advancing civil society peacebuilding. Since its inception, the CPS has been a joint project by governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in peace work and development activities aiming at preventing crises, reducing violence and establishing structures for peaceful coexistence. The CPS focuses on project-related capacity building programmes implemented with the help of CPS experts (*ZFD-Fachkräfte*), who are primarily sent to local partner organisations in conflict-affected contexts.

Palestine is a priority country for German Development Cooperation; there, its focus is particularly on water issues, economic development, governance/institution-building, education, and security.

According to the German Federal Foreign Office (AA), Germany has a special relationship with Israel owing to its responsibility for the Shoah:⁴ the two countries have developed very strong relations in the fields of diplomacy, trade, defence, scientific cooperation and youth exchange.

The Church Development Service (EED), *forumZFD* and KURVE Wustrow started activities with partners in Israel and Palestine under the CPS programme in 1999/2001, concentrating on the West

Bank's central area and on Jerusalem.

Their activities focused on supporting peace alliances and re-integrating conflict-affected groups. The main activity lines consisted of in-group socialisation (EED), peer-mediation trainings and peace education for Palestinians (KURVE Wustrow), and dialogue projects for Israeli and Palestinian youths (*forumZFD*). EED ended its activities in 2004, while the German Development Service (DED) and the World Peace Service (WFD) joined the programme in 2003, and the Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH) in 2005. WFD and AGEH support projects in marginalised areas of the West Bank, while *forumZFD* and KURVE Wustrow continue their previous activities. DED focuses on psycho-social care and dialogue, especially with Palestinian partners, and to a lesser extent on advocacy. WFD has launched non-violence music therapy and theatre activities and AGEH mainly carries out peace education activities with Christian educational organisations.

The objective of the CPS evaluation for the Israel/Palestine case study was

- to acquire insights into the functioning of the CPS in Israel/Palestine;
- to assess the results of the CPS contribution; and
- to make recommendations for the further development of CPS activities.

Context

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of – if not the – most crucial and long-lasting conflicts of the 20th century. Following the creation of the Israeli state, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war had far-reaching consequences for the Palestinians: the loss of land and the forced displacement of more than

³ The BMZ normally uses the term “Palestinian Territories”.

⁴ See http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Israel/Bilateral_node.html

750,000 people. The conflict has witnessed different dynamics of armed confrontation for more than four decades, including the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of the 1967 second Arab-Israeli war. Following the first Intifada against the occupation – according to international law, Israel has been a de facto occupier country since 1967 – the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) reached a settlement in 1993, known as the Oslo Agreement. Yet the so-called Oslo years (1993 to 2000) did not materialise into a final peace agreement, and contributed to fuelling new tensions. The occupation continued and the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000 gave birth to a new Intifada. The last decade has seen the radicalisation of the conflict with a dramatic increase of new forms of violence and has witnessed the break of national unity within the Palestinian constituency, with Hamas becoming the ruling party in Gaza in 2007.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is asymmetrical and multi-faceted, with the control of land to build independent states being a main root cause. While Israel obtained independence and international recognition, the Palestinians have been striving for their own state for almost a century. The conflict has also a strong identity dimension (Palestinian/Arab vs. Jewish) with a religious component (Muslim vs. Jewish). Today, the conflict mainly follows the logics of an occupying power and an occupied society's responses, with international involvement experimenting with unsuccessful mediation strategies.

Both the Israeli and the Palestinian societies have a long tradition of civil society organisations that have lately been targeted by international donors as key contributors to the peace process. However, civil society's role in

peacebuilding, meant to sustain a “bottom-up” process, has been overestimated in the absence of “top-down” political change. An analysis of the present situation should take the negative legacy of the Oslo years into account, when international donors actually promoted a ‘peace industry’. Several new Palestinian NGOs, created with external funding, have rather served the interests of a new elite that has been detached from its social base and co-opted by external stakeholders for the sake of promoting peace at all costs and normalising the relations between the occupier and the occupied.

Finally, the second Intifada has contributed to breaking the trust created by various confidence-building processes. The Israeli government has been actively trying to discredit international cooperation agencies and NGOs working on human rights issues in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The main issue has been to make international donors and NGOs remove advocacy, monitoring and the protection of human, economic, social and cultural rights from their agenda. In 2010, the peace horizon looks gloomy and the enemies of peace prevail in both constituencies. Both Israeli and Palestinian civil societies are fairly weakened and can hardly counter the consequences of a protracted conflict.

2. Key findings and conclusions

Relevance: The evaluation has found that the CPS programme for Israel/Palestine has been relevant for peacebuilding: the intervention is based on an accurate conflict analysis and the peacebuilding needs of the countries have been addressed together with relevant partners. The programme also corresponds to the overall CPS strategies outlined in the CPS Standards of 2005 and 2008. However, the main strategies of the CPS executing

agencies in Israel /Palestine only address the symptoms of the conflict.

Notwithstanding their importance of also working on the symptoms of the conflict, activities like monitoring, advocacy and protection (that are not performed by CPS in Israel/Palestine) could address the root causes of the conflict more effectively.

The evaluation team has concluded that the implementation modality of CPS experts is relevant for the conflict context, even if CPS experts face difficulties in becoming integrated into the partners' structures. The CPS experts' outside perspectives is a strength (especially with the 'all-partiality' approach) because of their support in planning, fundraising and monitoring activities. Moreover, their outsider status is a great advantage in conflict situations, because it enables them to engage in networking with existing structures and with other organisations more easily.

Effectiveness: Assessing the effectiveness of the CPS programme has proved challenging, mainly due to the absence of a project-embedded monitoring system. Since there were no baseline studies, outcome and impact statements with clear indicators and measurable results available, the evaluation team reconstructed the often implicit underlying theories of change and the overall intervention logic of the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. Project documents and proposals, the CPS Standards of 2008, the Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine of 2006 and discussions with CPS stakeholders provided the necessary information.

For assessing outcomes, we differentiated between the contribution of CPS experts (outcome 1) and that of partners (with or without CPS experts) to changes through project activities (outcome 2). Despite a number of challenges, the evaluation team has found that the placement of CPS

experts has numerous positive effects on partner organisations (outcome 1): it enhances the local partners' organisational and project management capacities as well as networking among peace organisations. CPS experts also optimise the use of new contacts and improve the partners' status. Although it was not possible to measure contributions, the evaluation team has concluded that a good number of project activities under the CPS programme (outcome 2) have been effective. They have contributed to changes in perceptions and attitudes and strengthened dialogue capacities and the use of new skills on the target group level. Few project activities, by favouring conflict transformation, have directly contributed to the reduction and prevention of violence inside and between the Israeli-Palestinian societies, and empowered civil society (outcome 3). Concerning variations in effectiveness with regard to different partner institution set-ups, it has been found that partnerships with private institutions gain in outreach if the project implementation is undertaken jointly with public institutions.

Impact: The assessment of the CPS's impact on the overall social environment in Israel/Palestine was not possible due to a lack of data.– with impact being understood in relation to the general theory of change which the evaluation team has reconstructed with respect to 'positive peace'. Moreover, impact is inconsistently defined in the CPS Standards 2008 and in project documents (which focus more on the micro level).

Efficiency: The efficiency of many administrative and financial procedures is mixed: the CPS's overall procedural timeline for the identification of projects, the approval by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the recruitment of CPS experts and the actual

implementation is too long. Many of the finance-related problems, that the evaluation has identified, are linked to BMZ regulations.

The establishment of CPS coordinator posts has been positively assessed in terms of relevance and efficiency. However, it needs to be further clarified who actually serves as the contact person for the CPS.

The recruitment of CPS experts could be extended to local and other European candidates. To CPS experts, reporting and monitoring seem to be a heavy workload. However, their current monitoring system is generally weak and does not include a participatory approach with partners. The inclusion of future scenario settings into strategic planning varies from project to project, and the lessons learnt by the CPS experts together with their local partners are rarely developed in a systematic, comprehensive and theoretical way at the end of a project, though a few pertinent examples exist.

Sustainability: The evaluation team only has observed few efforts to systematically introduce issues of sustainability into project activities from the beginning. In general, the local partner organisations are able and do continue local networks independently from the external support of the CPS experts. The extent to which partners and target groups are able to uphold the positive effects of the CPS interventions (sustainability of outcomes produced by project activities) in the long run and without further support, differs according to the type of project and from case to case.

Coherence, complementarity and coordination: While coordination within the CPS programme and with other German actors has already been reinforced since the establishment of CPS coordinator posts, the evaluation team has

found that there is still much room for improvement. CPS activities in Israel/Palestine are complementary with other civil society support activities and with each other. In addition, some cross-checking and cooperation among German actors can be observed, but again complementarity among peace organisations could be enhanced. However, with regard to coherence, overall German policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict context – like many other European countries' policies – often appear incoherent. On the one hand, the German government supports the occupier country Israel and, on the other hand, advocates nonviolent conflict resolution with Israeli and Palestinian civil societies through the CPS projects.

Cross-cutting issues: At a broader level, **gender** has not been systematically included into CPS-supported projects as a cross-cutting issue, although it is explicitly and prominently addressed in the implementation of some on-going projects.

CPS experts and their partners undertake a sound analysis of the conflict context and adopt **conflict sensitive** approaches. However, the CPS only addresses the symptoms of the conflict, but cannot solve its root causes.

3. Recommendations

Strategic recommendations to the BMZ for the overall CPS and the Israel/Palestine CPS programmes

1. The evaluation recommends continuing the CPS programme for Israel/Palestine.
2. Access to human, economic, social and cultural rights needs to be integrated into the overall framework. Otherwise, peace becomes meaningless.

3. The Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine (2006) should be updated in order to identify new fields of intervention as a basis for the approval of projects, such as advocacy and protection activities. This process should include the CPS experts and take the current country context into account. The input of CPS experts should be referred to for the practical development of programmes.
4. The administrative procedures of the CPS need to be adjusted. The BMZ should reduce the overall timeline between the projects' identification, the arrival of CPS experts in the countries and the actual beginning of the project implementation.
5. It should become possible to submit project proposals continuously throughout the year.
6. The possibility to resume projects in the Gaza Strip through direct partnerships with local organisations and the presence of CPS experts should be examined. It could increase the geographical coverage of the CPS.

Strategic recommendations to the BMZ and all members of the CPS Group

7. It should become possible to submit project proposals continuously throughout the year.
8. Financial accounting procedures need to be adjusted: more flexibility in financial planning should be introduced. CPS stakeholders at the country level should be allowed to manage their funds more autonomously.
9. Project planning and monitoring need to be enhanced, sustainability should be better introduced into planning.

10. The CPS expert recruitment policy should be extended to also include local and European candidates.
11. Coordination, coherence and complementarity should be strengthened not only between the CPS programmes and the different instruments of German development policy, but also with other peacebuilding initiatives in the country (e.g. in the protection field).

Strategic recommendations to the members of the CPS Group at central and country levels

12. The relevance of addressing the socio-political change in one society in order to influence the ongoing dominant conflict between two societies should be clarified.
13. Local counterparts should participate in the selection of CPS experts, thus facilitating the CPS experts' integration into the partner organisations.
14. Apart from the advocacy and protection activities already mentioned, the CPS executing agencies should develop more advocacy and in-group socialisation projects in Israel and more inter-group social cohesion and service delivery projects in marginalised areas in Palestine (Northern West Bank and rural areas). The importance of extending the geographical reach of interventions has already been emphasised in the Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine of 2006.
15. The parameters of sustainability should be better taken into account and made more explicit from the beginning of the project planning phase. Risk analyses and future scenarios should receive more

attention in collaboration with local partners.

16. The complementarity of different instruments ought to be improved, i.e. among projects supported by different CPS executing agencies in Israel/Palestine, among CPS coordinators and CPS experts, as well as between the CPS and other DED and GTZ programmes.
17. Procedures for translating experience into knowledge ('lessons learnt') should be enhanced. This would help knowledge-sharing among CPS local partners and improve the implementation of future projects.

Operational recommendations to the BMZ for the overall CPS and the Israel/Palestine CPS programmes

18. The time period between the submission of a request for CPS experts and their actual deployment should be reduced.
19. The BMZ and the CPS executing agencies should clarify and agree upon the role of the contact person for the overall Israel/Palestine programme.

Operational recommendations to members of the CPS Group at central and country levels

20. Projects should not exclusively target social actors that are 'peace connectors', but should also include spoilers. In addition, dissident organisations could be targeted. In Israel, (army) 'refusenicks' associations or, in the West Bank, settler organisations that show openness towards dialogue with the Palestinian population could be potential partners. However, the limits of the political framework set by the

local partners need to be taken into consideration.

21. CPS local partners and CPS executing agencies could work on the conflict by supporting already existing structures, such as the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC). Thus, they would bring Israeli and Palestinian actors together and involve them in joint peaceful demonstrations and non-violent actions.
22. It would be worthwhile to think about in-group socialisation and service delivery projects with former Palestinian political prisoners associations, as well as with the highly influential Israeli and Palestinian media.
23. A comprehensive overview document should be produced, including consolidated data on past and present CPS projects per country and partner. Theories of change and results chains should be developed more explicitly and be integrated into the country and project documents.
24. The legal registration in the host countries ought to be given more serious attention.
25. CPS experts should be offered more regular executive trainings according to identified needs, on peacebuilding effectiveness and advocacy, planning and monitoring.
26. In order to enhance coordination within the CPS programme, the monthly inter-agency meetings of working groups should be mandatory for all CPS experts. An annual workshop with external moderation could address the difficult dynamics within the group.
27. The connection between socio-political changes (main target of the project) and impacts on the overarching conflict context (presumed main target of the

CPS) must be clarified. These intended impacts should then be better integrated into the planning and implementation of projects.

- 28. Private/public partnerships and synergies should be considered more carefully.
- 29. Some projects, especially those related to culture, could increase their effectiveness and impact by targeting a larger audience through promotional activities both in Israel and Palestine.

30. Stronger and more systematic emphasis should be placed on joint learning processes with local partners (e.g. reporting in English).

- 31. Planning and implementation could focus on gender-sensitive issues more systematically. The CPS executing agencies should analyse and better address gender issues within the local partner organisations.

1 Background and introduction

1.1 Objective and purpose

The evaluation of the German Civil Peace Service (CPS) in Israel/Palestine⁵ is part of a global evaluation of the CPS taking place from June 2009 to January 2011. The CPS was created in 1998 (and became operational in 1999) as an instrument of the German Government for advancing civil society peacebuilding. The CPS has a number of features which make it a unique instrument that does not exist in other countries. Since its inception, the CPS has been a joint project by governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in peace work and development activities. The CPS focuses on crisis prevention, reducing hostility and violence, facilitating civil conflict transformation, and on establishing structures for peaceful coexistence.

The CPS focuses primarily on project-related capacity building implemented with the help of experienced experts (*Friedensfachkräfte* - CPS experts⁶) who are primarily sent to local partner organisations (upon their request) in conflict-affected contexts. This is based on the understanding that CPS experts shall provide qualifications, knowledge and resources that are not available locally. Their personal working habits, creativity and solidarity are to contribute to intercultural learning their. Furthermore, the CPS experts use their status as an outsider to the conflict to provide credibility, legitimacy, impartiality and protection (CPS Group, 2008a).

The CPS is a Group (in German: *Konsortium Ziviler Friedensdienst*) of eight executing agencies: *forumZFD* (Civil Peace Service Forum), AGEH (Association for Development Cooperation), CSI (Christian Service International), DED (German Development Service)⁷, EIRENE (International Christian Service for Peace), KURVE Wustrow - The Centre for Education and Networking in Non-Violent Action, EED (Church Development Service) and WFD (World Peace Service). At the end of 2009, the CPS had granted 583 CPS positions in 50 countries (BMZ 2010): the priority partner countries were in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. In the Middle East, DED and *forumZFD* have recently allocated three CPS experts beside those in Israel/Palestine to establish a joint CPS programme in Lebanon. An initial evaluation of the CPS was undertaken in 2002, leading to important insights with regard to its continuing establishment.

As the CPS has been in existence for ten years, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned an independent external evaluation. The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of

⁵ In the mission debriefing report we adopted the generic name of Palestine as used by the CPS Group. Actually, according to internationally recognized denominations, we should speak of Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). In this report, we will use the terms 'Palestine' and 'West Bank' in an interchangeable way, because in the OPT the activities of the CPS organisations are limited to the West Bank and in East-Jerusalem.

⁶ CPS local partner organisations in Israel/Palestine use different terms for CPS experts, such as project advisor, German expert, peace worker, peace consultant, project consultant, CPS professional. Differences in conceiving and implementing CPS are underlying this terminological variety.

⁷ Since 1 January 2011, the DED has been merged with the GTZ and InWEnt to form the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.

International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, responded to the public tendering and obtained the mandate for the evaluation.

The evaluation of the CPS was conducted in Germany and in eight selected conflict contexts (Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Guatemala, Israel/Palestine, Niger, Serbia and Uganda). The objective of the overall evaluation was to provide credible and useful evidence to strengthen accountability and contribute to learning in relation to the CPS. The core findings of the eight country case studies are integrated into a synthesis report of the global CPS evaluation.

The objectives of the CPS evaluation in Israel/Palestine were:

- to acquire insights into the functioning of the CPS in Israel/Palestine as well as to assess the results of its contribution;
- to contribute to the global evaluation of CPS;
- to make recommendations for the further development of CPS activities.

1.2 General introduction to the CPS country programme in Israel/Palestine

The CPS programme in Israel/Palestine started in 1999 with projects implemented by EED. Five other organisations (AGEH, DED, *forumZFD*, KURVE Wustrow and WFD) set up cooperation projects in the following years. Most CPS programmes (see Annex 2 and 3) are located in the central West Bank (East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem), some in marginalised areas of the West Bank, and others in Israel (West Jerusalem, Northern Israel and the Negev in the south). Over the past ten years, the CPS executing agencies have been cooperating with West Bank Palestinian partners, Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli⁸ associations. The projects have either been focusing on one single actor or have favoured bilateral collaborations; sometimes even trilateral cooperation.

One-third of the on-going projects under the CPS programme are focused on inter-group social cohesion (mainly through dialogue activities), involving Israeli and Palestinian, or Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli partners. Two-thirds of the projects operate in the West Bank, with Palestinian partners and fulfil service delivery (psycho-social support), advocacy (raising awareness of the political context), facilitation (peer-mediation) and in-group socialisation (education) functions. Overall, there are no protection and monitoring functions, even in completed projects, which mainly focused on inter-group social cohesion and facilitation, followed by in-group socialisation, service delivery and advocacy.

A total of 40 CPS experts⁹ have been working for the seven different CPS executing agencies in Israel/Palestine since 1999. Apart from *forumZFD*, all other CPS experts are placed within local partner organisations in different ways. but even this integrative model (e.g. DED, AGEH, KURVE Wustrow and WFD) is subject to variations. Currently, 24 CPS experts work in Israel/Palestine: five DED experts in four projects, six AGEH experts in five projects, nine *forumZFD* experts in five projects, two experts in one KURVE Wustrow project,

⁸ Around one-fifth of the present Israeli population is made up of Palestinians who did not leave their place of residence following the 1948 war and the creation of the State of Israel. All of them received Israeli citizenship and, according to the social actors interviewed, they self-identify or are identified either as 'Palestinian Israeli' or as 'Arab Israeli' citizens. In 2009, the Israeli Bureau of Statistics estimated the total population at 7.4 millions, classified under three main groups: Jewish (75.5%), Arabs (20.2%) and 'others' (4.3%).

⁹ Among these 40 CPS experts: 2 from EED, 6 from AGEH, 10 from DED, 13 from *forumZFD*, 5 from KURVE Wustrow and 4 from WFD.

and two experts in two WFD projects. Around 75 per cent of past and current CPS experts are women. In general, CPS experts stay in the same post for three years. The total programme budget for Israel/Palestine has amounted to some 10,880,000 euros until 2009.

1.3 Evaluation design, methodology and process

For evaluating the activities of the CPS in all identified countries, CCDP developed a comprehensive evaluation framework that allows for a systematic comparison of data across cases (see methodological details in the Inception Report). The evaluation questions for each criterion are presented in the Inception Report and were adapted to the case study after the pilot evaluation in Uganda was completed (see Annexes 5 and 6).

For data collection, the evaluation team interviewed the coordinators of the CPS executing agencies and the CPS experts, their local partners, as well as a number of project beneficiaries during individual meetings, focus-group discussions and workshops. Half of the interviews with local Palestinian partners were conducted in Arabic. Data have been triangulated by comparing the Israel/Palestine project documents and reports (some collected during the field mission); the self-evaluations of AGEH, DED, *forumZFD*, KURVE Wustrow and WFD; the overall CPS Standards 2008 (CPS Group 2008a), the CPS Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine (CPS Group 2006) and the 2008 document 'CPS experts in Palestine/Israel'. Interviews and group discussions were conducted with CPS experts, coordinators, partners, a number of German development actors (e.g. the Head of Development Cooperation at the German Representative Office in Ramallah, a programme manager at Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) and around thirty beneficiaries (see Annex 8). The evaluation team also benefited from inputs of international and local experts residing in Israel/Palestine, as well as the results of research on the role of civil society in peacebuilding (Paffenholz 2009 and 2010, Cuhadar and Hanafi 2010). The different data sets received allowed for a triangulation of data.

As the CPS is a complex instrument, the use of **key terms** relevant for the evaluation have been harmonised: '**instrument**' refers to the overall CPS programme, while '**implementation modalities**' of the CPS refers to the different ways of supporting partners, i.e. sending CPS experts, or funding project activities implemented by partners with or without CPS experts. When CPS experts support partners directly with training or institutional support, the term **CPS expert activities** is used; however, when local partners (with or without CPS experts) implement project activities under the CPS programme, these are referred to as **project activities**. The evaluation team is aware that project activities can also include CPS expert activities.

There is a tension between two different understandings of the role of CPS, i.e. while the BMZ sees the CPS as an instrument of German Development Cooperation and hence as an agent in its own right, the members of the CPS Group view the local partner organisations in the conflict countries as owners and agents of the CPS programme.¹⁰ This tension is reflected in different formulations: While the BMZ talks about 'The CPS programme in Israel/Palestine', executing agencies of the CPS Group talk about 'Projects under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine'. The evaluation team decided to use both formulations for this report.

¹⁰ A CPS executing agency observed that the BMZ division for peace and security seems to be closer to the view of the CPS Group, while the country desk officers are more in favour of a CPS as an instrument of German Development Cooperation.

The **relevance** criterion clarifies whether the ‘right things’ have been initiated in order to contribute to peacebuilding at the ‘right’ time. To ascertain the relevance of the overall CPS programme in Israel/Palestine and the implementation modality of sending CPS experts, the evaluation team assessed the ways in which the CPS executing agencies analyse the conflict context, and compared the peacebuilding needs in the countries with the CPS Strategy Paper and the main activity lines of the programme. Finally, the evaluation team also evaluated the ability of the local partner organisations to adapt projects to changing conflict contexts.

The **effectiveness** criterion is used to evaluate whether an intervention has reached its intended objectives and looks at the theories of change of the involved actors to achieve their goals, including their translation into clear objectives, results and process designs. Underlying theories of change and a causal results chain (combining the intervention and local partner’s level, and clarifying the respective roles and main responsibilities of outsiders and insiders) have been reconstructed. While it was easy to reconstruct the often implicit underlying theories of change (OECD/DAC 2008:35-36; 77-84), it has been much harder to establish the different steps of the overall logic of intervention of the projects under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine (i.e. how does the programme produce the intended outputs, outcomes and impacts?) in a way comparable to the results chain shown in below Figure 1. Both the underlying theories of change and the results chain have been reconstructed with the help of project documents, CPS Standards 2008, Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine 2006, and discussions with CPS stakeholders.

The effectiveness of the CPS projects also takes into account the main changes within the CPS partner organisations that can be attributed to the CPS expert work and how the CPS overall activities can be strengthened. In this evaluation, the CPS expert is at the centre of the assessment of effectiveness; however, it is often difficult to assess to what extent intervening outsiders (CPS experts) and insiders (local partners) are responsible for specific outputs and outcomes. Moreover, it is worth adding a remark about the operationalisation of results chains here, one that is especially relevant for the interventions in Israel/Palestine. It is known from research (e.g. Quack 2009) that results are not limited to observed “changes”, and that we should also consider “preserving” outcomes or impacts. Actually, in a conflict that often escalates at the macro level, preserving the valuable results of small-scale peacebuilding interventions (or replicating a project approach) which otherwise would be lost, can already be considered as an important success. For example, the attack against Gaza launched in December 2008 strongly exacerbated communication and cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors of some CPS projects. However, communication and cooperation structures have been preserved, and this is a worthwhile result of a peacebuilding intervention.

Outcome 1 (see Figure 1 below) concerns the changes that occur, through the work of the CPS experts, within the local partner organisations. For outcome 2, the evaluation team tried to assess how effectively the joint work of the CPS experts and the local partner organisations in project activities contributed to changes at the target group level (the assessment of project activities was grouped along the seven peacebuilding functions – see the Inception Report). For outcome 3, the onus was on how these changes have contributed to the reduction of violence, conflict transformation, and civil society empowerment.

The Inception Report elaborated four evaluation approaches to be used in all case studies: results-based, outcome-oriented, process-oriented, and theory-based (see OECD/DAC 2008: 85-89). The objective of the results-based approach is to assess whether activities


have achieved the intended results (outputs, outcomes or impacts). The evaluation team did not apply this approach, because it implies the existence of baseline studies and indicators of closed and on-going projects, allowing a before-and-after comparison. Such data is missing for the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. Moreover, the relationship between inputs and outputs, and the contributions of CPS experts, are not part of the theory of change within the Israel/Palestine programme documents, and so the evaluation team had to refer to the 2008 CPS Standards.

As a consequence, the evaluation team applied an outcome-oriented approach and a theory-based approach. The work first entailed an analysis of projects, but later also focused on the outcomes of the intervention, on the intended or unintended changes achieved between outputs and impacts. The entire results chain was not considered; instead, the evaluation team tried to identify outcomes 2 and 3 as perceived by the involved stakeholders. The team also referred to theories and peacebuilding research knowledge in order to find out whether the underlying assumptions or theories of change are correct and how the programme logic is correlated to the conflict analysis.

The **impact** criterion assesses whether the interventions have or have not achieved peacebuilding impact based on the established intervention logics. According to the documents, the impact refers to the contribution of projects of the CPS programme to positive peace¹¹ in Israel/Palestine and, to a lesser extent, to influence Germany's (and the international community's) stronger political role in conflict resolution (see Figure 1 below). Indeed, a direct impact analysis of the CPS activities in Israel/Palestine was not possible due to the lack of major baseline studies, long-term impact studies and results-based monitoring. Only a few examples have been found in the documents of some of the CPS executing agencies. The evaluation team thus sought to focus on the outcome level and did not evaluate the impact of the programme.

¹¹ The concept of 'positive peace', introduced by J. Galtung (1964), 'is the integration of human society' and the absence of structural violence, and negative peace 'is the absence of violence, absence of war' (Galtung 1964:2). The structural violence is an indirect form of violence built into social, political and economic structures, which gives rise to unequal power and consequently unequal life opportunities (Galtung 1969).

Figure 1: CPS results chain for Israel/Palestine



The **efficiency** criterion relates to the procedures (planning, implementation, monitoring including reporting and administration) and the cost-benefit relation of the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. The evaluation team tried to make a distinction between procedures and rules defined by the BMZ and the members of the CPS Group.

The evaluation of **sustainability**, generally defined as the continuation of benefits from a development intervention after granting assistance, assesses what institutional changes and activities are still in place after the CPS support ended. The team also assessed which aspects of sustainability have been built into programming from the start and how the CPS ensures that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by the German CPS experts.

Coherence, coordination and complementarity: In order to not assess the project in isolation, the evaluation team tried to consider the degree to which the intervention is coherent with (and influenced by) other fields of policy; how it is complementary with other CPS executing agencies and projects, and with other programmes, projects and players within the same region or conflict context (e.g. German development cooperation, German/international NGOs) and what synergies are achieved; and finally how it is coordinated by mechanisms and procedures that help to promote internal and external complementarity.

The findings are presented along the evaluation criteria, and are then distilled into **strategic and operational recommendations** addressed to the main CPS stakeholders (BMZ, members of the CPS Group in Germany and Israel/Palestine).

The main evaluation process in Israel/Palestine comprised the following elements:

- A self-evaluation involving the main CPS stakeholders in Israel/Palestine (AGEH, DED, *forumZFD*, KURVE Wustrow and WFD coordinators, CPS experts and local partners) (October-November 2009)
- Evaluation team mission to Israel/Palestine, from 23 January to 6 February 2010 (see Annex 7), consisting of:
 - One pre-briefing workshop with CPS coordinators in Jerusalem
 - Two briefing workshops with CPS experts in Ramallah and Jerusalem
 - Data collection in Palestine/Israel through visits to 17 projects
 - In-country preliminary data analysis
 - De-briefing workshop: presentation and discussion of preliminary findings with all CPS experts, with most Palestinian representatives of local partner organisations in the West Bank, and some representatives of German institutions in Palestine
- Debriefing note (20 February 2010)
- Draft report (July 2010)
- Draft final report (October 2010)

The evaluation team has experienced a transparent communication and a great deal of cooperation with the coordinators of the CPS executing agencies (who were very helpful in the establishment of an agenda for the meetings) and with the CPS experts, for the visits to the different project sites and the meetings with the majority of local partners. A visit plan had been agreed before the departure and was fully respected (see Annex 7). Beforehand, the evaluation team had also set a series of meetings with local and international experts,

resident in Israel/Palestine (see Annex 8), who helped in putting the work of the CPS executing agencies into context. For evaluating projects that had already been completed, the evaluation team requested, prior to the mission, the CPS coordinators to provide the contacts of the former CPS experts and the main project staff. During the field mission, the evaluation team had the opportunity to focus on the sustainability of some of the former project activities (often, the CPS executing agencies continue to cooperate with the same local organisations, developing new projects together). Employees of current local partners were a precious source of information. A number of telephone interviews were also held with the former German staff of CPS executing agencies.

Furthermore, the evaluation team held a 'pre-briefing workshop' in Jerusalem with the five coordinators of the CPS executing agencies, before holding two briefing workshops with the CPS experts in Ramallah and Jerusalem. All those meetings have been important moments for building trust and initiating a constructive evaluation process.

