



The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding  
**CCDP Working Paper**

A Review of Practices and Expert Opinions:

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# Linking Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding

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**CENTRE ON CONFLICT,  
DEVELOPMENT AND PEACEBUILDING**



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## Preface

This CCDP Working Paper considers the actual and potential linkages between humanitarian action and peacebuilding. It examines synergies through a comparative review of the practices and policy approaches of both fields. On the basis of extensive survey questions with specialists in both areas, the Working Paper seeks to demonstrate practical ways in which humanitarian action can contribute to sustainable peacebuilding.

The Working Paper finds that there are:

- Areas of convergence between humanitarian and peacebuilding mandates that could facilitate a closer collaboration;
- Many plausible entry-points for practical engagement for humanitarian actors to enhance and strengthen peacebuilding outcomes;
- Clear challenges to generate operational collaboration owing to the *modi operandi* of both fields – including sequencing priorities, planning framework and anticipated outcomes; and
- Realistic opportunities for joint actions, including the fostering of national ownership and contingency planning with ‘early’ assessment of peacebuilding capacities.

Notwithstanding considerable overlaps in goals and aspirations of humanitarian action and peacebuilding, there has been comparatively little learning between the two fields. The former is frequently treated narrowly as focusing on limiting the consequences and symptoms of crisis. By way of contrast, the latter tends to be characterized as more transformational and focused on addressing ‘root causes’. This Working Paper seeks to bridge a critical gap in policy and practice by highlighting where synergies exist.

The first section reviews the literature on humanitarian action and peacebuilding and illustrates key areas of convergence and divergence. It finds that while often simply defined, the two concepts are more complex and problematic than widely assumed. The labels in fact conceal political disagreements over their purposes and decision. What is more, defining a clear boundary between the two fields is exceedingly challenging. The section also traces out the varied approaches pursued by humanitarian and peacebuilding actors in an effort to examine overlapping policy areas and linkages.

Section two considers a number of areas of synergy for humanitarians and peacebuilders. It notes that key capacities required for delivering humanitarian action are also frequently needed in the pursuit of peacebuilding. The section sets out the findings of an ‘expert survey’ undertaken to examine these shared areas. Notwithstanding some reservations, a number of overlapping areas of work for both humanitarians and peacebuilders were identified. A generally shared view is that the ultimate goal for both actors remains sustainable peace and security.

Section three examines the many differences in direction and approach among humanitarian and peacebuilding actors. For example, the survey finds that humanitarian action tends to focus on immediate priorities and needs and less so on long-term peacebuilding objectives. Put another way, humanitarian actors tend to engage in a crisis with a short-term and tactical vision. On the other hand, peacebuilders frequently adopt a longer time horizon in the quest for sustainable peace and development. They often lack a sense of urgency.

What is more, humanitarians tend to resist addressing ostensibly political concerns and compromising cherished principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Peacebuilding actors tend to acknowledge the central role of politics and engage with its many dimensions to address core aspects of conflict and crisis.

The final section considers next steps to encourage more forward-looking synergy between humanitarian and peacebuilding communities. It emphasizes the imperatives of national ownership and enhanced engagement of the international community, and examines practical ways in which humanitarian action can contribute to national- and community-level peacebuilding. It also proposes that contingency planning processes be used instrumentally as an entry point for a joint planning platform. Such an approach could incorporate early assessments of peacebuilding capacities and possibly formulate an action plan for capacity development that shares the vision of both humanitarian and peacebuilding organizations.

The Working Paper also proposes an 'Assessment Checklist' for peacebuilding capacities and a sample 'Action Plan' for capacity development. These tools are included in Annex 1 and 2, so that practitioners can experiment with possible areas of collaboration.

Masayo Kondo Rossier undertook the research and drafting of this Working Paper during her four-month UN Sabbatical Leave Programme, which she spent at the CCDP. With her enthusiasm for the subject matter and wealth of field experience, Masayo made significant contributions to the centre's activities and debates. We look forward to continuing the conversation with her over the years ahead.

Keith Krause  
CCDP Director

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## Author Acknowledgements

The source of inspiration for this research was the United Nations Secretary-General's *Report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict* of June 2009. The recurring theme has been resonating in my experiences – the UN should deliver as one and we all have to work together. Yet many lessons have not been learned and more needs to be done to improve our support to peacebuilding efforts at the country level. At the same time, peacebuilding does not only come about in the aftermath of conflict – it can take place during any phase of potential conflicts, including during conflicts. With Côte d'Ivoire suffering from historical divides with the risk of renewed civil conflict and the 'Arab Spring' evolving into multiple crises in North Africa, it is all the more relevant to promote peacebuilding whenever we can.

I am very grateful to those who contributed to this research through the survey and feedback, with their knowledge and ideas, often exceeding the time allocation originally requested. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to Kaz Kuroda of the World Bank, Frederick Spielberg of UNICEF, John Sule Mahama and Francis Azuimah of UNDP-Ghana, Jahal de Meritens of UNDP/BCPR, Donato Kiniger-Passigli of ILO, Jock Baker of CARE International, Olivier Brouant of ECHO, Erwin Vanveen of OECD, Sarah Lamsdon of Oxfam-UK, Jamie McGoldrick, UN Resident Coordinator in Georgia, Lily Adhiambo, Fernando Arroyo, Laurent Dufour, Ysabel Fougery, Rajan Gengaje, Ignacio Leon, Anne-Marie Linde, Agnes Palacio, Edmore Tondhlana and Jean-Luc Tonglet of OCHA, and Brinda Wachs of UNECE, in supporting this study with their practical experiences and professional guidance.

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# Glossary

## *Humanitarian action*

Humanitarian action encompasses emergency preparedness and response to crisis situations. The following areas of action are included: Basic services delivery (Agriculture, Camp coordination and management, Early recovery, Education, Emergency shelter, Emergency communication, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene/WASH); Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy; Information management and analysis; Civil-military coordination; Political liaison with international/national actors; and Project administration (page 13). Different approaches exist, for example, the religious, Dunaanist and Wilsonian (page 42).

## *Peacebuilding*

It is characterized as efforts 'to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict' (page 19). Peacebuilding can take place at any time, including before an outbreak of – or during – violent conflict, at a window of opportunity for peace negotiations and in the aftermath of violent conflict (page 21).

## *Early recovery*

The focus is to restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or 'build back better', and avoid relapses. Early recovery is a multidimensional process guided by development principles that begins in a humanitarian setting and seeks to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyze sustainable development opportunities (page 25).

## *Protection of civilians*

Protection is of over-arching concern during humanitarian crises and therefore fundamental to humanitarian action. Humanitarian policy and response strategies are informed by the need to minimize the various risks people face and ensure full respect of the rights of all populations affected by disaster or armed conflict. Humanitarian actors must also ensure that humanitarian response does not result in discrimination, abuse, neglect and violence (page 30).

## *Humanitarian reform*

Humanitarian reform seeks to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response by ensuring greater predictability, accountability and partnership (page 32). It is an ambitious effort by the international humanitarian community to reach more beneficiaries, with more comprehensive needs-based relief and protection, in a more effective and timely manner.

## *Cluster approach*

The cluster approach aims to strengthen overall response capacity as well as the effectiveness of the response in the following ways: to ensure global capacity and predictable leadership, to enhance the concept of partnership, to strengthen accountability and to improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization (page 29).

# List of Acronyms

3C	A Coherent, Coordinated, Complementary, or 'Whole-of-System' approach
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CADRI	Capacity for Disaster Reductions Initiative
CCDP	Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EHAP	Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
GPP	Geneva Peacebuilding Platform
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Society
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NADMO	National Disaster Management Organization in Ghana
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
OCHA	(United Nations) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	(United Nations) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

# Introduction

The social upheavals associated with the ‘Arab Spring’ since early 2011 are a reminder of the twin challenges of humanitarian action and peacebuilding. They are an occasion to reflect on how to bring about peace in partnership with all actors. When and how can peace be built? What are the opportunities for enhanced collaboration?

The purpose of this Working Paper is to establish linkages between humanitarian action and peacebuilding. An objective is to identify opportunities where short-term humanitarian action can potentially reinforce long-term peacebuilding outcomes. The Working Paper adopts an interpretation of humanitarian action that is progressive, practical and rights-based. It also advances a broad definition of peacebuilding based on building ‘positive’ peace through proactive interventions. Nevertheless, the Working Paper was written from a humanitarian practitioner’s perspective with certain assumptions and prejudices. It was also crafted deliberately to explore opportunities for enhanced linkage and positive synergies with peacebuilding actors. As such, the target audience is comprised of practitioners from both the humanitarian and peacebuilding fields.

A critical finding of the research pursued as part of this Working Paper is that humanitarians need to think ahead. They must actively anticipate the opportunities and outcomes after humanitarian action if they are to support peacebuilding efforts. At a minimum, effective contingency planning and promoting national ownership are critical to ensure that linkages are made. For example, an assessment of in-country peacebuilding capacities in a given national context needs to be conducted while planning and delivering humanitarian action. Developing these ‘in-country’ capacities would contribute to supporting long-term peacebuilding and development goals.

The Working Paper finds that there are:

- Areas of convergence between humanitarian and peacebuilding mandates that could facilitate a closer collaboration;
- Many plausible entry-points for practical engagement for humanitarian actors to enhance and strengthen peacebuilding outcomes;
- Clear challenges to generate operational collaboration owing to the *modi operandi* of both fields – including sequencing priorities, planning framework and anticipated outcomes; and
- Realistic opportunities for joint actions, including the fostering of national ownership and contingency planning with ‘early’ assessment of peacebuilding capacities.

The promotion of more active synergies between humanitarian action and peacebuilding is built on common-sense wisdom. As is well established, humanitarian action needs to acknowledge the possible negative consequences of engagement and embrace longer-term planning strategies that ‘do no harm’. While preserving important principles, humanitarian action cannot stand completely aloof from the political arena. Humanitarian action can and should incorporate assessments of peacebuilding capacities and develop them where appropriate. In this way, humanitarian action can contribute to sustainable peacebuilding, while acknowledging the absence of common approaches, its constraints and persisting resistance to potential linkages.

It is worth recalling that this agenda, while occasionally acknowledged, is seldom researched. There have been relatively few, if any, linkages established between humanitarian action and peacebuilding. Indeed, proponents of each field believe that there are systemic

constraints in incorporating peacebuilding efforts into humanitarian action. This may be partially due to the recent stigma caused by the tragedies in Rwanda or Srebrenica. What is more, there are clear tensions in linking principled humanitarianism with progressive, positive peacebuilding. Some humanitarian organizations only focus on saving lives, 'doing no harm' or making a smooth transition from relief to recovery. Others are deliberately starting to link with other areas more proactively, particularly those organizations with dual mandates (humanitarian/development).

This Working Paper seeks to begin an informed dialogue between humanitarian and peacebuilding actors. It intends to simulate a debate between humanitarian agencies (both Dunantist and Wilsonian) and peacebuilding organizations to identify opportunities and constraints. It seeks to highlight the challenges limiting a thorough debate. For example, it notes that the *modi operandi* of humanitarians and peacebuilding actors mostly derive from different programmatic approaches and sequencing priorities. In spite of these differences, however, there are ways and means to bridge humanitarian action to peacebuilding goals.

The Working Paper is divided into a number of discrete sections. Taken together, it reviews the literature on prevailing ideas and practices in both humanitarian action and peacebuilding. It features the findings of an expert survey conducted during the months of December 2010 and January 2011. The survey was designed to test the premises of the Working Paper with questions on the perceived linkages between humanitarian action and peacebuilding. It was voluntary and the non-random sample included various experts from a range of sectors and disciplines (practitioners, donors, and scholars of the humanitarian and peacebuilding communities).

The survey is designed to highlight expert opinions and the 'conventional wisdom' on humanitarian action and peacebuilding. Out of eighty (80) questionnaires sent to colleagues, there were thirty-three (33) replies received for a response rate of forty-one (41) per cent.<sup>1</sup> Roughly two-thirds of respondents are currently engaged in a humanitarian field of activities, while several work in overlapping areas. The survey findings are periodically drawn upon to inform the key hypotheses and arguments and to shed some light on the potential for these linkages. The survey proved that there were certain common and essential capacities/expertise required for both humanitarian action and peacebuilding.

The first section of the Working Paper focuses on overlapping policy and practical areas for humanitarian action and peacebuilding. The second and third sections, both derived from the survey outcomes, outline areas of convergence – or practical synergies – and divergence respectively. The fourth section charts a path forward with entry points and opportunities for enhanced engagement of both fields.

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<sup>1</sup> There are biases in the sample owing to self-selection, but these are not insurmountable as this paper explores linkages from literature and practitioners' insights and opinions. Moreover, responses to the survey provide a basis for the research by drawing on prevailing practices and visions, so that a wider range of views, in addition to the author's, are reflected.

*Figure 1 - Linking humanitarian action and peacebuilding:  
Some of OCHA's presence in Africa*



# 1. Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding: Review of Literature and Practice

In this section, the extent to what humanitarian action could contribute to sustainable peacebuilding is examined by exploring the historical and current thinking behind the two concepts of humanitarianism and peace. Key areas of potential linkage between humanitarian action and peacebuilding will be described below. On the whole, the linkage or overlapping areas of the two fields are substantial, in terms of goals of the required capacities for planning and delivery of humanitarian action, and for peacebuilding.

## 1.1 Humanitarian Action

Although humanitarianism is generally understood on the basis of certain principles and a body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), this notion is widening in current practice to include a broader spectrum of humanitarianism and humanitarian action.<sup>2</sup> Hence the linkage and prospective of humanitarian action contributing to peacebuilding is broadening as well.

The ultimate goal of humanitarian action, in response to conflict situations including war, civil unrest and urban/election violence, is to save lives. This approach could be expanded, in linking humanitarian action with peacebuilding, to sustain those saved lives in a dignified way. Here, the timeframe for the humanitarian action provided to save lives starts to get longer to include other considerations. These are not just based on primary needs of food, shelter, health care, but also sustainable livelihood, employment and education, or training to reconstruct lost livelihoods. But where is the boundary between humanitarian action and peacebuilding efforts?

Humanitarian action will be delivered on the basis of:

- Humanitarian principles (Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence);
- New humanitarianism (Humanity, Universalism, Cosmopolitanism);
- Life-saving, alleviation of suffering and protection of human dignity;
- Immediate action given limited time and resources (but not dealing with root causes of the conflict with an aim of societal transformation).

In the post-9/11 context, new types of integration are also considered, such as interim stabilization and counter-insurgency (using a human security approach).

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<sup>2</sup> 'Instead of working in neutral territory between the two global superpowers (as in the Cold War) humanitarianism now finds itself rubbing shoulders with a single superpower and its allies, and it is this relationship that is a primary cause of concern for aid workers today.' Vaux, 2007, p. 1.

Concretely, the following actions can be considered as humanitarian:

- Basic services delivery (Agriculture, Camp coordination and management, Early recovery, Education, Emergency shelter, Emergency communication, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene/WASH);
- Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy;
- Information management and analysis;
- Civil-military coordination;
- Political liaison with international/national actors (negotiation for humanitarian space with warring parties, including during fighting);
- Project administration (financial and human resources, procurement, transport, emergency infrastructure-roads, bridges).

In addition to the above elements of humanitarian action, potential interaction between stabilization and humanitarian action has been actively discussed among the humanitarian and peacebuilding communities. These expanding areas of humanitarian action may be the key in linking to peacebuilding, as discussed below.

### ***Stabilization and Humanitarian Action***

Stabilization is premised on an assumption that weak governance, instability, violent conflict and associated poverty and underdevelopment pose a direct threat to their strategic interest and international peace and security more broadly [...] While stabilization is firmly rooted in security agendas focused on reducing or eliminating perceived threats, accumulated experience of international intervention and engagement to end conflicts and foster peace and development over the past decade has emphasized the need to integrate military, political, development and humanitarian action.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas aiming at different goals, originally conceived to combat insurgency, terrorism or narcotics, stabilization efforts are increasingly expanding to include more spheres of activities, resulting in a much boarder 'transformative, geographical and historical scope' to encompass a combination of military, humanitarian, political and economic instruments to render stability.<sup>4</sup> Here, if there is an interaction, the approach of humanitarianism may be venturing out into different territories.

Humanitarian action may not take sides under the principle of neutrality, yet the recent practices in Afghanistan are observed as 'one-sided,' since the humanitarian community does not negotiate access with the other side, nor openly advocates for the respect of humanitarian principles in all parties to the conflict.<sup>5</sup> However, more frequently than not, humanitarian assistance, provided by the international community including donors, will inevitably support one side of the conflict according to prevailing political preferences and funding. In response to disasters caused by natural hazards where on-going conflicts exist, humanitarian action can be politicized and utilized for a purpose (e.g. Pakistan earthquake in 2005, see below). At the same time, a disaster in a conflict zone can bring about peace.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010, p. S278.

<sup>4</sup> Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010, p. S276.

<sup>5</sup> Donini, 2010, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> The population in Aceh, Indonesia, struck by the tsunami in 2005, transformed minds and brought themselves out of the on-going conflicts. In so doing, they redirected efforts and focus on humanity, family and association (from an interview with a UN humanitarian worker who worked in Aceh in 2006).



In the post-9/11 era, foreign aid, prominently given by the United States and its European allies, became increasingly linked to the stabilization, counter-interagency and counter-terrorism objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq and then Pakistan, through humanitarian assistance to survivors of the 2005 earthquake. 'Many humanitarian organizations, including the specialized UN agencies, agonized over whether their contingency plan for post-invasion Iraq constituted in some sense an endorsement of the US-led military intervention.'<sup>7</sup> The resistance to work with 'one side' can be felt from this statement. In addition, there is very little evidence that humanitarian or development assistance has promoted greater stability in Pakistan, or improved public perception of the US in Pakistan in a sustainable manner.<sup>8</sup> 'Winning hearts and minds' of the affected population by utilizing humanitarian assistance, as stabilization measures for security and counter-insurgency, will have profound implications in obtaining humanitarian space. In principle, needs must be the criterion for the provision of humanitarian assistance. So, on the ground, the boundaries between humanitarian action and stabilization efforts become not so clear.

It seems that humanitarian action needs to be viewed in broader terms, including the responsibility to start up and plant seeds for peacebuilding without imposing universal values, as has been noted with regards to stabilization efforts, where short-term and long-term concerns also need to be considered;

[...] It also overlaps substantially with other broader-ranging policy arenas, including peace-making, peace-building, peace-enforcement, reconstruction, state-building, development and humanitarian action. Stabilization is thus simultaneously constructed as a short-term and conservative project and a potentially transformative, comprehensive and long-term project, possibly entailing substantial social, political and economic change.<sup>9</sup>

### ***Contracting Humanitarian Space***

Civil-military coordination is one of the elements of humanitarian action. However, when the military involvement starts to blur the boundary of humanitarian action, the possibility of creating 'humanitarian space' in the midst of armed conflicts will be severely questioned. When the military involvement in the delivery of services, considered as humanitarian assistance (such as medical aid and immediate nutritional needs), seeks to provide a general sense of confidence in the capacity of the government, the uneasiness for the humanitarian community grows.

