Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

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Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda

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Towards a Practical Agenda of Human Security[1]

Keith Krause

The concept of "human security," which today is widely used by a wide range of governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is only the latest in a long series of attempts to broaden traditional conceptions of security. These include such ideas as global security, societal security, common security, comprehensive security and cooperative security.[2] Aside from being the most recent attempt to reformulate or redefine the concept of security, the human security approach is significant for two reasons. First, because unlike most other previous reformulations, it stands in tension, or potentially even conflict, with the state-centric conception of security that has dominated our thinking. Second, it is important because policy-makers have adopted the discourse of human security, and have used it to generate important and interesting foreign and security policy initiatives. But a full understanding of the conceptual and practical implications of human security – which also helps to explain its utility and attractiveness – must unpack the complex relationship between human security and state security, and in particular the rights and responsibilities of states in meeting the security needs of their citizens.[3]

This paper thus explores the strengths, and some of the weaknesses, of the concept of human security, and the intertwined relationship between state and human security. The paper starts with a brief discussion on the contemporary genesis and development of the concept, and the two different visions of human security that are in circulation. It argues for a coherent "narrow" conception that focuses on security from the threat of violence as the core of human security, and shows how this vision can be linked to some central developments in the emergence and consolidation of the Western (Westphalian) state. This section draws attention to the political foundations of human security discourses, and shows how they are linked in the development of the modern state to the slow separation of the internal and external security functions of the state, and to the subordination of armed force to civil authority. The third part of the paper examines the contemporary implications of this, by highlighting a number of

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[1] This paper draws upon two earlier publications, "Une approche critique de la sécurité humaine", in Jean-François Rioux (ed.), *La sécurité humaine* (Paris: I'Harmattan, 2002), pp. 73-98, and "Human Security: An Idea Who's Time Has Come?", *Security and Peace*, 1 (2005), pp. 1-6.

[2] See, for a few of the key texts, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission), *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); Ashton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992); David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security", *The Pacific Review*, 7:1 (1994), pp. 1-15; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, second edition, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Ole Waever, "Societal Security - A Concept and its Consequences", unpublished paper, 1995; The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 80-81.

[3] The author recognizes that the term "citizen" is problematic here, since states also, under international humanitarian law and the law of war, have certain responsibilities to all individuals on their territory or under their control. But I use "citizen" to highlight the reciprocal relationships of duty and loyalty at stake here.

specific policy initiatives that have taken root under the auspices of human security, in particular those concerning landmines and the "protection of civilians agenda," small arms and security sector reform, and the responsibility to protect. It shows, at least tentatively, how the human security agenda is evolving to take on the broader implications for the relationship between states and their citizens that are contained within the vision of human security as "freedom from fear."

Overall, this paper argues that the use of the concept of human security by states and decisions-makers is not a trivial matter of sloganeering or labelling, and that the promotion of human security is not just a conceptual or theoretical parlour game. The discourse and practice of human security leads states and policy-makers to focus on different issues, to ask different questions, and to promote different policies, policies that are having a significant impact on the international security agenda for the 21st century.

1. The Origins and Diffusion of the Human Security Concept

The most striking thing about the concept of human security is that it was born in the policy world, and did not come from either academics or analysts. It was first used in a significant way in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report,* although arguably its roots are deeper. As Fen Hampson has noted, "since the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the nineteenth century, the notion that people should be protected from violent threats and, when they are harmed or injured, that the international community has an obligation to assist them, has gained widespread acceptance."[4] Ultimately, one could argue that the concept of human security itself, at least in its more focused formulation, originated with the work of the ICRC and the humanitarian community.

By contrast, the UNDP's vision of human security was very broad: it encompassed seven different dimensions, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. The overall goal was to expand the concept of security, which had "for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust". Human security was thus meant to change the referent object of security "from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security", and, somewhat more problematically, to advocate "security through sustainable human development".[5] This conception was also paralleled by the work of the Commission on Global Governance which, in its 1995 report, advocated an expanded concept of human security that included "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. [The Commission

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[4] Fen Osler Hampson, *et al*, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 17

[5] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: UNDP, 1994), pp. 22-46, at 22 and 24.

believes that] … the security of people must be regarded as a goal as important as the security of states."[6]

The idea behind the UNDP report was both political and practical. Politically, UNDP argued that human security (in its political dimension) meant that "people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights."[7] It also noted that military governments, countries experiencing political unrest, and countries in which there were high levels of military spending were not likely to be politically secure, since "governments sometimes use armies to repress their own people." In practical terms, it was hoped that an emphasis on human security would make it possible to capture the so-called "peace dividend" and to ensure that the resources devoted to the military through the Cold War were directed towards more productive ends. The direct aim of the 1994 *Human Development Report* was to influence the outcome of the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit, and from the outset the concept of human security was thus a practical one with clear strategic goals.

From the mid-1990s until today, the concept of human security has been used by a vast array of non-governmental organizations, states and international institutions. On the NGO side these have included Oxfam, the Academic Council on the UN System, the UN University, the Arias Foundation, the Center for Defence Information, the Worldwatch Institute, the Commission on Global Governance, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, the International Action Network on Small Arms, Pax Christi, Harvard University's Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, the Human Security Center at the University of British Columbia, Saferworld, the Bonn International Center for Conversion, the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), the Regional Human Security Center (Amman), the Canadian Consortium on Human Security, and so on. It has also become a cornerstone of policy for states such as Canada, Norway, Japan and Switzerland, and has been formalized in a multilateral setting within the Human Security Network, a loose grouping of 14 states that have met annually since 1999 at the Foreign Minister level, and that have agreed to pursue a common human security agenda on a wide range of issues.

