

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED NATIONS TARGETED SANCTIONS

FINDINGS FROM THE TARGETED SANCTIONS CONSORTIUM (TSC)



November 2013

Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

The authors wish to acknowledge the Governments of Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom for their financial contributions in support of the research of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC). The TSC is composed of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners worldwide who are conducting the first comprehensive, systematic, and comparative assessment of the design and effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions over the past twenty-two years. The purpose of this policy-engaged research is both to enhance the quality of public knowledge and discourse about this important instrument of global governance and to contribute to improved policy analysis and use of targeted sanctions. The TSC was first convened in 2009 and has been engaged in research and periodic policy briefings since that time. SanctionsApp, a smartphone application designed to democratize access to critical information about UN targeted sanctions, has been developed out of the TSC research, and core participants are currently preparing an edited volume that analyzes the comparative research findings in depth.

This document was prepared for the launch of the Web version of SanctionsApp available at www.sanctionsapp.com and supersedes the Practitioner's Guide that was prepared and disseminated in 2012. It reflects research developments in the TSC project since 2012 and includes the addition of six country sanction regimes to the qualitative and quantitative databases of the project, an updating of evaluations of effectiveness through to the beginning of 2013, and extensive research through Panel of Expert reports to fill in missing data on implementation, impacts, and unintended consequences. The databases now include information on all 22 UN targeted sanctions regimes imposed since 1991. The results remain provisional, as a complete analysis of the database upon which it is based is continuing and will be included in the edited book volume and other publications currently in preparation.

The objective of the TSC from the outset has been to develop a sound empirical basis for evaluating the design and effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions. For more information on TSC, please visit the website:

http://graduateinstitute.ch/internationalgovernance/UN_Targeted_Sanctions.html

The commentary and analysis presented in this guide represent the views of the authors, and are not officially endorsed by any of the governments which have supported our work. While it is based upon the research of a group of more than fifty scholars and practitioners (listed in Appendix A), the conclusions are our own, and any errors or omissions remain our responsibility.

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Executive Summary

Targeted sanctions are increasingly utilized by the United Nations to address a wide range of threats to international peace and security, yet in twenty-two years of experience, there has been no comprehensive study of their design and effectiveness. The Targeted Sanction Consortium (TSC) was formed to analyze systematically UN targeted sanctions and to develop a sound empirical basis upon which practical tools useful to sanctions policymakers may be derived. Comprised of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from around the world, the TSC began with different research teams studying each of the UN targeted sanctions regimes. The case studies have subsequently been analyzed comparatively, with the construction of two new qualitative and quantitative databases. Researchers are located in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America.

TSC conceptual innovations include (1) evaluating sanctions by *episodes* within broader country cases, which allows detailed analysis of changes in types and purposes of targeted sanctions over time (reflected in a TSC quantitative database of 62 case episodes for comparative analysis, with 288 variables for each, as well as qualitative summaries of each case), and (2) analysis of the *multiple purposes* of targeted sanctions, differentiating between whether sanctions are intended to coerce (change behavior), constrain access to critical goods/funds, raising costs and forcing changes in strategy, and/or signal and stigmatize targets in support of international norms.

Based on an analysis of all 22 UN targeted sanctions regimes, we have concluded that UN targeted sanctions are:

- Effective in achieving at least one of the three purposes of sanctions 22% of the time.
- More effective in signaling or constraining a target than they are in coercing a change of behavior (effective in coercing only about 10% of the time; in constraining activities nearly three times as frequently, or 28%; and signaling targets, 27%). It is therefore important to differentiate between the different purposes of sanctions to assess effectiveness.
- Unique and complex, with each regime reflecting differing contexts; previous experiences are not necessarily predictive of future outcomes.
- Always combined with other measures and never applied in isolation. They must be evaluated and integrated within an overall approach to international peace and security challenges.
- Enhanced by regional groups, with regional sanctions complementing UN action 59% of the time and often preceding effective measures.

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In addition,

- UN sanctions consist of a variety of types; arms embargos, while most frequently imposed (in 87% of the case episodes), are among the least effective sanctions when applied alone (not complemented with individual or commodity sanctions). Commodity sanctions (diamond trade sanctions in particular) appear to be highly effective.
- Secondary sanctions on other countries, although applied relatively infrequently (in only two sanctions country regimes), also appear to be highly effective.
- Targeting is important, and the list of targets should reflect the purposes of the sanctions. Too many, too few, or the wrong targets undermine the credibility of the measures.
- Important institutional learning within the UN has occurred over time, particularly with regard to the use of panels of experts, greater precision in making individual designations, and internal review procedures.
- Coordination within the UN system remains a problem and undermines sanctions' effectiveness.
- It takes the UN Security Council an average of 14 months from the time it first takes note of a conflict to the imposition of targeted sanctions: only 6 months in the case of proliferation, but an average of 17 months in cases of conflict.
- UN sanctions remain largely targeted (with the exception of sanctions on Libya in 2011), but broader unilateral and regional sanctions – while intended to complement UN measures – can be confusing, complicated to implement, conflict with, and potentially weaken UN sanctions.
- Evasion, even of relatively effective measures, still takes place through commonly employed methods including the diversion of trade through third countries and front companies, use of black market contractors, safe havens, and alternative value sources, re-flagging or disguising of vessels, and stockpiling of supplies, diversification of funds and investment, and reliance on family members.
- Targeted sanctions have unintended consequences, including increases in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, burdens on neighboring states, strengthening of political factions, resource diversion, and humanitarian impacts. One unintended consequence of ineffective efforts to constrain is the impact they can have on the credibility of the UN itself (possibly in part due to over-use of sanctions for ineffective purposes).
- Enhanced enforcement and implementation of UN sanctions through new inspection and seizure measures have had an important impact in constraining targets' access to prohibited items.

Introduction

UN Security Council sanctions are political tools employed to address challenges to international peace and security. By the time the Security Council acts, the situation is frequently dire and deteriorating, with violence having already occurred or security threats imminent. The international community has a range of options, from diplomatic pressure to referral to legal tribunals to the use of force. UN sanctions, however, are frequently *the* tool of choice because military intervention is not suitable and diplomatic efforts may be insufficient.

Targeted sanctions have been increasingly utilized by the United Nations (UN) to address a broad range of threats to international peace and security – to counter terrorism, prevent conflict, consolidate peace agreements, protect civilians, support democracy, improve resource governance, and limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They are designed deliberately to be different from comprehensive sanctions, either by focusing measures on leaders, decision-makers, and their principal supporters, rather than on the general population or by targeting a single sector, rather than an entire economy. In this way, targeted sanctions can lessen the negative humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians associated with comprehensive sanctions. They are more adaptable than comprehensive sanctions and can be calibrated to influence targets with a logic that differs from comprehensive measures. All UN sanctions imposed since 1994 have been targeted (see *UN Targeted Sanctions Cases* at the end of this document).¹

Despite these changes, much of the scholarly and public debate continues to consider targeted and comprehensive sanctions as if they were the same. Although the UN has twenty-two years of experience with targeted sanctions, to date there has been no major comprehensive study of their impacts and effectiveness. For this reason, the *Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC)* was formed to conduct a systematic, comprehensive, multi-year, multi-national study of the impacts and effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions.

Following consultations with relevant stakeholders and drawing on the expertise of a growing number of scholars and practitioners worldwide, the TSC project began in 2009 with a Swiss-sponsored international workshop to review the state of knowledge about targeted sanctions and to develop a common framework for analysis.² The inclusion of policymakers in the design of the research from the outset ensured a concerted focus on understanding how targeted sanctions have operated in practice and could be made more effective.

During the research phase, research teams located in Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America, comprised of both scholars and former practitioners conducted original research, utilizing a common research framework for analyses of all 22 UN targeted sanctions regimes imposed since 1990: Al-Qaida/Taliban, Angola, Côte

¹ Comprehensive sanctions against Iraq (imposed in 1990) remained in place until 2003.

² A list of scholars and policymakers participating in the TSC is included in Appendix A.

d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia-Eritrea, Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iran, Iraq (since 2003), Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya I (1992-2003), Libya II (since 2011), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan I (1996-2001), Sudan II (since 2004) and Taliban. Support for the TSC research was provided by the Governments of Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

The complex and rich case study material produced by the TSC research teams has been consolidated and harmonized into qualitative executive summaries of each sanctions regime, and systematized in a quantitative database. Based on an assessment of the design and effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions, this document provides a comparative analysis of the data as of November 2013.

Distinctive Aspects

Previous scholarly efforts to construct databases to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions have analyzed targeted sanctions in the aggregate, together with comprehensive sanctions and unilateral measures. Similarly, there has been no systematic analysis of UN sanctions, as distinct from national and regional sanctions. Building on these unique aspects, the TSC research includes two additional distinctive conceptual innovations.

The unit of analysis is a *case episode* (defined by the combination of targeted sanctions in place and/or the principal purpose or target of the sanctions), rather than by country sanctions regime, some of which has been in existence for more than twenty years. This allows a more detailed assessment of changes in types and purposes of targeted sanctions over time. As a result, the TSC quantitative database includes a total of 62 case episodes for comparative analysis of UN targeted sanctions, with 288 variables for each.

Assessment of sanctions effectiveness is evaluated in terms of the *multiple and differing purposes* of targeted sanctions, to:

- **coerce** a change in behavior,
- **constrain** proscribed activities (or access to essential resources such as funds, arms, sensitive goods, thereby raising costs and forcing changes in strategy), and/or
- **signal and/or stigmatize** targets about international norms.

The inclusion of practitioners in TSC from the outset also represents a novel approach to ensure the policy-relevant focus of the project.

Objectives and limitations

From the outset, one objective of the TSC has been to develop a sound empirical basis upon which practical tools useful to sanctions policymakers can be derived. In this regard, this guide is one of a series of policy-oriented products based on TSC

research including policy briefings, a smartphone app (SanctionsApp),³ and a collection of summaries of all UN Targeted Sanctions cases. In addition, a scholarly edited volume is being prepared and will be published to reflect in greater depth the research findings of the TSC.

