

Boomerangs to Partnerships?

Explaining State Participation in Transnational Partnerships for Sustainability

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Introduction

At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa (2002), Brazil announced an agreement with the World Bank and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) for the conservation of 12% of the Brazilian Amazon, an area roughly equal to the size of Spain. The agreement established a partnership – the Amazon Regional Protected Areas (ARPA) – for collaborative financing, management and implementation of conservation programs of unprecedented scope. Paradoxically, only a decade earlier, the same actors were entangled in a contentious relationship and ‘boomerang’ type of pressure was exercised by advocacy networks via the World Bank for greening Brazil’s development policies in the Amazon (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler and Keck 2007). The story of ARPA is emblematic of the substantial transformation of the roles of states and transnational actors, conceptualized here as non-state actors with substantial cross-border activities, in global environmental governance.

A variety of non-state actors, including both for-profit companies and advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs), increasingly engage in voluntary self-regulation as well as in collaborative environmental governance with states through transnational public-private partnerships. Transnational partnerships¹ such as ARPA are soft agreements between state and non-state actors on specific governance objectives and on means to advance them across borders. Over the last ten years, such arrangements have become a pervasive feature in global environmental governance as well in other spheres such as global public health, food safety standards, or humanitarian assistance.

¹ I use the term ‘transnational partnerships’ in the rest of the paper as shorthand for transnational public-private partnerships.

How can we account for the visible evolution of relations between states and transnational actors from lobbying or contestation towards more complex modes of interactions including collaborative governance for the environment? Why do states like Brazil, which traditionally care about non-infringement of sovereignty over natural resources, increasingly collaborate with NGOs and the private sector in their management? What are the implications for state authority and intergovernmental regimes?

While there is hardly a disagreement in the literature on the rise of transnational actors and new modes of governance, their impact on the state remains debated and insufficiently illuminated by empirical research. Some scholars of globalization have interpreted transnational partnerships as one manifestation of the insufficiency of the state in addressing complex global challenges and shifting power to transnational actors (Mathews 1997; Kobrin 1998; Reinicke 1999). Others proclaim the continued primacy of states and emphasize the ability of those with power to manipulate governance networks such as partnerships to their advantage (Waltz 1999; Drezner 2004). Still other scholars note the futility of the weak state – strong state debate and consider that the state might ‘rearticulate’ itself to partake in and orchestrate new mechanisms of governance (Slaughter 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2003; Evans 1997; Abbott and Snidal 2009). Although the ardor of these debates has somewhat subsided, we still lack a systematic empirical assessment of competing arguments on the political dynamics that drive the merging of transnationalism and statism in environmental governance. Such systematic analysis is needed not only to discern the validity of competing arguments, but even more importantly to gain a better understanding of the apparatus available to states for governing global issues.

This paper seeks to advance the study of environmental politics by elaborating a

model of the domestic and international determinants of the “rearticulation” of the environmental state in the context of globalization and its participation in transnational public-private partnerships. The existing literature on transnational partnerships for the environment establishes important macro trends of diversification and rescaling of governance both below and above the central state and horizontally across jurisdictions (Andonova and Levy 2003; Backstrand 2008; Biermann et al. 2007; Borzel 2009; Witte et al. 2003; Glasbergen et al. 2007). It also captures the exponential growth of public-private collaborations. The UN Commission for Sustainable Development alone has registered over 350 partnerships following the 2002 Johannesburg Summit (Biermann et al. 2007). The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), created as an intergovernmental funding institution, now operates also through partnerships such as the Small Grants Program with over 10,000 small-scale partnerships, or large partnership initiatives such as ARPA (Andonova 2010; Streck 2007). The UN Fund for International Partnerships created in 1999 has fostered over 480 partnership projects between UN agencies, governments, and non-state actors, of which 144 are in the area of the environment.² The SEED program, which elicits a bottom-up competition for innovative and locally driven partnerships, has registered submissions of hundreds of partnerships for sustainability across the globe.³ These initiatives are just samples of what has become a sea of partnership activity. Transnational partnerships are increasingly present in international regimes such as those for climate governance, development assistance, or biodiversity. For example, partnerships are at the core of the World Bank activities for climate change (Andonova 2010, Hale and Rogers 2011) and have provided a stimulus for the design and adoption the REDD+ mechanism under the United Nations Convention for Climate

² See www.un.org/partnerships/, accessed October 2011.

³ See www.seedinit.org/, accessed November 2011.

Change (UNFCCC).

The aggregate trends on transnational partnerships for the environment reveal strong presence and even orchestration by states and public institutions (Andonova and Levy 2003; Biermann et al. 2008; Andonova 2010; Hale and Rogers 2011). While scholars have called for thicker conceptualizations of the changing role of the state in global governance and its modes of engagement in transnational collaborations (Mol 2007; Conca 2006; Borzel and Risse 2005), the literature has made limited strides in that direction, particularly in terms of empirical research. We still have a limited systematic conceptual and empirical understanding on how and via what mechanisms states are reconfigured to engage the transnational sector in collaborative governance for the environment. Are states reducing their substantive policy making and instead shifting their responsibility to non-state actors to address failures in environmental governance via partnerships (Mol 2007; Conca 2006)? Is the field of partnership collaboration largely manipulated by powerful donor countries? Or do transnational partnerships reflect the ability of the state and its constituent units to take initiative and experiment with new mechanisms that further policy agendas and their implementation (Mol 2007; Slaughter 2004; Andonova 2010; Hoffmann 2011). We lack systematic theoretical and empirical explanation of why some states embrace opportunities to engage in public-private collaborations, while others restrict them or are left behind; and what are the implications of this variation for the effects produced by transnational partnerships.

This paper argues that in order to gain a better understanding of how and under what conditions states increasingly engage with transnational actors in collaborative environmental governance, we need to consider the interplay between the domestic constituencies of transnational actors, governmental agencies, and the opportunity structures afforded by domestic and international institutions. The study speaks to the

broader literatures on globalization and environmental governance by exploring the relative significance of alternative arguments about the changing role of the state in a policy arena characterized by a high interdependence and complexity. The next section specifies six hypotheses on the conditions for state participation in transnational partnerships, deriving from competing perspectives on globalization and the state, and the analytical framework on the interplay between transnational actors and domestic and international opportunity structures. The hypotheses are tested through cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of state participation in some 280 partnerships adopted at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. The conclusion draws the implications of the analysis about the likely contributions and limitations of public-private collaboration in addressing global environmental problems.