Within the UN system, the phrase "human security" has become a regular feature of UN and multilateral discourses, being used by officials such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or the UN Secretary-General. This process reached its height with the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, when the concept of human security received a "subheading" and was treated in paragraph 143:

> *Human Security*
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> *143. We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled*

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6 Our Global Neighbourhood, pp. 80-81.
7 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 32-33.

> *to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.*[8]

Of course, these states, NGOs and institutions were attracted to the idea because "human security" was a nice slogan. But there was more to it than that. Human security was a lens, a way of describing or framing what they were doing that allowed a number of disparate policy initiatives to be linked, and to be given greater coherence. In other words, the concept of human security was helping to catalyze a broader reframing of how scholars and practitioners thought of the different relationships between security, development, and human rights in world politics. In particular, by shifting the referent object of "security" from that of the state to that of the individual, it highlighted the tensions that exist between promoting state security, and promoting the security of individuals, which has historically often been jeopardized by the state.

2.   Two Visions of Human Security

There were, however, two competing visions of human security that emerged out of the various contributions to the debate, and that have been loosely reflected in two different policy approaches. The first, broad, vision drew upon the original UNDP formulation, and could be summarized by the phrase "freedom from want" – human security was about ensuring basic human needs in economic, health, food, social, and environmental terms. It was directly reflected in the 2003 report of the Commission on Human Security, and in the funding activities of the Japanese Trust Fund for Human Security. The Commission report focused not just on situations of conflict, but also on issues relating to fair trade, access to health care, patent rights, access to education, and basic freedoms, while the Trust Fund has sponsored projects in areas as diverse as food security for farmers in East Timor or fishermen in Southern Sudan, health security in Tajikistan or Mongolia, or the rebuilding of schools in Kosovo.

The second, more tightly focused, vision was linked more closely to the activities of the Human Security Network, and its key slogan was "freedom from fear" – human security was about removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people's everyday lives. Examples of policy initiatives included such things as the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, international action to deal with the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, promotion of the International Criminal Court, and the broad area of security sector governance. Some of these specific initiatives will be discussed below.

Although it is possible to pursue both the "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" agendas simultaneously (as the World Summit Outcome Document implies), the author argues that this narrow view of human security as "freedom from fear" is intellectually and programmatically more coherent, for at least two

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[8] General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1, *2005 World Summit Outcome*.

reasons. The first reason is a negative one: the broad vision of human security as "freedom from want" is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list; it involves labelling a wide range of issues presenting no necessary link to each other as threats to human security, and as a result of this, at some point human security seems to capture almost everything that could be considered a threat to well-being. It falls into the trap that Daniel H. Deudney aptly describes: "if everything that causes a reduction in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of 'bad'."[9] At this point, the concept no longer has any utility for policy-makers nor, incidentally, to analysts – since it does not facilitate priority-setting or policy coherence and it obscures the distinctive entailments of the idea of "security," inextricably linked to existential threats, conflicts and the potential or actual use of violence.

Perhaps even more importantly, it is not clear that anything is gained by putting the label "human security" on issues such as the right to education, fair trade practices, or public health challenges. Scholars such as Ole Wæver have described this process as "securitization," as "the move that takes politics beyond the usual rules of the game," and as a process that involves political actors, declaring that specific issues warrant exceptional attention, efforts or even sacrifices.[10] Examples such as the "war on drugs" or the "global war on terror" are good illustrations of this process. But does describing illiteracy as a threat to human security change our understanding of the right to basic education – does it facilitate more effective action, does it help us to solve problems? Or does it actually lead us down the wrong path in some cases, to treating certain problems, such as migration, the use of illegal drugs, or HIV/AIDS, as threats to security, when they would better be considered as simple public policy challenges? At least two examples clearly illustrate the tensions involved in securitizing issues: the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the securitization of migration.

With respect to HIV/AIDS, a UN Security Council high level meeting in January 2000 (addressed by the then-US Vice President Al Gore) examined the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa, and declared in July 2000 that "the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security."[11] But what does this mean in practice? Does the prevalence or spread of HIV/AIDS actually "decrease[s] security by undermining social and economic conditions, which in turn increases instability, crime, domestic violence, protest, and civil and international war," or are these simply postulated relationships that have no empirical foundation?[12] More importantly, are the conventional responses

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[9] Daniel H. Deudney, "Environmental Security: A Critique", in Daniel H. Deudney and Richard A. Matthew (eds.), *Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 187-219, at 192.

[10] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver Waever and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 21-47; Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47:4 (2005), pp. 511-531; Thierry Balzacq, "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", *European Journal of International Relations*, 11:2 (2005), pp. 171-201.

[11] See UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000), 17 July 2000. Also Susan Peterson, "Epidemic Disease and National Security", *Security Studies*, 12:2 (Winter 2002/3), pp. 43-81.

[12] From the project on AIDS and international security at: http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/intlpolitics/security. See also Susan Peterson and Stephen M. Shellman, "AIDS and Violent Conflict: The Indirect Effects of Disease on National Security", unpublished paper (no date) available at:

to security threats (exclusionary, militarized, and linked to "emergency measures") appropriate to public health challenges?

The literature on the "securitization" of migration illustrates another dimension of this tension.[13] From a security perspective, Western European states (and certain elements of the European political elite) have often reacted to migration as if it posed a threat to societal identity and values. From an economic perspective, however, the consensus is that Europe needs to encourage migration in order to sustain its welfare entitlements (including pensions), in the face of an aging workforce and population.[14] The debate has often been polarized, and the securitization of migration has not helped foster the development of sensible public policies on migrants, clearly illustrating some of the negative consequences of using the powerful concept of security in a loose, even perhaps politically careless, fashion.