<sup>7</sup> 'Even if they eschew government funding, humanitarian agencies may find it hard to adhere to the traditional principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality when their access to people in need is mediated by armed intervention or political violence. Moreover, conflict and catastrophe interact in ways that complicate the humanitarian terrain. Thus, when the tsunami struck areas that were already in the throes of armed conflict, such as Aceh and Sri Lanka, the issue of who should control the relief and reconstruction programs in the affected regions necessarily responded to politico-military considerations as well as to "simple" humanitarian concerns.' Eade, 2007, p. IX.

<sup>8</sup> Wilder, 2010, pp. S406-S426.

<sup>9</sup> Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010, pp. S276-S277.



In the United Kingdom's stabilization model in Afghanistan, the operational focus was on Helmand province with limited presence of local NGOs due to the hostile security environment. The perceived lack of NGOs as implementation partners, or the security restriction placed on civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) staff, led the UK military to adopt a greater role: stabilization Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs) started to be 'portrayed by the humanitarian community as part of securitization of assistance in pursuit of the *hearts-and-minds* agenda as opposed to what was in reality largely gap filling on the part of the military. Furthermore, by 2010, both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) had set up a health-care programme in Helmand, suggesting that, even in these circumstances, it was possible to create an element of humanitarian space.<sup>10</sup>

However, how far can what started as 'gap-filling' by military operations go? During or in the aftermath of armed conflicts, operational modes of civilian support and military personnel are considerably different, due to the disparate basic principles. Military operates under a strict line of command in order and discipline to support one side of a conflict. Civilian workers are in two different camps: 'political negotiators' work to bring opponents closer to a ceasefire or an agreement, while 'humanitarians' work in accordance with humanitarian principles (impartiality, neutrality and independence). To negotiate a humanitarian space with parties to a conflict, there is a need for neutrality. Although there seems to be an increasingly blurred boundary between service delivery and 'humanitarian' assistance, the basic principles and implementation purposes differ far too much. Thus, humanitarians run the risk of losing humanitarian space if seen as 'one-sided' by working side-by-side with military forces. Nevertheless, military escort may be necessary for civilian workers from UN peace missions for example, as they may need physical security in conflict-prone zones when working with all parties in conflict.

The humanitarian community has voiced concerns that the apparent harnessing of humanitarian interventions to a broad array of stabilization and statebuilding objectives would transform needs-based priorities into political or military ones, trading political visibility with sustainability. The association between health non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the counter-insurgency/statebuilding agenda felt to endanger health-care staff, seriously undermining the humanitarian space.<sup>11</sup>

In most cases, creating a humanitarian space needs painstaking negotiations based on humanitarian principles:

Being perceived as neutral and independent can help create a 'humanitarian space' that protects aid workers in the field and facilitates their access to populations at risk on all sides of a conflict.<sup>12</sup>

Even though military efforts, including military medical outreach, can support local population for 'saving lives' in a restricted security environment, the support would be single, one-off treatments that are unlikely to have any significant health outcome.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Gordon, 2010, p. S377.

<sup>11</sup> Gordon, 2010, pp. S380-S381.

<sup>12</sup> Barnett and Snyder, 2008, p. 146.

<sup>13</sup> Gordon, 2010, p. S378.

The stabilization discourse shares similarities with the promotion of early recovery, as both approaches search for longer-term instruments for engaging international responses with fragile states to achieve earlier and more effective recovery from conflict. They also share a tension between the short-term imperative to 'deliver' and the longer-term aspirations to develop sustainability.<sup>14</sup> The theme of 'linking relief to development' has been promoted by the international community for decades now, but the challenges of difference in approach as mentioned above remain the same.

It can be said that since the United Nations started to operate 'integrated missions', including the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2006, the interaction between military/security and civilian entities has increased. Integrated approaches continued, but criticism for this approach is also constant.

### ***Humanitarian Action in Non-war Situations***

Humanitarian Assistance may be required outside of the context of an 'officially recognized' crisis. This could happen, for instance, in non-war situations of urban violence (slums and drug-plagued cities). In the context of urban violence caused by criminal activities (drug and human trafficking), youth gang disputes, or domestic violence, where affected governments grant no official status for international assistance, how can humanitarian assistance be provided to save lives and alleviate sufferings of people living under such harsh conditions?

Humanitarianism can be officially applied in contexts of war, armed conflict, and civil war (International Humanitarian Law/IHL domain), but not in contexts of urban violence (for example, against criminal economic gain). In this case, the human rights approach will be used (International Human Rights Law/IHRL domain), without a clear legal basis for the presence of humanitarian actors. Consequently little humanitarian assistance is available to the population affected by urban violence.<sup>15</sup>

In such non-state emergencies, in spite of the intensity of the needs, the international community rarely provides humanitarian assistance to non-state entities. How can this be planned and implemented?

Violence in urban settings has various causes and a broad range of ramifications. Some causes might well be effectively addressed through a human security approach with increased policing, law enforcement and conflict resolution, or through more developmental approaches, including job creation and education. Likewise, some impacts (such as food shortages, inadequate housing and poverty) might be addressed – often on an ad hoc basis – by local charities or governmental agencies. But the fact remains that violence in urban contexts also produces immediate humanitarian needs that must be addressed even as the crisis is unfolding.<sup>16</sup>

The challenge is substantial; in addition to the unclear legal framework, an intense and urgent humanitarian assistance – medical aid in particular – will be required in the midst of on-going urban violence.

<sup>14</sup> Gordon, 2010, pp. S381-S382.

<sup>15</sup> Lucchi, 2010, pp. 973-995.

<sup>16</sup> Lucchi, 2010, p. 991.

### ***Humanitarian Action in Violent Urban Settings***

Such violent urban settings (hot spots) are mostly found in what are referred to as 'fragile states'. In such states, governmental action is seldom taken to reduce or prevent suffering/conflicts in these restless trouble spots. Even though the international humanitarian community can only deal with state-level issues that are addressed officially, there is a dire need to work in a coherent way to cover all levels of humanitarian crises, including those at community-level.

In engaging with local actors suffering from situations of urban violence and offering first aid training and limited treatment for violence-related injuries, humanitarian action can contribute to broader humanitarian aims (well-being, saving livelihood) and to the stabilization agenda.<sup>17</sup> In addition, supporting urban resilience and capacities in situation of chronic violence, with a focus on rapidly growing cities and vulnerabilities, can further contribute to the development of communities by adopting approaches built on localized networks and realities (rendering local actors as 'active enablers of urban governance'). Finally, there also exist rural areas referred to as 'ungoverned spaces' where assistance may be required.<sup>18</sup>

As in the above case, the areas and extent of provision of humanitarian action are expanding. It thus becomes necessary to review the different types of humanitarian action on the ground, as they often depend on the context in which they are played out and on the methods used to implement them.

## **1.2 Different Approaches within Humanitarianism**

Throughout the research, the most important issue was whether humanitarian action should be neutral, impartial and independent in any situation, or whether it could go all the way to support peacebuilding. In other words, is humanitarian action apolitical or political?

There have been various reactions to the approaches of humanitarian action:

Humanitarian organizations have reacted in different ways to the challenges posed by the new international political environment of the post-Cold War era. [...] The search for uniformity should not be allowed to cloud the fact that what we are actually seeing, in this new era of rights, is increasing diversity in the approaches to humanitarian action. It is becoming more and more clear that what works for ICRC and for many NGOs, does not necessarily work for United Nations organizations such as UNHCR.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross in Rio de Janeiro has an outreach programme with 'negotiated access' given by the police for specific protection activities. Muggah and Jütersonke (forthcoming) 'Rethinking Stabilisation and Humanitarian Action in Fragile Cities' and see the Urban Resilience in Situations of Chronic Violence (URCV) project by the Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) available at <http://graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp/urban-resilience-chronic-violence.html>.

<sup>18</sup> Colletta and Muggah, 2009, p. 426.

<sup>19</sup> Cutts, 1998, p. 15.

A decade later, it seems that the above statement still holds true.

In wrapping up the above discussions, expanding views for humanitarianism are unfolding. A distinct classification of humanitarian action is proposed in the next subsection.

### *Kinds of Humanitarianism<sup>20</sup>*

	<i>Apolitical</i>	<i>Political</i>
Accept constraints	<b>Bed for the Night:</b> unqualified short-term emergency relief to those in life-threatening circumstances	<b>Back a Decent Winner:</b> deploy resources to achieve a stable political bargain that will halt gross violations of human rights
Change constraints	<b>Do No Harm:</b> provide relief while minimizing the negative side effects	<b>Peacebuilding:</b> eliminate the root causes of conflict and help promote a more peaceful, stable and legitimate political and economic system

We need to consider whether humanitarian action can be categorized as political, which means that efforts are made to help achieve a political bargain or address not only the symptoms of the conflict, but the conflict in itself and its root causes. The other dimension is if the goals of actions are modest or ambitious, which will determine the shape of its results (accept or change constraints).

If the goals are ambitious (change constraints) and carry a political dimension, humanitarian action can aim at comprehensive peacebuilding. The peacebuilding agenda aspires to address not only symptoms but also its causes and the international actors, thereby prescribing to the view that peacebuilding is instrumental to the broader humanitarian and international peace and security agenda.<sup>21</sup> This explains the growing linkage with stabilization efforts as seen before.

In the post-Cold War and the post-9/11 eras, the focus and areas of humanitarian action became more diverse. Although the ICRC tries to keep an 'orthodox' way of engaging in humanitarian action, other areas of action, which can also be considered as humanitarian, are emerging.

In reviewing the development of humanitarianism since the early nineteenth century, it appears that the dimension of humanitarianism has become more complicated and intertwined with other dimensions of global social action:

The meaning of humanitarianism has expanded and increasingly includes what were once considered distinctive features of global social action, such as human rights, economic development, democracy promotion, and peacebuilding which increasingly are bundled together in a general ethic of moral caretaking and the reduction of suffering. Humanitarianism has become institutionalized, internationalized and prominent on the global agenda. It is an orienting feature of global social life that is used to justify, legitimate and galvanize action.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Barnett and Snyder, 2008, p. 146.

<sup>21</sup> Barnett and Snyder, 2008, pp. 150-151.

<sup>22</sup> Barnett and Weiss, 2008, p. 29.

Humanitarian action seems to be going back and forth among the political and apolitical zones, but at least more elements for transformation are found in recent drifts.

There is a need to 'highlight the ways in which humanitarian organizations and foreign actors represent a significant economic and political stake for local actors, often simultaneously empowering certain groups (warlords, organized political groups) and disempowering others (marginal populations, women, indigenous groups).'<sup>23</sup> In searching for the linkage, it seems that there is a growing gray area where humanitarian action and peacebuilding overlap and converge.

### 1.3 Building Peace

Turning to the other subject of this research, a reflection on 'building peace' is required. To 'build peace' is a far-reaching inspiration. In order to clarify and define key areas of peacebuilding, the definition of peace should be clarified.

#### *Peace*

There are many definitions of peace to begin with. For example, two compatible definitions of peace were proposed by Johan Galtung:

- Peace is the absence/reduction of violence of all kinds (static – focus on violence and peace in negation)
- Peace is a process of nonviolent and creative conflict transformation (dynamic – focus on the conflict and its transformation)<sup>24</sup>

According to Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>25</sup> the purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace [...]

The purpose is more restrictive or 'static' in paragraph 1 (prevention and removal of threats to peace and suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace), whereas paragraph 2 would require the Member States to act with more proactive or 'creative and transformative' attitudes.

<sup>23</sup> Krause and Jütersonke, 2005, p. 459.

<sup>24</sup> Peace is free from direct, structural (indirect) and cultural (legitimizing) violence. Direct violence is an *event*; structural violence is a *process* with ups and downs; cultural violence is an *invariant*, a *permanent*, *remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformation of basic culture*. (Galtung, 1996, pp. 9, 199, 265.)

<sup>25</sup> United Nations Charter, available at [www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml)

The 'dynamic' element of peace should be considered as a more important part of peacebuilding:

Peace-building activities can be identified with building structural and cultural peace. Ability to identify the non-articulated structural conflicts throughout society are needed, not necessarily trying to solve all of them [...] but to recognize them – a very important step toward positive transformation. [...] Undoing cultural violence is even more difficult. [...] The hidden is not deep down in social structure, but in the culture, hidden in the collective subconscious.<sup>26</sup>

### ***Peacebuilding***

In this paper, the peacebuilding activities are not defined as those meant to remove structural and cultural violence, but rather as efforts 'to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'.<sup>27</sup> This definition was updated by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 as follows:

Peace-building [...], as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace-building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques.<sup>28</sup>

In the above definition,<sup>29</sup> peacebuilding would take place at all times, not only in post-conflict situations. Thus, the areas of peacebuilding are expanding as well.

This research considers peacebuilding efforts that are deployed not only at times of emergency and recovery from conflict, but at any time facing (potential) conflicts or violence. Nevertheless, specific linkages with humanitarian action are sought and examined, unavoidably in situations of conflict – including urban violence.

<sup>26</sup> Galtung, 1996, p. 271.

<sup>27</sup> UNSG (United Nations Secretary General), 1992.

<sup>28</sup> United Nations, August 2000, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report)*, available at [www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)

<sup>29</sup> Another definition of peacebuilding can be found: Peacebuilding is defined as those actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed conflict ('negative peace') and a modicum of participatory politics (as a component of 'positive peace') that can be sustained in the absence of an international peace operation. Post-conflict peacebuilding is the subset of such actions undertaken after the termination of armed hostilities. (Call and Cousens, 2007, p. 2.)

As will be discussed in Section 2, some practitioners and scholars responded that peacebuilding should take place only at specific phases of the conflict. However, this paper considers that peacebuilding can take place at all phases, including during violent conflict when communities can deploy efforts to provide trauma counseling and peace education in a safe-haven or a humanitarian space<sup>30</sup> where humanitarian assistance is being provided.

Peacebuilding can include many issues, but what are the most critical areas of work? In 2006, an inventory was made to map the post-conflict peacebuilding capacities of the United Nations<sup>31</sup> as follows:

*Security and Public Order*

Security System Governance, Law Enforcement Agencies, Defense Reform, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Mine Action;

*Justice and Reconciliation*

Transitional Justice, Judicial and Legal Reform, Corrections, Human Rights;

*Governance and Participation*

Good Offices and Mediation, Constitution-Making, Public Administration and Government Strengthening, Local Governance, Financial Transparency and Accountability, Elections, Electoral Systems and Processes/Political Parties, Public Information and Media Development;

*Socio-Economic Well-Being*

Protection of Vulnerable Groups, Basic Needs,<sup>32</sup> Gender, Physical Infrastructure, Employment Generation, Economic Foundations for Growth and Development.

More specifically, a study carried out in 2007 identified three core dimensions of post-conflict peacebuilding: 1) creation of stability; 2) restoring state institutions; and 3) addressing the socioeconomic dimensions of conflict. These can be called the 'stages of recovery,' and they include early and medium-term recovery issues as well as the transition from recovery to development.<sup>33</sup>

In 2009, the most urgent and important peacebuilding objectives were identified as 'establishing security, building confidence in a political process, delivering initial peace dividends and expanding core national capacity.'<sup>34</sup> As suggested by a survey respondent, basic services delivery, which lies at the core of humanitarian action, could support peacebuilding by helping to establish security;

Restoring basic service delivery supported by humanitarian action and satisfaction of basic needs, will create a climate that is favorable to peacebuilding.

<sup>30</sup> 'There is the question of whether humanitarian space means primarily the space for humanitarian agencies to operate safely and effectively on the ground, or whether it relates to a wider social, political or geographical space within which human welfare is preserved and promoted – that is, a space within which people can cope, survive or find protection in the midst of crisis.' (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010, p. S288.)

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary General, September 2006.

<sup>32</sup> This will most likely be provided by humanitarian organizations.

<sup>33</sup> Barnett, Kim, O'Donnell and Sitea, 2007, p. 49.

<sup>34</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 6.



In sum, among all the issues within the peacebuilding arena discussed above, the research on which this Working Paper is based has identified the following areas as priorities for peacebuilding.<sup>35</sup>

- Statebuilding:<sup>36</sup> safety and security, political framework, economic renewal, reconciliation, growth of civil society, good governance
- Democratic governance through elections and referenda; validation of legitimacy (El Salvador,<sup>37</sup> Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, etc.)
- Early recovery (the converging area between humanitarian action and peacebuilding)
- Peace architecture for conflict prevention/ monitoring early warning signs (Ghana,<sup>38</sup> Sudan, Afghanistan,<sup>39</sup> etc.)
- Interim stabilization/Second-generation security promotion activities: at-risk youth and gang programmes (El Salvador, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti).<sup>40</sup>

Crises no longer remain in their separate and distinct boxes, no more than they are contained within their national borders. The challenges are numerous. In fact, six key challenges must be addressed nearly simultaneously, since each feeds into the other and could serve as indicators and potential triggers of conflict.<sup>41</sup> In the presence of mass violence, it would not be possible to achieve – let alone adequately address – the fundamental goals of promoting governance, sustainable development, and international stability and cooperation.

From the above insights, ideas, and practices, the extent of the overlapping area is again broader now than before, as peacebuilding was considered mainly in the aftermath of a conflict, or, as quite often termed, 'post-conflict peacebuilding'.

### ***Statebuilding in Post-conflict Situations***

As seen so far, the emphasis has been frequently placed on statebuilding in 'post-conflict situations', which translates into rebuilding a functioning state and society after the demise of a failed or fragile state. In addition, the post-Cold War era conflicts have mostly been internal or civil ones. In this sense, fragile states do not necessarily collapse, or 'fail', and could thereby be rebuilt if the function of a state is directed to 'good enough' governance.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>35</sup> The author acknowledges that while very broad in scope, the areas identified do not constitute an exhaustive list of the priorities for peacebuilding.

<sup>36</sup> Some consider peacebuilding and statebuilding as competing priorities in a post-conflict situation. For example, according to the OECD, '*peacebuilding* is about ending or preventing violent conflict and supporting sustainable peace, while *statebuilding* is about establishing capable, accountable, responsive and legitimate states.' (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2010, p. 21.)

<sup>37</sup> Karl, 1992, pp. 147-164.

<sup>38</sup> The Peace Architecture in Ghana is discussed in Section 3.

<sup>39</sup> International Herald Tribune, 29 September 2010, 'President Karzai named 70 members to a High Peace Council,' p. 4.

<sup>40</sup> Colletta and Muggah, 2009, p. 438.

<sup>41</sup> Steinberg, 2010, available at [www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/tackling-state-fragility-the-new-world-of-peacebuilding.aspx](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/tackling-state-fragility-the-new-world-of-peacebuilding.aspx). A summary table from the keynote can be found in Annex 4.

<sup>42</sup> 'Working toward "good enough governance" means accepting a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what is working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously; and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country.' (Grindle, 2004, pp. 525-548.)