The pre-briefing session helped to clarify the status of the different on-going projects and, in particular, the 'problems' of Israeli-Palestinian partnerships in Israel and the West Bank. Actually, while some CPS executing agencies favour inter-group social cohesion activities (mainly through dialogue projects), others oppose or have a lukewarm position towards them. This is mainly related to the standpoint of their local Palestinian partners, who are against so-called 'normalisation' projects, which bring Palestinians together with Israelis over a common cause (in this case, it would be that they all are CPS local partners), pretending that it is 'normal' for them to be meeting. For this reason, some of the CPS coordinators opposed the idea of having a joint meeting for all partners. Since a majority of the projects is presently conducted in the West Bank, the evaluation team decided to organise a de-briefing session with the Palestinian partners alone, in respect of their own choice. A second de-briefing session was also planned for the Israeli partners, but it could not be held because most Israeli partners were not available. This decision did not preclude the meetings between the evaluation team and the Israeli local partners during the field visits and the evaluation process, and it actually helped to debate and clarify the CPS position with all the Palestinian partners. The final de-briefing session has been a special opportunity because it was the second time that all CPS experts were meeting with all the CPS Palestinian local partners.¹²

1.4 Team

The evaluation was conducted by Riccardo Bocco, professor at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, assisted by Paola Taiana, researcher at the CCDP. Together they formed the evaluation team. They did not recruit a local evaluation team. On the one hand, prior to the departure the proportion of on-going projects in Israel was not clear. The bulk of activities is concentrated in the West Bank. Therefore, local experts were not engaged before understanding more precisely the situation in the field and the actual cooperation that CPS organisations had with Israeli and Palestinian partners. On the other hand, the difficulty for local Palestinian and Israeli evaluators to circulate in the West Bank, or between Israel and the West Bank, is a problem seriously hindering the work of local evaluators. Instead, the evaluation team resorted to a network of local and international experts residing in the host countries. This proved to be an effective alternative. Finally, to be able to visit all the on-going projects and to collect as much information as possible, the lead evaluator decided to

¹² See chapter 4.6.4.

recruit an assistant, Paola Taiana, who is knowledgeable of the Israel/Palestine context, has done recent fieldwork in the region and is fluent in Arabic, English and German.

The Israel/Palestine external evaluation team was supported by the team in Geneva, which included Jana Krause (project assistant), Sandra Reimann (administration), Oliver Jütersonke (management and review), Daniel Fino (regional expert) and Thania Paffenholz (lead evaluator).

1.5 Constraints

Overall and with some exceptions due to controls at Israeli checkpoints in Palestine, the evaluation team did not encounter major difficulties when travelling in the West Bank and Israel: the CPS experts and the local Israeli and Palestinian partners have shown a genuine interest in the evaluation process as well as a very collaborative attitude. A formal letter was issued by the BMZ divisions for peace and security and for evaluation, stating the objectives of the mission. This proved extremely useful for the evaluation team at the entry and during the exit procedures from the airport.

There was an overall lack of monitoring systems for most projects (which rendered the assessment of effectiveness and impact more difficult). Many core documents and most of the projects' self-evaluations were also and exclusively written in German; hence they could not be shared with the great majority of the local Israeli and Palestinian partners.

2 The country context

2.1 General country profile through an introduction to the political history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of – if not ‘the’ – most crucial and long-lasting conflicts of the 20th century. Its consequences have been reverberating well beyond the Middle East, with particular implications for Europe and the USA.¹³

The origins of the conflict date back to the late 19th century, with the beginning of the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the creation of the Zionist Movement, and the Balfour Declaration in 1917, when the UK declared its support for the establishment of a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine. After the end of the First World War and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, the British were entrusted by the League of Nations a mandate over Palestine. The period from 1920 to 1948 was marked by increasing flows of Jewish migrants to Palestine, sparked by the consolidation of Nazi and Fascist regimes in Europe that ushered in the Holocaust. After the Second World War, the United Nations voted a partition plan of Palestine, which was rejected by the Palestinian elites and most Arab leaders.

The first Arab-Israeli armed conflict began on 15 May 1948, the day after the formal declaration of independence of Israel by D. Ben Gurion. At the end of the war, Israel was in control of more than 75 per cent of historic Palestine. A part of it, the ‘West Bank’ (of the Jordan River), was occupied by the Jordanian army and formally annexed by the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950. The Gaza Strip was put under Egyptian military administration. The first Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 is a key-event for understanding the difficulties to date in reaching a peace agreement. For the Palestinians it was the Nakba, i.e. the catastrophe.

¹³ For a detailed country context, see Annex 1.

Palestine formally 'disappeared' from the map and more than 750'000 Palestinians became refugees. The new Israeli leaders refused to comply with UN General Assembly resolution 194, asking for the right of return and/or compensation of the civilian population. The historical narratives of the events of 1948 still constitute a crucial rift between Israelis and Palestinians.

The period between 1948 and 1967 was marked by the development of the modern Israeli state, which favoured the immigration of the Jewish population worldwide. The Israeli nation-building process entailed, among others, the creation of a new 'historical and cultural ethos', in which the Israeli army was going to have a pivotal role in forging the new 'Israeli citizen'. On the Palestinian side, a new political leadership emerged in exile. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) was created in 1964, soon dominated by Yasser Arafat, leader of the Fatah, one of the main member factions of the PLO.

A second watershed in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict was the 1967 war. In six days, the Israeli army defeated the Arab armies for a second time, occupied the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. The Israeli government did not abide by the UN General Assembly resolution 242 demanding the disengagement of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) from all the occupied territories. Indeed, since 1967 Israel has embarked on an occupation policy, the consequences of which are difficult to assess, in particular the consequences on the citizens who have been regularly serving in the Israeli army and are responsible for massive human rights' violations in the occupied territories.¹⁴ For the PLO leadership, the 1967 defeat inaugurated a new strategy of guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks that lasted until the late 1980s. By 1974, the PLO gained international recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, but its military strategies did not pay off. After the 1970-71 war in Jordan, the PLO rebuilt its headquarters in Beirut. In 1982, however, the IDF invaded Lebanon and expelled the PLO leadership, which found asylum in Tunis and managed to build proto-state institutions in exile: a representative parliament and efficient organisations operating at different levels in the Occupied Territories. In Israel, a few years after the 1967 war, a series of Likud governments took over. M. Begin inaugurated a colonisation policy in Gaza and the West Bank, with plans for land confiscation aimed at building Israeli settlements, and tightening the control over natural resources. During the 1970s and the 1980s, several peace plans did not materialise, but the 'routine' of the occupation was suddenly shaken by the eruption of the first Intifada. Started in December 1987, the rebellion lasted six years. The Israeli regime was suddenly put under internal and international public opinion pressure and the PLO leadership had to negotiate with a new actor on the local political scene, the Islamic Resistance Movement, i.e. Hamas. On the international level, the situation was compounded by the consequences of the 1990-91 Gulf war and the political stand of the PLO. By taking the side of Saddam Hussein's regime, Y. Arafat lost the support of most Gulf monarchies and his credibility among his Western allies. It is in a weakened position that the PLO joined the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.

¹⁴ As the authors of a recent study affirm: 'a culture of domination and delegitimisation of the occupied is likely to lead to a general decline in the value of human life and consequently to an increase in (...) interpersonal violence within the occupying society. (...) In addition to these costs, the need to justify the occupation and maintain a positive self-image may result in conscious disregard for the law in the context of the occupation' (Halperin et al. 2010: 67).

2.2 Understanding conflict and peacebuilding in recent decades (1993-2010)

Following the elections of the new Rabin-Peres government in 1992, the Palestinian leadership engaged in secret negotiations through Norwegian mediation. In September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed a 'Declaration of Principles' in Washington (also known as the 'Oslo Agreement'), which stipulated a five-year process, deemed necessary for reaching an agreement over five fundamental items (the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, the future of the Israeli colonies, the borders, and the control over natural resources).

2.2.1 The 'Oslo Peace Process' and its hopes

The Declaration of Principles was based on a 'land for peace' deal: the Palestinians would cease hostilities if the IDF would retreat from the Occupied Territories. The Oslo process intended to give incremental sovereignty to the Palestinians on part of the occupied lands. These were classified into areas A, B and C with different degrees of autonomy, with only 13 per cent of the land receiving full autonomy. The Palestinians were granted the possibility to set a Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and a Palestinian Authority (PA), a sort of interim government headed by Yasser Arafat. From the mid-1990s onward, this has also meant that the PA and the PLC have been negotiating for the Palestinian population worldwide, while their legitimacy was based on an electoral body limited to the West Bank and the Gaza constituencies.¹⁵ The Oslo years did not mean the end of the occupation, but rather its re-definition and re-framing. The expansion of old Israeli settlements and the establishment of new ones continued and increased. The 1994 Paris Protocol put the Palestinian economy under almost full control of Israel, while one-third of the Palestinian workforce was already dependent on the Israeli labour market. International donors were counting on plans of economic development at the national and regional levels to ensure future political stability. The European Union became the main funder of the peace process and the USA took a more formal political role.

The euphoria about the peace perspectives was quickly tempered by the creation of a coalition of a number of PLO factions and the Hamas opposed to the Declaration of Principles. One of the main bones of contention was the exclusion of UN Security Council Resolution 194 from the Oslo agreements. This meant that the right of return and/or compensation for millions of Palestinian refugees had been swept under the carpet, and that no legal basis for future negotiations had been considered. Arafat seemed ready to pay the price of breaking the national unity for the sake of a statebuilding project on 23 per cent of historic Palestine. The situation on the ground deteriorated quickly. In 1995, the Hamas began its strategy of suicide-bomber attacks against the Israeli civilian population. Y. Rabin was killed a few months later by an Israeli extremist and the peace process was seriously shattered. In 1996, the Likud won the legislative elections and the new Netanyahu government imposed a new 'security for peace' deal, trying to slow down the engagements of its predecessors. The Labour victory at the 1999 elections brought new hopes for resuming the peace talks. Backed by US President Bill Clinton, Ehud Barak urged Y. Arafat to meet in view of reaching a final peace agreement. The July 2000 Camp David negotiations did not bear fruit and crystallised the asymmetric relationships that had prevailed since the early Oslo talks.

¹⁵ In 2009, while the estimated total population of the Palestinian Territories was slightly less than four million (1.5 million in Gaza and 2.5 million in the West Bank), the Palestinian population worldwide was around 11 million.

2.2.2 The second Intifada and the new intra-Palestinian conflict

The Camp David failure, in conjunction with the eruption of the second Intifada at the end of September 2000, opened a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Time was also running out for both Bill Clinton and E. Barak, whose mandates were coming to an end.

The new American President, G. W. Bush did not consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a priority on his agenda, while the new Likud Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, did not set a priority in meeting the Oslo peace parameters. The second Intifada showed a new and very violent trend. Furthermore, the 11 September 2001 Al Qa'ida attack in New York had tremendous repercussions for the local conflict dynamics. Actually, Sharon capitalised on the fight against terrorism launched by the US administration. By pointing at Arafat as the responsible for the eruption of the new Intifada and by convincing part of the international stakeholders that he no longer had Palestinian peace partners, but just terrorists to fight against, the Israeli Prime Minister began a hard-line policy in the Palestinian Territories. In spring 2002, the IDF re-occupied all areas A in the West Bank and, a few months later, Sharon began the construction of a wall of separation. International donors put strong pressure on the PA for administrative reforms, democratic accountability and fight against corruption in exchange for continued financial support, which increased dramatically after 2001, especially through humanitarian aid. The 'Quartet' (i.e. the USA, the EU, Russia and the UN) suggested 'road maps' to resume peace talks, but never took political steps for monitoring and eventually sanctioning the non-implementation of agreements stipulated during truces. The main legacy of the first years of the second Intifada is certainly the sharp decline of a sense of trust in the 'former enemy' that had developed during the Oslo years. The Palestinians were paying the heavy price in this phase of conflict. The death of Y. Arafat in 2004 did not facilitate the transition towards more peaceful scenarios. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), though strongly backed by the international community, did not have the charisma of Y. Arafat to restore unity in the Palestinian camp.

The Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 sanctioned negatively the Fatah's policies of the previous ten years and witnessed the victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Following the international boycott of the new Hamas government, a new intra-Palestinian conflict emerged. In June 2007, Hamas took control of Gaza, while in the West Bank new tensions developed between Hamas militants and PA/Fatah representatives. In retaliation to the mortar attacks by Hamas' militants, the IDF launched a campaign against the Strip in December 2008. Since early 2009, Gaza and its inhabitants have been almost completely isolated, with the IDF allowing only a minimal part of international aid to enter the territory, kept under a *de facto* siege. The new Netanyahu government elected in 2009 has been promoting an 'economic plan' for restarting the peace process, without engaging explicitly in the support for the creation of a Palestinian state. The lack of substantial political decisions (by national and international stakeholders) and the failure of successive peace initiatives in producing changes in the dynamics and the structures of the conflict have induced a deep sense of frustration among Israeli and Palestinian social actors.

To sum up, one can say that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a multi-faceted one, with a main root cause, i.e. the control of land to build independent states. While Israel obtained independence and international recognition, the Palestinians have been striving for their own state for almost a century. The conflict has always been internationalised, which makes finding a peace deal additionally challenging. A strong identity dimension (Palestinian/Arab vs. Jewish) has also been attributed to the conflict, with an added religious component (Muslim vs. Jewish) playing a role during the past two decades especially. Finally, and after

1967 in particular, the conflict has also been defined as a settler-colonial enterprise in a post-colonial world. In the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today is mainly framed in the logics of an occupying power and those of an occupied society's responses, with heavy international involvement experimenting mediation strategies – so far unsuccessfully. Over time, the conflict has created internal tensions among different players on both sides (i.e. moderate against more radical forces inside the two camps) that augment the difficulties to reach a peace deal.

The general peacebuilding need is obvious, i.e. finding a reality-based political solution to the conflict over land and the refugee question that overshadows all other dimensions of the conflict. However, as the historical analysis above has demonstrated, other peacebuilding needs prevail, including humanitarian needs, addressing identity issues combined with psycho-social healing, relationship matters, reducing tensions between the different internal conflict lines in the various camps on both sides, as well as protecting people from the daily violence. Moreover, all strategies influencing the international players involved and supporting pressure on the conflict parties that will facilitate conditions for an agreement are also needed. Nevertheless, it has to be clear that without an overall political solution, there will not be sustainable peacebuilding.

2.3 Civil society peacebuilding efforts

Civil societies in both Israel and the West Bank have played a key historical role in shaping peacebuilding attitudes among their respective constituencies. International donors have attributed a special importance to civil society organisations during the 'Oslo years' in particular, and have invested important financial means to sustain, among others, 'people-to-people' (P2P) initiatives. The notion of civil society has specificities in Palestine because of the absence of a state (the PA constitutes but one of the elements of statehood), and in Israel because of the peculiar historical function of the Zionist social and religious organisations and their role in the process of statebuilding. In what follows, the focus will mainly be on how the policies of international donors have influenced the processes of definition of civil society in the two countries; its effects on the local societies will also be partly looked at.

2.3.1 Civil society in Palestine

Palestine has a tradition of voluntary charitable associations starting in the 19th century. Popular committees (labour unions, professional associations, student organisations, women committees, etc.) rose in parallel to the PLO consolidation in the 1970s and the 1980s. During the same period, a number of development NGOs and Islamic organisations were established to provide services in health and social care, agriculture, etc. During the first Intifada, many of these organisations were linked to different political factions of the PLO, and were part of an institutional framework enabling the resistance against the occupation and raising awareness of the importance of self-reliance. Most organisational practices were shaped by a combination of nationalist and developmental goals. Until the late 1980s, most funding was coming from Arab donors; Western donors massively stepped in from the early 1990s onwards.

Several changes happened during the years following the Oslo agreements. This period witnessed an important transition – on the side of the donors – from solidarity forms of support to politically driven aid, aimed at bolstering the peace process. An increased

dependence on external aid did not make Palestinian civil society organisations more autonomous, and a new trend in ‘professionalisation’ often contributed to create a hiatus between the leaders of NGOs and their constituencies, resulting in a decrease in grassroots support. Pre-packaged programmes have characterised a large part of international aid to Palestine since the 1990s. Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) have been confronted since 1994 with a ‘new government’ on the local scene, the PA, which has been, on the one hand, competing for external funding and popular support and, on the other, co-opting the staff of PNGOs for the sake of state institution-building. At the same time, the scene of the international actors operating in Palestine was tremendously reshaped: while relatively few international NGOs worked in the Occupied Territories prior to the Intifada, by 1993 they were estimated at 200 and the number of UN agencies jumped from 3 to almost 30. In terms of figures, more than 60 per cent of the existing NGOs were established after 1994, 34 per cent of them between 1994 and 2000, and 27 per cent after 2000. The MAS survey of PNGOs¹⁶ indicates that in 2007 their number totalled almost 1500, representing an increase of more than 60 per cent compared to the year 2000 (less than 930). The majority operates in the West Bank and almost 60 per cent are located in urban areas. The highest ratio of citizens to organisations is registered in the district of Jerusalem. There were more than 10,000 paid employees in 2000, while there were almost 17,000 in 2007. The percentage of NGOs receiving external funding rose from 39 per cent in 2000 to 47 per cent in 2007, while the total amount of revenue received by PNGOs during the same period doubled (from 112,7 million US-dollars to more than 223,6 million). NGOs are not the exclusive actor on the civil society scene, but have become the main partners of international cooperation agencies, which have contributed to their consolidation at the expense of the popular committees of the pre-Oslo era. Apart from NGOs there are also associations, movements, networks and Islamic charities.

After the year 2000, several factors have threatened the existence of a vibrant and autonomous Palestinian civil society. The first set of threatening factors has been related to the limitations imposed by the ongoing Israeli occupation. The second threat was imposed by the PNA and various armed Palestinian groups. The third group was the result of policies followed by international donors (Cuhadar/Hanafi 2010). Within the first category, threats to civil society include the Israeli financial embargo and the Israeli control over daily life. Such restrictions prevent free participation and mobility in civil society. In the second category, one example of a PNA activity undermining the autonomy of the civil society is the conflict between the PNGOs and the PNA over the drafting of NGO legislation. Into the third category falls the dependence of PNGOs on Western donors and the choices made by donors about whom to fund and how much to limit the autonomy of civil society (Challand 2008).

2.3.2 Civil society in Israel

The Israeli political system is officially a parliamentary democracy since the establishment of the Israeli state. However, several observers have highlighted institutional discrimination against minorities (Palestinian citizens of Israel in particular), military involvement in government affairs, presence of influential anti-democratic ultra-religious groups, breaches of press freedom and human rights violations. Actually, sixty years after the establishment of

¹⁶ To be defined as an NGO, the organisation must have an officially recognised legal existence. It must be an independent, non-profit organisation entailing a level of voluntary participation; it must also be representative, and not inheritable or factional (MAS 2007: vii).

the Israeli state, Israeli society is fragmented, socio-economic tensions are on the rise, and the crisis of trust in politics and politicians is culminating. Some Israeli researchers explain the functioning of the political system as an ethnocracy, i.e. an ethno-class stratification and polarisation going well beyond the Palestinian (Israeli citizen)-Jew distinction. Over time, the divide among Jews of different origins and religious background has been growing and has even become a major fault line within Israeli politics. Furthermore, the liberalisation policies since the 1980s and the failure of the Oslo process have fostered the development of interest-, identity-, and community-based organisations in the public sphere, mixing social and political repertoires of action. The potentially promising Israeli 'melting pot' is to be confronted with an endless quest for peace and security in a complex and unstable political environment – both at the national and international level – that strongly influences its civil society.

The media have often contributed to portraying Israeli civil society as broadly divided into a pro- and an anti-peace camp, the anti-settlers and the settlers, the secular and the religious orthodoxy, coinciding with political labels such as 'leftist' and 'rightist' associations. Yet the situation is actually more complex than that. Many NGOs, interest groups, third-sector organisations, social and protest movements have certainly a direct or an indirect standpoint towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they often encompass different constituencies with multiple agendas and sometimes contradictory visions. The second Intifada has reconfigured Israeli civil society, and the creation of the Kadima Party in 2005 is but one example of the blurring of 'left' and 'right' in the political system. Furthermore, the mushrooming of Arab civil society organisations in the 1990s has been adding to the complexity of Israeli civil society. Finally, if we examine the evolution of Israeli civil society in relation to the Arab/Palestinian conflict, peace initiatives emerged in the mid-1970s, developed during the Lebanon war and the first Intifada in the 1980s, and flourished in the 1990s. However, over the years, the peace movement has been counting on a small demographic constituency of activists. These have often been depicted as politically naïve by right-wing social actors and accused of inciting Palestinian violence. Left-wing radicals, on their side, have also been criticising the peace movement for tacitly collaborating with the mainstream political establishment, creating a façade of opposition and serving as a fig leaf for the human rights violations in the OPT. Actually, logics of action and reaction among civil society members in Israel cannot be understood without taking into account the pervasive role of the Israeli army, which is one of, if not 'the' most powerful actors in the socialisation process of most Israeli citizens.

2.3.3 Civil society and peacebuilding activities during the last decade

The main objectives of the P2P activities, initiated during the Oslo years, were to 'build bridges across the national divide' and to show that Palestinians and Israelis were equal partners that could live together peacefully. By underlying the importance of the peacebuilding functions of the NGOs, the P2P activities were meant to launch a 'bottom-up' peace process: civil society organisations were supposed to influence the wider public, and thus reach out to the political decision-makers of both countries. These projects were characterised by joint activities, promoting reconciliation, mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. However, starting from the late 1990s, they began to be boycotted by many Palestinian associations. The effectiveness of the P2P programmes was put into question because they did not reach the society at large. On the other side, they often stressed an apolitical nature in a heavily politicised context. These initiatives offered the false impression

of a discussion amongst equals, hiding however a profound asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians.

It is therefore important to take the negative legacy of the Oslo years into account, when international donors promoted a 'peace industry'. Several new Palestinian NGOs created in the 1990s through external funding have rather served the interests of new elites detached from their social base and co-opted by external stakeholders for the sake of promoting peace at all costs and 'normalising' the relations between Israel and the Palestinians. The P2P programmes became a 'business': between 1993 and 2000, the Western governments and foundations spent between 20 and 25 million US-Dollars on dialogue groups. Presently, peacebuilding activities promoted by foreign donors in the West Bank are often perceived by Palestinian stakeholders as possible attempts to promote 'normalisation' with the occupying power. In Israel, the years of the second Intifada have produced a general atmosphere of distrust against the former Palestinian 'partners for peace'. The dialogue programmes between Palestinian-Israeli and Israeli citizens are received with moderate enthusiasm as well. Actually, the Israeli public debates of the recent years have put at centre-stage the importance of the Jewish nature of the Israeli state, including the fear that the demographic balance between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority could be altered.

While the civil society 'peace camp' in Israel was prominent during the 1990s, it progressively vanished during the second Intifada and has appeared moribund during the 2008/2009 military operation in Gaza. It survives through a few organisations that concretely try to 'build bridges across the national divide', by visiting Palestinian villages and towns in the West Bank (e.g. during the olive picking season), in spite of the Israeli law forbidding it. They courageously oppose the Israeli occupation through nonviolent actions. On the Palestinian side, in 2007, more than half of the registered PNGOs were engaged in charitable and relief work, which reflects the severe economic conditions faced by the Palestinian population. In general, the number of programmes offering services in humanitarian and social aid, advocacy, and women's issues has significantly increased in comparison to other programmes. It is also interesting to note that, notwithstanding the critiques towards the ambiguities surrounding the roles of NGOs, the Palestinian public opinion is not so negative. A recent 'Governance Survey' conducted in 2009 by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics shows that, in the West Bank, more than 10 per cent of the population shares or directly benefits from NGO programmes. Overall, and although almost 30 per cent of the Palestinians interviewed during the 2008 poll believe that NGOs are not corruption-free, more than 97 per cent think that they play an effective role in society, 96 per cent that they build their programmes in accordance with community needs, and 98 per cent that marginalised groups are targeted by NGO programmes. These data can be positively interpreted as a sign of trust of the Palestinian public opinion towards their own civil society organisations, which can therefore be considered appropriate partners for peacebuilding strategies.

Figure 4 and 5,¹⁷ borrowed from Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010: 216), give an overall picture of the activities of contemporary Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs according to civil society peacebuilding functions. These data clearly show the prominence of three main kinds of programmes (advocacy, in-group social cohesion, and intergroup socialisation); grouped together, they constitute the bulk of activities for each camp, 75 and 85 per cent for Israel and Palestine respectively. These trends clearly target functions that civil society organisations can best develop and that correspond well to the peacebuilding needs in the

¹⁷ See Annex 1.

present phase of the conflict. Finally, various data show the lack of an automatically positive and linear relation between aid and improvement of the political situation, unless the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are seriously addressed by the political decision-makers (Bocco & Mansouri 2008). Basically, the US and the other members of the 'Quartet' continue to favour an incremental approach, where both Palestinians and Israeli are asked to make concessions for reaching a final agreement and where each peace partner takes its own responsibility in keeping up with the engagements taken along the process without a mechanism that can sanction the infringements to the promises that have been made.

In this context, supporting civil society organisations can be a complementary strategy of the utmost importance, since these can play, in principle, a decisive role at the domestic level by contributing to a modification of perceptions of the enemy and of the root causes of the conflict, while indirectly putting pressure on national political leaders as well. Civil society organisations can also create the necessary social 'bridges' to sustain grassroots partnerships with the other camp during higher level negotiations and may have a positive influence on the latter. The successive stalemates in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should not discourage investing in the peacebuilding programmes targeting civil society organisations.

3 CPS involvement

3.1 The special context of the German-Israeli relationship

Germany has a special relationship with Israel 'owing to its responsibility for the Shoah, the systematic genocide of some six million European Jews during the National Socialist dictatorship'.¹⁸ The two countries have developed very strong relations in the fields of diplomacy, trade, defence and scientific cooperation, as well as youth exchanges, through a network of different actors. This special relationship also translates into support for Israel's right to exist and for its security, implying also a close military cooperation, including arms export. Germany is the second most important bilateral trading partner for Israel after the USA (bilateral trade worth 4.3 billion euros in 2008).¹⁹

Since the 1990s, Germany advocates for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As an EU member state (and during its presidency in 2007) Germany has promoted peace efforts in the Middle East and supported EU participation in the 'Quartet' to mediate between Israel and the PA.

There is no official German development cooperation with or in Israel. Bilateral development cooperation with Israel came to an end in 1996 when Israel was dropped from the list of developing countries as per OECD-DAC definition. Bilateral German-Israeli relations also cover cooperation in the field of development policy in third countries. The first German-Israeli intergovernmental consultations were held on 17 March 2008, reaching agreements for projects in the areas of foreign policy, military cooperation, economics, environmental

¹⁸ See the AA website: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/Israel.html>

¹⁹ See BMWI (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie), 2010. '2nd Israeli-German Intergovernmental Consultations: Federal Minister Rainer Brüderle received the Israeli Ministers of Industry, Trade and Labour and of National Infrastructure in the Economics Ministry', Press Release, 18 January. <http://www.bmwi.de/English/Navigation/Press/press-releases.did=327448.html?view=renderPrint>

protection, science and research, and youth exchange. Concerning this last point, since that year the *German-Israeli Future Forum Foundation* (DIZF) has been active in supporting a network of young multipliers from both countries, through an inter-group social cohesion programme.²⁰ The dense societal relations between the two nations include exchanges between churches, parties, unions, and youth volunteers working in Israeli social projects or kibbutzim.²¹ German tourists represent 10 per cent of tourists travelling to Israel.²²

During the 2008 intergovernmental consultations, Germany and Israel agreed to intensify the bilateral cooperation in the areas of climate change, energy efficiency, renewable energy, water and waste management. On 18 January 2010, the BMZ and the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Berlin. The programme, involving the BMZ and MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation) promotes triangular cooperation in the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia with an emphasis on water management, agricultural irrigation and development, and public health.²³

Germany is also represented in Israel through a network of different cultural actors and institutions, among them the Goethe Institutes in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, German academic teachers and guest lecturers in Jerusalem and Haifa universities provided by the *German Academic Exchange Service* (DAAD), numerous churches and church institutions, town-twinning arrangements and numerous private foundations. The six political foundations funded by the BMZ are represented with offices in Israel: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (RLS), Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS) and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. Germany also cooperates with the Yad Vashem memorial.

3.2 Official German Development Cooperation in Palestine

Germany's assistance to the Palestinian population dates back to the 1960s. Following the September 1993 'Declaration of Principles', Germany was one of the first European countries to establish a representative office in 1994. Pooling its efforts with partner countries in the European Union, the BMZ strives to support development by reducing poverty and promoting peace and democracy. By improving the living conditions of the local population, the BMZ strategy tries to lay the foundations for better prospects for the future and aims at paving the way to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.

The major instruments of the German Development Cooperation are the financial and the technical cooperation carried out by governmental and non-governmental organisations as implementation agencies. The BMZ has identified four main official priorities:²⁴ water supply and sanitation, solid waste management; governance/institution building; and education and

²⁰ See the DIZF website <http://www.dizf.de/english/start/index.html?start=true>

²¹ Each year, up to 10,000 youths and volunteers from both countries participate in exchange programs. See P. Belkin, 2007, *Germany's Relations with Israel: Background and Implications for German Middle East Policy*, Congressional Research Service, 19 January, Washington DC.

²² See M. Asseburg, 2005. *German-Israeli Relations: Achievements and Challenges for the Future*, Working Paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June, Berlin. www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=2292

²³ BMZ, 2010. 'Second German-Israeli government negotiations', Press Release, 18 January. http://www.bmz.de/en/press/pm/2010/january/pm_20100118_09.html

²⁴ See the official leaflet published by the Representative Office of the Federal Republic of Germany in Ramallah in collaboration with the GTZ and KfW offices in Ramallah/Al Bireh.

support for economic development. Support for security sector reform and the rule of law in the Palestinian territories is led by the Federal Foreign Office (AA).