The State and Transnational Partnerships: Six Hypotheses

Compensation for the retreating state

The retreat of the state and the shift of authority to increasingly powerful and resourceful transnational actors was a common theme at the onset of the contemporary era of complex globalizations (Mathews 1997; Kobrin 1998; Schmidt 1995; Strange 1996). The retreat of the state, wrote Susan Strange, “relates not to the quantity of authority exercised by the governments of most territorial states but to the quality of that authority. It rests on the failure of most governments to discharge those very basic functions for which the state as an institutions was created.”(xii). Scholars writing in the neo-Gramscian tradition have interpreted transnational partnerships in similar vein, emphasizing their potential for corporatist capture of the retreating state intended to “reinforce a pattern of economic globalization that is concentrating power in the hands of global corporations

and generating excessive social and environmental costs.” (Utting 2000 pp2-3; Zummit 2003).

The limitations of state policies and capacity to respond to global environmental risks appeared even more pronounced compared to other areas of the political economy. The state-centered literature on international environmental regimes identified the capacity of states as a critical variable for regime effectiveness (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Young 1999; Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998), but also found that the effort and financial transfers contributed towards that end by international institutions are miniscule compared to the scale of the problems (Keohane and Levy 1996). Critical scholars further questioned the adequacy of the ‘environmental state’ in providing solutions to the multi-scalar environmental crises, many of which are directly associated with state intervention and coercion (Lipschutz and Conca 1993; Conca 2005). The economic literature, drawing on the concept of the environmental Kuznets Curve, similarly suggested that economic underdevelopment and limited resources are likely to constrain the institutional and policy capacity of a substantial portion of states to address environmental problems.

Against such a policy background and in the context of rapidly expanding and vibrant advocacy and self-regulation network in global environmental politics, it is not surprising that transnational public-private interactions were viewed early on largely as functional compensation for weak capacities and governance failures of the ‘retreating’ state to supply global public goods (Mathews 1997). Squeezed between growing transnational pressures, limited resources and a declining ability to regulate, the state had no choice but to yield authority to non-state actors and bring in their resources and influence in the mold of public governance (Reinicke 1999; Reinicke and Deng 2000; Mathews 1997; Castells 2006; Stern and Seligmann 2004; Kaul et al. 2005). Hypothesis 1 summarizes the logic of transnational partnerships emerging as compensation for

insufficient capacity and governance failures of state-centered institutions:

H1) The lower the institutional capacity of states and the greater the environmental governance gaps they experience, the more likely they are to participate in transnational partnership as a compensation mechanism, all else equal.

The arguments behind Hypothesis 1 are often used in the globalization literature as ‘strawmen’ against which to reassert the significance of the state. The systematic examination of the relevance of capacity limitations and environmental failures is more substantive here. The analysis takes as a starting point that such failures exist, and will seek to establish empirically to what extent they are a direct and sufficient driver of the increasing state engagement in transnational partnerships.

Instruments of the powerful state

Scholars writing in the neo-realist traditions reacted strongly to notions of state retreat, arguing that forms of private and hybrid governance are either inconsequential in what continues to be a state-centered international system (Waltz 1999; Krasner 2003), or are instruments of powerful states (Drezner 2004; Knill and Lehmhuhl 2002). From this perspective transnational partnerships can be viewed as an artifact of powerful states’ interests to create and exploit multiple forums of cooperation in ways that ultimately may undermine multilateralism (Drezner 2004). Transnational governance is in essence captured by powerful states rather than by advocacy or corporate actors. The logic of transnational partnerships as instruments of a powerful state is summarized in the next hypothesis.

H2) States with more power and resources in global environmental politics are more likely to initiate and participate in PPP as an alternative means of influence, all else equal.

The observable implications of Hypothesis 2 as to the patterns of state participation in transnational partnerships for the environment are almost diametrically opposed to those of Hypothesis 1. This is not surprising as they summarize two extremes in the globalization and governance debate. Both hypotheses, however, assume (or assume in the case of H2) what the role of transnational actors is in reshaping governance rather than to consider under what conditions such alliances are more or less likely to take place. While bringing the ‘state back in’ in analyzing transnational hybrid governance, neorealist arguments adopt such a narrow view of the state that they omit potentially significant political dynamics of substantial restructuring of state-society relations across states and in global governance.

The Rearticulated the state, but how?

The debate on the decline versus the continued omnipresence of the state has succeeded in elucidating a clear although rather general expectation about the impact of globalization, transnational actors and the state on global governance. Ultimately, however, this juxtaposition has proven limiting and relatively futile in explaining the variation in modes of governance and the variable roles states plays in the process of institutional reconfiguration. Scholars have challenged the “zero sum” debate on the power and authority of the state and transnational actors, and anticipated the ‘rearticulation’ of the state (Evans 1997; Slaughter 2004) or a world order of ‘networked minimalism’ whereby networked governance interplays with but does not supersede the

governance by states (Keohane and Nye 2000). The rearticulated state is neither sidelined by transnational actors and global markets, nor does it remain unchanged. The state re-groups to be active and a relevant participant in the reshaping of institutions and global governance, but state power is no longer omnipresent and the sole determinant of governance outcomes (Evans 1997; Slaughter 2004; Keohane and Nye 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2003).

Considerable uncertainty remains, however, as to the mechanisms and conditions through which the rearticulation of the state takes place across different contexts to include closer collaborative governance with transnational actors (Evans 1997; Conca 2005; Mol 2007). The environmental politics literature has made great advances in examining the political dynamics of the rise of private authority – from voluntary certification schemes advanced by NGOs to private self-regulations through codes of conduct, industry certifications and corporate social responsibility practice.⁴ Although the focus here is on the source of authority beyond the state, this literature takes note of the ‘shadow’ of the state in shaping the context and incentives in which private authority takes place (Cashore et al. 2004; Risse 2011). The political economy literature on the variation and diffusion of private environmental regulation demonstrates the significant relevance of domestic institutional variables alongside transnational markets (Prakash and Potoski 2006; 2007, Perkins and Neumayer 2010, Garcia-Johnson 2001). Several recent studies examine in comparative perspective the restructuring of state-society relations in ‘areas of limited statehood,’ suggesting that private regulations and public-private partnerships emerge in the ‘shadow’ of the state even in a relatively weak institutional context rather than as a substitute for limited capacity (Borzal 2009; Risse

⁴ The literature on private authority in environmental politics is substantial and expanding, see Haufler 2001; Prakash and Potoski 2006; Cashore et al. 2004; Pattber 2007, and Vogel 2008 for review.

