

# Palestinian Public PERCEPTIONS

REPORT VIII - June 2005

PALESTINIAN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS - REPORT VIII



  
institut universitaire  
graduate institute  
d'études du développement  
of development studies

Jamil RABAH  
Frédéric LAPEYRE  
Jalal Al HUSSEINI  
Isabelle DANEELS  
Matthias BRUNNER  
Riccardo BOCCO

JUNE 2005

Funded by



# Palestinian Public PERCEPTIONS

REPORT VIII - June 2005

Jamil RABAH  
Frédéric LAPEYRE  
Jalal Al HUSSEINI  
Isabelle DANEELS  
Matthias BRUNNER  
Riccardo BOCCO

Layout & graphic design by: Jack A. Rabah

# Table of Contents

<b>Table of Contents .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Table of Figures .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Forward &amp; Acknowledgments, <i>Riccardo Bocco</i>.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>List of Acronyms .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Objectives &amp; Methodology, <i>Matthias Brunner</i>.....</b>	<b>21</b>
0.1      Objectives .....	21
0.2      Methodology .....	24
0.3      Presentation of the main independent variables.....	24
<b>Chapter 1: Mobility Security, <i>Jalal Al Hussein</i> .....</b>	<b>27</b>
1.1      Security assessment.....	29
1.2      Israeli closure policies and their impact on mobility .....	37
1.3      Conclusion .....	46
<b>Chapter 2: Socio-economic Conditions, <i>Frédéric Lapeyre</i> .....</b>	<b>47</b>
2.1      Poverty: current situation and trends .....	48
2.2      Subjective poverty.....	53
2.3      Income differentiation and social cohesion.....	55
2.4      Poverty and coping strategy .....	56
2.5      Conclusion .....	62
<b>Chapter 3: The Labor Market, <i>Frédéric Lapeyre</i> .....</b>	<b>63</b>
3.1      Employment, underemployment, unemployment and job precariousness.....	64
3.2      Business environment and mobility restrictions .....	69
3.4      Types of occupation and employer.....	73
3.5      Employment and poverty risk .....	75
3.6      Conclusions .....	79
<b>Chapter 4: Needs Infrastructure, <i>Isabelle Daneels</i> .....</b>	<b>81</b>
4.1      Household needs.....	82
4.2      Community needs .....	87
4.3      Availability of services .....	92
4.4      Conclusion .....	98
<b>Chapter 5: Assistance Delivered in General, <i>Isabelle Daneels</i> .....</b>	<b>99</b>
5.1      Individual needs for assistance .....	100
5.2      Assistance distribution.....	104
5.3      Employment assistance.....	119
5.4      Conclusion .....	125

<b>Chapter 6: Food, <i>Jamil Rabah</i></b>	<b>127</b>
6.1    Need for food	128
6.2    Change in household food consumption	130
6.3    The most needed food items in the household	131
6.4    Source of food	132
6.5    Food assistance	134
6.6    Source of food assistance	136
6.7    Frequency of food assistance	138
6.8    Attitude towards food assistance	140
6.9    Value of food assistance	145
6.10   Conclusion	146
<b>Chapter 7: Health &amp; Education, <i>Isabelle Daneels</i></b>	<b>147</b>
7.1    Health and education in general	148
7.2    Health	150
7.3    Education	170
7.4    Conclusion	175
<b>Chapter 8: Women &amp; Children, <i>Isabelle Daneels</i></b>	<b>177</b>
8.1    Impact of the Intifada on women	178
8.2    Impact of the Intifada on children	186
8.3    Conclusion	199
<b>Chapter 9: Refugees &amp; UNRWA, <i>Jalal Al Hussein</i></b>	<b>201</b>
9.1    Demographic profile of the Palestinian refugees	202
9.2    Socio-economic conditions of the refugees: reality and perceptions	204
9.3    Socio-economic assistance and refugee status	210
9.4    Conclusion	217
<b>Chapter 10: Politics Government, <i>Jamil Rabah</i></b>	<b>219</b>
10.1   The situation in general	220
10.2   The political situation	221
10.3   Perceptions about peace	228
10.4   The red lines	232
10.5   Perceptions about reform and corruption in the PA	236
10.6   Attitudes towards the most trusted source of information	239
10.7   Conclusion	243
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>Annex I: Correspondence Table</b>	<b>248</b>
<b>Annex II: English Questionnaire</b>	<b>256</b>
<b>Annex III: Arabic Questionnaire</b>	<b>283</b>