During the post-conflict peacebuilding phase, the challenges can best be captured along three broad themes: security, welfare and representation. These represent the core functions of the modern state, whether democratic or authoritarian, and are also central to peacebuilding.<sup>43</sup> Before the current concept of ‘stabilization’ came into play, historical and theoretical knowledge considered security concerns – mainly disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/DDR, and security sector reform/SSR – as the focus of post-conflict peacebuilding and as core functions of a state in post-conflict situations. However, the current concepts of security and stabilization signal that peacebuilding is not limited to the aftermath of conflicts and can take place at any phase in a ‘fragile state’ situation.

Whereas the repeated mantra is ‘sustainable development requires security, and sustainable security requires development,’ there have been efforts to reconcile peace and security with development concerns. As one of the ways to promote more comprehensive approaches to armed violence reduction in post-conflict or high violence environments, the development of policies that transcend the conventional categories of armed conflict, post-conflict, and criminal violence is recommended.<sup>44</sup>

The above three elements can be kept in mind in examining the elements of statebuilding – albeit without limiting it to the post-conflict phase – in addition to considering the factors (peace dividends) that could give legitimacy to the government.

### ***Statebuilding and Nation Building in Africa***

With regards to nation building in the last fifty years in Africa, although the context of conflict was different (independence from European colonial status or cessation), the following four dimensions are proposed:

- Responsible leadership;
- Statebuilding and good governance (security and safety; transparency; political participation/voice, sustainable economic opportunities; and development/public services);
- Improving good governance;
- Strengthened institutions.

In this case, five main elements of statebuilding can be highlighted: 1) Security and safety; 2) Transparency; 3) Political participation; 4) Sustainable economic opportunities and 5) Development.

Although efficient capacities of institutions are central to nation building, strong leadership is emphasized to achieve good governance. This refers in particular to the situations in Zimbabwe or Côte d’Ivoire, as opposed to some successful countries, such as Botswana, Mauritius, or Ghana.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Jütersonke and Schwarz, 2005, p. 427 and Schwarz, 2005, p. 435. Security: a necessary condition for welfare and for political participation, Welfare: reduces conflicts and provide resources to produce security, and increases the capacity for political participation and Representation: allows for peaceful external relations and domestically for non-violent resolution of conflicts, and promotes economic growth and social justice and makes aid more effective.

<sup>44</sup> Muggah and Krause, 2009, p. 146.

<sup>45</sup> Rotberg, 2010.

### *Democratic Governance*

As seen so far, statebuilding is one of the key elements of peacebuilding as weak or fragile state institutions may impede access to resources and hamper stable social relations. In addition, the legitimacy of governance needs to be acknowledged during the process of strengthening state institutions.

Democratic governance and conflict prevention (and recovery) both promote and foster mediating institutions, leadership for decision-making, and the delivery of public goods and basic human needs. In many post-conflict situations, electoral processes are considered necessary to ensure legitimacy and good governance while being supported by peacebuilding/statebuilding measures. To find out about the inter-face between governance and conflict, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) offers eleven areas for consideration.<sup>46</sup>

Regarding the electoral processes, the following question is proposed:

Are the electoral system, processes and institutions credible and popularly perceived as such? Is a particular identity group or region excluded from electoral processes of administration (or feel that it is)? Is the election's timing deemed suitable?

When reflecting on the above question, recent events in Côte d'Ivoire come to mind: the legitimacy of the Electoral Commission was doubted when the commission became perceived as pro-incumbent and potentially provoking post-election violence, political impasse and consideration for the use of force. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assert that governance needs to be promoted with a 'conflict-preventive' lens:

The timing of elections is a key consideration. Elections may trigger violence, since they are a key determinant of who will wield considerable power over several years. Violence is especially probable, for instance, when the electoral rules or their application are not considered credible and fair, or when there is a fear that legitimate results will be tampered with.

While electoral processes can support democratization, they can also prompt elections-related violence. These negative consequences have mostly occurred in countries in transition, in countries consolidating their democracy, in post-war societies and in situations of referendums to ratify peace agreements or to determine the sovereign status of a nation.<sup>47</sup>

Elections do not 'cause' violence. Instead, the root causes of conflict are often found in deep-rooted economic, social or political issues in dispute and in the allocation of power among various social forces that the electoral process affects. Electoral violence is a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends. Similarly, societies prone to experiencing election related violence are normally

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<sup>46</sup> The questions are on: government institutions, degree of centralized political power, electoral processes, role and composition of political parties, changing frameworks and social contract, high expectations, human rights, historical cleavages, natural resources and economic development, internal pressures, and external pressures. (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009, pp. 5-6.)

<sup>47</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009a, p. 8.

vulnerable to broader or other kinds of political violence. Colombia, India, Indonesia, Kosovo and Sri Lanka are examples of instances in which electoral violence is embedded in a broader context of longstanding social conflict.<sup>48</sup>

The international community is increasingly concerned about the nature, timing and administration of electoral processes as instruments for conflict management. It thus becomes clear that transitional processes, which culminate in elections, are not the end point of peacebuilding.<sup>49</sup>

Elections are not an end of the postwar transition, a definitive green-light, an international exit strategy or the sole solution to peacebuilding; yet they are a critical turning point of the transition with considerable (if not determinative) implications for statebuilding.

As in the case of the post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire in November 2010, elections may not – and should not – signal the end of peacebuilding support. In fact, the international and regional stakeholders need to stay involved and alert for early warning signs to be able to react robustly to prevent or reverse the unilateral capture of the state.<sup>50</sup>

### ***Early Recovery***

As a converging area between humanitarian action and peacebuilding, early recovery is defined as follows:

The overall focus of the recovery approach, as defined by UNDP, is to restore the capacity of national institutions and communities to recover from a conflict or a natural disaster, enter transition or 'build back better', and avoid relapses. Early recovery is a multidimensional process guided by development principles that begins in a humanitarian setting, and seeks to build on humanitarian programmes and catalyze sustainable development opportunities. It aims to generate and/or reinforce nationally owned processes for post-crisis recovery that are resilient and sustainable. It encompasses the restoration of basic services, livelihoods, transitional shelter, governance, security and rule of law, environment and other socio-economic dimensions, including the reintegration of displaced populations. It strengthens human security and aims to begin addressing the underlying causes of the crisis.<sup>51</sup>

In promoting a smooth transition from the humanitarian phase, early recovery needs to take place alongside humanitarian action. To include early recovery concerns, a 'conflict analysis' is required at the planning stage. The Inter-Agency Framework is articulated in three key stages: analysis of the conflict; analysis of on-going responses; and strategic and programmatic conclusions for transition planning.

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<sup>48</sup> United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2009a, p. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Sisk, 2009, p. 201.

<sup>50</sup> Sisk, 2009, p. 211.

<sup>51</sup> Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, April 2008, p. 9.

In early recovery contexts, there is often a perception that ‘there is no time’ to do a conflict analysis. However, interventions that are not informed by an understanding of the context may end up harming the very people that these activities are trying to help. For this reason, it is important that agencies incorporate conflict analysis as an integral part of their regular programming, and, that, as a minimum, in an early recovery context, a ‘quick’ conflict analysis is undertaken to inform its interventions.<sup>52</sup>

At the humanitarian phase, the early recovery cluster as part of humanitarian coordination is divided into different capacities incorporating livelihoods, land, governance, rule of law or environmental issues. At the same time, early recovery may only be linked to a ‘stabilization’ (short-term) agenda.<sup>53</sup>

This way, early recovery can become the connecting element between the humanitarian and peacebuilding phases. By including the conflict analysis at the preparatory stage or when planning for a contingency, concerns for the peacebuilding agenda can already be included.

At the end of a December 2008 meeting of the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP), one of the recommendations provided an option for the linkage between peacebuilding and humanitarian action:

There needs to be a clarification of the link between peacebuilding and early recovery, as humanitarian and development actors are often involved in peacebuilding activities in the countries concerned long before the peacebuilding response commences. Early recovery activities should start during the humanitarian response. Immediately after large scale violence ceases, the objective of humanitarian and development actors should be to link operational practices to the overall definition and purpose of peacebuilding as defined in the national strategic plan.<sup>54</sup>

## 1.4 Overlapping Policy Spheres

As seen so far, the boundary of humanitarian action in relation to peacebuilding is getting increasingly blurred. For instance, the function of basic services delivery (such as medical aid and urgent nutrition needs) is sometimes considered and included as humanitarian, and other times as stabilization, early recovery, peacebuilding, or development activities.


The above discussions show that overlapping areas of humanitarian action and peacebuilding are emerging. Any strategic policy formulation should illustrate the diversity of spheres that interact with humanitarian action, namely those of stabilization, early recovery, peacebuilding, statebuilding and development. Figure 1 below captures the overlaps between stabilization and other policy spheres;

<sup>52</sup> Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery, April 2008, p. 21.

<sup>53</sup> Bailey and Pavanello, 2009, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP), 2008, p. 5.

*Figure 2 - Overlaps between stabilization and other policy spheres*



Source: Collinson, Sarah, Samir Elhawary and Robert Muggah. 2010. *States of Fragility: Stabilisation and its Implications for Humanitarian Action*. HPG Working Paper. London: Overseas Development Institute, p. 11.

Therefore, the humanitarian approach needs to consider a longer-term planning strategy, taking into account the potential negative consequences of its actions. The 'progressive' humanitarian action may not stand alone, and all actions need to incorporate potential capacities for peacebuilding. Hence, it becomes justified, at any stage of (potential) conflict situations, to plan for peacebuilding capacities simultaneously with humanitarian action. This way, the boundaries of humanitarian action can be further expanded to link into the peacebuilding spheres to some extent through common capacities identified at the country level. Section 2 will show how this can be achieved.

## 2. Practical Synergy and Common Capacities

In this section, the practitioners' insights and experiences will be drawn to gather key areas of convergence or practical synergy for humanitarian action and peacebuilding. It becomes evident that the boundary between the two is not clearly defined.

Based on the practitioners' responses to the survey, practical synergy was found in the following areas:

<i>Principal Elements of Humanitarian Action</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Basic services delivery, protection of civilians, early recovery</li> <li>■ Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy</li> <li>■ Civil-military coordination</li> <li>■ Political liaison with international/national actors</li> <li>■ Project administration</li> </ul>
<i>Priority Areas of Peacebuilding</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Stability, normalcy and rule of law</li> <li>■ Reconciliation</li> <li>■ Economic renewal</li> </ul>
<i>Common Capacities for Both Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding</i>
<i>Convergence between Humanitarian Action and Political Work</i>

### 2.1 Principal Elements of Humanitarian Action

This section firstly discusses the elements of humanitarian action and the required delivery expertise when trying to link humanitarian action with peacebuilding. According to the peacebuilding community, priority areas of humanitarian action may not be very clear. Secondly, priority areas of peacebuilding and required capacities for peacebuilding will be presented on the basis of the survey. These areas, in contrast, may not be very clear to humanitarian actors. Thirdly, common capacities required for both fields will be identified.

On the whole, the linkage and overlapping areas of the two fields are substantial, both in terms of the required capacities for planning and delivery of humanitarian action and for peacebuilding.

To examine prevailing practices and perception regarding humanitarian action, a question was asked in the survey,<sup>55</sup> with the following percentage allocated by respondents to a set of humanitarian actions:<sup>56</sup>

***Response: Areas of Humanitarian Action (multiple choices to select two)***

Basic services delivery	90.6%
Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy	68.8%
Information management and analysis	12.5%
Civil-military coordination	9.4%
Project administration	9.4%
Political liaison with international/national actors	9.4%
Tracing of missing people/Mine action	0.0%

As seen above, the majority of respondents indicated that the first two elements were the most important: 1) basic services delivery and 2) coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy.

***Basic Services Delivery***

Following a Humanitarian Response Review in 2005 ('Cluster approach'), humanitarian response has become better coordinated through the Global Cluster Leads designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). This seeks to enhance accountability and humanitarian financing, and strengthen leadership and partnership with other humanitarian actors. These clusters include Agriculture, Camp Coordination/Management, Early Recovery, Education, Emergency Shelter, Emergency Telecommunications, Health, Logistics, Nutrition, Protection and Water/Sanitation/ Hygiene (WASH), with additional cross-cutting areas such as Age, Environment, Gender and HIV/AIDS.<sup>57</sup> It should be noted that these clusters include two 'different' kinds of clusters outside of the 'traditional' basic services: Early Recovery (as discussed in Section 1) and Protection.

After five years of implementation of the cluster approach, a second evaluation was conducted by the IASC with two objectives: to assess the main outcomes of the joint humanitarian response at country level, and to present suggestions on how the cluster approach could be further improved and strengthened.

Among six recommendations, one is particularly relevant to this paper:

Identify existing preparedness, response and coordination mechanisms and capacities and link with/support/complement them where appropriate.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> The survey dealt with other issues such as tracing missing people or demining (including mine action-education).

<sup>56</sup> **Question 4:** From the viewpoint of your organization, what are the two most important areas of humanitarian action, provided by international support? What types of expertise should be deployed? Please select two key areas.

<sup>57</sup> One Response-Cluster Approach, available at [oneresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/Pages/Global%20Cluster%20Leads.aspx](http://oneresponse.info/Coordination/ClusterApproach/Pages/Global%20Cluster%20Leads.aspx)

<sup>58</sup> Streets et al, 2010, p. 11.

Concrete steps to implement this recommendation include the following:

Strengthen cooperation and coordination between clusters, national actors and development actors at every stage from preparedness to response and the transition to development. To do so, contingency plans should be shared between national and international actors. Joint simulation exercises and training should be held. Mechanisms for bridging the funding gap between humanitarian and development activities, including the provision of resources for early recovery, should be developed. Furthermore, appropriate links between cluster activities and plan and related processes, such as Post-Disaster and Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF) and National Development Plans, should be established.<sup>59</sup>

It is clear that appropriate links across all relevant strategic frameworks should be established and contingency plans should be shared among all actors. The discussion on the links between humanitarian action and peacebuilding are further explored in Section 4.

Existing capacities at country level can be optimized, particularly if led by organizations with dual or multiple mandates of humanitarian and peacebuilding/development, such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO) and some NGOs.

### ***Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict***

As noted above, protection, considered as part of advocacy or 'rights-based' humanitarian action, represents one of the clusters and is increasingly considered as a key element of humanitarian action.

Many humanitarians embraced the idea that aid should be delivered to people not only on the basis of their needs, but as part of a process that recognized their rights.<sup>60</sup>

The protection cluster is led by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from conflict and by UNHCR, OHCHR (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) and UNICEF for IDPs from disasters/civilians affected by conflict (other than IDPs). The focus of this work is described as follows:

Protection is of over-arching concern during humanitarian crises and therefore fundamental to humanitarian action. Humanitarian policy and response strategies are informed by the need to minimize the various risks people face and ensure full respect of the rights of all populations affected by disaster or armed conflict. Humanitarian actors must also ensure that humanitarian response does not result in discrimination, abuse, neglect and violence. [...] Ensuring affected populations are respected and protected also involves specialized services, such as providing legal aid, providing family tracing and reunification services, assisting demobilization of child soldiers and facilitating refugee registration.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Streets et al, 2010, pp. 78-79.

<sup>60</sup> Foley, 2008, p. 37.

<sup>61</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), available at [www.ochaonline.un.org/OCHAonMessage/tabid/6702/language/en-US/Default.aspx](http://www.ochaonline.un.org/OCHAonMessage/tabid/6702/language/en-US/Default.aspx)



It is emphasized in the above statement that humanitarian policies will play an important role in ensuring that humanitarian action does not support discrimination, abuse, neglect, and violence, which could result in supporting one side of a conflict. This suggests that humanitarian action can be influenced by political concerns depending on the situations (such as, for example, in Rwanda, Bosnia, Sudan, etc.)

### ***Early Recovery***

As another 'different' kind of cluster, early recovery contains the most significant areas of linkage between humanitarian action and peacebuilding, as seen in Section 1.

### ***Coordination of Humanitarian Action and Advocacy***

In addition to basic services delivery, the coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy, including assessments of the situation, needs, access, recovery and protection, are also significant elements considered by donors, governments, NGOs and other development actors. In addition, information management – including analysis and dissemination of the newest accurate information – makes a difference in effectively supporting the affected population.

The following areas considered as elements of humanitarian action are getting closer to the elements constituting peacebuilding: civil-military coordination; political liaison with international/national actors; and project administration.

### ***Civil-Military Coordination***

It is often essential for humanitarians to establish humanitarian corridors, or days of tranquility, in the midst of hostilities. In this regard, the United Nations defines 'humanitarian' civil-military coordination as, 'the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training. Key elements include planning, information sharing and task division.'<sup>62</sup> The practice of working with and alongside the military in humanitarian operations is on the increase and humanitarians have voiced some concerns. These concerns involve the stabilization strategy and the implications for humanitarian action, such as in the example of the UK's stabilization model in Afghanistan given in Section 1.

### ***Political Liaison with International/National Actors***

This element is particularly relevant in negotiating and securing humanitarian space with warring parties, including during fighting. As reviewed before, the principles of neutrality and independence will come into play, but the extent of conformity to these principles greatly differs across organizations. This also applies to the relationship with the military, as cited above.

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<sup>62</sup> For further information on humanitarian civil-military coordination: [ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinationSectionCMCS/tabid/1274/Default.aspx](http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinationSectionCMCS/tabid/1274/Default.aspx)

### *Project Administration*

Finally, project administration may be considered as elements of humanitarian action as these capacities will be required to manage humanitarian projects and programming, which have a tendency to continue, as part of a long-term strategy (from 6 months to one year). These capacities are discussed in the context of peacebuilding below.

## **2.2 Capacities for Humanitarian Action (Short-term and Long-term)**

After reviewing the elements of humanitarian action, what kind of more concrete capacities and expertise are needed at the planning and delivery stages? Can any of the capacities be useful for promoting peacebuilding? <sup>63</sup> It should be emphasized that these are not 'institutional' capacities, but are rather represented at the scale of one person or a group of initial capacities. Some capacities are specifically short-term and deal with humanitarian action, as drawn from the survey and illustrated below:

### *Response: Key Capacities for Humanitarian Action (Short-term)*

<i>Humanitarian Action</i>	<i>Required capacities/Expertise</i>
Basic services delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cluster leads, especially NGO cluster leads/co-leads</li> <li>■ Engineer</li> <li>■ Implementation manager and relevant quality control officer</li> <li>■ Rapid needs assessment expert</li> <li>■ Sectoral experts in technical management, coordination and policy</li> <li>■ Security access negotiator</li> </ul>
Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cluster coordinator</li> <li>■ Humanitarian affairs officer</li> <li>■ Needs assessment coordinator</li> </ul>
Information management and analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Baseline assessments (data) manager</li> <li>■ GIS expert</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation officer</li> </ul>
Civil-military coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Integration specialist</li> <li>■ Military and civil engineers (to restore emergency infrastructure, e.g. Bailey bridge<sup>64</sup>)</li> <li>■ Protection officer</li> </ul>
Project administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Finance officer</li> <li>■ Logistical coordinator – storage and delivery of food and non-food items</li> <li>■ Logistics planner</li> </ul>
Political liaison with international/national actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Facilitator for discussions between warring parties</li> <li>■ Programme manager/coordinator</li> </ul>

<sup>63</sup> **Question 5:** In the two areas selected, please describe three key capacities for each area.