Beside KfW Development Bank, GTZ, and the German Development Service, the BMZ also promotes projects and programmes implemented by three other major actors on their own responsibility:²⁵

- (1) German non-governmental organisations and, among them the CPS Group;
- (2) political foundations whose aim is to contribute to consolidating democratic structures by encouraging the participation of the population in political decision-making processes and by strengthening the economic independence of partner countries. Three (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (HBS), Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, (RLS)) out of the six political foundations funded by the BMZ are represented with offices in the West Bank and East-Jerusalem (and also the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in the Gaza Strip);²⁶
- (3) church organisations contributing to easing and enhancing the living conditions of the local population through a number of service delivery activities; these are able to mobilise sections of civil society worldwide, thus possibly exerting a strategic influence on political awareness building.

3.3 CPS portfolio in Israel/Palestine²⁷

The Church Development Service (EED), *forumZFD* and KURVE Wustrow started activities with partners in Israel and Palestine under the CPS programme in 1999/2001. The programme mainly concentrated on the West Bank's central area (Bethlehem and Ramallah) and on Jerusalem. The main areas of work are the support of peace alliances and the re-integration of groups, in particular those affected by violence. The main activity lines consisted of psycho-social support and in-group socialisation for Palestinians (EED), dialogue projects for Israelis and Palestinians youths (*forumZFD*), trainings in conflict transformation and peer mediation for Palestinians (KURVE Wustrow). The EED project partners were the *International Center of Bethlehem* (ICB) and the *Guidance and Training Center for the Child and Family* (GTC). *forumZFD* begun its project activities with the project of its membership organisation the *Förderverein-Willy-Brandt-Zentrum Jerusalem* (Support Association Willy Brandt Center WBC) located in Abu Tor (Jerusalem, on the Green Line). KURVE Wustrow's partners were the NGO *Middle East Non-violence and Democracy* (MEND) based in East-Jerusalem and the Palestinian NGO *Union of Palestinian Women's Committees* (UPWC) in Ramallah, with training of trainers, and building a trainer pool for conflict transformation and gender awareness.

EED ended its engagement in 2004, while the German Development Service (DED) and the World Peace Service (WFD) joined the programme in 2003 and the Association for Development Cooperation (AGEH) in 2005. The various CPS projects often target the youth (more than half of the current CPS experts, i.e. 12 out of 22, are currently involved in projects exclusively addressing youths or children) in line with the theories of change (see chapter 4.2.1): 60 per cent of the Palestinian population is less than 29 years old, and the youth, on

²⁵ These projects and programs are officially not covered by government negotiations.

²⁶ The other three foundations have joint offices for Israel and the OPT.

²⁷ For more details see Annex 4.

both sides, can be rightly considered a main potential for socio-political change, for building peace perspectives and for lowering violence.

WFD and AGEH supported projects in marginalised areas of the West Bank.

forumZFD operated also in the rural region close to Abu-Dis (east of East-Jerusalem) in association with the German *Federation for Social Defence* (BSV), supporting a committee of the Jahalin Bedouin tribe; otherwise, *forumZFD* continued to concentrate on dialogue projects through *Evangelical Association for the Support of Conscientious Objectors* (EAK) (with the Israeli NGO *SOS Violence – The Israeli Center for Violence Studies* and the Palestinian NGO *Madaa-Silwan Community Center*), through *PaxChristi* (with the Palestinian NGOs *Human Rights and Democracy Media Center – Shams*, *The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center – Wi'am* and the Israeli partners *Beit Midrash Iyun* and the *Association for Civil Rights in Israel* (ACRI). Besides the projects based in East and West Jerusalem, at the time of the field mission *forumZFD* was the only CPS organisation supporting a project with different marginalised groups in Israel, notably with the Arab-Israeli organisation *Bustan* operating in the Negev Desert (AGEH launched a new project in Israel with the Catholic Scouts Association in Israel (CSAI) in Nazareth in May 2010). *forumZFD* also initiated an internal project concerning the Regional Coordination Middle East of *forumZFD*, which is currently building up a CPS programme in coordination with the DED in Lebanon.

KURVE concentrated on trainings for nonviolent conflict transformation with the NGO *The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center – Wi'am* (which is also a partner of *forumZFD*) based in Bethlehem and the *General Union of Palestinian Teachers* (GUPT) in Ramallah.

DED focused on advocacy, psycho-social care and dialogue, especially with Palestinian partners (the *Jerusalem Center for Women* (JCW), the *Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange* (PACE) in Ramallah and the *Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation* (CCRR), *Dar Al-Kalima* and the *Ghirass Cultural Centre* in Bethlehem).

WFD launched non-violence projects (with the NGO *Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace* (LOWNP) in Hebron), music therapy and theatre activities with new established partners (*Yes Theatre* in Hebron and the *Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development* in Ramallah).

AGEH mainly works on peace education with Christian (Catholic and Protestant) educational organisations and with partners that already show a certain degree of institutionalisation (the *Bethlehem University* (BU) and the school *Talitha Kumi* (*Berliner Missionswerk*) in Bethlehem, the *German Association of the Holy Land* (DVHL) in Jerusalem, the *Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education* in the Biddu area). At the time of the field mission of the evaluation team, AGEH already was in agreement with the Catholic Scouts Association in Israel (CSAI): in Nazareth, renovation of a training centre was already on its way; a CPS peace worker has been operative there since May 2010.

Figure 2: CPS local partners in Israel/Palestine during 1999-2009, geographical coverage and scope of inclusion in the evaluation

Partner	Period	Coverage	Comment
EED Partners 1999–2004			
ICB	1999–2003	Bethlehem	Not included in the case study*
GTC	2001–2004	Bethlehem	Not included in the case study*
forumZFD Partners 2000–2009			
WBC (Shabibat Fatah; Young Labour; Young Meretz)	2000–current	Jerusalem, West Bank and Israel	Included in field assessments of the case study
BSV; Rabbis for Human Rights, PARC, Jahalin Committee	2004–2008	Jahalin (Abu-Dis)	Completed project
No partner (“Regional Coordination Middle East of <i>forumZFD</i> ” project)	2004–current	Jerusalem (Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon)	Included in field assessments of the case study
Pax Christi Rottenburg-Stuttgart Wi’am; Shams; Beit Madrash Iyun and ACRI	2007–current	Beit Jala, West Bank and Israel	Included in field assessments of the case study
WBC NO’AL; The Youth Guard (HaShomer HaTzair); Mahanot Haolim; The Arab Youth Movement, Independence Youth Union	2007–current	Jerusalem, West Bank and Israel	Included in field assessments of the case study
EAK; Madaa Silwan and SOS Violence	2008–current (with SOS the cooperation stopped in April 2010)	East-Jerusalem, Silwan	Included in field assessments of the case study
Al-Bustan	2008–current	Negev, Tel Aviv	Included in field evaluation**

* The two CPS experts were not reachable for interview and previous partners did not fill out the self-evaluation. The evaluation team only had a few project documents at its disposal in order to assess the completed projects.

** The evaluation team did not visit the project in the field because of logistical problems; however, CPS experts and partners have been consulted during individual interviews and focus group discussions.

Partner	Period	Coverage	Comment
KURVE Wustrow Partners 2001–2009			
MEND	2001–2006	East-Jerusalem	Completed project
UPWC	2001–2008	Ramallah	Completed project
Wi'am	2003–2006	Bethlehem	Completed project
GUPT	2009–current	Different schools in the West-Bank	Included in field assessments of the case study
UPWC	March 2010	Kindergarden teachers, Ramallah	Follow-up, not included in field assessments of the case study
DED Partners 2003–2009			
JCW	2003–2004	East-Jerusalem	Completed project
PACE	2003–2006	West Bank	Completed project / Included in field assessments of the case study
CCR	2003–current	Bethlehem, North West Bank, Israel	Included in field assessments of the case study
Dar Al-Kalima	2006–current	Bethlehem	Included in field assessments of the case study
No local partner, Dialogue Platform (with K.Adenauer Foundation)	2008–current	Jerusalem, West Bank and Israel	Included in field assessments of the case study
Ghirass Cultural Centre	March 2010	Bethlehem	New partner***
WFD Partners 2003–2009			
LOWNP	2003–2008	Hebron	Completed project
Yes Theater	2009–current	Hebron	Included in field assessments of the case study
Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development	2009–current	Ramallah and UNRWA schools (West Bank)	Included in field assessments of the case study

*** The project was at the very beginning of its implementation phase at the time of the field mission; the evaluation team met with the DED's CPS expert and the local Palestinian partner for individual interviews and focus group discussions.

AGEH Partners 2005–2009			
Bethlehem University	2005–current	Bethlehem	Included in field assessments of the case study
DVHL	2006–current	Jerusalem	Included in field assessments of the case study
The Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education	2006–current	Biddu area	Included in field assessments of the case study
Talitha Kumi School	2008–current	Beit Jala	Included in field assessments of the case study
Catholic Scouts Association in Israel (CSAI)	May 2010	Nazareth	New Partner****

**** At the time of the field mission the CSAI training centre was already in the process of being renovated, and a CPS expert was contracted in February 2010. However, the CPS expert has only been operative since May 2010 and the evaluation team was thus unable to meet with him.

4 Main findings along evaluation criteria

4.1 Relevance


4.1.1 Are activities addressing the main needs for peacebuilding in Israel/Palestine?

The CPS programme alone cannot address the complex root causes of the conflict in Israel/Palestine; as it is well explained in the CPS Standards 2008, CPS ‘projects alone cannot prevent or end armed conflict’ (2008a:1). We hardly know of situations where civil society alone has been able to bring about radical changes only through its own initiatives, but civil society can be a decisive factor for non-violent conflict resolution if coupled with upper levels of decision-making (see chapter 4.6.1). As also acknowledged by the CPS Group: ‘It is only in combination with coherent contributions made by other policy fields, for instance foreign, economic, financial and security policy, at the national and international levels and in close cooperation with other players in the conflict regions in question that the prevention of violence can become a reality’ (2008a:1-2).

The CPS programme in Israel/Palestine, implemented over the past ten years, can therefore be analysed as relevant for addressing the peacebuilding needs in both countries because it focuses on basic and key issues to produce important changes and improvements at the civil society level. Peacebuilding needs are addressed both in a long-term perspective (building bridges across social and political borders) and through short-term strategies of violence prevention and service delivery in order to contain social fragmentation. Activities target both social actors and institutional structures well, according to cases and needs. Figure 3 (below) summarises the main peacebuilding activities according to civil society functions and shows that one-third of the projects are focused on inter-group social cohesion activities (mainly through dialogue workshops), involving Israeli and Palestinian or Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli partners. Two-thirds of the projects are conducted in the West Bank, mainly with Palestinian partners, and fulfil service delivery, in-group socialisation, advocacy and facilitation functions.

The **inter-group social cohesion** projects help in countering the tendencies of some political actors of both camps (e.g. radical Islamic groups, radical Jewish-Israeli groups, or ministers of the present Israeli government) who do not favour dialogue across civil societies, in order to foster radicalisation of social actors on both sides. The **service delivery, in-group socialisation, advocacy** and **facilitation** projects are geared towards spreading values of peace, providing psycho-social support and developing peer-mediation activities among a Palestinian society in dire need of rebuilding self-confidence. Psycho-social support and peer-mediation (facilitation) projects, which became popular during the first Intifada, contribute to enhancing, directly or indirectly, in-group social cohesion: they are extremely important in reinforcing the resilience of children, women, families and communities, while simultaneously spreading the values of non-violence to withstand the consequences of the military occupation. The projects of CPS executing agencies address this need in a relevant way and are in tune with the most appropriate (non-medical) approaches. In some cases (see Annex 4) the objectives of the projects focus on raising awareness about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among German people (e.g. volunteers and pilgrims who are coming to the Holy Land, students, and young politicians). These activities do not directly target a local actor. Nevertheless, the evaluation team recognises their peacebuilding value and relevance in the long-term, because they raise awareness on the nature of the conflict among German citizens who may advocate for peace in their own country.

Figure 3 – Focus of CPS organisations’ activities in Israel/Palestine



In sum, the main strategy of the CPS addresses the symptoms of the conflict (see chapter 4.7.2): most CPS projects predominantly aim at inducing socio-political changes within the Palestinian society and do not “work on conflict” (CPS Group 2008a:1). As a self-evaluation paper pointed out: “Causes of the conflict are well-known. The ongoing military occupation of the OPT is affecting every aspect of Palestinian society. CPS activities should focus stronger on advocacy work, in order to reach political changes on a general level, as the causes of the conflict are rarely addressed through CPS activities (...). People are taught to keep up and practice non-violent conflict resolution as means to appease their own population. No efforts are made to address the dreadful general situation. In that general context, for example,

cross border and dialogue projects are bound to fail, as the preconditions for dialogue on the same eye level are not given. Therefore, and as long as the political situation is neither properly addressed nor solved, CPS can only be aiming at the strengthening of Palestinian civil society, in order to build up capacities for active involvement in the solving of the overall political situation, (...) and help to ease the psychological and personal effects of the occupation.” With this, it should not be understood that there is no connection between the socio-political change in one society and the ongoing dominant conflict between two societies; however, the relevance of addressing the former in order to influence the latter (i.e. the fact that psycho-social project activities within Palestinian society will help the peacebuilding process in the Israel/Palestine case) should be clarified.

Two remarks can nonetheless be formulated in relation to the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine:

1. *Civil society functions*: The CPS programme focuses too much on inter-group social cohesion and completely avoids the protection and monitoring functions. This point had already been raised by the CPS experts active in Israel/Palestine in their September 2008²⁸ reply to the July 2006 Strategy Paper for the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. CPS experts strongly suggested to support new project activities in the two fields of action that are currently missing or not exclusively addressed in Israel/Palestine with regard to the CPS Standards 2008: (a) Advocacy (media, information and awareness campaigns); (b) Human Rights (protection and monitoring). Project activities in these fields would better allow the roots of conflict to be addressed (e.g. through protection of non-violent actions against land confiscation). According to the theory concerning the contribution of civil society to peacebuilding developed by T. Paffenholz (2009 and 2010), the protection function is generally relevant (and highly effective), depending on the level of violence. The CPS did not focus on this function, even during the period of large-scale violence of the second Intifada. According to some CPS experts, the choice for not investing in this kind of activities is justified by the fact that other organisations (ICRC, UNOCHA, local and international NGOs, etc.) are already active in these domains. In addition, and according to other CPS experts, these project activities are not favoured by the BMZ because they are considered too politically sensitive by the Israeli government.²⁹ There is no evidence that the BMZ or AA have officially restricted CPS activities, but CPS executing agencies claimed to know, or at least to have a sense of, what their limits might be – and act accordingly.
2. *Geographical coverage*: Besides the projects based in East and West Jerusalem, *forumZFD* and *AGEH* are the only CPS executing agencies supporting a programme exclusively in Israel (i.e. the NGO *Bustan* in the Negev and *CSAI* in Nazareth); the other CPS project activities targeting Israelis are exclusively inter-group social cohesion projects. The focus on the West Bank is justified by the ‘weaker’ Palestinian position in the ‘asymmetrical’ conflict (CPS Group 2006:8). But in the Israel/Palestine context, occupation is the key word: the dynamics it engenders are of the utmost

²⁸ See ‘CPS experts in Palestine/Israel 2008’ mentioned in the bibliography. Apparently, the CPS Group never reacted to the September 2008 commentaries of CPS experts.

²⁹ Abu Zahra (2005) has also dramatically shown how, during the Second Intifada, the aggressive action of the Israeli organisation ‘NGO Monitor’ has progressively been able to marginalise and de-legitimise a rights-based approach to aid, to the extent of inducing international donor organisations to hesitate funding advocacy and protection activities.

importance to understand the situation of both societies. An example, as was outlined above (see chapter 2), is the importance of the Israeli army as the main socialising arena for young adults: the army's values are deeply embedded in the Jewish Israeli culture and non-violence has been a constant challenge for peace activists in such a militarised society. As a consequence, the evaluation team found that more in-group socialisation and advocacy project activities should be implemented by CPS in Israel with Israeli-Jews, as it has already been outlined in the CPS Strategy Paper 2006. Concerning geographical coverage among the Palestinians, DED has recently started to support projects in the Gaza Strip but, as of now, no sending of CPS expert to this field has been permitted by the BMZ.

4.1.2 Do activities under CPS adapt to changing conflict contexts?

Since the first CPS executing agencies started implementing activities in Israel/Palestine in 1999-2000, the countries have been living the major burden of the second Intifada's violence. This hard period has hindered the implementation of many planned CPS activities, which failed to adapt to the changing conflict context, e.g. implementing protection activities very much needed by the civilian population. The EED left the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine, being of the opinion that the CPS experts had to work under unsustainable pressure and that the CPS was not the right instrument of cooperation in the Israeli-Palestinian political environment. KURVE Wustrow's and DED's first projects have been delayed by the escalation of armed conflict. Moreover, the CPS programme's main lines did not radically change with the decline of violence and continued to propose in-group socialisation and peace education project activities (of course, inter-group social cohesion projects increased only after the end of the second Intifada).

That said, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is well analysed in the existing project proposals and project documents, and risk analyses are addressed in the project proposals sent to the BMZ. In general, however, strategic planning with future scenarios and the formulation of procedures to anticipate possible developments are not ensured. This can reduce the relevance of project activities and, additionally, weaken budgeting (see chapter 4.4.5). Nevertheless, on the ground, the CPS experts and their partners show a high level of adaptation to the local context, and a strong capacity for flexibility during implementation and in relation to rapidly changing situations (ups and downs of crises). For example, the AGEH project with Bethlehem University has seen important re-orientations. Initially conceived around conflict-resolution training activities for teachers and students, the CPS expert has been confronted with a rather strong opposition to the scope of the collaboration by the academic staff. This is not related to the professional qualities of the CPS expert, but it has rather to be understood in the wider context of political opposition to projects perceived as fostering 'normalisation'. The changes and adaptations have proven successful.

Following the 2008-09 Israeli military offensive in Gaza, the inter-group social cohesion project activities were the most affected. CPS experts have had to sensitively deal with the different groups and slightly change the activities (e.g. the discussion subjects). In the case of a *forumZFD* initiative (supporting *Madaa Silwan* and *SOS Violence*), originally thought of as an inter-group social cohesion project between two Palestinian and Israeli local organisations, the initiative has had to be reshaped in the aftermath of the Israeli offensive in

Gaza to become an in-group socialisation project with two distinct branches, each with its own independent activities, and communicating informally through the CPS experts.³⁰

4.1.3 Do project activities under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine correspond with the overall CPS strategies?

The project activities under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine are in compliance with the CPS Strategy Paper of July 2006 (CPS Group 2006), a very good and clear document outlining the vision, objectives and approaches of the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. With the intent of reaching peaceful coexistence, the CPS programmes aim at reducing the violence inside and between Israeli and Palestinian societies and promoting mutual understanding and dialogue, while supporting the civilian population against the impact of different forms of violence. The 'all-partiality' approach – i.e. the challenge of working with partners in both societies – is coupled with the 'bridging function' of most projects, which aims at fostering dialogue between parties across the conflict lines. In principle, the CPS favours a multi-layered strategy in terms of levels of intervention and of targeted actors. A successful strategy is conceived not only by 'recruiting more people', i.e. developing the base of peace supporters, but also and especially by 'targeting key people', i.e. religious and political leaders. Furthermore, projects should not exclusively target social actors that are 'peace connectors', but should also include the 'spoilers'. Finally, by pointing to the necessity of taking into account the different levels of action of the Israeli and Palestinian actors, the CPS paper also recognises the importance of coordinating action and sharing information with other (German) partners working at the local, national, regional and international levels. The CPS advocates a reflexive and critical approach towards its own initiatives which, in conjunction with a continuous attention given to the evolution of the situation, can constitute a guarantee for better tuned projects (building on lessons learnt from previous experiences). The July 2006 document highlights two main areas of intervention:

- (1) the promotion of 'alliances for peace', i.e. the promotion of education and executive trainings in the civil conflict transformation field, the support to structures and institutions fostering peace education and activities, and the support to political and social networks inside and between conflicting parties;
- (2) the reintegration of social groups particularly affected by the impact of different forms of violence within the peace processes. In this perspective, the CPS aims at including victims and perpetrators of both societies.

Finally, the CPS executing agencies show consciousness of the geographical concentration of most of their projects and express the willingness to develop initiatives in other areas and regions. However, this suggestion of the Strategy Paper 2006 has yet to be applied because of security concerns for CPS experts by members of the CPS Group in Germany. Some CPS executing agencies consciously chose Ramallah- or Bethlehem-based local partners with access all over the West Bank, in order to increase the outreach to more than one region.

In addition, the project activities under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine generally correspond with the overall CPS strategies outlined in CPS Standards 2005 and 2008. However, two fields of action out of the seven defined by the CPS Standards are less addressed in the Israel/Palestine programme, even though they are very relevant for the

³⁰ A number of internal *forumZFD* staff changes apparently accentuated these negative effects, especially concerning the project design (see chapter 4.4.4).

region.³¹ They concern monitoring and advocacy ('strengthen information and communication channels related to the topic of 'Causes and effects of violent conflict' – including peace journalism, networking, monitoring of conflict development –') and protection ('strengthen rule of law on local level – monitoring of the human rights situation, protection against human rights violations, local institution-building –'). In fact, *Peace Brigades International*, a CPS executing agency providing protective accompaniment to human rights defenders, is not active in Israel/Palestine, even if the context would be very much in need of this kind of intervention and comply with the stated aims of European policy,³² e.g. protection could concern Human Right Defenders (HRD), such as activists of the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC).

In conclusion, this document urgently needs to be updated in order to reflect the geo-political changes since 2006 and integrate additional fields of action, such as protection, advocacy and human rights promotion. In this way, the programme will correspond better to the overall CPS strategy.

4.1.4 How relevant are the CPS's local partners for peacebuilding?

The relevance of the CPS's local partner organisations for peacebuilding directly depends on the context and the organisational development of these partners. Local partners have been carefully selected, with due attention to their representative role in grassroots constituencies and the relevance of the programmes at the local level, and correspond to the local organisations' profile required by the CPS Standards 2008 (p. 5).

In a number of cases, the CPS executing agencies work with already well-established local institutions. This is the case, for example, for the dialogue partnerships of *forumZFD* and WBC with Shabibat Fatah and the youth organisations of political parties like Labour or Meretz, who have national networks in Palestine and Israel respectively; or for DVHL, UPWC, the *Talitha Kumi* school and the BU, which have been active for decades. *Talitha Kumi* and BU are well-known educational institutions and the activities implemented with them are of high relevance because of their role in the instruction of future elites.

In other cases, more recently established, but no less relevant partners have been chosen. This is the case of *Yes Theatre*, *Al-Mada*, and *Al-Bustan* (targeting minorities or different ethnic groups in Israel). The *forumZFD* cooperation with *Madaa Silwan*, located in the Wadi Hilwah neighbourhood of Silwan (an Arab area of East Jerusalem where more than eighty structures are threatened by demolition by the Israeli authorities³³) contributes to shedding light on the reality of one of the 'hot spots' of the Israeli strategy of occupation in East Jerusalem, and its activities can benefit from the international concern for the Holy City.

In other instances, the partner organisations are connected with national or international institutions operating in the West Bank and thus ensuring the possibility of reaching a wider range of beneficiaries. This is the case, for example, of KURVE Wustrow in its present partnership with the GUPT, which reaches out to governmental schools. Another example is that of WFD, whose project with *Yes Theatre* includes an agreement with the Palestinian

³¹ This can be explained by the fact that CPS executing agencies are supposed to address only the two fields of action (*Handlungsfelder*) noted in the *CPS Strategy Paper* of July 2006.

³² See e.g. 'Ensuring Protection: European Union Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders', <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/GuidelinesDefenders.pdf>

³³ OCHA-OPT, 2009. *Map of Al-Bustan (Silwan/East Jerusalem)*, February. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_map_silwan_al_bustan_2009_02.pdf

Ministry of Education for ensuring annual performances in Palestinian schools, and whose project with *Al-Mada* (a very new centre that WFD helped establish) is implemented through UNRWA schools as well.

Finally, a number of CPS local partner organisations have already acquired a strong local reputation for its professional activities and the commitment of its staff, and the geographical area where they operate made them relevant for the communities involved, e.g. *Rabbis for Human Rights*, the *Trust of Programs*, the *Ghirass Cultural Centre*, and LOWNP.

4.1.5 How relevant is the deployment of German CPS experts?

Sending European CPS experts is the main implementation modality of cooperation with partners under the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. CPS experts have to face various challenges in order to be integrated into the partners' structures: this can be explained by unclear roles (at the beginning of their assignment, CPS experts have to negotiate their position: are they advisors, experts, 'peace workers', members of the team, bosses?) and by mistrust towards a newly arrived person (CPS experts need to gain the confidence of the staff). In one case, an CPS expert mentioned the different political views as a source of disagreement with the local partner organisation's director. The difficult process of integrating internationals into local organisational structures does not depend on the local organisation's size, and possible logistic problems of accommodation have been solved rather quickly. When explicitly asked, partner organisations neither complained about individual CPS experts performances nor questioned the relevance of their presence. The evaluation team considers the policy of sending CPS experts to be relevant, and outlines a number of positive issues:

- (1) The outside perspective can be considered a strength in a conflict-affected context, especially when the 'all-partiality' approach of the CPS experts is the rule. 'All-partiality does and cannot mean keeping the same distance to all conflicting parties. What the concept does seek to emphasise, however, is that project activities must constitute more than one-sided alignment'.³⁴
- (2) Because of their outsider status, CPS experts can better engage in networking with existing structures or with other organisations. As outlined by the CPS experts (see CPS experts in Palestine/Israel 2008:3-4), networking activities imply a 'relational work' and therefore 'require a long-term assignment'.
- (3) CPS experts are often an added value in fundraising policies, and can contribute to organisational development of local NGOs by helping in strategic planning and/or in monitoring activities.

The evaluation concluded that German CPS experts are needed and can contribute to a better achievement of partners' objectives. However, some members of CPS executing agencies aired the idea of enlarging the CPS experts' recruitment to local and European candidates, according to the needs of the local partner organisation and its projects. For example, while international candidates (German or European nationals) can probably better fit into inter-group social cohesion projects, local expertise (when available) could constitute an added value for some service delivery or psycho-social programmes. Furthermore,

³⁴ 'Allparteilichkeit muss und kann dabei nicht heißen, gleiche Distanz zu allen Konfliktparteien wahren zu wollen. Sie soll jedoch verdeutlichen, dass Projektarbeit mehr sein muss als einseitige Parteilichkeit', (CPS Group 2006:7).

widening the recruitment base among Europeans³⁵ could also help in raising the standards of professional quality among the job applicants.

4.1.6 What would local partner organisations do if the CPS did not exist?

According to interviews with local staff, if local partners had not found support from CPS executing agencies, they would have tried to receive support from other international donors or NGOs. Many organisations (especially the well-established institutions that have existed for a number of years, with short-term project activities or addressing the inter-group social cohesion function) would have still functioned, owing to their good relationship with several donors.

The more recently established NGOs (e.g. *Al-Mada*, *Yes Theatre*, *Madaa Silwan*), which have received most of their funding via the CPS programme, explained that they would have never become what they are without the help of the CPS experts and the CPS funding, and that they would most likely not exist without that source of funding. Others affirmed that they would have found another way of reaching their goals, but that they had reached it 'quicker and better' with the support of CPS experts. In all cases, what makes the difference from the evaluation team's perspective is not only the 'financial' issue. Although the latter cannot be underplayed, as is the case with the WFD projects, international donors generally prefer funding instruments that give support to organisational development (e.g. offering equipment and training courses for the staff, increasing links with other NGOs working in the same area). The evaluation team therefore highlights that the specificity of the CPS experts approach (see chapters 4.1.5 and 4.2.2) constitutes the difference. Consequently, the evaluation team supposes that the organisational development and networking opportunities of the local organisations would have been weaker had it not been for the presence of CPS experts. Finally, the evaluation team finds that CPS experts influence the projects and partnerships in which the CPS organisations are engaged mainly in terms of quality (and sometimes originality) of the activities implemented to both partner organisations and beneficiaries. In addition, the evaluation team actually finds that the commitment of most CPS experts interviewed helped to give a 'second life' to the P2P programmes that have become obsolete after the Oslo years (see chapter 4.2.3).

4.2 Effectiveness

4.2.1 What are the theories of change of the involved actors to achieve their goals?

The overall results chain of the projects under the CPS programme is shown in Figure 1 (chapter 1.3). The underlying theories of change are explained below.

Theory of change for CPS expert-activities (inputs to outcomes): the CPS experts themselves are part of the theories of change, because of their role, function and work. As mentioned in the Standards for the Civil Peace Service, 'the external expert (...) offers his or her personality (working style, creativity, solidarity) as an asset to the intercultural cooperation with the local partner organisation' (CPS Group 2008a: 4). CPS experts contribute resources, knowledge and qualifications to the activities of partner organisations (*outputs*). They bring their outside perspective, play an important role as facilitators following

³⁵ Headquarters of German CPS executing agencies have already in the past and present recruited non-German, sometimes even non-European professionals.

the 'all-partiality principle' and the 'bridge function' (*outputs*) among the staff's members and competing groups and hence open new channels of communication and opportunities for dialogue (*outcome*) (see CPS Group 2006: 7). The importance of networking activities (within the organisations, between the organisations and others) has been strongly addressed by the commentaries of CPS experts about the *CPS Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine* 2006. Finally, CPS experts are not simply professionals performing according to their own expertise in Israel/Palestine, but they are also vectors for raising awareness in their home-country: 'Public relations and awareness campaigns in Germany should be a cross-cutting issue for all CPS experts' (CPS experts in Palestine/Israel 2008: 4).