# Table of Figures

## Objectives & Methodology

Figure 0.1	Place of Residence (place).....	25
Figure 0.2	Refugee status (o002).....	25
Figure 0.3	Place of Residence (place) by Refugee Status (o002).....	26
Figure 0.4	Poverty level (poverty3) .....	26

## Chapter 1: Mobility & Security

Figure 1.1	The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to region of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 2004 .....	29
Figure 1.2	The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to area of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 2004 .....	29
Figure 1.4	Reasons for feeling insecure according to place of residence (o119xplace) .....	30
Figure 1.3	Reasons for feeling insecure according to region of residence (0119xo059).....	30
Figure 1.5	Average number of Palestinians killed monthly by 8-9 months period from 29 September 2000 to 31 October 2004 .....	31
Figure 1.6	Average number of Palestinians injured per months/5-6 months periods and per type of injury (September 2000 to October 2004) .....	32
Figure 1.7	Number of Palestinians killed and injured according to locations from March 2004-October 2004 .....	33
Figure 1.8	Distribution of Palestinian Deaths by age (September 29, 2000-30 November 2004) .	34
Figure 1.9	Impact of mobility restrictions on Palestinians (o031), February - November 2004 ....	41
Figure 1.10	Impact of mobility restrictions (o031) according to place of residence (place), February - November 2004. ....	42
Figure 1.11	Possibility to go to work in the past six months (o114), February – November 2004..	42
Figure 1.12	Difficulties in accessing place of work (o114) according to place of residence (place), February - November 2004 .....	43
Figure 1.13	Children late or missed classes due to closures last 6 months (0113b) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004 - November 2004. ....	43
Figure 1.14	Various socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 a-i), February 2004 - November 2004.....	44
Figure 1.15	Selected socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 c,f,i) according to place of residence (place), February 2004 - November 2004. ....	45
Map 1.1	Mobility Restrictions in the West Bank (see below for possible option) .....	38
Map 1.2	Section of the Separation Wall .....	40
Map 1.3	The Wall from north to south.....	40

## Chapter 2: Socio-economic Conditions

Figure 2.1	Evolution of poverty (poverty3), November 2002 -November 2004 .....	48
Figure 2.2	Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	49
Figure 2.3	Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to place of residence (place) .....	50
Figure 2.4	Importance of assistance in household budget (o250) according to place of residence (place).....	50
Figure 2.5	Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to area of residence (o060) .....	51

Figure 2.6	Evolution of household income in the past six months (o108v2), July 2003 - November 2004.....	51
Figure 2.7	First cause if income decreased (o109v2) according to region of residence (o059) and to poverty level (poverty3).....	52
Figure 2.8	Average amount needed by the household to meet basic needs (o041) according to region of residence (o059).....	53
Figure 2.9	Subjective poverty (o041) .....	54
Figure 2.10	Subjective poverty (o041) according to place of residence (place).....	54
Figure 2.11	Perception of household's financial situation (o095), July 2003 – November 2004.....	55
Figure 2.12	Perception of household's financial situation (o095) according to place of residence (place).....	56
Figure 2.13	Perception of household's financial situation (o095) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	56
Figure 2.14	Ability to cope financially (o044) according to place of residence (place) .....	57
Figure 2.15	Ability to cope financially (o044) according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	57
Figure 2.16	Available means to cope with the hardship (o177).....	58
Figure 2.17	Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to place of residence (place).....	58
Figure 2.18	Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	58
Figure 2.19	Main coping strategies (o131), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	59
Figure 2.20	Using past savings (o131b), July 2003 – November 2004 .....	60
Figure 2.21	Not paying the bills (o131g) .....	60
Figure 2.22	Buying on credit (o131j) .....	60
Figure 2.23	Child labor (o131f) according to poverty level (poverty3) and place of residence (place) ..□	60
Figure 2.24	Importance of assistance for households' coping strategy (o250) according to place of residence (place) .....	61
Figure 2.25	Importance of assistance for households' coping strategy ..... (o250) according to poverty level (poverty level).....	61
Table 2.1	Poverty risk 9poverty3) according to the level of education (educ) .....	52
Table 2.2	Poverty (poverty3) according to age group (agec).....	53

