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The Darfur Refugees' Plight

Repatriation Challenges for Post-Doha Sudan

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The Darfur crisis has left behind a profound legacy of displacement, with some 300,000 refugees camped on the Chadian side of the border and about 2 million displaced internally within Darfur. Despite a reduction in armed hostilities and violent casualties since 2006, as well as a peace agreement signed at Doha in 2011, limited signs of voluntary repatriation are visible from eastern Chad; where refugees are seemingly willing, but not ready, to return. Further to the Doha peace settlement, they require genuine peace to be in place on the ground, marked by visible changes in the security landscape of Sudan. In particular, they ask for the prosecution of war criminals, disarmament of local militias, adequate compensation for human and physical losses, local reconstruction, and the departure of populations who have settled on their lands in the aftermath of mass atrocities. The marked demographic changes having taken place in Darfur over the past decade, and a 'peace' that fails to fully address impunity and be widely accepted, make the fulfillment of these requests seem far-fetched at present. While voluntary return is being discussed nationally and regionally, refugees underscore their profound need for justice and personal safety by remaining in the camps. When and how conditions for safe and dignified return will be met is something they are stillcarefullyconsidering.

ANNA PRAZ

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1. Introduction



1 A decade after the inception of the 2003-2004 Darfur crisis, and despite signed peace declarations and efforts deployed to facilitate voluntary return, eastern Chad still hosts about 300,000 refugees from Darfur. These refugees are reluctant to return to the homelands from which they were violently uprooted. The reasons for this reluctance are largely overlooked, as is the case for much of what has been happening inside Darfur since 2008. Since then, the global focus has shifted to the North/South divide and to other crises, and information channels inside Sudan have been restrained as key humanitarian actors have been expelled while those who remain strive to report objectively. Meanwhile, Darfur's refugees and IDPs are struggling to survive and be remembered. They remain victims of what some have called "one the world's worst humanitarian crisis", whose intractability has caused increasing international fatigue. With access to

Darfur difficult at the present time, the east Chadian border zones offer a *temporary* opportunity to glimpse a partial picture of the pressure and struggles suffered by the displaced of Darfur.

2 The aim of this study is to identify the refugees' perspective of the Sudan-led repatriation agenda in the broader context of peace-making in Sudan and its recent rapprochement with Chad. It is the fruit of two field missions to eastern Chad: the first enabled observation of the context of their protracted displacement; the second provided an opportunity to collect a survey sample and to engage directly with Darfurian refugees, humanitarian workers and the military-political apparatus in the country.

3 Structurally, the ePaper firstly presents the context of the current humanitarian crisis in Sudan/Chad, and then locates the research question in the relevant return-migration and peace-building literature, expanding on the links between peace-building and repatriation, and on the micro-level determinants involved in the refugees' decisions to return. Subsequently, the empirical investigation discusses the circumstances in which the current displacement occurred, and describes field areas and methods of enquiry. The findings are then presented, analyzed and tested against the assumptions and hypotheses gleaned from the literature. The ePaper concludes with a review of the research framework used, and some implications for global policy.

1.1 Case choice and approach used

4 The incentive to pursue this research track stems from an opportunity provided by CARE International in Chad to offer firsthand support to the humanitarian operations in three Darfur refugee camps in northeastern Chad. The camp experience made me increasingly aware of the gravity and protracted nature of the displacement situation of Darfurians, and of the hopeless prospects of refugees who could not envision any short-term solutions to their plight despite a general claim that peace had been "settled" in Darfur. In the fall of 2011, I identified the Darfur issue as being pivotal in helping to answer the broader question of "how do mass atrocities end?"[1] Do mass atrocities end when conflict-deaths dwindle and peace agreements are signed? How do the inter-generational impacts of conflict, such as prolonged victimization, persistence of impunity and protracted displacement fit into this notion of ending? Against this background, I hypothesized that *voluntary* return could be an important benchmark in determining that peace had been attained. In reality, there is often a significant disconnect between negotiated peace, security on the ground and the perception of both by the returnee. However, as a starting point for exploring these factors, I posed the following macro-research question:

5 *"Why, in the aftermath of a formal peace settlement, is voluntary repatriation to Darfur limited or non-existent?"*

6 On the basis of the opportunity/cost theory that views refugees as rational actors, I assumed that their decision to return would balance a number of push and pull factors associated with leaving the camps. Building upon observations from my first field mission, I limited this analysis to three main factors: economic ties, social ties and the perception of physical security on the ground. I posited that, in order to understand refugees' final decisions about return, these factors should be examined comparatively, looking at their situation in the camps and in their previous homeland (section 3.3). In the field, these components were measured mostly through qualitative observations and

data gathering. The methods used include structured questionnaires distributed to individual refugees, focus groups guided by open-ended questions and semi-structured individual interviews with refugees, humanitarian workers and socio-political actors (section 4.3).

7 As further developed in section 4.1, the research tries to apply scientific methods, with assumptions being deduced from the existing literature on return-migration and used as filters for analysis in the empirical investigation. The approach to the study is *critical,* i.e. interested in understanding the phenomenon in its social and political context, and focuses on the micro-level – the *refugees* as individual decision-makers – whilst trying to take into account the political, social and economic structures in which their decisions take place. It also relies on the assumption that phenomena such as the meaning of "peace", "identity" and "home" are interpreted subjectively and are continuously *constructed* by social actors, in this case the refugees themselves (section 6.1).

8 Being conducted in a humanitarian setting, this study was confronted with all the challenges associated with research on forced migration and its ethics. Firstly, the need to obtain the formal consent of the respondents and to preserve the confidentiality of the information, which was often highly politically sensitive (Jacobsen and Landau 2003). In the case study, some of the refugees interviewed requested that their names be withheld. Secondly, "the problem of reaction to, and re-assessing the initial categorization of, an outsider" (Goodhand 2000) was partially mitigated through pre-interview presentations of the research, transparent communication, building relationships with the camp authorities and socializing in order to build mutual trust. Information was generally "triangulated" (Olsen 2004) in the context of focus groups and multiple interviews. Finally, in the effort to meet another essential imperative, the research question and analysis hope to shed light on the impasse that refugees and humanitarian workers are currently struggling with. Assuming that this exercise has not added to the pain suffered by those interviewed, it is hoped that their testimonies will draw greater attention to this longstanding and almost forgotten plight.

1.2 Definitions

9 Recurrent terms used in this ePaper merit an initial definition. The first to be defined is the term "refugee", conceptually characterized in art. 1 of the 1951 refugee Convention as an individual "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted (...), being outside the country of his former habitual residence", and unable or unwilling to return to it in reason of such fear (...)." The 1989 OAU convention goes beyond the criterion of persecution, adding that the term refugee "shall apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country" (OAU 1989, art. 1(2))[2]. In the context of this study, I will label as "refugees" those who received *refugee status* from the UNHCR, while "persons in refugee-like situations" represent other individuals displaced across the borders who do not possess a refugee card. Similarly, the term "internally displaced persons" (IDPs) will be used to indicate "persons who have been forced (...) to leave or to flee their homes (...) to avoid effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights and natural or man-made disasters (...) and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border" as defined by the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. As per the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR is charged

with a core protection function towards these populations to ensure basic human rights, provide assistance, minimize the threat of violence, prevent *refoulement* and seek durable solutions (UNHCR 2001) [3]. "Voluntary return" or "repatriation" will be used interchangeably to indicate one such durable solution. Although no universal definition presently exists, these terms describe a durable solution by which refugees re-avail themselves of the nationality and protection of their country of origin - be the return spontaneous, facilitated or promoted. In order to be promoted, the UNHCR needs to assess that sufficient changes having taken place in the country of origin which enable a return in "safety and dignity", free from the fear of persecution that caused flight (UNHCR 1996, 6-8). Decisions to return should be made without any pressure, and are exercised by the refugees on the basis of their right to freely leave and freely return to their own country (UN 1948, art. 13(2)).[4] The voluntary nature of the decision has to entail a free choice from within the country of asylum and should imply "an absence of any physical, psychological, or material pressure" (UNHCR 1996, 10). Other durable solutions; including local integration and resettlement, will also be touched on briefly. The former involves the acquisition of the nationality and rights of the refugee's country of asylum, while the latter involves the relocation of the refugee to a third country through assistance and rights acquisition.

10 One of the keys to understanding the Darfur crisis is the concept of "protracted refugee situation" (PRS). This may be described as a situation in which refugees are trapped for several years in alien territories "in a longstanding and intractable state of limbo" and "without any immediate prospect or durable solution to their plight" (Crisp 2003, 1). These situations usually stem from a political impasse, protracted social conflict or inaction in the country of origin and/or of asylum. They are fraught with all the risks and deprivations that come with protracted displacement, such as insecure locations, harsh climatic conditions, limited rights and freedoms and often the un-fulfillment of social, economic and psychological needs. Numerically, PRSs are defined as situations in which "at least 25,000 refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country".[5] The next section will describe how the Darfur refugee situation in eastern Chad can fit this definition based on the broader political and social context that triggered the crisis. Finally, another concept that requires mention is " peace-building", which, according to the UN includes "all support actions which strengthen and solidify peace to avoid relapse into conflict" (UN Agenda for Peace 1992, 21). Although not central to the analysis of the case, it will be used to interpret some of its findings.

11 Since repatriation cannot be disconnected from sustainable peace and peace processes, a review of the theory will expand on these linkages in support of the research question posed.

NOTES

1. De Waal, *"How Mass Atrocities End",* seminar held by the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University, Medford, November 18 2011.

2. Armed conflict, violence, persecution and fear are central to the definition of being "displaced", and are the main triggers of a displaced person's entitlement to receive international protection. At the end of 2010 the UNHCR counted 43.7 million displaced persons fleeing conflict of which about 15.4 million were refugees and 25.7 million IDPs; 1.3 million "people of concern" did not fall into either of the previous categories (UNHCR 2011, 5).

3. The Principle of *Non-Refoulement*, enshrined in art. 33 of the Convention, reflects the commitment of the contracting parties not to "expel or return *(refouler)* a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." This principle basically prohibits involuntary repatriation by the host country, with the exception of refugees who have reasonable grounds to be regarded "as a danger to the security of that country" (Art. 33).

4. This right is enshrined in numerous legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 12(4)), the International Convention on Racial Discrimination (art. 5d(ii)), and other regional treaties. It is also a customary right which stems from the domestic law of states (Phuong 2005).

5. At the end of 2010, it was estimated that 7.2 million refugees were caught up in 29 PRSs around the world (UNHCR 2011, 15).

2. Setting the Crisis in Context

1 Darfur is the westernmost province of Sudan, covering about 250,000 square meters, with a population of about 6 million people (UN Sudan 2010). Since 1994 it has been sub-divided into three administrative units bordering Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic respectively.

2 Since 2003, this province has been the stage for one of the worst manifestations of inter-tribal conflict and civil war, arising from multiple protracted disputes that came to a head at the beginning of the decade (see box 1). The conflict pits farmers against the nomadic herder populations in a competition for land and resources which are rendered increasingly scarce by population growth and desertification. The disruption of the system of reciprocity that had previously existed between these populations reinforced ethnic polarization between those living a nomadic life-style, or so called "Arabs", and the "non-Arabs", who are generally farmers and landowners (De Waal 2004). These divisions were capitalized on by the government of Sudan, in its determination to resolve the rebellion initiated in 2003 by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), fighting for the end of political and economic marginalization in Darfur. These groups, backed by Zaghawa, Massalit and Fur peoples – the historical landowners in the region – were counter-attacked by the government and by their local rivals, then named broadly "Janjaweed"[6], whom Khartoum had reportedly armed.

3 The counter insurgency, started in April 2003, reportedly brutalized the civilian communities of Darfur. About 2000 villages and settlements were set ablaze by aerial attacks and ground assaults (UNSC 2006). During this process, most forms of livelihood strategy were wiped out, assets stripped, local infrastructure pulled down, while rape, torture, and starvation came into use as means of warfare (Young 2005). Attacks on villages continued and reached their peak in February 2004 by which time the number of people killed in the attacks was estimated to be at least 92,000 (Petersen and Tullin 2005, 14–15). To this figure must be added deaths caused by conflict-induced displacement, diseases and starvation, estimated at almost 300,000 people in 2008 (Lancet 2010). The international community, unable to stop the atrocities at their peak, deployed an African Union Mission to Darfur before replacing it with a hybrid peacekeeping mission in 2008, UNAMID, mandated to protect civilians. In 2005, criminal activities were referred to the ICC, which reconfirmed the perpetration of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against the peoples of Darfur.

Box 1: Retracing the roots of the Darfur conflict

The causes of the conflict in Darfur are manifold, interwoven and complex. The narrative of the "tribal" or "ethnic conflict" needs to be understood in the context of several instances of social breakdown that occurred at the beginning of the 2000s. The first can be described as the historical discontent of Darfur's populations towards the policies of the central government, which has adopted exploitative policies since the epochs of Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian domination in the 18th century. Colonial Sudan was characterized by exploitation of manpower, natural resources and goods, both in Darfur and South Sudan (Quach 2009, 9). Over time, centrist power dynamics assumed an ethnic character. The Egyptians institutionalized the practice of the "Jallaba" - Arab procurers sent from Khartoum to trade in slaves from Darfur. Although slavery was officially abolished under the British-Egyptian condominium, Arabism and Islam became the symbols of a center of power in opposition to the "culturally black" periphery which could access power and wealth only "by their free will to alienate themselves from their people to serve the center loyally" (Hashim 2006, 12). Such divisions continued after independence in 1956, when a long civil war started between the "Arab north" and the "African south", which intensified the politicization of Darfur, and the discrimination of Khartoum towards its peripheral regions (De Waal 2007, 3).

The second split relates to the livelihood strategies of the main ethnic groups inhabiting the province. Darfur is inhabited by numerous tribes with a predominance of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa, traditionally sedentary farmers. A minority of the population, originally Arab, relies on pastoralism or temporary cultivation as main subsistence strategies. The relations between these tribes were traditionally collaborative, based on the collective administration of land according to the native customary land system. The customary system implied that plots had to be left open to feed grazing livestock belonging to pastoralist nomads (Olsson 2010, 15). At the time when Darfur was an independent sultanate, the system of the hakuras or dars emerged. The hakuras were land rights the sultanate could grant to holy men preaching Islam, or to other important persons. Over time, these rights were transformed into administrative akuras which the Sultan could distribute not only to single individuals but to entire tribes (8). Soon the Fur, the Massalit and the Zaghawa became the main landowners in Darfur. Such arrangements were kept in place during the colonial period, but began to be challenged after Sudan's independence, a period marked by droughts, famines, declining annual rainfall, increase in the local population, and scarcity of land resources (Bush 1988, 6). In this period, cattle-raising nomads from Chad and northern Sudan started crowding into Darfur in search of sedentary settlements. Inter-tribal clashes and competition over resources disrupted the harmony of the system. Tensions increased with the gradual abolition of the local customary system by the central government. In 1970, the Government of Sudan adopted the Unregistered Land Act (ULA), stating that all unregistered land would be considered government property. In most of Darfur's villages, where traditional authorities managed land rights, registration rarely occurred. This stance of the government was perceived once again as a sign of favoritism towards the Arab minority, and a sign of discrimination against the other tribes (UN Security Council 2005, 60).

Thirdly, these local dynamics were significantly influenced by the regional context.

The Eritrean, Chadian, and Sudanese governments respectively empowered armed local proxy groups to either keep control over the region, or destabilize the Khartoum regime. In this respect, the role of Islam, and in particular Khartoum's support for jihadist movements in the horn of Africa, played a central role in fueling international support to Darfur's resistance (Flint 2007, 149-150). Regional support and the protracted grievances existing in the province help explaining the rise of two rebel movements in Darfur: the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These movements began to organize themselves in the mid-90s when Darfur's population was already disenchanted with Islamist leaders striving to promote equality among all Muslims in Sudan, in opposition to tribal discrimination (Heleta 2008, 4).

2.1 Trends in security and displacement

4 The conflict had disastrous consequences in terms of displacement. At the time of this project, over 2.2 million people had been displaced in over 60 settlements inside Darfur, and around 290.000 refugees were located in 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad (IDMC 2012; UNHCR 2012). However, statistics underestimate the number of affected people that find themselves outside the camps. Darfur became one of the largest humanitarian operations in the world. The number of affected people inside Darfur, as well as the number of refugees in Chad have risen steadily since 2004 (Fig. 1, 2) which is at odds with the number of conflict-related deaths inside Darfur. Although it can be very misleading to use combatant fatalities as indicators – as they often do not reflect the number of security incidents or civilian deaths – it is clear that the levels of displacement are a reflection of other factors beyond the count of fatalities.

Fig. 1 No. of affected civilians and humanitatian workers in six periodes of the crisis



Source: Guha Sapir, Degomme (2011, 295). The period sub-division is: Period 1=February to August, 2003; Period 2=September, 2003, to March, 2004; Period 3=April to December, 2004; Period 4=January, 2005, to June, 2006; Period 5=July, 2006, to September, 2007; and Period 6=October, 2007, to December, 2008.

Fig. 2. No. of Refugees in Chad (in hundreds) and Battle-DeathsDarfur (2003-2010)



Source: Uppsala Conflict Dataset Program (2010).

5 In the meantime, it has become difficult to assess the reality of “peace” or “conflict” inside Darfur. While the UN special envoy described it as “a low-intensity conflict, with a high risk of escalation”, US President Bush used the expression “genocide in slow motion” (UN Reuters 2009). Regrettably, the reality of Darfur has often been manipulated for political purposes in the absence of accurate and complete data about human security on the ground. This is also the result of a decline in the number and reliability of statistics coming out of Darfur after the 2009 ICC arrest warrants against perpetrators of mass atrocities were issued; these were followed by the expulsion of 13 aid agencies and over 40% of Darfur's humanitarian staff (ODI 2009). Those who remained, including peacekeepers, have been silenced, often pressured to report subjectively, or denied access to conflict zones. In this context of the “Sudanization” of Darfur, the early recovery agenda is being pushed forward as humanitarian aid diminishes in the aftermath of the Doha talks.