While this document is based on substantial analysis of the qualitative and quantitative databases, it is important to acknowledge from the outset the inherent limitations of research on sanctions effectiveness, including the TSC research and approach.

In simplest terms, each UN sanctions case is unique with incomparably complex dynamics. No two sanctions regimes are the same, and by definition, each episode is inimitable. The distinctive complexity of each, combined with the relatively small sample size for some categories, makes generalizations difficult. Thus, there are risks in over-generalizing from such distinctive and unique cases. Moreover, UN sanctions are always combined with other measures and never applied in isolation (in all 62 TSC episodes). Isolating the contribution of UN sanctions to policy outcomes is the most difficult analytical aspect of the exercise. While we have attempted to be methodologically consistent and rigorous in our approach, ultimately databases represent thousands of semi-subjective judgments made by researchers.

Likewise, it is important to state what this document and related findings are not. They are not a guide to “guarantee effective UN sanctions.” There is no magic formula by which just the right mix of instruments under certain conditions produces the desired policy outcome. There is no silver bullet for the design and implementation of targeted sanctions.

The findings contained in this guide, while by no means definitive, are intended to contribute to a better understanding of when UN targeted sanctions have been effective and how to design such measures to maximize effectiveness. Comments and feedback are welcomed.

³ The TSC SanctionsApp was supported by the Swiss Government and is available at the iOS App Store (for iPhone) and the Android Market/Playstore (for Android phones).

SECTION ONE:

Thinking about UN Targeted Sanctions

The dominant public discourse concerning sanctions – typically around the question “do sanctions work?” – ensues each time the Security Council considers responding to an international crisis by imposing sanctions. Irrespective of the particular case debated, most often, this question entails important assumptions about what sanctions are and what they are intended to achieve.

To evaluate the impacts and effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions, the TSC project developed an analytical framework that considers the complexities of designing and implementing sanctions.

Sanctions Episodes

Sanctions regimes change over time. For example, UN sanctions on Somalia have been in place for over 20 years, but their intent was very different when first imposed in January 1992 from what they seek to achieve today. During this period, the fundamental purpose of the regime has changed, the context is significantly different, and even the initial targets are no longer relevant. If one thinks about sanctions country-cases as a single unit, it is impossible to grasp analytically the nuances and variations in any regime over time.

For this reason, this analysis breaks down the broader sanctions country-cases into different *episodes* – periods in which the sanctions regime remains stable in terms of purposes, types, targets, and context.⁴ This way, it is possible to evaluate more accurately the measures taken by the Security Council in order to achieve its different purposes over time.

Purposes

In broad terms, sanctions can have three principal and fundamentally different purposes: to *coerce* a change in target’s behavior; to *constrain* a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to *signal* and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.⁵ Although these different purposes typically coexist within a sanctions regime and its different episodes, being aware of their distinct aspects is important in the design and evaluation of targeted sanctions.

⁴ Eriksson, Mikael. (2011). *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Sanctions*, Farnham, UK: Ashgate.

⁵ Building upon, but adapting the typology proposed by Francesco Giumelli, (2011) *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining and Understanding International Sanctions after the End of the Cold War*. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

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PURPOSES	Present		Principal Purpose	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Coerce a change of behavior	56	90.3	37	59.7
Constrain a target's behavior	60	96.8	23	37.1
Signal and/or stigmatize a target	62	100	2	3.2

Sanctions that attempt *to coerce* seek to make targets fulfill (in part or completely) specific demands made in a UN Security Council Resolution. *Constraining* sanctions attempt to deny a target access to essential resources needed to engage in a proscribed activity (e.g. financing, technical knowledge, material), raising its costs or forcing it to change its strategy. *Signaling* and stigmatizing occurs when the deviation from an international norm is clearly articulated and acknowledged by the Security Council and the broader international community. These different purposes may be directed simultaneously to more than one audience, aiming for example at a rebel faction, as well as its key supporters, as well as to domestic constituencies in sanctions sending states.

TARGETS	Coerce		Constrain		Signal	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Entire government	34	60.7	30	51.7	37	59.7
Government leadership	32	57.1	23	39.7	32	51.6
Rebel faction	25	44.6	25	43.1	27	43.5
All parties to the conflict	10	17.9	18	31	21	33.9
Terrorist group	6	10.7	8	13.8	8	12.9
Leadership family members	9	16.1	18	31	13	21
Facilitators of proscribed activity	12	21.4	20	34.5	21	33.9
Individual targets	24	42.9	31	53.4	30	48.4
Key regime supporters	6	10.7	9	15.5	11	17.7
Domestic constituencies	0	0	0	0	14	22.6
Regional constituencies	5	8.9	8	13.8	29	46.8
Global constituencies	1	1.8	1	1.7	26	41.9

This multidimensional approach challenges the traditional conception of sanctions, which emphasizes coercion as the *primary* and often sole purpose of the measures. Specifically, it tries to overcome what is known as the “naïve theory of sanctions,”⁶ the idea that increased economic pressure imposed on a country by sanctions will result in sufficient pressure on political leaders to change policy (the greater the economic pain, the more likely the political gain).

Objectives

Targeted sanctions are used to resolve a wide variety of problems facing the international community. From demanding the extradition of criminal suspects to the support of regional peace-making efforts, to countering nuclear proliferation or terrorism, sanctions are frequently *the* tool of choice. For this reason, it is useful to

⁶ Johan Galtung (1967), “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia” *World Politics* 19(3): 378-416.

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categorize and differentiate sanctions regimes based on the general objective they seek to achieve.

To date, more than half (60%) of the UN targeted sanction regimes have sought to address problems associated with armed conflict. Demanding that parties to a conflict cease hostilities, engage in the negotiation of a peace settlement, enforce a peace agreement, or respect human rights are frequent goals of Security Council efforts to address conflict. Countering terrorism has also been an important objective of UN targeted sanctions, at least since 1992 – accounting for 15% of the cases of targeted sanctions. Supporting democracy, often through the restoration of an elected government, similarly represents a goal in about 10% of the cases, from the effort to restore the Aristide regime in Haiti in the early 1990s to the response to the military coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2012, including in the interim specific episodes in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire.

More recently, since 2006, UN sanctions have been used to slow nuclear proliferation activities. Sanctions targeted at Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), constitute about 10% of the instances in which the UN has imposed targeted sanctions. The remaining cases (5%) refer to the application of targeted sanctions for three different objectives: support of judicial process following the Hariri assassination in Lebanon (2005); support for better governance of natural resources in Liberia (2006); and the protection of civilians under R2P in Libya (2011).

Other objectives have also been included as part of the rationale for the imposition of UN targeted sanctions. Human rights concerns are routinely invoked, though rarely as the primary objective, and occasionally, the provision of humanitarian relief and the establishment of new laws and institutions for the management of resources have also been included in resolutions as additional rationales for sanctions regimes.

OBJECTIVES	Present		Main objective	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Armed conflict	42	67.7	37	59.7
Cease hostilities	31	50		
Peace enforcement	31	50		
Support peace building	10	16.1		
Negotiation of peace agreement	9	14.5		
Human rights	21	33.9	0	0
Democracy support	17	27.4	6	9.7
Counter-terrorism	16	25.8	9	14.5
Good governance	8	12.9	1	1.6
Support judicial process	6	9.7	1	1.6
Non-proliferation	6	9.7	6	9.7
Support humanitarian efforts	3	4.8	0	0
Protect population under R2P	2	3.2	2	3.2

International Norms

Norms are central to the understanding of sanctions regimes. Because the affirmation of an international norm is embedded in the *signaling* aspect of every episode, sanctions function as a central mechanism for the strengthening and/or negotiation of international norms. This means that debates on the establishment of sanctions regimes are often entangled with political attempts to establish and/or refute norm-precedents in different domains.

This has had, in the past, substantial political consequences. Inside the Security Council, negotiation over the normative aspects of the objective of sanctions has at times damaged the optimal design of sanctions regimes. Elsewhere, because the legitimacy of sanctions as a tool is often associated with the legitimacy of the norm it seeks to enforce, the appetite for implementation has been affected by the conflation of these two distinct elements.

Of the 62 sanctions episodes included in the TSC database, all of them signal specific international norms. While the primary norms signaled tend to be directly associated with the respective objective of each sanction regime (e.g. prohibition of armed conflict, nuclear non-proliferation, responsibility to protect), other norms such as the prohibition of the use of child soldiers, sexual and gender based violence and even the established authority of regional organizations are also often signaled. As discussed above, the establishment of these norms has important consequences not only for the specific case in question, but also for the establishment of political and legal precedents in international society.

NORM SIGNALLED	Present		Principal Norm	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Prohibition of war/armed conflict	35	56.5	33	53.2
Human rights	27	43.5	1	1.6
Authority of regional arrangements	22	35.5	0	0
Counter-terrorism	16	25.8	9	14.5
Non-constitutional change in government	16	25.8	7	11.3
Improved governance (natural resources/security sector)	9	14.5	3	4.8
Non-proliferation	7	11.3	6	9.7
Authority of the UN Security Council	7	11.3	0	0
Protect population under R2P	4	6.5	2	3.2

Types of Targeted Sanctions

In broad terms, targeted sanctions can be categorized into six different types. *Individual/entity sanctions* (most often asset freezes and travel bans) are applied to individuals and corporate entities (companies or political parties). *Diplomatic sanctions* are restrictions on the diplomatic activity of a government, and refer to measures like the limitation of accredited personnel, travel, and general suspensions from inter-governmental organizations. *Arms embargoes*, the most commonly applied UN sanction, include the general or limited suspension of international arms or proliferation-related dual-use goods to a specific country or region. *Commodity sanctions* limit trade in specific products coming from the

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targeted country or region, most often applied to valuable natural resources such as diamonds or timber. Sanctions to the *transportation* sector refer to the prohibition of international transit of carriers (naval, aerial) coming from the targeted state. Targeted sanctions may also be applied to *core economic sectors*, which have a broader impact on the economy. These include financial sanctions (e.g. investment ban, limitations of banking services) and oil embargoes.