<sup>64</sup> The expertise and access to specific emergency infrastructure is an important part of the response to natural disasters. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Central America in November 1998, Bailey bridges were solicited to connect river banks with washed-out passes. This expertise would also be relevant in case of conflicts. The Bailey bridge is a portable pre-fabricated truss bridge, designed for use by military engineering units to bridge up to 60-metre gaps (200 ft). It requires no special tools or heavy equipment for construction, the bridge elements are small enough to be carried in trucks, and the bridge is strong enough to carry tanks. It is considered a great example of military engineering. Bailey bridges are also extensively used in civil engineering construction projects to provide temporary access across canals, rivers, railway lines, etc. Source: [en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailey\\_bridge](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailey_bridge).

The various possibilities that emerged from the responses to the survey are compiled along with the author's input in the table below, which illustrates the long-term capacities needed for each area of action. It is important to note that the cited capacities could possibly be essential for both humanitarian action and peacebuilding:

***Response: Key Capacities (Long-term) for Humanitarian Action  
and for Peacebuilding***

<b><i>Area of Humanitarian Action</i></b>	<b><i>Required capacities/ Expertise</i></b>
Basic services delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Agriculture and business development experts</li> <li>■ Community development expert and facilitator (Service collaboration/integration with local efforts)</li> <li>■ Community liaison officer</li> <li>■ Cross-cutting issues specialist (gender, human rights, HIV, environment)</li> <li>■ Financing coordinator</li> <li>■ Human resources officer</li> </ul>
Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy officer to advocate issues with influence</li> <li>■ Development programming officer</li> <li>■ Information management officer</li> <li>■ Information and Communications Technology (ICT) expert</li> <li>■ Management Information Systems (MIS) expert</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation officer</li> <li>■ Peacemaker (Peace messages)</li> <li>■ Preparedness and response/contingency planners</li> <li>■ Policy analyst</li> <li>■ Public relations officer</li> <li>■ Resource mobilization officer/Donor coordinator</li> </ul>
Information management and analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Capacity building officer (to provide local media with constant information dissemination)</li> <li>■ External relations officer</li> <li>■ Information manager (including, to provide people in need with adequate information on humanitarian assistance)</li> <li>■ Planning officer (to Integrate emergency and next phase planning for durable solutions)</li> <li>■ Public Information officer</li> </ul>
Civil-military coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Military and civil engineers (to restore emergency infrastructure)</li> <li>■ Strategic planning officer</li> </ul>
Project administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Finance officer</li> <li>■ Logistical coordinator – storage and delivery of food and non-food items</li> <li>■ Logistics planner</li> </ul>
Political liaison with international/national actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Accounting officer</li> <li>■ Advocacy officer to lobby relevant countries/bodies with influence</li> <li>■ Employment (job creation) advisor/Integration coordinator</li> <li>■ Peacemakers</li> <li>■ Strategic planner (e.g. Linking basic needs with political, development and security sectors, as well as emerging partner country authorities to ensure alignment and coherence)</li> </ul>

Several key capacities for humanitarian action seem to be the same as what is required for peacebuilding: advocacy officer, policy analyst, communications officer, community liaison, strategic planner, and even peacemaker. In particular, the areas of project administration and political liaison in humanitarian action overlap with those of peacebuilding. (The capacities required for peacebuilding will be reviewed later in this section.)

As seen above, scores of capacities required in each area of humanitarian action overlap, which means that one staff member would play multiple roles in the delivery of humanitarian action – as usually happens. In this context, certain types of capacities performed by one staff member can also be used for sustainable peacebuilding.

## 2.3 Peacebuilding: Phases and Priority Areas

### *Phases*

To examine the perception regarding ‘peacebuilding,’ instead of using the definitions of each respondent, a question was asked about the phases of peacebuilding<sup>65</sup> (see Annex 3). As seen in Section 1, although four phases were proposed (before an outbreak of violent conflict – including imminent crisis and fragile situations; at a window of opportunity for peace negotiations; during violent conflict; and in the aftermath of violent conflict), the majority of respondents selected all of the above phases (63.6%). More often than not, peacebuilding has been implemented in a post-conflict context, as mentioned in the United Nation’s ‘Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict.’<sup>66</sup> Nevertheless, peacebuilding efforts can be made any time before, during or in the aftermath of conflict, violence, disputes or crises.

### *Priority Areas*

It has been generally agreed that challenges facing fragile states are not separate, but interact together to influence stability, development and peace. In the survey, two highest priority areas out of six elements identified by the International Crisis Group<sup>67</sup> were selected from each organization’s point of view:<sup>68</sup>

Each type of respondents selected the following priority areas:

Humanitarian actors (66% of respondents):

- 1) Stability, normalcy and rule of law
- 2) Reconciliation
- 3) Economic renewal
- 4) Legitimate political framework

<sup>65</sup> **Question 1:** In your view, when does peacebuilding take place?

<sup>66</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 3.

<sup>67</sup> Steinberg, 2010.

<sup>68</sup> **Question 2:** From the viewpoint of your organization, what are the two highest priority areas of peacebuilding capacities at the national level? What types of expertise should be built or developed first? Please select two key areas.

Development/Peacebuilding actors: (34% of respondents):

- 1) Stability, normalcy and rule of law
- 2) Reconciliation
- 3) Economic renewal
- 4) Getting regional context right

Both groups' priority areas coincide: 'Stability, normalcy and rule of law', 'Reconciliation', and 'Economic renewal'. The first three priority areas are considered as common ground. However, why is 'Legitimate political framework' the next important area for humanitarians while it is 'Getting regional context right' for peacebuilding actors?

This may come from the timeframe used by humanitarians for strategic planning. As such, a legitimate political framework would mean, for example, an 'early' election. Although the timing of this election is most contested, many peace operations led by the United Nations conducted and monitored presidential or other types of elections to promote democratic governance. The attitude of humanitarians vis-à-vis peacebuilding and development actors will be discussed in Section 3.

To get the regional context right, there is a need to engage the most immediate neighbors, i.e. regional stakeholders. Obviously, working with regional organizations and partners will take time to cultivate good working relationships, taking into account similar historical and cultural contexts. Numerous mediation efforts were undertaken to encourage the peaceful resolution of political impasse for the post-election situation in Côte d'Ivoire in January 2011.<sup>69</sup> These included the mediation efforts by South Africa's former head of state Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the African Union (AU), a mission from the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) consisting of the presidents of Benin, Cape Verde and Sierra Leone, and a visit by former Nigerian president Obasanjo. The AU appointed Kenyan Prime Minister Odinga as official mediator. (Ivoirians pointed out that no women representative was included in the above mediation efforts.)<sup>70</sup> For humanitarians, although it is essential indeed, this long-term relationship may not fit in an immediate priority action area and is rather left for political negotiators.

<sup>69</sup> The regional efforts for contingency planning in Ivory Coast are described in Section 4.

<sup>70</sup> International Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 January 2011, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Warnings from the West' available at [www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=91733](http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=91733)

## 2.4 Peacebuilding Capacities in Priority Areas

To examine key peacebuilding capacities, survey respondents were asked to specify three key capacities in each area.<sup>71</sup> Capacities can be both ‘institutional’ and ‘individual’ for this question. For the purpose of clarification, the proposed capacities were sorted out in the following groups:

### *Initial Peacebuilding Capacities*

	<b>1. Thematic capacities</b>
	<i>Capacity development</i>
	<i>Technical expertise</i>
	<b>2. Process capacities</b>
	<b>3. Transitional capacities</b>
	<b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b>
	<b>5. National context capacities</b>

It should be noted that respondents considered specific context and experiences from past cases. Therefore, the list of potential peacebuilding capacities should be adapted to each country/conflict context, in addition to areas of priorities. The entire list is found in Annex 3 (Question 3).

## 2.5 Common Capacities for Both Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding

It seems that there are, to some degree, different timeframes in the key peacebuilding capacities (See Annex 3, Question 3). The categories 3, 4, and 5 (transitional capacities, peace and mediation capacities, and national context capacities) are mostly long-term concerns, and only a ‘Recovery project expert’ is found to be required for both.

<sup>71</sup> **Question 3:** In the two areas selected, please describe three key capacities for each area?

In conclusion, the principal capacities required for both peacebuilding and humanitarian action gathered from the survey were as follows:

***Capacities Required for Both Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding***

<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <p><i>Capacity development</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Capacity development advisor</li> <li>■ Human rights trainer/teacher</li> </ul> <p><i>Technical expertise</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy officer for peace initiatives</li> <li>■ Civil-military coordination officer</li> <li>■ Civilian security forces (police officer)</li> <li>■ Communication officer (to work with warring parties)</li> <li>■ Conflict preparedness/contingency planner</li> <li>■ Conflict transformation/prevention expert</li> <li>■ Early warning capacity through specialized monitoring units</li> <li>■ Gender advisor</li> <li>■ Human security expert</li> <li>■ Legal expert</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation officer</li> <li>■ Operational and logistics expert</li> <li>■ Protection officer (for civilians)</li> <li>■ Strategic conflict assessment analyst</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Information manager to disseminate accurate information for the communities</li> <li>■ Situation analysis</li> <li>■ Strategic planners (also for youth in conflict)</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Recovery project expert</li> </ul>

As the planning time stretches, there are more possibilities within national context capacities. Insights revealed here are most noteworthy for reconciliation (e.g. group of elders, community self-protection volunteers, informal peace and reconciliation avenues through faith-based organizations/traditional process, and (women) peacemakers), and for recreating civil society (e.g. grassroots leadership and participation in decision-making, social service delivery, sustainable livelihood, promoting community groups through activities, and community empowerment).

## 2.6 Views on Convergence between Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding

To examine the perception of possible overlapping areas of work between humanitarian action and peacebuilding, the following question<sup>72</sup> was asked: *Where do you think humanitarian (life-saving) action and political work (peace mediation) converge?*

### *Response: Areas of Convergence*

1	<i>Everywhere.</i> Humanitarian and political issues are greatly interconnected when it comes to protection of civilians, human rights, and access issues, among others.
2	<i>Everywhere.</i> Both are essential factors for giving communities their life back, safely and with dignity.
3	Life-saving efforts work best at the outbreak of crisis to ensure lives are saved and suffering is reduced, and to prepare the ground for an effective humanitarian response leading to recovery. <i>This needs to be linked quickly to peace-making efforts.</i> Early introduction of peace-making initiatives paves the way for dialogue and reconciliation and ultimately leads to peacebuilding, reconstruction and development.
4	I would not restrict this to life saving but extend the cycle to <i>recovery</i> , because ultimately both sides (humanitarian and political) are interested in affected communities resuming their lives in normalcy, peace, and security. This makes the <i>overall goal of the humanitarian and political/peacebuilding actors the same.</i>
5	Where it provides ' <i>safe spaces</i> ' and expands the humanitarian space, where early intervention <i>builds confidence</i> among competing parties, and where it offers an <i>impartial bridge between competitors.</i>
6	Wherever <i>communal tensions and/or political strife affect the ability to carry out life-saving efforts</i> in an emergency.

Areas of convergence can be wide. For example, humanitarian action has linkages with human rights, humanitarian access and life saving, inevitably connecting it to livelihood. Along the way, the humanitarian space will be expanded to confidence building and a common space for dialogue. When humanitarian assistance can save lives and reduce suffering, the ground for recovery is also being paved. This is the moment when affected communities will resume their lives in normalcy, peace and security, which is the ultimate common goal for both humanitarian action and peacebuilding.

Nevertheless, humanitarian actors might show some resistance to this convergence, owing to the fact that peacebuilding action is seen as 'direct' political work that may endanger humanitarian action and contract the humanitarian space, as illustrated in the table below;

<sup>72</sup> **Question 9** (See Annex 3).



*Response: Areas of Divergence*

<b>7</b>	<i>I don't think they do. Humanitarian action can never be an element in the solution of a political problem.</i> This being said, some specific aspects of humanitarian action (such as humanitarian mine clearance) might run quite close (not intersecting though) with peacebuilding initiatives.
<b>8</b>	When working on humanitarian action, <i>direct political work must be avoided</i> . Rather, the focus should be put on meeting needs and getting people to work on issues related to improving family welfare. All political work should be an indirect outcome.

Generally, both humanitarians and peacebuilding/development actors seem to accept (or at least acknowledge) the importance of the linkage between the two areas of work.

As noted above, humanitarian actions have not always been considered in the realms of (long-term) peacebuilding because of the fundamental nature of its 'reactive' approach rather than a strategic one. In 2005, Humanitarian Response Review advanced a more comprehensive accountability to humanitarianism by introducing a 'cluster' approach to enhance predictable response. However, challenges remain, in particular in the transitional phase from humanitarian to early recovery, which is not in fact 'transitional' but rather 'concurrent'. (See Section 1 on Early Recovery.)

In light of the obstacles cited above, how can humanitarian actors include long-term peacebuilding measures in early planning at times of response?

### ***Working with Synergy***

Efforts to link humanitarian and development work are underway. For example, attempts are made in the context of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)<sup>73</sup> to link disaster preparedness work with disaster risk reduction. Recently, in formulating contingency plans, humanitarians started to include early recovery concerns with development actors into humanitarian response planning. However, issues of (long-term) peacebuilding and conflict prevention have yet to be encompassed in these contingency plans. This trend is probably due to the fact that in crisis situations, humanitarian practitioners lack the time to reflect on better ways of planning for humanitarian action (preparedness) that may effectively connect and foster subsequent development programmes.

The IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness, currently chaired by UNICEF and WFP and supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), plays a key role in standardizing humanitarian action. This group of humanitarians could promote a more systematic planning with a long-term focus (strategic, structural and process-oriented) by supporting inter-agency contingency planning with early peacebuilding capacity assessment. In addition, as a next step, proposals for capacity strengthening and development can be jointly developed with UNDP and other dual-mandated UN agencies.

<sup>73</sup> UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 2005, available at <http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/hfa.htm>

To support a coherent and effective response, the following is proposed in the agenda for action:

The United Nations and its partners typically have considerable country expertise and humanitarian capacities on the ground that will continue to provide life-saving support based on humanitarian principals in the early post-conflict period. Some of these capacities can also be transitioned towards early peacebuilding priorities, particularly through those entities that have dual humanitarian and development mandate, such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization. These agencies also work with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the Early Recovery Cluster/Network to initiate recovery at the earliest opportunity. This can help to jump-start the response, deliver early peace dividends and develop national capacities in key areas during the earliest phase, for example, by expanding essential services in health and education or rehabilitating essential infrastructure.<sup>74</sup>

In terms of the effective use of existing capacities, those agencies with a dual mandate do have a key role to play in linking humanitarian and peacebuilding/development work.

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<sup>74</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 10.

## 3. Constraints on Delivering Peacebuilding Capacities in the Initial Humanitarian Phase

As seen so far, if peacebuilding capacities can be already considered at the initial humanitarian (preparedness and response) phase, the effectiveness of humanitarian action may contribute more effectively to peacebuilding. It could also enhance national ownership by bringing up those capacities. If this is the case, why has it not taken place and what are the constraints? This section will discuss the divergence collected from the survey and current practices, followed by the role of humanitarian action at national and community levels. The section will also present good practices in Ghana.

### 3.1 Attitude, Perception and Timeframe for Humanitarian Actors

First, let us consider the difference between humanitarian and peacebuilding (development) actors' operations. It is often observed and confirmed by both types of actors that humanitarians and peacebuilders/development actors do not work together, in particular when formulating a joint plan or project (programming). As stated above, the speed of thinking, action, and decision-making are quite different. It seems that the 'short-term nature' of humanitarian action is also projected in its working mode, resulting in producing meeting records and planning actions very quickly in comparison to the peacebuilding community's 'long-term' methodology of reporting, planning, and decision-making.

Humanitarian actors are inherently responsive, but not strategic. That is, humanitarian response must be flexible and adaptable, since needs and conditions are urgent and sometimes life-threatening. In other words, life-saving requirements in protection of civilians and provision of assistance (such as food, shelter, healthcare, water and sanitation) are acute and urgent. Humanitarian actors deliver their product in the context of the humanitarian *modus operandi*: with immediate focus and priorities. Long-term sustainable peace and development objectives (in accordance with national strategic priorities such as poverty reduction) are often not in sight when responding to crisis with a short-term, tactical vision. This is quite often due to the lack of time to sit down and reflect on future implications of humanitarian action as emergency situations usually require quick decision-making.

In contrast, peacebuilders or development actors will take time to think strategically, work within the national and historical context and analysis of on-going or potential conflicts, and act with a long-term vision that includes national capacity development measures. The flip side of this relatively long-term perspective is that peacebuilders often lack a sense of urgency.

There is also a tendency to draw lines between humanitarian action and peacebuilding, as the time required for the two areas is significantly different. This may also be due to the recent financial crisis, obliging each entity and donors to focus on the most critical priorities.

Meanwhile, organizations promoting principled humanitarianism according to impartiality, neutrality, and independence, seem to have quite a strong resistance in linking to progressive, positive peacebuilding, which is seen as political and involving a wide range of issues and a

multiplicity of stakeholders. In this sense, humanitarian actors may need to shift from the current standing point to be able to link with peacebuilding.

In a recent study, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) divided NGOs' cultural and philosophical origins into three categories: religious, Dunantist, or Wilsonian.

The religious tradition, the oldest of the three, has evolved out of overseas missionary work, but apart from the evangelical organisations, most religious humanitarian agencies do not proselytise in any direct way. Catholic organisations, such as CRS, Caritas and CAFOD, represent some of the largest and most visible aid organisations. These organisations see their humanitarian programmes as straddling the church and the secular world, combining social and religious goals. For Jewish and Islamic humanitarian organisations, proselytisation is in theory less of an issue; Judaism's universal covenant means that Jews are not driven to recruit for their religion, while the Koran also allows for civilised disagreement within a wider framework of universal human values. [...] 'Dunantist' organisations seek to position themselves outside of state interests. 'Wilsonian' humanitarianism characterises most US NGOs. [...] the Wilsonian tradition sees a basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and US foreign policy objectives. [...] Wilsonians have a practical, operational bent, and practitioners have crossed back and forth into government positions.<sup>75</sup>

The orientation of humanitarian organizations (NGOs in particular) will be determined by funding to a certain extent:

NGO private funding outstrips humanitarian financing from some of the world's largest government donors, says a recent report by UK think-tank Development Initiatives (DI). Fifty-one percent of humanitarian funding for 114 NGOs studied comes from private sources. As a result, an NGO such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which channeled US\$495 million to emergency response in 2006, outspends the humanitarian budgets of 20 individual government donors, including France, the Netherlands, Germany and Norway. And MSF is outspent only by the two largest Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) donors, the United States and United Kingdom.<sup>76</sup>

This relative financial security from private funding could provide NGOs with more maneuvering space. Increasingly, as seen before, there are ideas for closing the gap between humanitarian and peacebuilding objectives and actions:

In practice, if not in principle, many agencies have come to accept the imperative of a transformative agenda. Thus, relief agencies are directly or indirectly seeking to influence the causes and risks that shape vulnerability and suffering among populations. [...] What has yet to emerge, however, is a coherent humanitarian paradigm that incorporates political, military, development or judicial action to achieve humanitarian objectives.<sup>77</sup>

Thus, although no coherent paradigm exists yet, the humanitarian approach needs to be more open and progressive to be able to link with wider peacebuilding objectives.