2011). The exponential growth of transnational partnerships for the environment and the variable patterns of state participation provide in some sense a larger laboratory to stipulate the processes through which the rearticulating of state-society relations happens, and to examine empirically the patterns of such engagement against the alternative, more limited views of the state.

In order to specify the variable conditions for the ‘rearticulation’ of the state through transnational public-private collaborations, the analysis takes as a departure point ‘opportunity structure’ framework, elaborated by Kathryn Sikkink (2005), on the interplay of domestic and international institutional structures in influencing the evolution of state-society relations. The framework engages head on the possibility of multiple types of interactions between states and transnational actors and the possibility of movement from contentious and boomerang strategies towards public-private coalitions. The framework uses two dimensions – the openness of international institutions and of domestic institutions – to discern the possibility for variation of activist strategies vis-à-vis state structures across periods of times and contexts. Within these structural dimensions, I also add consideration of the domestic constituency effect of transnational actors and the agency of units of government in actively reshaping opportunity structures for collaboration within given institutional contexts. By considering the interplays between domestic and international institutional structures and agency, I posit that two types of transformations have facilitated state engagement in transnational partnerships for the environment: i) the greater pluralism of states reflecting waves of democratization and thicker domestic constituencies of transnational networks; ii) and the entrepreneurial state agencies using transnational and international opportunity structures to export policy agendas. These dynamics and associated hypotheses are discussed in turn.

The waves of democratization that closely preceded and overlapped with the

onset of contemporary processes of globalization have modified the domestic opportunity structure for public-private cooperation both by increasing the openness of domestic institutions (Sikkink 2006) as well as by facilitating a greater domestic presence of transnational networks. This transformation is particularly evident in the politics of the environment. The processes of democracy building of the 1990s and up to this day have strong transnational and environmental components. The environmental movements were part of the dissident core against communism in the Soviet sphere (Hicks 1996). Elsewhere, environmentalisms similarly linked issues of human rights and liberty to environmental degradation (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hochstetler and Keck 2005; Fox and Brown 1997). The consolidation of democracies has been furthermore supported with substantial financial and institutional support for non-governmental organizations by development agencies, international organizations and transnational non-state actors. These actors have opened channels for state-society collaborations in the way that such programs have been administered. Democracy-building and environmental assistance has had the dual effect of consolidation of the non-state sector but also of its taming and professionalization (Fagan 2005; 2011; Hochstetler and Keck 2005). While the professionalization of the environmental NGO community raises concerns about its increasing detachment to grass-roots activism (Fagan 2011), it has also had the effect of increasing the interplay and interest of transnational and state actors in collaborating more closely through internationally funded projects and programs. The variable extent to which states have undergone processes of consolidation of liberal democracies is thus likely to influence the opportunity structure for public-private collaboration both by increasing the overall degree of openness of domestic institutions and by strengthening the capacity of civil society for such interactions. Hypothesis 3 formulates this expectation.

H3. The stronger the consolidation of liberal democracy, the more likely states are to engage in public-private partnerships for the environment, all else equal.

The pluralization of domestic environmental politics has been further enhanced by the dramatic rise in the number, diversity and practices of transnational non-governmental networks. The number of transnational organizations has grown from about 2,795 in 1970 to 48,220 by 2010 as reported by the Yearbook of International Organizations.⁵ In the environmental sphere, even more important than the sheer number of organizations is the accompanying density of local networks, and the diversification of the transnational sphere to include an increasing number of business networks for the environment and a multiplicity of strategies pursued by advocacy NGOs including direct governance in collaboration with business or local communities.

This diversification of transnational networks for the environment and their deeper reach in domestic politics has enhanced the opportunity structure for transnational public-private collaborations, I posit, by creating domestic constituencies and communities of practice. The presence and activities of transnational non-governmental networks varies considerably across countries, depending on path-dependent institutional context as well as on market and environmental incentives (Garcia-Johnson 2001; Prakash and Potoski 2007; Espach 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2005). The more dense presence of transnational environmental networks domestically implies greater opportunities for the diffusion of advocacy and business norms for the environment and an increasing demand for state engagement in new forms of

⁵ Yearbook of International Organizations accessed via <http://www.uia.org/statistics/pub.php>, June 2007.

environment governance. States with greater density of domestic constituencies of transnational environmental networks are more likely to identify domestic benefits from and opportunities for transnational collaboration. They are furthermore less likely to fear sovereignty cost or redistribution of influence away from the state, as some forms of norm internalization, trust and control are more likely to have been established (Sikkink 2005; Hochstetler and Keck 2005; Garcia-Johnson 2001; Andonova 2004; Steinberg 2001). Collaboration with transnational business and civil society is thus processed through domestic politics and opportunity structures rather than imposed on weak states or controlled by powerful ones. The following hypothesis specifies the constituency effect of transnational advocacy and business networks on the likelihood of public-private collaboration.

H4: States are more likely to engage in transnational partnerships, the stronger the domestic presence of transnational advocacy and/or business networks for the environment, all else equal.

Hypothesis 4 suggest that while transnational networks are likely to influence the opportunity structure for transnational partnerships via domestic practices, states retain an important role in advancing or blocking such opportunities. The following section considers the agency of states and the role of international institutions in further shaping the opportunity structure for such alliances.

Entrepreneurial states with active policy agendas are more likely to have both interest and agency capacity to seek cooperation with transnational actors and to establish transnational mechanisms to advance preferred policies or instruments. Exporting domestic policy preferences and leader-laggard dynamics have been important political

drivers of formal intergovernmental regimes for the environment (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993), as well as of informal transnational measures such as labeling standards or regulatory diffusion (DeSombre 2000; Vogel 1995). The attractiveness of exporting environmentalism via networks as well as international institutions, if anything, has increased with the advent of globalization which makes the effectiveness of domestic norms and their economic consequence highly dependent on transnational spillovers and externalities.

The scholarship on transnational relations furthermore emphasizes that taking a disaggregated view of the state whereby units of government are seen as actors with agency, is particularly important for understanding its multiple roles in transnational governance (Keohane and Nye 1971; Risse-Kappen 1995; Slaughter 2004; Raustiala). In states with active environmental policy, units of government such as environmental ministries or environmental departments in foreign aid and foreign policy agencies are likely to be central players in the rearticulation of governance practices to engage transnational actors. Partnerships with transnational actors can provide soft ways for reformers to tie their hands behind voluntary agreements, often with a specific term limit, to generate new focal points and resources for advancing reform both domestically and internationally. Partnerships can also help government agencies to solve domestic principal-agent problems, particularly when faced with multiple principals and conflicting principal demands (Milner 2006). By engaging transnational actors in voluntary programs and agreements that correspond closely to the agency mandate and policy preference, government departments in effect increase incrementally their agency autonomy to pursue a specific international agenda that may please some of their principals and constituencies, but may have been blocked otherwise by opponents if a formal agreement by all principals is required. Transnational partnership networks can

thus open new opportunities for simultaneous agency influence and policy advancement on the domestic and international political scenes (Haas 1989; Pollack 1997).