2.2 From DPA to DDPD and the role of displacement

6 Several attempts have been made by the international community to gather the conflicting parties and find a political solution to the conflict that is spreading insecurity and humanitarian concerns across the region. Diplomatic talks began as early as 2004 with the Ceasefire Declaration of Ndjamena, continuing into 2006 with the Abuja talks between the major rebel groups – JEM and SLA/M (by then fragmented into two factions) – and the government of Khartoum, under the auspices of the African Union. In 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by the government of Sudan and one faction of the rebel movement – the SLA, led by Minni Minawi. During the Abuja Talks, it appears that key elements of Darfur's civil society were excluded from the negotiations, which help explain the lack of consensus and the retaliation on the ground following the signing of the agreement.[7] The Doha talks, held in Qatar in 2010-2011, tried to address this gap. The international community, spearheaded by the UN and the AU, tried to bring together refugees, IDP leaders and traditional authorities in Darfur to build consensus among the victims. However, key rebel groups such as JEM and SLA/M boycotted the talks, and only the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) – a splinter coalition – signed the final document. The Doha Declaration for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), agreed upon in July 2011, fleshed out provisions for wealth and power sharing, compensation, reconciliation and the return of IDPs and refugees.

7 In the implementation phase of this peace agreement, however, it became apparent that the provisions on voluntary return were at the top of the agenda. LJM leader, Tijani Sese, stated: “The success of the Doha agreement depends on the closure of the displacement camps voluntarily“ (Sudan Tribune 2011); the government-led Humanitarian Aid Commission presented a 2011–2016 strategy for return and reintegration of the displaced of Darfur (OCHA 2011, 5). Internal IDP conferences and meetings in Chad have already been taking place to spur on the process. However, for the moment, the results remain poor. While thousands of South Sudanese have been heading to their country after independence, post-Doha voluntary returns to Darfur have been limited, especially among refugees. Up to June 2012, no case of return has been officially registered by the UNHCR inside the camps in eastern Chad (section 5).

NOTES

6. Expression adopted by Darfur populations to refer to Arab militia men, literally meaning “evil horsemen”.

7. The volatility of actors, the lack of trust in the peace process, unfavorable regional dynamics and diplomatic deadlines were some of the other factors which prevented the DPA from creating security on the ground and finding a political solution to the conflict (Nathan, 2007:245).

3. A Review of the Literature and Research

3.1 The repatriation-peace nexus

1 There is an increasing amount of literature on the relationship between repatriation and sustainable peace, and the role of displacement in peace building. There is, however, no unified view on the matter. Displacement is traditionally viewed as contingent on situations of conflict and insecurity. However, protracted refugee situations (PRSs) that last for years without a clear solution pose a growing challenge in this area. There is a growing conviction that unresolved refugee issues are detrimental to regional peace dynamics. Milner (2009) holds that PRSs in fragile states not only lead refugee populations into poverty, frustration and idleness, but also convert them into direct and indirect threats to the country of origin and to the host states, potentially becoming spoilers of the peace process and socio-economic burdens to host communities. Also to be borne in mind is that the displaced are often active participants in the conflict in addition to being its victims.[8] Addressing their needs and grievances of refugee populations is essential when it comes to addressing the root causes of conflict itself and minimizing the risk of its recurrence (Brookings 2007). Last but not least, it should be noted that in some countries the scale of displacement is such that it is simply unrealistic to achieve peace without addressing the needs of the displaced, which can be different from those of other conflict-affected civilians (11). Displaced populations represent huge social and economic capital that can positively contribute to the reconstruction of the country of origin and to the legitimization of new political constituencies (RSG 2007).

2 Over time, these elements have reinforced the importance of mainstreaming the resolution of displacement in peace processes and agreements. However, whether mass voluntary repatriation is a determinant of peace or vice versa is much debated. Adelman (1999) distinguishes between soft and hard positions on the matter. What he labels as a *Soft 1* position theorizes that the resolution of refugee issues – be it though repatriation or integration – is a manifestation of peace. *Soft 2* positions reflect the belief that repatriation is an important signal that peace has been restored.

Table 1: The peace-repatriation nexus

Soft 1: Solved refugee issue ←→ peace	**Soft 2:** Successful repatriation → peace
Hard 1: Peace ←→ Successful repatriation	**Hard 2:** Peace → Successful repatriation

3 A *hard 1* position concludes that peace and repatriation are inter-related processes, whereby "ending displacement is not possible without peace, and addressing displacement is essential to building peace" (Brookings 2007, 15). Finally, a *hard 2* position maintains that peace is unachievable without successful repatriation and reintegration. Table 1 summarizes these views. Contemporary post-conflict peace-building philosophies seem to espouse the hard 1 view, in that repatriation is often considered part of the process of peace consolidation. Hanggi (2005, 12) considers repatriation and integration of refugees and IDPs to be an integral part of the socio-economic dimension of building peace, along with the security dimension (disarmament, security sector reforms, arms controls, etc.) and the political dimension (rehabilitation of politico-administrative authorities, reconciliation, transitional justice and rule of law). The linear sequencing of these components is not established. However, it is acknowledged that premature repatriation occurring before conditions of safety and sustainability are in place may exacerbate conflict or even create renewed refugee movements (Millner 1009, 26).

4 Conversely, the human rights approach tends to endorse softer views, with the conviction that the re-establishment of human security, in all its social, economic, psychological and legal dimensions, is the enabling condition for sustainable return (UNHCR 1997; Phuong 2005; Kaun 2008; etc.). Not only should the displaced not be forced to return to places where they would face persecution, torture or any inhuman or degrading treatment (UN Convention Against Torture 1987, art. 3), they should also have the right to return voluntarily under conditions of "safety and dignity" (Pinheiro Principles 2005, art. 10; CIREFCA Declaration 1989, art. 3). Practically, this entails the restoration of human security in material, legal and physical dimensions (Crisp 1999). [9] In reality, UNHCR policies give a broader scope to voluntary return. In the UNHCR conclusions 18 (1980) and 40 (1985) the agency and governments set four conditions for participating in voluntary return programs: (1) Fundamental change of circumstances; (2) Voluntary nature of the decision; (3) Return in safety and dignity; (4) Tripartite agreements between host country, country of origin and the UNHCR. The first option is one in which repatriation can be "mandated", as the causes for refugee movements have been removed. Peace is therefore a pre-cursor to repatriation. In the others, particularly option (4), repatriation can be promoted under the *formal* guarantee that safety will be provided in the country of origin. The loosely defined imperative to preserve the safety and dignity of the returnees often poses protection challenges as repatriation programs are not necessarily carried out following changes of a fundamental and enduring nature in the country of origin (Bradley 2007).

3.2 Repatriation as a micro-level decision

5 There is a certain lack of consensus on how to theorize repatriation in the available literature. Some authors regard it as a subset of migration – or its reverse process – and therefore screen it through different levels of analysis according to a given degree of human agency in relation to a social or systemic structure (Wright 1995, 771). As such, repatriation can be seen (1) as a determination of refugees' decisions, based on opportunity/cost factors, individual perceptions and available information (individualist model); (2) as a passive response to economic, social and political processes which are beyond the refugee's control (structuralist model); or (3) as the result of a complex system of interacting elements moving to achieve a state of equilibrium (scientific and systemic model) (Bakewell 1996). This research will embrace the individualist approach (1), based on the micro-level decisions of the refugees and their individual perspectives of exile.

3.2.1 The individual notion of "home"

6 The first concept with which voluntary repatriation is usually associated is the one of "returning home". Home is not a neutral term, but one that depicts a unique space of attachment, safety, familiarity and common understanding. The fact that returning "home" is usually accepted as a natural human instinct makes repatriation a first-line solution (Harrel Bond 1995), as it should re-establish the familiarity and attachment to a place which refugees have been deprived of during exile. Kibreab (1999) supports the territorial definition of a people and affirms that "the identity people gain from a particular place is an indispensable instrument to a socially and economically fulfilling life" (385). The country of origin, he argues, is not only a space of life but is also a space of rights and represents home in its function of giver and protector of citizenship. Long (2008) corroborates this view and considers repatriation to be a political process of collective national identities moving back into a space to reform "a new social compact" with accompanying rights and entitlements (23–26). The territorial view is also upheld by Waltzer (1980), Coles (1985) and Connolly (1991), who maintain that the identity of a people is embedded in the historical notion of the nation-state, characterized by communities, territory and government. The country of origin can also be a space of collective memory and personal attachment before displacement. In a study on reintegration in Angola, Kaun (2007) found that individuals' motivation to reintegrate depended, amongst other things, on historical, socio-cultural and personal affiliations preceding exile (Kaun 2008, 4–5).

7 On the other side of the spectrum, a number of scholars break down the traditional symmetries between territory, government and the place that individuals call "home". Warner (1994) challenges the assumption that an individual is associated with a homogenous and static group, and supports Marx's claim that refugees rely on networks in a social world that is not physically grounded (Marx 1990, 194). He also opposes the idea that refugee return could ever be equated with the return to a *status quo ante.* Firstly, nostalgia for a place might be colored by certain memories of the place of return that can make it feel alien and feared. Secondly, as much as refugees adjust and re-adjust their relationships in exile, so do the communities that did not cross the border. Laura Hammond, in her ethnographic account of Ethiopian refugees returning from Sudan,

demonstrates how the changes that have occurred during exile made "home" less of a geographical space and more of one "in which community, identity and political and cultural membership intersect" (Hammond 2008, 10). In her account, refugees returning to Ada Bai, Ethiopia, went through the laborious process of re-transforming the place they had left behind into one that had meaning for them. Ada Bai could become home again only after strenuous efforts by the returnees to *implant* themselves again though social and economic practices, and by reforming a new community with fresh social functions and power relationships.

8 Using a similar approach, Lisa Malkki contests the phenomenon of "uprootedness" usually attached to being a refugee. In *Purity and Exile* she describes how Hutu refugees in Tanzania were continually engaged in constructing and de-constructing the historical processes by which the nation and people of Burundi were formed. Distinguishing between urban refugees and camp refugees, she describes the categories these communities had established in order to comprehend their ambiguous state of exile "in the national order of things".[10] Urban refugees saw it as an opportunity to build a new life away from violence and persecution. Camp refugees, on the other hand, perceived it as an essential step in the journey towards the "Hutu nation"; this was a time during which they could "purify" themselves and their lineage before the time of Hutu domination in Burundi (Malkki 1995).

9 Tania Ghanem, instead, uses a psychosocial approach to examine every stage of exile and of return. She insists on the uniqueness of every individual migration experience, which is perceived differently depending on life history, personal past and the macro-social environment in which each refugee operates (Ghanem 2003, 20–22). The homeland can become a foreign land even before flight when: neighbors suddenly become enemies; spiritual places become places of death, and, protective institutions become perpetrators of violence However, once in the host country, the notion of belonging is shaped by a dialectical relationship between the new settlement and the former homeland. As Zetter explains, the conditions of exile in which refugees find themselves "mediates between the past and the future", and exile is a time in which refugees try to maintain continuity with their past. This link is made, either by recreating symbols of the past in the host country, or by investing in the hope of a future return (Zetter 1999, 10).[11] Nevertheless, after protracted exile, the country of origin might or might not meet the expectations refugees have of the place they left. In many cases, returning home is not just "the end of a myth" but "the beginning of homelessness" (Ghanem 1999, 35–39).

3.2.2 The decision to stay or to return

10 The temporary nature of refugee status does not imply that repatriation coincides with a much desired return home. Indeed, a number of protracted refugee situations testify to this reality. In some cases, refugees may view their exile as permanent from the outset as a consequence of their lack of identification with their place of origin (Allen and Morsinsk 1994, 32-33). In this respect Kunz classifies "refugee" into three categories: (1) refugees who oppose the causes of their exile but retain a strong bond with their homeland, or *majority identified* refugees; (2) refugees who feel discriminated against or alienated from the rest of their home populations and therefore are not likely to desire return – *event-related refugees*; and (3) refugees who, for personal or ideological reasons, alienate themselves from the rest of the society within which they live, and who therefore consider exile a permanent solution to their situation – *self-alienated refugees* (Kunz 1981,

44). In some cases, where refugee settlements are located on the borders with their country of origin, periodic repatriation is observed. This solution is an ambiguous one in which refugees may cross the borders in order to keep contacts with their family and former villages alive This may be for economic activities such as pastoralism and seasonal transhumance, or in order to actually return home during either a lull in fighting or in the absence of direct hostilities even though the overall situation is still be volatile (Allen and Morsinsk 1994, 31). Periodic repatriation highlights the mobility and flexibility that the idea of "home" can acquire in the life of a refugee.[12] In other cases of forced migration, even when the conflict situation has stabilized, a portion of refugees – the so called "residual caseloads" – might decide not to return (Crisp 2003, 3). In fact, once in the camps, refugees can make their decisions on the basis of different factors than those extant at the time when they had to flee. These factors balance *pull* factors keeping them in the camps, with *push* factors attracting them back home (Portes and Böröcz 1989). For simplicity, these factors will be placed into four groups: (1) Security-related; (2) Economic; (3) Socio-cultural; and (4) Psycho-physical.

(a) Security-related factors

11 Threats to the person and his/her physical integrity are key factors not only in the decision to flee, but also in the one to repatriate. It is widely assumed in forced migration that the key factors influencing the flight are conflict, persecution, and threats to an individuals' personal security. Domestic threats, such as civil wars, acts of genocide, generalized political violence, institutionalized human rights abuse and the interaction between state-dissent significantly influence flows of forced migration (Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003). Generally, the costs of leaving one's home and property is outweighed by the hope of finding a more secure environment elsewhere. In most protracted refugee situations, refugees cannot return because the conditions causing their flight have not substantially changed, and the war continues (Jacobsen 2005). Other cases are ones in which peace agreements have been signed, sometimes even calling for the voluntary return of the displaced. In the past this has been the case for Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, and others. In these cases two interrelated but distinct factors have to be considered to explain reluctance to return. One is the objective disconnect between negotiated peace and the ground reality. Negotiations may have converged interests and reconciled parties, but peace may not be a reality on the ground: pockets of resistance might persist, security incidents continue, and local crime be boosted by the wide availability of small arms (Muggah 2007). In addition, "negative peace", namely the formal cessation of hostilities, may not coincide with "positive peace", which involves deep structural change, the resolution of social breakdown and the ending of indirect violence (Reisman 1998; Roberts 2011).[13] In civil war contexts, discrimination can persist. In such circumstances refugees might not want to take any risks associated with return. This has occurred, for instance, in Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, eastern Congo and South Sudan where refugees have adopted a "wait and see" attitude until peace has been consolidated. In some cases, refusal to be repatriated might be the result of refugees' (and IDPs') rejection or mistrust of the peace negotiated. This generally happens in those situations in which displacement issues are not adequately accounted for in the peace process, which can consequently undermine the legitimacy of the peace deal and its implementation. This has previously happened in Colombia (1998) and Sri Lanka (2002) (USIP, 2007) among others. It is worth noticing that displaced populations can also be

very politicized and act as spoilers of the peace process, as witnessed in the Darfur negotiations in Abuja in 2006 (De Waal 2007). Clearly, the security situation in the camps, or in the host country, plays into the choice to return. Camps are not always "refuges" for the displaced and can become places of arms proliferation, military recruitment and continuation of the conflict (Muggah 2006; Millner 2009; Terry 2002). Additionally, refugee settlements can be located in volatile regions, and potentially exacerbate communal conflict with host communities. These pressures may increase the perception of threat and prompt refugees to be more risk-taking in their repatriation decisions (Stein & Cuny 1994). Besides, repatriation, even in a time of conflict, might happen under pressure from the host government, or in response to intimidation, relocation or forced return (177).

(b) Economic factors

12 Economic factors are essential in the decision-making process for a refugee. Refugee populations have in many instances fled their villages and left behind most of their property and belongings, which they may not find waiting for them upon their return.[14] The extent to which villages/areas of origin have been devastated or have decayed during exile affects both the decision to return and the success that these population have in readjusting. As Rogge describes it, there is a time-lag between the input the returnee invests in economic activities and the output these will produce. Inputs might consist of land reclamation, building or renovating infrastructure, fertilizing, sowing and harvesting, and identifying other types of produce for exchange or barter (Rogge 1991, 36) Outputs for full self-sufficiency may be achieved only after several agricultural seasons have gone by, during which time inputs have exceeded outputs. Often, the re-acquisition of land may be very problematic, especially if the conflict has been about territory. Repatriation to Sudan after the protracted Khartoum-SPLA conflict is an example of this challenge. Returnees had to struggle to secure rights to the land that had been previously owned by the state, and over which statutory rights and customary land systems conflicted (Shanmugaratnam 2008). In other cases, return home for rural refugees might imply reintegration into an utterly new economic system, where agricultural employment and land tenure systems might have been altered or replaced. In some circumstances cultivation techniques and tools used during exile might have to be readjusted to suit the geo-physical characteristics of the place of return – which requires effort (Hammond 2008).[15] On the other hand, during protracted exile, refugees tend to create an economic system that differs from that of their land of origin; this is particularly true in the camps. In some cases camps acquire a population density, layout, infrastructure and a range of economic activities making them equivalent to a small city or market town. In this case refugees that were previously peasants in remote and poor rural areas are reluctant to go back and resume their previous lifestyle. The Daadab and Kakuma camps in northern Kenya are examples showcasing these dynamics. These settlements have been in place for decades and have developed features of permanent urban enclaves: a high population density; well-developed health care facilities; schools and infrastructure; and even inter-camp transportation systems[16] (Perouse de Montclos et Kagwanja 2000). Furthermore, the camps have developed large trading networks supplying the surrounding areas. Each community has its own functions and occupations in the economic system and maintains links with the outside population, which provides a level of variety of goods and multi-ethnic exchange comparable to that of a market

town (215). In other cases, humanitarian assistance can discourage repatriation by creating dependency (Voutira and Harrel-Bond 1995; Hyndman 1997). The Khmer refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border are an example of humanitarian agencies not making any attempt to promote economic self-reliance (Rogge 1991). Refugees, instead, became vitally dependent on foreign aid, were heavily restricted in their movements and were unable to develop economic exchange with outside communities or to make autonomous decisions. Essentially, camps had become "communities of confinement" (Mollica 1989). Even in settlements where freedom of movement is guaranteed, humanitarian aid is often an essential "keep factor" as refugees are not guaranteed to receive such assistance upon return. Laura Hammond describes the disappointment of Ugandan refugees who had left Sudan with the expectation of receiving humanitarian support back in Uganda, and instead were not granted any additional individualized assistance after their repatriation had been facilitated (Hammond 2004, 190–191).