<sup>75</sup> Stoddard, 2003, pp. 1-2.

<sup>76</sup> International Regional Information Networks (IRIN), March 2009, 'Individuals give NGOs more funds than donors,' available at [www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=83453](http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=83453)

<sup>77</sup> Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010, p. S287.

## 3.2 The Role of Humanitarian Action in Peacebuilding Capacity

### *At the National Level*

Let us examine the externally provided possibilities for humanitarian action to contribute to national policy-making level and community level capacities. Based on its fundamental principles – neutrality, impartiality and independence – and in response to needs, humanitarian action would potentially reach out to different political, economic, and social affinities of the society. Can peacebuilding take advantage of this extensive reach of humanitarian action to conflict-prone societies at national and community levels?

For international (external) humanitarian and peacebuilding actors, joint planning and training in a whole-of-system approach are necessary. At the country level, the 3C approach means that it is context-specific and not one-size-fits-all. In addition, the actors, including the United Nations, regional organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs, need to work together on a common platform, through joint planning based on a longer-term vision.

As examined in the previous section, peacebuilding can take place at any time, including in the following phases: before the outbreak of violent conflicts; during and in the aftermath of violent conflicts; and during a window of opportunity for peace negotiations. When working toward successful conflict prevention, existing local capacities need to be embedded into conflict prevention actions and linked with both humanitarian and peacebuilding/development actors. Constant dialogue initiatives should continue at the (conflict-prone) community levels.

If prevention efforts end up in failure, there will be a need to plan for humanitarian action. The preparedness (of a general nature) or contingency planning (for specific scenarios) should include the assessment of existing and potential peacebuilding capacities. In-country international actors and national actors can conduct capacity analysis and assessment long before planning a contingency/scenario in a conflict-prone area. This way, it would be feasible to link conflict preparedness (and conflict prevention) with peacebuilding efforts. The value in this joint process is grounded on the humanitarian ‘sense of urgency’ where immediate impact is expected.

To examine the role of humanitarian action in relation to peacebuilding, the following question<sup>78</sup> was asked in the survey: *How can humanitarian action, provided by international (external) actors, contribute to peacebuilding efforts at the national policy-making level? How can it be effectively managed by both international and national actors?*

The question is two-fold: 1) to what extent and 2) in what way is humanitarian action effectively managed at the national level? The survey respondents presented the following answers;

- 1) It could contribute to advancing the restoration of basic services, promoting human rights and a climate of confidence, winning trust of the population and engaging them in peace processes. Along the way, realistic recognition of limited local capacities or legitimacy may lead to identify and develop the required capacities. Harmonizing the goals of humanitarian action with those of peacebuilding can contribute to long-term recovery objectives.

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<sup>78</sup> **Question 7** (See Annex 3).

2) It should be part of a long-term strategy at the onset, with causes, conflict points and communities involved identified, and also in tune with peacebuilding action, including clear roles and responsibilities of national and local actors. Straightforward communication and information exchange among international and national actors are also required for transparency and active participation. International actors' global knowledge on other conflicts or best practices can stimulate national-level partnership.

It is also necessary to integrate peacebuilding into the design and implementation of humanitarian action from preparedness and response to early recovery, and harmonize the goals of international and national actors, including those of civil society. Actors should be careful not to exacerbate pre-existing tensions or supporting negative effects<sup>79</sup> ('Do no harm' approach). By placing national authorities and communities in charge of the implementation of humanitarian and peacebuilding actions, the national capacity to plan, manage and monitor humanitarian action can be supported and developed.

### *At the Community Level*

Conflicts occur (or start and escalate) at the community level or at conflict flash points. To find out the role of humanitarian action at this lowest – and key – level, where international actors also interact with local actors, the following question<sup>80</sup> was asked in the survey: *How can humanitarian action, provided by international (external) actors, contribute to peacebuilding efforts at the community grassroots level? How can it promote local ownership?*

The question is two-fold: 1) to what extent and 2) in what way can humanitarian action promote local ownership at the community level? The survey respondents presented the following answers;

1) It is a connector that can reduce tensions, create a climate favorable to peacebuilding and common grounds with 'the other side.' Humanitarian action can also provide capacity strengthening for preparedness, response and early recovery. The external actors should 'do no harm', recognize and be prepared to build on local knowledge, and to strengthen the regional/municipal/district governance processes so as to strengthen participation and voice.

2) Through participatory approaches to humanitarian projects, by bringing communities together over common issues, local ownership will be enhanced. Humanitarian action should be delivered in a transparent and publicly informed way – ensuring fairness; targeting the most vulnerable; including conflict resolution and confidence-building measures; and based on humanitarian principles. Identification of conflict resolution mechanisms during humanitarian operations is essential. Humanitarian actors must provide support and information to the communities, creating the environment to build community ownership.

<sup>79</sup> 'Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) withdrew from the Rwandan refugee camps because it judged that humanitarian assistance was doing more to strengthen the *génocidaires* than to relieve suffering.' (Eade, 2007, p. XIV.)

<sup>80</sup> **Question 8** (See Annex 3).

When based on needs and rights rather than on agency mandates, capacity or donor priorities, and when ensuring fairness and participation of community representatives (official or traditional, women, the youth), humanitarian action can promote community ownership of peacebuilding. Community members should be responsible for programme design and consultations should be made with the affected population. Beneficiaries can play an integral part in project formulation and implementation. The external actors can support grassroots organizations in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, but they can also promote peacebuilding.

In sum, local ownership can be promoted through a greater involvement of local actors in design and implementation of peacebuilding activities, e.g. teaching tolerance, cross-cultural promotion, etc. More importantly, actors must be sensitive when directly talking about peacebuilding. Rather, they should base their work on the idea that ultimately everyone needs a safe and secure place to live and this can be done by improving the economic status of all.

### **3.3 Linking Both Fields: The Case of Ghana**

The case of Ghana serves as an interesting example to see how peacebuilding activities and efforts are functioning at both the national and local (region/community) levels with the support from the international community.

#### ***National-Level Action for Conflict Prevention***

Ghana has established the National Architecture for Peace<sup>81</sup> to meet its needs for conflict prevention. This framework stipulates a harmonization of peacebuilding activities in the country through networking and coordination, as well as an advocacy campaign to raise awareness on the use of non-violent strategies in response to conflict.

While peacebuilding strategies can be designed at any time before potential conflicts or during violence, certain efforts are expressively put in place because of imminent crisis situations. In the case of Ghana, a string of events preceding the Presidential Election of 2008 led to the design of a series of conflict prevention measures. In 2004, after the assassination of the Ya Naa in Dagbon,<sup>82</sup> ensuing efforts were made to reduce the possibility of violence in the North before the December 2004 elections. In March 2006, a roadmap for peace was signed and the National Architecture for Peace established a little later in the same year. Finally, a successful government change took place in 2008. All these events constituted the series of steps in preventing a potential nation-wide armed conflict.<sup>83</sup>

Ghana also succeeded in preventing a potential conflict with Gambia, when the discovery of the bodies of eight Ghanaians who went missing in 2005 triggered a series of disputes. The efforts made by the UN and ECOWAS fact-finding missions and reports eventually led to the signing of an agreement during the AU Summit in Libya in July 2009.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Available at [http://www.undp-gha.org/mainpages.php?page=national peace council](http://www.undp-gha.org/mainpages.php?page=national%20peace%20council)

<sup>82</sup> UNDP, 2009a, p. 65.

<sup>83</sup> UNDP, 2009b, pp. 37-39.

<sup>84</sup> United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), 2009-2010, pp. 14-15.



### ***Conflict Preparedness through Contingency Planning***

Before the 2009 elections in Togo, UNHCR led the efforts to formulate a contingency plan near the Ghana's bordering towns with Togo in the southern Volta region. The preparations included the inspection of the status of previous refugee camps, stockpiling and a reception centre for refugees. The possible caseload was discussed but not determined. The National Disaster Management Agency (NADMO) officials were invited to take part in the joint contingency plan.

In response to the chaotic situation in Côte d'Ivoire after the November 2010 elections, and against its regional implications, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and three other neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali) have been working on a contingency plan since December 2010 (see Section 4). The most relevant concerns revolve around the potential violence-related refugee influx in Ghana's Western and Northern regions that share boundaries with Côte d'Ivoire.

### ***Regional (Provincial)-Level Action for Conflict Prevention***

The NADMO's regional office in the West of the country has mediated ethnic conflicts for numerous times in the past.<sup>85</sup> The regional Peace Advisory Council, headed by a bishop, is constituted of religious leaders and traditional community leaders/chiefs. The regional Security Council, chaired by the regional Minister (Governor), is the highest body that deals with emergencies. NADMO advises the chair on those emergency situations. For example, in preparation for regional or municipal elections, two main opposing political leaders will be invited to meet and lay out issues in front of all, so that election-related violence is prevented.

### ***Conflict Preparedness Triggered by Early Warning***

The West of Ghana is not a conflict-ridden region, but is at conflict risk as oil drilling is starting and, along with it, the rising expectation for income and development gains could lead to a potential conflict. Meeting minutes of Peace Councils provide insights on early warning signs of potential problematic areas, including resource distribution, land disputes and on-going small-scale conflicts. During such meetings, social (e.g. chieftaincy), political (e.g. elections) and economic (e.g. land ownership) causes of conflicts are often discussed. In the Western region, the regional Peace Council is represented by a bishop, traditional chiefs, teachers, and other professional members of the region. The objective of the meetings is to ensure that stakeholders promote peace and development through attitude change and transformation.

### ***Community-Level Action for Conflict Prevention***

For conflict prevention measures, Ghana has also established Peace Advisory Councils at the district and community levels. In this forum, community members from all groups (religion, institutions, age, gender, occupational groups, etc.) are represented. These community actors are also represented during the preparedness and planning processes, where peacebuilding capacities are assessed and further developed through clearly established procedures in preparation for imminent crises or for preventive efforts/dialogues.

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<sup>85</sup> From interviews conducted with OCHA, UNDP national staff in Accra and NADMO staff in Takoradi in October 2010.



### ***Conflict Preparedness Triggered by Early Warning***

Currently, NADMO and UN agencies send joint fact-finding missions when early warning signs or reports of intra-ethnic conflicts are received. The causes of conflict are generally related to land disputes and food shortage. In some cases, the humanitarian assistance contributes to escalating conflicts (when, eventually, it becomes part of the 'power' struggles). In April 2010, such a mission was sent to the Northern region and the following recommendations were reported:

- A clear and effective response mechanism is required, as requested by the Regional Coordinating Council, the Regional Assembly, and the international community.
- A coherent policy framework for early conflict management and prevention should be developed.
- Effective early warning systems are needed to inform the government's decision-making bodies of potential flash points and to facilitate swift response.
- The districts need to support capacity building initiatives for reconciliation and conflict resolution. The capacity of the local authorities must be strengthened to manage conflict at all levels. The capacity of other key groups, such as the youth, women, combatants, clan heads, religious leaders and chiefs, should also be strengthened. A platform should be created for them to discuss and dialogue on issues affecting peace at the grassroots level.

### ***Response in the Form of Mediation***

In 1992, the National Mobilization Programme (NMP, ex-NADMO) offered support to the mediation efforts in the armed internal conflict in the Northern region, where ethnic conflict had erupted around land use entitlement. As happens in many cases of land disputes, pieces of land were rented by farmers who then contributed crops to chieftaincy structures in their communities. When the right to cultivate those lands was taken away and passed onto others in a different ethnic group, conflict erupted between several ethnic groups and additional mediation efforts were required.

The team of mediators (traditional chiefs, Christian and Muslim leaders and other mediation experts including ethnic representatives), accompanied by NMP representatives, met with warring parties' chiefs separately and were present during the rituals required to promote conflict resolution. The NMP supported the team in putting the claims into right context so that the real issues behind the talks were properly analyzed. NMP staff, local residents with good awareness of the historical and political context behind the source of the conflicts, mediated for a ceasefire. The latter was not bound by a written and signed agreement, but through traditional rituals. This mediation procedure seems to be still in for conflict resolution in the community-level Peace Advisory Council mediation fora.

### ***External Support to Ghana***

As seen so far, the case of Ghana provides us with many possibilities for peacebuilding. To build on the concrete efforts taking place in a country, external actors can support national peacebuilding capacities through the joint formulation of the national and in-country Inter-Agency Contingency Planning.

As a key in-country international partner, UNDP has been supporting the National Architecture for Peace<sup>86</sup> and other regional peace council meetings since 2006. It provides operational support for media air time, transport, coordination meetings, among other initiatives to promote peace. In addition, the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), a regional NGO headed by a Ghanaian national from the Upper East region, is actively mediating conflicts in the West African region, namely in Côte d'Ivoire.

In 2010, a Strategic Partnership for Preparedness (SPP), supported by OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, IFRC, bilateral donors and NGOs at global, regional (West Africa) and national levels, selected Ghana as a pilot country and fielded a mission to assess the country's national response capacity. Support is on-going, through CADRI and the World Bank, to link humanitarian and development actors, under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator, toward a joint action plan for broader capacity development. Elements of conflict preparedness are included, but further linkage with wider peacebuilding objectives is necessary.

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<sup>86</sup> See UNDP/Government of Ghana, available at [www.undp-gha.org/mainpages.php?page=national peace council](http://www.undp-gha.org/mainpages.php?page=national%20peace%20council) and [www.mint.gov.gh/dmdocuments/A\\_PEACE\\_ARCHITECTURE\\_FOR\\_GHANA\\_.pdf](http://www.mint.gov.gh/dmdocuments/A_PEACE_ARCHITECTURE_FOR_GHANA_.pdf)

## 4. National Ownership and Contingency Planning: Entry Points for Peacebuilding

This section will discuss the ‘imperative’ of national ownership and enhanced engagement of all (international/in-country/national, and humanitarian/peacebuilding/development) actors. It outlines practical steps to incorporate peacebuilding capacity assessment and capacity development plans into contingency planning.

### 4.1 The Imperative of National Ownership

National ownership is critical for sustainable peacebuilding. A ‘parachuted’ international peacebuilding strategy will not be context-specific nor locally owned in fragile, conflict-prone countries. Although this point has been made countless times over decades, national ownership has yet to be effectively promoted.

#### *Support from the International Community*

The international community, including the United Nations, supports concerned Member States’ efforts in peacebuilding. However, governments are in charge of determining required actions with regards to the fundamental principle for peacebuilding as well as for other matters. The Secretary-General’s ‘Report on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict’ has been widely used as a basis for discussion among the international community.

First and foremost, we know that peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Only national actors can address their society’s needs and goals in a sustainable way.<sup>87</sup>

Fragile, war-torn or conflict-prone states need support from the international community in an effective and viable way. So far, the efforts to support national peacebuilding have faced several difficulties.<sup>88</sup> Through hasty statebuilding enterprises, external support may sometimes reinforce pre-existing weak statehood, as there will be intricate interactions between international and local elite groups:

Shock therapy, peacebuilding-style, undermines the construction of the very institutions that are instrumental for producing a stable peace.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 4.

<sup>88</sup> Paris, 2010, pp. 342-343.

<sup>89</sup> Barnett and Sürcher, 2009, p. 24.

Nevertheless, the international community has tried to work together to support peacebuilding across the mandates, horizontally and vertically;

The establishment of a coherent strategy in a fast-moving and uncertain post-conflict environment requires the support and cooperation of a diverse range of national and international actors. At present, efforts to foster such a strategy are frustrated by disunity among actors, fragmentation of assessment and planning tools and the lack of a framework for prioritization. [...] Within the United Nations, despite ongoing efforts to integrate planning for security, efforts aimed at political, humanitarian and development remain a serious challenge.<sup>90</sup>

Thus, it is essential to make a proactive use of existing or potential in-country capacities, including those brought in by humanitarian actors before or during crisis situations at the country level.

Capacities and mechanisms put in place during the humanitarian crisis can provide a basis to quickly support the development of national capacities and delivery of basic services in the early post-conflict phase.<sup>91</sup>

How can the international community provide such 'quick' capacities? A careful planning during the non-crisis phase is necessary to assess the capacities needed in the national context through a comprehensive conflict analysis (together with national and local actors). How can these capacities be assessed in an effective way? In planning and building peacebuilding capacities, there is indeed a missing link between humanitarian action and peacebuilding efforts at the national level: in-country international actors' response/ contingency plans and those of national actors have seldom been formulated jointly.

### ***Post-Conflict Needs Assessment***

The Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), an in-country and nationally-led common assessment and priority-setting methodology, has been designed to link international and national actors in the complex post-conflict process. The PCNA seeks to situate local actors at the centre of the assessment process. It is focused on immediate and medium-term peacebuilding and recovery assistance needs, and provides the basis for discussion with national actors, leading in time to the development of a national framework for peace consolidation and recovery, albeit with greater national involvement and ownership. The PCNA reflects political and security dimensions to engage the political and security actors present on the ground in a more effective manner.<sup>92</sup>

PCNAs are multilateral exercises undertaken by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), the European Commission (EC), the World Bank (WB) and Regional Development Banks in collaboration with the national government and donor countries. PCNAs are used by national and international actors as entry points for conceptualizing, negotiating, and financing a common strategy for recovery and development in fragile post-conflict settings.

<sup>90</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>91</sup> United Nations, 2009, p. 14.

<sup>92</sup> United Nations, 2009. pp. 13-14.

As of July 2010, PCNAs have been undertaken or remain ongoing in Afghanistan, Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (preparation only).<sup>93</sup>

### ***3C (Coherent, Coordinated, Complementary) or 'Whole-of-System' Approach***

The international community in general and donors in particular should realize the importance of anchoring support efforts and actions in the national context and according to national priorities. To insure this, a more coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach<sup>94</sup> has been adopted by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).<sup>95</sup> This approach builds on a previous 3D approach (diplomacy, defence and development). With regard to goals and strategic approaches, coherence may be more realistic than coordination among actors of humanitarian action, peacebuilding, early recovery and development. Improved coordination is needed among international actors and the donor community.<sup>96</sup>

### ***In-country Peacebuilding Capacity Planning***

In-country peacebuilding capacity will not be built only during the post-conflict recovery phase, but also throughout the potential conflict preparedness/prevention phases. To achieve this, the first point of entry is to identify potential peacebuilding capacities according to the national context and assess the existing capacities. These preparedness measures could serve as a basis for peacebuilding, as they will also be linked with 'transition elements' for early recovery.

Eventually, this start-up or existing peacebuilding capacity (could be at the individual or group scale, or an international or national capacity) should eventually be developed into effective, contextualized, and local institutional capacity. There should be a plan or a procedure to find the existing capacity at the country level, to reposition existing (international) in-country capacity, or to immediately deploy 'stand-by' international or regional (surge) capacity. There should also be an arrangement to draw on national and local expertise.