Theories of change for project activities (from outcomes to impact): The local partners' ownership of underlying theories of change looks very strong. After 60 years of occupation, the Palestinian local partners are well aware of all sorts of effective and ineffective theories applied in order to 'resolve the conflict'. Some NGO directors, even among CPS local partners, know how to benefit from these theories, by promoting projects that respect the intervention logics supported by the Western donors (e.g. dialogue projects). The theories used are quite general and, with few exceptions, the evaluation team did not find well-defined results chains for the interventions with explicitly outlined objectives and process designs. However, the CPS has supported initiatives that have generally been effective. Some grassroots local NGOs do not use any coherent theoretical framework, but their activities are based on a clear vision and consciousness about how they can achieve change and produce a broader impact. The theories of change of the CPS activities in Israel/Palestine have in part been explicitly articulated by the majority of CPS local organisations and by their partners, and in part reconstructed by the evaluation team. They are based on three main theories of change:

- Empowering each camp through a non-violent culture – This theory is based on the idea that Israelis and Palestinians are used to violence, either as perpetrators (towards the enemy, among the youths, or inside their own families) or, more often according to CPS projects, as victims. The Palestinian society is affected by the violence of the occupation,³⁶ which reverberates on children and women, who are particularly vulnerable and often victims of domestic violence. A major part of the Israeli population tends to perpetuate the past memory of victimhood (which Norman Finkelstein has even stigmatised as the 'Holocaust industry'³⁷) and cultivate the feeling of being persecuted and not accepted by the Arab neighbours since the establishment of the Israeli state. This blend of perceptions and realities has largely justified aggressive policies towards the Palestinians and the need to underplay internal differences for the sake of keeping united against a common enemy. By influencing, in a non-violent way, individuals' attitudes and by raising awareness about the negative effects of violence (through peace education, in-group socialisation activities, psycho-social projects), social and personal internal tensions can be lowered, if not inhibited. This would favour the build-up of just and democratic

³⁶ 'The daily life of the Palestinian population continues to be affected by Israeli occupation. The majority is continuously exposed to situations of stress, and a large proportion of the population has either been a direct victim or is indirectly traumatised' ('Das Alltagsleben der palästinensischen Bevölkerung ist nach wie vor von der israelischen Besatzung geprägt. Die Mehrheit ist anhaltenden Stresssituationen ausgesetzt, ein Großteil der Bevölkerung war entweder direktes Opfer von Gewalt oder ist sekundär traumatisiert'.) (CPS Group 2006:4).

³⁷ See FINKELSTEIN N.G., 2000. *The Holocaust industry: reflections on the exploitation of Jewish suffering*, London, Verso.

Israeli and Palestinian civil societies, able to promote positive socio-political change. The assumption is that an 'empowered', functioning and strong civil society is favourable to the peace process.

However, many of these projects are not always clear as to how they fill the conceptual gap between the concrete aims of the activities and more general peace goals, e. g. how does grassroots empowerment of women foster overall peace in Palestine? At the same time, the evaluation team and the CPS executing agencies involved are aware that the general political climate of polarisation in Israel/Palestine cannot be counteracted by a few initiatives of this kind. In fact, as outlined in the chapter on relevance, only one *forumZFD* project activity addresses non-violence among Israeli Jews. Very limited support is given to Israeli civil society organisations that put into question the role of the army (an exception is the *forumZFD*-PaxChristi project, which does empower civil society actors to question the role and the deeds of the army through implementation of IHL), or to individual Israeli conscientious objectors.

- Building bridges over the national divide – A just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be achieved only through dialogue between Palestinians, Israelis and Palestinian-Israeli citizens. The great majority of *forumZFD* projects and two DED projects operate within this framework. All dialogue models seek to change the attitudes of participant members (in P2P workshops) towards the 'Other', and contribute to paving the way to long-term reconciliation. However, it is not clear whether and how the divide between former enemy groups will be bridged and, again, how the local micro-level initiatives could be linked to the macro-level peace process (currently in a stalemate).

In recent years, especially in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, a number of research projects and initiatives have focused on dialogue-oriented civil society programmes (in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in Cyprus, in Northern Ireland, etc). During the past half century, two main approaches have been consolidated in the field of reducing inter-group tensions: the 'Conflict Management workshops' developed by Lewin (1948) and the 'Contact Hypothesis' elaborated by Allport (1954). Lewin is one of the founders of social psychology: in contrast to the biological determinism of most psychology approaches prior to the 1930s, Lewin contributed to conflict resolution theory by emphasising the role of the social context in an individual's development of perceptions (of himself and of the other) and the subsequent behavioural change (Eckmann 2004: 104-106). The contact hypothesis stipulates that tensions between groups can be overtaken through the establishment of interpersonal relations between members of enemy groups. As Challand (2009: 17) has also argued, conflict transformation can occur through exchanges or discussions between different people. Through interaction, a feeling of trust is built and a gradual rapprochement between conflicting societies can take place. M. Eckmann, who studied dialogue workshop approaches in the Israeli-Palestinian context during the early 2000s, has pointed out that notwithstanding the difficulties, the meetings often have the advantage of creating quite a good level of empathy for the situation and the living conditions of the 'Other', to foster better knowledge on the aspirations and the rights of the 'enemy' (Eckmann 2009: 144).

Involvement of the international (German) actors – This theory of change is based on the assumption that external (Western) countries, and among them Germany in

particular, have had and continue to hold an important responsibility towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The international community could play a stronger (political) role in the solution of this conflict which is arguably not as 'unsolvable' as many Western politicians or media like to repeat. Therefore, a few CPS projects include the participation of German youths, whose accounts upon their return from field visits and interaction with Israeli and Palestinian actors are often at the heart of these programmes. The objective is to attract the attention of German civil society and the government (and, through the latter, the international community) by raising the awareness about the asymmetrical Israeli-Palestinian reality on the ground. This vision also complements the numerous German-Israeli youth exchange programmes.

The AGEH project in partnership with Bethlehem University organises conferences on different topics, involving German and Palestinian students and lecturers. A number of *forumZFD* projects bring together Palestinian, Israeli and Arab/Israeli young politicians or musicians in order to discuss or perform together. Other projects address mainly (or exclusively) German actors: a closed DED project supported the cultural and political tours of PACE in the West Bank, for tourists or internationals – especially Germans – visiting or working in Israel/Palestine; AGEH supports a DVHL project with an interesting approach aiming at youth volunteering in Israeli or Palestinian social institutions, hoping to influence their social commitment and political stand once back to Germany. AGEH is also developing another project with DVHL, which will offer alternative pilgrimage tours in order to make the German pilgrims better aware of Palestinian daily life.

4.2.2 Are theories of change translated into clear objectives, results and process designs?

The above mentioned theories of change and intervention logics, even if not always clearly mentioned in the documents, are well embedded in the approaches employed by CPS experts, and in the projects implemented under the CPS programme.

4.2.3 Assessing outcome 1: What are the main changes within CPS local partner organisations that can be attributed to the work of the CPS experts?

In spite of the troubles mentioned in chapter 4.1.5, the placement of a CPS expert contributes to strengthening the local partner organisations. This has always numerous positive effects, although some negative aspects have also been officially mentioned to the evaluation team by staff members or directors of local partner organisations (see chapter 4.1.5). The main contributions of CPS experts to the effective work of local partner organisations can be summarised as follows:

- Thanks to the support and activities of CPS experts (e.g. monitoring, reporting, fundraising – to find and access international donors –, writing proposals, strategic planning, leading of staff meetings), the evaluation team found that the institutional development and the capacity-building of local partner organisations increases,³⁸ and

³⁸ An example of a CPS expert's *activity* (see Figure 1): between 2003 and 2009, DED supported the Palestinian NGO CCRR with a project specifically addressing 'capacity development' (programme development, organisational development, networking...). More recently, as a practical consequence of this report's findings, AGEH began to offer a solid Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PME) training sequence to Palestinian and Israeli CPS local partners.

the project management's general competencies are also enhanced through mid- and longer-term involvement (see chapter 4.5.1).

- The outsider perspective of CPS experts is considered a qualitative asset by the local partner organisation, which can benefit from a different perspective for analysing issues of various kinds. For example, CPS experts are especially beneficial for inter-group social cohesion project activities, where they can be the connecting link between the different 'sides'. But a CPS expert outlined the importance of being a 'foreigner' even in an advocacy project, 'bringing in the role of the 'foreigner' who gives feedback on the background of Western perceptions on the students' attempts to advocate towards foreigners on Palestinian or Middle East topics, and by this enhancing intercultural learning'.³⁹
- Staff empowerment through psycho-social training, training on CPS experts' sector of expertise (i.e. education or psycho-social techniques, support in computer sciences, creation of organisation's website, etc.) and training on the activities mentioned above (see first bullet point).
- Increased networking opportunities at the regional and national level among peace organisations for the implementation of specific projects. The CPS experts have also been described as 'the feet' of Palestinian organisations (especially by the ones involved in dialogue projects) based in the West Bank, because of their easier mobility in the West Bank and the access to Israel.
- Development of a good working environment through the facilitation exerted by the CPS expert among the local partner organisation's employees.

The positive contribution of CPS experts to the local partner organisations depends on the duration of their stay. The period following the recruitment of the CPS expert is committed to negotiating the CPS expert's role and building a personal and professional trust relationship with the local partner staff. Usually, a CPS expert only really becomes operational a year after recruitment. The integration of the CPS expert does not differ according to the size of the local partner organisation. The types of placements of the CPS experts (i.e. as external actors with an independent infrastructure – *forumZFD* – or embedded in the partner organisation) are rather justified by the nature of the project (e.g. most inter-group social cohesion activities do not need the CPS experts to be embedded in the local partner organisation, since CPS experts have to play the role of facilitators among competing groups). The evaluation team did not define any differences in terms of effectiveness (and sustainability) between the approach of *forumZFD* and other CPS executing agencies.

Problems with the personalities or characters of the local partner directors (sometimes depicted as being 'despotic') have been mentioned by a few CPS experts as possible sources of friction and de-motivation. However, such sentiments are not to be confused with negative outcomes 1, but as process difficulties which can eventually affect outcomes in a negative way (but this never occurred in the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine).

³⁹ Quotation from AGEH, 2007. '*English Language for Advocacy*: Pilot Course at the English Department at Bethlehem University for Major English Students as an Elective Course, Spring Semester 2007. Some Reflections on the Course and its Process'.

4.2.4 Assessing outcome 2: How did project activities contribute to the main changes at the level of the target groups?

Changes at the level of the target groups can be perception and attitude changes, strengthened dialogue capacities, and use of new skills.

The main focus of completed and on-going project activities has been on **socialisation** (mainly through dialogue, which encompasses a wide range of activities, involving Israeli and Palestinian partners), followed by the use of **service delivery** as an entry point for peacebuilding (psycho-social support for Palestinian women, the elderly, and children). The programme also implemented **facilitation** to solve limited problems (peer-mediation in the schools of the West Bank, peace education) and encouraged **social cohesion** for Palestinian marginalised groups. **Advocacy** for raising awareness about the political context has been rarely included in project activities, and the **protection** and **monitoring** functions are absent overall (although some preventative protection measures have been found).

Because of a lack of measurable outcomes and poor systematic monitoring, the evaluation team mainly triangulated outcomes as assessed by project reports, stakeholders (CPS experts, staff of local partners) and subjective beliefs of beneficiaries. In what follows, the effectiveness of the CPS projects will be considered according to the seven civil society functions outlined in 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding' (Paffenholz 2010).

Protection – As mentioned in chapter 4.1.1, no direct protection activities against violence (or human rights violations) have been implemented so far by current or past CPS projects in Israel/Palestine. Some CPS supported projects address specific forms of violence, in particular against children and women, through service delivery or inter-group socialisation. In *The Trust of Programs* project (aimed at reducing domestic violence and supported by AGEH), protection is indirectly addressed, and focused around specific needs. The programme also offers preventative protection measures, as the involved women come to a better understanding of the legal situation of violence as presented in the Qur'an. The women interviewed by the evaluation team were enthusiastic about the project activities and stated that by the meetings enabled them to talk about particular aspects of culture and identity that interact with gender, and also to share common difficulties. Through this process, they have learned that violence is not legitimised by mainstream Islamic teachings; it also allowed them to build new relationships. Due to a lack of data, the effectiveness of this preventative protection for peacebuilding could not be assessed, given the difficult context. Nevertheless, these activities fulfil one of the key success factors for making protection effective (Paffenholz 2009 and 2010), namely the combination with advocacy (see next section).

Monitoring and Advocacy – Within the peacebuilding context, monitoring is closely related to protection and advocacy. As in the case of the previous function, **monitoring** has never been directly addressed by the CPS projects in Israel/Palestine. So far, no CPS activity has focused on human rights violations.⁴⁰ Again, it could be argued that monitoring is a function that is already performed by other local or international actors. Since 2000, many initiatives have been developed in relation to land access and confiscation, proliferation of checkpoints, extra-judicial killings, massive waves of imprisonment of Palestinian men, or detention conditions of political prisoners, etc. These monitoring programmes and initiatives have been

⁴⁰ Among the relevant fields of action in conflict situations, the *Standards for the Civil Peace Service* mention the possibility to 'strengthen the rule of law on the local level (monitoring of the human rights situation, protection against human rights violations, local institution-building)' (CPS Group, 2008a: 3).

implemented by international organisations such as UN OCHA-OPT and ICRC, or by Palestinian (e.g. PHRMG, ARIJ, Al-Haq) and Israeli NGOs (e.g. B'Tselem, Machsom Watch).

According to theories of civil society peacebuilding, **advocacy** is considered as the most effective function overall. A number of inter-group social cohesion projects address advocacy issues, but CPS projects directly or exclusively concerned with advocacy strategies are not very numerous. Among the latter, important research has been carried out and published on the relationship between Islam and Peace (CCRR 2006) and on the value of negotiations (Halabi et al. 2009). Previous DED CPS experts by CCRR contributed to the publication of the magazine 'Tree of Hope' (among the subjects: peace education, democracy and Islam, woman and conflict), which appears regularly and is distributed in schools. These publications are addressed to all the constituencies concerned by the conflict and have been translated into English and German. AGEH, with *The Trust of Programs*, has published very interesting booklets in Arabic concerning women's rights and the position of the woman in Islam. These publications target local communities in order to raise awareness among women and wives, but also among men and husbands (who are usually more difficult to get involved in workshops on gender issues organised by social workers), in order to counter violence against children and women. Again, effectiveness cannot be assessed and outcomes measured because of a lack of data. What we know from theory is that the precondition for effectiveness in such cases is a dissemination strategy for these booklets to reach the targeted population that has to be embedded in an awareness campaign. But such a comprehensive campaign has never been organised.

Another AGEH project, in partnership with BU, partially focuses on advocacy. It organised the photography exhibition 'Inside Out' about the Wall and its consequences on the daily life of Palestinians. The exhibition has been shown in the Peace Centre in Bethlehem, in the Municipality of Cologne, in the Catholic University for Applied Sciences in Cologne, and at VIS in Rome. The target groups reached were Bethlehemites, youths from the refugee camps of the town, internationals visiting the Peace Centre, citizens of Cologne (the twin city of Bethlehem), and students of the university. A report has been published in the form of a booklet. The research about Rachel's tomb (see AGEH, annex 4) will be published in 2010 in Berlin. Moreover, the BU English Department's curricula have been modified by introducing new interdisciplinary courses about advocacy. The AGEH activities at BU have been positively evaluated by both students and professors. The evaluation team has the impression that these activities have had some positive effects on changing people's attitudes about the conflict and taught beneficiaries new advocacy skills (as mentioned in an internal BU student evaluation). However, due to lack of surveys or public opinion polls this impression cannot be reconfirmed.

AGEH's projects in partnership with DVHL, addressing German volunteers and planning to address pilgrims, also focus on advocacy: the German volunteers' programme has been performed for many years. Again, its effectiveness cannot be confirmed nor its outcomes measured because of a lack of data, but stakeholders consider it to be effective.

Another *forumZFD* project uses intercultural exchange about political issues relevant to the conflict and art as forms of social activism directed towards social change. Through these means it also partially deals with issues directly related to the Israeli occupation: it organised art exhibitions in the WBC (also in cooperation with the Israeli NGO *Zochrot* and the Swedish consul in Ramallah) on 'House demolitions in Silwan', 'Palestinian houses in West-Jerusalem' and pictures of the wall advocating for the rights of Palestinians in Israel and East-Jerusalem. Another exhibition ('Waterphonia') on water access in Palestine has been

coordinated with the Goethe Institute in Ramallah. Israeli documentary filmmakers (e.g. Avi Moghrabi and Shai Pollack) have been invited to public debates after the projection of their movies. The issue of marginalised communities in Israel has also been raised through an exhibition and the publication of a booklet on Sudanese refugees living in dramatic conditions in Tel Aviv. Most of these 'cultural' projects address both advocacy and inter-group social cohesion functions. The evaluation team believes that such activities are important. However, the duration of the exhibitions is generally short and not necessarily consecutive. Therefore during the evaluation, there were no on-going exhibitions and the assessment of effectiveness was challenged by poor systematic monitoring.

Finally, in 2011 KURVE Wustrow will start a new project in partnership with *Wi'am* in Bethlehem with the title 'Publicity for non-violence'. The project intends to raise awareness about non-violent campaigns (e.g. against the separation barrier) and to strengthen non-violent political activists in Palestine.

In-group socialisation – While several inter-group social cohesion projects implemented by CPS in Israel/Palestine often include an initial 'in-group socialisation phase',⁴¹ only a few initiatives directly targeting in-group socialisation objectives can be recorded. In these cases, this function entails socialisation for democratic attitudes, for consolidating an in-group identity, and for handling conflicts peacefully.

Currently, two WFD and *forumZFD* projects include programmes oriented, among Palestinians, towards this civil society function. The target populations of such initiatives vary from children to adults. The projects do not bring people together simply for the sake of 'discussing peace', but they resort to concrete activities promoting changes of attitude within society by building and consolidating in-group identity through theatre (e.g. WFD project in Hebron), through trainings on non-violence and through providing a safe space for children to engage in common activities (e.g. the *forumZFD* project in Silwan). Both projects take place in a very tense context, dominated by the Israeli occupation through the Israeli settlers' presence and on-going house demolitions agreed by the municipality of Jerusalem. Again, as there are no public opinion polls or beneficiary surveys, the evaluation team cannot assess with certainty whether these projects are effective. However, the impression from documents and interviews is that the WFD and *forumZFD* projects have been effective at the local level due to the fact that they are giving back hope to children; as is known from theory, building up identity and self-confidence is needed to make people survive in this context.

The *Yes-Theatre* staff, which targets children, youths and adults, also stressed the importance of 'building the capacity and the self-confidence of the Palestinian people before talking to the 'Other' {ndr. dialogue or negotiations with the Israeli social actors}'. The *Yes-Theatre* tries to achieve these goals by preserving the Palestinian culture (e.g. through the use of Palestinian literature and theatre) and strengthening youth capacities to formulate demands and to participate in processes as meaningful partners. The projects are not one-off events, but are characterised by systematic processes. From research it is known that drama and theatre are useful tools for conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Arendshorts 2005; Slachmuislder and Tshibanda 2009); theatre has proved to be a very effective method for dealing with trauma in the West Bank, as illustrated by the well-known

⁴¹ For example, *Wi'am* and *Shams* (partners of a project supported by *forumZFD*) teach people democratic and civic attitudes and offer training in conflict resolution skills. Beneficiaries also learn traditional peacemaking methods, like *sulha*, in order to resolve conflicts peacefully and contribute to a nonviolent society.

case of *The Freedom Theatre* in Jenin or as personally experienced by the *Yes-Theatre* staff. The fact that the members of the theatre are themselves former children of the first Intifada demonstrates that this new initiative supported by CPS seems to be particularly effective in providing social rehabilitation for persons affected by violence.

Inter-group social cohesion – During the Oslo peace process, numerous inter-group social cohesion initiatives that brought together various Israeli and Palestinian groups were implemented. Due to the difficult context, these type of activities have mostly lost social and institutional support, particularly among the Palestinians. These initiatives have been accused of trying to reduce a deeply rooted political conflict to a relationship problem (see Cuhadar/Hanafi 2010). The CPS projects in the implementation of the inter-group social cohesion function constitute a ‘second generation’ of projects compared to the P2P programmes of the Oslo years. Second generation projects differ from the ones developed during the 1990s (explained in chapter 2.3.3) and fulfil a number of pre-conditions that should make them more effective (see Eckmann 2004): the kind of political goals discussed (which include concrete topical issues of the present occupation and conflict context), the social actors chosen (not only the ‘usual suspects’ in the Israeli and Palestinian camps are asked to participate in dialogues), and the kind of reflexive work that strongly focuses on a critical perspective towards personal-community-national *a priori* of the participants to the inter-group social cohesion workshops, all together constitute innovative elements.

Nevertheless, in spite of these improvements, the effectiveness of some of the ‘second generation’ initiatives supported by the CPS programme is limited by three main reasons. First, there is the difficulty of local partners to meet in Israel or Palestine (this was easier during the Oslo years). Second, there is a language barrier. In most workshops and meetings, participants do not use their native language and, more often than not, the Israeli partners master the *lingua franca* (English) better than their Palestinian counterparts. CPS executing agencies should thus apply adequate selection criteria for participants. The third reason is the disadvantage in education on the Palestinian side that creates asymmetries that become manifest during bi-national workshops, both at the level of the participants’ competences and at the level of the managerial skills of the facilitators. The above-mentioned limitations were rather clear at least in the DED workshop organised during the field mission of the evaluation team, which centred on Israeli and Palestinian narratives of 1948 – ‘the’ crucial event for the elaboration of all sorts of myths among both Israelis and Palestinians (see chapter 2.1) – and geared towards catering to a public of young academics of both countries. The other DED workshops organised for Palestinian and Israeli journalists on the Jewish character of the Israeli state seemed – at least from the documentation the evaluation team had access to and from the evaluations written by the participants – more effective because of the topics chosen for the debate and the professional quality of the participants involved. The DED projects with the CCRR and *Rabbi for Human Rights* also represent ‘second generation’ projects. In this case the CCRR involved less prominently known participants, but the projects were nonetheless effective because of the relationships built, the breakdown of stereotypes (e.g. in the case of the Israeli journalists), the participants’ local legitimacy, and their capacity of spreading the results of the dialogues among their constituencies. Simultaneous interpretation was provided during these workshops.

Facilitation – Between 2000 and 2009, the CPS initiated many small facilitation projects with different local partners and among various kinds of beneficiaries (i.e. youths, students, women, etc). Currently, one KURVE Wustrow project focuses on facilitation and is assessed

as very effective by the involved participants, who learnt new skills to settle disputes in a non-violent way between students, and/or between students and teachers.

AGEH is supporting a project in partnership with *Talitha Kumi* School in Beit Jala, a German institution that plays the role of local partner. The CPS expert is supposed to work as a facilitator by training teachers and children in peer-mediation, an approach that has shown promising results in the PA schools KURVE Wustrow works with. Around 50 mediators, who have become trainers, have been formed since the AGEH CPS expert's assignment and a 'mediation room', where pupils and students can discuss their problems, has been established in the school. The project activity is assessed as effective by the teachers and the students interviewed. Moreover, from peace research we know that the effective ability to induce change in education activities and trainings is conditioned by context variables (e.g. domestic violence). Parents have been invited to attend the programme supported by AGEH, in order to increase the chances of effecting change. However, these promising results are less effective because the German school director has reduced the role of the CPS expert to that of a psychologist rather than that of a facilitator in training teachers and children in violence-prevention activities. The latter role would have a broader reach and thus present greater opportunities for effectiveness.

Service delivery as an entry point for peacebuilding – Four main projects are concerned with service delivery activities, mainly through psycho-social support. Two initiatives (music therapy in Ramallah and psycho-social support in Bethlehem) are at their early stages (one started in late 2009 and the second in the late winter of 2009). It is therefore not possible to assess their outcomes, even if very positive short-term outputs have already been noticed in one of them. *The Trust of Programs* work combating domestic violence has already been positively assessed under the 'protection' and 'advocacy' functions. The women's centre, based in Biddu, offers psycho-social support, and provides mothers with services for baby- and childcare. Currently, it seeks to empower women of rural communities, a majority of married women (usually also mothers), who meet in the centre. Paraprofessionals also visit the women at home when it is difficult (or forbidden) for them to go out, and the participants' perception of *The Trust of Programs* and the AGEH intervention is extremely positive. The project has also contributed to socialising the participants through sessions on women's rights (thus also adding an in-group socialisation function).

In the DED project in partnership with *Dar Al-Kalima*, service delivery is a good entry point for the conflict-sensitive socialisation function of civil society peacebuilding. Actually, the health professionals try to improve the daily life of Palestinians people, help them to take ownership and to get rid of the feelings of helplessness and depression, notwithstanding a clear awareness of the difficulties to achieve global socio-political changes. In the words of a local professional working in the project: 'The goal is not to build dialogue skills or simply to face stress conditions, but the objective is to raise awareness on the directions that Palestinian society thinks appropriate for itself'.

4.2.5 Assessing outcome 3: Do CPS project activities contribute to the reduction of violence, conflict transformation, and empowerment of civil societies?

As the reconstructed overall results chain (Figure 1 in chapter 1.3) indicates, the main outcome 3 (and impact) of the CPS programme should take place among Israeli and Palestinian civil societies, and the minor one inside German civil society. Even if the aimed awareness about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Germany, and the subsequent influence on its government, are of strategic, political and ideological importance, the evaluation team

did not take this into account during the evaluation because it did not have the opportunity to undertake fieldwork in Germany and because of a lack of monitoring data. Moreover, the CPS programme is very much aiming at producing outcomes on the Israeli and (especially) Palestinian civil societies, and focuses to a lesser extent on the German one.

Concerning outcome 3 in Israel/Palestine, generally the whole picture has not changed, but some local changes have been observed. There are a few examples (see below) of where project activities directly contributed to the reduction and prevention of violence inside and between the Israeli-Palestinian societies, favoured conflict transformation and empowered civil societies. For example, with the help of different local partner organisations, the project supported by KURVE Wustrow is being implemented by the GUPT since 1998 in several schools; this can already be considered as an achievement (see chapter 1.3). Positive outcomes have been assessed by a PA Ministry of Education evaluation, which reported a noticeable decrease of violence in schools. Actually, the projects' success can be related to the peace education programmes, which have been initiated in a dozen schools.

The AGEH facilitation project takes place in a different context, which is an important factor for the ability of this kind of initiative to produce change. The project is implemented in a private school, in principle characterised by a softer climate of conflict and tension compared to the governmental schools in which GUPT is involved. In *Talitha Kumi* (AGEH's local partner), the teachers and the social-counsellors are enthusiastic about the lower levels of violence observed among the pupils and find the programme appropriate. The difficulties related to the activities of the CPS expert already mentioned (see 'facilitation' in chapter 4.2.3), are certainly a factor that has prevented a wider positive outcome of the project. The peace education programme had a good effect for change and is now well established in the school's structure. The AGEH project, however, does not conceive a future expansion beyond the *Talitha Kumi* school and does not look for a broader reach to support other schools in Bethlehem or the West Bank, in contrast to the above mentioned KURVE Wustrow programme.

The two above-mentioned projects started non-violent conflict resolution education in schools by focusing on teachers. In order to better achieve their objectives, the students' parents were also progressively included in the peace education sessions. However, the success of these initiatives is contingent upon the context and is not always able to reach and spread into the wider community.

In *The Trust of Programs* project supported by AGEH, the increase in domestic violence occurring since the beginning of the Second Intifada is a main, direct consequence of the worsening economic conditions of the Palestinian population (especially in the region of Biddu, where inhabitants have fought against the construction of the wall, against land confiscation, and the restriction of work permits) and the exposure to political violence (Clarck et al. 2010; Giacaman et al. 2010). Its success is arguably destined to be limited unless the root causes of the problem – the occupation – are addressed.

4.2.6 What is the link between effectiveness and the type of local partner?

CPS executing agencies in Israel/Palestine work with very different local partners, in terms of location, NGO history, date of establishment, number of members and population targeted, and in terms of whether they follow an institutional or a grassroots approach. In general, small grassroots organisations are more suited to taking into account the main context variables, in particular the Israeli occupation.

The evaluation team did not see particular success factors that are linked to particular types of partners. Nevertheless, working with a private or a public organisation may have important consequences for the effectiveness of a project. In principle, one may think that small private organisations may adapt and introduce quick changes in their internal organisation to respond to the needs of their changing environment, while public bureaucracies would tend to be slower. Actually, the evaluation team found that the link to the public sector is an important vehicle for the scaling up of project effectiveness: it has been found that partnerships with private institutions gain in outreach if the project implementation is undertaken jointly with public institutions. The example of the WFD project with *Yes Theatre* and that of KURVE Wustrow with GUPT showed a good degree of effectiveness by articulating the partner organisations' activities with the networks of the Ministry of Education, thus ensuring that the project activities lead to broader results. This is not the case yet with the Talitha Kumi school project, even if a promising start can be discerned.⁴²

4.2.7 In which phases of conflict are activities more effective?

First, it is worth pointing out that the three main phases of conflict used in the TORs of this evaluation are not always easy to apply or pertinent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This has also been underlined in the self-evaluations of CPS experts and local partners. The conflict (mainly characterised by the Israeli occupation context) is on-going, with possibilities of sudden changes and breaches of negotiations. The past ten years, in which the CPS programme has already been active in Israel/Palestine, have been punctuated by waves of hope (e.g. the Geneva accords and the Annapolis initiative) and despair (e.g. the 2002 reoccupation of the West Bank, the building of the Wall, the Gaza wars). These sudden changes have created windows of opportunities for engaging civil society peacebuilding activities that have been difficult to evaluate in terms of long-lasting momentums. CPS project activities in general aim at contributing to medium/long-term prevention. This is coherent with a conflict context in which radical decisions are not taken by national and international decision-makers to pave the way to peace. Therefore, a lesser emphasis on short to medium-term prevention within the overall programme is understandable.

The overall conflict context has evolved since 2000, but the CPS activities have mostly been developed as they would have been in an 'after large-scale violence phase' (see chapter 4.1.2), when the types of programmes offered would actually have had higher chances of being effective. There is a direct link between the effectiveness and the *types* of project activities: in-group socialisation and inter-group social cohesion projects are more effective in contexts of reduced violence. However, in a context of low-intensity violence and absence of human, economic, social and cultural rights, monitoring and advocacy project activities would be needed as well as project activities focusing on protection.