TYPE OF SANCTIONS	Present	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Individual sanctions	45	72.6
Travel ban	39	62.9
Asset freeze	32	51.6
Asset freeze and transfer	3	4.8
Diplomatic sanctions	8	12.9
Revision of visa policy	5	8.1
Limiting of travel of diplomatic personnel	4	6.5
Closing of embassies / offices of official representation	4	6.5
Limiting number of diplomatic personnel	4	6.5
Sectoral sanctions	57	91.9
Arms imports embargo	54	87.1
Aviation ban	11	17.7
Arms export ban	8	12.9
Proliferation-sensitive material	6	9.7
Shipping	5	8.1
Oil service equipment	1	1.6
Commodity sanctions	17	27.4
Diamonds	11	17.7
Oil import ban	7	11.3
Timber	3	4.8
Luxury goods	2	3.2
Charcoal	1	1.6
Other	2	3.2
Financial sector sanctions	8	12.9
Investment ban	4	6.5
Diaspora tax	2	3.2
Central Bank asset freeze	1	1.6
Financial services (insurance)	1	1.6
Sovereign wealth funds	1	1.6

It is useful to think about these different types of sanctions on a continuum, with one side being the most “targeted” sanctions and on the other the relatively most “comprehensive” ones. The variation from one side to the other of the continuum is based on how discriminating the measure is. For instance, although both are sanctions on a sector of the economy, an oil embargo affects the entire population of a country considerably more than, for example, an arms embargo or diplomatic sanctions. This makes oil embargoes relatively more “comprehensive” in the continuum.⁷

⁷ It should be noted that many of these targeted measures have collateral or unintended consequences on other sectors. Diplomatic sanctions may embarrass elites, arms embargoes may weaken police and security services more generally, while commodity sanctions may cast a shadow over entire industries.

Types of Targeted Sanctions: Degrees of Discrimination (or relative “comprehensiveness”)

Individual/Entity targeted sanctions (e.g. travel ban, assets freeze; most discriminating)

Diplomatic sanctions (only one sector of government directly affected)

Arms embargoes or proliferation-related goods (largely limited impact on fighting forces or security sector)

Commodity sanctions other than oil (e.g. diamonds, timber, charcoal; tend to affect some regions disproportionately)

Transportation sanctions (e.g. aviation or shipping ban; can affect much of a population)

Core economic sector sanctions (e.g. oil and financial sector sanctions; affect the broader population and therefore are the least discriminating of targeted sanctions)

Comprehensive sanctions (non-discriminating)

Unintended Consequences

Unintended consequences are a critical aspect to consider when thinking about targeted sanctions. Although targeted sanctions do not have the same degree of unintended impact as comprehensive sanctions, it would be a mistake to assume that they do not result in some unintended consequences, both negative, and sometimes positive. Indeed, they are found in 91% of the case episodes.

Among the many possible unintended consequences considered in this study, the increase in corruption and criminality was the one most frequently observed (69%). The strengthening of authoritarian rule in the target (54%) and the diversion of resources (44%) were also frequently highlighted. Negative humanitarian consequences of sanctions, a frequent subject of debate, were observed in 39% of the episodes studied. Also importantly, the legitimacy and authority of the Security Council was harmed in more than one third of the cases (39%).

It is important to note that while many unintended consequences are avoidable, some are not and should be considered in the “costs” of the tool. Of course, as will be further discussed, awareness of the potential unintended consequences during the design of sanctions may help in the selection of the most appropriate measures, as well as in the development of strategies to mitigate their broader side-effects.

Evasion/Coping Strategies

Sanctions are prohibition norms that create powerful incentives for evasion, and there is evidence of evasion or coping strategies in over 90% of the cases of UN targeted sanctions. Targets of sanctions commonly devise means of evading the measures, from employing black market contractors (who charge a premium for their services) to using safe havens, disguises of identity, or front companies. At the same time, targets are likely to explore a variety of adjustment strategies to cope with the impacts of the sanctions. Stockpiling of critical materials is likely if sanctions are threatened in advance, while diverting trade through third countries, diversifying investment partners, and developing new technologies or industries that may be made economic the longer the sanctions remain in place.

EVASION/COPING STRATEGIES	Present		Missing	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Indications of evasion/coping strategies	51	91.1	6	9.7
Evasion	45	83.3	8	12.9
Black market contractors	37	69.8	9	14.5
Safe havens	23	44.2	10	16.1
Disguise of identity, forged documents	16	32.7	13	21
Informal value transfer systems	14	26.9	10	16.1
Front companies	14	27.5	11	17.7
Denial of inspection	13	22.8	5	8.1
Disguise vessels	13	24.5	9	14.5
Reliance on family members	6	12	12	19.4
Coping strategies	48	85.7	6	9.7
Diversion of trade through 3 rd countries	45	81.8	7	11.3
Stockpiling supplies	32	62.7	11	17.7
Diversify sources of funds or investment	19	33.9	6	9.7
Alternative value sources	9	16.7	8	12.9
Import substitution, new technology	8	14	5	8.1
Coerce/pressure major trade partners not to enforce	5	9.8	11	17.7
Shifting terms/subject of debate (diplomatic)	4	7.7	10	16.1
Other evasion/coping strategies	13	22.8	5	8.1

Relationship to Other Policy Instruments

Sanctions do not exist in isolation. No UN targeted measures were ever put in place without the presence of other policy instruments seeking to achieve similar or related objectives. Concomitant diplomatic negotiations occurred more than 95% of the time, and peacekeeping forces, many authorized by the UN, are on the ground in nearly 60% of the episodes. Some military force (i.e. limited strikes and operations, robust military force, no-fly zones or naval blockades) was used 55% of the time and legal tribunals were present in 47% of the cases.

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OTHER POLICY INSTRUMENTS	Present	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Diplomacy (pressure and/or negotiations)	59	95.2
Legal tribunals	29	46.8
ICC/ICJ	14	22.6
Special courts and tribunals	19	30.6
Peacekeeping operations	37	59.7
Threat of use of force	16	25.8
Use of force	34	54.8
Limited strikes and operations	19	30.6
Robust military force	23	37.1
No-fly zone	1	1.6
Naval blockade	2	3.2
Covert	8	12.9
Cyber-sabotage	5	8.1
Targeted assassinations	8	12.9
DDR/SSR	25	40.3

In 90% of the cases, UN sanctions were preceded or supplemented by other sanctions in the form of regional (AU, ECOWAS, EU) or unilateral measures. In 73% of the cases, other sanctions preceded the initial imposition of UN sanctions on the country. Often resulting from a request of a regional body that has already imposed individual sanctions (travel or assets freeze) on targets, UN measures complement preexisting sanctions. More recently, however, UN sanctions resolutions have been used as a basis for more extensive coordinated multilateral and unilateral sanctions (against Iran and DPRK), which have created controversy within the Council and some confusion in terms of implementation.

OTHER SANCTIONS	Present		Missing	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Regional sanctions already in place	46	76.7	2	3.2
EU	42	72.4	4	6.5
AU	1	1.6	4	6.5
OAS	1	1.6		
ASEAN	0	0		
ECOWAS	11	19.3	5	8.1
Unilateral sanctions already in place	38	63.3	2	3.2
US	38	63.3	2	3.2
UK	18	32.1	6	9.7
Other	7	12.7	7	11.3
Sanctions regimes in neighboring countries	34	54.8		

Thus, UN sanctions are better understood if seen in the context of these other contemporaneous policy instruments. Because these efforts are inherently interconnected, the planning, implementation and evaluation of targeted sanctions should be considered in terms of what they provide to, and benefit from, other initiatives taking place in the region. Specifically, while targeted sanctions may be a particularly useful tool for the UNSC to resolve difficult issues, they are also important if used to support and reinforce other (often regional) initiatives.

Every Sanctions Regime is Unique

Although comparing sanctions regimes and their episodes is a very useful way to understand their workings systematically, it is important to remember that every sanctions regime is unique. Each of them is embedded in a very specific historical, geographical and political context, with their own complexities, dynamics, and objectives. Previous experiences should not be seen as inherently predictive or precise roadmaps for future efforts.

SECTION TWO: Evaluating the Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

Most large scale comparative studies of the effectiveness of sanctions (which lump targeted sanctions together with comprehensive sanctions and unilateral measures) conclude that sanctions are effective or “work” about one-third of the time.⁸ Our analysis of 62 episodes of UN targeted sanctions over the past 22 years indicates that sanctions are effective in coercing, constraining or signaling a target on average about 22% of the time.⁹ As described in detail in Appendix B, we measure sanctions effectiveness as a function of two variables: policy outcome and the UN sanctions contribution to that outcome. Policy outcome is evaluated on a 5-point scale, with 1 representing least effective and 5 most effective, and UN sanctions contribution is measured on a six-point scale, with 0 representing a negative contribution and 5 representing UN sanctions as the most important contribution to the outcome. We only consider UN measures effective when the policy outcome is evaluated as a 4 or 5 and when the UN sanctions contribution to that outcome is at least a 3, meaning they reinforce other measures.

The pattern is more interesting and informative, however, when the analysis is broken down into the different purposes of sanctions (i.e. to *coerce* a change in behavior, *constrain* the activities of a target, or send a powerful *signal*). Here we find that targeted sanctions are much more effective in constraining or signaling a target than they are in coercing a change in target behavior. They are effective in coercing a change in behavior only 10% of the time. By contrast, they are effective in constraining target behavior (increasing costs and inducing changes in strategy) almost three times as frequently, or 28% of the time. They are nearly as effective in sending signals to target audiences, which they do 27% of the time. Table 2.1 displays the frequency distribution and associated percentages of each category of purpose of targeted sanctions.

Table 2.1 Sanctions effectiveness distribution

	Effective	Mixed	Ineffective
Coerce	10%	27%	63%
Constrain	28%	22%	50%
Signal	27%	44%	29%

⁸ Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott and Barbara Oegg, (2007) *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd Edition, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. See also, Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Valentina Krustev (2008) “The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(1): 92-110.