## Chapter 3: The Labor Market

Figure 3.1	Distribution of the labor force (o008r), November 2002-November 2004.....	64
Figure 3.2	Distribution of the labor force (o008r) according to place of residence (place).....	65
Figure 3.3	Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2), February 2004-November 2004 .....	65
Figure 3.4	Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2) according to place of residence (place) .....	66
Figure 3.5	Probability of loosing job in the coming year (o244) .....	66
Figure 3.6	Probability of loosing job in the coming year (o244) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	67
Figure 3.7	Change in employment situation in the past 6 months (o012v2) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	67
Figure 3.8	Main cause of change in employment status (o013) according to place of residence (place).....	68
Figure 3.9	Attempts to find a job when unemployed (o014) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	68

Figure 3.10	Extent of job matching training (o245) according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	69
Figure 3.11	Source of information about current employment (o243).....	69
Figure 3.12	Source of information about current employment (o243) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	69
Figure 3.13	Business investment since the beginning of the second Intifada (o162) according to region of residence (o059).....	70
Figure 3.14	Business suffered due to inability to market products (o140a) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 .....	70
Figure 3.15	Business suffered due to difficulties to buy raw material and products (o140b) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 .....	71
Figure 3.16	Various business problems in the agricultural sector related to the separation wall (o164) .....	71
Figure 3.17	Business suffered due to problems to reach the workplace (o140c) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004.....	72
Figure 3.18	Ability to go to work in the past six months (o0114v2) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004 .....	72
Figure 3.19	Ability to cultivate land in the past six months (o0115v2) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004-November 2004 .....	73
Figure 3.20	Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) .....	74
Figure 3.21	Type of employer (o063v2), July 2003-November 2004.....	74
Figure 3.22	Type of employer (o063v2) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	75
Figure 3.23	Poverty risk (poverty3) according to employment status (o008r).....	76
Figure 3.24	Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to age group (agec) .....	76
Figure 3.25	Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to level of education (educ).....	76
Figure 3.26	Poverty risk (poverty3) according to unemployment duration of main household breadwinner (o100).....	77
Figure 3.27	Poverty risk (poverty3) according to workplace (o011) .....	77
Figure 3.28	Poverty risk (poverty3) according to type of employer (o063v3).....	78

## Chapter 4: Needs & Infrastructure

Figure 4.1	The two most important household needs (o079), November 2004 - February 2004...	82
Figure 4.2	The two most important household needs (o079) according to region of residence (o059) .....	83
Figure 4.3	The two most important household needs (o079) according to area of residence (o060) .....	83
Figure 4.4	The two most important household needs (o079) according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	84
Figure 4.5	The two most important household needs (o079) according to educational level (educ) .....	85
Figure 4.6	The first most important household need (o079) according to different variables.....	85
Figure 4.7	The most important unmet household need in general, November 2004 - February 2004.....	86
Figure 4.8	The most important unmet household need according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002).....	86
Figure 4.9	The most important unmet household need according to poverty level (poverty3), educational level (educ) and gender (o061).....	87
Figure 4.10	The two most important needs of your community (o080), in general, November 2004 - February 2004.....	88

Figure 4.11	The two most important needs of your community (o080) according to region of residence (o059).....	88
Figure 4.12	The two most important needs of your community (o080) according to educational level (educ) .....	89
Figure 4.13	The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) in general .....	89
Figure 4.14	The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to refugee status (o002) .....	90
Figure 4.15	The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	90
Figure 4.16	The most important communication facility needed in the community in general (o278).....	90
Figure 4.17	The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to region (o059) and refugee status (o002) .....	91
Figure 4.18	The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to poverty (poverty3) and educational level (educ).....	91
Figure 4.19	Availability of services in general .....	92
Figure 4.20	Household connection to the electricity network (o174) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	92
Figure 4.21	Connection to the water network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060) .....	93
Figure 4.22	Availability of a well (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060), and refugee status (o002) .....	93
Figure 4.23	Household connection to a sewage disposal network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3) .....	94
Figure 4.24	Availability to the household of own latrines, sewer or septic tank (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and educational level (educ) .....	94
Figure 4.25	Availability to the household of solid waste disposal services (o174) according to area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3) .....	95
Figure 4.26	Household connection to a fixed phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	95
Figure 4.27	Household connection to a mobile phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	96
Figure 4.28	Availability of a permanent internet connection to the household (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	96
Figure 4.29	Availability of satellite TV to the household (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	97