4.2.8 The subsidiary principle, cost-efficiency, and alternatives to the CPS

The consultancy 'market' in Israel/Palestine is flourishing and is a very expensive one, both in the case of local and foreign experts. By opting for a consultant, the CPS would operate much like other international NGOs, UN or cooperation agencies, and there are no

⁴² E.g. linking with the Egyptian partner school in Cairo; there is also a link to the GUPT activities of KURVE Wustrow; linkage with the recently begun peace education project at Collège Des Frères (De-La-Salle School Brothers) in Jerusalem and other De-La-Salle schools in the region is already planned for.

guarantees that financial costs could be dramatically lowered. The value added by the presence of the CPS expert is the intimate knowledge of the situation and of the local partner organisation, a knowledge that cannot necessarily be conveyed by a consultant who comes on a one-off basis or in an intermittent way. This stand is not meant to underestimate the professional inputs of consultants, but the professional field of peacebuilding is more than a 'technical' affair and the overall approach of the CPS fosters human values of solidarity, empathy and partnership that can probably be better achieved through the presence of a CPS expert. The issue of the 'local expertise' differs according to the field or domain of intervention and between Palestine and Israel, the latter country equalling in many cases the professional level of the average West European or North American country. The effects of occupation policies in the West Bank are visible on the local labour market: in certain fields of activity (juridical or psychological, for example), high-level professional expertise is either minimal or of mediocre quality (due to the bad conditions of study); in other cases, some of the best local expertise is already working for foreign institutions in the country (this is the case for a number of economists working for the World Bank, the IMF and the UN) or has left the country because of the difficult living conditions. Although the subsidiary principle is an important one, it has to be put into context. Many CPS executing agencies have actually found a good compromise by setting up partnerships with recognised institutions in the country, both public and private, for the implementation of projects. This does not prevent the CPS executing agencies in some cases to develop their network of collaboration with local experts when pertinent and needed.

4.3 Impact

According to the overall intervention logic for Israel/Palestine, impact generally refers to positive peace, in line with the CPS Standards of 2008. As is known from research (Quack, 2009), impact analysis is generally problematic; what is more, in this case impact could not be measured for a number of reasons:

- (1) The impact level (as outputs and outcomes) is not clearly outlined in the Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine 2006 intended to guide the CPS executing agencies (CPS Group 2006:2), and the results orientation (*Wirkungsorientierung*) is very vague.
- (2) Sufficient data does not exist for most interventions; there is no impact assessment in place and no published impact evaluation for the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine. The evaluation team did not have the means, given the short time frame in which the mission took place, to make such an assessment of generally long-term impacts.
- (3) Some new projects need more time to (presumably) lead to concrete impact.
- (4) Documents (project documents, project proposals, CPS Standards 2005 and 2008, CPS Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine) show that there is no consistent understanding of impact.

According to the CPS Standards 2008 and the CPS Strategy Paper 2006, impact should be measured at the overall social environment level, in a medium- and long-term contribution to violence reduction and conflict transformation at the national level of society (see Figure 1 in chapter 1.3). Yet the impact of the different projects presented for the CPS programme is at a micro level. It is not possible to measure the rather small CPS interventions in Israel/Palestine, which have as a main goal the strengthening of local actors within the projects' fields of action, against high expectations that suppose influencing a very large and

old conflict. Moreover, according to the OECD/DAC *Guidance for the evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities*, ‘It is not necessary to hold a conflict prevention and peacebuilding intervention to an ultimate standard of ‘achieving peace’ (OECD and DAC 2008:41), and the CPS programme in Israel/Palestine cannot aim for such high-level changes considering its resources. As a consequence, the evaluation team decided not to focus on impact levels for this evaluation.

4.4 Efficiency

4.4.1 Administrative procedures

The first CPS projects were identified by the headquarters of executing agencies, which contacted local institutions and discussed with potential local partner organisations. The projects are generally designed by the local partner, but they can also be identified by individual CPS experts (already active in Israel/Palestine), who can play a crucial role in this phase. Local coordinators encourage the CPS experts to be actively involved at this stage: the role of the CPS experts in project identification can certainly contribute to the relevance and effectiveness of the initiatives. Then, a draft proposal in English is submitted to the CPS executing agency. After a positive feasibility assessment, the local coordinator assists the partner organisation with final project planning and drafting (with the stakeholders and other relevant people and institutions). The planning meetings are geared to set up logical frameworks, to develop timetables and calculate budgets. In the case of the DED, the final project proposal is presented to an elected participatory committee of development workers and to the country director. The proposal is then translated into German and, with BMZ approval, the project team adopts project programming measures and a monitoring system.

The overall timeline of CPS procedures for the identification of projects, approval by the BMZ, recruitment of CPS experts, and the actual start of implementation is too long. In spite of a good degree of efficiency, the executing agencies and their CPS experts also have potential for shortening the timeline (during the recruitment and preparation of the CPS experts). This process can take up to 2-3 years and in several projects it has entailed important delays. In the interim, the local partner organisation may ‘forget about’ the commitment taken with the CPS executing agency, or the conflict context can witness sudden changes, leading to necessary and important planning reorientations (this was the case of the project activity with *Madaa Silwan* supported by *forumZFD*). These, in turn, may again delay the implementation of the project.

Project documents – The overall amount of files, related to closed and on-going projects made available to the evaluation team, was of considerable size. The DED, in particular, also provided the evaluation team with interesting internal documents concerning project design and planning. However, a number of deficiencies – that also made the initial phase of this evaluation more challenging – have been observed.

- There is a lack of overview documents, including a consolidated list of general information about the projects (i.e. title of the project, partners involved, main lines of activities, location, duration, budget), both at the level of the overall CPS programme in Israel/Palestine, and at the level of single CPS executing agencies. *forumZFD* created such a document with some of the information mentioned above at the end of January 2010, on the occasion of the visit of *forumZFD*’s Head of Department. This kind of document could also help the local representative of the BMZ in Ramallah to better understand the CPS programme.

- The project titles used in the project documents often differ, especially with regard to the English translation. Sometimes a number of projects are assembled under a common heading, making it difficult to identify which activities are implemented by which partners.
- Most documents are written in German, making them inaccessible to most local partners who do not know the language.
- Apart from the above mentioned drawbacks, project documents are generally clear and well structured. They present a good conflict analysis and clearly highlight the political context, but the explicit or implicit theories of change are not always translated into systematic results chains.
- Not all CPS executing agencies present and analyse the activities of their partners in the local context (e.g. among similar institutions, their history and background, their access to other donors, etc.).
- KURVE Wustrow offers an interesting example of how to put its projects into context. In its project documents, the executing agency adds a heading showing the coherence and relationship between the new proposed initiative and other completed or ongoing KURVE Wustrow projects. Furthermore, it also emphasises linkages with other CPS projects in Israel/Palestine.

Concerning administrative and procedural weaknesses, three out of five CPS executing agencies active in Israel/Palestine are not legally registered in the host countries. This is the case of AGEH, KURVE Wustrow and WFD; DED is registered only with the Palestinian Authority for formal reasons (government consultations); *forumZFD* is registered both in Israel as a non-profit organisation and under the PA Ministry of Interior as an NGO. This gives the four CPS executing agencies a certain leeway concerning the choice of their activities, especially towards the Israeli government. The evaluation team did not hear about any concrete examples of CPS experts not obtaining a visa. At the same time, however, this choice weakens the status of the executing agencies and may endanger the activities of the CPS experts. CPS experts of all executing agencies have a 'service passport', but their work permits in Israel and Palestine are at Israel's mercy.

4.4.2 Financial procedures

The financial procedures of the CPS executing agencies operating in Israel/Palestine differ. WFD is the only one offering their partners core funding, managed by the latter in an autonomous way. The two current local partners of WFD have recently been established and strongly appreciate this approach. According to the WFD CPS experts, the BMZ regulations in this matter are not flexible enough. Budget changes cannot be carried out easily, although the whole budget is allocated to the project as such. The financial accounting procedures are too complicated.

DED provides partners with CPS experts as well as funds for their projects, but its CPS experts complained that there is no fixed annual budget for the partner at the beginning of each year. Delays in the disbursement of funds and transfer of funds have also been mentioned. KURVE Wustrow provides the partner with an activity budget that covers all expenses related to the project, including investments if needed. This budget is managed by the project teams (CPS experts with their local counterparts). Additionally, local partners

directly receive support for running costs (office rent, communication, stationary, etc.) and overhead salaries.

Other CPS executing agencies provide local partners with one or two CPS experts and with only a small budget, managed by CPS experts, that normally does not cover all the project expenses but just small activities within it (e.g. workshops, the publication of booklets, etc.). AGEH operates with annually fixed budgets tied to the position of the CPS expert, but attributed to the local partner organisation and jointly administered by the local partner organisation and the CPS expert. The overall budget planning as well as the auditing – in accordance with the German Federal Budget procedures and regulations (*Bundeshaushaltsordnung*) – is still done in close cooperation with the AGEH headquarters in Cologne, the CPS experts and their local partners.⁴³ A car is sometimes made available to the CPS experts by the CPS executing agencies; in some cases, the car is shared with the local partner organisation.

Finally, financial procedures have not been a major point of critique by either CPS experts or local partners, but BMZ regulations are too rigid and financial accounting procedures too complicated.

4.4.3 Role of CPS coordinators

Three out of five CPS executing agencies active in Israel/Palestine have introduced the position of local coordinator, currently absent in the two other organisations (KURVE Wustrow and WFD) because of the reduced size of their projects and personnel. This new position has been positively assessed by all the CPS experts, in terms of relevance and efficiency. Local coordinators have the potential for creating more synergetic dynamics among local partner organisations and CPS experts; they support the professional/personal development of CPS experts, organise meetings and workshops for experience-sharing among colleagues (see chapter 4.6.4), liaise between the CPS experts and the headquarters in Germany, and ensure team supervision. They are usually responsible for administrative and organisational matters concerning the CPS staff (e.g. visa applications, work permits).

There is no single coordinator for the overall CPS programme (although the function of a contact person does exist in order to facilitate the information flow; see chapter 4.6.4) and executing agencies feel that it is not possible and appropriate to create this kind of post. The 'contact person' is not aware of all the single projects that are implemented by the CPS executing agencies, is not responsible for the coordination of all the CPS programmes, and has no legitimacy to represent the five organisations, which work with different approaches and procedures.

4.4.4 CPS expert postings

A third of the CPS experts have strong (personal and professional) links with Israel and/or Palestine, have lived in the region prior to their recruitment in the CPS programme, are very familiar with the conflict situation and the local customs, and speak Hebrew and/or Arabic. If needed, the CPS experts can benefit from free language classes and introduction courses before and after their arrival in the host country, at the beginning of their assignment. However, as a means of increasing efficiency and performance in the projects, the evaluation

⁴³ Plans are underway to shift part of this responsibility to CPS host countries, with the help of the AGEH CPS coordinators.

team would suggest offering regular executive trainings to the CPS experts according to identified needs. This would also help to compensate their rather modest allowance (see details below). CPS experts have an average annual income of 60,000 euros, including different kinds of allowances, such as housing rent and social insurances.

The stipends of CPS experts vary according to the age of the contract holder, as well as her/his civil status, the level of academic education, past professional experience, and seniority within the German Development Cooperation. Compensation also depends on the CPS executing agency: DED's salary system differentiates according to civil status, but not according to age, level of academic education, and past professional experience.

The remuneration of CPS experts (generally similar to all CPS executing agencies and locations of CPS activities around the world) is derived from their legal status as 'development aid workers' according to the German Development Aid Workers Law of 1969 (*Entwicklungshelferförderungsgesetz*). Their work is perceived and defined as 'development service' to the German and international communities, modelled along other sorts of services in the public interest such as (compulsory) military service, the alternative service, public service, and volunteer service.

In exchange for their service, CPS experts are remunerated, accommodated and insured – rather than 'paid for' in a profit-oriented sense. Their remuneration is certainly decent, but the ideological superstructure includes an idealistic motivation, i.e. a readiness not to strive for maximum income (the law explicitly mentions that the service has to be done 'without intention of enrichment'). By international standards, remuneration is admittedly low, compared to the average 'foreign expert' stipends employed by the UN, by bilateral cooperation agencies, or other international NGOs in Israel/Palestine, but in comparison with their colleagues in the local partner organisations it is still rather high. Nevertheless, the relatively low salaries of the CPS experts add to the credibility of the CPS experts' intentions and the overall CPS executing agencies, in the West Bank in particular.

The modest incomes can also partially explain the unbalanced gender recruitment among CPS experts observed by the evaluation team, with a strong majority of female German staff. The other possible explanations of this phenomenon, which has been raised during the debriefing workshop, could be the fact that the CPS expert duties do not necessarily include a leadership/executive position, or the fact that the CPS expert posts are not framed into a career path and contracts are limited in time. In the Palestine/Israel case, however, there has never been a shortage of CPS experts to fill the posts advertised.

4.4.5 Monitoring, reporting and learning

Reporting and monitoring are often presented as heavy workloads by the CPS experts.

When a CPS executing agency does not have a coordinator, the monitoring depends on the country director of the organisation, residing abroad and coming periodically to the field.

Reporting by CPS experts is generally done in German⁴⁴ and there is no joint reporting from the CPS experts and their partners (there is an exception: KURVE Wustrow's quarterly reports are written in English by the project teams, i.e. local counterpart together with CPS experts, and they address KURVE Wustrow headquarters as well as the partner organisation).

⁴⁴ AGEH reports are more often in English, since instructions for follow-up reports ask to write them 'in the European lingua franca of the host country'.

Monitoring and **evaluation** are mainly conducted through mid-term questionnaires and final evaluations (self-evaluations and questionnaires to beneficiaries) of the project, but also by checking a number of practical indicators (e.g. at the end of the music therapy project in Ramallah supported by WFD, 90% of the participants will have to prepare and play their own music or dance piece). However, for most activities there is no real monitoring system that is an in-built part of project implementation and also done in a participatory manner with the partner and beneficiaries. Risk analyses are addressed in the project proposals sent to the BMZ, but future scenario setting in strategic planning is unevenly ensured across the projects. During the debriefing workshop at the end of the field mission, CPS experts acknowledged the importance of further developing risk analysis and future scenario planning together with the local partners, thus hopefully improving the CPS flexibility to adapt to upcoming risks, crises and political changes.

Learning: Finally, the very rich information and experiences matured through past and present projects and partnerships are not transformed into knowledge for at least half of the programs engaged. At the end of a project, the 'lessons learnt' of the German staff are rarely developed in a systematic, comprehensive and theoretical way, going beyond the mere single experience with a particular local organisation. The written reports (that should be developed) could be very useful for other CPS executing agencies willing to launch similar projects in the future, in the country or elsewhere. Nonetheless, some positive examples putting into value the experiences of past or current projects do exist. For example, in September 2005 the CPS experts active in Israel/Palestine wrote a very pertinent 'Lessons Learnt' document assessing their experiences and roles as German experts, the CPS fields of action, and methods of implementation, thus providing recommendations for further projects.⁴⁵ The CPS experts of KURVE Wustrow are presently using a very complete manual developed by a former CPS expert⁴⁶ for their peer-mediation workshops, after his work in the same field with the Palestinian NGO MEND. KURVE Wustrow has also compiled a booklet on lessons learnt regarding training as a tool for social change; a printed German version has already been circulated, but the English translation has yet to be authorised (originally the document was compiled in German and Arabic). *forumZFD* and WBC are planning to produce similar lessons learnt booklets through their inter-group social cohesion projects. The inter-organisational Peace Education Working Group (of KURVE Wustrow, *forumZFD* and AGEH CPS experts) is compiling a lessons learnt list.

4.5 Sustainability

4.5.1 What are experiences of sustainability after the CPS expert leaves? How are issues of sustainability integrated into the planning of CPS activities from the beginning of the project?

It's very hard to assess the 'steps' that 'have been undertaken or planned in order to achieve a lasting contribution towards changing human attitudes and actions and creating lasting peacebuilding processes, structures and institutions' (TORs 2009:7). The difficulty of measuring attitudes (change of which do not necessarily imply behaviour and action changes) and to evaluate them in the long-term have already been mentioned. Actually, the

⁴⁵ CPS experts of EED, DED, *forumZFD* and WFD wrote the document *Lessons Learnt: Erfahrungen deutscher CPS expert aus sechs Jahren Zivilem Friedensdienst in den Palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten und in Israel 1999-2005*, Jerusalem, 6 September 2005.

⁴⁶ S. Clauss, 2006, *Constructive Conflict Transformation. Training Manual for School Counsellors*, hg. v. Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy / KURVE Wustrow, Ramallah, Palästina.

evaluation team believes that behaviour change is required independently from whether or not people have become 'friends'. With regard to the issue of developing and supporting the local partner organisations in a sustainable way, one can say that the latter have been – without exception – strengthened in terms of their institutional capacity. The majority of the projects is still on-going, but it has been demonstrated, by interviewing former or current local partners where CPS experts had already left, that procedures introduced or skills taught by CPS experts (e.g. planning and reporting, new contacts for fund raising, a list of 'dos and don'ts' for fund raising) are still in place and used.

The extent to which partners and target groups are able and willing to uphold the positive effects of the CPS interventions, in the long-term and without further support, differs according to the types of project and specific cases. In the case of completed projects, when new donors came in, several NGOs (e.g. MEND, PACE, GUPT, UPWC) continued many activities already supported by the CPS experts. The House of Non-Violence has been opened in 2006 by a former WFD partner, the LOWNP, with the support of a former CPS expert, and the House continues to provide trainings on non-violent culture, communication and art therapy even after the CPS expert left and the project was closed. The local staff of several organisations is now very capable of implementing projects with little external advice. Moreover, the local partner organisations are in general willing to continue local networks without the external support of the CPS experts (e.g. when the partnership with DED ended, the Palestinian NGO PACE continued to keep the contact with other DED partners like the Jahalin, Al-Quds Educational TV, etc.). However, the inter-group social cohesion projects between Israelis and Palestinians will certainly need an external mediator in order to continue to exist; the logistics and implementation of these initiatives would be practically impossible without the help of an international, who can equally bridge across the various physical, social and political borders.

There are a few examples of structures and institutions that have been changed for sustainable peacebuilding. The AGEH project in BU managed to introduce new advocacy courses in the academic curriculum and the institutionalisation process of the sexuality education class is on-going. CCRR, with the help of DED's CPS experts, succeeded in including 'conflict resolution' as a topic in the training programme for social workers of the PA Ministry of Education. A new psychotherapy unit has been established, with the help of DED, in the *Dar Al-Kalima* Health and Wellness Center. The peer-mediation method has been successfully integrated into most governmental schools, through GUPT.

No empirical evidence regarding experiences of sustainability of inter-group social cohesion projects exists. However, considering the peacebuilding literature related to the targeted groups, the study of Cuhadar and Hanafi (2010:227) mentions Ygal Rosen's research, according to whom the positive achievements of workshops among Palestinian and Israeli youths are not sustainable and declined after two months. Rosen estimates that the dialogue projects influence the negative emotions and stereotypes between the members of enemy groups, however they do not influence in a particular way the attitudes arising from the beliefs about each group's conflict narrative. According to the 2002 report by *Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information* already mentioned, 91 per cent of Palestinian youths who participated in dialogue projects or P2P activities affirmed that they were no longer in contact with any Israelis that they had met through the programme; 93 per cent also said there was no follow-up to the camp activity they had participated in. The report concludes that 'The long-term positive effects, if any, fades with time, because these meetings end with the termination of the programme and there is absence of communication and follow-up at

various levels. It is noted that these activities expire with the end of the meeting and the closure of the project'.⁴⁷

The evaluation team is less pessimistic than the above-mentioned authors and it is possible to quote other pieces of research with more optimistic views about the inter-group social cohesion dialogue projects. Examples include the Peace Education School of Neve Shalom/Wahat-al-Salam (located between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv), a CRR partner, or the Israeli-Palestinian meeting centre of Givat Haviva (see also Eckmann 2004). Besides the different approaches practiced in these two centres (which can be the subject of debate), the main difficulty identified in chapter 2 is the overall occupation context and the way P2P initiatives have been instrumentalised by international donors, by the Israeli government and the PA for the sake of their own political interests.

Finally, the evaluation team saw only a few efforts of systematically introducing issues of sustainability into project activities from the beginning.

4.5.2 How does the CPS ensure that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by European (CPS) experts?

The evaluation team does not see this issue to be a risk. The CPS experts are complementary to, and not competitive with the local expertise. For example, in an inter-group social cohesion programme (i.e. the DED project in partnership with KAS Ramallah), a local network of academics, media and civil society experts helps the CPS expert in the establishment of the Israeli and Palestinian groups. Their advice is considered very important for the different aspects of the project by the CPS expert.

As requested by the local organisations, CPS experts work under the supervision and direction of the local staff, and like the other employees, they have to face the hierarchical structure of Palestinian partner organisations. Although some CPS experts have experienced difficulties in hierarchical relationships as subordinates, and many NGOs in Palestine suffer from the lack of more participative decision-making, it would be unfair to generalise or target management behaviours as being culturally determined. It has been pointed out during the interviews conducted by the evaluation team with local partner staff that the CPS experts respect local staff needs and cooperate with the partners during every phase of the project. They do not have an independent decision-making authority. They can advise but not impose. This approach can better foster the local ownership of the partner. According to some CPS experts, the risk of downplaying the local expertise is limited by a structure (generally common to the CPS executing agencies, with the exception of *forumZFD*) that embeds the German staff inside the partner organisation.

In sum, the evaluation team recognises the potential risk of downplaying local expertise, but does not deem it to be an issue in the case of the CPS projects under evaluation.

⁴⁷ See M. Kalman, 2008, 'Few results seen from Mideast teen peace camps', in *Chronicle Foreign Service*, October 19. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/18/MNTK133IHH.DTL>

4.6 Coherence / coordination / complementarity (3Cs)

4.6.1 Coherence: To what extent is the effectiveness of the CPS project activities influenced by other fields of policy?

In the very special context of the Israeli-Palestine conflict setting, the effectiveness of the CPS peacebuilding activities is highly influenced by other fields of policy. First, by the general evolution of the 'peace process' between Israel and Palestine, i.e. Track 1 negotiations that are supported by a number of key external actors including the European Union and Germany. For example, according to a DED project document, 'As long as there won't be any political progress, as long as the Israeli occupation increases [...], as long as conditions for a fundamental change at the civil society's level for dialogue projects can't be created, what kind of rapprochement between people could be achieved? Goodwill is not enough'. Project activities can become meaningless for people that have no access to human, economic, social, cultural rights: 'It is not possible for local target groups to have a true feeling of lasting peace in their everyday lives unless peace is accompanied by a tangible improvement in their material situation' (CPS Group 2008a:8). If human, cultural, economic and social rights are not taken into account, how can the local population adhere to the hopes of political talks somewhere in Washington or Sharm-el-Sheikh, between Israeli and Palestinian leaders? Civil society organisations, closer to the reality on the ground, can remind political negotiators of the need to improve the living conditions of the civilian populations. As the Working Group on Development and Peace (FriEnt) pointed out during their roundtable on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in July 2010, project work should not be separated from political context and action.⁴⁸ The particular situation of this long-lasting conflict setting also directly affects the work of the CPS experts. Very motivated, the CPS experts acknowledged during the initial briefing workshops the 'frustration' of working in a situation that will not improve soon and the difficulty of contributing to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This is also directly linked to the effectiveness of certain activity lines of CPS over the years. As is known from the theory concerning the contribution of civil society to peacebuilding that was already mentioned, dialogue and socialisation projects in particular can be effective when the political climate is suitable. When the overall political climate changes negatively, the effectiveness of these types of activities is in general significantly reduced.

Second, Germany and most other Western countries try to balance their support to both Israel and Palestine; this may result in different policies and a lack of coherence. This is particularly noticeable in the case of Germany due to Germany's special historical relationship with Israel. The main overall policy incoherence here is the fact that most Western countries support Israel politically, economically and often also militarily and at the same time try to compensate for the damage caused by Israel in Palestine due to the long-lasting conflict. Foreign policy orientations do not lie within the realm of the BMZ but remain the domain of the Foreign Office and the Chancellery; however, the ambivalent relationship to Israel as a special partner and its role as conflict party inevitably creates policy incoherencies that also affect the relation between CPS executing agencies and local Palestinian partners, and CPS activities. DED underlined that 'the credibility of the projects is

⁴⁸ 'Participants agreed that implementation should not be decoupled from the political parameters and the conflict' ('Einig waren sich die Teilnehmenden darin, dass die Durchführungsarbeit nicht von den politischen Rahmenbedingungen und dem Konflikt entkoppelt werden dürfe'. (FriEnt 2010).

threatened to be jeopardized by the decisions of western governments, even more so since the achieved impact is constantly put into question by the evolution of the wider conflict. To name but one example, the decision by most western governments to boycott the elected [Palestinian] government in 2006 has had not only catastrophic repercussions on development work, but also led to a lack of credibility for international donor organisations and workers that is still being felt nowadays' (Crooke 2007). According to KURVE Wustrow and UPWC representatives, UPWC agreed to work on the issue of conflict transformation together with KURVE Wustrow because 'the two organisations share a history of political activism and therefore KURVE Wustrow became credible as a partner who has no hidden agenda but follows a rights based approach'. When discussing possible involvement in CPS activities with KURVE Wustrow, Palestinian partners directly mentioned their mistrust 'towards non-violent conflict transformation initiatives introduced or supported from Western countries (especially those which are perceived as supporters of Israel)'.

Germany supports the strengthening of civil society structures and advocates for non-violent conflict resolution through the CPS; however, CPS experts cannot participate (according to interviews with CPS experts, around half of them wished to do so) in non-violent direct actions or demonstrations (e.g. against the construction of the separation wall, the demolition of Palestinian houses, etc.). In this case, non-violence seems destined to remain a theoretical vision without practical action for the CPS experts, who are supposed to advocate for it and diffuse it through the CPS programme. In order to counter these incoherencies of the different German policies, CPS experts suggested in their reply to the 2006 Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine to institutionalise the post of a CPS expert in the German Embassy or the German Representative Office (CPS experts in Palestine/Israel 2008:3). The evaluation team could not assess with certainty to what extent CPS activity lines are restricted due to political reasons, i.e. whether the CPS is restricted by the BMZ or the Foreign Ministry to implement mainly social cohesion and socialisation projects or whether the CPS executing agencies have chosen to do so themselves. CPS executing agencies affirmed that they always have to take into account the sensitive role Germany (whether as official government or as civil society or as joint venture) plays when becoming active in Israel-Palestine.

4.6.2 Internal complementarity: To what extent do the CPS executing agencies work together?

There have been a few complementarities between projects of CPS executing agencies interested in the same field: KURVE Wustrow and AGEH CPS experts working on peer-mediation visited their respective initiatives in the schools. Recently, DED and *forumZFD* planned to cooperate in a common project (to date, it is the only attempt of this kind among the five executing agencies in Israel/Palestine) on interreligious dialogue, in partnership with the *Arab Educational Institute*, ACRI and *Rabbis for Human Rights*. However, the idea failed because of important structural problems (i.e. the different approaches of the two CPS executing agencies on the CPS expert position). A Memorandum of Understanding has been signed and the project split: but the DED CPS expert, working with CCRR, and the *forumZFD* CPS experts, cooperating with *Shams* and *Wi'am*, communicate together and share information about their programmes. However, in general there are no sectoral perspectives (e.g. a common strategy for a certain region, for specific beneficiaries, or in the same peacebuilding field) and complementarity among the executing agencies and their programmes is weak.

4.6.3 External complementarity: What linkages are there with other programmes / players and what synergy effects are achieved?

With other German Development Cooperation actors: CPS activities in Israel/Palestine are complementary to other civil society support activities in the countries and to each other. Considering CPS complementarity with other German actors and the BMZ country strategies and priorities, it has to be mentioned, first of all, that the CPS executing agencies follow the strategy agreed upon by the CPS Group in 2006. The following positive examples on cross-checking and cooperation among German actors can be cited:

- (1) DED (overall organisation, not only DED-CPS) 'Promotion of Civil Society' programme sometimes overlaps with CPS activities.
- (2) GTZ offers a 'Programme of support for civil society at local level in the Palestinian territories' among its institutional promotion initiatives. As the CPS, it also seeks to strengthen civil society by giving direct support to non-governmental institutions; however, it mainly addresses the cooperation with Palestinian local administrations on shaping political and administrative reform processes.
- (3) In 2010, a new project should be implemented in refugee camps through a partnership between DED and GTZ.
- (4) *forumZFD* (WBC) and the Goethe Institute, as well as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, cooperate in the implementation of a photography exhibition, already mentioned.
- (5) DED has an inter-group social cohesion project in partnership with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
- (6) Many CPS experts mentioned that they attended political workshops offered by the Friedrich Ebert and Konrad Adenauer Foundations (in East and West Jerusalem) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The evaluation team found that other actors of the German development cooperation usually do not take the CPS programme seriously. The reasons for this are the relatively small CPS budget (compared to other BMZ instruments in Israel/Palestine) and the peacebuilding approach based on civil society (and not directly on 'politics'). Initiating reflections on the ways in which the local German institutions perceive the CPS executing agencies could help improve the image of the latter. This in turn could foster and strengthen coordination and cooperation with the German national institutions present in the host countries.

With other German peace organisations: There appears to be only one project supported by the CPS ('Combating domestic violence' of *The Trust of Programs* in Biddu) that is also funded by another German organisation, Caritas Germany. In this case, the BMZ, AGEH and Caritas Germany have a close funding relationship.

Between the CPS programme and other similar project activities or international NGOs (not supported by Germany): Concerning the funding, the project activities of many CPS local partners are funded by a variety of international donors, e.g. USAID (*Dar Al-Kalima*), EU (CCRR), *War Child* (CCRR and *Yes Theatre*), Austrian Development Agency (CCRR). The *forumZFD/PaxChristi* project networked with a number of international and local NGOs and collaborate with some of them (*Diakonia*, *Tent of Nations*, *Pax Christi International*) on IHL issues. In 2006, when contact with KURVE Wustrow was established, the Norwegian Peace Alliance (NorPeace) and the GUPT partnered primarily with schools, whose counsellors had

been part of the trainings conducted in the frame of KURVE Wustrow's partnership with MEND.

Regarding the content of the project activities, adopting a wider vision of the activities of CPS executing agencies in the Near East region and of the non-CPS organisations active in the same field in the West Bank, could add useful perspectives. A former CPS expert, for example, stated that: 'Thinking about the history of the CPS, it is a pity that there were few links to other peace organisations like the Christian Peacemaker Team. I feel that all stakeholders would benefit from a programmatic dialogue'.