⁹ This is calculated on the following basis: a total of 38 case episodes have been evaluated as effective (5 in coercing, 16 in constraining, and 17 in signalling) out of a total of 169 possible (62 case episodes times 3 purposes minus 17 cases of non-applicable objectives = 169). $38/169 = 22.48\%$. This implies valuing the three distinct purposes of sanctions equally.

To illustrate this point more graphically and link it specifically to the 62 cases in the study, Table 2.2 on the following page displays those cases identified as effective and as ineffective for each of the three purposes. Those characterized as having mixed results were omitted from the analysis for the time being, but future analyses will likely lead to further insights.

Table 2.2 identifies in abbreviated form each of the episodes characterized as effective (4 or 5 out of 5) or ineffective (1 or 2 out of 5) and illustrates the striking variation among the different purposes. Out of a sample of 62 cases, the lowest number (only 5) of those evaluated as effective and the highest number (31) of those considered ineffective were attempting to coerce a change in behavior. A similar inverse pattern is observed in the other categories.

Thus, when thinking and talking about the utility of targeted sanctions, it is important to differentiate between the different purposes of sanctions. They are clearly more effective in accomplishing some policy goals (constraining and signaling) than others (coercing a change in behavior), and routinely should be evaluated as such.

Accordingly, it is important to improve the public debate on sanctions by moving away from a nearly exclusive preoccupation with their ability to coerce a change in behavior toward their ability to constrain actors (i.e. reduce their capacity to engage in proscribed activity) or to send a powerful signal about prevailing norms. It is important that policymakers be realistic about what sanctions can achieve. There should be reasonable expectations about what targeted sanctions can and cannot accomplish.

Based on our analysis of the relative effectiveness of targeted sanctions (that they are far more effective in constraining and signaling than in coercing a change in behavior) policymakers should be advised to avoid falling into the rhetorical trap of calling for “crippling” sanctions. While the phrase may be useful for some constituencies, it signals the degree to which they are mimicking the discourse about comprehensive sanctions regimes and reproducing a form of what scholars termed the “naïve” theory of economic sanctions more than forty years ago.

Table 2.2: Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

Effective

Coerce	Lib.1	Som.	DRC	SL	CDI	Total 5 10%
	E1	E4	E2	E4	E3	
	4	4	4	4	4	
Constrain	Lib.1	E1	E3	E2	E3	Total 16 28%
	E2	E4	E4	E4	E4	
	4	4	4	4	4	
Signal	Lib.1	E1	E3	E2	E3	Total 17 27%
	E2	E4	E4	E4	E4	
	4	4	4	4	4	

Legend:

AOT: Al-Qaeda/Taliban

CDI: Côte d'Ivoire

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

E-E: Ethiopia-Eritrea

FRY: Former Republic of Yugoslavia

G-B: Guinea-Bissau

Kos.: Kosovo

Lib.: Libya

Libert.: Liberia

SL: Sierra Leone

Som: Somalia

Sud.: Sudan

Talib.: Taliban

Rwan.: Rwanda

Ineffective

Coerce	Somalia		Haiti		Angola			Rwan.		Sudan 1		Sierra Leone		AQT		DRC		Sudan 2		CDI		Iran			Taliban		DPRK		Libya 2		G-B	
	E1	E2	E3	E1	E2	E3	E4	E1	E1	E2	E2	E3	E1	E2	E1	E4	E1	E2	E1	E2	E1	E2	E3	E1	E2	E1	E2	E1	E2	E1		
	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2		
	1	1	4	3	3	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	2	1	2	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2		

Constrain	Somalia		Haiti		Rwanda		Sierra Leone		AQT		E-E		DRC		Iraq		Sudan 2		CDI		Iran			Taliban		DPRK		G-B	
	E1	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E2	E1	E2	E1	E1	E1	E1	E2	E1	E4	E2	E1	E2	E1	E2	E3	E1	E1	E2	E1	E2	E1	
	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1
	0	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	1	3	2	2	1	0	2	1	3	4	1	2	2	2	2	3	3

Signal	Somalia		Haiti		Rwanda		Sud. 1		SL		DRC		Iraq		Sud. 2		CDI		Talib.	
	E1	E1	E2	E3	E4	E5	E1	E1	E2	E2	E3	E1	E1	E1	E1	E1	E2	E1	E2	E1
	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	4	0	1	4	3	4	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2	2	3	3	3

Total	
31	63%

Total	
29	50%

Total	
18	29%

Note: Cases in which the policy outcome is coded as a 3 are defined as mixed cases and excluded from this table.

SECTION THREE: Analytical Results

Building on the distinction between the different purposes of sanctions (to coerce, constrain, and/or signal), it is possible to sketch out elements of context, political will, design, relationship with other policy instruments, implementation, evasion, and unintended consequences that are correlated with effective and ineffective outcomes. It is important to emphasize that these are correlations. They are not causal inferences about which combinations of factors will produce particular outcomes. Some of them may be necessary, but they are not necessarily sufficient for effective (or ineffective) outcomes.

Coercion

The relatively small number of instances in which sanctions have been effective in coercing a change in target behavior share some characteristics that distinguish them from the average pattern observed in the entire set of cases. For example, while they do not have to be based on a unanimous UN Security Council resolution or devoid of any reservations from the permanent members (P-5), they are more likely to be effective if the goals are rather narrowly defined (such as convene elections or turn over suspects). The presence of secondary sanctions on a neighboring country (Liberia in the case of Sierra Leone and Eritrea with regard to Somalia) and the use of multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Kimberly Process show strong evidence of correlation with effective coercion. There is also some evidence of a positive correlation when there is evidence of an increasing rule of law in the target country, when there are indications of a direct political impact on the target, and when the target is forced to use alternative value sources to cope with the sanctions.

EFFECTIVE COERCION	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Political will	Unanimous UNSC vote	↘	-.258	.068
	Significant NGO pressure on UN deliberation	↗	.240	.086
	Panel of Experts/Monitoring team	↗	.231	.099
Target	Rebel faction	↗	.245	.080
	Primarily regional constituencies	↗	.273	.051
Sanction type	Secondary sanctions	↗↗↗	.394	.005**
	Diaspora tax	↗	.273	.051
Other actors	Kimberly process	↗↗↗	.394	.005**
Impact	Indirect political impact	↗	.272	.062
Evasion/coping	Use of alternative value sources	↗	.268	.067
Unintended consequences	Increases in corruption/criminality	↘↘	-.325	.031*

[†] ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation (p<0.10), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation (p<0.05*), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation (p<0.01**).

Effective Coercion: Libya, Episode 3 (April 1999 – September 2003)

Sanctions were suspended once the two suspects were handed over to the special Scottish Court in the Netherlands (as specified in UNSCR 1192) on 5 April 1999 and terminated with UNSCR 1506 (once compensation was provided and Libya renounced terrorism).

Purposes

Coerce the Government of Libya to provide compensation and renounce terrorism; and signal Libya and international community about norm against state-sponsored terrorism.

Sanction type

Sanctions suspended in April 1999, seven months after the passage UNSCR 1192, but not terminated until UNSCR 1506 in September 2003.

Coercion effectiveness (*Effective)

Assessment: 4/5, Suspects were turned over, trials conducted, compensation provided, and terrorism renounced, but not on the precise terms of the original UNSCRs.

UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Suspension of sanctions was significant to reinforce legal procedures underway in domestic and international courts regarding compensation.

Unintended consequences

Strengthening of authoritarian rule.

The instances in which attempts to coerce a change in behavior are notably ineffective are far more numerous (31 cases as opposed to 5). They also share characteristics that distinguish them from the average pattern observed in the entire set of cases, and often in the exact opposite direction as those just described. There is strong evidence of correlation between ineffectiveness and attempts to coerce a group engaged in the commitment of acts of terrorism or a state that harbors them. There is also evidence of correlation between ineffective coercion and the absence of attempts to use referrals to special courts and tribunals (like the ICTY or Special Court in Sierra Leone). Ineffectiveness is also associated with the ability of the target to develop substitutes for sanctioned items or is able to develop new technology.

There is some evidence of a correlation between ineffective attempts to coerce and some types of targets, particularly rebel groups, rather than government leadership. Failure to involve regional organizations, particularly if regional sanctions are not applied, is also associated with ineffective coercion. Finally, ineffective efforts to coerce a change in behavior appear to be correlated with sanctions that are regionally limited and not applied to an entire country. Arms embargoes imposed without other complementary measures (individual sanctions or commodity bans) and after protracted delays, tend to be particularly ineffective, as demonstrated in the case of Somalia, as are sanctions that are authorized but never imposed, such as the aviation ban in the Sudan or the sanctions authorized in Lebanon.

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

INEFFECTIVE COERCION	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Target	Terrorist group	↗↗↗	.405	.005**
	Primarily rebel faction	↗	.266	.062
Sanction type	Regionally limited sanctions (within the country)	↗	.273	.059
	Sectoral: Shipping	↗	.257	.072
Other actors	Kimberly process	↘↘↘	-.391	.006**
Other sanctions	Regional organizations	↘	-.278	.054
Other policy instruments	Special courts and tribunals	↘↘	-.309	.030*
Implementation	Assets frozen	↗↗	.479	.017*
	Accounts frozen	↗↗	.510	.020*
	Cancellation of credits	↗↗	.577	.025*
Evasion/coping	Import substitution, new technology	↗↗	.295	.046*
	Use of informal value transfer systems	↗	.287	.059

[†] ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation (p<0.10), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation (p<0.05*), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation (p<0.01**).

Constraint

There is evidence of a correlation between effective constraint if the primary objective of the sanction is to constrain a group engaged in acts of terrorism and if a terrorist group is the primary target of constraint. Interestingly, support for human rights as an objective is inversely associated with effective constraint. Effective constraint is also strongly associated with support for a judicial process. With regard to targets, effective coercion is correlated with specific parties to the conflict being identified, rather than situations when “all parties to the conflict” are identified as the target of the sanctions. There is strong evidence of a positive correlation if key regime supporters are meant to be constrained. With regard to the types of targeted sanctions associated with effective constraint, commodity sanctions (diamond embargoes, timber bans) and aviation bans are particularly effective. So too are government asset freezes and some diplomatic sanctions (such as a tightening of visas or the expulsion of categories of nationals).