(c) Social factors

13 An array of social factors, both inside and outside the camps, evidently plays into the refugees' decision to return. First of all, this decision is usually taken collectively, within the refugee or camp communities (Allen and Hiller 1985). Secondly, forced migrants come from societies in which they might have had relatives, clan affiliations and ethnic ties, influencing their desire to return. As argued by Kaun (2007, 2), individual aspects of the refugees' definition of reintegration in Angola included "reunification with family" and "good relationships with neighbors". Yet the unity of the family is a luxury in situations of forced displacements, which tend to divide families in space and time. The extent of this disruption is even stronger in cultures where family is not limited to close relatives, but is extended to represent a larger community. Reunification is then an important step in the refugee cycle, sometimes representing the final stage in a long process of alienation (UNHCR 1990). Despite the strength of these ties, however, refugees might have lost touch with their relatives, might not know where they are, or may have lost some of them during the conflict. In addition, those who stayed in the village might not be the same people that the refugee left; social and demographic change, especially after protracted exile, can radically alter the ethnic and cultural landscape of a region. These are all reasons why displaced populations can hesitate to go back (Ghanem 1999). It is also useful to look at the way refugees cope with this immeasurable social breakdown and loss suffered during displacement. There is limited research on the effects of protracted exile and camp life on families and social structures, and in practice it is difficult to make sensible generalizations. Williams (1990, 100) posits that alterations in family structure already occur in the pre-migration phase – losses, separations, etc. – after which the family has to cope in the period of exile by making internal adaptations. Numerous refugee households might become female-headed, which forces women into a completely new position of decision-making over allocation of resources and family priorities (Rogge 1991, 43). In this new power structure, which seemingly promotes "a new sense of self", at times there might be a struggle and at times a reluctance to face the pressures and stigmatizations that a traditionally patriarchal society might impose. Williams (1990), in referring to Khmer refugee women on the Thai-Cambodian border, explains that, "*In addition to family tasks, women gained a sense of satisfaction from organizing a morning market, selling pastries and food items*". Such roles were usually confined to men in traditional Khmer societies (104).[17] Reluctance to go back might also stem from anti-social survival

strategies, such as prostitution, that may preclude them from being able to return and overcome the associated social stigma (Rogge 1991, 42) Similarly, women that have been raped in front of their communities might also be unwilling to return as they could be ostracized, isolated or repudiated by their husbands, families or entire villages. In the Somali refugee camps of northern Kenya, women that have been raped are not only rejected by their (prospective) husbands, but also stigmatized by other women (Stein 1995, 222). Another reason dissuading people from returning is that the displaced may have positively integrated within the local communities where their settlements are located. Once amalgamated economically, socially and culturally in "a system of otherness", a return to the past may not be the preferred solution (Krulfeld 1992, 7). This is even more so the case with refugees who have been relocated to areas of similar ethnic composition. Kinship ties facilitate understanding and communication, mitigate xenophobia and facilitate solidarity and support (Cederman *et al.* 2009, 5). This has been the case for Kenya-Somalia, Burundi-Tanzania, Sudan-Chad and other areas where the same ethnic group is found on both sides of the borders. Finally, reintegration back "home" might be controversial for the myriad of refugees that do not even have memories of their country of origin, as they were born in the camps – the so-called "second", or even "third-generation refugees".[18] Although this issue has scarcely been explored, its impact on repatriation should not be underestimated. Refugees born in the camps are even more likely to have adopted local ways and attitudes, integrated in local schools or education systems, and hence might not identify themselves with their land of origin any longer. In a 1999 study on Malawian returnees from Zambia, Cornish, Peltzer and MacLachlan report that less than half the returnees considered Malawi their "home" (Cornish *et al.* 1999, 274–277). For many, returning to Malawi had been an experience "of acculturative stress and ambiguity of their own self and national identity" (279).

(d) Psycho-physical factors

14 Some of the factors behind an unwillingness to return are psychological and subjective. Indeed, although social structures and households are very influential in the life of a refugee, the psychological uniqueness of the individual and his or her specific ways of making sense of events and circumstances cannot be ignored. For some refugees the experience of flight might have been so violent and traumatizing that returning home would revisit the pain and losses they have gone through (Jacobsen 2005, 9). Many trauma victims experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) including hyper-arousal, distorted appraisal of reality, long term neurobiological impairments and avoidance of trauma-related memories (Friedman 1997, 33). These disturbances severely hamper individual capacity in making rational choices, especially if they persist or go untreated in the camps. In a study on the mental health of Iraqi refugees, Gorst-Unsworth and Goldenberg (1998) report that the experience of flight and that of exile both contributed to traumatization. This is confirmed by Mollica and Jalbert (1989) who explain that more than 20% of Khmer refugees on the Thai-Cambodian borders had been affected by serious mental disorders associated with pre-flight, Khmer-perpetrated violence, at the same time, a much greater proportion, about 60%, were experiencing psychoses and depression caused by a sense of imprisonment in the camps (35–41). The latter, they report, was generally caused by the lack of freedom, privacy, employment, as well as educational and recreational opportunities (9). This "second victimization", as Mollica labels it, can generate idleness, loss of self-esteem, hopelessness and humiliation.[19] In some cases, as

elaborated in "*We live in a country of UNHCR*", rules and regulations adopted by the humanitarian community can eliminate opportunities for refugees to be the makers of their own policies and impedes their becoming agents of their own lives (Moulin and Nyers 2007, 356–357)[20]. Last but not least, as much as psychological vulnerabilities can factor in the decision to return, so can physical ones. Some refugees might have been severely handicapped by the war, or simply be too aged or sick to embark on a journey whose long-term outcome is unknown (Crisp 2003).

3.3 Applicability of the theory to the Darfur case

15 During protracted displacement the aforementioned factors can negatively influence the repatriation decision by creating a polarization between the camp and the country of origin. The homeland or the village of origin may appear unattractive and the opportunity/cost associated with repatriation negative, as opposed to remaining in the camps. The table below attempts to portray this concept.

Table 2: Push and Pull factors involved in the repatriation decision

	Push and pull factors			
	Security	**Economic**	**Social**	**Psycho-physical**
Home country ↑	-Persistence of conflict - Political opposition - Level of security (mines, robbery, bandits, etc.)	- Stripped assets -Services provided upon return	- Dispersed relatives - Ethnic hatred - Stigmatization	- Psychic trauma associated with conflict -Subjective perception of risk
↓ **Refugee camp**	-Level of security in the camp - Acceptance or rejection by local communities	-Economic integration with local communities -Economic development in the camp -Humanitarian aid	-The presence of relatives -Socio cultural affinity -Social integration -Social changes (e.g. female-headed households) -Second generation refugees	- Dependency syndrome - Physical impairment - PTSD and fear of returning -Subjective perception of protection

16 This schema gives motive for analyzing security-related, social and economic aspects in a comparative mode. All these factors can figure in an explanation and analysis of the Darfur refugee crisis. First of all, the Darfur crisis can be described as a protracted refugee situation, continuing and increasing in size even after the peak in violence. Consequently, it is important to analyze the repatriation decision through filters that go beyond the objective assessment of security and the level of negotiated peace. The camp vs. homeland tension should, instead, be assessed through a socio-economic analysis of the refugee world in the camp and the *perception* of threat and insecurity discerned on the ground. Since the camps are situated in an area contiguous to their place of origin, it makes sense to assess the strength of socio-economic ties and how these influence return. The importance of relationships and social networks may or may not corroborate the supposition that transnationalism – meaning the "regular and sustained social contacts over time and across national borders" (Portes *et al.* 1999, 219) – can create identities de-linked from territory and might weaken the necessity and the desire to return. Transnationalism applies to forced migration in two fields of enquiry: (1) transnational

identities; and (2) transnational mobility. The former implies a process of assimilation by the migrant into the society into which he or she has been displaced, and the subsequent need for reverse adaptation upon return home. The latter manifests itself in a framework of social and financial interaction between migrants and their countries of origin, on the basis of their ethnic affinity (Cassarino 2004, 261–265). Transnationalism accounts for the temporal and relational dimensions of exile; repatriation is no end stage in the migration cycle, as it brings too many changes in space and time to even be conceived of as cyclical. In addition, nine years of displacement creates or strengthens certain ties as much as it weakens or breaks others. These ties may be economic or social and built around a new set of social interactions with the homeland and the host country.

Fig. 3 : Framework of analysis of refugees' decision to return



17 Additionally, physical security should be accounted for in the repatriation decision. As for the success of voluntary repatriation, the grounds for fear need to be removed; security, in such cases, will be measured through the subjective *perception of threat* and the elements that constitute it. Psycho-physical dimensions, although important, will be excluded from this analysis. Post-traumatic stress disorders and displacement stressors are prevalent in the camps where Darfur's refugee live (Rasmussen 2010) and might have a significant impact on individual decisions not to return home. However, this research will target community-level decisions on repatriation (Allen and Hiller 1985), in which such individual cases cannot be systematically examined. Some trauma-related aspects may yet arise from the responses given about the desire to return or to remain in the camps; these will be the starting point for understanding how Darfur's refugees identify themselves with the current displacement situation. Socio-economic and security-related factors will be assessed comparatively in line with the opportunity/cost mechanisms identified in the push-pull approach (Portes and Böröcz 1989). This exercise will facilitate understanding of the level of polarization created between the camps' and Darfur's communities during the years of exile.

NOTES

8. The notion of "refugee warrior" has been widely explored (Muggah 2006, etc.). Camps may become safe havens for militarized struggle and proxy wars, especially in highly volatile contexts with weak border controls and in the absence of strong state presence. In the last two decades this phenomenon has been identified in several countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, Chad, Thailand, Nicaragua and many others.

9. In its broader definition, *human security* encompasses the removal of physical threats ("freedom from fear") and the protection of economic, social, and political rights and entitlements ("freedom from want") (UN Commission on Human Security 2003; UNDP 1994). Return in safety and dignity is partially grounded on this notion. "Safety" describes a return under conditions of legal, physical and material protection. The notion of dignity, more complex to define, suggests a return which is "serious, composed worthy of honor and respect"; in practical terms it implies the restoration of rights and relationships, and their full acceptance by national authorities (UNHCR 2006, 11).

10. With this phrase she describes "a class of phenomena that is deeply cultural and yet global in its significance" (Malkki 1992, 47) to emphasize that the nation is a spatially and temporally defined unit of analysis, yet at the same time carries a "transnational cultural form". The national order of things is distinct from "national" or "nationalism" which are attached to the notion of nation-state (Malkki 1995, 5).

11. In case of forced-migration the desire for creating continuity with the past can also stem from the abrupt and traumatic experience of leaving the homeland due to a life-threatening situation without taking proper leave of family, the community and the village (Maletta *et al*. 1989, 196)

12. Cross-border movements and "go and see" attitudes are typical of protracted refugee situations and they often happen in secrecy. They can be a form of livelihood strategy to cope with limited assets in the refugee camp or host country (Amirthalingan and Lakshman 2009).

13. This is one reason why it is inappropriate to describe post-settlement contexts as post-conflict contexts.

14. Assets may be part of natural, physical, social, human and financial capital through which returnees can organize their livelihood strategies (Stein & Cuny 1994, 10).

15. Alternatively, refugees might consider moving to urban centers in their homeland in the hope of finding better opportunities and occupations. However, the latter are rarely guaranteed. Many former refugees do not possess the skills, education, experience and connections that can make their integration in urban areas any easier (Rogge 1991, 38).

16. Buses, the so-called *"matatus"*, connect the camps with each other and with local villages (Perouse de Montclos et Mwangi Kagwanja, 2000).

17. Women leadership of the household as a consequence of a husband's death does not, *a priori,* exclude women from male-perpetrated physical and psychological abuses in the camps. In many refugee situations not only is sexual abuse common, but so are power abuses, especially in the form of excluding women from management positions in the camps. As Williams puts it, "the most insidious form of abuse that occurs to women is the lack of status, lack of participatory management in camp organization and the loss of protection" (Williams 1990, 105).

18. The three camps of Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera in Daadab in Kenya, have been around since February 1992, and currently host over 460,000 refugees, including some 10,000 third-generation refugees born from parents that were themselves born in the camp (http://www.un.org/apps/

news/story.asp?NewsID=41307&Cr=somali&Cr1). This phenomenon is a conundrum for refugee agencies trying to find durable solutions to PRSs, whose average length of stay has nearly doubled over the last decade, reaching an average of almost twenty years (Milner and Loescher 2011, 3).

19. The ICRC Head of Delegation in Cambodia stated in 1989: "Dependencies on relief programs have taken their toll. Today the majority of displaced Cambodians are in charge of next to nothing, hardly even of themselves [...] If we want them to go home, once they can [...] We have to give them the skills to do so and we have to give them the courage to do so as well" (Mollica and Jalbert 1989, 3).

20. The authors refer to a number of demonstrations held between September and December 2005 by Sudanese refugees in Cairo, who vehemently protested against the policies affecting their status, in terms of care and protection, to which they had been unable to contribute. The demonstrations were held against the UNHCR, which was imposing its 'govern-mentality' of intervention on them. However, refugees, who are usually problematized as "objects" of intervention regimes, can claim and push their own political agenda. Moulin and Nyers introduce the innovative concept of "global political society" by which they understand "a way of thinking about global political life from the perspective of those who are usually denied the status of political beings" (Moulin and Nyers 2007, 356).

4. Empirical Investigation

4.1 Research question and hypotheses

1 Having explored the linkages between repatriation and peace agreements, and the micro-level factors underpinning refugees' decisions, this research is designed to allow hypotheses and assumptions drawn from the literature to help bridge the conceptual gap that exists between peace processes and voluntary return. Understanding the reasons given by the refugee community for their non-return can shape a "genuine notion" of peace that theoretical generalizations may not account for. In view of how the conflict has evolved in Darfur, taking into account the recently signed peace settlement, we assume that flows of returnees should be observed at this point in time. Hence, the macro-research question posed is as follows:

2 ***Marco-research question:*** *Why is only limited voluntary repatriation observed despite the signature of a peace settlement and declining intensity of the conflict?*

3 The first assumption is that a disconnect exists between, on the one hand, the peace settlement and the way conflict intensity is measured and, on the other, how refugees make their decision to return despite the fact that repatriation measures are being promoted by the settlement. Consequently, the following assumption is made:

4 ***Macro-assumption:*** *Refugees make an opportunity/cost calculation to remain in the camp or to return home. Their calculations compare possible living conditions in the host country and in the homeland.*

5 These cost calculations balance push and pull factors that go beyond "physical security" in absolute terms, and encompass socio-economic factors in and outside the camps together with the *perception* of threat on the ground. To encompass these factors, I will establish two hypotheses:

6 ***Hypothesis I:*** *During protracted displacement, refugees have created new social and economic relationships within refugee and host communities, while major relationships with their home country have been disrupted.*

7 ***Hypothesis II:*** *Despite the signature of the peace deal and reduced intensity of the conflict, a climate of relative insecurity in their homeland is still perceived by the refugees.*

8 The strength of the socio-economic and security-related components will be examined comparatively, assessing the relationships with and impressions refugees have of the host country and the homeland respectively. As elaborated above, refugees can maintain, break or reform social and economic relationships with their home village or country. Looking comparatively at these two human spaces can offer insights into their decision to return or not. The same applies to security. By comparing the perception of threat in the camps with that in their homeland, not only is the notion of peace from the point of view of the refugee better understood, but also more clarity can be gained on whether security is still a major obstacle to return. This exercise will also facilitate an understanding of which of the two components is prioritized among the Darfur refugees surveyed.[21] These two hypotheses give rise to other micro-questions that will be useful during field research:

9 ***Micro Research Question I:*** *What social and economic relationships have Darfur refugees created within their camps/host communities and which have they maintained with their homelands respectively?*

10 ***Micro Research Question II:*** *How safe do refugees perceive the camps and adjacent communities to be, and how safe do they perceive their homeland to be?*

11 The next sections will illustrate how these issues have been assessed, and the limits posed by the research design.

4.2 Description of field areas

12 This fieldwork was carried out over five weeks in May and June 2012 following a two-month long work experience with CARE International in Chad over the summer of 2011. Most of the primary data was collected in eastern Chad, during field research conducted in six of the twelve refugee camps located on the Chado-Sudanese borders. All the camps were set up between 2003 and 2004, and the majority of the camps' population consists of women and children under the age of 17. The refugees' life expectancy is lower than 50 years of age, similar to Chad's life expectancy of 47 (OCHA 2011). In general, these camps mostly host a mix of Zaghawa, Masalit and Fur populations, the largest ethnic groups in Darfur (See annex I and II). Unlike the local population which is Arabic and French speaking, the majority of the camp population speaks Sudanese Arabic, local dialects and some English.

13 The first part of the fieldwork was spent in the capital, Ndjamena, where logistical aspects of the fieldwork, including access to the camps were resolved. In Ndjamena, I also started engaging with the humanitarian community on the issue of repatriation. The second part of the fieldwork was conducted in three different sites in eastern Chad from where I could access those camps within relatively short distances (2 to 45 km). The main locations were Iriba, Farchana/Hadjer Hadid and Goz Beida. Travel between different locations was done via humanitarian flights or road trips passing through Abeche, the largest urban center in the east of the country (see map 1).

14 **Iriba**, the first site, is a small town located in the Wadi Fira region in northeastern Chad. The site is inhabited mainly by the Zaghawa tribe, situated on both sides of the borders. Within a radius of 45 kilometers from Iriba are located Am Nabak, Touloum and Iridimi, three refugee camps where I carried out my fieldwork. The refugee camps held a total population of over 70,000 refugees from Darfur, mainly from the Zaghawa tribe (CARE

2012). The camps are divided into ten zones, with health, education facilities, markets and water points (see annex VII).

15 **Farchana** is situated in the Ouaddai region, about 110 kilometers east of Abeche. It is the hub for numerous humanitarian bodies that serve four surrounding refugee camps. The camps surveyed are called Treguine and Bredjing, close to the village of Hadjer Hadid where I was based. The two camps contained a total population of over 54,000 refugees (UNHCR 2012) with Bredjin being the second largest camp in eastern Chad. The majority of the camps' populations are Massalit people, who, similarly to the Zaghawa, inhabit both sides of the Chado-Sudanese border.