Shifting to a more positive set of arguments, if the concept of human security is focused on "freedom from fear" – from the threat or use of violence – it can be linked to a powerful and practical and intellectual agenda that is embedded in a particular understanding of the Western state, and of state-society relations. The question of controlling the institutions of organized violence and evacuating force from political, economic and social life has been central to the whole modern understanding of politics and the struggle to establish legitimate and representative political institutions. It is part of Thomas Hobbes' vision of the political Leviathan – an institution created to bring us out of the situation of "war of each against all" into a civil state in which economic, social and political life could flourish. It is echoed in Max Weber's definition of the state as an organization that has the legal monopoly over the legitimate means of violence. And it is tied up with the centuries-long struggle to eliminate the threat of force and violence from everyday human interactions. From this perspective, human security focuses on the primary responsibility of political institutions to maintain the social order that is a precondition for the security and well-being of individuals and communities.[15]

Placed in a broader historical (and philosophical) context, this vision of human security tackles two issues that have been central to the liberal tradition (and its challengers): the reciprocal rights and duties individuals owe to each other, and the nature and scope of the sovereign institutions designed to safeguard these rights and duties. In short, human security is *unavoidably and inextricably* about the state, and more specifically about the relationship between citizens, and between citizens

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http://mjtier.people.wm.edu/intlpolitics/security/papers/AIDS.pdf; Robyn Pharaoh and Martin Schönteich, "AIDS, Security and Governance in Southern Africa: Exploring the Impact", IIS Paper 65 (January 2003); P.W. Singer, "AIDS and International Security", *Survival*, 44:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 145-158.

[13] See, for representative contributions, Didier Bigo, "Sécurité et immigration: vers une gouvernementalité par l'inquiétude", *cultures et conflits*, 31-32, automne-hiver 1998, pp. 13-38; Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38:5 (December 2000), pp. 751-777. Pinar Bilgin, "Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security", *International Studies Review*, 5 (2005), pp. 203-222; Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Immigration and the Politics of Security", *Security Studies,* 8:2-3 (1999-2000), pp. 71-93.

[14] See Jonathan Coppel, Jean-Christophe Dumont and Ignazio Visco, "Trends in Immigration and Economic Consequences", Economics Department Working papers, no. 284 (Paris: OECD, June 2001).

[15] As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde argue, "this [the political] sector is probably the primary locus at which (seemingly) individual-level security appears on the security agenda". *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, p. 141.

and the state.[16] That this point has been elided is a consequence of the desire of many in the human security debate to move "beyond" state centric conceptions of security, but it seems there is no escaping the state as the central institution of political life. As many have pointed out, "human security reinforces state security but does not replace it": a state that protects its citizens and respects their rights is ultimately one that enjoys legitimacy and support.[17] If we look at human security in this way – as the question of the nature of the relationship between citizens and their states, and as a lens for interrogating the power and responsibilities of state institutions – then we remain quite close to the narrow understanding of human security as "freedom from fear." It is based on the idea that security – indeed politics and political debate as we know it – cannot flourish without first evacuating the threat of force and violence from public space. This is, arguably, true for all political, social, and economic interactions, since where the threat of force and violence is omnipresent, society cannot flourish, politics cannot be democratic and representative, and markets cannot function.[18]

3.   The Provision of Security and Public Order

Two specific developments – the separation of the internal and external security functions of the state, and the subordination of armed force to civil authority – can be sketched to illustrate the way in which the concept of "freedom from fear" became implicitly embedded in our understanding of the Westphalian or liberal state, and why therefore human security concerns resonate so powerfully today on the international stage.

With respect to the first, the separation of the internal from the external security functions of the state, and the idea that the state *provides* security and is responsible for guaranteeing public order through policing, rather than representing a source of insecurity (and violence) for the population, was relatively slow to take root in Western Europe. Over time, the provision of security to individuals and communities became a central part of the bargain that provided legitimacy to the modern state, and justified the outward orientation of its own security policies and practices.[19] As late as the 19th century, French peasants could pray to be delivered from the taxman and the police officer, rather than protected by state institutions.[20] Yet the process of state-building and legitimation ultimately transformed the conception of the proper relationship between the individual and

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[16] For an interesting take on this see Andreas Behnke, "Post-Modernising Security", paper for Presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Mannheim, 26-31 March 1999.

[17] *Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003), p. 5.

[18] A third element that is not treated in this paper would be the struggle to establish the rule of law - an *état de droit* - in which all political, social and economic actors are subject to the same system of justice and the same administrative, bureaucratic and political machinery.

[19] For the general argument on state-building see Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169-191; Charles Tilly, *Capital, Coercion and European States, AD 990-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). For case studies that contrast external threat to the development of democratic norms, see Brian Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[20] See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

the state, to the point where we simply presume that one function of the state is to provide for the security of its citizens.

Two developments were important for this: the growing (practical) monopolization of violence by the state and its subordination to civil control, and the increased provision of public order. Private physical violence, either wielded by one individual over another or by one group or class against another, was only slowly outlawed. In theory, of course, the monopoly of violence was a cornerstone of the modern state. As Jean Bodin noted, "declaring of war or making of peace is one of the most important points of majesty [sovereignty], since it often entails the ruin or the preservation of the state." Such sentiment was echoed by kings: as a 16th century French royal ordinance put it: "the King expressly forbids all his subjects...to undertake or have undertaken any levying or assembling of soldiers...under any pretext without explicit royal command."[21] In practice, the maintenance and use of private military forces by feudal lords was only slowly banned. At the same time as the ordinance quoted above was proclaimed, France was collapsing into civil war. Up until the French Revolution, it was not unusual to witness rival nobles raising and using private military forces. In regions (such as Sicily or Corsica), where clan and family bonds were as important as hierarchical relations of classes, it took somewhat longer (up until the 19th century in some cases) for the central authorities to check the organized or ritualized violence (revenge killings, for example) that were part and parcel of the essentially peasant codes of justice. The exercise of *legitimate* violence slowly became the sole preserve of the state, even if there were significant and widespread derogations from this principle.