In sum, the opportunity structure for transnational partnerships is likely to reflect the incentives of states and their environmental agencies to actively carve out new space for such collaboration in the global public domain. Far from retreating, such states typically have both a vibrant policy agenda and some capacity to advance issues via new collaborations (Evans 1997; Steinberg 2001). The next hypothesis captures the agency of the entrepreneurial state in fostering transnational partnerships.

H 5 The more active the environmental policy and bureaucracy of countries, the more likely they are to initiate or participate in transnational partnerships, all else equal.

Hypothesis 5 attributes considerable agency to the state in shaping the opportunity structure for transnational partnership. However, contrary to the powerful state hypothesis (H2) it allows us to conjecture that even states with weaker capacity in terms of access to resources can be motivated by an active or reformist policy agenda to engage in collaboration with transnational actors precisely to overcome resource and political constraints. Indeed several studies demonstrate that access to transnational networks of different types (epistemic, advocacy, business or transgovernmental) can be a critical source of leverage for environmental policy entrepreneurs in developing and transitional countries (Andonova 2004, Slaughter 2004, Haas 1998, Steinberg 2001). Networks do not step in to substitute for the retreating state; rather they are integrated to work for an activist agenda as part of the state.

Finally, state participation in intergovernmental institutions for the environment,

which over time have increased their permeability to non-state actors, is another element of opportunity structure that has facilitated the shift towards transnational public-private collaboration (Haas 1989; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2006; Slaughter 2004; Risse-Kappen ed. 1995). International environmental institutions traditionally foster epistemic networks in part as a result of the knowledge-intensive nature of environmental problems. They have provided focal points or even platforms of mobilization, access, and leverage for environmental NGOs in their direct and boomerang pressure strategies (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2001; Fox and Brown 1997). The permeability of environmental regimes has further increased via the inclusion of NGOs in national delegations, by their greater capacity to organize substantive side events at intergovernmental environmental negotiations, and via delegation by states of discrete regime functions to non-state actors (Betsill and Corell 2007). International Organizations have themselves used their agency autonomy to promote, broker and legitimate the opening of the multilateral system to more direct collaboration with the private sector and advocacy organizations (Andonova 2010; Ruggie 2003).

Greater involvement in international regimes for the environment facilitates entrepreneurship on the part of governmental agencies of transnational partnerships via improved access to transnational networks, by helping to establish a knowledge base for such collaboration, and via the legitimating and risk management functions afforded by international institutions. Countries that are more engaged in intergovernmental regimes tend to have larger international bureaucracies and expert communities and are better able to select partners in ways that enhance national objectives within the regime and to promote decentralized “fire alarm” type monitoring and implementation (Raustiala 1997). International institutions furthermore provide normative platforms that can enhance the legitimacy of transnational partnerships and reduce the risk of agenda capture if adequate

mechanisms for transparency and diffused accountability are put in place (Backstrand 2008). The literature on transnational partnerships has indeed revealed that while early on developing countries expressed skepticism about direct collaboration with transnational actors fearing the types of power shift and manipulation effects anticipated by Hypotheses 1 and 2 (King 2001), their subsequent participation in transnational partnerships has been substantial and highly correlated with facilitation by international organizations (Andonova and Levy 2003; Andonova 2010). The next hypothesis summarized the anticipated positive effect of international environmental institutions on the opportunity structure for transnational public-private collaboration.

H6) The more engaged countries are in multilateral collaboration for the environment, the more incentive and opportunities they are likely have for participation in transnational partnerships, all else equal.

Unlike neo-realist arguments, which interpret transnational collaborations as instruments that weaken multilateral institutions, H6 suggest a mutually reinforcing dynamic. The systematic articulation of multiple logics and conditions under which state-society relations have evolved to engender a greater degree of collaboration for the environment has the advantage helping us to get a better grasp of the mechanisms through which globalization influences the recalibration of the environmental state and the menu of governance options. The six hypotheses are drawn on the basis of alternative interpretation of the interplay between global integration, transnational actors and state institutions in environmental governance. They are better viewed as competing rather than as necessarily mutually exclusive interpretations. While, for example, specific weaknesses in state institutions or governance deficiencies may be in part informing the

search for new forms of governance as H1 suggests, the entrepreneurial state hypothesis, H5, implies that such solutions are more likely to be found by states that have some institutional capacity and active policy agenda rather than being imposed on retreating 'weak' states. Similarly, while the neorealist hypothesis H2 attributes transnational mechanisms of governance to the particularistic interests of powerful states, the pluralist state hypothesis H4 implies that more diverse sets of interest are likely to be reflected in transnational partnerships. The next section seeks to provide an empirical assessment of these arguments by examining the variable state participation in one of the first major initiatives for transnational partnerships launched at the 2002 WSSD in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The Rise of Transnational Partnerships: Context and source of data

The Johannesburg Summit has a special place in the formal recognition of partnerships as a legitimate mechanism in global environmental governance and their subsequent proliferation transitionally and throughout the multilateral system. As we approach the next Global Environmental Summit Rio + 20 in 2012, it becomes clear that these high-profile diplomatic events concerned with the sustainability of the earth and its people, represent also for the social sciences snapshots in time that capture the evolving nature of global environmental politics.

The first international environmental summit in Stockholm, Sweden (1972) was organized by states and for states. It reflected a rising environmental concern in Western industrialized democracies and an effort to place the issue on the international agenda. While some 170 NGOs mostly from industrialized democracies were present in Stockholm as observers (Conca and Dabelko 2004), the meeting was dominated by

classic Cold War politics. The Soviet Block boycotted over a security issue related to the recognition of two separate German states, while developing countries branded the problem as one of the industrialized world. The Summit contributed to the construction of the modern environmental state and system of governance, as it resulted in the creation of the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and stimulated the establishment of domestic environmental agencies.