16 **Goz Beida**, is located in the Dar Sila region, and is the southernmost site visited. It is a town that grew considerably in terms of size and infrastructure as a result of the humanitarian crises affecting local and refugee populations over the past decade. The camp of Djabal is located a few kilometers from the town, and hosted about 18,000 refugees, mainly from the Masalit and Fur tribes, with a minority of Dajo and Tama. Geo-physically, the area is less desertified than Iriba with more fertile soil and green shrubs, especially in the rainy season. In the vicinity of Goz Beida are also several IDP sites hosting Chadians who were displaced as a result of the spillover of the conflict in Darfur.

Map 1: Surveyed sites

4.3 Description of methods and data collection

17 The data collected during the research is both qualitative and quantitative. The quantitative data includes factual details about the camp experience, as well as data pertaining to when and where refugees situate themselves in the decision to repatriate. This data was mostly, although not exclusively, used to respond to the first micro-

research question on economic and social ties inside and outside the camps. Qualitative data, on the other hand, permeates the entire investigation, and is captured in the guiding questions of how and why refugees perceive insecurity, how integrated they feel in the camps, or, where applicable, what causes their alienation. Information was mainly gathered using a structured questionnaire, which constitutes the main sample source, complemented by focus groups, interviews with key personalities, field notes, and reflections and photographs collected during participatory and non-participatory observation. The next subsection will describe in more detail how the sampling was carried out, the structure of the main questionnaire, and how other methods were used to test the hypotheses advanced.

(a) Sampling

Fig. 4 : Typical power structure in a refugee camp community



The first challenge in the sampling was to identify sample characteristics according to the way repatriation decisions are made among the refugee population. Not surprisingly, this decision is rarely taken in isolation. Individuals and households generally decide according to community-based criteria, under the influence of traditional authorities and respected individuals in the camps. The camp community is headed by the *Umdas* or "mayors", who usually represent tribal and traditional authority.[22] In some camps, Umdas must be distinguished from the President of the camp who is elected by the refugee community as camp representatives.[23] Umdas, camp presidents and international organizations also identify representatives for each zone and social group in the camp. These individuals are usually grouped into four "committees": (1) committee of the chiefs of blocs; (2) women's committee, (3) youth committee; and (4) camp guards. Committee members usually mediate between humanitarian organizations and individual households. Most of them are not remunerated and also have other occupations.[24] Some

of them are teachers in camp schools and can read and write in Arabic and English. Even when not on the committees, teachers are very influential personalities in the camp; some of them played political roles in Darfur, making them well informed about the political and security situation on the ground and their opinions generally influence other decision-makers.[25]. In the written survey, I targeted mainly – but not exclusively – members of the four committees, teachers, Umdas and other relevant personalities in the camp. Occasionally, the survey was distributed to students, heads of-household or anyone who was interested in responding. Focus groups with other social segments in the camp, and interviews of key stakeholders served as an additional source of responses to the surveys.

(b) The survey

18 The survey attempts to gather systematic information on aspects of displacement mentioned in the hypotheses. Hence, it is divided into five sections starting with general demographic data about the respondents, their perception of belonging, refugees' social ties, their economic ties and their perception of security in the host country and the country of origin.

19 Question types used include multiple choice, binary questions, paragraph text, grids and subjective scaling. Thus, the survey contains both subjective and objective measures of the level of socio-economic integration in eastern Chad and of continued ties with Darfur. The survey occasionally asks about the future intentions of the refugees and their opinions about a return to Darfur. In the last section, in particular, the respondents are asked to list the elements they believe are necessary to facilitate return. In addition, to assess the level and persistence of ethnic division which has been a hallmark of the conflict, some questions refer specifically to contact with Arab populations and with the main Darfur tribes (Zaghawa, Fur, Massalit).[26]

20 The sections of the survey can be summarized as follows:

21 *1. General information about the respondent*: gender, age, ethnicity, place of origin, camp name and date of arrival in the camp. To ensure the confidentiality of the data the questionnaire is anonymous, but detailed enough to enable age and/or gender disaggregated analysis.

22 *2. Sense of belonging*: this section aims to assess the average personal feeling of attachment to the homeland and the camp respectively. Since the imagery of "home" is very subjective and often socially constructed, the respondent is asked to give at least three elements that he/she associates with "feeling at home". Later the respondent is asked to give a subjective assessment of the attachment perceived to Darfur and to the camp. To understand the influence of protracted displacement on the sense of belonging and to measure the extent of border crossing by refugees, the respondent is specifically asked to mention the last time he/she was in Darfur.

23 *3. Social ties:* this section explores the strength and quality of social ties created inside the camp and with the adjacent Chadian communities, the level of participation in camp activities and trust in other refugees. Since the refugee population in eastern Chad is only a small proportion of the overall displacement within Darfur, the respondent is asked to specify where his/her close and extended family members are located, and the frequency of contact with them. Finally, I ask about the type and quality of relationships with people in Darfur.

24 *4. Economic ties*: similarly to the previous section, this segment aims at assessing the current level of economic relationships within the camp, with Chadian local communities and with the population residing in Darfur. Frequency of travel and the importance of such relationships on income generation are explored. In addition, this section explicitly asks whether the war disrupted any economic links with the homeland, and whether or not they have improved since the arrival to the camp.

25 *5. Security:* this last section aims to assess the average perception of threat the refugees attach to their homeland and to their current locations. I asked them to evaluate, on a scale from 1 to 5, the level of security perceived in Darfur today, in adjacent villages in Chad and inside the camp. In addition, the respondent is asked to explain the reasons for such perceptions and how he/she assesses security in Darfur (traveling, news, NGO/IO reports, reports from other refugees, telephone calls with family or friends in Darfur, etc.) Finally, the respondent is asked to mention the conditions he/she believes necessary for repatriation, and the impact security has on the repatriation decision.

26 *6.* The questionnaire was distributed to all refugees in its Arabic version. The English version was translated by an Egyptian Arabic speaker, and later reviewed by a Sudanese university professor in Ndjamena. A complete version of the survey in English and a completed version in Arabic can be found in annex II and III.

(c) Focus groups and interviews with key personalities

27 In addition to the structured questionnaire distributed to the refugees, I also set up a number of focus groups in the camps for women, students, influential refugee personalities and merchants. This exercise allowed a better understanding of the context in which refugees make their decisions to return. It also gave refugees the opportunity to freely express their own understanding of the context and of the challenges they face in returning and even staying in the camp. These groups opened up the exercise to other segments of the camp populations, especially the illiterate; - a large proportion of the women in the camp, in fact, cannot read and write.[27] Lastly, it enabled the refugees to share their evaluations and critiques of, and questions regarding, my field research. This often created a climate of mutual trust that enabled us to go beyond superficial notions of what they experience as refugees and I as an observer. Focus groups were usually facilitated and translated from English/French into Arabic by either NGO staff or by an English speaking refugee.[28] Other field techniques included map drawings from the refugees, field notes, and photographs taken during participatory sessions in the camps.

28 I also consulted, on an individual basis, the humanitarian community, Chadian government officials and the military - both in the capital Ndjamena and in the field. Among the interviewees were officials from the UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF, ICRC, CARE, JRS, IRC, RET, the CNARR, the Chadian police in eastern Chad (DIS), and military personnel operating on the border (the Joint Force, or 'Force Mixte'). The interviews were usually open-ended or semi-structured, carried out in English or French, and gathered an actor-specific perspective of the repatriation issue in the current regional context and in light of the international peace agreement. In the context of this research, both focus groups and interviews provide a complement to the interpretation of primary data collected through the surveys in the camps.

4.4 Sample overview

	Count	Percent
Total	191	
Gender		
Males	148	77,5%
Females	43	22,5%
Age		
11-25	62	32,5%
26-50	110	57,6%
51 or older	14	7,3%
N/A	5	2,6%
Ethnic Group		
Fur	34	
Massalit	74	
Zaghawa	70	
Other	13	
Survey Sites		
Iriba	83	43,5%
Hadjer Hadid	58	30,4%
Goz Beida	48	25,1%
Camps breakdown		
Djabal	48	
Bredjin	35	
Treguine	23	
Iridimi	13	
Touloum	48	
Am Nabak	22	

29 The main sample is composed of the responses to 191 questionnaires completed in the camps: 22 in Am Nabak, 48 in Touloum, 13 in Iridimi, 23 in Treguine, 35 in Bredjing and 48 in Djabal. In percentages, over 40% of the surveys were carried out in Iriba, approximately 30% in Farchana/Hadjer Hadid and the remaining, roughly 25%, in Goz Beida.

30 The geographical distribution allowed reasonable coverage of the ethnic composition of Darfur. Around 20% of the surveys were completed by Fur, who are less numerous in the camps in comparison to the Zaghawa and Masalit, who completed 36% and 39% of the surveys respectively. The remaining 7% were completed by other Darfur tribes such as the Dajo, Tama and the Borgo, which are also minorities inside the camps (see annex II).

31 Concerning the gender distribution, the imbalance is more pronounced because of very low female literacy levels. Over 75% of the respondents are male with less than one quarter female. This discrepancy has been partially addressed through women's focus groups and oral interviews carried out separately, particularly in Djabal and Touloum refugee camps. The latter, although not part of the primary sample, will be used to complement the analysis of the responses in the next section.

32 Age-wise, more than half the respondents were aged between 26 and 50 years old, about 33% were adolescents and young adults between 11 and 25, and the rest were either 51 or older, or unspecified. Again, the written nature of the survey excluded children below the age of 11, who make up a significant proportion of the camps' inhabitants. Most of the children are second-generation refugees who have never seen Darfur. As a consequence, although their perspective on never having known Darfur would have been interesting, the majority would not have been able to respond orally to the questionnaire which is

conceived for adults who have experienced pre and post-exile phases. That being said, some hints of the children's attitudes and aspirations are gathered from the interviews and from personal observations that are mentioned in the next section.

33 The socio-economic status of the respondents also varied. Most of the refugees have more than one occupation, such as farming and business, as occupations like farming will depend on the season and the availability of tenants.[29] Some of the refugees are unemployed, or rely on daily remunerated tasks without any systematic salary. In general the poverty level is high, such that more than a quarter of the refugees surveyed declare themselves as "jobless" or relying entirely on humanitarian aid to survive (see section 5.2).

Table 3: Sample overview




Gender Distribution
22,5%
77,5%
Males
Females
Age Groups
7,3%
2,6%
32,5%
57,6%
11-25
26-50
51+
N/A
Ethnic Groups
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Fur
Massalit
Zaghawa
Other

NOTES

21. For simplification, economic and social aspects will be analyzed together though they represent two variables.

22. Usually the Umdas were previously influential persons in Darfur, such as Sultans, or Chiefs of villages. Focus group with Zaghawi and Massalit women, Touloum and Djabal camps, June 2012.

23. Interview with Adbel Madjid, CNARR representative in Bredjing camp, June 13 2012

24. For this reason, the social function of the respondent does not determine his/her socio-economic status.

25. See analysis and results in the following section.

26. The questionnaire is mindful of the social and political context in which this refugee crisis is embedded. As the root causes of the conflict hinge strongly on the split between "African" and Arab tribes, I have been careful to measure this division without making specific tribal reference. Although not including all Darfur tribes, the questionnaire specifically mentions Zaghawa, Fur and Massalit – which the majority of the respondents identify themselves with – and then more generally "Arab tribes". In only one question do I list some of the largest tribes usually considered to be of Arab descent (Reizegat, Baggara, Taaisha, Malaaiya, Beni Halba and Habbaniya). Although the questionnaire is not exhaustive of Darfur's ethnic diversity, most questions enable the respondents to make reference to other tribes that are not listed.

27. At the time of this investigation, about 70% of children between 3 and 17 years of age had received formal education in the camps, but statistics were lower for adults who did not benefit from camp educational services. Also, women are generally less educated than men. In July 2012 the total number of teachers in the twelve camps was 1,922, of whom only 37% were women. (Personal communication with Bienvenu Handoum, Education officer for the Jesuite Refugee Service (JRS), Goz Beida, July 12 2012)

28. In Touloum, Iridimi and Am Nabak, focus groups have been facilitated mainly by CARE's staff, in Treguine and Bredjing by refugee teachers, while in Djabal by refugee teachers and JRS staff.

29. Darfur refugees do not generally own the land, but are employed by Chadian land owners (see section 5.2).

5. Findings and analysis

5.1. The refugees' notion of home

1 Most Darfur refugees in eastern Chad arrived in the camps between 2003 and 2004. Since then it is reported that no official case of voluntary return has been registered; only undeclared cross-border movements, rarely culminating in a definitive departure from the camp, seem to occur.[30] The first question to be asked, therefore, is: do refugees still envision returning home? Are Sudan and Darfur places they still consider "home" – a place to return to – or have the refugee camps become the permanent loci of life, fulfillment and sense of belonging for these populations?

(a) Darfur: our land, our home

2 The responses to the surveys indicate that the nine years of displacement have not weakened the general desire to return. Over 85% of the respondents indicated repatriation, mainly to their original village, as their preferred long-term solution. About 5% expressed a desire to remain permanently in Chad, while the remaining proportion listed alternatives such as emigration.

Fig. 5. Refugees' preferred durable solution





3 The preference for repatriation is chiefly justified by the refugees' attachment to their land. This attachment has historical roots in the so-called *hakura* (or land tenure) system, institutionalized during the Fur Sultanate in the 17th century. Sultans at the time conceded the right of usufruct over demarcated territories *(hawakir)* to notable individuals, in order to maintain control over areas which were sparsely populated. Soon Zagahawa, Fur, Massalit and other sedentary tribal chiefs became the main owners of the *hawakir*, with their households owning a land parcel or *dar* (Abdul Jalil *et al.* 2005, 40-45).[31] Although this system began to be challenged after Sudan's independence in 1956, with the practice of land registration,[32] the tradition of privately-owned land remains very vivid in the memory of these tribes, whose notion of "home" is tied to the land. The respondents describe their "home" using words like: "land of my ancestors"; "my farming land" (fig. 6); often translated with the words "*dar*" and "*hakura*". These references indicate a deeply rooted desire to return to the areas from which they had been evicted.

Fig. 6: Words used to describe the attachment to Darfur



4 Together with this sense of belonging derived from the land, refugees ascribe to the notion of "home" the place of their birth, childhood, and pre-war memories – a space of growth and affection that preceded the bitter experience of the conflict. As expressed by a Massalit woman from Djabal camp: *"I spent my childhood there in my village playing with my peers, it's my home and there I will return"*[33] Darfur is also described as a beloved, almost mythical, place: "a beautiful land"[34], "my dear country", "the land I love". It represents a home that seems remote in space and time and whose identity is often construed through comparing pre-war experiences with living conditions in the camp. In this exercise of

remembering "home", much of what Darfur currently represents – destruction, occupation and insecurity – is sometimes overlooked in the hope that a *status quo ante* might one day be restored.

Box 2
"We had so much more in Darfur [than in the camp]: water, milk, tomatoes, mangoes, oil and wild millet. We also have more firewood. Here, sometimes we have to go search firewood too far away and be sexually assaulted (...) Here [in the camp] there are so many worries; our children cannot eat – the ration is scarce. The day I will be home, my worries will be gone. This issue strikes right to my heart."
Focus group with Zaghawa women, Touloum camp, June 2012.

Photo 1: Woman carrying firewood, Touloum camp, Chad (2012)

5 Life in the camp indeed straddles past memories and future hopes. For several respondents home is pre-war Darfur – a space for a socially and economically fulfilling life in opposition to the miserable living conditions experienced as "displaced persons" in Chad. This gap is mainly expressed geo-climatically and economically. A Fur woman in Djabal camp despises the dry and desert climate of eastern Chad and weeps over her lost land of "green pastures, rivers, valleys and all the elements of Darfur's nature". The natural assets of Darfur such as water, tree fruit, crops and firewood are also idolized when compared with the scarcity of and competition over resources refugees and indigenous populations are faced with outside the camps in Chad (see box 2). These concerns are mainly raised by women and young girls, who, quite consistently across the ethnic groups interviewed, bear the specific responsibility of bringing water and firewood to the camps, preparing meals and taking care of the household resources.[35] Such tasks,

they argue, were much easier in Darfur, where water and firewood were more easily available and their family members could support them.[36]

6 A significant proportion of refugees, although not identifying home with the camps, have a less idealistic and more pessimistic view of what Darfur has become during the conflict and how mass atrocities have impacted their sense of belonging. Of these, 49% do not recognize Darfur as their home, unless it becomes a place with rights and entitlements for all its citizens. This group of refugees describes the "idolized home" as a place with "security", "development" and "rights", which they cannot recognize as existing in Darfur because of the human rights abuses and process of marginalization carried out in peripheral areas since independence. Among factors contributing to alienation, refugees mention "blatant segregation," "racism," "lack of freedom" and "protracted insecurity" dating as far back as the 1970s.[37] The war, and the trauma it causes, also fosters alienation, identity loss, and post-traumatic stress disorder. These views explain the lack of (positive) emotional attachment to Darfur shown by the remaining proportion of the respondents. Several refugees were witnesses to gruesome acts of violence and killings perpetrated against their closest relatives and acquaintances, including rape, decapitations, and amputations as well as the burning of property and individuals.[38] Others, especially those who were children at the time, remained deeply traumatized by the experience of flight, which could involve several days of hiding alone without food, water or clear directions (see box 3).

Box 3

"On February 2, 2003 my village, Habira, was attacked. The Janjaweed killed all the men, even little boys. Women were spared but their babies were thrown into fire if they were males. Older men were hung. We all had to dress up like women with a tarha [veil] and run away to avoid being killed (...)"

Testimonies given during focus group with teachers in Djabal camp, June 2012.

"I was a little boy when my village [Kab Kabia] was attacked. My brother and uncle were shot in front of me. I ran away but could not find help. I was crying and shouting, but found no help. I hid alone for a week without water and food. When the fighting ceased I crossed over to Aramba and found some people that had donkeys and camels and moved with them to Iridimi camp. I was alone. Mom became an IDP in Kab Kabia. My dad is in El Fasher. His legs, nose and ear were amputated."

Testimony provided by Rajal, young man aged 22, during focus group with teachers in Iridimi, May 2012.

7 Despite the efforts made to avoid re-traumatization, some refugees gave unsolicited detailed accounts of the last time they saw their homeland. These demonstrated that the war in Darfur could provoke a range of different, often contradictory, emotions at the same time. These include: the desire to return; frustration at not knowing when the might do so; desperation for the loss; and anger over perpetrators who go unpunished. In the confusion over how to feel about Darfur, and whether or not it can ever again become the "home" that some respondents refer to, it is clear that the crimes experienced firsthand by the survivors could result in dangerous and inter-generational consequences for their perpetrators, whenever repatriation may occur (Amnesty Int. 2008).