The most important transformation, however, occurred in the provision of public order, a cornerstone of the modern state legitimacy. Before discussing the emergence of institutions to guarantee public order (police, gendarmes, national guards, and so forth), it is worth pointing out that policing ought to be regarded as a key element of any conception of human security, for at least two reasons. First, the police represent the security institution that most individuals are likely to encounter directly in their lives. Second, the provision of security to individuals and communities was a central part of the bargain that provided legitimacy to the modern state, and justified the outward orientation of its own security policies and practices.

A study of policing has traditionally been excluded from treatments of security, for reasons that are obvious and revealing.[22] Contemporary policing has traditionally focused on domestic security, and in a liberal democratic state a sharp distinction has been erected between the institutions, practices and laws governing domestic and international order. In the United States, for example, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibited the use of the US Army for civilian law

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[21] James Wood, *The King's Army* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 43.
[22] One interesting exception to this is Latin America, where the transition from authoritarian or military rule has led to an intense focus on "public security", which in practice means "freedom from fear". See, for example, the website http://www.comunidadesegura.org; John Bailey and Lucia Dammert, *Public security and police reform in the Americas (*Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, forthcoming).

enforcement, thus exemplifying the principle of separating civilian and military authority. But rather than accepting this distinction between domestic and international security as axiomatic, it is more revealing to examine the evolution of public security institutions in order to understand how this seemingly natural division emerged, and how it underpins a particular notion of the role of state institutions in providing human security.

The precise trajectory taken in the development of modern policing varied widely in time and place, and there is no uniform pattern. In France, for example, a permanent centralised policing structure was in place by the end of the 17th century, although it should be recognized that as late as 1714 there were perhaps only 1,000 men policing the whole of rural France. By contrast, the British police only really came into being between 1829 and 1888, and although it grew rapidly – by about 1855 there were 15,000 policemen in England and Wales, it remained decentralized. In Italy, a formal gendarmerie was introduced by Napoleon, replacing the native institution of the *sbirri*, "the armed thugs who performed some policing functions [coupled with extortion] in most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Italian states."[23]

Despite the general trend (especially in the 20th century) towards a distinct separation between military and police forces, in many places there was at the outset no clear distinction made between the means that states used to provide external or internal security. In France, for example, the gendarme was modelled on the soldier, with military discipline, equipment and organization. As Clive Emsley points out, "the gendarmes were professional soldiers/policemen at a time when the armies of continental Europe were increasingly shifting from a professional mercenary to a conscript base." They also represented "a significant manifestation of state power," and [were] an instrument of the expanded bureaucratic surveillance capacity of the state." In the German lands, the *hatschiere* police and hussars (light troops) were often converted soldiers, who could be recalled to serve in wartime.[24] In England in the early 1700s, state control was exercised in part by the army, the militia, and the constables.[25] All three institutions were weak and unreliable: the constables were susceptible to being overwhelmed by organized criminal bands, the militia was locally-recruited and hence an "uncertain support for legal order" and the army was an organization of last resort, although "last resort" was not an infrequent result.

The provision of public order was also a dual-edged sword, one that highlighted the tensions in the relationship between states and their citizens. The means used to protect the people were also often used to protect the regime (or elites) *from* the people, since the suppression of violence from other organized groups did not

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[23] Details from David Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe", in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Clive Emsley, "The Nation-State, the Law and the Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Europe", in Xavier Rousseaux and René Lévy, eds., *Le pénal dans tous ses Etats* (Bruxelles: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1997), pp. 153-178; Michael Broers, "Notabili, Gendarmes and the State: Preserving Order and the Origins of the Centralized State in the Italian Departments of the First Empire", in *Le pénal dans tous ses Etats*, pp. 179-190.

[24] "The Nation-State, the Law and the Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Europe", pp. 7-8, 152.

[25] Paul Rock, "Law, Order and Power in Late Seventeenth- and Early Eighteenth-century England", in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull, *Social Control and the State* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 191-221.

eliminate large-scale disorganized violence, directed against the state and its officials, from erupting periodically. Most often these eruptions of violence were catalyzed by the perceived venality or corruption of state officials, or from the exploitation and repression of class-driven social orders. In most cases, the army was used when deemed necessary to suppress unrest, alongside the less forceful and more traditional institutions. An interesting example of this was post-Napoleonic Italy, where the gendarmerie, first regarded as an imposed institution inimical to traditional Italian elites, became a tool of state consolidation used to enforce loyalty to the state and to suppress popular violence. That extending the reach of the state into the rural hinterlands was part of state-formation was understood by most ruling elites. In Spain, as a 19th century general put it, "the distribution of the *Guardia Civil* in over 1000 detachments amounts to a fully military occupation of the entire national territory."[26]

As diverse as these developments were, the main point is that they involved a centralization of security structures (policing) within the state, an extension of state power and surveillance throughout a given territory, and a growing distinction between the institutions of internal security and those responsible for external security. While the internal consolidation of policing structures did not involve uniform centralization across states, it did exhibit common movements toward rationalisation and bureaucratisation, and a move away from the informal, local, and ascriptive practices that previously dominated the policing of social life. The differentiation between the institutions of internal security and those oriented toward the external domain then followed. As David Bayley has characterised this distinction: "An army is publicly constituted to use force, just as police are, but its jurisdiction is external to the collectivity. An army uses force to defend a community from threats outside itself; a police force protects against threats from within."[27]

But only as the notion of the national community became more deeply entrenched with the spread of modern nationalism in the 19th century did the boundaries between external and internal start to coincide with formal legal frontiers. And only as the practical and legal reach of the state converged did the distinction between the institutions for guaranteeing internal and external security emerge clearly. Once a certain threshold had been crossed, the domestic use of the institutions of organized violence designed to ensure of external security – the use of the army to break up strikes for example – became regarded as justified only *in extremis*. Human security – understood here as freedom from everyday violence – was provided for by institutions that were politically controlled, and widely (but not universally) legitimate.