The capacity planning that includes identifying and assessing potential and existing peacebuilding capacities could be drawn up from successful peacebuilding operations and peace processes. The plan could include, for example, existing financial and human resources and in-country expertise; flexible support from the international community adapted to the national/regional context; learning from good practices/lessons learned; and taking advantage of the civil society's knowledge and capacities.

<sup>93</sup> In June 2010 the first training for PCNA Expert Practitioners took place with participants from the African Development Bank, the European Commission, the UN and the World Bank. These Expert Practitioners will become the first members of a PCNA roster, enabling the PCNA partners to quickly respond to request for PCNA missions. Available at [www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=144](http://www.undg.org/index.cfm?P=144)

<sup>94</sup> The 3C Conference was held on 19-20 March 2009 in Geneva under the theme 'Improved results in conflict and fragile situations: Towards a coherent, coordinated, complementary approach across security, diplomacy, aid and finance.' (SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation), 2009.)

<sup>95</sup> The International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), established in 2009 as a subsidiary body of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), is a forum that brings together diverse stakeholders to support development outcomes in the world's most challenging situations. Available at [www.oecd.org/dac/incaf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf)

<sup>96</sup> Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (GPP), 2008, p. 4.

### ***Joint Planning with the In-Country Humanitarian Country Teams***

Humanitarian action, and in particular the preparedness/planning process, can contribute to peacebuilding by using a contingency planning process: humanitarian response actions are planned for an imminent crisis. For this process, in-country Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) work with governments towards drawing a five-year comprehensive plan, the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) papers, which are based on national priorities from the national development planning.

The linkage between humanitarians and development actors is necessary at every stage from preparedness to development. This requires that contingency plans are shared between national and international actors, that mechanisms for bridging the funding gap between humanitarian and development activities are developed, and that an appropriate linkage between humanitarian action and related processes is put in place as described above. The 3C approach should also be taken into account when planning for and delivering (external) humanitarian assistance.

At the same time, when developing scenarios for natural hazards (e.g. floods, earthquakes), governments can also plan for potential conflict scenarios with HCTs – although in case of internal conflicts, governments are reluctant to openly prepare for conflicts.<sup>97</sup> In addition, for conflict preparedness, other elements for contingency planning are required, such as methods of security analysis, protection for staff in the form of viable guidelines and possibly insurance benefits, and a sharpened analysis of the political context and security implications of assistance.<sup>98</sup>

### ***National Priorities and National Development Plans***

Do the national development priorities change if the governments are toppled or change hands (through a coup d'état, peace accords, elections, etc.) and an opposition party takes over? Priorities in certain areas will be unchanged, such as overall economic development and social cohesion (equalities and inclusive governance). In other words, even with a change in authorities, principal national development plans will not change (for example, some of the key priorities reflected in the national plans toward the Millennium Development Goals/MDGs<sup>99</sup> remain as is.) Therefore, international support actions should stay linked to national priorities at all times and planned in accordance to national priorities, as those generally remain valid even after a shift of governance.

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<sup>97</sup> Natural hazards response planning with government counterparts can be useful, either a) to begin to involve governments in the process of planning and gradually expand their willingness to consider other scenarios; b) to encourage governments to reveal details of how it would respond to conflict; or c) as a subterfuge to distract governments long enough to permit other humanitarian actors to do contingency planning for serious conflict issues.

<sup>98</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2003.

<sup>99</sup> For example, strengthening national ownership and leadership of development strategies; supporting participatory, community-led strategies aligned with national development priorities and strategies; improving capacity to deliver quality services equitably; ensuring the full participation of all segments of society, including the poor and disadvantaged in decision-making processes; and working towards transparent and accountable systems of governance at the national and international levels. (United Nations, 2010.)

In some cases, grievance issues might need to be addressed (fair distribution of profits from natural resources and extractive industries, land distribution, chieftaincy, ethnic disputes, etc.) In addition, issues related to transitional justice, military structure and SSR, and DDR may require fundamental policy priority changes.

Where capacity is limited, aid instruments (e.g. multi-donor trust funds) can facilitate implementation of national and international common priorities. If government priorities cannot be supported due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders to seek partial alignment.<sup>100</sup>

### ***National Ownership – Dili Declaration***

Several initiatives such as the INCAF seek to foster national ownership for peacebuilding support provided by the international community. Aid must be distributed fairly across the country so that the risk of conflict is reduced, social inclusion ensured, and a common national identity respected by international partners. The measures for peacebuilding and statebuilding will differ depending on each context and no support should be formulated as ‘one size fits all’. For this contextual approach, much more effort for local conflict analysis and consultations with stakeholders and citizens is required.<sup>101</sup>

At the Accra High Level Forum in 2008, partner and donor countries committed to launch an International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding,<sup>102</sup> as stated in the Accra Agenda for Action.<sup>103</sup> The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding aims at improving national and international policy discussions in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Set up in contrast to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative,<sup>104</sup> the first global meeting of the Dialogue took place in April 2010, where the participants signed the Dili Declaration, thereby stating the ‘will of fragile states and regions to reduce poverty, deter conflict and provide better conditions for our people’.

Our collective vision is to end and prevent conflict and to contribute to the development of capable, accountable states which respond to the expectations and needs of their populations, in particular the needs of vulnerable and excluded groups, women, youth and children. We recognize the centrality of state-society relations in supporting the development of capable, accountable and responsive states. This will require sustained efforts by all stakeholders to improve governance, strengthen

<sup>100</sup> Organization for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD), 2007.

<sup>101</sup> The International Network on Fragility and Conflict (INCAF), available at [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/10/44282247.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/10/44282247.pdf)

<sup>102</sup> OECD provides the Secretariat for the process. The country-level, donors and developing countries will work and agree on a set of realistic peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and participation of women.

<sup>103</sup> Ministers of developing and donor countries responsible for promoting development and heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions endorsed the statement in Accra, Ghana to accelerate and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2 March 2005). Available at [www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf)

<sup>104</sup> The Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative is an informal donor forum and network that facilitates collective advancement of GHD principles and good practices. It recognizes that donors can more effectively encourage and stimulate principled donor behaviour and, by extension, improved humanitarian action. In 2003, a group of 17 donors endorsed the Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship. Available at [www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/home.aspx](http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/home.aspx)



economic and social development, and promote peace and security as outlined in the statement by the g7+ (Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Nepal, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan and Timor-Leste).<sup>105</sup>

## 4.2 Contingency Planning: a Humanitarian Preparedness Tool

One definition for humanitarians is that contingency planning is a ‘process, in anticipation of potential crises, of developing strategies, arrangements and procedures to address the humanitarian needs of those adversely affected by crises.’<sup>106</sup> In essence, contingency planning serves to identify triggers for action, to optimize resources and to raise awareness for the modalities and frameworks for coordinated response. Contingency planning is a process and a plan, developed and owned by national and in-country actors. Existing in-country capacity for early recovery, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding can be incorporated and eventually connected with planned or on-going government efforts for peacebuilding.

It is also noted that the process itself has substantial value:

One of the clear benefits of contingency planning is developing working relationships and common understandings of potential emergencies. Supporting government-led contingency planning processes is also an opportunity for humanitarian organizations to build national capacity, not only in contingency planning, but also in emergency response itself. For example, the contingency planning process in Ethiopia has sought to build analytical capacity, a key challenge in presenting credible assessments and appeals.<sup>107</sup>

Contingency plans for natural hazards can serve as an entry point for some reluctant governments:

Ultimately, national governments are responsible for the wellbeing of their citizens, and humanitarian organizations often work with national authorities in pursuit of their mandates. However, in many situations humanitarian actors may be faced with national authorities that are belligerents in a conflict, or where they do not exist or function. In the majority of cases where national authorities play a strong role in humanitarian action, they often take the lead in contingency planning, and a humanitarian organization’s planning should be conducted within the national contingency planning framework. [...] Although in some cases the process has at times been difficult, the fact that the planning process took place within official government-led coordination mechanisms meant that many of the problems that would have hampered an emergency response were addressed during the planning process.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>105</sup> International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, April 2010, *Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding*. Available at [www.c-r.org/our-work/influencing-policy/Dili\\_Declaration\\_FINAL\\_12042010.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/our-work/influencing-policy/Dili_Declaration_FINAL_12042010.pdf)

<sup>106</sup> Choularton, 2007, pp. 3-5. Contingency plan includes the following elements: scenario, response strategy, implementation plan, operational support plan, preparedness plan and budget.

<sup>107</sup> Choularton, 2007, p. 35.

<sup>108</sup> Choularton, 2007, p. 35.



In countries needing to respond to contexts affected by both conflict and natural disasters, contingency plans formulated in preparation for disasters can be made use of for conflict situations:

Preparedness is essential to design an effective disaster management strategy and build the capacity to implement it. Some agreement within the movement on roles and responsibilities in advance can be helpful. However, the rapid changes in a conflict context could affect how these roles develop. Time spent developing relationships and mutual understanding through preparedness work, however, clearly pays off when a conflict situation arises. Operational plans based only on natural disaster response cannot provide a foundation for conflict response.<sup>109</sup>

Finally, the benefit of contingency planning is wide-ranging:

Contingency planning can bring significant benefits to humanitarian response. It helps foster agreement on what a potential emergency could look like, and what different organizations will do to respond. It helps identify and prioritize preparedness activities, and the process itself can be a useful exercise in information preparedness. It also helps maintain and improve the coordination mechanisms that are so important in an emergency. The in-depth analysis conducted during scenario development can identify indicators and help focus early warning efforts, while contingency plans linked to early warning systems can help translate early warning into early action.<sup>110</sup>

In-country capacity for early recovery, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding should also take into account the regional context as in the case of Côte d'Ivoire described below.

### 4.3 Côte d'Ivoire: Contingency Planning

#### *Côte d'Ivoire plus Five (2005)*

A regional contingency plan was formulated to prepare for regional crises with neighboring countries of Côte d'Ivoire: the 'Côte d'Ivoire plus Five' was led by WFP in Dakar at the regional level, and by UNHCR in Ghana. In order to react effectively to the regional insecurity and instability resulting from the protracted conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, representatives from UNHCR, UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, OCHA, the UN Office for West Africa, WFP, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), ICRC, IFRC and Oxfam from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana met in October 2005 in Dakar. The participants decided to develop a regional contingency plan for Côte d'Ivoire and its five neighbors. It was ensured that the plan was updated ahead of key political milestones that could trigger instability and violence. The lessons learned from this preparedness initiative have been applied to other potential cross-border crises in the region.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>109</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2003, available at [www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5udjt8.htm](http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5udjt8.htm)

<sup>110</sup> Choularton, 2007, p. 37.

<sup>111</sup> Choularton, 2007, p. 36.

### ***Côte d'Ivoire plus Four (2010): Contingency Planning in Ghana***

In Ghana, the scenarios focus on possible displacements of refugees, evacuees and third county nationals to arrive in the West, midlands and Northern parts of the country.

More often than not, contingency plans are formulated in two different platforms: in-country humanitarian partners (Inter-Agency Contingency Planning) and national contingency planning. Efforts are underway to harmonize these two plans by making use of the same response mechanisms (cluster-approach) and by meeting together to combine the two plans. Ghana had developed a separate 'national' contingency plan for multiple scenarios (floods, earthquakes, pandemic and oil spill) in April 2010, but then formulated a joint contingency plan for the situation in Côte d'Ivoire in December 2010.

When formulating contingency plans, governments must assume the leadership in implementing actions included in the plans to promote national ownership. In addition, this ownership also has to be assumed by civil society, at the local and community levels.

### ***Côte d'Ivoire plus Four (2010): Regional Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan***

The regional Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP) for Côte d'Ivoire and its four neighboring countries (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea and Mali)<sup>112</sup> was elaborated after the post-election crisis situation in January 2011. It was designed to allow humanitarian actors to reinforce their logistical capacities, level of preparedness, and coordination so as to respond effectively to the humanitarian needs of up to 2 million people in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as up to 100,000 refugees and other vulnerable groups. (Due to the particular impacts resulting from the influx of refugees into Liberia, the Humanitarian Country Team prepared its own EHAP.)<sup>113</sup>

After a fact-finding mission in the troubled Western region of Côte d'Ivoire, the HCT felt an urgent need for humanitarian action:

The humanitarian needs in Duékoué were stark. "People need food. They need water and sanitation. They need medical care. Until recently, we were looking at a figure of around 4,000 people requiring help in the west, then it suddenly shoots up to 16,000." [...] "Until recently, the focus was on early recovery, construction, even development. There were some residual humanitarian problems: food shortages in the north, displaced persons in the west. A lot of NGOs left or reduced their activities. But things have changed." Ngokwey (UN Humanitarian Coordinator) said it was crucial that current concerns were addressed and contingency plans put into action.<sup>114</sup>

In the contingency plan for Côte d'Ivoire updated on 31 December 2010, the scenario was formulated as follows: post-election violence characterized by armed confrontations mainly in Abidjan and other locations, causing massive internal displacement (IDPs) and population movements to neighboring countries (refugees).

<sup>112</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2011, *Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP) for Ivory Coast*, available at <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1935>

<sup>113</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2011, *Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan (EHAP) for Liberia*, available at <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?Page=1946>

<sup>114</sup> International Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 January 2011, 'Côte d'Ivoire: Warnings from the West,' available at [www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91601](http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=91601)

#### **4.4 Contingency Plans with ‘Early’ Assessments of Peacebuilding Capacities**

In addition to humanitarian concerns and responses to basic needs as outlined above, this paper proposes a peacebuilding capacity assessment within the framework of contingency planning. During the incorporation of early recovery concerns, ‘early’ assessments of peacebuilding capacity can be conducted.

As stated earlier, this process should be locally and nationally owned by ensuring the participation of national actors in a planning platform for longer-term conflict prevention. This would include capacity building, sustainable peace and livelihood, economic and social progress/development.

This joint planning platform, created through a contingency planning process, can incorporate and plan peacebuilding capacity assessments and actions at the humanitarian preparedness phase, with a purpose of sustainable well-being. In this way, humanitarian actions, during and after conflicts, are bound to be linked to and promote sustainable national capacity for peacebuilding, to prevent recurring conflict, and to promote lasting peace for safety and foundation for productive development.

##### ***Incorporating Assessment of Peacebuilding Capacities***

In spite of the time constraints described above and in the objective of sustaining the well-being of the affected population, response planning should incorporate an assessment strategy of existing and potential peacebuilding capacities, as well as plans for peacebuilding capacity development. If the assessment of these capacities is done at the onset of the humanitarian action, peacebuilding objectives can be incorporated into long-term development plans early on.

An important point to note is that this joint planning assessment of peacebuilding capacities can be in peril if it is formulated through the lens of ‘universal’ knowledge. In other words, there is a danger that the superiority of universal values can judge ‘local values’ as a cause of suffering.<sup>115</sup>

At the same time, initial peacebuilding capacities can face important challenges such as a lack of local assets, severe destruction from the violence, continuing conflict, and minimal support from powerful donors. This is because ‘states emerging from war do not have the necessary institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with political and market competition.’<sup>116</sup>

The process of planning for the development of potential peacebuilding capacities should be inclusive. This supposes giving consideration to, for example, capacities (e.g. expertise, procedures and funds) for restoring and providing security and safety, basic services, livelihood, future ability to provide peacebuilding education (reconciliation), and hope for the youth through extra-curricular activities, sports, art, culture, vocational training, job creation and ultimately, poverty reduction.

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<sup>115</sup> Barnett and Weiss, 2008, p. 242.

<sup>116</sup> Barnett and Sürcher, 2009, p. 23.

The survey asked if such peacebuilding capacities could be prepared or deployed while preparing for humanitarian action.<sup>117</sup> As noted before, this research considers peacebuilding at any phase of conflict, but some practitioners and scholars responded that peacebuilding would take place at specific phases. Consequently, some peacebuilding capacities may be explicit in particular phases. (Proposed capacities are listed under two headings: 1) all phases and 2) before an outbreak of conflict, at a window of opportunity, or in the aftermath of conflict.) The responses are outlined in the table below.

***Can Peacebuilding Capacities be Prepared/Deployed while Preparing for Imminent Crises or Responding to Them?***

<i>Yes/No</i>	<i>Total Respondents</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
Yes	80.0%	100% of peacebuilding/development actors
No	20.0%	23% of humanitarians

Among the potential peacebuilding capacities, as defined earlier by some respondents, there are different phases of peacebuilding. Thus the deployment of such potential capacities may be limited in each phase (see Annex 3, Question 6).

At the same time, there are still some diverging views. For example, one humanitarian practitioner responded negatively by stating that:

No, (peacebuilding capacities cannot be prepared or deployed while preparing for imminent humanitarian action) because this will always be interpreted as an aggression or act of hostility by one of the parties to the conflict. In other words it is too late and too risky at this stage.

According to some actors, engaging in peacebuilding action along humanitarian action in preparation for or during a conflict will be perceived as taking sides, which could mean taking risks. Here, we can see the conflicting views of humanitarian organizations: providing assistance to save lives or rather saving societies to save lives?<sup>118</sup>

<sup>117</sup> **Question 6:** While preparing for imminent crises (conflict situations including war, civil unrest, urban/election violence) or responding to them, is it possible to plan for or deploy peacebuilding capacities? If Yes, what 'potential' peacebuilding capacities can be planned or deployed during the humanitarian (preparedness and response) phase? Please name three. If No, please explain.

<sup>118</sup> Barnett and Snyder, 2008, pp. 14, 18-19.

The peacebuilding capacities proposed by the respondents are sorted out into groups below:

***Initial Peacebuilding Capacities***

	<b><i>1. Thematic capacities</i></b>
	<i>Capacity development</i>
	<i>Technical expertise</i>
	<b><i>2. Process capacities</i></b>
	<b><i>3. Transitional capacities</i></b>
	<b><i>4. Peace and mediation capacities</i></b>
	<b><i>5. National context capacities</i></b>

The peacebuilding capacities perceived as 'required' are substantially different in the responses from the two groups above; while the humanitarian group is focused on specific short-term conflict situations (mostly before and in the aftermath of conflict), the peacebuilding/development group includes potential peacebuilding capacities of long-term nature. In comparison to the responses to Question 3, where peacebuilding capacities in each priority area were listed, the capacities required refer to longer-term, institutional peacebuilding action.

The checklist below is used to assess potential deployable 'individual' or 'group' capacities (international or national) in peacebuilding, with the objective of linking them with humanitarian response capacities. As seen before, some capacities are essential in delivering humanitarian action (followed by a \*). As illustrated in the checklist, humanitarians and peacebuilders find much common expertise in the Thematic and Process capacities.

Among the capacities identified so far, two types of peacebuilding capacities can be considered for assessment if there are potential or existing capacities on the ground: 1) in-country capacity, provided by external/international actors already in the country concerned, and 2) local capacity to be provided by national actors.