Box 4

- " لدينا بعض المشاكل النفسية والاقتصادية (...) أحس وكأنني مسجون بدون أي جريمة و لفترة غير معلومة(...)"

"We have psychological and economic problems. I feel as if I were in jail, without having committed any crime, and for an unknown period of time (...)."

- "الحياة في المخيم أسوأ حياة ولاتوجد قيمة للإنسان ونحن على وشك كارثة"

"Life in the camp is the worst ever: there is no value for the human being. We are on the verge of a catastrophe."

(b) The camp: locus of trust, locus of alienation

Photo 2: Darfur man walking in Am Nabak camp, Chad (2012)

8 In order to understand how this protracted refugee situation could affect the decision to return home, it is worth assessing the extent to which the camp has become a "place of belonging" or a second "home" for the refugees. Again, responses differ according to the subjective experiences of camp life. 63% of the respondents reported "feeling at home"[39] in the camp because of the perceived safety, the presence of their fellow citizens, and the length of displacement. In fact, camps have seen increased security due to the permanent deployment of Chadian police, the DIS – *"Détachement Integré de Sécurité"* (Combined Security Detachment) – charged with the protection of the refugee population. In

addition, UN personnel, INGOs and the Chadian government via the CNARR – "*Commission Nationale d'Appui pour le Répatriement et la Réinsertion des Réfugiés*" (National Support Committee for the Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees) – have permanent offices inside the camps, which also contribute to this positive perception of security. The feeling of belonging to the camp also stems from the social stability perceived by refugees which is based on their trust in other refugees, along with their social and economic integration which has generally been very positive (see section 5.2). Finally, the length of displacement, which can be up to nine years long in some cases, often with no contact with the home country, has resulted in a strong attachment to the camps - especially among young adults who completed the survey.

Box 5
"We do not see our future clearly. We are refugees, we are powerless. No guns to fight, we are prisoners. And if you saw our houses, you'd also think that a prison is better (...)"
Focus group with young adults, Djabal camp, June 7, 2012.
"We have no contact with the outside world. We eat sorghum, we teach. We eat sorghum, we teach (...)"
Focus group with teachers, Treguine camp, June 12, 2012.

9 Among those who responded negatively to the question, the camp is seen merely as place of survival, powerlessness, dependence and even imprisonment (see boxes 4 and 5). Indeed, refugees lament having survived, but being unable to plan their future They are discouraged by the lack of educational (especially post-secondary) opportunities, are frustrated with their inability to exercise their citizenship rights, deplore the dire economic conditions in the camp, and feel increasingly abandoned and betrayed by the international community (see section 5.4). Allegedly, for some politically active refugees this frustration has increased over time with the de-militarization and de-politicization of the camps that initially (during the first phase 2003–2008) served the political interests of Chad and Darfur by openly harboring officers and combatants from major Darfur rebel groups such as JEM, SLA and SLM.[40] Action was, indeed, subsequently taken to collect firearms and heavy weapons which were circulating freely in the camp[41]; to relocate some camps farther from the borders[42]; and, according to the CNARR and UNHCR codes of conduct, to prohibit political gatherings. Despite these measures the camps remain politicized as the flight and the return of the refugees are closely linked to the political situation in Sudan. As explained by the CNARR Camp Manager in Am Nabak camp: "The decision to return is very political: a great cause of divisions in the camp, which host supporters of both signatories and non-signatories of the peace agreement whereby the process of voluntary return is fleshed out"[43] (see section 5.3). However, the inability to use the camp for open political and military action has generated a sense of powerlessness for many who were previously key political players in Darfur. The extent to which the camp is, in reality, a place of disempowerment is rather difficult to assess. In general, humanitarian workers notice a positive move in the opposite direction. When they first arrived, refugees were victims and passive recipients. However, the freedom and educational character of the camp have subsequently emancipated them, and "in contrast to when they arrived, now they strongly aware of their rights and duties".[44]

Table 4. Home-feeling in Darfur and in the camp after protracted displacement

A. Did you feel "at home" the last time you were/went to Darfur ?



B. Do you feel "at home" in the camp ?



Table 5: Refugees' quotations about Darfur as their "home"

"كل طائر إلى عشه * وكل غائب إلى بيته"

"Every bird will go back to its nest, every absent (man) will go back to his home"

"دارفور هو جسدي وروحي وأمي وأبي"

"Darfur is my body and my soul, my mother and my father"

" الوطن الأرض ليس له بديل وصدق قول الشاعر: بلادي وإن جارت علي عزيزة * وأهلي وإن ضنوا علي كرام"

"There is no alternative to one's homeland. As a poet says: My country is dear even when it is unfair to me, my people are generous even when they are harsh to me."

"كم منزل فى الأرض يألفه الفتى وحنينه أبـدا لأول منــزل"

"A young man gets used to many homes but will always miss the first one"

Conclusion I

10 In spite of a lack of declared returns, repatriation in safety and dignity is the long-term preferred solution for over 85% of the respondents, as opposed to local integration and camp life. Whereas a significant number of respondents feel a strong attachment to the land where they were born, grew up and farmed, about half of the respondents do not identify themselves with today's Darfur, where insecurity and discrimination are still a daily concern. A smaller proportion of respondents, especially young adults, spoke of the negative impact of the trauma they experienced on their sense of identity and of the limited opportunities offered in the camp. As such, these refugees voiced a desire to emigrate abroad. While, for some, Darfur is a quasi-mythical final homeland, for others, it is a victim of Sudan's abuses. Many refugees expressed a desire to rebuild their pre-war circumstances by returning to their original village, yet only if certain conditions that can make Darfur "home" again are fulfilled (see section 5.3). In the absence of such change in Sudan, refugees are prepared to remain in the camps, which have become places of trust and relative safety for a significant proportion of refugees. For others, staying in the camp provokes a sense of frustration, dependence and powerlessness, which make protracted displacement a difficult experience. Overall, the harsh living conditions in the camps and the scarcity of resources in eastern Chad, contribute to the general reluctance to consider camp life or integration in Chad as a permanent solution.

5.2 Refugees' socio-economic ties

Photos 3: Market, Am Nabak camp, Chad (2012)

11 The aim of this section is to assess the relative importance of the socio-economic ties created in Chad and maintained (or interrupted) with Sudan in any decision to return home. This aspect is relevant if it is assumed that social and economic integration achieved during displacement are taken into account in the opportunity/cost calculation made by the refugees prior to repatriation.

(a) Relationships within the camp

12 In order to better understand the social and economic relationships inside the camps, it is worth highlighting the high rate of family dispersion evident from the sample. Roughly 46% of the respondents have part of, or all, their close[45] family members outside their camp, mainly in other camps in Chad, or in Sudan. Even more pronounced is the dispersion of extended family members; over 80% of respondents affirm to have extended family members outside the camp. In addition, over 80% of the refugees have lost close and extended family members as a consequence of the conflict (see fig. 7) These factors, coupled with the length of displacement, have clearly shaped the type and the quality of relationships refugees have created in the camps. In fact, the atmosphere among camp refugees is extremely convivial, supportive and collaborative.

Fig. 7: Number of respondents having lost close or extended family members during the conflict



Box 6

- "(...) ارتباطنا ببعضنا مثل اليد الواحدة في المخيم"

"(...)In the camp, we are bound to each other powerfully, like fingers in one hand"

- "أشارك حياتي مع اللاجئين الآخرين في السراء والضراء"

"I share my life with other refugees, whether in good or in bad times"

13 The vast majority of the refugees describe their relationships with other refugees as very positive in all social and economic aspects of life in the camp. Refugees describe the camp as "one family, "one body" or "one hand" due to the shared origin, customs, religion and fate. Inter-tribal cohesion is very strong among all the camp tribes (Zaghawa, Fur, Massalit, Daju, Borgo, etc.) resulting in inter-tribal marriages and widespread participation in camp celebrations, such as weddings, school graduations, end of Ramadan etc. (see box 6). Solidarity and support are shown during sad and difficult situations in the camp, e.g. participation in mourning ceremonies and the sharing of food, clothes and services with the neediest refugees in the camp.[46] The strong social network created within the camps reflects the range of economic activities that refugees engage in with non-family members as livelihood strategies. These include farming, business, wood collecting, teaching, fetching water, handicraft, handiwork, transportation, construction and other. During their stay in the camp some refugees have strengthened their links with other Darfur tribes with whom they were not cooperating as closely in their original villages because of geographical distance.

(b) Relationships with other camps and with Chadian communities

Fig. 8: Level of socio-economic interactions with refugees from other camps in Chad on a scale from 1 to 3



14 Most respondents affirm that their social and economic relationships go beyond camp borders. 63% report significant social and economic interaction with refugees from other camps, particularly for family visits, educational meetings, business, and social consultations. Indeed, refugees across all 12 camps have been attempting to build cohesion and speak with one voice on a range of issues including political decisions, repatriation challenges, the peace process and how to engage with international organizations.[47] Camps are sometimes spread out, but trips between them are possible; these are usually made using the vehicles of Chadian or refugee businessmen who travel regularly to different camp locations and towns.[48] Refugees are, in fact, allowed to move freely in Chadian territory following the issuance of a travel permit from CNARR offices in the camps.

15 Very positive social and economic relationships are also very common with Chadian communities in neighboring villages. Positive cultural integration has been facilitated by common ancestors, customs, religion and languages that the indigenous tribes of eastern Chad share with the refugees. The Chadian borders are inhabited by, among others, the Zaghawa, Massalit, Daju, Borgo and Tama, who are also among the largest tribes living within the camps. Economically, 40% of the respondents report important commercial relationships with Chadian communities, particularly for business and farming (fig. 9).

Fig. 9: Level of socio-economic interactions with locals on a scale from 1 to 3



16 Exchange of products takes place in camp or town markets where the Chadian businessmen sell their merchandise originating in Abeche and Ndjamena for Sudanese products traded by the refugees. IRC Wash Manager in Oure Cassoni, explains how this camp, the northernmost in Chad, has been a strategic crossroads for the exchange of merchandise coming from Chad, Sudan and Libya.[49] Around 15% of the refugees also share how they are farming and working in agriculture as laborers on land parcels that Chadian land owners allocate, usually in exchange for part of the harvest.[50] Other activities include cattle trading, digging of common water holes, construction, transportation, and charity, including the sharing of humanitarian aid. Overall, economic and social partnerships with Chadian communities are described as positive by a majority of the respondents.

(c) Relationships with people in Darfur

Box 7

- "قد فرقتنا الحرب وأصبحت بيننا عداوة"

"The war separated us and made us enemies"

17 If extra-camp relationships on the Chadian side of the border are common and generally positive, the situation is almost reversed on the Sudanese side. Roughly half of the refugees say they have only sporadic contact with their families in Darfur, while 26% have no contact at all. In addition, 79% of the respondents have not travelled back to Darfur since their arrival in the camp (fig.11), which makes communication difficult in areas with no mobile network coverage where travelling is the only available option for obtaining family news. In some cases, contact with family is achieved through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), especially for the transmission of important family news or family verifications.[51] A vast majority of the refugees explain that this lack of contact with family and friends from sedentary Darfur tribes is a result of distance and lack of security in Sudan (see section 5.3). Relations with Arab tribes in Darfur are often disrupted on ethnic grounds. 61% of the refugees surveyed appear to have little or no relationship with those tribes which they associate, en masse, with pro-government militias, namely: “the Janjaweed,” “the enemy,” or “the criminals” (fig.10).

Fig. 10: Level of interaction with Arab populations in Darfur on a scale from 1 to 3



Fig. 11: Respondents' most recent travel to Darfur



18 In general, economic relationships with people in Darfur are not common. Only a small proportion of the sample mentions active relationships such as business ties, educational exchanges with displaced communities, occasional cross-border farming activities, visiting relatives for money transfers and contacts of a "political nature". 122 out of 191 respondents confirm that the war has cut all ties, especially with Arab groups, with over 43% insisting on the deterioration of these relationships over time (fig. 12).

Fig. 12: Respondents' assessment of the evolution of economic relationships with populations in Darfur since arrival to the camp



19 In fact, little has been done to reconcile these tribes and rebuild the socio-economic cooperation they historically displayed (see section 5.3). This breakdown in relationships testifies to a much greater economic and social crisis inside Darfur caused by inter-tribal asset stripping, crop and market failures, and the closure of important routes used for trade and remittances (Tufts 2005). Humanitarian aid makes up for some of the food shortage in the camps, but is often not enough to generate household income. Inside Darfur, where food distribution is hampered by restricted freedom of movement for humanitarian workers and civilians, the crisis causes even more serious consequences for the most vulnerable IDPs living in areas that are left out from food assistance, sometimes for consecutive months (Dabanga 2012).[52]

(d) Trans-border movements

20 Although the overarching majority of the refugees surveyed have not travelled to Sudan since their initial displacement to the camps, cross-border movements are reported by multiple UNHCR and CNARR officials and even by some refugees. Such movements happen without any travel permit being issued by the camp authorities. Rather, these are in response to specific needs in terms of education and health that cannot be addressed inside the camps, or for the purpose of family visits. An example is the journey undertaken by secondary-school students who have been travelling to obtain official school certificates in the absence of a proper Sudanese-like examination system in the camps. In early 2012, the camps of Touloum and Iridimi alone sent 295 students to Tine Sudan and Kornoi for school examinations.[53] Refugees have also been increasingly travelling to the health facilities in Geneina and Fasher where they would reportedly receive free medical treatment for serious health conditions - a service that has allegedly been put in place for refugees and the displaced to incentivize return.[54] Finally, as mentioned earlier, there are reports of businessmen and merchants who travel weekly and monthly to localities in Darfur, as far as El Fasher, for the exchange and purchase of goods that are not found in Chadian markets.

21 Contrary to what humanitarian workers and the Chadian government seem to have concluded, a deeper analysis of these movements shows how they are not symptomatic of a substantial improvement of the general security situation and living conditions in

Darfur". First of all, these movements are not widespread among the camp populations. Secondly, Darfur includes pockets of relative stability which refugees are aware of (see section 5.3). Journeys deeper into Darfur, such as those of merchants and university students are also fraught with risks, especially in the more far-flung areas of Nyala and El Fasher.[55]

Conclusion II

22 The economic and social ties that refugees have built during the period of displacement demonstrate the refugees' positive integration into the Chadian border zones. Refugees have generally forged solid relationships in the camps based on trust, cooperation and mutual assistance. Positive relationships have also been identified as existing outside the camps, both with refugees in other camps and with Chadian communities in the areas of business, farming and the management of common resources. On the other hand, contacts with the population still living in Darfur are much more limited and infrequent. Trade routes to Darfur do exist, but are subject to insecurity and restriction of movement. The majority of the respondents have not travelled to Darfur since their arrival – neither for economic nor social purposes. This situation contributes to a growing disconnect between the social ties created in the camps and family ties that have been disrupted. Furthermore, in spite of the limited resources that the camp can offer, refugees have established livelihood strategies and business contacts that benefit from their border situation, such as trans-border trade. Their refugee status, and the humanitarian assistance provided, creates a framework for stability and social protection which contributes to the reluctance to return home without the guarantee of livelihoods and cross-border security. Finally, the gravity of the humanitarian crisis inside Darfur, affecting over 2 million IDPs, discourages refugees from engaging in the repatriation process without tangible signs that the situation has normalized.

5.3 Perception of threat in Darfur

Photo 4: Armed man from the joint military patrols on the Chado-Sudanese border (2012)

23 The refugees attachment to the ties created in the camps is not, by itself, sufficient explanation for their unwillingness to return. As outlined in section 5.1, the current feeling of belonging to Darfur is, for most refugees, rooted in the private ownership of land (as in the word *Dar-fur*, or "land of the Fur") and in the hope of returning there legitimately. However, the current position of Darfur, within the broader Sudanese context, is a source of fear and alienation. This section aims to identify the main elements in terms of security which refugees give as the main obstacle to their return. Starting from their perception of security on the ground, several other elements of concern for refugees will be examined, such as disarmament, discrimination and land restitution, as well as the negotiated political settlement.

(a) Physical insecurity and persistence of conflict

24 Sticking to the narrow definition of physical insecurity as "threat and the use of force and violence," around 80% of the refugees consider physical insecurity as a major obstacle to their return. Despite UNAMID's 2009 declaration that "the conflict in Darfur is over" – based on the yearly drop in conflict-related deaths – refugees in Chad do not perceive any substantial decrease in the threat to life inside Darfur (fig. 13).