Thus achieving this aspect of human security in Europe involved a centralization of security structures (policing) within the state, an extension of state power and surveillance throughout a given territory, and a growing distinction between the institutions of internal security and those responsible for external security.

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[26] Quoted in "The Nation-State, the Law and the Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Europe", p. 153.
[27] "The Police and Political Development in Europe", p. 329.

Although the claim is a bit large, the author believes that a clear link can be made between the rise of the idea that state institutions were accountable to citizens and that the state itself had a responsibility to provide public order and security, with the growing legitimacy of political institutions and the spread of democratic and representative rule.

4.   The Subordination of Armed Forces to Civil Authority

Parallel, and related to this, was the slow subordination of the external instruments of security – the armed forces – to civilian control and oversight. This process goes by many labels: the democratic control of the armed forces, civil-military relations, or as a component part of security sector reform. Whatever the phrase, the struggle to exert civilian or democratic control over the external institutions of organized violence was a slow process that unfolded at different speeds in different states, and had significant implications for how the security of individuals and communities was conceived.

At the outset, the army served as the tool of the prince, and soldiers were mere mercenaries serving the narrow political or strategic interests of nascent state-builders.[28] As Charles Tilly argues, early modern states in Europe were born as war-making machines, and their focus on raising funds to expand and consolidate territory meant that the state elites' relationships with the population were confined to extraction, taxation and predation – not qualitatively different than recently witnessed in contemporary warlord politics in places such as Somalia, Liberia, or Afghanistan.[29] Such predatory armed forces obviously did not promote human security.

The relationship between citizens and the army began to change in the 18th century, in particular with the mass mobilization that characterized the Napoleonic wars. Although these mass armies were like roving bands of locusts that wreaked havoc whenever they passed, their creation had one unintended consequence. The result, as Carl von Clausewitz noted, was that states and state elites that wished to mobilize the masses had to do so not just in the name of *raison d'état*, but in the name of the nation – *la patrie*.[30] This move marked the first step on the long road to the democratic control of armed forces. The importance of such a development for human security in Western – Westphalian – states cannot be underestimated, for without civilian oversight, the belief (and the experience) was that the armed forces, like any other instrument of organized violence, represented a potent reservoir of power that could be used for narrow sectarian interests, to suppress unrest, or even simply to subjugate a population.[31] It also, and not incidentally, consumed a huge proportion of state revenues,

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[28] For an accessible overview see Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[29] See Tilly, *Capital, Coercion and European States*; William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

[30] See Barry Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power", *International Security*, 18:2 (1993), pp. 80-124.

[31] For an example of this in the Middle East, see Keith Krause, "Insecurity and State Formation in the Global Military Order: The Middle Eastern Case", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2:3 (September 1996), pp. 319-354.

revenues that were increasingly raised from forms of taxation that touched directly the population and often imposed a heavy burden.

The different steps in the assertion of civilian control over the institutions of organized violence were not followed strictly in chronological order, but two early issues included parliamentary oversight over the military budget, which was still not fully achieved in most of 19th century Europe, and the struggle against what was conventionally called "militarism."[32] The focus on militarism emerged, in a sort of forerunner of the "democratic peace debate," as the greater democratization of political life raised concerns that a strong influence of military institutions on national policy regarding war and peace led to pernicious results. These results included a tendency to worst case reasoning, an overestimation of potential threats, an exaggeration of the resources needed to confront these threats, and a too-great willingness to resort to the use of force to achieve political ends. All of these issues were raised in the historiographical debate around the "slide to war" in the summer of 1914, and the militaristic influences of the so-called "Prussian" model of civil-military relations.[33]

The link between militarism and human security is relatively easy to grasp in contemporary politics, and formed one plank of the 1994 UNDP formulation, as noted above. Insofar as war and preparations for war could undermine public order and suspend the normal "political rules of the game" – sometimes temporarily, sometimes for much longer periods – human security was negatively affected.

Of course, one does not have to go far back in European history – considering Spain under Generalissimo Franco, or the colonels' regime in Greece (1967-74), or the dictatorship of Salazar in Portugal – to see how the question of civil-military relations was centrally linked to the issue of human security and democracy.[34] In the second half of the 20th century, however, the debate took a more democratic turn, as Ministries of War became Departments of Defence, as parliamentary control was expanded beyond budgetary matters to include oversight of policy, procurement, staffing and other important issues.[35] Even the business of strategy itself – especially nuclear strategy – was increasingly seen as too important to be left to the generals. Historically this is a very striking development: the idea that people with no direct experience of a particular

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[32] Classic studies include Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (New York: Free Press, 1967), and Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[33] Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany* (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1969); Gordon Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1840-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). For a contemporary version of this concerning nuclear deterrence see Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons", *International Security*, 18:4 (Spring 1994), pp. 66-107.

[34] See for example Felipe Agüero, Soldiers, *Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), and for a general study, John Lovell and David Albright, eds., *To Sheathe the Sword: Civil-Military Relations in the Quest for Democracy* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997).