Then years later, the 1992 Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro marked the infusion of new energy into the realm of environmental politics. The concerns of developing countries were brought in through the organizing concept and focus of the meeting on ‘sustainable development.’ The voice of environmental NGOs was stronger as some 14,000 organizations registered, demanding greater consultation and transparency. The business community was present for the first time as an interlocutor. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development was created as the first transnational business network advancing objectives of clean production, waste minimization, and closer integration in environmental governance (Conca and Dabelko 2004; Mathews 1997).

The outcomes of the Rio conference – the programmatic document *Agenda 21*, the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change; the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Global Environmental Facility - remained strictly intergovernmental however. These outcomes resulted from tough inter-governmental bargains between industrialized and developing countries, which reasserted their sovereign control over natural resources and left little space for non-state actors. As one Brazilian diplomat stated after the Rio Conference: “Brazilian interests are reinforced in the majority of the documents... We came out of the negotiations without the slightest scratch to our sovereignty” (cited by Conca 1998, 78).

At the 2002 the WSSD in Johannesburg, South Africa, environmental cooperation moved from the realm of strictly intergovernmental relations to incorporate transnational partnerships. The density of transnational actors and their demand for direct governance had further intensified. An estimated 8,000 NGOs,⁶ including advocacy, business, and research organizations clamored for attention and influence. The UN organizers of the conference proposed the adoption of public-private partnerships as an official Type II outcome in part strategically to avert the labeling of the summit as failure in view of the lackluster intergovernmental process, which ultimately resulted in weak intergovernmental *Plan of Implementation*. Engaging the private sector and NGOs was part of broader UN reforms initiated by then Secretary General Kofi Annan (Ruggie 2003), who had launched the Global Compact in 2000 and the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) with the support of US\$1bn donation by Ted Turner.

Some 230 public-private partnerships were ultimately adopted as official Type II outcomes of the intergovernmental summit, covering diverse issues such as biodiversity, air quality, water, chemical safety, and energy technology diffusion (Andonova and Levy 2003; Biermann et al. 2007). In an interesting twist of history, one of the partnerships showcased at Johannesburg was ARPA, a transnational agreement that would have seemed unthinkable from the point of view of the Brazilian diplomat that guarded so zealously Brazil's sovereignty at the Rio Summit in 1992. The Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) was subsequently tasked to maintain a database of the transnational partnerships adopted at the Johannesburg Summit and to facilitate the registration of additional partnerships through its annual intergovernmental meetings.

The Rio +20 Summit scheduled for 2012 may come full circle in integrating even

⁶ Data available at: http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/basic_info/faqs.html#joburg1. Accessed in October 2004.

more closely intergovernmental processes and transnational collaboration with non-state actors. While the public-private partnerships spurred by the Johannesburg summit and managed by the CSD are on the agenda of the Rio+20, the input and voice of ‘all relevant stakeholders’ in UN parlance is much broader, more substantial and integrative compared to earlier summits. One of the major themes of the summit “The Transition to the Green Economy” advances an approach to tackling environmental problems that includes regulatory frameworks, but also goes beyond formal regulations to include economic instruments, markets, partnerships, and community based management. This approach in effect brings into the mold of intergovernmental governance mechanisms with which transnational actors, states, and partnerships have experimented incrementally outside the formal domain of multilateralism.

By examining systematically the political dynamics of public-private collaborations unleashed in the run-up to the 2002 WSSD in Johannesburg, the empirical analysis seeks to illuminate the relevance of domestic and international variables behind the turn toward greater collaborative governance. The analysis tests the six hypotheses on the conditions for state engagement in transnational partnerships, using WSSD Partnership Dataset, which was constructed on the basis of 231 PDF documents of public-private partnerships registered at the Johannesburg Summit website in 2002.⁷ The WSSD Dataset contains coded information on the lead organization, country participation, and issue orientation of each of these 231 public-private agreements, as well as country-specific data from the World Development Indicators,⁸ and the

⁷ The dataset is based on documents, accessed via the website of the Summit <http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/> on February 12, 2003. Currently, information and PDF documents on partnerships adopted at Johannesburg and subsequent meetings of the UN Commission for Sustainable Development are available at <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/partnerships.htm>.

⁸ World Bank 2003.

Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI),⁹ arguably two of the most comprehensive sources of economic, international, and environmental variables. The announcement and registration of WSSD partnership initiatives within a relatively short period of time of under two years provides almost a quasi experimental setting for analyzing the opening of international institutional space for a variety of state and non-state actors, the powerful and less so, to initiate or join transnational partnerships. It thus offers in many ways an ideal testing ground for assessing the competing perspectives on the roles of the states and transnational actors in transforming global governance.

State participation in transnational partnership: model operationalization

Dependent variable

The dependent variable of the statistical model is specified as NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS to which each country signed onto at the Johannesburg Summit. Some states such as the Philippines, Thailand, France, the US, Italy, Japan, South Africa, and Indonesia participated in over 20 partnerships. Other states such as Croatia, Iceland, Estonia, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia were among some 37 states that did not sign any of the partnerships agreements despite being represented at the Summit. On average, states participated in 4.4 Johannesburg partnerships, with a maximum of 33 and a minimum of 0 partnerships, and with a standard deviation of 5.6., revealing a wide range of variation in the propensity of states to engage in collaboration with non-state actors.

Explanatory Variables

⁹ World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN. 2001 and 2002.

To test Hypothesis 1, which interprets transnational partnerships as compensation for weak state capacity and governance failures in environmental governance, the statistical model uses several measures: GDP, ENV STRESS, LOW INCOME, and CORRUPTION. GDP is specified as the natural logarithm of countries' 2001 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in purchasing power parity, in constant 1998 international dollars.¹⁰ While GDP per capita is a relatively crude measure of governance capacity for the environment, it corresponds to standard assumptions and empirical evidence that countries with greater level of wealth are more likely to have both the resources and political will to develop domestic institutions for the environment. Specification 2 of the model uses the variable LOW INCOME, with values of 0 for countries coded by the World Bank as "high income countries" and a value of 1 for the rest of the sample (World Bank 2003), as alternative binary measure of capacity. This measure is motivated by expectations that environmental capacity limitations are highly concentrated in developing countries, and thus a binary rather than continuous measure might better capture the impact of limited wealth. The third measure of governance capacity, CORRUPTION, comes from the World Bank Governance Matters V dataset (Kaufmann et al. 2005). It tests the impact of this pervasive governance failure, which is highly correlated with the limited ability of states to enforce environmental legislation, on the likelihood of higher participation of countries in transnational partnerships. Finally the variable ENV STRESS is the composite measure of countries' capacity to reduce environmental systems' stress as reported by the ESI 2002, with higher values indicating greater capacity of states to reduce negative environmental externalities.¹¹ These four variables thus capture different aspects of states' capacity to intervene to address

¹⁰ Data from World Bank 2003.