Once again, the use of regional courts or special tribunals appears to be strongly correlated with effectiveness, as is the participation of some other actors, such as the Kimberly Process, where relevant. Although it is probably a reflection of the number of cases of effective constraint in the West African conflicts, there is evidence of correlation between the presence of regional (ECOWAS) sanctions and effective constraint facilitated by UN sanctions.

With regard to implementation, there is strong evidence of correlation between travel ban implementation and effective constraint, and evidence also of effectiveness when Member State reporting is requested. Once again, evidence of a direct political impact on the target is strongly correlated with effectiveness, while there is evidence of correlation when there are indications of a direct economic impact.

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Objectives	Support judicial process	↗↗↗	.378	.004**
	Human rights	↘↘	-.304	.020*
	Primarily counter-terrorism	↗↗	.297	.024*
Political will	Member state reporting requested	↗↗	.305	.021*
	Key regime supporters	↗↗↗	.375	.004**
Target	All parties to the conflict	↘↘	-.331	.012*
	Primarily terrorist group	↗↗	.306	.020*
	Leadership family members	↗	.253	.054
Norm signaled	Primarily counter-terrorism	↗↗	.297	.024*
	Commodity sanctions	↗↗↗	.365	.005**
Sanction type	Aviation ban	↗↗↗	.433	.001**
	Government asset freeze	↗↗↗	.441	.001**
	Regime asset freeze	↗↗	.297	.024*
	Diplomatic sanctions	↗↗	.297	.024*
Other actors	Kimberly process	↗↗↗	.482	.000**
Impact	Direct political impact	↗↗↗	.427	.002**
	Direct economic impact	↗↗	.332	.020*
Evasion	Disguise of identity/use of forged documents	↗↗	.329	.026*
Unintended consequences	Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains	↗↗	.327	.021*
	Widespread harmful economic consequences	↗↗	.360	.021*

[†] ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation (p<0.10), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation (p<0.05*), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation (p<0.01**).

Effective Constraint: Liberia Episode 4 (December 2003 – June 2006)

Following the departure of Charles Taylor (regime change) and progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone, a peace enforcement sanctions regime was established in Liberia to ensure compliance with the comprehensive peace agreement signed in Accra on 18 August 2003 and to support the transitional government of national unity. The Liberian ceasefire was maintained, DDR implemented, and elections were held during this episode. UNSCR 1521 lifted the previous sanctions and immediately re-imposed them in support of a new objective: peace enforcement. The Council also articulated specific criteria for lifting.

UNSCR 1532 imposed financial sanctions on Charles Taylor, his family, and other close associates for misappropriating Liberian funds and property and using them to destabilize the transitional government during the early phase of this episode. Taylor appeared before the Sierra Leone Special Court in April 2006 and was extradited to the Hague in June 2006. Elections were held in 2005 with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf taking office January 2006.

Purpose

Constrain and signal parties that might threaten the comprehensive peace agreement and the transitional government of national unity.

Sanction type

Arms embargo, travel ban applied to individuals (and members of their families) who might undermine the peace agreement or threaten the transitional government, ban on export of rough diamonds, and ban on export of timber (until certification schemes in place); asset freeze on Taylor, family members, and close associates was applied in UNSCR 1532 (12 March 2004).

Constraint effectiveness

Assessment: 4/5, Panel of Experts concludes that sanctions helped to stabilize the situation in Liberia; elections were held, DDR took place, though Taylor tried to de-stabilize the process at the outset.

UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Sanctions against the remnants of Taylor's regime reinforced the peacebuilding efforts of the government of Liberia, but international tribunals (the Sierra Leone Special Court and ICC) played a major role in constraining Charles Taylor.

Unintended consequences

Insufficient information available at present.

When it comes to ineffective efforts to constrain a target, the comparative analysis of case episodes suggests that specific targets should be designated, including leadership family members. There is strong evidence of ineffectiveness when "all parties to the conflict" and no leadership family members are designated. There is also strong evidence between absence of commodity sanctions (where relevant), aviation bans, and diplomatic sanctions and ineffective efforts to constrain a target.

With regard to implementation there is strong evidence of a correlation between ineffectiveness and the failure to specify enforcement authorities and where there is no evidence of direct political, economic, or social-psychological impact on the target. Not requesting Member State reports and the failure to freeze individual accounts is also associated with ineffective efforts to constrain.

INEFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Objectives	Negotiation of peace agreement	↗↗	.333	.011*
	Primarily cease hostilities	↗↗	.323	.014*
Political will	Member state reporting requested	↘↘	-.320	.016*
	All parties to the conflict	↗↗↗	.447	.001**
Target	Leadership family members	↘↘↘	-.447	.001**
	Government leadership	↘↘	-.317	.016*
	Individual targets	↘↘	-.311	.018*
Norm signaled	Authority of regional arrangements	↗↗↗	.435	.001**
	Primarily prohibition of war/armed conflict	↗↗	.313	.017*
	Commodity sanctions	↘↘↘	-.492	.000**
Sanction type	Sectoral sanctions			
	Aviation ban	↘↘↘	-.365	.005**
	Shipping	↘↘	-.307	.019*
	Arms imports embargo	↘↘	-.272	.038*
	Diplomatic sanctions	↘↘↘	-.340	.010**

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

Sanction type	Travel ban	↘↘		-.323	.014*
	Government asset freeze	↘↘		-.272	.038*
Other sanctions	Unilateral sanctions	↘↘		-.286	.032*
Other policy instruments	Special courts and tribunals	↘↘		-.276	.036*
Enforcement	Enforcement authorities specified	↘↘↘		-.351	.009**
Impact	Direct political impact	↘↘↘		-.434	.002**
	Direct economic impact	↘↘↘		-.429	.003**
	Direct social or psychological impact	↘↘↘		-.406	.003**
Evasion	Disguise of identity/ use of forged documents	↘↘		-.364	.013*
Unintended consequences	Widespread harmful economic consequences	↘↘		-.359	.022*

† ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation ($p < 0.10$), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation ($p < 0.05^*$), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation ($p < 0.01^{**}$).

Signaling

Effective signaling tends to be associated with UN Security Council attempts to support democracy (or restore unconstitutionally overthrown governments) and support for peace enforcement activities. Interestingly, there is evidence that they are inversely correlated with efforts to negotiate a peace agreement. There is also strong evidence of a correlation between effective signaling and the absence of an explicit threat prior to the imposition of the sanction. A certain element of surprise may play a role in signaling.

Signaling is likely to be effective if members of the family of the leadership and key regime supporters are targeted. The designation of specific individuals is a key part of effective signaling. In terms of types of sanctions, effective signaling is associated with commodity sanctions, travel bans on individuals, and secondary sanctions on a neighboring country. The presence of a peacekeeping operation in a neighboring country is also correlated with effective signaling, as are other processes (like commodity certification schemes), regional sanctions, and efforts to secure disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of military forces.

With regard to implementation, effective signaling is correlated with Member State reporting, the presence of a Panel of Experts or Monitoring Team, when there is evidence that the panels are interacting with other actors, and when enforcement authorities are specified. Actual enforcement of a travel ban is also correlated with effective signaling. There is strong evidence of a correlation between effective signaling and indications of a direct political impact and direct economic impact. Regrettably, however, both widespread economic harm and a significant burden on sending states are also associated with effective signaling.

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

EFFECTIVE SIGNALING	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Objectives	Democracy support	↗↗↗	.352	.006**
	Peace enforcement	↗↗↗	.325	.010**
	Negotiation of peace agreement	↘↘	-.253	.046*
Sanction regime	Threat of sanctions preceded imposition	↘↘↘	-.357	.005**
Political will	Member state reporting required	↗↗	.314	.015*
	Panel of experts/Monitoring team	↗↗	.293	.021*
Target	Leadership family	↗↗↗	.394	.002**
	Key regime supporters	↗↗↗	.377	.003**
	Individual targets	↗↗	.273	.032*
Norm signaled	Primarily non-constitutional change in government	↗↗↗	.350	.006**
Sanction type	Commodity sanctions	↗↗↗	.514	.000**
	Travel ban	↗↗	.322	.011*
	Secondary sanctions	↗↗	.280	.027*
Other actors	Kimberley process	↗↗↗	.466	.000**
	Peacekeeping mission in neighboring country	↗↗↗	.380	.004**
	Panel of experts interacting with other actors	↗↗	.403	.011*
Other sanctions	ECOWAS sanctions	↗↗↗	.387	.003**
Other policy instruments	DDR/SSR	↗↗	.306	.016*
Enforcement	Enforcement authorities specified	↗↗	.292	.025*
Impact	Direct political impact	↗↗↗	.415	.002**
	Direct social or psychological impact	↗↗↗	.361	.006**
	Direct economic impact	↗↗	.281	.041*
Unintended consequences	Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains	↗↗↗	.377	.006**
	Widespread harmful economic consequences	↗↗	.311	.039*
	Significant burden on implementing states	↗↗	.267	.048*

[†] ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation (p<0.10), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation (p<0.05*), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation (p<0.01**).

Effective Signaling: Angola, Episode 4 (January 1999 – December 2002)

Shooting down of second of two UN aircraft over UNITA controlled territory prompted strong reaction from UNSC (UNSCR 1221). Given the return to full-scale war, UN peacekeepers were removed in February 1999.

Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler assumed chair of Angola Sanctions Committee in January, which set up two expert panels in May (one on financing of UNITA and another on arms, later merged). This resulted in a major strengthening of the sanctions regime in terms

of implementation at the UN level. The PoE “Fowler Report” is released and creates a storm of protest by naming and shaming of African heads of state for their role in undermining UN sanctions. UNSC sets up a mechanism for monitoring sanctions violations (threat of secondary sanctions) in April 2000, but no secondary measures imposed.

Sanctions were continued in December 2000, and there was evidence that sanctions monitoring had disrupted UNITA’s supply lines. A December 2001 offensive against UNITA ended with Savimbi (and his Vice President’s) death in February 2002.