[35] See Wim F. van Eekelen, "Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The National and International Parliamentary Dimension", *Occasional Paper* no. 2, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), October 2002.

phenomenon, war in this case, were the best placed to plan strategies such as nuclear deterrence that implicated the risk of violence at unthinkable levels.

With respect to human security, however, despite the different pathways, dimensions, and chronologies, the move to increase civilian oversight over the institutions of organized violence in all cases revolved around the idea that the risk of war, or the incidence of the use of force, or the amount of financial resources devoted to the armed forces would be diminished through civilian oversight and control, and that these benefits would increase the security of individuals and communities.

5.   The Dynamic between Human and State Security

How can we move from this brief historical sketch to understand the contemporary strength and resonance of the conception of human security focused on "freedom from fear" of organized violence? The first step is to resolve an apparent paradox in human security policies: despite the desire to "put people first" or adopt a "people-centred" approach to security, most of the practical policy measures on the agenda of human security actually involve strengthening the role and resources of the state. Programmes to enhance security sector governance, or to reduce armed violence by stemming the proliferation and misuse of small arms, or to improve the criminal justice system, focus on the national level, and involve strengthening state institutions and working with state authorities. This paradox disappears, however, once one recognizes that the goal of human security – understood as outlined above – is to propagate the norms underpinning the Western liberal state, and where necessary to reshape the relationship between states and their citizens. In a sense, promoting human security is about making states and their rulers keep their side of the basic social contract: states are created (among other things) to provide security – in order that individuals can pursue their lives in peace. States have responsibility not just to provide for welfare, or representation, but – first and foremost – to ensure the security of their citizens. This is arguably the basic compact or contract that led humanity out of the Hobbesian anarchy. In short, promotion of a strong version of human security tends to make the perceived legitimacy (and potentially even sovereignty) of states conditional on how they treat their citizens.

This goes some way also to explaining the opposition of many Southern states to what they see as the interventionist logic of human security; regardless of the fact that in the short-term these same states would benefit directly from, for example, elimination of the scourge of anti-personnel landmines, or reductions in armed violence. Many states, especially in the South, have regarded the concept of human security as a thin justification for a new form of interventionism, as a means of pitting citizens against their states. In this case, human security is part of a broader trend of many advocates and analysts, against the backdrop of the war in Kosovo (1999), the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the collapse of state authority in places such as Somalia, to argue that the international community

could no longer tolerate abuses of human rights on a massive scale, standing by as thousands of lives were placed at risk in the name of the abstract principle of sovereignty or non-intervention.

Within the UN system, this was partly demonstrated by the expanded definition of "threats to international peace and security" that emerged in the mid-1990s as a response to the situation in Somalia (and elsewhere).[36] Whether or not this logic of intervention took the most forceful form of the use of armed force to overthrow a government or coerce it into changing its policy or behaviour, or was expressed through more subtle forms of conditionality and pressure to conform to particular understandings of good governance in the economic, political or social realm, was largely irrelevant. The perception was that a "people-centred" vision of world politics might pit individuals against their states, and seemed to give outsiders a *droit de regard* over the relationship between states and their citizens, expanding the circumstances in which the international community ought to intervene in matters that had hitherto been considered as falling within the essentially domestic jurisdiction of states.

There is thus some truth to the view that the idea of human security promoted, intentionally or inadvertently, an agenda that could give rise to an unfettered right of intervention, at least in the sense that the language of human security has been used to combat the culture of impunity and to strengthen civil society institutions and NGOs. It is also clear that there was a link between the Canadian promotion of human security (under the then Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy) and the creation of the Canadian-sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which published its impressive report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, in 2001.[37] This report was an attempt to rethink the idea of humanitarian intervention within the framework of human security. But it ultimately adopted a cautious approach to the circumstances in which intervention for humanitarian purposes could be considered, and it clearly stated that "Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out."[38] It also went beyond an exclusive focus on the Security Council to note that when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to act, alternative means of fulfilling the responsibility to protect have to be considered, including action under the authority of the General Assembly or regional organizations. Consistent with its focus on human security, the ICISS stated that:

> *If the Security Council fails to discharge its responsibility in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, then it is unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action to meet the gravity and urgency of these situations. If collective organizations will not authorize collective intervention against*

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[36] For interesting recent overviews, see Jeff Holzgrefe and Robert Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), Jennifer Welsh, *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[37] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

[38] *The Responsibility to Protect,* p. 50.

regimes that flout the most elementary norms of legitimate governmental behaviour, then the pressures for intervention by ad hoc coalitions or individual states will surely intensify.[39]

What is important to note though is that such an action would need to be justified publicly as having followed basic rules and principles, and that this justification would have to be accepted by a strong consensus of states. An important part of this justification is a precautionary principle of "right intention": demonstrating that "the primary purpose of the intervention…must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned."[40]

A somewhat stronger point is that one should not be too impressed by what state elites say about human security, because one of the main sources of threat to people's security around the world undoubtedly comes from the state – from corrupt police and judges, from violent and unruly gangs of ex-combatants, from predatory rulers who ignore basic rights and rule of law. As the ICISS put it, the international community may not have a right to intervene, but it should have a responsibility to protect the weak and vulnerable members of any community, especially from the threats of large-scale violence and genocide. Again, seen in a longer historical perspective, this represents the outward projection or globalization of the logic (and ethic) behind the centuries-long struggles that resulted in the emergence of the liberal state in the 19th and 20th centuries.