## Chapter 5: Assistance Delivered in General

Figure 5.1	Household need for assistance, in general, February 2001-November 2004 .....	100
Figure 5.2	Household need for assistance according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002) .....	101
Figure 5.3	Household need for assistance according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	101
Figure 5.5	Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) according to region of residence (o059).....	102

Figure 5.4	Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251), in general .....	102
Figure 5.6	Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) according to area of residence (o060).....	103
Figure 5.7	Importance of assistance in the household budget since the beginning of the Intifada (o250), in general and according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	103
Figure 5.8	Received assistance in the past six months (o035), in general and according to region of residence (o059), February 2001-November 2004 .....	104
Figure 5.9	Percentage of received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada (o035b) and during the past six months (o035) according to place of residence (place).....	105
Figure 5.10	Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to area of residence (o060), February 2001-November 2004 .....	105
Figure 5.11	Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to poverty level (poverty3), February 2001-November 2004 .....	106
Figure 5.12	Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3), November 2002-November 2004.....	107
Figure 5.13	Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months (o035) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004.....	108
Figure 5.14	The median value of the received assistance (o036), February 2001-November 2004.....	109
Figure 5.15	Median value of the received assistance (o036v1v) according to poverty level (poverty3), November 2001-November 2004 .....	110
Figure 5.16	Type of received assistance (o036), in general, February 2001-November 2004.....	110
Figure 5.17	Received financial assistance (o036fin) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	111
Figure 5.18	Main sources of received assistance (o036t), in general, February 2001-November 2004.....	112
Figure 5.19	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the Palestinian Authority/municipalities (o036tpna) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	113
Figure 5.20	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from UNRWA (o036tunr) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	114
Figure 5.21	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the trade unions (o036ttu) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	114
Figure 5.22	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from NGOs (o036tngo) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	115
Figure 5.23	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from Islamic organizations (o036tisli) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	115
Figure 5.24	Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from international organizations (o036tio) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3).....	116
Figure 5.25	Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037), in general, February 2001-November 2004.....	116
Figure 5.26	Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037) according to poverty level (poverty3), February 2004-November 2004 .....	117
Figure 5.27:	Reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received assistance (o123), in general, February 2004-November 2004, and according to poverty level (poverty3)	118



Figure 5.28	Level of satisfaction with financial (o036fint) and medical assistance (o036medt), in general.....	119
Figure 5.29	Employment assistance received by the household (o026) and personally (o024), in general, November 2002-November 2004.....	120
Figure 5.30	Employment assistance received by the household (o026) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004.....	120
Figure 5.31	Types of household (o026) and personal (o024) assistance, February 2004-November 2004.....	121
Figure 5.32	Types of employment received by the household (o026a, b, c, d), in general, February 2004-November 2004.....	122
Figure 5.33	Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to place of residence (place).....	122
Figure 5.34	Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	123
Figure 5.35	Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), in general, February 2004-November 2004.....	123
Figure 5.36	Level of satisfaction with employment assistance, received personally and/or by other household members (o025), in general, February 2004-november 2004.....	124
Figure 5.37	Reasons behind dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance (o025d), in general, February 2004-November 2004.....	124
Table 5.1	Percentage of the total population who received assistance in the past six months (o035) according to refugee status (o002), November 2001-November 2004.....	107
Table 5.2	Median value of received assistance (o036v1v) according to place of residence (place).....	109
Table 5.3	Received employment assistance (o036emp) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	112