Fig. 13: Is Darfur safe? Perception of the respondents



25 Consistently, refugees report the persistence of violations of human rights and freedoms perpetrated by local authorities and Arab militias in South, North and West Darfur. Violations mentioned by the refugees include killings, arbitrary arrests, rape of women, bombing, burning and looting of villages and discrimination against their fellow tribal members whenever they are deemed of sympathizing with the rebel opposition. According to the refugees, these violations are committed in a climate of impunity and in violation of the ceasefire declared during the peace talks. In the first half of 2012, at least seven localities in West and South Darfur and South Kordofan have suffered aerial attacks and ground incursions causing the death of civilians, the loss of livestock and the destruction of infrastructure.[56] These attacks involve among others the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) battling pockets of rebel resistance that have opposed the Doha peace talks, operating in some remote areas of Darfur.[57]

Fig. 14: Refugees' assessments of security-related information on Darfur



26 According to the surveys, almost 40% of the refugees assess security incidents by listening to radio news[58], around 30% rely on the reporting of international organizations, 18%

using telephone calls and family communications, while others are simply firsthand witnesses of the situation as a result of their travels (6%). Travelling to Darfur, the rarest of available options mentioned, is, however, the only way refugees can directly observe how the situation in Darfur is evolving. Merchants and students who left Sudan to join the camps all report how their journey was a complicated web of encounters with Arab militias, government forces and rebel groups controlling different zones and threatening travelers according to their specific political interests. All report the risk of travelling without a refugee card and without a specific purpose, which can lead to forced recruitment into the rebel ranks, or alternatively, arrests, and even killings by armed militias (see box 8). The refugees from Djabal camp have been concerned with the heavy presence of the Janjaweed commandos in several towns in south-western Darfur, particularly Nyala, Beida, Arara, Gubbe, Kabar, Geneina, Bolbol and Edd el Fursan (See annex VI). The presence of armed Arab militias across Darfur is perceived as a major threat by the refugees; 39% are not willing to return unless the Arab militias have been completely disarmed (see fig. 14. in section 5.3*d*). In fact, despite the pledges in 2006 and 2008 by the Government of Sudan to disarm them (ReliefWeb 2006; Sudan Tribune 2008), no successful attempt has been made to do so comprehensively.[59] On the contrary, in 2008 the notorious Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal was appointed as advisor to the Ministry of the Interior, which concedes grounds for thinking that a section of the militias has become closer to the government forces. On the other hand, Arab-led defections exist, especially among a number of tribes that have, over time, become disillusioned with promises that "Khartoum failed to keep and over rewards it did not give" (Flint 2009).[60] Reportedly, a significant contingent of Arab militias attacked government forces in July 2012 in the area of Kab Kabia, northern Darfur, where the movement called *Al-Jund Al-Mazloom* – or "Oppressed soldiers" – are thought to have their stronghold (Dabanga 2012).[61] Other semi-autonomous Arab groups are located in the south, where inter-Arab clashes between Reizegat and Saada tribes took place in May 2010 (Dabanga 2010)[62] and where, in 2007, the Arab opposition leader Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo, nicknamed 'Hemeti', defected to the government along with thousands of paramilitary troops (SAS 2010).[63] Overall it is inaccurate to label the whole Arab presence in Darfur with the demonizing term "Janjaweed". Most of these troops are in turn victims of abuse and political manipulations at higher levels.[64] However, from the perspective of the refugees their armed presence throughout Darfur is a symptom of impunity and danger. Whether for reasons of personal defense, fear or for military motives, Darfur's Arab tribes are heavily armed, while, at the same time, small arms are easily accessible, even to other civilians, in town markets.[65]

Box 8: El Fasher-Iridimi by road. Rajal, 22, witnessing his journey in August 2011

"I went from El Fasher to Kutum by car with a businessman. He was an Arab – with a Zaghawa grandfather. Kutum is full of Janjaweed. A very dangerous place for a Zaghawa. When you try to get food they try to listen to your accent and then arrest you. If you speak Zaghawa they'll kill you. Zaghawa language, culture and moves are recognizable so it is quite easy to be caught, and you cannot trust anyone (...). I got arrested in Kutum but then they released me because I had a refugee card.

These people rape Zaghawa and Fur women; this happened to some of our aunts in the past. But also when we were there we saw before our eyes a Fur woman being raped by four men, one after the other... And we could not do anything, or else they

would shoot us dead.
Then we moved to Dor which was full of soldiers with weapons. Soldiers would insult you and ask you: “where are you from?” And they’d kick you. If you have money they take your money. If you do not have money they give you some clothes to wash and make fun of you. We, the Zaghawas and Furs had to wash their clothes in front of them.
From Dor we went to Orshi, at night, and ran into the SLA/M (Zaghawas and Fur rebels). If you are a student they let you go, but if you do not have any job they will recruit you. My friend, Osman, was jobless at the time, with no student card and they took him (...) We left Orshi at the sunrise.
In Amboro we found UNAMID at 10 am. The Sudanese government was there too but did not do anything bad to us. We got some food. Amboro is safe. Then we moved close to Kornoi, and went to Tine Sudan where the government of Sudan and UNAMID have police posts (they asked us questions – “What are we doing? Why are we travelling?” – And eventually they let us go. But again, if you are unemployed you run into trouble (they will think you are a rebel).
We stayed for 3 days in Tine Chad and had our bags withheld by our driver, as we did not have money to pay him. Then we met a refugee from Iridimi with a car. He lent us money to pay the driver.
From there we arrived to Iridimi. The journey lasted 12 days. We got to the camp on August 25 (...)”

Map 2: Presence of Darfur Resistance – as of May 2010



(b) Presence of new settlers and land occupation

27 Rejection, hatred and fear of the "Arab tribes" of Darfur are not only the result of mass atrocities, including killing, rape and pillaging, but also of the transformation that forced eviction has brought to the land of the refugees and the internally displaced. Petersen and Tullin (2006) estimated that by September 2005 up to 58% of the Darfur villages had been burnt during the attacks, with an estimate of around 46% of the non-urban population driven off their lands (20-23). The current state of many of those former villages, almost a decade after the events, is still unknown. Some villages have been completely wiped off the map of Darfur leaving behind empty spaces, where – as refugees sarcastically report – "there is no one, except birds and wild animals".[66] For others, especially in South and West Darfur, refugees report the presence of new Arab settlers occupying their *dar*, erecting new buildings and completely transforming their former living spaces.[67] These claims are supported by reports by IOs and observers. In 2010, the UNHCR and the Commission on Refugees in Sudan reported the arrival of a large group of Chadian nomads from across the border, intending to settle permanently in the areas where Massalit villages were located prior to 2003 (Mundt 2011, 9). The purpose and cause of such demographic change is equally puzzling: In April 2012, radio Dabanga reported on authorities in the West Saleh area of West Darfur – one of the places most severely ravaged by the conflict – hiring new settlers to burn and destroy all remaining evidence of mass graves in the area.[68] Both some of the refugees interviewed[69] and experts on Sudan, contend that new "Arab settlers" invading Darfurians' historical lands marks the current iteration of the fundamentalist ideology pervasive in Sudan since 1989, aimed at making Sudan a Muslim and Arab-dominated country.[70]

28 The presence of new settlers poses enormous challenges to the future voluntary return of refugees and IDPs, who mostly find themselves stripped of their lands and sometimes even of their land rights. Over time, settlers that were initially illegal squatters have been given the possibility to obtain land rights by registering in government municipalities (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2010).[71] This re-appropriation has been causing clashes with internally displaced persons who have attempted to return to work on their farm lands and who were reportedly "threatened with weapons while trying to sow their seeds" (Dabanga 2012).[72] Elsewhere, refugees and IDPs were asked to pay the occupiers in cash or in kind in order to perform labor during the rainy season.[73] Recognition of traditional land rights and mechanisms to address the issue of land ownership are an essential prerequisite for the refugees who are not ready to return unless they are guaranteed secure access to their land. Without first resolving the land issue, which is at the very root of this conflict, not only will repatriation be unlikely to occur, but the risk of further bloodshed also increases.

(c) Institutionalized ethnic discrimination?

29 As mentioned above, the general perception of insecurity among the refugees is not only heightened by incidents on the ground, but is further exacerbated by the continuing discrimination between "Arabs" and "Africans" that persists in Sudan. Most of the refugees surveyed report experiences of "discrimination" and perceived "inequality" of rights and entitlements within Sudan. Those interviewed made references to the historic nature of the discrimination and the way ethnic differences have been institutionally manipulated to serve political and economic interests of the elites in power. Coexistence

and inter-marriages between "non-Arab" farmers and "Arab" tribes existed until rapid population growth and desertification caused a split along ethnic lines. The division was mainly centered on access to land for farmers and herders. However, historically, under-development

30 and political marginalization in Darfur augmented the claims to power-sharing by Arab tribes, based on ethnic supremacy and political manipulation by the central government in its fight against opponents inside Darfur (See section 3, box 1).[74] Not much has changed – according to the refugees – regarding how they feel excluded, segregated and unable to express their identities inside Sudan. Discrimination, they stress, is not occasional, but institutional. It trickles down from the educated elites in the capital and pervades places of public education and public speech. It has infiltrated several layers of society and become a political reality and a tool of power. Refugee students from Iridimi, Treguine, Bredjin and Djabal camps narrate how discrimination at Sudanese universities compelled many of them to abandon the studies they had been pursuing before the war and during the period of displacement.[75] Mr. Zidan, JRS education supervisor in Djabal camp, further argues that discrimination in Khartoum is delivered through five categories of "ethnic purity and prestige" depending on geographical origin and level of Arab descent. The descendants of the elite in power are the most privileged tribe, while non-Arab people from Blue Nile, Darfur and South Kordofan, he argues, are placed on the lowest rung of the ladder[76].

31 Political dissent and complaints about the system, or any other expression of their rights inside academic institutions, or within the academic space, led to arbitrary detentions, torture and degrading treatment for many of the refugees interviewed.[77] Discrimination is equally, if not more gravely, feared inside Darfur, where it gives leeway inter-tribal looting, money extortion, rape, public humiliation and revenge murders, with quasi-total impunity. In several areas of Darfur, refugees travelling for studies or family visits witness the absolute negation of their freedom of identity, to the extent that speaking, dressing or displaying aspects of their culture in any way could lead to death[78] (see box 9).

Box 9
"Kutum [in West Darfur] is a very dangerous place for a Zaghawa. When you try to get food they try to listen to your accent and then arrest you. If you speak Zaghawa they kill you. Zaghawa language, culture and moves are recognizable (...) you cannot trust anyone."
Interview with Mr. Rajal, describing the journey from El Fasher to Iridimi in August 2011, Iridimi camp, May 28, 2012.

32 Finally, refugees continue to fear public statements loaded with discriminatory intent against Darfur or other peripheral areas of Sudan. In most camps, the refugees visited spoke of their indignation over the label "insects" used in April 2012 by the President Bashir to publicly describe the people and the government of South Sudan, to whom Darfurians often associate[79].

(d) A mistrusted peace settlement

33 The refugees' unwillingness to return home and the unresolved issues that are perceived as posing a threat to their return are better understood once the relationship between the current political settlement and the refugee communities is explored. As presented in

section 4.2, the Doha Declaration for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) is the most recent negotiated attempt to resolve the Darfur conflict, politically and security-wise. Unlike previous negotiations within the Darfur Peace Agreement, characterized by rigid track I diplomacy, the Doha peace talks marked the first real attempt to bring all main parties to the conflict to the negotiating table. This included Darfur's civil society and displaced populations. This approach, aimed at creating a more inclusive and people-focused peace agenda, failed to meet the most pressing requests of Darfur's victims.

34 *Umda* Daoud, the refugee representative for the 12 refugee camps at Doha, explains that the refugees from the different camps had gathered in Abeche prior to the Doha talks to agree on eight common requests they would present to the parties at the negotiations. These included: (1) a comprehensive peace reconciling all the parties to the conflict; (2) justice and punishment for all criminals accused of mass atrocities, genocide and crimes against humanity; (3) complete disarmament of the Janjaweed militias; (4) reconstruction of Darfur's infrastructure and establishment of public services; (5) individual and collective compensation; (6) reparations for the killings; (7) land restitution and eviction of the new settlers and; (8) elections to determine the level of autonomy for Darfur.[80] Without these requests being fulfilled, he adds, no agreement would have been recognized by the refugee community.

35 According to the refugees, however, the Doha talks failed to reconcile the rebels and used Tijani Sese, the leader of the un-influential JLM coalition, as a front to demonstrate the alleged success of the peace talks to the concerned international community.[81] Concerning the question of criminal justice, Mr. Daoud reports that the Sudanese representatives present at the talks were reluctant to address this issue. At the same time, the language used on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in the final agreement was not conducive to creating a framework of mechanisms for binding the parties to ensure successful disarmament throughout Darfur. Furthermore, according to the refugee chief, the land question was not directly addressed, the compensation agreed for the returnees was unsatisfactory[82] and the negotiation process was partially corrupted by the presence of 'false' IDP representatives.[83] The hope that the involvement of civil society could bring together a plurality of views was eventually dashed by manipulation and poor preparation which, consequently, according to experts, allowed the National Congress Party to dominate the conference (DCRS), reinforced a general existing mistrust against the negotiations, and confirmed the un-readiness of the parties around finding a lasting political solution to the crisis (see box 10).

- تفسر سلام الدوحة هو أن خطوات طريق السلام في طريق والموقعون سلكوا طريقا آخر

"I see Doha as a two-way settlement: the steps towards peace go one way, those who signed it, the other."

Box 10

36 Regardless of the provisions spelled out in the DDPD, many refugees advocate that no problem in Sudan can be sustainably resolved unless a change of regime occurs. Some place their hope in the international community, despite the disillusionment it has warranted due to the delayed and ineffective UNAMID deployment. At the same time, other refugees put their trust in the newly created coalition of Sudanese resistance movements.[84] The Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), also called "Kauda Alliance", came together in November 2011 as the union of the non-signatories to the Doha agreement and the Sudan People Liberation Army (North) branch of the armed opposition of South Sudan. According to its founding charter, this alliance would seek to "represent all the marginalized people of Sudan" and "offer a *national* solution to the ongoing violence in South Kordofan, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Darfur"[85] (SRF 2011). Its objectives are markedly political: "achieve a democratically-elected government, and nationwide respect for human rights and peaceful relations between North and South Sudan." Refugees affirm that Darfur and South Sudan "are closer now than ever" and aim to find not a partial, but a comprehensive solution to the Sudanese predicament.[86]

37 It is worth noting that the views contained in the eight Doha requests, taken together with the desire for regime change, are expressed consistently throughout the sample surveys. In order for return to happen, over 83% of those surveyed demanded an enhancement in security conditions, specifying that this should be achieved through justice and accountability for war criminals (44%); disarmament (40%); land restitution and removal of new settlements (37%); complete peace (30%); individual and collective compensation (29%); and the re-establishment of basic citizenship rights (18%). In addition to security-related requests, over 54% mention the development and reconstruction of Darfur through the establishment of basic services such as health and education as essential for their safe and dignified return. Finally, 16% advocate for regime change as a condition sine qua non for voluntary return (see fig. 15).

Fig. 15: Frequently mentioned requests to be fulfilled for voluntary return



Conclusion III

38 This section highlights the fact that the perception of insecurity in Darfur plays a key role in the decision to return home. Refugees, already victims of violence, discrimination, and forced eviction, are not ready to return home unless the risk that these violations may re-occur is totally eliminated. In fact, they maintain that, in spite of the signature of a formal peace settlement at the Doha talks, the causes of their initial flight still persist inside Darfur: direct incidents of violence are recurrent; militias have not been disarmed; ethnic discrimination continues; and their former lands have been occupied. At the same time, the 2011 DDPD is an object of mistrust, critique and rejection because of the weak provisions it contains and the fact that it was signed by only one rebel coalition. The peace talks failed to address the root causes of the conflict, to incorporate the demands of civil society, or to create solid legal guarantees and follow-up mechanisms to oversee all parties' implementation of the provisions. All these shortcomings exist within a broader climate of limited freedom of opinion and political manipulation.

39 Based on these flaws, the refugees do not endorse this peace, nor do they believe that it can end conflict in the region, or ease the humanitarian situation on the ground. Consequently, they are not ready to return unless the peace process lays solid foundations for: (1) an inclusive and nationwide peace; (2) total ceasefire and disarmament; (3) prosecution of criminals and restoration of individual rights; and (4) reconstruction of areas destroyed. These requests reflect some of the main pillars on which the practice of peacebuilding is built and enhance understanding of where repatriation sits in the process. Refugees will feel safe once all the parties commit to resolving the conflict by means of negotiation; incidents of direct violence are drastically reduced by pre-emptive measures such as disarmament; relationships are transformed through reparations, criminal prosecution and restorative justice; and finally, once infrastructure is provided inside Darfur, through development and reconstruction (See fig.16).

Fig. 16: Components prioritized by surveyed refugees for voluntary return and their links with peace building



The axial peacebuilding components are adapted from Schirch (2006: 75).

40 By requiring these mechanisms to be put in place prior to repatriation, Darfur's refugees are, demonstrably, an important example of the concrete link between repatriation and peace settlements (section 2.1). Refugees are not willing to return unless tangible signs of peace exist on the ground, which they are in a position to assess in person owing to their border position and the experiences of their internally displaced relatives.

41 Peace talks and negotiated peace settlements are opportunities to cement the road map through which such progress can be achieved, but do not describe the stage of peace unless they become inclusive and sufficiently trusted as marking substantial change in physical security on the ground. Because of the atrocities experienced, and the mistrust of the Khartoum regime, refugees are not willing to accept any risks associated with repatriation – one of several steps in the process of peace-*making*. Rather, they expect repatriation to be a final step towards normalization in Darfur, once peace on the ground has been *consolidated*.