4.6.4 Coordination

Within the CPS programme: It has been noticed that there is a rather good communication flow inside each CPS executing agency. DED has an internal board of its different sectors (water, economic development, promotion of civil society and CPS), which meet every three months. Concerning the communication among the five CPS executing agencies, the official coordination mechanism among CPS executing agencies in Israel/Palestine (through the establishment of a CPS local coordinator) is meant to help promote complementarity and the creation of synergies. However, the '3Cs' in Israel/Palestine could also be improved by giving a clearer role and status to the CPS coordinator position, thus improving the quality of the external communication. This is certainly important for the local BMZ representative in Palestine, who seeks more efficient channels of communication with the CPS executing agencies. This is not meant to imply that the five independent organisations should be rendered more homogeneously under one umbrella. Indeed, in spite of the fact that they have the same goals and coordinate among them, they work with at times very different approaches and procedures (i.e. regarding whether or not the CPS expert is embedded in the local partner organisation, ownership of the project, funding system, etc.), which have to be respected, are part of the single organisations' culture, and are convenient for different kinds of local partners.

Concerning the differences among CPS procedures, a former CPS expert asserted that it might have been advantageous to have an umbrella for all CPS executing agencies at the beginning of the CPS programme in the countries. At that time, in fact, this could have helped avoiding the competition between the local (Palestinian) organisations for donor funding.

Recently, there have also been very positive initiatives to improve information sharing across CPS executing agencies. Since 2005 (they then stopped and were taken up again only recently), monthly seminars (the 'CPS Cross-Organizational Working Group') with the aim of information exchange, collegial support and strategic discussions have been organised by different CPS coordinators and CPS experts. During these unofficial meetings, at which participation is voluntary (not all CPS experts attend these meetings regularly and some have indeed never attended them), the German staff visits projects of other CPS executive agencies and can discuss sensitive topics. The general meetings organised among the CPS experts are important regular events that contribute to the socialisation of the expatriate staff, but could be improved and rendered more attractive by including events related to the professional activities of the CPS experts. This would further increase their possibilities for sharing knowledge and experiences. A workshop with external moderation aiming at improving alliance and cooperation was held in October 2009.

Finally, the evaluation team noticed that there is a lack of coordination among CPS experts and partners of the different CPS executive agencies, who rarely or never meet all together. In 2006, a meeting for all local partners and CPS experts (most people involved at the time have not participated in this evaluation) had been organised in Jericho; consensus was to regularly meet, but this has not happened, mainly because of money and time constraints, and a lack of initiative by any of the CPS expert or CPS executive agencies.

With other German Development Cooperation actors: The BMZ has required the creation of the post of 'contact person' for all the CPS executing agencies, in order to facilitate the communication between the German Development Cooperation of the German Representative Office in Ramallah, on the one side, and the five CPS executing agencies, on the other. This function is rotating among the CPS local coordinators and is currently filled by the *forumZFD* coordinator. All this is based on the relevant paper of the CPS Group of 2008, *Trägerübergreifende Ansprechpersonen im Zivilen Friedensdienst*.⁴⁹

From the perspective of the CPS Group, there needs to be a clear distinction between such a contact person and the role of the coordinator of each CPS executing agency. According to the German Representative Office in Ramallah, experience has shown that it is unrealistic to have one coordinator who is in a position to speak for all CPS executing agencies. Therefore, after the field mission of the evaluation team, it was agreed between the CPS coordinators (of all agencies) and the German Representative Office that the latter will participate regularly in the meetings of the coordinators. The representative of the BMZ will attend every second meeting in order to provide an informal forum of exchange. This solution has led to the clarification of the role of the 'contact person', whose post is maintained, even if its common understanding (e.g. with regard to content, training, and rotation) has still to be developed. All involved persons are comfortable with these new procedures.

4.7 Cross-cutting issues

4.7.1 Gender: How is the gender dimension addressed by the programme?

At a broader level, gender has not been systematically included as a cross-cutting issue in CPS supported projects. Gender dimension indicators are generally absent from project documents. However, gender is explicitly and prominently addressed in the implementation of some current CPS projects. This is the case for the project on 'Combating domestic violence' implemented by *The Trust of Programs; a Dar Al-Kalima* project concerned with elderly women (widows and mothers); the AGEH projects at BU (i.e. theatre activities raising gender issues, and the introduction of a sexuality education class); and the WFD project with *Yes-Theatre*, where gender balance is an important criterion for the selection of participants:

⁴⁹ Among the tasks of the 'contact person', the CPS Group's document mentions 'Exchange of information and experiences with all CPS partner organisations, with the German diplomatic mission and other organisations for development cooperation; (...) exchange of information and experiences with all CPS experts active in the partner country, and with the involvement of local partners; (...) information and communications turntable in all questions relevant to all CPS partner organisations (e.g. point of contact for questions related to the CPS in a particular country/region from the Embassy/Foreign Ministry/BMZ; (...)', ('Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausch mit allen ZFD-Trägern, der deutschen Auslandsvertretung und anderen EZ-Organisationen; (...) Informations- und Erfahrungsaustausch mit allen im Partnerland tätigen Friedensfachkräften unter Einbeziehung der einheimischen Partner; (...) Informations- und Kommunikationsdrehscheibe in trägerübergreifenden Fragen (z.B. Ansprechpartner/in bei Fragen zum ZFD in einem Land/einer Region aus der Botschaft/dem AA/dem BMZ; (...))' (CPS Group 2008b:2).

the staff deliberately wants to reach out to both men and women, in spite of the conservative society that often disapproves of actresses.

A completed project addressed only female beneficiaries, namely the project supported by DED, with JWC promoting women's empowerment. The projects targeting women always take into account the wider context of the families and the community, and attempt to get husbands or fathers involved. Another completed project by KURVE Wustrow, with UPWC, implemented an intensive trainer course on gender and conflict transformation for women and men together. The traditional role of the male is not directly challenged by any present project. With regard to other project activities, gender was not a core focus, but both men and women have benefited from the programme (even if not all activities have been carried out with mixed groups because of cultural reasons). Almost all partner organisations have both male and female staff members, though most of the management positions are occupied by men – *Al-Mada* musical centre and *Dar Al-Kalima* are exceptions.

4.7.2 Conflict sensitivity: How effective are the CPS activities in incorporating issues of conflict sensitivity/do no harm?

Conflict sensitivity refers to the ways in which the initiatives have incorporated the conflict context into their work to avoid the possible exacerbation of existing conflict. CPS experts and local partners in Israel/Palestine are aware of the context they are working in, have a good understanding of the conflict situation and avoid negative effects on conflict ('do no harm'). As mentioned in chapter 4.1.2, however, the possibility that conflict situations may evolve over time is not systematically included in planning and monitoring procedures, although activities have been adapted to the context as needed (see the chapter on 'Relevance'). The Israel/Palestine programme provides a good conflict analysis, but CPS-supported projects do not sufficiently address the causes of conflict. 'The goal of CPS is to influence, by non-violent means, the form and dynamics of a given conflict in such a way that violence is prevented, ended, or at least reduced ('working on conflict')' (CPS 2008:1); in other words, the CPS focus should be on 'policies and activities working *on* conflict', which means that 'they are intentionally trying to impact conflict and peace prospects' (OECD and DAC 2008:17). As the country context and the 2006 CPS Strategy Paper for Israel and Palestine shows, both Israeli and Palestinian societies are affected by numerous internal conflicts. On both sides, psycho-social and political problems are very often a direct consequence of the overarching Israeli-Palestinian conflict, of the continued military occupation of the West-Bank and of the Israeli government's policies towards its fragmented society and minorities⁵⁰ (i.e. civic and political rights, access to land and resources; the *forumZFD* project in Negev takes place in this framework). Therefore, one would expect the focus of a CPS project in this region to be designed to influence the conflict context (i.e. the continued military occupation of the OPT and the Palestinian resistance to it). However, the main strategy of CPS addresses the symptoms of the conflict and – as a qualified observer has noticed for many peacebuilding projects – not 'the very cause of the conflict by showing its negative effects' (Challand 2009:17). This last point has also been raised by many CPS experts who feel that they should orient their work in a different direction.

⁵⁰ See NESLEN Arthur, 2006. *Occupied Minds: A Journey through the Israeli Psyche*, London: Pluto Press.

5 Recommendations

The following recommendations are divided into strategic and operational ones. They are addressed to the different stakeholders of the CPS programmes in Israel/Palestine, i.e. the BMZ, the CPS executing agencies present in the countries (AGEH, DED, *forum*ZFD, KURVE Wustrow, WFD), and at the central (Germany) and local (Israel/Palestine) levels.

5.1 Strategic recommendations

5.1.1 To the BMZ for the overall CPS and the Israel/Palestine CPS programmes

- The evaluation recommends continuing the CPS programme for Israel/Palestine.
- Access to human, economic, social and cultural rights needs to be integrated into the overall framework. Otherwise peace becomes meaningless.
- The Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine (2006) should be updated in order to identify new fields of intervention as a basis for the approval of projects, such as advocacy and protection activities. This process should include CPS experts and take the current country context into account. The input of CPS experts should be referred to for the practical development of programmes.
- The administrative procedures of the CPS need to be adjusted. The BMZ should reduce the overall timeline between the projects' identification, the arrival of CPS experts in the countries and the actual beginning of project implementation.
- It should become possible to submit project proposals continuously throughout the year.
- The possibility to resume projects in the Gaza Strip through direct partnerships with local organisations and the presence of CPS should be examined. It could increase the geographical coverage of the CPS.

5.1.2 To the BMZ and members of the CPS Group

- It should become possible to submit project proposals continuously throughout the year.
- Financial accounting procedures need to be adjusted: more flexibility in financial planning should be introduced. CPS stakeholders at the country level should be allowed to manage their funds more autonomously.
- Project planning and monitoring need to be enhanced, sustainability should be better introduced into planning
- The CPS expert recruitment policy should be extended to also include local and European candidates.
- Coordination, coherence and complementarity should be strengthened not only between the CPS programmes and the different instruments of German development policy, but also with other peacebuilding initiatives in the country (e.g. in the protection field).

5.1.3 To the members of the CPS Group at central and country levels

- The relevance of addressing the socio-political change in one society in order to influence the conflict between two societies should be clarified.
- Local counterparts should participate in the selection of CPS experts, thus facilitating the CPS experts' integration into the partner organisations.
- Apart from the advocacy and protection activities already mentioned, the CPS executing agencies should develop more advocacy and in-group socialisation projects in Israel and more inter-group social cohesion and service delivery projects in marginalised areas in Palestine (Northern West Bank and rural areas). The importance of extending the geographical reach of interventions has already been emphasised in the Strategy Paper for Israel/Palestine of 2006.
- The parameters of sustainability should be better taken into account and made more explicit from the beginning of the project planning phase. Risk analyses and future scenarios should receive more attention in collaboration with local partners.
- Complementarity of different instruments ought to be improved, i.e. among projects supported by different CPS executing agencies in Israel/Palestine, among CPS coordinators and CPS experts, as well as between the CPS and other DED and GTZ programmes.
- Procedures for translating experience into knowledge ('lessons learnt') should be enhanced. This would help knowledge-sharing among CPS local partners and improve the implementation of future projects.

5.2 Operational recommendations

5.2.1 To the BMZ for the overall CPS and the Israel/Palestine CPS programmes

- The time period between the submission of a request for CPS experts and their actual deployment should be reduced.
- The BMZ and the CPS executing agencies should clarify and agree upon the role of the contact person for the overall Israel/Palestine programme.

5.2.2 To the members of the CPS Group at central and country levels

- Projects should not exclusively target social actors that are 'peace connectors', but should also include 'spoilers'. In addition, dissident organisations could be targeted. In Israel, (army) 'refusenicks' associations or, in the West Bank, settler organisations that show openness towards dialogue with the Palestinian population⁵¹ could be potential partners. However, the limits of the political framework set by the local partners need to be taken into consideration.
- CPS local partners and CPS executing agencies could work on the conflict by supporting already existing structures, such as the Popular Struggle Coordination

⁵¹ See for example the interesting article of L. Bar-Gefen and M. Rapoport, "Awakenings", in: *Haaretz Magazine*, January 22, 2010, pp. 14-17.

Committee (PSCC). Thus, they would bring Israeli and the Palestinian actors together and involve them in joint peaceful demonstrations and non-violent actions.

- It would be worthwhile to think about in-group socialisation and service delivery projects with former Palestinian political prisoners associations, as well as with the highly influential Israeli and Palestinian media.
- A comprehensive overview document should be produced, one that includes consolidated data on past and present CPS projects per country and partners. Theories of change and results chains should be developed more explicitly and be integrated into the country and project documents.
- The legal registration in the host countries ought to be given more serious attention.
- CPS experts should be offered more regular executive trainings, according to identified needs, on peacebuilding effectiveness and advocacy, planning and monitoring.
- In order to enhance coordination within the CPS programme, the monthly inter-agency meetings of working groups should be mandatory for all CPS experts. An annual workshop with external moderation could address the difficult dynamics within the group.
- The connection between socio-political changes (main target of the project) and impacts on the overarching conflict context (presumed main target of the CPS) must be clarified. These intended impacts should then be better integrated into the planning and implementation of projects.
- Private/public partnerships and synergies should be considered more carefully.
- Some projects, especially those related to culture, could increase their effectiveness and impact by targeting a larger audience through promotional activities both in Israel and Palestine.
- Stronger and more systematic emphasis should be placed on joint learning processes with the local partners (e.g. reporting in English).
- Planning and implementation could focus on gender-sensitive issues more systematically. The CPS executing agencies should analyse and better address gender issues within the local partner organisations.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Country context

1 General country profile: Introduction to the political history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of – if not ‘the’ – most crucial and long-lasting conflicts of the 20th century. Its consequences have been reverberating well beyond the Middle East, with particular implications for Europe and the USA. It is also a conflict which has produced over time an impressive amount of writing and expertise from academics, politicians and professionals in different fields of policy-making, both at the local and at the international level.

The origins of the conflict date back to the late 19th century, with the beginning of the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the creation of the Zionist Movement in Europe and its quest for a territory to build a state for ‘a people without a land’. A first ‘momentum’ on the road to the creation of an Israeli state was certainly the Balfour Declaration in 1917, when the United Kingdom (UK) declared its will to favour the establishment of a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine. Following the end of the First World War and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, the British were entrusted by the League of Nations a mandate over Palestine; the objective of this mandate was the creation of an independent state with a constitutional regime.

The period from 1920 to 1948 was marked by increasing flows of Jewish migrants to Palestine, mainly sparked by the consolidation of Nazi and Fascist regimes in Europe, which accelerated the pace of anti-Semitic policies and ushered in the Holocaust. The Palestinian rebellion of 1936-39 clearly set the lines of a future Jewish-Arab/Palestinian conflict around the control of the land for building an independent state. Following the end of the Second World War, Britain asked the newly created United Nations organisation for advice in drafting a partition plan of the territory under the British mandate. UN Security Council resolution 181 proposed that Palestine be partitioned, with over 50 per cent of the territory of ‘historic Palestine’ destined to become a Jewish state; 49 per cent of the land a Palestinian state, and 1 per cent kept for the city of Jerusalem, endowed with a special international status. The plan immediately met the opposition of the Palestinian elites and the League of Arab States. For most Arab leaders, it was unconceivable that the Jewish population, representing 31 per cent of the total inhabitants of Palestine in the mid-1940s, could be allotted 50 per cent of the entire territory. For the Arab League, Europe was definitely trying to solve the ‘Jewish problem’ on the back of the Arabs. On the other side, for the Jewish population in Palestine and its Zionist leaders, UN Security Council resolution 181 was (finally!) the acknowledgement of the right of the Jewish population worldwide to have an independent nation state in the Holy Land.

Though the armed conflict between the Palestinians and the Jewish settlers in Palestine developed from late 1947 onwards, the official date of the beginning of the conflict is 15 May 1948, when the British High Commissioner left the country, the day after the formal declaration of independence of Israel by D. Ben Gurion in Tel Aviv. The conflict had an in-built regional dimension because of the parties involved and because of its consequences. The armies of surrounding Arab countries invaded Palestine, but to no avail for the Palestinian cause. At the end of the 1948 war, Israel had seized control of more than 75% of historic Palestine. A part of Palestine, which has since then become known as the “West Bank” (of the Jordan River), was occupied by the Jordanian army and was formally annexed by the Hashemite Kingdom in 1950. The Gaza Strip was put under Egyptian military administration.

The first Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 represents a key event, until today, for understanding the difficulties in reaching a peace agreement. For the Palestinians it was the Nakba, i.e. the

catastrophe, not only because Palestine formally 'disappeared' from the map, but because more than 750'000 Palestinians became refugees inside and mostly outside historic Palestine. The UN created a special agency (UNRWA) to cater to the needs of the displaced population and covering the five areas of operation (Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) where the main bulk of the refugees had fled (Bocco 2009). Most Palestinians also felt betrayed both by the Arab leaders and by their own leadership, which lost legitimacy in the eyes of a prevailing rural population that had been dispossessed of its land and deprived of its basic means of livelihood. The new Israeli leaders refused to comply with UN General Assembly resolution 194, asking for the right of return and/or compensation of the civilian population that left its lands during the conflict. Actually, they started spreading the national myth according to which the new Jewish state was established on 'a land without a people for a people without a land'. The historical facts leading to and following the 1948 war have been reported in a different way by Israelis and Palestinians and constitute until today one of the big rifts between the two societies.

The period between 1948 and 1967 was marked by the development of the modern Israeli state, which granted citizenship to the Palestinian population that had remained on its land, and favoured the immigration of the Jewish population worldwide (the Ashkenazim groups from Europe and Sephardim from the Arab world, in particular). While at the regional level, the advent of Nasser in Egypt and the Suez Canal crisis mobilised the Israeli army in 1956, at the internal level, important nation-building policies began to develop under successive Labour governments.⁵² This entailed, among others, erasing more than 480 former Palestinian villages and building a new 'historical and cultural ethos', where the IDF was going to have a pivotal role in forging the new 'Israeli citizen'. On the Palestinian side, it was not until the early 1960s that a new political leadership emerged, mainly recruited among Palestinians in exile. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) was officially created in 1964, between Cairo and Kuwait. At the beginning tightly controlled by the Egyptian regime, the organisation progressively gained in independence from nationalist Arab politics under Yasser Arafat, leader of the Fatah, one of the main member factions of the PLO.

A second watershed in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict was the 1967 war. In six days, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) defeated for a second time the Arab armies that had attacked the Jewish state. Israel occupied the West Bank (including all Jerusalem), the Golan Heights (Syrian territory), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai (Egyptian territory). The war was going to have dramatic and durable consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians. The Israeli government did not comply with UN General Assembly resolution 242 asking for the IDF's disengagement from all the territories occupied during the military operations, and instead capitalised on its victory's pride. Indeed, since 1967 Israel has embarked its society on an occupation policy in the Palestinian and Syrian (mainly Druze) territories, the consequences of which have not been seriously questioned so far, neither by successive Israeli regimes nor by most international stakeholders. It is difficult to assess, in fact, for three generations of Israelis at least, what the consequences will be – if and when a peace agreement will be reached – of massive human rights violations in the occupied territories for the Jewish citizens who have been regularly serving in the national militia army (Gordon 2008). A very recent study (Halperin et al. 2010) has outlined not only the socio-psychological coping mechanisms and societal beliefs that an occupier develops in the context of a prolonged occupation, but also the costs for the occupying side itself.⁵³

For the Palestinian PLO leadership, the 1967 defeat inaugurated a new strategy of military confrontation with Israel, a blend of guerrilla tactics and terrorist attacks that prevailed during

⁵² An excellent example of the nationalist ideology inculcated by the Israeli regime is presented in the documentary 'Izkor' (i.e. 'remember!') by the Israeli film-maker Eyal Sivan, produced in 1991.

⁵³ As the authors of the study affirm: 'a culture of domination and delegitimisation of the occupied is likely to lead to a general decline in the value of human life and consequently to an increase in (...) interpersonal violence within the occupying society. (...) In addition to these costs, the need to justify the occupation and maintain a positive self-image may result in conscious disregard for the law in the context of the occupation' (Halperin et al. 2010: 67).

the 1970s and 1980s. By 1974, the PLO had gained international recognition as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian population, both for the member states of the Arab League and for the UN. During the same year, the PLO representatives in the West Bank had also won the municipal elections in the West Bank, thus confirming the organisation's role in a part of Palestine that after 1967 was going to become a pivotal centre for Palestinian resistance politics, a role attributed until then to the Palestinians in Israel. However, the Palestinian military strategies did not pay off. After the (Black September) 1970-71 civil war in Jordan, the PLO had to flee to Syria and finally rebuilt its headquarters in Beirut. Yet the guerrilla war waged from Lebanon did not bear fruit either: in 1982, the IDF invaded Lebanon and once again expelled the PLO leadership, which found asylum in Tunis and partly in Yemen. Notwithstanding the distance between Palestine and the PLO headquarters (more than 2000 km), the PLO leadership managed to build proto-state institutions in exile: a representative parliament of the Palestinian diaspora and, among others, efficient organisations (i.e., women, student and workers associations) operating at different levels in the Occupied Territories.

In Israel, a few years after the 1967 war (and the Yom Kippur War of 1973), a series of Likud governments began following a different set of policies from those pursued by the Labour Party that had prevailed since independence. In parallel to the successful Camp David Peace Agreement signed with Egypt in 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin inaugurated a policy of colonisation in the Occupied Territories, with plans for progressive land confiscation aimed at building Israeli settlements, and tightening the control over the natural resources in Gaza and the West Bank. The Likud governments also (indirectly) encouraged the development of the Muslim Brothers' organisation in Gaza, a strategy devised to counter and weaken the PLO's supremacy.

During the 1970s and 1980s, several peace plans mediated by international and regional stakeholders did not materialise, but the 'routine' of the occupation was suddenly shaken by the eruption of the first Intifada, a popular rebellion originally instigated by Palestinian youths, who began throwing stones against the occupying army in Gaza. Started in December 1987, the rebellion was going to last six years, a period which saw the emergence of new actors and dynamics. At the beginning, both the Israeli government and the PLO leadership were worried and fearful of losing control of the situation. The former was suddenly put under internal and international public opinion pressure, and the latter had to negotiate with a new actor on the local Palestinian political scene, the Islamic Resistance Movement, i.e. Hamas.

On the international level, two main political events certainly characterise the period of the first Intifada. The first was the severing of the administrative ties between Jordan and the West Bank, unilaterally decided by King Hussein in July 1988. Following that decision, and during the Algiers meeting of the PLO National Council in November of the same year, Y. Arafat declared for the first time the State of Palestine in Gaza and the West Bank, therefore indirectly recognising the State of Israel in its 1948 borders. The second event was compounded by the consequences of the PLO's political stance during the 1990-91 Gulf war. By taking sides with Saddam Hussein's regime, Y. Arafat lost the support of most Gulf monarchies (who had been funding the PLO until then) and his credibility among Western allies as well. It was therefore in a weakened position that the PLO sent representatives (under the leadership of the Jordanian delegation) to the Madrid Peace Conference in the fall of 1991. The Palestinian-Israeli relationship had reached a stalemate, while the occupation and the Intifada were continuing.

2 Understanding the dynamics of conflict since 1993

Following the elections of the new Rabin-Peres government in 1992, the Palestinians engaged in secret negotiations over a peace process with Norwegian mediation. In September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed a 'Declaration of Principles' in Washington. The declaration, also known as the 'Oslo Agreement' (because of the secret talks held in the Norwegian capital city) stipulated a five-year process, deemed necessary for both parties to

reach an agreement on five fundamental items (the Palestinian refugee question, the status of Jerusalem, the future of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied territories, the borders, and the control over natural resources – water, in particular). This should have paved the way to final status negotiations in view of a long-lasting peace agreement.

2.1 The 'Oslo Peace Process' and its hopes

The Washington Declaration of Principles of September 1993 was essentially based on a 'land for peace' deal: a Palestinian cessation of hostilities against the IDF retreat from the Occupied Territories. The Oslo process included a number of interim agreements, intended to give incremental sovereignty to the Palestinians on part of the occupied lands. These were classified into areas A, B and C with different degrees of autonomy. While more than 60 per cent of the land was kept under full Israeli control, only 13 per cent (the more densely populated urban areas) were given full autonomy, while the rest was going to be under joint Israeli/Palestinian control. Autonomy materialised in an adaptable model for ensuring different kinds of territorial control.

The Palestinians were granted the possibility of setting up new political institutions, notably a Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and a Palestinian Authority (PA), a sort of interim government pending the creation of a full-fledged state. Yasser Arafat formally kept alive the PLO, but without reconvening the Palestinian National Council, i.e. the 'parliament in exile' representative of the Palestinians worldwide. The Fatah's leader, already president of the PLO, also became the elected president of the new PA. From the mid-1990s onward, this has meant that the PA and the PLC have been negotiating for the Palestinian population in general, while their legitimacy was based on an electoral body limited to the West Bank and the Gaza constituencies.⁵⁴

The 1990s saw the return to Palestine of many PLO cadres, former *fedayeen* who had been living in exile for many years. In most cases, these 'returnees' were entrusted key-post in the new Palestinian administration, often at the expense of the local population that had been fighting and striving to survive during the years of the first Intifada. While the PA was not granted the possibility of setting up an army but only police forces, Y. Arafat created up to 10 different security services, which proved to be an important labour market for the returnees and many Fatah supporters (Challand 2008).

The Oslo years did not actually mean the end of the occupation, but rather its re-definition and re-framing. Notwithstanding the creation of Autonomous Territories, the expansion of old Israeli settlements and the establishment of new ones (in the West Bank and East Jerusalem in particular) continued and increased, thus contravening the Washington 1993 agreements that had stipulated the illegality of altering the situation on the ground. Finally, the Paris Protocol of 1994 put the Palestinian economy under almost full control of Israel, which was placed in charge of borders and customs, and benefited from specific trade clauses, while one-third of the Palestinian workforce was already dependent on the Israeli labour market (Daoudi and Khalidi 2008).

At the international level, in the mid-1990s Israel signed a peace agreement with Jordan (the Wadi Araba Treaty) and restored diplomatic and economic relationships with a number of Arab States, in the Gulf and in the Maghreb. International donors, enthusiastic at the perspective of peace, were betting on plans of economic development at the national and regional levels to ensure future political stability. While the European Union quickly became the main funder of the peace process, the USA took a more formal political role.

However, the euphoria about the peace perspectives was rather quickly tempered by the creation of a coalition opposed to the Declaration of Principles. Some PLO factions and the

⁵⁴ In 2009, while the estimated total population of the Palestinian Territories was slightly less than 4 millions (1.5 million in Gaza and 2.5 million in the West Bank), the Palestinian population worldwide was around 11 million.

Hamas, supported by Syria and Lebanon, united to stand against the implementation of the Oslo process. One of the main bones of contention was the acceptance by the PLO of not including the UN Security Council resolution 194 of 1948 in the Oslo agreements, but only resolution 242 of 1967. This meant, on the one side, that the right of return and/or compensation for several million Palestinian refugees had been swept under the carpet during the secret talks, and that no legal basis for future negotiations had been considered. On the other hand, the majority of refugees, which had for decades constituted the backbone of the Palestinian National Movement, felt betrayed by their own leadership. Arafat seemed ready to pay the price of breaking the national unity for the sake of a state building project on 23 per cent of historic Palestine (Al Hussein & Bocco 2009).

The situation on the ground deteriorated quickly. In 1995, following the Baruch Goldstein assassination of 23 Muslims in the main Hebron mosque, the Hamas retaliated and began its strategy of suicide-bomber attacks against the Israeli civilian population. Y. Rabin was killed a few months later by an Israeli extremist and the peace process began to be in serious jeopardy. In 1996, the Likud won the legislative elections and the new Netanyahu government imposed a 'security for peace' deal, trying to slow down the engagements of its predecessors. The different multilateral working groups dealing with final status issues came progressively to a halt and, in 1998, the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were very far from reaching agreements preparatory to the drafting of a global peace agreement.

The Labour victory at the 1999 elections brought new hopes for resuming the peace talks. Prime Minister Ehud Barak pulled the Israeli troops back from southern Lebanon, but the seemingly promising negotiations with President Hafez Al Assad did not materialise into any form of peace agreement with Syria. On the Palestinian front, and backed by US President Bill Clinton, E. Barak urged Y. Arafat to meet in view of reaching a final peace agreement. The July 2000 Camp David negotiations did not bear fruits and actually crystallised the asymmetric relationships that had prevailed since the beginning of the Oslo talks. Worse than that, the failure of the negotiations was attributed to the bad will of the PA President (Al Hussein & Bocco).

2.2 The second Intifada and the new intra-Palestinian conflict

The unsuccessful Camp David talks in July 2000 in conjunction with the eruption of the second Intifada at the end of September of the same year, opened a new phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the negotiators continued their work through the fall and winter of 2000-01 and seemed to have reached an important momentum in Taba six months after Camp David, time was running out for both Bill Clinton and E. Barak, whose respective mandates were coming to an end.

The new American President, G. W. Bush, did not consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a priority on his agenda for the Middle East, while the new Likud Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, appeased the 'hawks camp' in Israel by side-lining any substantial move towards meeting the Oslo peace parameters. The second Intifada showed from the beginning a new, very violent trend compared to that of a decade before. Furthermore, the 11 September 2001 Al Qa'ida attack on the Twin Towers in New York had very important repercussions for the local conflict dynamics. Sharon quickly capitalised on the fight against international terrorism launched by the US administration. By pointing at Arafat as the one responsible for the eruption of the new Intifada and by convincing part of the international stakeholders that he no longer had any Palestinian peace partners to negotiate with – an argument developed by his predecessor E. Barak – but just terrorists to fight against, the Israeli Prime Minister began a hard-line policy in the Palestinian Territories (Gordon 2008). In spring 2002, the IDF occupied all areas in the Autonomous Territories and, a few months later, Sharon began the

construction of a wall of separation⁵⁵ with most parts of it deeply inside the OPT in order to integrate large settlement blocs

The Palestinian side reacted to Israel's aggressive policy by intensifying suicide-bomber attacks. The dynamics of these attacks also reflected a competition both against the PA by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and inside the PA between an old and a young guard, all striving for political legitimacy in the fight against the common enemy (Challand 2008). International donors put strong pressure on the PA for administrative reforms, democratic accountability and the fight against corruption, in exchange for continued financial support, which increased dramatically after 2001, especially in the form of humanitarian aid. The 'Quartet' (i.e. the USA, the EU, Russia and the UN, the main political external stakeholders that coalesced as mediators in 2002) suggested 'road maps' to resume peace talks. However, the Quartet never took political steps for monitoring and eventually sanctioning the non-implementation of agreements and decisions taken during truces. Israelis and Palestinians were left to resort to their own good will to keep their word (Bocco & Mansouri 2008).