*Checklist for Existing/Potential Peacebuilding Capacity Assessment*

	<b>1. Thematic capacities</b>
	<i>Capacity development</i>
	■ Capacity development advisor*
	■ Human rights trainer/teacher*
	■ Peacebuilding trainer
	■ School curriculum development expert
	■ Vocational trainer
	<i>Technical expertise</i>
	■ Advocacy officer for peace initiatives*
	■ Civil-military coordination officer*
	■ Civilian security forces (police officer)*
	■ Communication officer (to work with warring parties)*
	■ Conflict preparedness /contingency planner*
	■ Conflict transformation/prevention expert *
	■ Early warning capacity through specialized monitoring units*
	■ Gender advisor*
	■ Human security expert*
	■ Incident reporting officer
	■ Legal expert*
	■ Monitoring and evaluation officer*
	■ Operational and logistics expert*
	■ Protection officer (for civilians)*
	■ Strategic conflict assessment analyst*
	<b>2. Process capacities</b>
	■ Information manager to disseminate accurate information to communities*
	■ Situation analyst*
	■ Strategic planners (also for youth in conflict)*
	<b>3. Transitional capacities</b>
	■ Confidence-building initiatives expert (e.g. monitoring centers for regional arms reduction agreements)
	■ Election observer
	■ Environmental recovery expert
	■ Expert to promote social dialogue
	■ Governance advisor
	■ Peace and development advisor
	■ Private sector player involved in regional discussions/implications*
	■ Psycho-social expert of reintegration/DDR
	■ Recovery project expert*
	■ Socio-economic recovery expert
	<b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b>
	■ Conflict resolution expert/Reconciliation expert
	■ Education specialist on peace and tolerance
	■ Fact finding missions/Truth and reconciliation missions
	■ Mediator/Negotiator
	■ Pre-deployed peacekeeper
	<b>5. National context capacities</b>
	■ Community leaders
	■ Confidence-building expert (e.g. joint projects to bring communities together)
	■ Cross-cultural community organizer
	■ National context expert

\*Capacities required for both humanitarian action and peacebuilding.

The checklist is a reference list for assessing capacities during the response preparation stage in times of crisis. (In addition to this list, there will be a need to create a list of individuals who may possess required expertise in the post-assessment phase.) Thus, the capacities are quickly needed on-site, so that humanitarians can cooperate with peacebuilding and development actors on the ground. Clearly, the proposed peacebuilding capacities need to be adapted to each country/conflict context.

It was suggested by one respondent that 'it should be mandatory to plan for or deploy peacebuilding capacities in preparing for imminent crises or responding to them, otherwise the risk of entering relapsing cycles loom large'. To foster national peacebuilding capacity, relevant institutions and practices should be able to cope with conflicts. External actors should be aware of the available capacity on the ground, how it works, and how it can be further developed.

In addition, other respondents suggested more concrete ideas for developing peacebuilding capacities linked with humanitarian action:

- Humanitarian programmes deliver support for basic needs but they also need to protect civilians. When violence and human rights violations decrease, a more favorable environment for peace can be created;
- Cluster leads should encourage the members to include peacebuilding activities in their humanitarian assistance projects. Peace education materials can be added in emergency education kits, or water sources can be used as places to engage the communities in dispute. These examples can be extended to other sectors;
- Peace messages can have a good impact when included in regular communications and media tools. A review on how to improve communication between humanitarian organizations and beneficiaries or communities should be made.

With regards to required peacebuilding capacities, as found in the comparative research on El Salvador and Guatemala, promoting liberal democracy and market reforms (as per the 'liberal peace thesis') was more important than investing on the institution-building efforts that precede political and economic liberalization. For example, the first capacity deployed in El Salvador was human rights observers: ONUSAL (United Nations Peace Mission in El Salvador) was far more effective than MINUGUA (United Nations Peace Mission in Guatemala). ONUSAL was deployed before the warring factions signed a definitive truce, and initially comprised a mission of 30 human rights observers. During the implementation phase of the peace accords, this division continued to record facts and undertake good offices in the search for remedies to the human rights situation. It also supported the training of Salvadoran judges, helped the armed forces to adopt a democratic doctrine, and reviewed the curricula for military academies.<sup>119</sup>

In the context of on-going United Nations political or integrated missions such as in Iraq, international staff members are currently working with national civil servants at the national, governorate (provincial), and district levels within different ministries, in specific policy areas where gaps are found.<sup>120</sup>

It should be emphasized that the international community should stay engaged long enough to support the development of national capacity, as capacity development in core

<sup>119</sup> Nasi, 2009, pp. 336, 355.

<sup>120</sup> From the statement made by Mr. Ad Melkert, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for Iraq, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), at the GPP Policy Briefing on 10 February 2011.

institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Support from the international community should be predictable and mutual consultation and coordination should be ensured.<sup>121</sup>

#### 4.5 Developing Community-Level Peacebuilding Capacity

Some of the required peacebuilding capacities at the national level have been reviewed so far, but more importantly, how can these capacities be developed and fostered at the community level?

##### *Service Delivery as Building Blocks*

Providing humanitarian assistance to look after basic health care, emergency medical aid, and generic medicines can bring communities together. This basic sense of well-being can contribute to a harmonized co-existence. Restoring water, sanitation services, and transport systems, or equipping a space with educational kits, could also contribute to common spaces for dialogues among communities in dispute.

Health services, alongside education and infrastructure development, are portrayed as key instruments in strengthening the state but also in promoting optimism about the future, stimulating broader reforms of government and buying time that serves to reduce the chances of the state slipping back into violence. Hence, service delivery strategies, particularly in areas such as education, health care, rural infrastructure and water/sanitation, are increasingly portrayed as critical building blocks in developing the state's performance legitimacy in ways that are sufficient for the fragile state's immediate survival and for its longer-term growth.<sup>122</sup>

In fact, efforts to link two IDP communities previously in conflict date back to the 1980s and 1990s:

Service delivery has been a very valuable tool in diminishing one obvious cause of tension between rival communities. In the 1980s in Southern Kordofan Province of Sudan, the UN agencies tried 'twinning' IDP communities with nearby host communities in a conscious effort to promote harmony between displaced southerners and the northern Sudanese, in whose communities they had settled. Oxfam did the same with water supply in the mid-1990s for Rwandan refugees and the host communities that were located closest to in Western Tanzania. By now, the strategy of providing the same services (food, water, education, etc.) for displaced and host communities has become the standard strategy.<sup>123</sup>

As suggested by some of the respondents, there has been a recognizable and powerful linkage between humanitarian action and peacebuilding.

<sup>121</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development (OECD), 2007.

<sup>122</sup> Gordon, 2010, p. S369.

<sup>123</sup> According to a humanitarian expert from UNICEF.



### ***Peace Education***

It is possible to start peace education programmes for young children of different ethnic origins in the midst of a war. The essence of the peace education is to start early, with young children of different upbringings or social background: teach children to live together and harness tolerance among themselves in the community and among the youth. Parents should also educate children to promote tolerance. Sometimes children can help parents to come to negotiations, if they have been engulfed in great anger and vengeance. Preventing conflicts will eventually lead to poverty reduction. Communities need to engage in productive activities, instead of conflicts, so as to promote lasting and sustainable peace.

In situations of chronic violence (e.g. Central America<sup>124</sup>), the youth join gang groups involved in drug dealing and violence to avenge society and project their frustrations. They see no hope in their advancement due to prevailing economic crisis and unemployment. They thus become a threat to society, instead of the 'hope' they represent. Setting up a meeting place for youth to discuss their concerns and to plant seeds of hope for the future through open dialogue and consultations can be a good start. Sports can also play a substantial role.

The United Nations has set up a programme, the 'Cyberschoolbus', focused on peace education:

Peace education brings together multiple traditions of pedagogy, theories of education, and international initiatives for the advancement of human development through learning. It is fundamentally dynamic, interdisciplinary, and multicultural and grows out of the work of educators such as John Dewey, Maria Montessori, Paulo Freire, Johan Galtung, Elise and Kenneth Boulding, and many others. [...] peace education aims to cultivate the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed to achieve and sustain a global culture of peace. Understanding and transforming violence is central.<sup>125</sup>

The Hague Appeal for Peace Global Campaign for Peace Education states the following:

A culture of peace will be achieved when citizens of the world understand global problems, have the skills to resolve conflicts and struggle for justice non-violently, live by international standards of human rights and equity, appreciate cultural diversity, and respect the Earth and each other. Such learning can only be achieved with systematic education for peace.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Jütersonke, Muggah and Rodgers, 2009, pp. 373-397.

<sup>125</sup> United Nations Global Teaching and Learning Project, available at [www.cyberschoolbus.un.org](http://www.cyberschoolbus.un.org)

<sup>126</sup> The urgency and necessity of such education was acknowledged by the member states of UNESCO in 1974 and reaffirmed in the Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy in 1995.

### *Sports and Peace*

Finally, sports can play a crucial role in peacebuilding. The United Nations Office on Sports for Development and Peace (UNOSDP) describes the relationship between sports and peace as follows:

Sport as a universal language can be a powerful tool to promote peace, tolerance and understanding by bringing people together across boundaries, cultures and religions. Its intrinsic values such as teamwork, fairness, discipline, respect for the opponent and the rules of the game are understood all over the world and can be harnessed in the advancement of solidarity, social cohesion and peaceful coexistence.<sup>127</sup>

In grassroots projects, sport is used in an extremely wide range of situations – whether as an integrated tool in short-term emergency humanitarian aid activities, or in long-term development cooperation projects, on a local, regional or global scale. From a development perspective, the focus is put on popular sport activities rather than elitist sport. Sport is used to reach out to those most in need including refugees, child soldiers, victims of conflict and natural catastrophes, the impoverished, persons with disabilities, victims of racism, stigmatization and discrimination, persons living with HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

Other aspects of peacebuilding objectives can be attained by the following components of sports:<sup>128</sup>

#### *Sports and Peacebuilding*

Reconciling war-torn Societies	Sport can serve as a unifying tool and a buffer for conflict. It can help build relations, bridge division between groups in dispute, and create unity and tolerance.
Rebuilding economies/ Early recovery	Reconstruction of open sport facilities (e.g. stadiums), where people can meet and play, has contributed as an important, early step to the normalization process.
Political framework/ Recreating civil society	Establishment of sport clubs and the league systems, based on democratic processes and agreed rules and regulations, can contribute to building civil society and to fostering the respect for laws and principles by participants.

At the community level, where conflict prevention and preparedness take place, there should be many different opportunities to develop the previously mentioned peacebuilding capacities. Concrete and innovative initiatives for further developing these capacities will undoubtedly strengthen the capacities of communities to effectively respond to crises.

<sup>127</sup> UN Office on Sports for Development and Peace (UNOSDP), available online [www.un.org/wcm/content/site/sport/home/sport/peace](http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/sport/home/sport/peace). According to the Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, sport is seen to have the most benefits in: individual development; health promotion and disease prevention; promotion of gender equality; social integration and the development of social capital; peacebuilding and conflict prevention/resolution; post-disaster/trauma relief and normalisation of life; economic development; and communication and social mobilization.

<sup>128</sup> Adopted from the table by Pelle Kvalsund, 'Sport and Peacebuilding', available online [www.toolkitsportdevelopment.org/html/topic\\_8C99D814-CFBC-494E-8BAD-8C51BCAEA5BE\\_6458A396-8CE6-4E87-BD61-6C626363A7AB\\_1.htm](http://www.toolkitsportdevelopment.org/html/topic_8C99D814-CFBC-494E-8BAD-8C51BCAEA5BE_6458A396-8CE6-4E87-BD61-6C626363A7AB_1.htm)

## Conclusion

**H**umanitarian action can save lives and reduce suffering. During such a process, the ground is undoubtedly being paved for peacebuilding. It is at this very moment, when communities in dispute resume their lives in peace and security, that the common goal for both humanitarian and peacebuilding actors is best portrayed.

Indeed, humanitarian action has been expanding its territory from 'traditional' life saving into human rights, stabilization efforts, sustainable peace and livelihood, with higher aspirations for the transformation of societies in conflict. Along with this expanding definition, humanitarian action can link with and contribute to sustainable peacebuilding – which includes statebuilding, early recovery, and other policy spheres.

However, there are concerns around the power that humanitarian action exercises with the view of transforming the society where linkages are made. If the aspiration of humanitarianism to save lives and sustain those lives is upheld over a long period, there is a need to carefully review the ways those links are made in the local context, in view of the consequences that humanitarian action may lead to.

In addition, there is some resistance to the process of linking humanitarian action with peacebuilding. Some humanitarian actors perceive peacebuilding action as 'direct' political work, fearing that this may endanger humanitarian action, possibly contracting the humanitarian space. Nonetheless, practitioners from both fields agree that some peacebuilding capacities can be planned or deployed at the initial humanitarian phase. Moreover, potential linkages have been constantly sought between the two areas of work – through early recovery, stabilization efforts, and through a rights-based approach.

It has been noted that fragile states are developing their own efforts towards 'nationalizing' peacebuilding. Thus, by placing national authorities and communities in charge of the implementation of humanitarian and peacebuilding actions, national capacity in planning, managing and monitoring these actions, can be supported and developed.

Although provided by external actors, humanitarian action can contribute to peacebuilding at the national and community levels. Planning for humanitarian action and peacebuilding efforts at the national level needs to be formulated jointly by in-country international actors and national/community players. It is also necessary to integrate peacebuilding into the design and implementation of humanitarian action from preparedness and response to early recovery, and harmonize the goals of international and national actors, including those of civil society.

As an entry-point for enhanced engagement, the contingency planning process can be used as a joint planning platform, incorporating early assessment of peacebuilding capacity and possibly formulating an action plan for capacity development. The emphasis is placed on 'individual' (or 'group') capacities, rather than institutional ones. The research this paper is built on has surveyed initial peacebuilding capacities that were identified and categorized into five areas according to: thematic capacities; process capacities; transitional capacities; peace and mediation capacities; and national context capacities.

Through this joint planning platform, humanitarian action (during and after conflict) is ultimately bound to 1) foster sustainable national capacity for peacebuilding; 2) prevent societies from relapsing into conflict; and 3) promote lasting peace for safety and a foundation for productive development.

A strong stance to support a more progressive humanitarian action was taken by a senior humanitarian and development practitioner from Oxfam-Great Britain, who states that:

The reaction to the Rwanda disaster has now run its course. Humanitarian actors now have less to fear from development colleagues. For more than a decade, resources have flowed in their direction to the point where they can well afford to go beyond the minimum of saving lives. They may need to embrace elements of developmentalism. Uneasy about the political pressure applied on them by Western governments and local elites, aid workers now need some kind of protection from manipulation and mistake. This seems most likely to come from deeper understanding and deeper engagement.<sup>129</sup>

Further research perspectives can be proposed as follows:

- The conflict analysis currently conducted by the international actors on the ground can be further strengthened, possibly making more use of national capacities identified during the planning stage or other national capacities, such as, for example, those of national civil servants.
- Further methods can be initiated to bring partners from the 'other side' of the conflict into peacebuilding efforts. Examples could include dialogue initiatives at conflict flash points (usually at the community level) led by innovative peacebuilding groups, such as civil society actors.

If we agree that humanitarian action should aspire to transform society through a link with peacebuilding based on the national context, the value of establishing the linkages between humanitarian action and peacebuilding is high and verified thus far. The question is how to promote this value in a context where all actors are concerned with the advancement of a peacebuilding agenda. More than ever, we must take the opportunity to make this link at the time of the initial humanitarian planning stage. This means ensuring the engagement of peacebuilding actors in acquiring initial capacities that will contribute to the peacebuilding process already in progress.

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<sup>129</sup> Vaux, 2007, p. 17.

# Annex 1: Planning Tool Options: Checklist for Peacebuilding Capacity

## *Checklist for Existing/Potential Peacebuilding Capacity Assessment*

<b>1. Thematic capacities</b>
<i>Capacity development</i>
■ Capacity development advisor
■ Human rights trainer/teacher
■ Peacebuilding trainer
■ School curriculum development expert
■ Vocational trainer
<i>Technical expertise</i>
■ Advocacy officer for peace initiatives
■ Civil-military coordination officer
■ Civilian security forces (police officer)
■ Communication officer (to work with warring parties)
■ Conflict preparedness /contingency planner
■ Conflict transformation/prevention expert
■ Early warning capacity through specialized monitoring units
■ Gender advisor
■ Human security expert
■ Incident reporting officer
■ Legal expert
■ Monitoring and evaluation officer
■ Operational and logistics expert
■ Protection officer (for civilians)
■ Strategic conflict assessment analyst
<b>2. Process capacities</b>
■ Information manager to disseminate accurate information to communities
■ Situation analyst
■ Strategic planners (also for youth in conflict)
<b>3. Transitional capacities</b>
■ Confidence-building initiatives expert (e.g. monitoring centers for regional arms reduction agreements)
■ Election observer
■ Environmental recovery expert
■ Expert to promote social dialogue
■ Governance advisor
■ Peace and development advisor
■ Private sector player involved in regional discussions/implications
■ Psycho-social expert of reintegration/DDR
■ Recovery project expert
■ Socio-economic recovery expert
<b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b>
■ Conflict resolution expert/Reconciliation expert
■ Education specialist on peace and tolerance
■ Fact finding missions/Truth and reconciliation missions
■ Mediator/Negotiator
■ Pre-deployed peacekeeper
<b>5. National context capacities</b>
■ Community leaders
■ Confidence-building expert (e.g. joint projects to bring communities together)
■ Cross-cultural community organizer
■ National context expert

## Annex 2: Planning Tool Options: Action Plan for Peacebuilding Capacity Development

*(Sample) Action Plan for Peacebuilding Capacity Development*

<i>Areas of Focus &amp; Capacity Development Strategy</i>	<i>Priority</i>	<i>Lead</i>	<i>Support (Resources) &amp; Activities</i>	<i>Timeline</i>
<b>1. Thematic capacities</b>	X		UNDP	May
Peacebuilding trainer			Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Ghana	
<b>2. Process capacities</b>	XX		UNICEF	July-Dec
Situation analyst			WFP	
<b>3. Transitional capacities</b>			UNDPA	November
Election observer				
<b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b>			WANEP	August
Conflict resolution expert				
<b>5. National context capacities</b>	X		UNDP	Jan-June
Community leaders			Ghana Red Cross	

## Annex 3: Survey: Humanitarian Action and Peacebuilding

The responses to the following questions were extensively used to direct this research. The total number of respondents is thirty-three (33).

For Question 2, respondents are identified as humanitarian or peacebuilding/development from the current areas of responsibilities, not necessarily reflecting more years of experience.

**Question 1. *The UN Secretary-General's Report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (June 2009) focuses on 'the challenges that post-conflict countries and the international community face in the immediate aftermath of conflict, defined as the first two years after the main conflict in a country has ended.' In your view, when does peacebuilding take place?***

- Before an outbreak of violent conflict (including imminent crisis and fragile situations)
- During violent conflict
- A window of opportunity for peace negotiations
- Aftermath of violent conflict
- All of the above phases

### *Response: When Peacebuilding Takes Place*

<i>Phases</i>	<i>Number of Respondents (33)</i>
Before an outbreak of violent conflict (including imminent crisis and fragile situations)	5
During violent conflict	0
At a window of opportunity for peace negotiations	3
Aftermath of violent conflict	8
All of the above phases	(63.6%) 21

(If the last option is not chosen, answers may be more than one.)