¹¹ World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN2002.

environmental problems.

Hypothesis H1 implies negative coefficients for GDP, CORRUPTION and ENV STRESS as countries with lower income, higher corruption (which is represented by lower scores of the freedom from corruption index), and lower capacity to reduce environmental stress are expected to be engaged in transnational partnerships to a larger extent to compensate for the limitations or failures of state institutions. The expected coefficient for LOW INCOME is positive, as countries which score 1 are those with expected lower capacity and higher likelihood of participation in compensatory governance.

To assess the implications of the neo-realist Hypothesis 2 on transnational partnerships as an instrument of powerful states manipulation of global environmental governance, I use the binary variable ODA DONOR as a proxy for structural power in environmental politics. The variable has values of 1 for states that are donors of foreign aid and 0 for recipients.¹² The expectation is for a positive coefficient as more powerful donor countries are likely to have, according to the neorealist perspective, both the capability and interest to engage in transnational partnerships as forums that divert resources and efforts towards their preferred programs. Hypothesis 2 furthermore implies a negative coefficient for Low Income, contrary to Hypotheses 1, as industrialized countries are more likely to have the power and interests to create and participate in partnerships as forum shopping venues and selective rewards.

The statistical model examines the implications of the opportunity structure and agency argument on the rearticulation of the state via transnational partnerships by using several domestic and international variables. To assess the relevance of the overall level

¹² Coding for DONOR is based on data from World Bank 2003.

of political liberalization and pluralism the CIVLIB variable is based on the Freedomhouse Civil Liberties index, which measures political freedom on a scale of 1 (free) to 7 (least free).¹³ The expectation of Hypotheses 3 is for a negative coefficient, as states with more consolidated liberal democracies are likely to provide a more conducive opportunity structure for public-private collaborations.

Two variables are used as proxies for the domestic constituency effect of transnational NGO and business networks, respectively. TNGOs are specified as the number of IUCN member organizations in each country as of 2002.¹⁴ The IUCN is one of the oldest, largest, and most active of the transnational environmental organizations, with strong technical and policy expertise. In the absence of a more comprehensive measure of the activities of transnational environmental NGOs across countries,¹⁵ the number of World Conservation Union member organizations is a good proxy of the variation in the size of transnational advocacy sector constituencies across states. The variable ISO14000 is specified as the number of ISO14000-certified companies per country in 2001.¹⁶ ISO14000 is a voluntary certification for environmental management, which is a relatively broad and frequently used indicator of transnational business self-regulation for the environment across countries. Being closely associated with processes of economic integration and domestic opportunity structures, this indicator allows us to reflect upon the variation in domestic constituency effect of transnational business networks for the environment in the context of globalization. The expectation of Hypothesis 4 is for

¹³ Freedomhouse data as reported in the ESI 2002, see World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN 2002.

¹⁴ IUCN data as reported in the ESI 2002, see World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN 2002.

¹⁵ Comprehensive cross-country data on the size of the environmental advocacy sector is not available. TNGOs corrects for this problem by measuring the number of organizations associated with one of the largest transnational environmental networks.

¹⁶ ISO data as reported in the ESI 2002, see World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN 2002.

positive coefficients of both TNGOs and ISO14000.

Turning to the agency of units of states in fostering transnational collaborations for the environment, I use the 2002 ESI variable ENV PLANS, which measures the number of national environmental strategies and plans adopted by a country.¹⁷ The adoption of national environmental programs is considered in the environmental policy literature to be a good indicator of states' environmental policy activism and bureaucratic capacity.¹⁸ ENV PLANS thus allows us to assess Hypothesis 5 and the anticipated positive impact of environmental policy activism and institutional capacity of domestic environmental agencies on participation in transnational partnerships.

The model uses two variables to test the anticipated positive impact of international institutions on the opportunity structure for transnational partnerships. ENV TREATIES is specified as the number of international environmental agreements signed by a country as of 2001.¹⁹ The expected sign of ENV TREATIES is positive according to Hypothesis 6. I also consider the relevance of states' overall participation in the international official development assistance (ODA) regime in enhancing the opportunity structure for transnational partnerships for the environment via increased access to networks of non-state actors, greening of aid, and improved access to resources by specialized agencies. The variable ODA regime is specified as the normalized sum of official development assistance payments and receipts of each country for the period 1960-1999.²⁰ The expectation is for a positive coefficient.

¹⁷ Data from ESI 2001, see World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN 2001.

¹⁸ World Bank 1994; World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN.2001.

¹⁹ Data from Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) 2003.

²⁰ Data from World Bank 2003.

Control variables

The model includes several control variables. The variable HOST controls for the greater opportunities and reputation incentives of the host countries of the preparatory and the actual meetings of the World Summit for Sustainable Development to support public-private partnerships. It has a value of 1 for Indonesia and South Africa, and 0 for the rest of the sample. The variable LARGE POPULATION has values of 1 for the quartile of countries with largest populations and 0 for the other states.²¹ It controls for the fact that large countries are likely to be attractive partners in public-private institutions due to their greater global footprint and resources. The variable RAINFOREST is specified as the percentage of the total land area of the country covered by rainforest.²² It takes into account that countries rich in environmental resources such as forests and biodiversity are more likely to be targeted as strategic partners in collaborative networks. The variables LARGE POPULATION and RAINFORST thus control for fact that while in theory all countries had an opportunity to enter public-private agreements at Johannesburg, some may have been more attractive partners than others. The variable DEFORESTATION, defined as percentage change in countries' forest cover between 1990 and 1995, and the variable SPECIES THREAT, defined as percentage of mammals threatened, are introduced in specifications 5 and 6 of the model respectively. They control for the fact that both state and non-state actors might have incentives to foster environmental partnerships in areas of the world with higher rates of threatened species and deforestation to slow these trends. The expected sign for SPECIES THREAT is positive. The expected sign for DEFORESTATION is negative as negative scores reflect loss in forest cover, which should trigger stronger partnership effort. The variable SPECIES

²¹ Population data from World Bank 2003.

²² Source <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/countries.htm>, accessed March 2007.

THREAT and DEFORESTATION can also be considered proxies for environmental governance gaps, albeit for from universal or comprehensive, and the effect of these variables if it materializes to be significant can be interpreted as additional evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables.