## Chapter 6: Food

Figure 6.1	The two most important needs of the Palestinian households (o079), a comparison between February 2004 and November 2004.....	128
Figure 6.2	Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty (poverty3), educational level (educ), age (agec), and refugee status (o002).....	129
Figure 6.3	Most important unmet need of the Palestinian households (o180).....	129
Figure 6.5	Change in the consumption of various food items in the household (o081), comparison between February 2004 and November 2004.....	130
Figure 6.4	The two most important needs of the community (o080).....	130
Figure 6.6	Change in consumption of dairy products (o081v1a) and meat (o081v1b) according to the poverty level (poverty3).....	131
Figure 6.7	The two most needed food items in the household (o107).....	131
Figure 6.8	Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077).....	132
Figure 6.9	Primary source of food (o077) according to the poverty level (poverty 3).....	132
Figure 6.10	Primary source of food (o077) according to refugee status (o002).....	133
Figure 6.11	Primary source of food (o077) according to area (o060).....	133
Figure 6.12	Main source of food in the household (o077) according to those receiving assistance.....	133
Figure 6.13	Proportion of food assistance compared to the overall assistance provided (o035).....	134
Figure 6.14	Food distribution (o036foo) according to area (o060) and region of residence (o059), a comparison with July 2003.....	134
Figure 6.16	Food distribution (o036foo) according to district.....	135

Figure 6.15	Food distribution (o036foo) according to place of residence (place).....	135
Figure 6.17	Food distribution (o036foo) according to poverty (poverty3), comparison with February 2004 .....	136
Figure 6.19	Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and poverty level (poverty3) .....	136
Figure 6.18	Providers of food assistance (o036foos).....	136
Figure 6.20	Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and refugee status (o002) .....	137
Figure 6.21	Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and area of residence (o060) .....	137
Figure 6.22	Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and region of residence (o059)...	137
Figure 6.23	Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and place of residence (place) ...	138
Figure 6.24	Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) .....	138
Figure 6.25	Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) by source of food assistance (o036foos) ..	139
Figure 6.26	Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to area of residence (o060) .....	139
Figure 6.27	Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to region of residence (o059)....	139
Figure 6.28	Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to the poverty level (poverty3)..	140
Figure 6.29	Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166).....	140
Figure 6.30	Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to region of residence (o059).....	141
Figure 6.31	Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to place of residence (place).....	141
Figure 6.32	Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to poverty level (poverty3).....	142
Figure 6.33	Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution in general (o075) .....	142
Figure 6.34	Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to poverty level (poverty3) and source of food assistance (o036foos).....	143
Figure 6.35	Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot).....	143
Figure 6.36	Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to region of residence (o059) .....	144
Figure 6.37	Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to food assistance provider (o036foos) .....	144
Figure 6.38	Average value and median of food assistance (o036foov) according to place (place), region (o059), area (o060), refugee status (o002), and source of assistance (o036foos) .....	145

## Chapter 7: Health & Education

Figure 7-1	The two most important needs of your household (o079).....	148
Figure 7-2	Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most important need of your household? (o180).....	148
Figure 7-3	The two most important needs of the community (o080) .....	149
Figure 7-4	The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) in general and according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	151
Figure 7-5	The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002).....	151
Figure 7-6	Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) in general and according to age (agec).....	152
Figure 7-7	Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) according to place of residence (place) and poverty level (poverty3).....	152
Figure 7-8	Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) in general and according to age (agec) and poverty level (poverty3).....	153

Figure 7-9	Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place).....	153
Figure 7-10	Frequency of impairment (Q105).....	153
Figure 7-11	Type and reason for impairment in general and for children of 14 years and younger (Q105) .....	154
Figure 7-12	Type of medical care needed in the past six months (o102v2) .....	155
Figure 7-13	Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place).....	155
Figure 7-14	Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) according to refugee status (o002), area of residence (o060) and poverty level (poverty3).....	156
Figure 7-15	Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place).....	157
Figure 7-16	Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) according area of residence (o060) and poverty level (poverty3) .....	157
Figure 7-17	Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102cv2) in general and according to area of residence (o060) and age (agec).....	158
Figure 7-18	Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102iv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) .....	158
Figure 7-19	Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the past six months (o102kv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and age (agec).....	159
Figure 7-20	Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060).....	159
Figure 7-21	Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	159
Figure 7-22	Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the following services in the past six months (o126) .....	160
Figure 7-23	Providers (Q111) of hospital services in the past six months (o126as) in general and according to place of residence (place) .....	161
Figure 7-25	Providers (Q113) of primary health care in the past six months (o126gs) in general and according to place of residence (place) .....	162
Figure 7-24	Level of satisfaction with benefited from primary health care in the past six months (o126g) in general and according to refugee status (o002).....	162
Figure 7-27	Providers (Q115) of specialized care in the past six months (o126is) in general and according to place of residence (place).....	164
Figure 7-26	Level of satisfaction with benefited from specialized care in the past six months (o126i) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and refugee status (o002).....	164
Figure 7-28	Level of satisfaction with benefited from ambulance transportation in the past six months (o126j) in general and according to area of residence (o060) .....	165
Figure 7-29	Providers (Q117) of ambulance transportation (o126js) in general and according to place of residence (place) .....	166
Figure 7-30	Sources of health coverage (o089v2) in general and according to area of residence (o060) (excluding Jerusalem respondents) .....	168
Figure 7-31	Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place).....	168
Figure 7-32	Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to poverty level (poverty3) (excluding Jerusalem).....	170
Figure 7-33	Sources of health coverage (o089v2) for hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem) .....	170
Figure 7-34	Level of satisfaction with benefited from education services in the past six	