5.4 Perception of threat in eastern Chad

(a) Political pressure

42 Unfortunately, those who signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur seem not to share the same philosophy as the refugees in terms of voluntary return. In April 2012, the LJM leader, Tigani Sese, signatory of the Doha document, declared: "meticulously planned return is a prerequisite for the successful implementation of the DDPD". This affirmation accurately captures the importance that the DDPD signatories assign to return as a step towards peace. In fact, only a few days after the Declaration was signed by the two parties, the government of Sudan initiated tripartite talks with the UNHCR and the Chadian government to resolve the refugee situation in eastern Chad.[87] The talks followed inaccurate announcements of massive returns to Darfur. In February 2012, UNAMID reported the return of 100,000 IDPs and refugees to their villages in West Darfur,[88]

information that the UNHCR in Chad has dismissed.[89] The UNHCR stresses that up to June 2012 no official case of voluntary return had been registered inside the refugee camps, but admits the possibility of spontaneous returns of border populations living in refugee-like situations. The estimated figure for these types of return stood at 31,000 in May 2012. [90]

43 In the meantime, the Chadian and Sudanese governments have been working to bring the process forward seeking the support of the UNHCR. In their joint press release, they outlined the procedures for "voluntary return" in response to "an enhancement of security and decrease in acts of violence inside Darfur". They sketched out a time line and action plan for the signature of a tripartite agreement and the creation of a ministerial commission which would take charge of the process.[91] Specific deadlines have been set for meetings with camp leaders, information sharing on spontaneous returns, and "go and see visits" which, it is proposed, the refugees would undertake in North, South and West Darfur over the next year (CNARR 2011).[92]

44 In the midst of these procedures, tensions are mounting in the Chadian camps. Refugees are increasingly concerned with the recent political rapprochement between the two governments, which has been sealed by the marriage of Idriss Deby with Amani Musa Hilal, daughter of a famed Janjaweed leader[93]; they perceive this entente as one hindering the impartiality of humanitarian agencies working in Chad. A significant number of refugees lament the interruption of the UNHCR resettlement program – part of the agreement negotiated between Chad and Sudan in 2010. The two states are alleged to have ended a long and mutual proxy war by negotiating, on the Chadian side, the expulsion of foreign troops on the borders, the extradition of Darfur rebels, and the ending of emigration opportunities for Darfur refugees. In return, Sudan would have stopped harboring groups opposing the Chadian government, and asked to hand over to Ndjamena Chadians prisoners held in Khartoum.[94] The UNHCR does not dismiss these claims on resettlements and, instead, admits to the impossibility of counteracting this political decision on the basis of respect for national sovereignty.[95]

(b) Camp restrictions and insecurity

45 Pressure on refugees comes from various sources, particularly in the realm of physical security in and outside the camps. In several focus groups, young students and teachers reported concerns over the presence of the joint Chado-Sudanese military forces which took over the functions of the UN peacekeeping mission MINURCAT in 2010. As mentioned earlier, Idriss Déby was actually the one demanding that MINURCAT's mandate not be renewed, following political negotiations between Sudan and Chad. This move sparked controversy among humanitarian workers afraid that the government would not have the capacity to provide civilian protection, and among the refugee communities, which interpreted this manoeuvre as an infiltration of the Sudanese government into their safe haven. While humanitarian fears have been alleviated by an actual enhancement of security on the ground (UNHCR 2012), the perception of threat has increased among the refugees. They report incursions of the *force mixte* (joint force) in Bredjin, Goz Amer and Gaga refugee camps with the intention of arresting individual refugees and transporting them to El Geneina, Darfur.[96] This information was reported in two different sites, although this was denied by the Chadian police in the camps.[97]

46 Other complaints included violations of freedom of expression, personal intimidation and decisions being made by camp authorities without the approval of the refugee community. Two groups of refugees from different camps testified to not being properly consulted in the selection process for representatives at the Doha talks and the tripartite meeting on voluntary return.[98]

47 Finally, refugees from Bredjin reported border populations being urged to return to Sudan. This fact is not surprising given that cases of forced relocation have already been reported in Sudan by IDP communities. In October 2007, John Holmes, UN undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs, expressed his concern over forced relocation in South Darfur where IDPs were forced to leave Kalma and Otash camps near Nyala (Sudan Tribune 2007; Amnesty International 2008).[99] The populations were either required to move to other camps in government controlled areas, or to return to their former villages, placing them under even greater insecurity.[100] The government of Sudan is deemed to have an interest in dismantling the camp, as expressed in an article by Mohammed Abdalla, Director of the Government Commission for Refugees. He stated that, "the Darfur crisis lies in refugee camps" which draws the attention of Western media and "are capitalized on by rebel movements" (Sudan Vision 2011).[101]

48 Although forced relocations have not, as yet, been experienced by refugees inside the Chadian camps, authorities on the border have been reportedly pressuring Darfurians living in refugee-like circumstances (outside of official camps) to repatriate.[102] These concerns were primarily reported following fieldwork in Djabal and Bredjin camps, but can be considered to be true for other camps as well.[103] Finally, refugees also noticed a decline in international presence, both at the level of humanitarian workers employed in the IOs, and in the presence of journalists, who they maintain "have not visited our camps since Chad and Sudan have become political allies". As the media also reports, political changes in Chad have brought about the closure of two offices of the ICC in Djamena and Abeche that previously used to engage with Darfur refugees (Institute for War and Peace Reporting 2011). [104]

(c) Economic pressures

49 Last, but not least, refugees are pressured to return by the decreasing humanitarian aid and assistance generally provided in the East. The budget drop is affecting different areas of humanitarian assistance such as education, water and sanitation, food aid and other basic services due to apparent international donor "fatigue" over this crisis.[105] As asserted by a CNARR country representative, the current objectives of the UNHCR and CNARR are "to create a transition for the refugees from pure humanitarian assistance to development and self-reliance"[106] - an ambitious objective in the quite inhospitable landscape of eastern Chad (see box 11).

Box 11
"...UN agencies do not have the same funding as before. Food ratios are being cut, Refugees that were paid to watch over water points are now unpaid. Compensations for sick refugees have been halved, and so on. The effort is to make the refugees self-reliant (...)"
Interview with Abdel Madjid, CNARR camp manager, Bredjin camp, June 13, 2012.

50 While this difficult transition is being made, tensions mount in the camp, not only over reduced rations, but over delays in food delivery which are causing the rations to be cut even further. Food aid – previously delivered by the WFP though Libya – has recently been supplied through Sudan where transport is less secure and often hampered by road blockades.[107] Tensions are also mounting within local communities, which, although welcoming the refugees in the beginning, are witnessing degradation of the already poor natural resources in the east as a consequence of deforestation, water drainage and land erosion. Refugees, especially women, report harassment during the collection of firewood and whilst farming. These are activities that refugees are not allowed to undertake beyond a five-kilometer radius of the camps[108], but, for practical reasons, they often exceed. These incidents partially explain why some local authorities are particularly adamant about continuing repatriation talks, whereas the word "integration" is rarely even mentioned.[109]

Conclusions IV

51 Despite their international legal status of displaced persons, "cross-border" refugees in eastern Chad are feeling increasingly pressured and trapped in the border area - a location that they perceive as increasingly insecure. The pressures are, first of all, political. The Doha peace talks' major aim is to dismantle IDP and refugee camps and bring an end to the Darfur crisis, which continues to show to the world the agonies inflicted on them as a result of the conflict. The recent political entente between Deby and Al Bashir has resulted in early talks on voluntary return, the blockage of several resettlement programs, and a decreased international presence in East Chad, marked, among other things, by the withdrawal of UN troops and the deployment of a Chado-Sudanese military contingent. Aware of the forced relocations carried out inside Darfur, refugees in Chad stick to the Chadian side of the border, despite experiencing restrictions on their freedom, infiltration of the military into the camps, and underhand moves marring the political gathering intended to determine their future. The pressure is also economic: the budgets allocated to eastern Chad have decreased markedly, with food aid and basic camp services being cut. In the context of any decision to return home, the camps presently remain the safest solution refugees have, but by no means represent one that is perceived as being without threats.

5.4 Methodological and analytical limitations

52 This research presents important methodological limitations in terms of data collection and analysis. It should be remembered that the sample predominantly represents camp elites who influence community decisions and excludes some sections of society such as second-generation refugees. A more representative analysis could be conducted by targeting marginalized households, children and more illiterate women to understand their short, and long-term, priorities more in depth. In addition, qualitative data analysis could have been more gender/age disaggregated. This exercise could be useful and interesting, especially if the sample size were larger and more representative of gender/age proportions in the camps. Furthermore, this investigation may also have suffered from the language barrier where nuances were potentially lost in the process of translating from Arabic to French or English and vice versa. A fluent Arabic speaker

would, likely, have gained greater insights, obtained more details, and possibly built greater trust within the refugee community. As discussed in section 3.3, by choosing to examine specific components, in this case socio-economic and security related factors, the scope of the enquiry is automatically restricted and risks excluding key aspects from the analysis. Psycho-social components, such as trauma or stigmatization, and physical impairments are not sufficiently researched in terms of how they influence the desire to repatriate. Finally, no objective conclusions on the situation in Darfur can be reached unless the views narrated by the refugees are triangulated by fieldwork inside Sudan. Since the PRSs in Chad are only a small proportion of Darfur's displaced, fieldwork inside Darfur could have offered a better understanding of the challenges faced by IDPs and of the extant security conditions. Unfortunately, limitations in terms of access, contacts and time did not allow for a visit to Darfur.

Photo 5: Iridmi camp, Chad (2012)

NOTES

30. "Official case" means that the return has been declared to the humanitarian and government authorities in the camp and the refugee card has been officially returned (Interview with CNARR camp manager, Djabal, June 9, 2012).

31. Land tenure rights were mainly distributed to sedentary populations, with the exclusion of some nomadic Arab tribes, particularly in North and West Darfur (Tubiana 2005, 73–74).

32. The statutory system was set up mainly through the 1970 Land Registration Act, which states that all unregistered land parcels must be regarded as state-owned. Clearly tribal *dars*, which were not registered, fell into this category (Azzain Mohamed 2005, 211).

33. Survey N. 101.

34. Survey N. 2.

35. Focus groups carried out in Touloum and Djabal camps, June 2012.

36. Several of the women interviewed were heads of the household following the deaths of their husbands and/or brothers during the conflict. Indeed, during the attacks women were usually spared from the killings (although often subject to rape and ill-treatment), whereas men, young boys and even male babies would be killed (see box 3); this explains the unusually high proportion of females in the 12 camps (Focus group with Massalit and Fur women in Djabal camp, June 2012).

37. Surveys N. 6, 11, 54, 67, 81, 93, 99, 101, 104, 125, 128, 136, 144, 145, 152, 160, 161, 169, 172, 178, 184, 190, 191.

38. Surveys N. 9, 13, 26, 17, 28, 29, 31, 41, 43, 45, 56, 69, 63, 64, 65, 68, 70, 71, 73, 92, 108, 115, 131, 132, 146, 148, 153.

39. "Feeling home" was translated in Arabic as "feeling of belonging" (see annex III).

40. In 2007 the UNHCR announced the infiltration of Darfur armed groups in Treguine, Bredjin, Oure Cassoni, and Goz Amer, with other camps being used as rest and recuperation sites and rear bases for the recruitment of combatants, including child soldiers (Small Arms Survey 2008; Human Rights Watch 2007).

41. Mr. Bedoum, IRC Wash Manager, witnessed a major weapon collection operation was carried out in 2009 by the Chadian government in Oure Cassoni camp. He adds that thousands of heavy weapons, as well as ammunition, were found in the camp to the great astonishment of the humanitarian community that had been working in a far more dangerous place than they had imagined (Interview, Ndjamena, May 17, 2012).

42. Oure Cassoni is one of the camps which have been relocated (UNHCR global Appeal 2005, East Chad and Darfur, available at http://www.unhcr.org/41ab28c20.pdf, retrieved July 3, 2012).

43. Interview with Moustapha Moussani, CNARR manager in Am Nabak camp, June 2012.

44. Interview with Abdel Madjid, CNARR manager of Bredjin camp, Bredjin, June 13, 2012.

45. Close family members is understood to mean: parents, children and siblings.

46. Refugees mention the practice of goodwill and charity towards widows, the elderly, handicapped, and orphans.

47. Interview with Umda Daoud Khemis, Djabal, June 8, 2012.

48. For example in Oure Cassoni camp vehicles leave daily from the camp to Tine Chad, and then to Abeche, with intermediary stops at other camps. (Interview with Justin Bedoum, WASH Manager for the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Oure Cassoni, Ndjamena, May 17, 2012).

49. Convoys of multiple trucks stop in the camp on a weekly basis to deliver merchandise from Nyala, Darfur and return daily. After the 2009 Libya turmoil, the Libyan business corridor has been closed. (Interview with Justin Bedoum, WASH Manager for IRC in Oure Cassoni, Ndjamena, May 17, 2012).

50. Interview with Jules Demba Kodindo, Program Manager for CARE International, Iriba, May 27, 2012. In order to avoid disputes and misunderstandings over land allocations, refugees and local authorities gather on a weekly basis in a joint committee. The committee includes the *Imam* (religious leaders), and village and district chiefs. Despite the efforts to ensure peaceful coexistence over land and other natural resources, incidents of violence and rape are reported (Interview with Mahamat Ali Mahamt, Ministerial Representative in Hadjer Hadid, June 14, 2012).

51. From January to May 2012 the ICRC sent 510 messages from the camps to Darfur and received 437 from Darfur to the camps. These messages include family verifications and important family

news (births, deaths, etc.) (Interview with Christian Wabnitz, Adjoint Chief of Delegation, ICRC, Ndjamena, May 21, 2012).

52. Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/32292 , accessed July 15, 2012.

53. Interview with Tching-chackbe B. Lucie, Education Manager with CARE International in Chad, Iriba, June 2012.

54. Interview with Mahamat Nour Abdulaye, CNARR, Sécrétaire Permanent, Ndjamena, June 2012.

55. Merchants travelling from Iridimi to Sharif Umra (Sudan) narrate: "*Sometimes we travel from Iridimi camp to El Fasher to buy and sell products. The trip is safe when we stop in SLA and JEM areas, such as El Elya, Tugani, Meski and Orshi. But as soon as you get farther in to towns such Anabegi, Dor, Kutum and Kofot, you have to give a lot of merchandise to the "Janjaweed", or else you do not get alive to El Fasher".*These merchants also confirm the Janjaweed presence in areas closer to the borders, such the town of Goz Gidera which is on the way from Iridimi to Umra (Focus group with merchants, Iridimi camp, June 2012).

56. In the first half of 2012, the localities of Dilling, South Kordofan, Aurakoja, Kormon, Malam Menawashi, Abu Hamra, Girdeed and Dabba-Nayra in Jabal Marra, West and South Darfur have been bombed in April, June and July for consecutive days, causing new waves of displacement in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 2012. Available through: http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/32527, http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/29720, http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/32110)

57. In 2012 the Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Army – Abdul Wahid splinter faction (SLA-AW) – had its stronghold in Est Jebel Marra in western Darfur and Jebel Meidob in northern Darfur. The Fur splinter group, SLA- Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), was originally located in Jebel Marra and has had a sporadic presence south of El Fasher in northern Darfur, while the Zaghawa Justice and Liberation Movement (JEM) has been allegedly operating in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, on the borders with South Sudan (see map 2) (Small Arms Survey 2010 a, b).

58. Such as radio Dabanga, Afia and Sudan service (Focus groups with teachers, Treguine camp, June 2012).

59. Both public statements were released shortly after US and ICC accusations of crimes of genocide against the non-Arab population, seemingly a political move to assuage international concerns. (Available though: http://reliefweb.int/node/216184 ,and http:// www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-pledges-ceasefire-in-Darfur,29245 , accessed July 9, 2012).

60. According to the author, Arab militias and paramilitaries took a stand against the government by signing local pacts of non-aggressions with the JEM and the SLA.

61. Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/32803 , accessed July 9, 2012.

62. Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/1093 , accessed July 9, 2012.

63. Available through http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures-armed-groups-darfur-arab.php , accessed July 9, 2012.

64. Interview with Abdelbagi Jibril, Director of the Darfur Relief and Documentation Center, Geneva, July 11, 2012.

65. Such as in Geneina, right across the Sudanes borders (Interview with Abdel Madjid, CNARR camp manager, Bredjin camp, June 2012).

66. Survey N. 45.

67. The presence of populations from Niger, Chad and other North African countries is reported in several surveys of students who travel regularly through Darfur and merchants interacting with these communities for business purposes (Interview with Mubarak, refugee student travelling by vehicle from Abdel Kher to Iridimi; focus group with merchants in Iridimi market, June 2012).

68. Reportedly, such measures followed the arrest warrant issued by the ICC for the Sudanese Defense Minister Abdel Brahim Mohammed Hussein and Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb for crimes

against humanity, war crimes and crimes of genocide. Radio Dabaga, April 2012. Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/28085, accessed July 9, 2012.

69. Both public statements were released shortly after US and ICC accusations of crimes of genocide against the non-Arab population, seemingly a political move to assuage international concerns. (Available though: http://reliefweb.int/node/216184, and http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-pledges-ceasefire-in-Darfur,29245 , accessed July 9 2012)

70. Interview with Abdelbagi Jibril, Director of the Darfur Relief Documentation Center, Geneva, July 11, 2012.

71. Available through http://iwpr.net/report-news/land-rights-confusion-hinders-darfur-idp-returns , accessed July 13, 2012.

72. Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/31943 , accessed July 13, 2012.

73. Interview with *Umda* Daoud Khamis, Djabal camp, June 6, 2012.

74. Interview with Abdelbagi Jibril, Director of the Darfur Relief and Documentation Center, Geneva, July 11, 2012.

75. They report that the University of Khartoum accepts no official payment of tuition fees from non-Arab tribes, fails students on exams on an ethnic basis, and imposes membership of the National Congress Party in order for students to succeed in their course of studies. (Focus groups with teachers, Treguine, Bredjin and Djabal camps, June 2012).

76. According to Mr. Zidan, a graduate of Khartoum university, the five levels of tribal discrimination are the following: (1) Shaggiya and Jalliya – descendants of the elite in power (2) Danagla, Beni Taaisha, Malaaiya – Arabs originally from northern Sudan, (3) Reizegat, Misseriya – Arab herders, (4) Beni Amr, populations originally from eastern Sudan, and (5) Massalit, Fur, Zaghawa, and others indigenous population from Darfur and Kordofan. (Interview with Mohammad Ali Zidan, Education Supervisor for the Jesuit Refugee Service, Djabal camp).

77. Focus group with former students at Khartoum University, Iridimi camp, May 28, 2012.

78. Focus group with students, Djabal camp, June 2012.

79. Several refugees made references to a public statement made by President Al Bashir in relation to the government of South Sudan and the SPLA in which he described "a movement of insects" being chased from the oil-rich border region of Heiglig. (Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/video/africa/2012/04/201241981512676164.html). Although not explicitly addressing Darfur people, this statement is interpreted by the refugees in Chad as an insult against all non-Arab people in Sudan.

80. Interview with Umda Daoud Khamis, refugee representative for the 12 refugee camps at the Doha peace talks. Djabal camp, June 7, 2012.

81. Interview with Mr. Abdullaziz, Djabal camp, June 06, 2012.

82. A compensation of $250 per family was established for every displaced household as a "return package". This sum was unanimously rejected by IDPs and refugees as expressed also by Umda Atim camp coordinator in northern Darfur and Umda Daoud representative for the refugee camps in Chad (Dabanga, 2012.Available through http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/13978 , accessed July 10, 2012).

83. The use of certain tactics and bureaucratic impediments to influence the behavior of the stakeholders has been confirmed by other sources. In its Doha analysis report, the DRDC (2011) confirms that the government allegedly intimidated independent delegates and had delayed authorization for UNAMID flights carrying IDP delegates and representatives from West Darfur to land. Allegedly, these planes were only allowed to land after UNAMID and the AU Joint Mediation Team accepted that certain IDP leaders should be allowed onboard (DRDC 2011, 24).

84. Focus groups with teachers, Treguine, Djabal and Am Nabak camps, June 2012.

85. Emphasis added.

86. Focus groups with young adults and teachers, Treguine and Djabal camps, June 2012.

87. The first tripartite meeting took place in Khartoum on July 26, 2011. UNHCR. Internal press release. Chad, July 2011.

88. Available through: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/africa/darfur-refugees-returning-home.html?pagewanted=all, accessed July 11, 2012.