The main legacy of the first years of the second Intifada is certainly the sharp decline of a sense of trust in the 'former enemy' that had developed during the Oslo years between political elites and partly also at lower levels. The Palestinians were paying a heavy price in this phase of conflict: their economy was seriously disrupted, the systematic policy of closures of the OPT by Israel made unemployment and poverty rise dramatically, and internal Palestinian political and social divisions grew steadily. The death of President Arafat in late 2004 did not facilitate the transition towards more peaceful scenarios. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), though with a strong backing from the international community, did not have the charisma of Y. Arafat to restore unity in the Palestinian camp.

The Palestinian legislative elections of January 2006 sanctioned negatively the Fatah's policies of the previous ten years and witnessed the victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Following the international boycott of the new Hamas government and the Fatah's policy of opposition, a new intra-Palestinian conflict emerged. This materialised into the military seizure of power by Hamas in Gaza during June 2007 and on-going tensions in the West Bank between Hamas militants and PA/Fatah representatives. Notwithstanding its withdrawal from Gaza during the summer of 2005, the Israeli government has kept a *de facto* regime of occupation in Gaza and in the West Bank as well.

The internal political divisions between the PA, officially controlled by the Fatah, and the Hamas government in Gaza have not been beneficial for the advancement of the peace process, and the Palestinian camp has become weaker than ever. In retaliation to the mortar attacks by Hamas militants in southern Israel, in December 2008 the IDF launched a campaign against the Gaza Strip. Since early 2009 and in the wake of the end of the military operation, Gaza and its inhabitants have been almost completely isolated and the IDF allows only a minimal part of the international aid to enter the territory, which is kept under a *de facto* siege.

The new Netanyahu government elected in 2009 – probably the most right-wing cabinet since the creation of Israel – has been challenging the new US Obama administration, which has been trying to impose a freezing of settlement building in the West Bank as a pre-condition for resuming peace talks. The Israeli Prime Minister has maintained his stand and, in exchange, has instead promoted an 'economic plan' for restarting the peace process, without explicitly engaging in support of the creation of a Palestinian state.

The lack of substantial political decisions (by national and international stakeholders) and the failure of successive peace initiatives in producing changes in the dynamics and the structures of the conflict have induced a deep sense of frustration among Israeli and

⁵⁵ Besides the updated information on the wall (also called 'separation barrier' or 'fence') available on the UNOCHA website for the OPT, the excellent documentary shot in 2004 by S. Bitton, 'The Wall', gives a vivid image and analysis of the consequences of this project on the Palestinian population.

Palestinian social actors. Over the past ten years, the reproduction of armed conflict and violence has occurred in a situation of permanent asymmetric relationships between Israelis and Palestinians.

To sum up, one can say that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a multi-faceted one, with a main root cause, i.e. the control of land to build an independent state. While Israel obtained independence and international recognition, the Palestinians have been striving for a state for almost a century. Due to the time dimension of the conflict, its different phases and dynamics, the conflict has been defined in various ways, mainly in relation to the position of the actors involved (Israelis, Palestinians and international observers). In this sense, and besides its main root cause, the conflict has been attributed a strong identity dimension (Palestinian/Arab vs. Jewish), with a religious component (Muslim vs. Jewish) especially during the past two decades. Finally, and after 1967 in particular, the conflict has also been defined as a settler-colonial enterprise in a post-colonial world. In the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict mainly follows the logics of an occupying power and an occupied society's responses, with heavy international involvement experimenting with so far unsuccessful mediation strategies.

3 Peacebuilding efforts: an analysis of the main actors involved

Civil societies in both Israel and the West Bank have played a key historical role in shaping peacebuilding attitudes among their respective constituencies. International donors have attributed a special importance to civil society organisations during the 'Oslo years' in particular, and have invested important financial means to sustain, among others, 'people-to-people' (P2P) initiatives officially geared to contribute to a successful peace process. Beside the debate on the pertinence and validity to export a European historically-grounded concept, the notion of civil society has specificities in Palestine because of the absence of a state (the PA constitutes but one of the elements of statehood), and in Israel because of the peculiar historical function of the Zionist social and religious organisations and their role in the process of state-building. While we do not dwell here on the more academic debate of the issue but only on its policy-relevance, we will take into consideration how the policies of international donors have influenced the processes of definition of civil society in the two countries. We will also partly look at its effects on the local societies.

3.1 Civil society in Palestine

Palestine has a tradition of (Muslim, Christian and secular) voluntary charitable associations starting in the 19th century.⁵⁶ Popular committees (mainly in the form of labour unions, professional associations, student organisations, women's committees, etc.) rose in parallel to the PLO consolidation in the 1970s and the 1980s (Robinson 1997: 94-131). During the same period, a number of development NGOs and Islamic organisation were established to provide services in health and social care, agriculture, etc., in the OPT (Cuhadar & Hanafi 2010). During the first Intifada, many of these organisations were linked to different PLO political factions and were part of an institutional framework enabling the resistance against the occupation and raising awareness on the importance of self-reliance. Most organisational practices were shaped by a combination of nationalist and developmental goals (Abu Sada 2007). Until the late 1980s, most funding was coming from Arab donors; Western donors massively stepped in starting from the early 1990s (Hammami 2001, Challand 2009).

Several main changes occurred during the 1990s, in particular during the years following the Oslo agreements. This period witnessed an important transition – on the side of international

⁵⁶ The recent work of E. Schaublin (2009) on the West Bank Zakat Committees is shedding light on key social actors that have been side-lined by international donors in the aftermath of the 2006 Hamas victory in the legislative elections, and is contributing to a reconsideration of the role of these organisations accused of supporting terrorist activities.

organisations and donors – from solidarity forms of support to politically driven aid, aimed at bolstering the peace process (Brown 2003: 138-190). An increased dependence on external aid did not make Palestinian civil society organisations more autonomous (Challand 2009), and a new trend in ‘professionalisation’ often contributed to creating a hiatus between NGO leaders and their constituencies, resulting in a decrease in grassroots support (Hanafi & Tabar 2004). Pre-packaged programmes with pre-defined thematic concerns and sectors have characterised a large part of international aid to Palestine since the 1990s.

Last but not least, Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) – which became the most important kind of civil society organisations from the early 1990s onwards – have been confronted since 1994 with a ‘new government’ on the local scene, the PA. The PA has, on the one hand, been competing for external funding and popular support and, on the other, been co-opting PNGOs’ personnel for the sake of state institution-building (Hammami 2001, Brynen 2005). At the same time, the scene of the international actors operating in Palestine was tremendously reshaped: while relatively few international NGOs worked in the Occupied Territories prior to the Intifada, by 1993 they were estimated at 200 and the number of UN agencies jumped from 3 to almost 30.

In terms of figures, more than 60 per cent of the existing NGOs were established after 1994, 34 per cent of them between 1994 and 2000, and 27 per cent after 2000. The MAS survey of PNGOs⁵⁷ indicates that in 2007 their number totalled almost 1500, with an increase of more than 60 per cent compared to their number in 2000 (less than 930). The majority operates in the West Bank (68.5 per cent), the rest in the Gaza Strip (31.5 per cent). Almost 60 per cent are located in the urban areas, 30 per cent in the rural areas and just over 10 per cent in refugee camps. The highest ratio of citizens to organisations is registered in the district of Jerusalem. There were more than 10,000 paid employees in 2000, and almost 17,000 in 2007. The percentage of NGOs receiving external funding (from Western and Arab Donors) has risen from 39 per cent in 2000 to 47 per cent in 2007, while the total amount of revenue received by PNGOs during the same period has doubled (from US\$ 112.7 million to more than 223,6 million). Moreover, a certain tendency of fragmentation and a growing ‘clientelism’ has developed after Oslo within the Palestinian civil society. Since 2007, Palestinian civil society has fragmented further due to the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Although NGOs are not the exclusive actor on the civil society scene, they have become the favourite partner of international cooperation agencies; this has partially contributed to their consolidation, often at the expense of the old popular committees prevailing in the pre-Oslo context.

3.2 Civil society in Israel

The Israeli political system is officially a parliamentary democracy since the establishment of the Israeli state. However, the internalisation of democratic norms and values continues to be an issue at stake. Halperin and Bar-Tal (2006) have recently highlighted recurrent problems, such as institutional discrimination against minorities (Palestinian citizens of Israel and foreign labourers in particular), military involvement in government affairs, presence of influential anti-democratic ultra-religious groups, breaches of press freedom, and human rights violations. Actually, as E. Marteu (2009) has pointed out, 60 years after the establishment of the Israeli state, Israeli society looks fragmented, socio-economic tensions are on the rise, the crisis of trust in politics and politicians is culminating, and the Zionist myth of the ‘sabra’, the new idealistic Israeli citizen, is being increasingly contested (Bar-On 2008).

Some Israeli researchers, like O. Yiftachel (2006), explain the functioning of the political system as an ethnocracy, i.e. an ethno-class stratification and polarisation going well beyond the Palestinian (Israeli citizen) – Jew distinction. Over time, the divide among Jews of

⁵⁷ To be defined as an NGO, the organisation must have an officially recognised legal existence. It must be an independent, non-profit organisation entailing a level of voluntary participation; it must also be representative, and not inheritable or factional (MAS 2007: vii).

different origins and religious background (Ashkenazim, Sephardim, Russian, Ethiopian, secular and orthodox) has been growing and even become a major fault line within Israeli politics. Furthermore, the liberalisation policies since the 1980s and the failure of the Oslo process have fostered the development of interest-, identity-, and community-based organisations in the public sphere, mixing social and political repertoires of action. The potentially promising Israeli 'melting pot' is confronted with an endless quest for peace and security in a complex and unstable internal, regional and international environment that strongly influences its civil society.

The media have often contributed to portraying the Israeli civil society as broadly divided into a pro- and an anti-peace camp, the anti-settlers and the settlers, the secular and the religious orthodox, coinciding with political labels such as 'leftist' and 'rightist' associations. The situation is actually more complex than that. Many NGOs, interest groups, third-sector organisations, social and protest movements (all part of a wide range of associations composing Israeli civil society) have certainly a direct or an indirect stand towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but they often encompass different constituencies with multiple agendas and sometimes contradictory visions. The second Intifada has reconfigured Israeli civil society and the creation of the Kadima Party in 2005 is but one example of the blurring of 'left' and 'right' in the political system. Furthermore, the mushrooming of Arab civil society organisations in the 1990s has been adding to the complexity of Israeli civil society.

Historically, the differentiation between state and civil society is a rather recent phenomenon in Israel. Before 1948 and for almost three decades after the creation of Israel, the Jewish and Zionist organisations penetrated and 'managed' the life of most Jewish immigrants to Palestine in a wider 'welfarist' environment. The (economic) liberalisation process since the 1980s has certainly brought important waves of change inside Israeli society, but 'civil society and NGOs can be analysed as agents for change and democracy if they follow the state's values, but they can also be perceived as community groups challenging the Israeli identity' (Marteu 2009: 9).

Finally, if we examine the evolution of Israeli civil society in relation to the Arab/Palestinian local and regional conflict context, one can clearly see a pattern of emergence of peace initiatives during the mid-1970s, which developed during the Lebanon war and the first Intifada in the 1980s, and flourished in the 1990s. However, it has to be stressed that, over the years, the peace movements have been counting on a small demographic constituency of activists. These have often been depicted as politically naïve by right-wing social actors and accused of inciting Palestinian violence and being responsible for the latter's excessive demands during negotiations. Left-wing radicals, on their side, have also been criticising the peace movement for tacitly collaborating with the mainstream political establishment, creating a façade of opposition and serving as a fig leaf for the human rights violations in the OPT (Hermann 2009). Actually, logics of action and reaction among civil society members in Israel cannot be understood without taking into account the pervasive role of the Israeli army, which is one of the most powerful actors (if not 'the' most powerful) in the socialisation process of most Israeli citizens.

3.3 Civil society and peacebuilding activities during the last decade

The main objectives of the P2P activities, initiated during the Oslo years and externally funded, were to 'build bridges across the national divide' (Kaufmann et al., 2006:3) and to show that Palestinians and Israelis were equal partners that could live together peacefully. They were based on the assumption that the Oslo accords had solved the political hinderance of the occupation. Therefore, the two nations had to fight against stereotypes, societal beliefs and psychological barriers built up over time. By underlining the importance of the peacebuilding functions of the NGOs, the P2P activities were meant to launch a 'bottom-up' peace process: civil society organisations were supposed to influence the wider public (e.g. through peace education programmes and dialogue workshops), and thus reach out to the political decision-makers of both countries.

These projects were characterised by joint activities bringing together Israelis and Palestinians, promoting cooperation at a grassroots level in order to favour reconciliation, mutual understanding and coexistence. They took shape through nonviolent communication programmes, and cultural and educational activities (theatre, dance, etc.). However, starting from the late 1990s, these projects began to be boycotted by a number of Palestinian associations.

The effectiveness of the P2P programmes was put into question for several reasons. On the one side, they did not reach the society at large, as they mainly focused on the individual level. On the other side, they often stressed an apolitical nature in a heavily politicised context. These initiatives offered the false impression of a discussion amongst equals and thus hid the profound asymmetry of the setting between Israelis and Palestinians (Challand 2009). They were a reflection of the overall peace process.

The civil society peace camp in the West Bank has clearly undergone important changes after the end of the first Intifada, but an important issue to keep in mind while analysing the present situation is the negative legacy of the Oslo years for the Palestinian side. Actually, international donors have been directly and indirectly promoting a 'peace industry': several new Palestinian NGOs have been created in the 1990s thanks to external funding. Many of these organisations have served the interests of a new elite that is more and more detached from its social base and co-opted by external stakeholders for the sake of promoting peace at all costs and 'normalising' relations between Israelis and Palestinians (Hanafi & Tabar 2004). The P2P programmes became a 'business':⁵⁸ according to a 2002 report by the *Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information*, between 1993 and 2000 the Western governments and foundations spent between 20 and 25 million US-dollars on dialogue groups.⁵⁹

This strategy produced several rifts inside Palestinian society and, over the past ten years in particular, has also induced mistrust of grassroots organisations towards international NGOs and donors. 'Unfortunately, while liberal Israelis were busy sharing hummus with their new Palestinian friends, successive Likud and Labour governments accelerated the pace of land confiscation, settlement construction and economic closure of the Territories. This ultimately left many Palestinians to wonder if all the conversation wasn't a ruse to keep them occupied while Israel permanently secured its hold on their lands'.⁶⁰

Therefore, peacebuilding activities promoted by foreign donors in the West Bank are often perceived by Palestinian stakeholders as possible attempts to promote 'normalisation' with Israel and few local actors dare to publicly say, for example, that they engage in dialogue activities with Israeli organisations. In Israel, the years of the second Intifada have produced a general atmosphere of distrust against the former Palestinian 'partners for peace'. The last three Israeli governments (those led by Sharon, Olmert and Netanyahu respectively) have not really pushed for P2P initiatives. On the other side, the programmes favouring dialogue between Palestinian-Israeli and Israeli citizens are also received with moderate enthusiasm. Actually, the Israeli public debates of the recent years have placed the importance of the Jewish nature of the Israeli state centre-stage, and the fear that the demographic balance between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority could be altered is continuously kept alive.

While the civil society 'peace camp' in Israel has been prominent during the 1990s, it has progressively vanished during the second Intifada and has appeared moribund during the

⁵⁸ See S. Tamari, 2005/2006. 'Kissing Cousins: A Note on a Romantic Encounter', in *Palestine-Israel Journal*, Vol.12(4) et Vol.13(1). <http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=396>

⁵⁹ See M. Kalman, 2008. 'Few results seen from Mideast teen peace camps', in *Chronicle Foreign Service*, October 19. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/10/18/MNTK133IHH.DTL>

⁶⁰ See M. Levine, 2004. 'The Death of Arafat and the Myth of New Beginnings', in *Common Dreams*, November 13. <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1113-24.htm>


2008-09 'Cast Lead' military operation in Gaza. It survives thanks to peace organisations like *Ta'ayush*, or women's organisations, as well as through new actors such as *Anarchists against the Wall* established in 2003. These Israeli organisations concretely try to 'build bridges across the national divide', by visiting Palestinian villages and towns in the West Bank (e.g. during the olive picking season), in spite of the Israeli law forbidding it. They courageously try to foster dialogue and cooperation between societies and oppose the Israeli occupation through non-violent actions. Finally, in spite of the Palestinian critics, some P2P programmes are still being implemented. Currently, the most famous NGO offering such activities is *The Peres Center for Peace*, established in 1996 by Shimon Peres.

On the Palestinian side, in 2007 more than half of the registered PNGOs were engaged in charitable and relief work, which reflects the severe economic conditions faced by the Palestinian population, during the past ten years in particular. The number of relief programmes has tripled between 2000 and 2007. In general, the number of programmes offering services in humanitarian and social aid, advocacy and women's issues has significantly increased in comparison to other programmes (MAS 2007). It is also interesting to note that, notwithstanding the critics of the possible ambiguities of the roles of the NGOs, the Palestinian public opinion is not so negative. A recent 'Governance Survey' conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics shows that in the West Bank more than 10 per cent of the population shares or directly benefits from NGOs programmes. Overall, and although almost 30 per cent of the Palestinians interviewed during the 2008 poll believe that NGOs are not corruption-free, more than 97 per cent think that they play an effective role in society, 96 per cent that they build their programmes in accordance with community needs, and 98 per cent that marginalised groups are targeted by NGOs programmes (PCBS 2009: 64). These data can be positively interpreted as a sign of trust of the Palestinian public opinion towards their own civil society organisations, which can therefore be considered appropriate partners for peacebuilding strategies.

Figure 4 and 5, borrowed from Cuhadar and Hanafi (2009: 216), give an overall picture of the present activities of Israeli and Palestinian peace NGOs according to civil society peacebuilding functions. These data clearly show the prominence of three main kind of programmes (advocacy, in-group social cohesion and inter-group socialisation), which together constitute the bulk of activities for each camp, 75 and 85 per cent for Israel and Palestine respectively. These trends clearly target functions that civil society organisations can best develop and correspond well to the peacebuilding needs in the present phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, it is also clear that a lot of money has been spent in Palestine during the last decade as a way of covering the international community's political guilt towards the Palestinians and for trying to save a moribund peace process (Le More 2008). Evidence has also shown the lack of an automatically positive and linear relation between aid and improvement of the political situation, unless the roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are seriously addressed by the political decision-makers (Bocco & Mansouri 2008). The US, as the official political godfather of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the other members of the 'Quartet' basically continue to favour an incremental approach, where both Palestinians and Israeli are asked to make the necessary and painful concessions for reaching a final agreement and are simply accompanied in the process, i.e. each peace partner takes its own responsibility in keeping up with the engagements taken along the process without a mechanism that can sanction the infringements to the promises that have been made.


In this context, supporting civil society organisations can be a complementary strategy of the utmost importance since these can play, in principle, a decisive role at the domestic level by contributing to a modification of perceptions of the enemy and of the root causes of the conflict, while indirectly putting pressure on national political leaders as well. Civil society organisations can also create the necessary social 'bridges' sustaining grassroots partnerships with the other camp during higher level negotiations, and may have a positive influence on the latter. The successive stalemates in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process should not discourage investing in the peacebuilding programmes targeting civil society organisations.

Figure 4 – Israeli peace NGO's focus of activities




(Source: Cuhadar and Hanafi 2010:216)

Figure 5 – Palestinian peace NGOs' focus of activities



(Source: Cuhadar and Hanafi 2010:216)

Annex 2: Map of the West Bank (ARIJ 2008)



Source:

http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/Geopolitical%20West%20Bank%20Atrash.jpg

Annex 3: Map of Israel (United Nations 2004)



Source: www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/israel.pdf

Annex 4: CPS portfolio in Israel/Palestine

EED

EED has been the first German organisation implementing activities in Israel/Palestine under CPS. EED initiated its first project in Palestine in November 1999, with the International Center of Bethlehem (ICB) – Dar Annadwa, a current DED partner. The CPS expert (a music teacher) was offering a cultural programme, teaching music, Palestinian folk dance, creating a chorus, etc., with the aim of reducing violence and promoting a peaceful socialisation. The second project begun in 2001 and has always been implemented in Bethlehem, with the partner *Guidance and Training Center for the Child and Family* (GTC). The CPS expert was offering training on mental education to local therapists of the center and helping children, youths and adult victims of trauma. Both projects have been closed and the EED does not work anymore in Israel/Palestine under the CPS programme. In fact, the EED estimated that the pressure was too high for CPS experts working at that time with local partner organisations of EED in Palestine.

forumZFD

The *forumZFD* initiated its activity in Israel/Palestine with a programme of inter-group social cohesion, and the support of the *Willy Brandt Center* (WBC) located in Abu Tor (Jerusalem, on the Green Line). The geographical location of the WBC enables encounters between Israeli, Palestinians from East Jerusalem or with permits from the Israeli army, and German youth ‘multipliers’. The WBC was officially established in 2003, as a result of previous partnerships (since 1996) between the German SPD Young Socialists organisation (Jusos), the Palestinian Fatah Youth organisation (*Shabibat Fatah*), the Israeli Avodah (the Youth organisation of the Labour Party) and the Meretz Party Youth organisation (partner since 2000). All organisations are members of IUSY, the International Union of Socialist Youth. The *forumZFD* project with the WBC has been the only one active during the first part of the Second Intifada.

The current *forumZFD* projects mainly focus on the inter-group social cohesion function. The *forumZFD* supports two different projects in order to build new peace alliances and prepare the future young socio-political elites. The projects target, on the one hand, decision-makers in Shabibat Fatah, Young Labour leadership and Young Meretz and, on the other hand, HaNoar HaOved VeHalomed (the Israeli Federation of Working and Studying Youth), The HaShomer HaTzair (The Youth Guard), Mahanot Haolim, the Arab Youth Movement and Independence Youth Union. In the initial project phase, every youth party/social movement organisation works individually and develops seminars and workshops about creative thinking, social political values and non-violent communication as well as historical narratives. In a second phase, encounters between Israeli and Palestinian representatives are facilitated by the CPS experts, in Jerusalem and/or in Germany. The CPS experts also organise ‘Red Lounges’ for Israeli, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian musicians, film makers, authors and other artists. These Red Lounges also deal with conflicts or social political difficulties of international relevance other than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, e.g. the human rights violations in Darfur. Political cafés and critical art exhibitions illustrating the life of the Palestinians under occupation and advocating for their rights or for those of marginalised communities in Israel, also addressing taboos of both societies such as internal discrimination, racism, corruption and social-economic shortcomings, are complementary activities towards the same objectives.

After 2004, *forumZFD* also operated in the rural (semi-arid) region close to Abu-Dis (east of East-Jerusalem), in association with the German *Federation for Social Defence* (BSV) and through a project which supported until 2008 a committee of the Jahalin Bedouin tribe menaced by land expropriation. The BSV was already cooperating with *Rabbis For Human*

Rights (RHR), a rabbinic organisation established in 1988 during the First Intifada with the aim of preventing human rights violations in Israel and the OPT, and promoting social and economic justice. The organisation, headed by Rabbi Arik Ascherman, participates to date in nonviolent direct action and solidarity demonstrations with disadvantaged communities in Israel, and is involved in ecumenical dialogue and advocates for the victims of human rights abuses. Another partner of the same project was also the *Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee* (PARC)⁶¹, a Palestinian NGO founded in 1983. Historically, this NGO is an off-spring of Palestinian leftist organisations, notably the Communist Party, and has been involved in rural development programmes.

In 2004, *forumZFD* initiated an internal project concerning the Regional Coordination Middle East of *forumZFD*. Because of the regional dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 'Regional Coordination Middle East of *forumZFD*' project wishes to coordinate and integrate the CPS projects, to develop strategies and new initiatives, to organise meetings and workshops for the CPS experts and for the local partner organisations. On the regional level, the CPS expert in charge of the project is currently committed to establishing coordination with Lebanon, where *forumZFD* would like to work with Palestinian refugees in Beirut.

After 2007-2008, *forumZFD* launched several new projects. To date, the three *forumZFD* member organisations, the WBC (2 projects), the *Evangelical Association for the Support of Conscientious Objectors* (EAK, 1 project) and PaxChristi (1 project) work in four different projects with local civil society organisations. It also supports a project with the Israeli NGO *SOS Violence – The Israeli Center for Violence Studies*, co-headed by Yony Choona and Georg Rössler, and the NGO *Madaa-Silwan Community Center*,⁶² headed by Mr Jawwad Siyam. *SOS Violence* was established in 2004 and is located in West-Jerusalem; the activities of the two NGOs include a cooperation with the German Academy for Violence Prevention (*Gewalt Akademie Villigst*) and separate trainings and workshop with members of the two NGOs, which aim at the Israeli and the Arab-Israeli school community. *Madaa* is a local grassroots organisation working with Palestinian children and youths, founded in 2007 and located in the Wadi Hilwah neighbourhood of Silwan, an Arab area of East Jerusalem where more than eighty structures are in danger of demolition by the Israeli authorities.⁶³ *Madaa* has also established an information centre aimed at raising awareness about the political situation threatening the livelihood of the Palestinian dwellers of the neighbourhood. Originally created as an inter-group social cohesion project, the *forumZFD* programme with *SOS Violence (The Israeli Center for Violence Studies)* and *Madaa* became an in-group socialisation project because of the increasingly tense political situation and the refusal of the Palestinian partner to cooperate with an Israeli NGO. Presently, the former partners are implementing their activities separately. In order to highlight nonviolent alternatives, initially *forumZFD* attempted to develop network and specialist advisory structures of peace educational experts among the two NGOs. The *forumZFD* project supported *SOS Violence* in their initiatives and work for students, teachers and parents on nonviolent methods for conflict resolution and nonviolent communication to solve the tensions in Israeli schools. *Madaa* tries to build a strong community, to face up to the violence of the Israeli occupation and its impact on the local Palestinian society. In reaction to the lack of services (provided neither by the Israeli municipality of Jerusalem nor by the PA) *Madaa* offers trainings on nonviolence for teenagers and provides educational and recreational activities to the Silwan children. These activities include music, art, folkloric dance, theatre and English classes; moreover, a library for children, with books on non-violence, has been established.

⁶¹ For more information about PARC see: Abu-Sada C., 2007.

⁶² The NGO is officially registered in Israel under the name of 'The Association for the Dialogue and Education for the Prevention of Violence in the Society', because the Israeli government has yet not accepted the name suggested by the *Madaa* director.

⁶³ OCHA-OPT, 2009. *Map of Al-Bustan (Silwan/East Jerusalem)*, February.
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_map_silwan_al_bustan_2009_02.pdf

Through *PaxChristi*, *forumZFD* implements a trilateral project on religion and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) targeting students of theology (Christian), Sharia students (Muslim) and Jewish religious students. The project is implemented in cooperation with three local NGOs. On the one hand, the Palestinian NGOs *Human Rights and Democracy Media Center* – *Shams*, established in 2003 in Ramallah and offering trainings for Sharia students on human rights, democracy and international law from a religious perspective; and with *The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center* – *Wi'am*, founded in 1995 by Dr Zoughbi Zoughbi in Bethlehem as a grassroots organisation aimed at building a democratic society. The general activities of *Wi'am* focus on trainings and workshops on conflict resolution and related topics, but in particular on traditional '*sulha*'⁶⁴ approaches, a Palestinian device for solving intra- and inter-group conflicts. *Wi'am* targets Christians to discuss issues on international humanitarian law and religion. The Israeli partners have been changing: currently, they are Beit Midrash from Tel Aviv and the *Association for Civil Rights in Israel* (ACRI). The inter-group social cohesion project in partnership with *Pax Christi* aims at building bridges between civil societies by offering separated trainings on international humanitarian law, interfaith leadership dialogue and non-violent conflict resolution methods to Palestinian Muslim students attending the Faculty of Shari'ah and Law (*Kulliyat Al-Shari'ah*) from all over the West Bank (through *Shams*), to Christian students (through *Wi'am*) and to Israelis or Jews from Beit Midrash of Tel Aviv (who are attending 'Judaism / Human Rights in War Time' classes). In the future, the targeted groups will probably meet together in Talitha Kumi (Beit Jala) for joint workshops.

Besides the projects based in East and West Jerusalem, *forumZFD* is the only CPS executing agency supporting a programme in Israel, notably the Arab-Israeli environmental justice organisation *Bustan* headed by Mr Raed Al-Mickawy. Founded in 1999, but only officially established as a non-profit organisation in 2006, the NGO operates in the Negev Desert. *forumZFD* is supporting the NGO involved in the *forumZFD* project through conceptualisation and facilitation of the workshops. Limited funding is also secured by *forumZFD* for these activities. Al-Bustan works for sustainable resource allocation, to help (newly recognised) Bedouin village dwellers and to foster relationships between Bedouin and Jewish (settler) communities, mostly in the south of Israel. The *forumZFD* project with Al-Bustan focuses on inter-group social cohesion and in-group socialisation within the Israel context. It is too early to make any assessment about this initiative, although it seems to be extremely interesting and promising because of the originality of the targeted groups: minorities or different ethnic groups within Israel (i.e. Bedouins, and more recently also Russian migrants through the NGO *Moreshteinu Our Heritage – the Charter for Democracy*). *Moreshteinu* (Russian Speaking Israelis) together with the Israeli-Arab organisation *Arbat* (alumni organisation of Arab students from Universities of the former Soviet Union or other Russian speaking areas), organises encounters mainly in the north of Israel with participants of both organisations from all parts of Israel. Currently, a syllabus on 'Image, identity and stereotypes' is being developed; the syllabus will be circulated and courses will be built around the topic in several art schools.

KURVE Wustrow

KURVE Wustrow's first projects with the Palestinian NGO *Middle East Non-violence and Democracy* (MEND),⁶⁵ headed by Lucy Nusseibeh, and the Palestinian NGO *Union of Palestinian Womens's Committees* (UPWC), established in 1965, were delayed by the escalation of armed conflict in the spring of 2002 and actually begun during the summer.