6.   A Concrete Agenda for Political Action

What remains is to illustrate how the policy agenda of human security has expanded in ways that also implicate the remaking of relations between states and their citizens, in the image of the Westphalian liberal state. This is crucial, since ultimately the influence of such an idea cannot be measured simply by the discourse, but by whether or not it informs, or is linked to, a set of concrete practices that are either new, or that represent a significant departure from previous practices. In the case of human security, there was at least one specific set of political initiatives that emerged in the late 1990s, and that represented a partial departure from existing ways of practicing diplomacy for a number of states. This was the creation of the Human Security Network. It was established in 1999 as a loose grouping of states led by Canada, Norway and Switzerland, and including Chile, Jordan, Austria, Ireland, Mali, Greece, Slovakia, Thailand, South Africa (as an observer), and the Netherlands, who had as a goal pursuing common policies on human security in a variety of international and regional institutions. They meet annually at the Foreign Minister level, and throughout the year to pursue their initiatives in a variety of formal and informal ways, as a forum for the coordination and shaping of the international security agenda.[41] As a result, many

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[39] *The Responsibility to Protect,* p. 55.
[40] *The Responsibility to Protect,* p. xii, 35-36.
[41] See the Network's website at http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org for a good survey of ongoing activities.

of the member states, in particular the three leading states, have also devoted significant financial resources to promoting human security initiatives, often hand-in-hand with non-governmental organizations or with other member states of the Network.

On the practical level, the activities of the HSN gave rise to a concrete agenda for political action on a range of issues such as: eliminating the scourge of anti-personnel landmines, stopping the use of child soldiers, promoting respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and the work of the International Criminal Court, combating proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, enhancing efforts to protect civilians in conflict, working towards reform of the armed forces, the police and criminal justice systems (security sector reform). It is impossible to summarize all of the individual initiatives that have been pursued under this wide-ranging and ambitious agenda. Three examples, however, can be offered to show how the human security agenda evolved from its earliest focus on relatively narrow and self-contained issues, to the taking on board of the some of the policies and programmes that are implied by the "deeper" state-remaking agenda of human security.

The first is the evolution of the issue of anti-personnel landmines. Earliest efforts in the mid-1990s focused on negotiating a ban (or partial ban) within the context of existing arms control and disarmament instruments. By 1996, when these efforts proved fruitless, a coalition of like-minded states and NGOs committed to negotiating a total ban in an *ad hoc* forum, the result being the 1997 Ottawa Treaty (which entered into force in 1999).[42] The initial focus was on banning the *use* (including development, production, transfer, and stockpiling) of anti-personnel landmines. Within a short time, however, attention focused as much on assistance to victims of landmines, and, in the most recent period, on exploring the synergies between mine action (usually meaning practical demining) and broader social and economic development issues. What began as an "arms control" issue evolved into a humanitarian or human security issue, and then continued towards a concern with state capacity and the development needs of affected communities. This logical progression was not really foreseen by anyone, but it did reflect a learning process by which concerned states deepened their engagement with a human security issue.[43]

In a related fashion, one can demonstrate that an early concern among HSN states with the high-profile issue of child soldiers evolved into a wide-ranging agenda for protection of children (and other vulnerable groups) in armed conflict. At the outset, the goal was simply to ban the recruitment of children below a certain age (usually 18) into armed forces, whether regular or irregular. But as advocates and researchers pointed out, this captured only a small percentage – and arguably not

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[42] Two indispensable sources on landmines are: Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998); and Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines", *International Organization*, 52:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 613-644.

[43] For example, the Geneva-based International Centre for Humanitarian Demining launched in 2006 a project to examine "linking mine action and development."

the most important one – of the children profoundly affected by armed conflict. Attention turned then, through a series of Security Council resolutions (Resolutions 1460 and 1539), to the broader issues of protecting the rights of children (especially girls) in conflict situations, and to dealing with such phenomena as the deliberate use of rape as a strategy of war, or the treatment of sexual violence as a war crime.[44]

Perhaps the policy arena in which this linkage is most visible is that of small arms and light weapons, which began, like the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, with a focus on traditional arms control or supply-side measures. These included such things as efforts to increase regulation of international arms brokering, the establishment of a mechanism for the international tracing of illicit weapons, concern over the security of weapons stockpiles, and codes of conduct on small arms transfers. Within a few years, however, the agenda had broadened, however, to focus on post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) efforts, on integrating small arms work into broader development strategies, and on embedding small arms work in broader armed violence prevention and reduction (including demand-reduction) strategies.[45] This was coupled with a growing recognition that the sources of most weapons in conflict or high-crime zones were local, and that reducing the availability or misuse of weapons depended crucially on whether or not individuals and communities felt that their security needs would be met by other means – by state institutions. The link between small arms and violence reduction and security sector reform is also therefore slowly emerging on the international agenda.

7.   Conclusion

Although these sketchy observations and examples do not add up to a comprehensive case that explains the resonance and importance of the concept of human security, they do show how states, NGOs and international organizations, responding in a pragmatic and practical manner to perceived policy challenges of the post-Cold War period, opened the door to a wider agenda that does in fact involve a broad rethinking the meaning of security – for whom, against what, and by what means. The development of the "freedom from fear" agenda was *ad hoc*, and based on the experience of middle-power states working together (and occasionally in partnership with NGOs), in particular on the international campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines. Although the states that came to the human security agenda did so in many cases with their own baggage of policies that they wished to promote, and although political entrepreneurship by states, NGOs and international organizations was a crucial feature shaping the rapid

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[44] See, for example, The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (http://www.child-soldiers.org/); the Children and Armed Conflict Working Group, *The Responsibility to Protect Children: An International Policy Priority*, December 2004, available at:
http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/Responsibility%20to%20Protect%20Children-English.pdf

[45] For overviews of some of these issues see *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); DDR, demand. A focus on the link between "armed violence and development" was also the topic of a Ministerial level meeting sponsored by UNDP and the Swiss government in June 2006. See http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/e/home/foreign/humsec/smallarms.html

development of the practice of human security, it would be a mistake to consider that the crystallization of the concept of human security was a sort of afterthought or that its use as a label to describe policies that states were already pursuing makes the concept itself irrelevant.[46] In fact, most important concepts in international politics (such as sovereignty, diplomacy, international law) emerge *as a result* of changes in state practice, and the recognition that disparate threads of policy and practice constitute a new sort of policy domain, or new form of political practice, that requires a specific label.