	months (o126k) in general and according to region of residence (o059).....	171
Figure 7-35	Providers of education services in the past six months (o126ks) in general and according to place of residence (place) .....	171
Figure 7-37	Educational attainment (educ) according to gender .....	173
Figure 7-38	Educational attainment (Educ) according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place) and area of residence (o060) .....	173
Figure 7-39	Educational attainment (educ) according to place of work (o011v2) of those who are employed and unemployed .....	174
Table 7-1	Please rank in order of importance the 5 main expense types your household income is primarily devoted to (o194 a, b, c, d, e) .....	149
Table 7-2	Effect of the construction of the separation wall on access to education or health (o164f) .....	150
Table 7-3	Level of satisfaction with benefited from hospital services in the past six months (o126a) in general .....	160
Table 7-4	Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to household income level (excluding Jerusalem respondents).....	169
Table 7-5	Educational attainment (Educ) according to poverty level (poverty3) .....	174
Table 7-6	Educational attainment (Educ) and change in the employment situation (o012v2)...	175

## Chapter 8: Women & Children

Figure 8-2	Most important unmet household needs (o180) according to gender (o061).....	178
Figure 8-1	Number of women living in the household .....	178
Figure 8-3	General level of satisfaction with received assistance (o037) by gender (o061) .....	179
Figure 8-4	Reception of personal employment assistance (o024), short-term job assistance (o024b) and unemployment funds (o024c) according to gender (o061) ..	179
Figure 8-5	Most important sources of information (o136v3a) according to gender (o061) .....	180
Figure 8-6	The main breadwinner in the household (o196) according to area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3), educational level (educ), and age (agec).....	181
Figure 8-7	Women domestic and economic work .....	182
Figure 8-8	Occupation (o009) according to gender (o061) .....	182
Figure 8-9	Type of employer (or last type) (o063v2) according to gender (o061) .....	183
Figure 8-10	How did you hear about current employment?, according to gender (o061) .....	183
Figure 8-11	Employment situation (o008v2) according to gender (o061).....	184
Figure 8-12	Main place of work (or last place) (o011v2) according to gender (o061).....	184
Figure 8-13	Job matches technical or academic training (o245) according to gender (o061) .....	184
Figure 8-14	Change in employment situation in the past six months (o012v2) according to gender (o061) .....	185
Figure 8-15	Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender (o061) .....	185
Figure 8-16	Number of children below the age of eighteen living in the household.....	186
Figure 8-17	Number of hours children below the age of 18 are involved in domestic work and in economic activity, in general .....	186
Figure 8-18	Child domestic work.....	187
Figure 8-19	Domestic work of children below the age of 18 according to gender .....	188
Figure 8-20	Child economic work.....	188
Figure 8-21	Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as a coping strategy (o131f) in general, according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), and poverty level (poverty3) .....	189
Figure 8-22	The two most important needs of the children in the household	