⁶⁴ An Arabic word literally meaning 'reconciliation, peace'. A recent study has also detailed the use of *sulha* as a cultural peacemaking tool for managing and resolving environmental conflicts among Palestinians in Israel (see Tarabeih et al., 2009).

⁶⁵ The NGO is actually registered in three countries: in Israel as an '*amuta*' (association) since 1998, in the West Bank with the PA Ministry of Interior since 2004, and in the United Kingdom since 2005.

MEND's main office is located in Beit Hanina (East Jerusalem), but it has eight regional centres for active non-violence and eleven community centres/libraries throughout the main cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The NGO actively promotes non-violence and democracy among Palestinian youths and adults, mainly through trainings offered to schools or women's organisations.

From 2003 to 2006, KURVE Wustrow supported a project with the NGO *The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center – Wi'am* (which is also a partner of *forumZFD*) with a project focused on the town of Bethlehem.

To date, the CPS executing agency works with the *General Union of Palestinian Teachers* (GUPT), created in 1969 in Jordan and currently headed by Jamil Shahada. GUPT helps the Palestinian teachers attain better education and better employment conditions, and aims as well at raising the educational level of Palestinian governmental schools. The current project of KURVE Wustrow focuses on facilitation. GUPT, with the help of the CPS experts and translators, works at reducing the level of violence among the students of public schools, between the students and their teachers, and within the Palestinian society at large. It does so by offering trainings of 50 hours on peer-mediation to teachers and social counsellors, who in turn train the students. The project with KURVE Wustrow covers the districts of Nablus, Jericho and Bethlehem. Before the partnership agreement with KURVE Wustrow, GUPT was implementing a similar project (a pilot project) in different governmental schools with the support of the Norwegian Peace Alliance (NorPeace).

DED

The DED's activities in the Palestinian Territories focus on four different issue areas: water/wastewater/solid waste; sustainable economic development; development of the civil society; and the civil peace service. In May 2000, the DED already conducted a feasibility study for the identification of CPS projects in the area. The beginning of the Second Intifada (late September 2000) and, later on, the Iraq War (spring 2003) prevented the CPS executing agency to start implementation until June 2003. Since 2004, the DED office is based in the 'German House for Development Cooperation' (Ramallah) with the GTZ and KfW offices.

The DED launched its programme with three Palestinian NGOs: the *Jerusalem Center for Women* (JCW), the *Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange* (PACE), and the *Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation* (CCRR).

The JCW, located in East Jerusalem, was established in 1994, in parallel to its West Jerusalem sister organisation *Bat Shalom*. Together, JCW and *Bat Shalom* carried out joint Palestinian-Israeli programmes through the Jerusalem Link. Presently headed by Rula Salameh, the JWC offers trainings to young women activists, students and professionals on methods of conflict resolution and on women and human rights in order to increase women's empowerment. It also monitors and advocates for women's rights and against human rights violations in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, with the help of a legal unit (e.g. it provides legal assistance to families at risk of being expelled and/or having their homes demolished).

PACE, located in Ramallah and headed by Dr Adel Yahya, seeks to protect and promote Palestinian cultural heritage through education (delivering lectures, publishing pieces of research), through exchange programmes and cultural tours (especially for internationals).

CCRR, an NGO registered with the PA since 2000, founded and headed by Noah Salameh, works on strengthening democratic relations inside the Palestinian community, and changing the approach to conflict resolution by promoting values of reconciliation and forgiveness. The NGO, a DED partner, offers training programmes on conflict transformation, communication and non-violence to students, religious leaders, journalists and civil society at large.

The current project of CCRR supported by the DED focuses on inter-group social cohesion, promoting cross-border peace alliances and interfaith dialogue. The project objectives are usually pursued in a first phase through 'mono-religious' meetings inside groups of Palestinian Muslim sheikhs, of Christian priests and of Jewish rabbis with recognised local constituencies. In a second phase, smaller groups of representatives from mono-religious meetings join together in multi-religious workshops, which take place abroad (e.g. Turkey or Jordan).

The DED is also implementing a further inter-group social cohesion project. Since 2008, in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Ramallah), but without a regular local partner, the DED is engaged in the coordination of a dialogue project between Israeli, Palestinian and German social and professional actors (scholars, journalists and young academics). It focuses on historical narratives as a contribution to the civil conflict transformation in Israel and Palestine. During the field mission, the evaluation team was present during activities of an on-going project, facilitated, on the Palestinian side, by Prof. Sami Adwan, the co-director of Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME) and, on the Israeli side, by Dr Maya Kahanoff of the Swiss Centre for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution of the Hebrew University.

To date, the DED also works with a Health & Wellness Centre located in Bethlehem, *Dar Al-Kalima*. The latter belongs to the *Diyar Consortium*, an umbrella organisation which also includes the International Center of Bethlehem (Dar Annadwa), and Dar Al-Kalima College. *Dar Al-Kalima*, operational since 2003, aims at promoting individual and community health through the establishment of facilities and community programmes. It offers health care services (in the fields of audiology, endocrinology, nutrition, and psychotherapy) and wellness services (swimming, sauna, and fitness classes). The DED is supporting the psycho-social unit of *Dar Al-Kalima*, thereby focusing on service delivery functions in order to empower and restore self-confidence in the Palestinian community. The CPS expert is training young couples, women and elderly groups in psycho-social techniques, relaxation, meditation and stress management, helping them to face the consequences of violence and life under occupation. The elderly people assisted through the project are distributed in ten villages and three refugee camps; they often live alone because of the high level of youth migration from the region. The young couples belong to the Lutheran Church and can also attend educational lectures and workshops on health and social issues. What is more, with the help of the DED, *Dar Al-Kalima* will soon initiate a number psycho-social projects in Zababde (Nablus district).

Starting from March 2010, the DED is also supporting an educational, cultural and leisure center, the *Ghirass Cultural Centre* in Bethlehem. The centre is affiliated to the Bethlehem Arab Society for Rehabilitation and caters to school-age children and young people in greater Bethlehem. Its activities target disadvantaged children and young people, coming from refugee camps and rural areas. It offers special education for children with learning difficulties, a library, art education (music, handicrafts, folkloric dances) and summer camps. Concerning the service delivery function, the DED intends to implement a new project with the *Ghirass Cultural Centre*; the focus is on training teachers, social workers and educators in psycho-social support to children with learning difficulties.

WFD

The WFD has strong ties with Palestine since the 1960's, when it started supporting women grassroots organisations in the villages of Kafr Na'meh and Bil'in (Ramallah district). Its activities under the CPS umbrella began in 2003, with the implementation of a project in Hebron in association with the NGO *Library on Wheels for Nonviolence and Peace* (LOWNP) until 2008.

LOWNP was founded in 1986 by the Palestinian Centre for the Study of Nonviolence and became independent in 1994, headed by Nafez Assailly. Created with the aim of providing Palestinian children living in isolated villages in the West Bank with books and educational material, notably about non-violence, it seeks to empower the Palestinian society through trainings on non-violence and peaceful means. LOWNP is based in Hebron, where around 400 to 450 ultra-orthodox settlers live among the Palestinian inhabitants.⁶⁶ The NGO advocates for the non-violence and peace traditions in Islam, which can be used within the Palestinian society (e. g. family, school), but also against the Israeli occupation in order to achieve social change and justice. Accordingly, LOWNP organises training programmes for children and youths in leadership, non-violent communication, and non-violent conflict resolution.

In 2009, two new programmes were launched by WFD: the first focuses on the marginalised area of the Hebron district, supporting a new theatre established by former children of the First Intifada. Created in 2007, *Yes Theatre* aims at having a positive impact on Palestinian children and young people's lives, by supporting the development of a community of confident citizens aware of their local heritage and culture. In pursuit of this goal, they offer theatre and drama projects in cooperation with the PA Ministry of Education. The project with *Yes Theatre* focuses on in-group socialisation. Working at the grassroots and local levels, the organisation based in Hebron promotes theatre as a means for social change. Their drama projects target the southern neighbourhoods of the town, including the surrounding villages and refugee camps. The artistic team offers workshops on theatre pedagogy and on the 'Theatre of the Oppressed', with pieces inspired from the Palestinian daily life, social and cultural topics. The activities target children, youths, adults and teachers of public school of the Hebron district, who have the opportunity to express their opinions, feelings and traumas by using drama as a tool for self-confidence and peacebuilding. The WFD also supports the networking with national/international theatres and Palestinian/foreign nationals theatre trainers. The opening of a specialised library on theatre and the publication of a newsletter is part of the project.

The second project is being implemented in partnership with *Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development*. *Al-Mada* is a centre for music therapy established in March 2009 and located in Ramallah, but with activities in the Jericho district as well. The WFD entirely supported the establishment of the centre, which offers trainings to teachers and social counsellors of UNRWA schools in four Palestinian refugee camps, in order to target Palestinian children and young people who have been victims of violence. The music therapy helps in counteracting the negative effects of fear and feelings of anxiety by developing self-confidence mechanisms.

AGEH

AGEH started its activities in Israel/Palestine under the umbrella of the CPS Group in 2005. It mainly works with Christian educational organisations and partners that already show a certain degree of institutionalisation, having often already been present in Israel/Palestine for a long time.

AGEH has been supporting the *Bethlehem University* (BU) with projects addressed to the Palestinian students enrolled in its faculties and to the lecturers.⁶⁷ Founded in 1973 in the Lasallian tradition, the BU has been the first university established in the West Bank, with important financial support from the Vatican. The AGEH project within Bethlehem University

⁶⁶ See OCHA-OPT, 2008. *Unprotected: Israeli settler violence and related activity against Palestinians civilians and their property*, Occupied Palestinian territory Special Focus, December, East-Jerusalem: OCHA. http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_settler_vilonce_special_focus_2008_12_18.pdf

⁶⁷ Israeli students do not enrol in Bethlehem University. Actually, since the beginning of the second Intifada, Israeli citizens are not allowed to visit the occupied territories or to reside there.

mainly focuses on advocacy and in-group socialisation. The original objective of the project, which aimed to organise meetings and workshops on non-violent conflict transformation, could not be achieved because of the Palestinian partners' reluctance towards peace studies in general and particularly when taught by foreign nationals. Therefore, the CPS expert found another entry point through teaching intercultural dialogue with an interdisciplinary approach in the educational curricula. A course on advocacy about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been initiated in the English Department, for students destined to work as journalists or as employees in NGOs. A theatre course focusing on gender issues within the Palestinian society has been developed, as well as an annual workshop on sexuality education. AGEH also organises interdisciplinary videoconferences for intercultural dialogue with the Social Science Department of the Cologne University for Applied Sciences and with the Catholic University of Eichstätt; it has motivated artistic reflection regarding the Israeli occupation (e.g. photography exhibition on the Wall) and accompanied students in interdisciplinary research on intercultural and contested symbolic focal points of Islamic, Jewish and Christian identity (e.g. Rachel's Tomb⁶⁸).

Since 2006, AGEH has also contracted a partnership agreement with the *German Association of the Holy Land* (DVHL).⁶⁹ Located in Jerusalem, the DVHL was established in 1895, following a merger of the Holy Sepulchre Association and the Palestine Association of the German Catholics. Promoter of German Catholic interests in Palestine and aiming at maintaining the Christian institutions in the Holy Land, nowadays it offers social and pastoral services, supports other Christian local initiatives, promotes interreligious dialogue and reconciliation, and organises pilgrimages for German groups. The DVHL manages the Schmidt's Girls College in Jerusalem as well, the Beit Emmaus nursing home in Qubeybeh, a meeting place in Tabgha and the Dormition Abbey of the Benedictine community in Jerusalem. Currently, the AGEH coordinator is also holding a part-time (30 per cent) position as advisor for conflict and peace-related activities of DVHL. Focusing on advocacy, AGEH supports DVHL on three issues: safeguarding conflict sensitivity of DVHL's volunteer programme; influencing the social commitment and the political stand of the German volunteers upon their return to Europe; and developing a concept for reshaping DVHL's own pilgrimages to the Holy Land in a conflict-sensitive way, by raising the German pilgrims' awareness about the daily constraints faced by the Palestinian civilian population and about the Christian faith's obligation to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, AGEH plans to complete a database of Christian peace-related organisations in Palestine and Israel in order to foster their cooperation.

AGEH is also focusing on Service Delivery, supporting *The Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education's* section covering the rural Biddu's area (North-West Jerusalem) in the West Bank. The *Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education* was founded in 1984 by Farid Abu Gosh in Jerusalem. AGEH is supporting the non-profit NGO since 2006. With the purpose of improving the quality of life, combating domestic violence, empowering and supporting the development of the children and their families within marginalised Palestinian communities in Gaza, the West Bank and Israel, the *Trust of Programs* offers trainings to the mothers on early childhood, health education, women's rights and programs to children with learning difficulties. Concerning the projects, the CPS executing agency has been involved in the 'Combating Domestic Violence' programme, aimed at preventing early marriage practices and countering family abuse, by training paraprofessionals (who educate women on their rights in the community and spread awareness of domestic violence) and by offering the women the opportunity to meet and share their common difficulties.

⁶⁸ See Haaretz Editorial, 2010. 'Not combat heritage' in *Haaretz*, February 26. <http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1152258.html>

⁶⁹ DVHL is housing the regional office of AGEH, which does not have a main office in Israel/Palestine.

Lastly, in 2008 AGEH started a partnership with the German Evangelical Lutheran school *Talitha Kumi (Berliner Missionswerk)*. Established in Jerusalem in 1851 as a girls school, the institution was relocated in Beit Jala in 1951. Among its structures, there is a kindergarten, a primary school and a college offering a Palestinian and/or a German curriculum. AGEH supports a peer mediation project with trainings targeting the teachers (who, in turn, will become trainers), students and pupils of the Talitha Kumi School. The workshops are focusing on non-violent communication for violence prevention at school. A 'mediation room' has been established in order to resolve the conflicts. However, in spite of the outlined activities and the agreement between AGEH and Talitha Kumi, the CPS expert has been introduced by the school director as a psychologist, and not as a 'peace worker'. Therefore, the CPS expert is currently less involved in peace education, as it had been agreed, and is asked to cooperate with the psychological counselling section of the school.

Annex 5: Evaluation questions for the Israel/Palestine case study

Relevance

- Are CPS activities in line with the countries' peacebuilding needs?
- Do CPS activities adapt to changing conflict contexts?
- How relevant are CPS activities for gender issues?
- How relevant is the sending of German CPS experts?

Effectiveness and impact along the seven civil society peacebuilding functions

- What are the theories of change of the involved actors to achieve their goals? Are theories of change translated into clear objectives, results and process designs?
- Under which conditions are results being achieved?
- What are the differences in effectiveness with regard to different partners?
- In which 'phases of conflict' are activities more effective?
- How is the gender dimension addressed by the programme?
- How effective are the CPS activities in incorporating issues of conflict sensitivity?
- What are the main changes within the CPS partner organisations that are attributed to the CPS experts' presence?

Efficiency of CPS procedures and structures, and of CPS as an instrument

- How are CPS projects initiated, planned and implemented?
- What are the main strengths and weaknesses of the CPS's administration, procedure and monitoring instruments? How could they be strengthened?
- CPS expert posting: the main reasons why staff recruitment for CPS continues to be challenging?
- Are the administrative costs and other transaction costs reasonable? Are there alternatives that would lead to the same results with lower costs (e.g. using local experts or short-term consultants)?
- How does CPS align with the subsidiary principle (to favour local experts and structures)?

Sustainability

- What are experiences of sustainability after the CPS expert leaves the projects and activities?
- How are issues of sustainability being integrated into the planning of CPS activities from the beginning of the project?
- How does the CPS ensure that local expertise is not sidelined or downplayed by European experts (CPS experts)?
- What kind of change in structures and institutions for sustainable peacebuilding have been enhanced or created with the support of the CPS?

Coherence / Coordination / Complementarity (3Cs)

- What kind of coordination mechanisms exist?
- Are CPS activities in a country coherent and complementary with other civil society (support) activities in the country; each other; BMZ country strategies and priorities; other programmes/projects of CPS executing agencies in the country?
- To what extent is the effectiveness of the CPS interventions influenced by other fields of policy?

Annex 6: Interview guide for the Israel/Palestine case study

The General Interview Guide presented below and used by the evaluation team has been slightly adapted according to the interviewees (CPS experts, coordinators, local partner's staff, beneficiaries, experts). A number of partner interviews were conducted in Arabic and in the absence of the CPS experts.

Phase I: Welcome

- Presentation of the mission members and interview partners

Phase II: Introduction

- Introduction to the evaluation mission background and objectives
- Interviewees' expectations from the evaluation
- Explanation of the objectives of the interview

Phase III:

1) Political situation

- Information on how interviewees perceive the political situation, both in Israel/Palestine and in their area of work. Assessment of the main issues, of the current context and future trends

2) Partner organisations

- Organisational structure and activities: can you give us a briefing on your organisation?
- What is the biography of the organisation's director? What is the history of the organisation? What are the main activity lines in peacebuilding?
- How many staff members? What is the average annual funding?
- When did the CPS support begin? How?
- What are the other supports and donors?

3) Main activity lines projects

- What are the main activity lines of the local partner organisations?
- When have activities been started and why? How did CPS executing agencies integrate the past activities of the local partner organisations?
- What peacebuilding needs do these activities address? What do you expect to change and how? What are the strategy's peculiarities of your CPS executing agency? What are the theories of change and the intervention logic of the executing agency?
- What about activities in the fields of protection and monitoring, with spoilers (e.g. refugees or settlers)?
- Information about beneficiaries (selection of participants, reasons of Israeli-Palestinian mixed presence, what constitutes normalisation, etc.)
- What are the main achievements and challenges?
- How is the gender issue dealt with?
- How is conflict sensitivity dealt with?
- What other organisations are working in the same field of peacebuilding? How are you linked?
- How did your activities change in the different phases of the conflict? In which phases of the conflict are project activities most effective?
- What are the monitoring tools that are being used? What about learning experience?

4) CPS issues

- What is the role of the CPS experts within the organisation? Is an external support needed? What type of support? What do CPS experts do and what have previous CPS experts done? What are (have been) their main contributions? What are the challenges / alternatives to CPS expert placement? What kind of skills should the CPS experts have? How has their recruitment been done? What is the relationship between the CPS experts and the staff?
- Which type of funding do you get? What type of administrative and financial procedures do you face? What is the calendar of application for projects?
- What is the role of CPS coordinators?
- How are experiences and learning capitalised on?
- What type of cooperation and exchange is established within the CPS Group, with other (German) peacebuilding organisations, with the German Development Cooperation and with other international NGOs and international organisations?

Phase IV: End of interview

- Greeting and thanking
- Information on follow-up
- Open questions

Annex 7: Mission schedule

Saturday, 23 January 2010

2.30 pm Arrival in Tel Aviv
7.00 pm Dinner with Dr Cédric PARIZOT (CRFJ)

Sunday, 24 January 24 2010

9.00 am Meeting at PACE (The Palestinian Association for Cultural Exchange), Ramallah.
10.00 am Tour to Jericho and interview with Dr Adel YAHIA (Director of PACE)
-5.00 pm
7.00 pm Dinner with Mr. Lex TAKKENBERG (UNRWA)

Monday, 25 January 25 2010

10.00 am Meeting with CPS coordinators (in DVHL office, Jerusalem)
2.00 pm Visit to MAS (Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute – Ramallah)
3.00-5.00 pm Meeting in Ramallah with Hazem AL-NAMLA of Al-Beisan Centre

Tuesday, 26 January 2010

9.00 am Meeting with Bernd MUSSINGHOFF (in DVHL office, Jerusalem; AGEH partner; CPS expert: Michael VAN LAY)
1.00–4.30 pm Briefing Session with CPS experts (in DED/German House offices, Ramallah): 3 DED, 2 KURVE Wustrow and 2 AGEH
5.00-7.00 pm Meeting with Mr. Mustafa KHAWAJAH (PCBS, Ramallah)

Wednesday, 27 January 2010

9.30am Briefing Session with CPS experts (in the *forumZFD* office, Jerusalem): 9
-1.00 pm *forumZFD*, 3 DED, 2 AGEH, 2 WFD
5.00 pm Meeting with Dr Elisabeth MARTEU (CRFJ, Jerusalem)
7.30 pm Dinner with Mr. Henrik MEYER (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jerusalem).

Thursday, 28 January 2010

9.30 am–12.00 Presentations of CPS organisations' strategies (in Paulus-Haus, Jerusalem), Meeting with 3 Coordinators (AGEH, WFD and DED).
1.00–5.00 pm *forumZFD* Project presentations (in Talitha Kumi School, Beit Jala) with 9 *forumZFD* CPS experts, local staff and local partners.
7.30 pm Dinner with Prof. Reema HAMMAMI (Women's Studies Centre, Bir Zeit University) and Mr. Alex POLLOCK (UNRWA)

Friday, 29 January 2010

9.00 am Meeting with Mrs. Susanne DRAKE on *forumZFD* strategies
10.30 am Workshop 'Historical Dialogue' (DED project) at YMCA Hotel, West-Jerusalem
-5.00 pm
7.30 pm Dinner in Jerusalem with Ms. Annika WANDSCHER (Head of Development Cooperation at the German Representative Office in Ramallah)

Saturday, 30 January 2010

10.00 am
-1.00 pm Project visit on 'psychosocial support' (DED project), Ghirass Center (Bethlehem)
Project visit on 'psychosocial support' (DED project), Dar al Kalima (Bethlehem)
3.30–7.00 pm Project 'Prevention of violence' (*forumZFD* Project), Madaa – Silwan

Community Centre (Jerusalem)
20.00 pm Dinner with Prof. Ismayyl NASHEF

Sunday, 31 January 2010

10.00 am
–1.00 pm Project 'Interfaith Dialogue' (DED project), Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (CCRR, Bethlehem)
2.30 pm Visit to Rabbis for Human Rights Office (West-Jerusalem)
4.00–8.00 pm Project 'Cooperation on non-formal education with youth organisations' (*forumZFD* project), Willy Brandt Center (Jerusalem)
Red Lounge event 'Open Mic #2'

Monday, 1 February 2010

8.00–10.30 am Project 'Non-violent conflict response' (AGEH project), Bethlehem University (BU)
11.00 am
–1.00 pm Project 'Peace education' (AGEH project), Talitha Kumi School (Beit Jala)
1.00 pm Lunch in Talitha Kumi and interview with CPS expert S. SCHAARSCHMIDT
2.00 pm Meeting with WFD Coordinator to travel to Hebron
3.00–5.30 pm Project 'Youth Theater Project' (WFD project), Yes-Theater for Communication among Youth (Hebron)

Tuesday, 2 February 2010

9.00 am Project 'Violence in families' (AGEH project), The Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education
2.00 pm Project 'Learn-By-Play' (AGEH project), The Trust of Programs for Early Childhood, Family and Community Education

Wednesday, 3 February 2010

9.30 am–12.30 Project 'Peer mediation' (KURVE Wustrow project), General Union of Palestinian Teachers (GUPT, Ramallah)
2.00–4.00 pm Project 'Music Therapy Center' (WFD project), Al-Mada for Arts-Based Community Development
7.00 pm Dinner with Dr Sylvie MANSOUR and Prof. Kamil MANSOUR

Thursday, 4 February 2010

9 am–4.30 pm Debriefing workshop for Projects with Palestinian partners in Talitha Kumi (Beit Jala)

Friday, 5 February 2010

11.00 am Meeting with Mr. Luca GERVASONI (Co-director of NoVA – Program for Active Nonviolence and Peace Building)
2.00–5.00 pm Meeting with CPS expert Suzanne LAUTERBACH (*forumZFD*)
7.00 pm Dinner with Ms. Wassila MANSOURI

Saturday, 6 February 2010

12.00 Jerusalem-Tel Aviv
4.00 pm Flight to Geneva

Annex 8: List of respondents

Name	Position
ABDO SABAH Maha	Counsellor at The Trust of Programs
ABDUL-HADI Reem	Al-Mada board member and volunteering acting manager
ABU AMSHA Jihad	Vice-Principal of the school Talitha Kumi
ABU DAGGA Seba	Local advisor of <i>forumZFD</i> /Pax Christi
ABU-DAYYEH Hyam	Local advisor of <i>forumZFD</i> /Pax Christi
Dr ADWAN Sami	Director of PRIME
ALEXANDER Michael	Local advisor of <i>forumZFD</i> /Pax Christi
BECKER Carola	DED coordinator
BERMANN-HARMS Christina	CPS expert <i>forumZFD</i> /Pax Christi
CHOONA Yony	Executive Director of SOS Violence – The Israeli Center for Violence Studies
Dr DÜRR Georg	Principal of the school Talitha Kumi
DRAKE Susanne,	<i>forumZFD</i> coordinator
EIMERMACHER Ulrike	CPS expert AGEH
EMAYA Elias	Teacher at the school Talitha Kumi
EMAYA Sana'	Counselling teacher at the school Talitha Kumi
GAZAWNEH Wafa	Social worker at The Trust of Programs
GEITH Jonas	CPS expert DED
GERVASONI Luca	Co-director of NoVA – Program for Active Nonviolence and Peace Building
GÖLLER Kerstin	CPS expert <i>forumZFD</i> /EAK
GRÄSLE Raana	CPS expert <i>forumZFD</i> /WBZ
HAMDAN Leyla	Social worker at The Trust of Programs
HAMMAMI Reema	Professor of Sociology at the Women's Studies Program of Bir Zeit University, expert on Palestinian NGOs
HASAN Mona	Project manager and English teacher at Madaa – Silwan Community Center
AL-HAWASHLAH Mohammed	Qasr Al-Sir's representative in Abu Basma Regional Council,
HOFFMANN Almut	CPS expert KURVE Wustrow
Prof. HUSARY Nelly	Faculty of Health Sciences – BU
Dr ILZGHAYYER Ibtisam	Director of Ghirass Centre
'ISSA Mohammed	Manager of Yes-Theater

Name	Position
JABER Mai	Office of the Dean of Students – BU
Dr KAHANOFF Maya	Swiss Centre for Conflict Research, Management and Resolution, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
KAMMERER Cheb	CPS expert <i>forumZFD/WBZ</i>
Prof. Dr KATTAN Jeanne	English Department at BU
KHADER Rami	Manager of Dar Al-Kalima
KHAWAJAH Mustafa	Head statistician, PCBS (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics), manager of the 'Governance Surveys' for Palestine
KHOURY Rana	Vice-President for Development and Outreach of Al-Diyar Consortium
KOHMANN Martina	CPS expert DED
LAUTERBACH Suzanna	CPS expert <i>forumZFD</i>
LENZ Britta	CPS expert <i>forumZFD/WBZ</i>
MACAROV Yehonatan	Strategic Development Director of Al-Bustan
MAHMUD Abdallah	Project manager of Shams – Human Rights and Democracy Center
MANSOUR Kamil	Jurist and political scientist emeritus professor and former dean of the Faculty of Law at Bir Zeit University
MANSOUR Raida	Project manager of Dar Al-Kalima
MANSOUR Sylvie	Psychologist, special advisor to the Palestinian Ministry of Health (Ramallah) for the Mental Health Programs
MANSOURI Wassila	Political scientist, former UNOCHA junior officer, presently working for Médecins du Monde
MARTEU Elisabeth	Political sociologist, researcher at the CRFJ (Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem), expert on Israeli and Arab-Israeli social movements and NGOs
MASHIL Saana	Social worker at The Trust of Programs
MEYER Henrik	Political scientist, programme manager at Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jerusalem
AL-MICKAWY Ra'ed	Director of Al-Bustan
MUSSINGHOFF Bernd	Head of DVHL
AL-NAMLA Hazem	Al-Beisan Centre
NASHEF Ismayyl	Anthropologist, professor at Ben Gurion University (Beer Sheva), expert on social movements in Israel and Palestinian political prisoners.
Prof. NASSAR Mai	English Department – BU

Name	Position
NASSER Nabella	Educator at The Trust of Programs
Rabbi NOVIS-DEUTCH Avi	Project coordinator of RHR
ÖZKUTLU Sevtap	CPS expert WFD
PARIZOT Cédric	Anthropologist, researcher at the CRFJ (Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem), expert on the Negev Bedouin society and Arab Israeli's NGOs
POLLOCK Alex	Economist, UNRWA director at the Jerusalem Headquarters, Head of the Micro-credit and Micro-finance Program
QADDUMI Hisham	Project manager of Shams – Human Rights and Democracy Center
RADWAN Sanaa	Project coordinator of CCRR
REINKE Melanie	CPS expert DED
Dr SALAMEH Noah	director of CCRR
SAMI Nadim	Coordinator of GUPT
SCHAARSCHMIDT Sophie	CPS expert AGEH
SCHIESZL Ulrike	CPS expert WFD
SEIFU Fetlework	CPS expert KURVE Wustrow
SHAHADA Jamil	General Secretary of GUPT
SHYOUKHI Ra'ed	Drama teacher and media spokesperson at Yes-Theater
SIYAM Jawwad	Director of Madaa – Silwan Community Center
SMITH Robert FSC, PhD	Vice-President for Academic Affairs at BU
STOLL Jochen	CPS expert <i>forumZFD/PaxChristi</i>
STUMPP Katja	CPS expert <i>forumZFD/EAK</i>
TAKKENBERG Lex	Jurist, UNRWA director at Jerusalem Headquarters, expert on protection and monitoring
TIEMANN Ingeborg	CPS expert AGEH
TITI Mohammed	Drama teacher and planning and development responsible at Yes Theater
TURJMAN Odeh	Technical Director and Musician at Al-Mada
Dr YAHIA Adel	Director of PACE
Prof. Dr YAMANI Hala'	Faculty of Education – BU
VAN ECK Fabienne	Music teacher at Madaa – Silwan Community Center
VAN LAY Michael	AGEH coordinator
VON GEHLEN Konstanze	CPS expert DED
WANDSCHER Annika	Head of Development Cooperation at the German

Name	Position
	Representative Office in Ramallah
ZAHDA Ihab	Drama teacher and public relations responsible at Yes-Theater
ZOUGHBI Zoughbi	Director of Wi'am – The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Centre

Moreover, interviews with beneficiaries were conducted with

- young representatives of Shabibat Fatah, Youth Meretz, Arab Youth Movement and HaNoar HaOved Vehalomed;
- with professors and students at BU;
- with teachers and students of the school Talitha Kumi;
- with women of the Biddu region, and
- with participants of DED dialogue groups.