The important question to ask therefore is: how does what states are "doing" today depart from conventional understandings of the international security agenda of ten or twenty years ago? Seen in this light, the issues that come under the heading of human security were almost completely absent from the international scene twenty years ago. The use of the concept of human security to unite these disparate strands of thought parallels post-1945 developments, when the concept of *national security* itself crystallized in international discourse and practice, and "at certain moments, unfamiliar phrases suddenly become common articles of political discourse, and the concepts they represent become so embedded in the national consciousness that they seem always to have been with us."[47] Arguably, the concept of human security is entering international discourse in much the same way. Like all concepts of security, its meaning is constructed through the various efforts of institutions and individuals, and in today's world, it is a powerful concept around which practical policies and concrete initiatives have been, and can be, developed and promoted.

Although human security may be an idea whose time has come, this does not make it immune to critical scrutiny. Three main issues can be raised here. Firstly, and as noted above, there is a potential paradox in the promotion of policies that can lead to a strengthening of the state at the same time as the state is diagnosed as the source of much human insecurity. Disarming the weak without controlling the strong, for example, will not enhance human security in the long run. Encouraging good governance with lower military spending may actually, in some cases, leave a state prey to lawlessness and anarchy. Of course, the goal is to contribute to the construction of strong and legitimate states, but the potential dilemmas or unanticipated consequences that human security policies may trigger must be recognized.

Secondly, the fact that much of the conceptualization of human security and the elaboration of concrete policy initiatives has emerged from states, rather than

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[46] For example, Switzerland encouraged its traditional emphasis on IHL as part of the activities of the Human Security Network, Japan folded many of its established development assistance policies under the banner of human security, Austria promoted human rights education as a human security issue, Canada focused on the issue of child soldiers after the landmines treaty was completed, and a host of states (most prominently Switzerland, Canada and Norway) seized the issue of small arms and light weapons proliferation as the logical follow-on to the landmines issue.

[47] Daniel H. Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 195. Yergin was writing about the emergence of the concept of "national security", which he shows was first invoked as a guiding principle for US foreign policy only in 1945, in US Senate hearings on the post-World War II American defence policy and military structure. For the broader evolution of the concept of security, see Ole Waever, "Security: A Conceptual History for International Relations", unpublished paper, 1999.

from civil society, poses a problem. States inevitably face systemic and competitive pressures that lead them to revert to more traditional foreign and security policy stances when they are perceived as getting too far ahead of the broader international community. Within every foreign policy bureaucracy there are traditionalists alongside the policy entrepreneurs and the balance shifts between them, depending on the perceived advantages and disadvantages that either approach gives to the state (or its Minister of Foreign Affairs). This sort of bureaucratic pulling and hauling is not surprising, but it can undermine the commitment to promoting the real concerns of human security. Certainly in Canada and Norway, two of the progenitors of the Human Security Network, traditionalists have at different points reasserted their weight against the enthusiasts for human security.

The third problem relates to the role of civil society and non-state actors in the promotion of human security. In order for freedom from fear to be achieved, individuals have to be empowered to take control of their environment and to become stakeholders in political, economic and social processes that affect them. Yet associating a number of prominent Western scholars or NGOs with the idea of human security, and soliciting their input on a variety of policy questions, is not in itself going to advance this bottom-up process of social change. Obviously, a more inclusive dialogue between states and civil society is desirable, but in the realm of human security, as in so many other realms, the "new multilateralism" does not penetrate deeply, nor is it necessarily the case that non-governmental actors are equal contributors or partners.[48] It is still the case that the people to whom "freedom from fear" matters are mostly passive subjects in the human security discourse.

Ultimately though, promoting an agenda of human security – promoting "freedom from fear" – draws our attention to a number of essential challenges around the world. It goes well beyond the traditional conflict prevention or conflict resolution agenda, and leads us to ask some basic questions about how to make people safe and secure in their daily lives – in their homes and streets, within their communities, and in their regions. It also shines a spotlight on the links between violence and insecurity, and underdevelopment and poverty, and perhaps can help give new direction or energy to some parts of the development community. For political actors and activists, human security is an excellent mobilizing slogan. It gives coherence to a set of policy issues that urgently need to be addressed, including the problems of post-conflict reintegration, the situation of vulnerable groups in conflicts, the role of small arms and light weapons in both war and non-war situations, and the effective and legitimate operation of the institutions that we have built to provide security and safety in the modern state. More than that, it provides an intellectually strong foundation for innovative and focused policy initiatives.

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[48] For a trenchant critique see Alejandro Bendaña, "Politics or Paternalism? The Need for a Social Transformation Framework in Global Campaigns: A View from the South", unpublished paper posted at: http://www.iansa.org/documents/research/res_archive/ngo29.htm#1.

The contemporary promotion of human security is the culmination of the liberal project of building strong, legitimate and representative political institutions. It has its roots in enlightenment ideas of the importance of individual rights and personal freedoms. And if the 20th century can be characterized as the century of the "national security state", perhaps the 21st will unfold under the sign of human security.