Phase out – A truce quickly followed in March, negotiations in April, and UNITA dismantled its armed wing in August. UN lifted sanctions in December 2002.

UNSCRs during the episode included UNSCR 1221 (January 1999) which expressed outrage and specifically named Savimbi and UNSCR 1237 (May 1999), which created a panel of experts. In March 2000 the “Fowler Report” S/2000/203 was released. Following this, UNSCR 1295 (April 2000), established a monitoring mechanism and UNSCR 1448 (December 2002) terminated sanctions immediately before Angola joined the UNSC.

Purposes

Coerce UNITA to cease hostilities and implement the peace agreement; constrain UNITA from being able to act autonomously; stigmatize UNITA and its supporters in other African countries (including heads of state).

Sanction type

Continuation of existing sanctions, but significant increase in enforcement mechanisms at the UN level, including enhanced monitoring (panels of experts), public naming and shaming of heads of state in the Fowler Report and a monitoring mechanism to increase enforcement and explore secondary sanctions.

Signaling effectiveness

Assessment: 5/5, Savimbi became the principal target and was thoroughly isolated by UNSCR 1221.

UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Diplomatic pressure was also significant.

Unintended consequences

Increases in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council, increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains.

There is strong evidence of a correlation between ineffective signaling and the absence of any direct political or social/psychological impact on the target. There is also evidence of an association between ineffective signaling and efforts to cease hostilities, when the facilitators of proscribed activity are not targeted, and when the entire government is not targeted. The absence of commodity sanctions (where appropriate) is also associated with ineffective signaling.

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

INEFFECTIVE SIGNALING	Variable	Relation [†]	Phi coefficient (correlation)	Statistical significance
Background	Regional organizations involved	↗↗	.278	.028*
Objectives	Primarily cease hostilities	↗↗	.308	.015*
Target	Facilitators of proscribed activity	↘↘	-.308	.015*
	Entire government	↘↘	-.271	.033*
Norm signaled	Authority of regional arrangements	↗↗	.346	.024*
Sanction type	Commodity sanctions	↘↘	-.313	.014*
Implementation	Substantive member state reports received	↘↘↘	-.380	.008**
	Direct political impact	↘↘↘	-.387	.003**
Impact	Direct social or psychological impact	↘↘	-.322	.015*

[†] ↗/↘ Some evidence of a relation (p<0.10), ↗↗/↘↘ evidence of a relation (p<0.05*), ↗↗↗/↘↘↘ strong evidence of a relation (p<0.01**).

Characteristics Associated with Effective UN Targeted Sanctions

Effective Coercion

- Goals are narrowly defined (e.g. convene elections, turn over suspects)
- Kimberly Process (a natural resource certification scheme) is involved
- Not focused on a terrorist or rebel group
- Direct political impacts on the target
- Accompanied by legal tribunals
- Presence of regional sanctions
- Applied to an entire country, not restricted to a particular region

Effective Constraint

- Primary objective and target is terrorist group
- Specific parties to the conflict are identified as targets of sanctions (not “all parties to the conflict”)
- Imposition of commodity sanctions
- Aviation bans
- Diplomatic sanctions
- Regime asset freeze
- Robust Security Council infrastructure in place to support implementation (sanctions committee and guidelines, panels of experts, Member State reporting, good coordination with relevant UN agencies, and in conflict sanctions, UN peacekeeping operations provided sanctions enforcement authority)
- Combined with other policy instruments such as legal tribunals

Effective Signaling

- Primary objective to support democracy (restore constitutionally elected government and support peace enforcement)
- Specific identification of individual targets, family members, facilitators, regime supporters
- Commodity sanctions (where applicable)
- Secondary sanctions on neighboring country
- Panel of Experts interacting with other relevant actors
- Enforcement authorities specified

SECTION FOUR: Designing UN Targeted Sanctions

Sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council are fundamentally political tools employed to address intractable challenges to international peace and security. By the time the Security Council considers sanctions, the situation is frequently dire and deteriorating, with violence or a crisis imminent or having already occurred. As a result, sanctions are designed under less than optimal conditions, with different levels of knowledge, different levels of engagement, and typically without much time for thoughtful deliberation. Agreed text from previous resolutions becomes the default, but may not be appropriate to the specific circumstances at hand. While every effort should be made to conduct pre-assessments (e.g. identification of targets, likely impacts, unintended consequences, and evasion strategies), such planning is often not possible.

To maximize effectiveness, a range of factors can and should be addressed in the course of designing UN targeted sanctions. Based on the TSC framework and findings, the following checklist of questions and issues to be considered in the design of UN targeted sanctions has been developed as a structured framework for contemplating the imposition of sanctions.

Checklist for Designing Sanctions

1. Purposes

What purposes are the sanctions intended to achieve?

- Coerce a change in the behavior of targets
- Constrain access to essential resources (e.g. finance, arms, technology/goods, expertise)
- Signal consequences for violations of international norms and/or stigmatize or isolate targets and activities violating international norms

What is the primary purpose?

- Coerce a change in behavior
- Constrain access to resources
- Signal norms or stigmatize target

2. Objectives and Norms

Objectives articulated in the UNSC resolutions that trigger new episodes.

- Non-proliferation
- Counter-terrorism
- Armed conflict
 - Cease hostilities
 - Negotiate peace settlement

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

- Enforce peace
 - Support peace building
- Democracy support
- Good governance
- Human rights
- Humanitarian crisis
- Protection population under R2P
- Support humanitarian efforts
- Support judicial process

Which specific international norms do the sanctions support?

- Non-proliferation
- Counter-terrorism
- Prohibition of war/armed conflict
- Non-constitutional change in government
- Improved governance (of natural resources and/or security sector)
- Human rights (such as the use of child soldiers, treatment of minorities, gender-based violence, and ethnic cleansing)
- Protect population under R2P
- Authority of the UN Security Council
- Authority of regional arrangements

3. Targets

Who are the intended targets?

- Entire government
- Government leadership
- Rebel faction
- Parties to the conflict
- Terrorist group
- Facilitators of proscribed activities
- Individual targets (e.g. inciting violence, human rights violations),
- Family members of targets
- Key regime supporters (financial, material, etc.)
- Domestic constituencies
- Regional constituencies
- Global constituencies

How are the targets related to the threat, and how will their designation promote the purposes of the sanctions?

What is the basis or justification for listing targets that can be shared publicly?
What are the listing criteria?

What information is obtainable regarding the targets (to gauge vulnerabilities and pressure points), and what detailed information is available (e.g. nationality, birth

date, place of birth, passport or travel identification number, etc.) in order for sanctions to be implemented effectively?

What specific actions do targets need to take for sanctions to be lifted?

How will the list of targets remain current?

What procedures will be available for targets to appeal their designations?

4. Sanctions types

Types of UN targeted sanctions (from most to least targeted):

- Individual sanctions
 - Travel ban
 - Asset freeze
 - Asset freeze and transfer
- Diplomatic sanctions
 - Revision of visa policy
 - Limiting of travel of diplomatic personnel
 - Closing of embassies/offices of official representation
 - Limiting number of diplomatic personnel
- Sectoral sanctions
 - Arms imports embargo
 - Aviation ban
 - Arms exports ban
 - Proliferation-sensitive material
 - Shipping
 - Oil service equipment
- Commodity sanctions
 - Diamonds
 - Timber
 - Charcoal
 - Oil import ban
 - Luxury goods
 - Other
- Financial sector sanctions
 - Investment ban
 - Diaspora tax
 - Financial services (insurance)
 - Central Bank asset freeze
 - Sovereign wealth funds

For individual targets, what assets are available in financial institutions, and do targets travel internationally?

Are diplomatic sanctions (e.g. limiting travel, closing embassies or reducing diplomatic personnel, visa restrictions) desirable?

Effectiveness of UN Targeted Sanctions

What specific resources (e.g. arms, specific dual-use goods or technology related to proliferation or other proscribed activities, or financial) are necessary for the targets to carry out sanctionable activities?

Do specific natural resources provide essential funding for sanctionable activities (e.g. diamonds, timber, oil, gold, etc.)?

What means of transportation/delivery are used to access resources, and are such restrictions feasible?

Does a ban on aviation (commercial airlines or servicing of aircraft) promote the objectives?

What are the implications for air safety or access to essential medical service? Are travel exemptions for humanitarian or religious purposes appropriate to consider?

What are the unique features of the target's economy (e.g. dependence on specific sectors or commodities such as oil, degree of economic integration, reliance on foreign credits, loans, insurance or other financial services)? What are the target's core economic sectors?

What other sanctions might be possible?

5. Scope limitations

Should sanctions be limited to certain territorial regions or areas?

- Demarcated region
- Area controlled by target

Is the imposition of sanctions delayed to allow compliance, or time-limited in duration?

- Delay in start
- Duration

What exemptions are necessary?

- Humanitarian (e.g. basic, religious, extraordinary)
- Other

6. Other sanctions

Are there existing unilateral or regional sanctions in place? If so, what are they, and how will UN sanctions interact with them?

- Regional organizations (EU, AU, OAS, ECOWAS, ASEAN)
 - Type
 - Scope
- Major states (US, UK, Other)
 - Type
 - Scope

7. Interaction with other measures

What other policy instruments are currently being employed and what alternatives to the imposition of sanctions are available?

- Diplomacy (pressure and/or negotiations)
- Legal tribunals
 - ICC/ICJ
 - Special courts and tribunals
- Peacekeeping operations
- Threats of use of force
- Use of force
 - Limited strikes and operations
 - Robust military force
 - No-fly zone
 - Naval blockade
- Covert measures
 - Cyber-sabotage
 - Targeted assassinations
- DDR/SSR

How do sanctions relate to other initiatives? Do they complement or potentially conflict?

8. Implementation

What infrastructure exists, or needs to be put into place at the UN level to implement sanctions, and should these measures be included in the Security Council resolution?