89. Interview with Honorine Sommet Lange, Adjoint Representative for UNHCR Chad, Ndjamena, June 2012.

90. Personal communication with UNHCR Protection Officer in El Fasher, May 9, 2012.

91. Interview with Mahamat Nur Abdulaye, CNARR representative, Ndjamena, June 2012.

92. Interview with UNHCR focal point, Goz Beida, June 2012.

93. Available at http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-capital-gripped-in,41358, accessed July 3, 2012. Focus group with teachers, Djabal camp, June 8, 2012.

94. Interview with Mr. Abdullaziz, Djabal camp, June 8, 2012.

95. During an interview in June 2012, UNHCR focal points in Goz Beida affirmed: "The resettlement program has been put on hold – except for serious medical cases – due to an expression of the Sudanese government. We [the UNHCR] cannot oppose the Chado-Sudanese agreement. Chad would obstruct their departure anyway. This is the first time in my career at UNHCR that I have seen one such case". Mr. Jibril Abdelbagi, a human rights advocate in Geneva, affirms that Chad is not a unique case. The government of Sudan is alleged to have negotiated no-emigration policies for Sudanese nationals with multiple Arab countries, where, he adds, "the UNHCR has given in to the pressure". According to Mr. Jibril, the Government of Sudan is alleged to have agreed to block the emigration of Sudanese nationals with Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. (Interview with Abdelbagi Jibril, Darfur Relief Documentation Center – Director, Geneva, July 11, 2012).

96. Refugees add that the UNHCR intervened in 2012 to block one such operation, so that the militias were unable to arrest individuals holding a valid refugee card inside the camp. Focus group with teachers, Djabal and Bredjin camps, June 2012.

97. Interview with DIS officer, Bredjin camp, June 12, 2012.

98. One such case occurred on the occasion of the tripartite meeting held on July 4, 2012 in Abeche, Chad. Refugees from Djabal lamented that the selection of 3 out of 5 refugees sent to the tripartite meeting in Abeche was made by CNARR without the approval of the refugee community. They further explain that the three people selected, although holding a refugee card, were not camp inhabitants, but came from the neighboring villages of Verkaje, Adday and Liouna (personal communication with Djabal camp, July 5, 2012).

99. Accessible through http://www.sudantribune.com/UN-shows-concern-over-forced,24507 , accessed July 12, 2012.

100. This happened in breach of international principles on internal displacement, which Khartoum had agreed to respect in a pact signed with the UNHCR and IOM (Amnesty 2008, 21).

101. He added: "The Darfur camps have turned into a source of proliferating immoral crimes, which must disappear (...)". Available through: http://www.sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=50835 , accessed July 13, 2012.

102. Interview with Ministerial Representative (*Sous-Préfet*) in Farchana, June 13, 2012.

103. "In October 2011 in Shak Khala, locality of Adré, border military threatened to arrest a refugee who was advising Darfurians on the borders to apply for a refugee card in Chad, instead of returning home. Sudanese officials were trying to convince them that security in Darfur has improved and they should return (...)" (Focus group with young adults in Treguine camp).

104. Available through http://iwpr.net/report-news/has-icc-lost-touch-darfur-refugees accessed July 12, 2012.

105. The UNHCR declined to provide any trends on budget allocations specific to the Darfur crisis. However, sharp decreases in funding were reported by INGOs and CNARR. CARE International confirms that budgets allocated for Am Nabak, Touloum and Iridimi camps have

decreased by more than 50% since 2009 (interview with F. Hammond, Country Director for CARE International in Chad, June 18, 2012).

106. Interview with Mahamat Nour Abdulaye, CNARR representative, Ndjamena, July 18 2012.

107. CNARR officer in Bredjin camp confirmed that for the month of July the refugee rations have been reduced significantly because of delivery delays by WFP, which is having to ship through Sudan, and because of the decreasing funds that the organization delivers to refugees. Conversely, some food aid has been provided this year to local populations due to the poor rainy season in 2011 (interview, Bredjin, June 2012). As confirmed by the WFP in Mach 2011, the unrest in Libya had indeed cut off a 3000 km supply corridor used since 2004 to bring about 40% of the food to Eastern Chad (Source: WFP 2011 – available though http://www.wfp.org/content/libya-chad-libya-unrest-cuts-critical-aid-route , accessed July 12, 2012).

108. DIS officer, Bredjin camp, June 13, 2012.

109. Ministerial Representative Mr. Alhabo Mohammed, Farchana, June 18, 2012. The government representative also complains that, “they are spoiled here with us (...) but their presence is very deleterious to our land. They are destroying our environment, exploiting our soil and water to the detriment of the local people. They have to go home.”

Document sans titre

1 This ePaper was aimed at understanding the reasons behind the limited voluntary return of Darfur's refugees living in eastern Chad in spite of the formal Darfur peace agreed in Doha in July 2011. The empirical investigation was guided by the assumption that decisions to return are made by the refugees on the basis of: (1) perceived physical security and; (2) strength of socio-economic ties both in the homeland and in the host country.

2 The in-depth analysis of this case study revealed both factors played a part in explaining non-return. However, insecurity in Darfur appears to be the dominant concern for the refugees, insofar as it also affects how economic and social relationships evolve over time. Perception of threat included not only bombings, destruction of villages and violations of the ceasefire, but also discrimination and abuses against men, women and children based on their ethnic origins and cultural identities. The persistence of these divisions has cut all links between refugees and the Arab population in Darfur and has significantly restricted refugees' relationships with their families scattered in other parts of Darfur or Chad. Although cross-borders movements exist and are used for trade, they are considered by the majority to be too dangerous an option for generating income. This explains the strengthened cooperation and economic integration with Chadian communities, particularly for trade and farming activities

3 The field investigation also reveals that the way refugees understand "security" and "peace" goes far beyond a decrease in deaths directly caused by the conflict inside Darfur. Refugees will not *feel* safe in Sudan until military attacks and activities cease in other areas of the country such as the Blue Nile and South Kordofan. Peace, they claim, has to be "total", nationwide, and inclusive of all factions fighting the regime. Darfur and South Sudan, for a long time considered as two separate issues, appear to fight now more than ever for the same cause: a new Sudan-wide peace; constitutional reform; free and fair elections; and the end of economic and political marginalization. This is one of the main reasons for dissatisfaction with the Doha Declaration, which refugees consider a poorly articulated agreement marred by manipulation and disregard for the people of Darfur. The agreement not only remains weak on the issues of land restitution and compensation – essential if displacement is to end – but also fails to provide justice to war victims by ignoring or downplaying the issues of criminal liabilities and security sector reform. In their failure to resolve the root causes of internal and international displacement, the

Doha signatories appear to be hoping to use this settlement to trigger repatriation without addressing the factors that make such a move impossible from the point of view of the refugees. This situation spurs the concerns of refugees in East Chad over their future, as they feel the political pressures mounting following the Chado-Sudanese rapprochement, as well as the fatigue of the humanitarian community whose funding and assistance are decreasing.

6.1 Policy implications

4 In this context, humanitarian workers operating in Chad and Darfur should take measures to protect the refugees and internally displaced persons from any political pressure to repatriate them. Despite the operational difficulties, the UNHCR must remain a fully informed, neutral and impartial protector of the rights of the refugees - including their right to voluntary return. The voluntary nature of return should manifest "in the individual ability to decide that the conditions that made him leave *no longer exist"*, or, at least, not to the extent that he/she needs protection elsewhere (UNHCR 2002; Le Rutte 2011, 35) This assessment should be made, first of all, by the refugees who best understand the situation on the ground, in their homeland. Consultations with refugee leaders should take place free from manipulation and the arbitrary selection of interlocutors in the camps (section 5.3). The UNHCR should also weigh the information received from partners and the Government of Sudan against what is received via independent information channels or comprehensive field assessments in Darfur. As long as extensive areas remain inaccessible to humanitarian actors, talks about repatriation do not make practical sense. Voluntary return shall occur in *safety* and *dignity* - including physical, legal and material guarantees - which do not appear to be currently in place, nor have been sufficiently fleshed out by the Doha Declaration. Lastly, durable solutions in eastern Chad should consider demographic change, change of livelihood strategies and urbanization trends inside Darfur. Although Khartoum strives to promote return from within Sudan, the *status quo ante* might not be desired by many IDPs whose camps "are urban settlements in all but name" (De Waal 2009). Are the camps in Chad following the same pattern? The refugees interviewed do not desire this to be the case, but there are indications that this is likely trend.

5 Given the impossibility of separating repatriation from the broader political process, the international community has to be aware of what the current peace settlement can do to bring peace to Darfur. From the perspective of Darfur refugees and some opposition movements, sustainable peace cannot be achieved without a comprehensive solution to the plight of all Sudanese people. The formation of a united rebel front opposing the Doha agreement appears to make the moment ripe for an expanded peace-making agenda, possibly addressing the fundamental root causes of conflict in Sudan. The long-standing marginalization and disenfranchisement of citizens in the peripheral areas of the country mandate a need for broad constitutional reform, accommodation of political interests and wealth sharing. As long as Darfur is tackled in isolation from turmoil in other parts of Sudan, the average perception of threat is unlikely to diminish, and the situation consequently unlikely to normalize.

6 Last, but not least, impunity cannot continue unabated. The avoidance of discussing and acting on this issue during peace talks will by no means promote reconciliation, especially in Darfur. Refugees, as well as IDPs presumably, are not ready to turn a blind eye to those

who massacred their families and communities, and demand justice first and foremost. A first step towards addressing impunity is through national tribunals.[110] Alternatively, international criminal justice would involve the ICC to which the situation in Darfur has been referred since 2005 (UNSC Res. 1593). However, the multiple arrest warrants for the perpetrators of mass atrocities make it unlikely for the incumbent government to delegate the task to the Court. The way forward will depend on states members of the Rome Statute and the degree of their cooperation with the ICC in holding perpetrators accountable whenever they may enter their territories. In the absence of a solution to impunity, pushing repatriation might be even more dangerous than the status quo; in their present inability to forgive and to forget, returnees risk taking the law into their own hands, thus fuelling further conflict locally.

6.2 Implications for further research

7 The case of Darfur's refugees in Chad testifies to an important link between repatriation and peace. The limited voluntary repatriation to Sudan stems from the fact that changes of a fundamental nature, as well as stabilization, have still not been achieved inside the country. The case study shows a deep-rooted disconnect between the language of peace used by the refugees and that used in the peace process. The Sudanese government is pushing for a *hard 2* position on the peace/repatriation relationship (see section 2) - namely that refugee repatriation alone is an essential element in the social construction of peace inside Sudan. However, refugees are completely on the *soft* side, and refuse to return until human security is completely consolidated. In this process, refugees also attach a clear linear sequencing to the peace-building process. Political and security dimensions, including disarmament and establishing security, have to come first for the refugees: It is likely that this is a probably the result of mistrust of the regime under which they are urged to repatriate. This study also shows the importance of justice and reconciliation as tools for attaining sustainable peace (Bertram 1995; Francis 2000; Lambourne 2004). Justice is a complex concept, rich in symbolic, social, economic, legal and psychological meanings and is first and foremost a human need - especially in the aftermath of mass atrocities. However, little research has been done on how justice, reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace relate to each other. Further research is needed to explore the multiple implications this has for peace-building. Also, it is clear that talking about justice in isolation is not enough. This research shows the importance of identifying which of the many forms of justice can promote reconciliation in post-war societies. Does international justice best fulfill the needs of the victims and can it break down the barriers of enmity? What is the damage caused and what are the realistic prospects for success of international arrest warrants issued for head-of-state perpetrators of crimes? These questions are fundamental to avoid re-victimization through border closure, black-boxing and the reduction of humanitarian aid resulting from "fear of foreigners". Deontological ethics should be carefully counterbalanced with practicality in contexts where those who risk the heaviest burden are already the most vulnerable. The research also confirms that social and economic dynamics, sense of identity and alienation, and the desire to return are strongly shaped by the perception of threat on the ground. Protracted conflict can force the displaced to adopt alternative coping mechanisms which "extract" them from their original social networks, even if the country of origin is still close. In particular, the combination of internal and cross-border

displacement poses even greater challenges to the resumption of a *status quo ante,* where "reintegrating back" means starting completely anew. It is generally acknowledged that protracted family disunity can be alienating during exile, but what is lacking is an understanding of what its negative impacts might be on repatriation. The temporary dimension of exile can lead parents, children, siblings and couples to grow apart and their ties with each other to become weaker than those forged in the camps. How does protracted family disunion negatively affect the displaced in their decisions to repatriate? How far can social rootedness in the camps make up for refugees' emotional losses? These are possible future research tracks in the effort to address the needs of the displaced.

Photo 6: Children hiding, Bredjing camp

NOTES

110. Sudan's criminal law is a mix of British, Egyptian and Islamic law as well as *sha'aria* and local customs; criminal sentences include detention, physical punishment, compensation or death (Parmar 2012).

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Annexes

I. Age and Gender Breakdown for Refugee Camp Population in East Chad



Image 2000000900007FD00000BA687D1FC3A8.wmf

II. Image 200000090000081470000B85574C689AA.wmfEthnic distribution in Camp Population – East Chad



III. Excerpt of Survey Questionnaire: English Version

General Information

Dear respondent, this questionnaire is anonymous. Please fill it out individually.
Thank you for your participation.

What is your gender?
- Male
- Female

Which category below includes your age?
- 10 or younger
- 11-25
- 26-50
- 50 or older

What is the name of the camp you live in?
- Am Nabak
- Touloum
- Iridmi
- Other:

What is your ethnic group?
- Zaghawa
- Massalit
- Fur
- Other:

Where are you from? Please mention the name of your village and province.

When did you arrive to the camp?
- in 2003 or before
- in 2004
- in 2005
- in 2006 or afterwards

In a scale from 1 to 3 what is your degree of attachment with the camp?

1 2 3

little ◯ ◯ ◯ strong

When is the last time you have been to Darfur?

- ◯ In the last six months
- ◯ In the last two years
- ◯ Previously, after my arrival in the camp
- ◯ I have not been to Darfur since i arrived to the camp

In a scale from 1 to 5 what is your degree of attachment to Darfur?

1 2 3

little ◯ ◯ ◯ strong

The last time you have been to Darfur, did you feel at home? (did you feel you belong?)

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Explain Why.

Page 3 After page 2 Continue to next page

Social ties

Where are your closest family members (parents, siblings,children) ?
You can check one or more boxes.

- ◯ In the camp with you
- ◯ In another refugee camp in Chad
- ◯ Displaced, in Darfur
- ◯ In your village of origin in Darfur

In a scale from 1 to 3 how important is this partnership for your economic revenues?

1 2 3

Irrelevant ◯ ◯ ◯ Essential

Do you partner or interact with refugees of other camps?
If yes, please write name of the camp in which these partners are situated

- ◯ Yes, Camp name:
- ◯ No

Please explain the nature of your interaction.

In a scale from 1 to 3 how important is this interaction for your economic revenues?

1 2 3

Irrelevant ◯ ◯ ◯ Essential

Do you partner or interact with local Chadian populations outside the camp?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Please explain the nature of your interaction.

In a scale from 1 to 3 how important is this interaction for your economic revenues?

1 2 3

Irrelevant ◯ ◯ ◯ Essential

Do you partner or interact with populations in Darfur?

- ◯ Yes
- ◯ No

Please explain the nature of your interaction.

How do you feel these relationships have evolved since you are in the camps?

- ◯ They have improved
- ◯ They have been re-established
- ◯ They got worse

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Safety and Security

What is safety for you? When do you feel safe? Explain.

In a scale from 1 to 5 how safe do you feel in these places?

	Very unsafe	Unsafe	Nearly safe	Safe	Very safe
Inside the refugee camp	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Outside (nearby) the refugee camp	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
In your village of origin in Darfur	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯
Elsewhere in Darfur you have been - specify:	◯	◯	◯	◯	◯

Explain why you feel safe/unsafe in the refugee camp.

Explain why you feel safe or unsafe in your village of origin/ Darfur

How do you assess safety in Darfur?

IV. Excerpt from filled out questionnaire (Arabic)



V. Snapshot from the survey database

Timestamp	What is your gender?	Which category below includes your age?	What is the name of the camp you live in?	What is your ethnic group?	Where are you from? Please mention the name of your village and province.	When did you arrive to the camp?	What is your preferred long term solution?	Please explain why.
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Goz Nain	2004	Emigration	Darfur is n
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Abul Gamr	2003	R	But if ther
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi	2004	R	No wants t
	F	26-50	Touloum	Fur	Libicabia	2003	R	I hope fror
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Barboi, reg	2004	R	I want to l
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi	2004	R	Because m
	M	11 25	Touloum	Zag	kab Kabia	2004	R	I want to g
	F	11 25	Touloum	Zag	Abu Sachin	2004	R	After peac
	M	26-52	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi, reg	2004	R	I would ret
	F	50 or older	Touloum	Zag	Darkoni	2004	R	-
	F	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Amro, in Kl	2004	R	If there is s
	M	11 25	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi	2004	N/A	After peac
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Serjela, Kut	2004	R	After they
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Garguri	2006 or aft	R	After secur
	M	50 or older	Touloum	Fur	Kutum (Bar	2004	R	N/A
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi	2004	Integration	but if secu
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Adgal Meh	2004	R	if security
	F	11 25	Touloum	Zag	Tine Bassa	2005	R	N/A
	F	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Kornoi, Suc	2004	R	If the secu
	M	26-50	Touloum	Zag	Gondoliat,	2004	R	After there
	F	26-50	Treguine	Mas	Harara, Suc	2004	R	when we h
	M	11 25	Trebiye	Mas	Trebiba, Su	2004	R	N/A
	M	26-50	Treguine	Mas	Trebiba, Su	2004	R	I was born
	M	26-50	Treguine	Mas	Kongo Hara	2004	R	After the c
	M	26-50	Treguine	Borgo	Kongo Hara	2003	R	I want to g
	M	26-50	Touloum	Bartawi	Ambro, No	2004	R	N/A
	F	26-50	Am Nabak	Zag	N/A	2004	R	N/A
	M	11 25	Treguine	Mas	Kokagi	2004	R	I want to li
	M	11 25	Kar Kita	Mas	Trebiba, Su	2004	R	I like to liv
	M	26-50	Treguine	Mas	Kongo Hara	2003	R	Only if sec
	M	11 25	Treguine	Mas	Baouda	2003	R	N/A
	M	50 or older	Treguine	Mas	Gandje, Su	2004	R	N/A

VI. Map drawn by the refugees, showing IDP settlements and Janjaweed commandos across the Chadian borders



VII. Camp facilities: Am Nabak camp