[Table 1 about here]

Interpretation of Results

The model of public-private institutions for sustainable development is tested using ordinary least square regression analysis in a cross-sectional sample with an N of 127-138 states, for which data on all variables is available in the different specifications. Table 2 presents the regression results. The model provides a good fit to the data, explaining over 62% percent of the cross-country variation in the number of partnerships adopted at the Johannesburg Summit. The results are, furthermore, consistent across the different specifications. Model 1 in Table 2 is the baseline specification, while Models 2-6 control for a variety of additional factors as discussed above to avoid the potential for omitted variable bias. All specifications of the model applied the White test for heteroskedasticity in the cross-sectional sample. The test statistics indicated that the hypothesis of homogeneity of the variance of the residuals could not be rejected, and therefore the efficiency of the coefficient estimates is not undermined by heteroskedasticity.

[Table 2 about here]

The results of the statistical analysis provide strong support for the two-level opportunity structure and agency perspective on the conditions for greater collaboration

between state and transnational actors in environmental governance. The coefficients of TNGOs and ISO14000 are positive and significant, suggesting a strong domestic constituency effect of transnational NGOs and business networks on the likelihood of state engagement in partnership collaborations. The standardized coefficients of these two variables are relatively large compared to other factors tested in the model, indicating that the domestic presence of environmental advocacy networks such as the IUCN and business interest in environmental self-regulation such as ISO14000 are substantively among the most important determinants of the variation in cross-country participation in Johannesburg partnerships.

Table 3 illustrates the relationship between ISO14000 certification and the number of public-private partnerships across states. It shows that countries with no ISO14000-certified companies at the time of the Johannesburg summit became weakly involved in public-private partnerships facilitated by the intergovernmental meeting, on average having 2.6 partnerships per country. By contrast, countries with high number of ISO14000-certified firms were most active in signing onto public-private partnerships for the environment. Countries with over 400 ISO14000-certified enterprises participated on average in 14.3 partnerships at the Johannesburg Summit, which is 3 times as many partnerships compared to the mean of the sample, and 5 to 7 times as many compared to the average for countries with few or no ISO14000 certifications.

[Insert table 3 here]

The one element of the domestic opportunity structure that appears to have no statistically significant impact on state participation in transnational partnership is the relative consolidation of liberal democracy. The CIVLIB variable is insignificant across all specifications. This result maybe associated to some extent with the domestic constituency effect of transnational networks, which increasingly penetrate, especially in

their market-driven or ‘professionalized’ variety, even less democratic countries such as China or states that have some degree of democratic openness but not fully established liberal institutions.

Turning to variables that capture the agency of the state and facilitation by international institutions, we similarly find consistently positive and significant effects. The coefficient of ENV PLANS is positive and significant, supporting the argument that states with active environmental bureaucracies and policies are likely to view transnational partnerships such as those endorsed in Johannesburg as mechanisms to advance their policy agendas both domestically and internationally.

The coefficients of ENV TREATIES and ODA are also positive and significant at the 5% and 10% confidence levels respectively.²³ These results support the expectations that higher involvement in the international environmental and ODA regimes, which are characterized with relatively higher permeability to non-state actors, improves the opportunity structure for collaborative governance with transnational actors. Recent studies that highlight the informal transnational activities of IO suggest that what the Johannesburg Summit may have done in effect is to help bring to the fore informal collaborations that were already fostered by international institutions, including alliances between state actors, IOs and transnational organizations (Fox and Brown 1997; Murphy 2008).

Fig. 1 uses Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data analysis techniques to explore further the positive relationship between the ENV TREATIES and NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS. Darker colors on the map reflect greater participation in international environmental regimes, while the bars reflect the variation in state participation in the

²³ In Model 2, the statistical significance of the variable ENV TREATIES is slightly reduced due to high collinearity with the variable LOW INCOME (correlation coefficient 0.53).

Johannesburg partnerships for the environment. Fig. 1 shows high partnerships participation by countries which are most actively engaged in intergovernmental environmental treaties, contrary to interpretations of transnational governance as means to undermine multilateralism. Russia is one visible exception, being a country with high participation in intergovernmental treaties but weak support for partnerships, a case that reflects to a large degree the limitations in domestic opportunity structure and agency.

[Figure 1 about here]

The analysis also finds support for Hypothesis 2. The coefficient of the binary variable DONOR is statistically significant and has a large positive coefficient, indicating that countries that can leverage substantial resources for sustainable development are likely to use their position to advance and participate in partnerships. Fig. 1 furthermore suggest a pattern of relatively strategic clustering of partnerships in the spheres of interest of donor states such as the US, Japan, France, and Australia, but also in regions of interests of the host countries of the summit, Indonesia and South Africa, which were among the leading actors in facilitating partnerships. There is high number of partnerships, for example, in South-East Asia, near South Africa, in Francophone Africa, and in biodiversity and resource rich countries of South and Central America. One of the advantages of a systematic analysis of the political economy of transnational public-private collaborations is to demonstrate that indeed multiple logics are at play in the diversification of global governance mechanisms and the interaction between states and transnational actors. While states with relative power in terms of access to financial resources have influenced the makings of the transnational partnership landscape considerably, these initiatives do not appear to have undermined multilateralism. Moreover, domestic and international institutions appear to be an important determinant of the wider variation in the incentives

and the ability of states to engage in multiple forms of governance include collaboration with societal and private actors.

Interesting, the various indicators of state capacity (GDP, LOW INCOME, CORRUPTION, and ENV STRESS) as well as those indicative of relative governance failure (DEFORESTATION and SPECIES THREAT) appear insignificant across all specification. Thus, while concern about capacity limitation and continued environmental degradation may be an important rationale for the search for new mechanisms of governance including with the non-state sector, the actual patterns of partnership engagement are driven by political opportunity considerations rather than functional limitations. There is thus little evidence that transnational partnerships are substituting or taking over the environmental functions of weak environmental states.

The remaining four control variables are significant. The coefficient of HOST is positive and highly significant both statistically and substantively, taking account of the active roles of South Africa and Indonesia in promoting partnerships prior to and at the Johannesburg Summit. The coefficients of LARGE POPULATION and RAINFOREST are also positive and significant, providing additional evidence that partnership patterns reflect the strategic considerations of transnational and state actors that advance them. Everything else equal, states with a larger global footprint and rich in natural resources were among the most attractive partners at the WSSD. Overall, the statistical results provide little support for a broad functional explanation of public-private institutions as evidence of the retreating environmental state, as a powershift or functional compensation of weak governance. At Johannesburg Summit, public-private partnerships were facilitated by states with active policy agendas and vibrant domestic representation of transnational constituencies; they were furthermore facilitated by international regimes and the resources leveraged by donor states. Transnational partnerships in effect reflect

the differential interest and ability of states to reach out to the transnational sphere and experiment with new forms of governance.