- Sanctions Committee (including guidelines, reporting requirements, implementation assistance)
- Panel of Experts to monitor implementation (expertise, expansion or contraction)
- Designations (by UNSC in resolution, sanctions committee, special commission)
- Reporting requirements (requested or required)
- Enforcement authorities (for inspection, interdiction, seizure, etc.)
- Consideration of violations or non-compliance
- Resources, including outreach initiatives and visits by the Committee/Chair
- Other

What do Member States require to implement sanctions? Are such capabilities extant or does technical assistance and training need to be provided to assist implementation?

What enforcement challenges are associated with implementing the sanctions?

Which private sector actors (e.g. financial institutions, commodity importers, etc.) are involved and how can their input and participation be ensured?

9. Evasion/coping methods

How can the sanctions be evaded and/or coped with?

- Evasion
 - Use black market contractors
 - Use safe havens
 - Disguise identity, use forged documents
 - Use informal value transfer systems
 - Construct/use front companies
 - Deny inspection
 - Disguise vessels (reflag, renumber, etc.)
 - Rely on family members
- Coping
 - Divert trade through third countries
 - Stockpile supplies
 - Find alternative value sources (e.g. diamonds)
 - Import substitute, develop new technology
 - Coerce-pressure major trade partners not to enforce
 - Shift terms/subject of debate (diplomatic)
- Other evasion/coping strategies

How can evasion attempts be managed or minimized?

10. Unintended Consequences

What are potential unintended consequences – both negative and positive?

- Increase corruption/criminality
- Strengthen authoritarian rule
- Strengthen instruments of security apparatus of sending states
- Rally round the flag effect
- Harmful effect on neighboring states
- Strengthen political factions
- Enhance stature of targeted individuals
- Increase in state regulatory/enforcement capacity
- Resource diversion
- Increase in the growth of the state role in the economy
- Burden on implementing states
- Increase in human rights violations
- Humanitarian consequences
- Decline in credibility/legitimacy of UN Security Council
- Reduction of local institutional capacity
- Widespread harmful economic consequences
- Human rights implications for sending states
- Other

How can potential consequences or side-effects be minimized?

11. Automatic renewal or re-start sanctions with new mandate

Consider whether there might be occasions when it might be desirable to re-start a sanctions regime, rather than carry on with the accumulated baggage of previous regimes (purposes, commitments, concerns)

- Maintaining focus
- Renewing mandate

12. Keeping sanctions current

How will sanctions be reviewed and updated?

- Periodic review of effectiveness, purposes
- Adjustment to list of targets
- Responses to evasion or non-compliance

13. Suspension or termination of sanctions

What are the specific criteria for termination or suspension of sanctions?

- Cease hostilities
- Sign peace accord
- Join coalition government
- DDR and/or SSR
- Resources under managed control
- Suspension of proscribed activities
- Termination of proscribed activities
- Renounce use of terrorism
- Other

How might modification, including suspension, of sanctions provide incentives?

14. Impacts and responses

What are the likely impacts of the sanctions (economic, political, and social/psychological), and possible responses by the targets to the imposition of sanctions?

What retaliatory measures targets are likely to take, or how can the impact of sanctions be deflected or reduced?

SECTION FIVE: General Findings and Recommendations

Findings

UN targeted sanctions are much more effective in signaling or constraining a target than they are in coercing a change in target behavior. They are effective in coercing a change in behavior only 10% of the time. By contrast, they are effective in constraining target behavior (increasing costs and inducing changes in strategy) almost three times as frequently, or 28% of the time. They are nearly as effective in sending signals to target audiences, which they do 27% of the time.

Every sanctions regime is unique. While comparing sanctions regimes by episodes is useful to understand systematically their workings, each case reflects a specific context with inimitable complexities; previous experiences are not necessarily predictive of future outcomes.

All UN targeted sanctions have multiple purposes (to *coerce* a change in target's behavior; to *constrain* a target from engaging in a proscribed activity; or to *signal* and stigmatize a target about the violation of an international norm). All sanctions signal international norms.

UN sanctions are always combined with other measures and never applied in isolation. They must be evaluated and integrated strategically within an overall approach to international peace and security challenges.

Types of sanctions: Arms embargos, while most frequently imposed, are among the least effective sanctions when not complemented with individual or commodity sanctions. Commodity and secondary sanctions (when appropriate) are particularly effective.

Regional groups play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of sanctions, with regional sanctions typically preceding effective UN measures and being complemented by UN action.

Targeting is important, and the list of targets should reflect the purposes of the sanctions. Too many, too few, or the wrong targets (or not properly identified), undermine the credibility of the measures.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ironically, UN targeted sanctions appear to be more effective when the UN takes sides in a conflict (most often, a State), rather than tries to remain neutral to all parties to the conflict. There is a general pattern in many of the African conflict cases in which the UN begins with a general arms embargo on all parties to the conflict and gradually becomes more targeted. The sanctions against Angola reflect this general pattern, increasingly becoming more targeted over time, initially on UNITA, but later on the personal role of Jonas Savimbi. The same is true of other cases, including Al-Qaida/Taliban in its early episodes.

UN sanctions remain largely targeted. Sanctions vary in degree of discrimination (from individual sanctions at one end of the continuum to financial and oil sector sanctions at the other). With the exception of Libya in 2011,¹¹ the UN has not implemented broad sectoral sanctions on any country since it imposed oil import sanctions on Sierra Leone in 1998.

Institutional learning within the UN has occurred over time – sanctions resolutions now routinely require creation of a sanctions committee, guidelines, designations, Member State reporting, panels of experts, and most recently, enforcement authorities.

Coordination within the UN system remains a problem and undermines sanctions' effectiveness. Panels of experts are sometimes perceived as a threat to, or a distraction by UN agencies operating on the ground in some conflict settings; the UN does not always act as a purposive agency (as "one UN").

Secondary sanctions, although applied relatively infrequently, appear to be highly effective. Examples include sanctions against Liberia in support of peace enforcement goals in Sierra Leone, and in the case of Somalia, against Eritrea (though their use was more threatened than applied in the latter case).¹²

Relationship to other sanctions While often complementary with UN measures, which sometimes provide the basis for additional preventive measures (Iran/DPRK), the differences between UN and other sanctions regimes can be confusing to implement for states and private sector entities. Regional and unilateral measures not only complicate but also can potentially weaken UN sanctions by making them appear less discriminating than they actually are.

Evasion, even of relatively effective measures, still takes place. Common methods include the diversion of trade through third countries and front companies, use of private (black market) contractors, safe havens, and alternative value sources (e.g. diamonds), re-flagging or disguising vessels, and stockpiling of supplies, diversification of funds and investment, and reliance on family members.

¹¹ Financial sector sanctions against Libya, though understandable given the context (both the urgency of the situation and the degree of the Qaddafi family direct control over and access to central government finances), was relatively indiscriminating and nearly had significant humanitarian consequences.

¹² This implies that there is more than one way to strengthen targeted sanctions. Most of the popular, scholarly, and policy discourse tends to the default position that the only way to strengthen sanctions is to expand their scope. Given the fact that when used, secondary sanctions are relatively effective, they should be considered an alternative to a general broadening (or what some have termed a "comprehensivization") of targeted sanctions. Secondary sanctions can be applied to one of two types of entities, either to states actively involved in the evasion of existing measures or to corporate entities (usually firms) actively engaged in evasion. The latter are typically identified in better panels of experts' reports, and there are instances where Sanctions Committees have acted on the recommendations and added evading firms to designation lists.

Unintended consequences result even from targeted sanctions, including increases in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, burdens on neighboring states, strengthening of political factions, resource diversion, and humanitarian impacts. An unintended consequence of ineffective efforts to constrain is the impact they can have on the credibility of the UN itself (which appears to some to be over-using sanctions for ineffective purposes).

Enhanced enforcement and implementation of UN sanctions through new inspection and seizure measures have had an important impact in constraining targets' access to prohibited items.

Recommendations

While further analysis of the TSC database will continue to yield additional insights, the following general recommendations are provided:

- ***Sanctions should be designed with comparable deliberation and planning of military operations***, with a clear understanding of purposes, objectives, consequences and impact assessments, evasion, contingency planning and exit strategies.
- ***UN targeted sanctions should remain targeted***. Making sanctions more comprehensive does not necessarily make them more effective. They can be deepened through secondary sanctions, rather than widened through less discriminating measures.
- ***Policymakers need to be realistic about what UN targeted sanctions can reasonably achieve***. Based on analysis of the relative effectiveness of targeted sanctions (they are far more effective in constraining and signaling than in coercing a change in behavior), expectations should be adjusted.
- ***Discursive treatment of UN sanctions matters***. Characterizations of sanctions as “crippling,” while perhaps useful politically, reinforces misperceptions about the nature of UN *targeted* sanctions.
- ***Enhance the quality of public debate***. Effective implementation of sanctions is made more difficult by the lack of accurate information and basic misperceptions about their impacts and effectiveness. It is important to inform the public debate with empirically-based information and engage in a dialogue with relevant policy communities (government and regional organizations, NGOs, academics) internationally.

APPENDIX A: Targeted Sanctions Consortium Project Description and List of Participants

- The first comprehensive, systematic, and comparative assessment of the impacts and effectiveness of major UN targeted sanctions regimes over the past twenty-two years: Al-Qaida/Taliban, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia-Eritrea, Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya I (1992-2003), Libya II (since 2011), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan I (1996-2001), Sudan II (since 2004) and Taliban.
- Conceptual innovations: (1) *episodes* within broader country cases allows detailed analysis of changes in types, purposes, and targets of targeted sanctions over time; (2) analysis of effectiveness in terms of *multiple and differing purposes* of targeted sanctions: to coerce (change behavior), constrain (access to critical goods/funds, raising costs and forcing changes in strategy), and signal/stigmatize targets (in support of international norms).