**Question 2. From the viewpoint of your organization, what are the two highest priority areas of peacebuilding capacities at the national level? What types of expertise should be built or developed first? Please select two key areas.<sup>130</sup>**

- Economic renewal
- Getting regional context right
- Legitimate political framework
- Reconciliation (coming to grips with past abuses and atrocities)
- Re-creating civil society
- Stability, normalcy and rule of law

***Response: Priority Areas of Peacebuilding***

<b><i>Priority Areas</i></b>	<b><i>Number of Respondents (33)</i></b>
<i>Stability, normalcy and rule of law</i>	71.9%
<i>Reconciliation (coming to grips with past abuses and atrocities)</i>	53.1%
<i>Economic renewal</i>	28.1%
Legitimate political framework	25.0%
Re-creating civil society	12.5%
Getting regional context right	9.4%

The survey was carried out among two main fields: 1) humanitarian and 2) peacebuilding and development practitioners, donors and scholars. The responses from two different fields were as follows:

***Response by Humanitarian/Peacebuilding Actors***

<b><i>Priority Areas</i></b>	<b><i>Humanitarian</i></b>	<b><i>Peacebuilding</i></b>
Stability, normalcy and rule of law	36.4%	31.8%
Reconciliation (coming to grips with past abuses and atrocities)	29.6%	22.8%
Economic renewal	13.6%	13.6%
Legitimate political framework	13.6%	9.1%
Re-creating civil society	6.8%	9.1%
Getting regional context right	0.0%	13.6%

<sup>130</sup> Steinberg, 2010, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/tackling-state-fragility-the-new-world-of-peacebuilding.aspx>



**Question 3. In the two areas selected, please describe three key capacities for each area (e.g. legal advisor).**

***Response: Required Peacebuilding Capacities in Priority Areas***

<i>Priority Areas</i>	<i>Required capacities/ Expertise</i>
Stability, normalcy and rule of law	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b>  <b>Technical expertise</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Civilian security forces (police)</li> <li>■ Communications officer</li> <li>■ Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)</li> <li>■ Economic officer</li> <li>■ Environment expert</li> <li>■ Human rights advisor</li> <li>■ Humanitarian affairs officer (to ensure that residual humanitarian need are covered)</li> <li>■ International political observer</li> <li>■ Legal/ judicial affairs officer</li> <li>■ Military observer</li> <li>■ Peacekeepers/Peace enforcement officer</li> <li>■ Service delivery &amp; monitoring</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Coordination advisor</li> <li>■ Policy planner</li> <li>■ Project/programme manager</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ (Community) Development specialist</li> <li>■ Democratization officer</li> <li>■ Education curriculum development expert</li> <li>■ Financial management officer</li> <li>■ Governance expert (reaching a minimum level of functioning ministries)</li> <li>■ Legal advisor to provide justice to victims and prosecution of perpetrators</li> <li>■ Moral cleansing of inflicted public institutions</li> <li>■ Promoter of a dialogue on constitutional principles with transparency and power sharing</li> <li>■ Transitional justice expert</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Special envoy</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conflict assessment analyst (addressing root causes)</li> <li>■ Impartial and increasingly legitimate security force (drawn from organic elements of society)</li> <li>■ Strong, key private sector players involved in regional discussions</li> </ul>

<i>Priority Areas</i>	<i>Required capacities/ Expertise</i>
Reconciliation (Coming to grips with past abuses and atrocities)	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Community development adviser/cultural promotion</li> <li>■ Economic/social/political affairs officers</li> <li>■ Human rights teacher/trainer</li> <li>■ Information management officer</li> <li>■ Psychologist</li> <li>■ Service delivery &amp; monitoring officer</li> <li>■ Sociologist</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Investigator</li> <li>■ Policy planner</li> <li>■ Program manager</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Legal advisor and advocate</li> <li>■ Peace and development advisor</li> <li>■ Peace and governance advisor</li> <li>■ Reintegration advisor</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conflict resolution expert</li> <li>■ Negotiator/mediators (from countries that experienced similar processes) and broker of cessation of hostilities</li> <li>■ Political will (bringing all parties- stakeholders- together civil society, politicians, academia)</li> <li>■ Special envoy</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Community self-protection volunteers</li> <li>■ Group of elders</li> <li>■ Informal peace and reconciliation avenues (such as through faith-based organizations/ traditional process)</li> <li>■ Peacemakers (women peacemakers)</li> </ul>
Economic renewal	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Community development specialist</li> <li>■ Procurement experts</li> <li>■ Public financial management advisors</li> <li>■ Socio-economic &amp; budgetary advocacy</li> <li>■ Value chain analyst (to find ways of improving the products bound for markets especially from local industries.)</li> <li>■ Vocational trainer</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advisors on coordination of donor support</li> <li>■ Ensuring basic service delivery and local ownership (via community-driven development, likely requiring experts in this area to work with government officials and NGOs)</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Context-sensitive investment advisor</li> <li>■ Creating and normalizing market exchange</li> <li>■ Entrepreneurship/ business skills development expert (keep the youth engaged in productive ventures instead of conflict)</li> <li>■ Re-establish banking services</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Reopen communication lines</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Local economic/livelihood recovery advisor</li> <li>■ National youth employment schemes analyst (to conduct a review of existing schemes and recommend a viable option for duty bearers)</li> </ul>

Priority Areas	Required capacities/ Expertise
Legitimate political framework	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Constitution</li> <li>■ Electoral officer</li> <li>■ Functioning judiciary system</li> <li>■ Human rights monitor/advisor</li> <li>■ Institutional advisor</li> <li>■ Legitimate leader and government</li> <li>■ Political affairs officer</li> <li>■ Service delivery &amp; monitoring officer</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Policy planning</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Governance advisor</li> <li>■ Strengthening political party system and culture</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Development of a dialogue regarding basic constitutional principles with transparency and power sharing</li> <li>■ High-level diplomats</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Strong, key private sector players involved in regional discussions</li> </ul>
Recreating civil society	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Agriculture specialist</li> <li>■ Economic advisor</li> <li>■ Institutional development (according to prevailing circumstances, local, national and international expertise is required)</li> <li>■ Security sector reform</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Team building and group dynamics expert</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Conflict/governance and development specialist</li> <li>■ Develop specific expertise in the countries of the region leading to regional exchanges (e.g. education: specialized schools/universities: medicine in country A, economy in country B, etc.)</li> <li>■ Socio-economic reintegration advisor</li> <li>■ Transitional justice specialist</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Reopen communication lines</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Community empowerment and education/Grassroots leadership and participation in decision-making</li> <li>■ Promoting community groups through activities</li> <li>■ Social service delivery monitor</li> <li>■ Sustainable livelihood advisor</li> </ul>
Getting regional context right	<p><b>1. Thematic capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Political analyst</li> </ul> <p><b>2. Process capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Bring in expertise from countries which experienced similar processes</li> </ul> <p><b>3. Transitional capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Develop specific expertise in the countries of the region leading to regional exchanges</li> </ul> <p><b>4. Peace and mediation capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ High-level diplomats</li> </ul> <p><b>5. National context capacities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Information manager, working with international organization</li> <li>■ Strong, key private sector players involved in regional discussion</li> </ul>

**Question 4. From the viewpoint of your organization, what are the two most important areas of humanitarian action, provided by international support? What types of expertise should be deployed? Please select two key areas:**

- Basic services delivery (agriculture, camp coordination and management, early recovery, education, emergency shelter, emergency communication, health, logistics, nutrition, protection, and water-sanitation-hygiene/WASH)
- Civil-military coordination (to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, by planning, information sharing and task division)
- Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy
- Information management and analysis
- Mine action
- Political liaison with international/national actors
- Project administration (financial and human resources management, procurement, transport, emergency infrastructure)
- Tracing of missing people

***Response: Areas of Humanitarian Action***

<i>Basic services delivery</i>	90.6%
<i>Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy</i>	68.8%
<i>Information management and analysis</i>	12.5%
Civil-military coordination	9.4%
Project administration	9.4%
Political liaison with international/national actors	9.4%
Tracing of missing people/Mine action	0.0%

**Question 5. In the two areas selected, please describe three key capacities for each area (e.g. logistical engineer).**

***Response: Key Capacities for Humanitarian Action***

<b>Area of Humanitarian Action</b>	<b>Required capacities/ Expertise</b>
Basic services delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Agriculture and business development experts</li> <li>■ Community development expert and facilitator (Service collaboration/integration with local efforts)</li> <li>■ Community liaison officer</li> <li>■ Cluster leads, especially NGO cluster leads/co-leads</li> <li>■ Cross-cutting issues specialist (gender, human rights, HIV, environment)</li> <li>■ Engineer</li> <li>■ Financing coordinator</li> <li>■ Human resources officer</li> <li>■ Implementation manager and relevant quality control officer</li> <li>■ Rapid needs assessment expert</li> <li>■ Security access negotiator</li> <li>■ Sectoral experts in technical management, coordination and policy</li> </ul>
Coordination of humanitarian action and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Advocacy officer to advocate issues with influence</li> <li>■ Coordinator</li> <li>■ Cluster coordinator</li> <li>■ Development programming officer</li> <li>■ Humanitarian affairs officer</li> <li>■ Information and Communications Technology (ICT) expert</li> <li>■ Information management officer</li> <li>■ Management Information Systems (MIS) expert</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation officer</li> <li>■ Needs assessment coordinator</li> <li>■ Peacemaker (Peace messages)</li> <li>■ Policy analyst</li> <li>■ Preparedness and response/contingency planners</li> <li>■ Public relations officer</li> <li>■ Resource mobilization officer/Donor</li> </ul>
Information management and analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Baseline assessments (data) manager</li> <li>■ Capacity building officer (to provide local media with constant information dissemination)</li> <li>■ GIS expert/External relations officer</li> <li>■ Information manager (including, to provide people in need with adequate information on humanitarian assistance)</li> <li>■ Monitoring and evaluation officer</li> <li>■ Planning officer (to integrate emergency and next phase planning for durable solutions)</li> <li>■ Public information officer</li> </ul>

<i>Area of Humanitarian Action</i>	<i>Required capacities/ Expertise</i>
Civil-military coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Integration specialist</li> <li>■ Military and civil engineers (to restore emergency infrastructure, e.g. Bailey bridge)</li> <li>■ Protection officer</li> <li>■ Strategic planning officer</li> </ul>
Project administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Administrative/transport officer (to manage transportation arrangements and keep their records and documentation)</li> <li>■ Civil engineers (to restore emergency infrastructure)</li> <li>■ Community liaison officer</li> <li>■ Finance officer</li> <li>■ Human resources manager</li> <li>■ Logistical coordinator (storage and delivery of food and non-food items)</li> <li>■ Logistics planner</li> </ul>
Political liaison with international/national actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Accounting officer</li> <li>■ Advocacy officer to lobby relevant countries/bodies with influence</li> <li>■ Employment (job creation) advisor</li> <li>■ Facilitator for discussions between warring parties</li> <li>■ Integration coordinator</li> <li>■ Peacemakers</li> <li>■ Programme manager/coordinator</li> <li>■ Strategic planner (e.g. Linking basic needs with political, development and security sectors, as well as emerging partner country authorities to ensure alignment and coherence)</li> </ul>

**Question 6. While preparing for imminent crises (conflict situations including war, civil unrest, urban/election violence) or responding to them, is it possible to plan for or deploy peacebuilding capacities? [Yes / No]**

*-If Yes, what 'potential' peacebuilding capacities can be planned or deployed during the humanitarian (preparedness and response) phase? Please name three.*

*-If No, please explain.*

**Response: Table 10 – Peacebuilding Capacities can be Prepared/Deployed**

<b>Yes/No</b>	<b>Total Respondents: 33</b>	<b>Ratio</b>
Yes	80.0%	100% of peacebuilding/ development actors
No	20.0%	23% of humanitarians

### **All phases**

#### **1. Thematic capacities**

##### *Technical expertise*

- Advocacy officer for peace initiatives
- Basic services
- Civil-military coordination
- Employment-intensive reconstruction
- Gender advisor
- Human security experts
- Legal advisor
- Operational and logistics expert
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Protection officer for civilians
- Robust early warning system

##### *Capacity development*

- Capacity development advisor
- Peacebuilding trainer
- Training of human rights monitor

#### **2. Process capacities**

- Planning officers
- Situation analyst
- Strategic planners
- Strategic plans for youth in conflict

#### **3. Transitional capacities**

- Development specialist
- Election observers
- Expert on socio-economic recovery
- Expert to promote social dialogue
- Governance advisor
- Peace and development advisors
- Recovery project experts

**4. Peace and Mediation capacities**

- Conflict mitigation, reconciliation
- Conflict transformation/resolution experts
- Education specialist on peace and tolerance
- Mediation
- Negotiators
- Pre-deployed peacekeepers
- Reconciliation
- Upholding rule of law

**5. National Context capacities**

- Community leadership
- Cross-cultural community organizations
- National experts

**Before an outbreak of conflict, at a window of opportunity, or in the aftermath of conflict**

**1. Thematic capacities**

- Capacity development for reconciliation experts
- Early warning capacity through specialized monitoring units
- Incident reporting and prevention
- Reducing conflict in the areas where conflict is building up
- Preparedness (analysis, scenario-building, planning and pre-positioning of capacities) to reduce potential effect of the anticipated crisis

**2. Process capacities**

- Accurate dissemination of information with the communities

**3. Transitional capacities**

- Confidence-building initiatives (creation of regional/sub-regional risk reduction centers of monitoring of regional arms agreements)

**4. Peace and Mediation capacities**

- Fact-finding missions
- Negotiations and reconciliation expertise
- Preventive peacekeepers deployment and diplomacy missions
- Peacemaking/peacebuilding experts

**5. National Context capacities**

- Confidence building through joint projects aimed at bringing communities together

**Question 7. How can humanitarian action, provided by international (external) actors, contribute to peacebuilding efforts at the national policy-making level? How can it be effectively managed by both international and national actors?**

**Question 8. How can humanitarian action, provided by international (external) actors, contribute to peacebuilding efforts at the community grassroots level? How can it promote local ownership?**

**Question 9. Where do you think humanitarian (life-saving) action and political (peace mediation) work converge?**



## Annex 4: Peacebuilding Challenges

### *Interlocking Challenges for Peacebuilding*<sup>131</sup>

<i>Key Challenges</i>	<i>Action</i>	<i>External Support</i>
Stability, normalcy and rule of law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Credible local security forces, both defense forces and polices must quickly take over international peacekeepers to provide stability, normalcy and rule of law to everyday life.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Security sector reform is essential to ensure that forces are well-trained, disciplined, and adequately paid so that they do not exploit and abuse the populations they are supposed to protect.</li> <li>■ Effective programs of DDR for ex-combatants, including militias.</li> <li>■ Child soldiers must pick up schoolbooks.</li> </ul>
A legitimate political framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Build credible governance at national and local levels; transform armed movements into political parties; and ensure that effective legislatures and judiciaries counter-balance the power of the executive, which grows during conflict periods.</li> <li>■ Decentralization and local empowerment balanced against need for strong central authority in fragile states.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The premature holding of elections can create a winner-take-all power dispensation, a prelude to new conflict from disempowered minorities.</li> <li>■ A culture of accountability and transparency in government, along with an effective system to protect human rights.</li> </ul>
Economic renewal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ In long-term development, reviving agriculture, creating conditions needed to attract local and foreign investment, ensuring greater equality in income distribution, and creating jobs. (In societies facing massive youth unemployment, renegade leaders have lured disaffected young people with a siren song that offers quick empowerment.)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ (Strictly physical terms) Rebuilding of roads, clinics, schools, power grids and houses.</li> </ul>

<sup>131</sup> This table is designed and inspired by the keynote speech of Donald Steinberg, Deputy President of the International Crisis Group to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference on Peacebuilding, 1 February 2010. Available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/tackling-state-fragility-the-new-world-of-peacebuilding.aspx>

<i>Key Challenges</i>	<i>Action</i>	<i>External Support</i>
Reconciliation (Coming to grips with past abuses and atrocities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Nations and individuals who have suffered from grievous treatment must balance accountability and national reconciliation, but too often, peace agreements provide blanket amnesties in which men with guns forgive other men with guns for crimes committed against women and children.</li> <li>■ There is no one-size-fits-all approach to transitional justice.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Action by local courts, the International Criminal Courts, a truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa, the gacaca community court system in Rwanda,<sup>132</sup> or ad-hoc international tribunals in cases where local courts are inadequate, ensuring accountability is essential to rebuilding rule of law and eliminating a culture of impunity.</li> </ul>
Re-creating of civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Groups of academics, lawyers, teachers, unions, and women are the glue that holds society together and serve as safety valves to permit the peaceful redress of grievances.</li> <li>■ Such groups are frequently polarized during conflict, often due to conscious 'divide-and-rule' strategies by national or factional leaders. Women in particular are not only the primary victims of conflict, but a key to peace consolidation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Bringing women's groups to peace table improves the quality of agreements reached, and involving them in post-conflict governance reduces the likelihood of returning to war.</li> <li>■ The single best investment to revitalize agriculture, restore health systems, and improve other social indicators after conflict is girls' education: 'educate a boy and you educate an individual; educate a girl and you educate a community.'</li> </ul>
Getting regional context right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Comprehensive peacebuilding must recognize differing yet often synergistic roles to be played and interests to be pursued by neighboring countries, each with its special relationships and contracts with key actors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Regional and sub-regional organizations can serve this purpose.</li> </ul>

<sup>132</sup> The Rwandan government began implementing a participatory justice system, known as 'gacaca', (pronounced GA-CHA-CHA) in 2001 in order to address the enormous backlog of cases in the judicial system. Communities elected judges to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes except planning of genocide or rape. [...] Rwanda continues to use the classical national court system to try those involved in planning genocide or rape under normal penal law. Those that are accused of these crimes do not benefit from provisional release. The gacaca courts give lower sentences if the person is repentant and seeks reconciliation with the community. These courts are intended to help the community participate in the process of justice and reconciliation for the country. Available online [www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/photogal/leopold/dest/index.shtml#gacaca](http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/photogal/leopold/dest/index.shtml#gacaca)

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**M**asayo Kondo Rossier conducted this research at the Graduate Institute's Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding (CCDP) from October 2010 to February 2011 in the framework of her UN Sabbatical Leave Programme. This Working Paper is the outcome of her four-month stay at the CCDP.

Masayo has been working with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the field of emergency preparedness and response since 1995. As a Desk Officer, she has covered humanitarian issues in Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific, including cases of disasters and conflicts. She has also served as an Electoral Observer with the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), for the post-conflict Presidential Election in 1992. Her interest in peacebuilding resulted from her experience following the 'negotiated' revolution.

Moreover, Masayo is interested in linkages and coordination within the 'humanitarian-development' divide, which has been quite resistant in her environment. She has been supporting efforts to enhance international coordination of emergency preparedness and response, and to strengthen governments' response capacity. More recently, she and her colleagues initiated a pilot project in Ghana to assess the country's national capacity of responding to emergencies, where sustainable efforts to strengthen local capacities for peacebuilding have been in progress. She plans to conduct research on possible applications of Central American peacebuilding experiences for West African peacebuilding realities.





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