Conclusion

This paper argues that globalization and the rise of transnational actors have contributed to a new dynamic of interplay between international and domestic politics to facilitate closer collaboration between states and non-state actors for the environment. By assessing systematically the political determinants of the variation in such collaborations, the analysis allows us to further contemplate the purposes and limitations of transnational partnerships as a form of environmental governance. It suggests that partnerships provide means for governments and transnational actors to experiment with new instruments to tackle environmental problems and to advance policy trajectories incrementally both at the domestic and international planes. These experimentations are enabled by the soft institutionalization of transnational agreements and the agency of specific governmental and transnational advocates. These dynamics imply, however, that transnational partnerships are a more easily reversible and transient form of governance compared to formal domestic or international regulations, as the commitments of both state and non-state agents behind partnerships need to be self-enforceable on the basis of overlapping interests and norm internalization.

Due to their loose institutionalization and reliance on expanding public-private political alliances across levels of governance, transnational partnerships for the environment can be hugely successful in using openings in the international and domestic opportunity structures to bring to the fore new governance solutions and constituencies to back them. They can be also dismal failures when initial expectations for resource, policy, or normative leverage do not materialize or when state priorities change and the

commitment of state or transnational partners unravels. Transnational partnership initiatives such as the World Bank climate finance partnerships, the Small Grants Program of the GEF, and partnerships for biodiversity management such as ARPA have produced substantial effects in terms of institutional development and intervention that have trickled up to international regimes and down to domestic implementation practices (Andonova 2010). Such partnerships have influenced the behavior of a range of relevant actors and indirectly the instruments and development of intergovernmental regimes. At the same time we also know from existing surveys of the land of transnational partnerships that substantial number of the original WSSD initiatives registered at Johannesburg are for all practical purposes now non-functional (Bosman 2011; Szuleski et al. 2010). This paper demonstrates and argues for the utility of systematic comparative research in taking the next steps to examining the variation in the effectiveness of transnational partnerships for the environment. Transnational partnerships are the result important political transformations within and across states. They are likely to have a subtle but lasting impact on environmental governance and the variable presence and effectiveness of partnerships is important subject for further systematic research.

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Annex I: Tables and graphs
 Table 1 Descriptive statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS	4.35	5.62	0.0	33.0
<i>Explanatory Variables</i>				
TNGOs	4.58	7.77	0.0	52.0
ISO14000	162.16	626.01	0.0	7155.0
CIVLIB	3.49	1.98	1.0	7.0
ENV PLANS	1.80	1.50	0.0	7.0
ENV TREATIES	23.47	25.53	1.0	139.0
ODA	0.00	1.00	-0.7	5.7
GDP	8.38	1.11	6.2	10.6
ENV STRESS	51.38	12.87	9.4	70.3
LOW INCOME	0.75	0.44	0.00	1.00
CORRUPTION	-0.04	1.00	-1.79	2.49
DONOR	0.87	0.34	0.0	1.0
<i>Control Variables</i>				
HOST	0.00	0.07	0.0	1.0
LARGE POPULATION	0.23	0.42	0.0	1.0
RAINFOREST	13.53	22.96	0.00	94.70
DEFORESTATION	-0.15	2.23	-9.00	14.90
SPECIES THREAT	12.92	9.80	0.00	80.00

Table 2 Determinants of public-private partnerships for sustainable development

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Intercept	-0.471 (-0.1)	-0.624 (-0.28)	-0.694 (-0.13)	3.349 (0.61)	-2.796 (-0.49)	-0.436 (-0.09)
TNGOs	0.148*** (2.63)	0.148*** (2.66)	0.148*** (2.62)	0.128** (2.18)	0.143** (2.52)	0.152*** (2.67)
ISO14000	0.002*** (4.07)	0.002*** (3.96)	0.002*** (4.04)	0.002*** (3.16)	0.002*** (3.98)	0.002*** (4.07)
CIVLIB	0.008 (0.03)	0.009 (0.04)	0.00002 (0.00)	0.009 (0.04)	0.041 (0.17)	0.025 (0.1)
ENV PLANS	0.617*** (2.50)	0.624** (2.59)	0.619** (2.49)	0.616** (2.44)	0.582** (2.32)	0.622** (2.49)
ODA	0.658* (1.75)	0.668* (1.82)	0.658* (1.74)	0.729* (1.86)	0.756* (1.91)	0.635* (1.67)
ENV TREATIES	0.040*** (2.12)	0.034 (1.60)	0.041** (2.03)		0.039** (2.04)	0.039** (2.05)
GDP	-0.047 (-0.1)		-0.015 (-0.03)	0.016 (0.03)	0.206 (0.37)	-0.104 (-0.22)
ENV STRESS	0.009 (0.29)	0.017 (0.53)	0.008 (0.26)	0.007 (0.21)	0.012 (0.39)	0.009 (0.3)
HOST	21.304*** (5.18)	21.307*** (5.25)	21.335*** (5.15)	21.564*** (5.13)	21.345*** (5.18)	21.306*** (5.15)
LARGE POPULATION	2.785*** (3.02)	2.899*** (3.13)	2.753*** (2.84)	3.497*** (3.55)	2.774*** (3.00)	2.685*** (2.86)
RAINFOREST	0.057*** (3.37)	0.057*** (3.58)	0.057*** (3.30)	0.062*** (3.42)	0.056*** (3.33)	0.057*** (3.34)
LOW INCOME		-0.649 (-0.41)				
CORRUPTION			-0.082 (-0.11)			
DONOR				3.659** (2.34)		
DEFORESTATION					-0.204 (-0.81)	
SPECIES THREAT						0.029 (0.78)
Adj. R2	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62
N	134	138	134	127	134	133

Significance *** p < .01, ** < .05, * < .1

Table 3 Country participation in environmental partnerships according to industry ISO14000 certification

<i>Enterprises with ISO14000</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>	<i>Average Number of Partnerships per Country</i>
0	95	2.6
1-5	41	3.3
6-100	26	5.0
101-400	16	6.4
Over 400	18	14.3




Fig. 3 Country participation in multilateral environmental treaties and partnerships for sustainable development