Project Team

- Co-directed by Thomas Biersteker (The Graduate Institute, Geneva) and Sue E. Eckert (Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University), the Targeted Sanctions Consortium consists of more than fifty scholars and policy practitioners from around the world, including the principal authors of the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin, and Stockholm Process manuals
- Policy practitioners working at both the global and national levels engaged from the outset in both the project design and research
- Researchers located in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America composed of both scholars and former practitioners (including UN Secretariat and expert panel members)

Current Status

- Research phase, funded by Governments of Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, ongoing, with presentations of preliminary findings (to date) in New York, Geneva, Washington, London, and Brussels
- Initial project outputs include a Practitioner's Guide, qualitative and quantitative databases, SanctionsApp, and scholarly publications

Targeted Sanctions Consortium Participants

The project is co-directed by Professor Thomas J. Biersteker, Gasteyger Professor of International Security and Director of the Programme for the Study of International Governance at the Graduate Institute, Geneva (thomas.biersteker@graduateinstitute.ch) and the Honorable Sue E. Eckert, Senior Fellow, Watson Institute of International Studies, Brown University (sue_eckert@brown.edu).

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For more information about TSC, please visit the websites at:

[http://graduateinstitute.ch/internationalgovernance/UN Targeted Sanctions.html](http://graduateinstitute.ch/internationalgovernance/UN_Targeted_Sanctions.html)
and http://www.watsoninstitute.org/project_detail.cfm?id=4.

For access to the Web version of SanctionsApp, please visit: sanctionsapp.com.

APPENDIX B:

Targeted Sanctions Consortium Framework for Analysis and Effectiveness Coding

The Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) has developed both a quantitative dataset and qualitative assessments of all twenty-two UN sanctions regimes. Distinct episodes within each country sanctions regime constitute the core unit of analysis, and the database constructed includes a total of 62 case episodes for comparative analysis, with 288 variables for each. Qualitative executive summaries of each country case, based on an extensive template of elements to be considered for each episode, have also been prepared. The following factors have been examined and catalogued by each research team in order to assess consistently and comprehensively the effectiveness of UN sanctions.

Context – situating UN sanctions in the history of the specific conflict or threat, including Member States directly affected, regional organizations involved, the inter-relationship with pre-existing unilateral or regional sanctions, whether the threat of sanctions preceded imposition, and the specific sequence of events which led the Security Council to impose targeted sanctions.

Purpose – recognizing that sanctions have different but concurrent purposes – to *coerce* a change in target's behavior; to *constrain* proscribed activities by limiting targets access to essential resources; and to *signal/stigmatize* targets for violations of international norms – a realistic assessment of the distinct policy goals sanctions are intended to advance is necessary.

Objectives/norms – sanctions are used to respond to a variety of threats to international peace and security: armed conflict (cease hostilities, negotiate a settlement, enforce peace agreements, protect human rights), countering terrorism, stemming proliferation of WMD, supporting election results, promoting effective resource management, and protection of civilians. All UN sanctions signal support or reinforce specific international norms.

Targets – for each sanctions purpose, there are usually multiple targets (e.g. government leadership, rebel faction, facilitators of proscribed activities, or key supporters of the above). Determining specific targets to be coerced or constrained is important, as are identifying targets and constituencies (e.g. domestic, regional, or global such as neighbors and NGOs) to be signaled through UN sanctions. Accurate, focused or precise, and up-to-date lists of targets are essential for effective and credible sanctions, and should be directly related to the purposes of the sanctions.

Sanctions type – a wide variety of sanctions are available: individual sanctions (asset freeze and travel ban), diplomatic measures (closing of, or downgrading embassy staff, limiting travel, or visa restrictions), arms embargo (or specific dual-use goods), transportation sanctions (aviation or shipping bans), commodities

(such as oil, diamonds, timber, etc.) or financial measures, and should be selected on the basis of unique circumstances related to targets.

Interaction with other policy instruments – sanctions are never employed in isolation, and almost always include diplomatic initiatives, UN peacekeeping operations, referral to international legal tribunals, or the use of force. The calibration and coordination of these tools is important in achieving the appropriate mix of instruments to accomplish policy objectives.

Implementation – at both the UN level (through designation of targets, creation of expert panels to monitor sanctions, and enforcement authorities) and Member State level (freezing of assets, travel restrictions, implementation and enforcement authorities), specific administrative and enforcement actions must be required.

Direct and indirect impacts – economic, political and social/psychological impacts of sanctions are usually discernible only after implementation of sanctions, but should be considered in the design of the sanctions regime and correlated with the purposes of sanctions.

Unintended consequences – both negative (e.g. strengthening leadership or political factions, increased corruption and criminality, resource diversion, burdens on neighboring states, or humanitarian concern) and positive (e.g. increased regulatory and enforcement capacity, enhanced credibility of UN) consequences of sanctions should be anticipated before imposition, and monitored throughout the duration of UN sanctions.

Evasion – efforts to evade sanctions always will take place, and should be anticipated. Common methods include the diversion of trade through third countries and front companies, use of private (black market) contractors, safe havens, and alternative values sources (e.g. diamonds), re-flagging or disguising vessels or stockpiling of supplies.

Evaluation of Effectiveness

The elements described above were converted into 288 variables and a binary coding scheme employed to assign a value to most variables.¹³ The policy outcomes associated with the targeted sanctions were assessed for each episode, differentiating among the three purposes of coercing, constraining, and signaling/stigmatizing, taking into consideration direct and indirect impacts, unintended consequences, implementation, and evasion.

For each episode, effectiveness is measured along a continuum ranging, for example in the case of coercion, from complete intransigence/no change in behavior by the target, to all principal objectives of sanctions being met. A five

¹³ In addition to binary variables, the database also includes Lickert scales and numerical identifiers for pre-coded variables, as well as open fields in which relevant information can be recorded. The latter is particularly important for some variables, since data on implementation, impacts and unintended consequences, and evasion is largely anecdotal.

point scale is utilized, with 1 representing least effective and 5 constituting most effective. For constraint, 1 equates to no discernible constraints experienced by the target, and 5 represents significant costs to the target resulting in a change of strategy or difficulties in engaging in proscribed activities. In the case of signaling/stigmatizing, 1 constitutes failure of international norms to be articulated and/or no stigmatization of the target, with 5 indicating clearly articulated norms and full stigmatization/isolation of the target.

Following scoring of the policy outcome, the contribution of UN targeted sanctions to that outcome is assessed for each episode – often the most difficult analytical aspect of the exercise. Measurement of sanctions contribution considers other instruments utilized by the international community at the time (such as diplomatic pressure, use of force, etc.), indications by the target of the impact and role of UN sanctions, and the nature of sanctions relative to the primary purpose. Again, a five point scale is used in which 1 means no discernible sanctions contribution, and 5 indicates that UN sanctions are the single most important factor to the policy outcome. Scores of 4/5 are considered effective, 1/2 are defined as ineffective, with 3 representing mixed results. The following framework of coding rules was used in assessing the effectiveness of each episode.

Coding Effectiveness¹⁴

1. **Coercion** is defined in terms of a change of behavior of the target.

Effectiveness is measured on a continuum ranging from:

- (1) Lack of significant change in behavior, ignoring the UNSCR, or complete intransigence.
- (2) Agreeing to a process and/or engaging in negotiations that could result in settling or resolving the dispute or in obfuscation, delaying, or changing terms of debate.
- (3) Accommodation or significant concessions to resolve the dispute.
- (4) Meeting most of the objectives of the UNSCR and/or approximating the core purposes as originally articulated in the UNSCR (but not necessarily according to the explicit terms spelled out in the original UNSCR).
- (5) Meeting all the principal objectives of the UNSCR.

¹⁴ To determine the sanctions contribution to effectiveness, each episode was evaluated by mapping other instruments in play at the time; looking for explicit evidence or reference to targeted sanctions by the target; and analyzing the nature of targeted sanctions relative to the objective or core purpose. In each of the categories or purpose (coerce, constraint, and signal), there is a primary target or audience (parties to the conflict), which varies by episode.

2. UN Sanctions contribution to coercion

- (0) Negative (regime is strengthened and increases its proscribed activity).
- (1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution).
- (2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome).
- (3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures).
- (4) Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target).
- (5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions).

3. **Constraint** includes limiting access to essential resources (finance, goods/technology, arms, expertise, or political options), slowing target activities, buying time for negotiations, and raising costs for targets to continue proscribed activities. Effectiveness is measured on a continuum ranging from:

- (1) No discernible constraints experienced by the target.
- (2) Increases in costs can be managed by the target (sanctions are largely a nuisance factor) perhaps due to ease of evasion.
- (3) Slight increases in costs to target (as evidenced by diversion of trade through third countries, and/or delay in engaging in proscribed activity and/or diminution in the frequency of engagement in proscribed activity).
- (4) Increases in costs, minor changes of strategy of the target, statement that target may be experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity.
- (5) Significant increases in costs, changes of strategy of the target, statement that target is experiencing financial/material/logistical difficulties and/or constrained from engaging in proscribed activity.

4. UN Sanctions contribution to constraint

- (0) Negative (regime is strengthened and increases its proscribed activity).
- (1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution).
- (2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome).
- (3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures).
- (4) Major (sanctions appear necessary but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by target).
- (5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions regime).

5. **Signaling/Stigmatizing** includes *signaling* targets, third parties, domestic constituencies, and the international community about the consequences of norm violation and *stigmatizing or isolating* targets and activities for violating international norms.

(1) Norm (or norms) not articulated, no stigmatization and/or clear evidence of legitimation.

(2) Norm (or norms) poorly articulated (e.g. too many, diffusely articulated), limited evidence of stigmatization and/or possible legitimation.

(3) Norm (or norms) articulated, and some stigmatization of target.

(4) Norm (or norms) articulated and targets strongly stigmatized.

(5) Norm (or norms) clearly articulated and target fully stigmatized and/or isolated¹⁵ (e.g. effective signaling to the international community and stigmatizing and/or isolation of the target).

6. **UN Sanctions contribution to signal/stigmatization**

(0) Negative (regime is strengthened and increases its proscribed activity).

(1) None (no discernible sanctions contribution).

(2) Minor (other measures taken appear most significant to outcome).

(3) Modest (sanctions reinforced other measures).

(4) Major (sanctions appear necessary, but not sufficient; or some acknowledgement by the target).

(5) Significant (the single most important factor is the presence of UNSC sanctions).

¹⁵ NB: This is focused on the international community as the principal audience for signaling. The evaluation of effectiveness of signaling would vary for other audiences.

UN Targeted Sanctions Cases