	(o105v3a, o105v3b) in general .....	190
Figure 8-23	The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to region of residence (o059).....	191
Figure 8-24	The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to area of residence (o060) .....	191
Figure 8-25	The first most important need (o105v3a), in general and according to region (o059) and area of residence (o060).....	192
Figure 8-26	Children's activities during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086a until o086f), in general .....	192
Figure 8-27	Children playing in the neighborhood during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086a) according to region of residence (o059), poverty level (poverty) and educational level (educ) .....	193
Figure 8-28	Children attending summer camp during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086b) according to region of residence (o059) and educational level (educ) .....	193
Figure 8-29	Children going to clubs during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086c) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	194
Figure 8-30	Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086d) according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	194
Figure 8-31	Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086f) according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ) .....	195
Figure 8-32	Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or late arrivals due to curfews/closures (o113b), in general and according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), area of residence (o060), and poverty level.....	195
Figure 8-33	Children in the household absent from school for more than two weeks since the beginning of the school year for reasons other than illness or Israeli measures (o192), in general and according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060).....	196
Figure 8-34	The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a), in general .....	197
Table 8-1	Main reason for not trying or not trying very hard to find a job (o140) according to gender (o061) .....	185
Table 8-2	Children working during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086e) according to region of residence (o059) .....	194
Table 8-3	Number of meals a day for children in the household (o253), in general .....	197
Table 8-4	The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to region of residence (o059).....	198
Table 8-5	The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to area of residence (o060) .....	198
Table 8-6	The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to refugee status (o002) .....	199

## Chapter 9: Refugees & UNRWA

Figure 9.1	Distribution of refugees (o002) according to region (o059).....	202
Figure 9.2	Percentage of refugees (o002) according to region of residence (o059) .....	203
Figure 9.4	Percentages of refugees (o002) according to place of residence (place) .....	203
Figure 9.3	Distribution of refugees (o002) according to area of residence (o060) .....	203



Figure 9.5	Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 - November 2004 .....	204
Figure 9.6	Poverty status (poverty3) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 .....	205
Figure 9.7	Family income (o057v3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	206
Figure 9.8	Household income close to needs (o041) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	206
Figure 9.9	Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to refugee status (o002), February - November 2004 .....	207
Figure 9.10	Type of employer (o063v2) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	207
Figure 9.11	Household employment assistance, general and specific (o026a, b, c), according to refugee status (o002) .....	208
Figure 9.12	First most important household need (o079av3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	209
Figure 9.13	Most important unmet needs (o180) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	210
Figure 9.14	Assistance received (o035, o037) according to refugee status (o002) .....	211
Figure 9.15	Assistance received (o035) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004 .....	211
Figure 9.16	Assistance according to needs (o038) according to refugee status (o002) .....	212
Figure 9.17	Assistance according to needs (o038) according to place of residence (place) .....	212
Figure 9.18	Most important items received (o036) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	213
Figure 9.19	Source of first and second most important received services (o036) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 - November 2004 .....	214
Figure 9.20	Source of most important received services (o036) according to place of residence (place), February 2004 – November 2004 .....	214
Figure 9.21	Reason for dissatisfaction with assistance in general (o123) according to refugee status (o002) .....	215
Figure 9.22	Camp refugees and municipal elections (o263) according to place of residence (place) .....	216

## Chapter 10: Politics & Government

Figure 10-1	General feeling of security (o118) .....	220
Figure 10-2	The poverty situation (poverty3) .....	221
Figure 10-3	The labor market situation (o008r) .....	221
Figure 10-4	The system of government Palestinians would like Palestine to be modeled after (February 2004) .....	222
Figure 10-5	Factional trust (o133) .....	223
Figure 10-6	Trust in political factions (o133) according to the poverty level (poverty3) .....	223
Figure 10-7	Trust in political factions according to area of residence (o060) .....	224
Figure 10-8	Trust in political factions according to region of residence (o059) .....	224
Figure 10-9	Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada .....	226
Figure 10-10	Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to district and region of residence (O059) .....	226
Figure 10-11	Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) .....	

	according to education (educ).....	227
Figure 10-12	Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to trust in political factions (o133) .....	227
Figure 10-13	Attitudes about a peace settlement with Israel in general (o266) .....	228
Figure 10-14	Attitudes towards a peace settlement (o266) with Israel according to region of residence (o059).....	228
Figure 10-15	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to area of residence (o060).....	229
Figure 10-16	Attitudes towards a peace settlement (o266) with Israel according to district.....	229
Figure 10-17	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to place of residence (place).....	229
Figure 10-18	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to (agec), educational level, gender (o061), and refugee status (o002).....	230
Figure 10-19	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to the poverty level (poverty 3).....	231
Figure 10-20	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to factional trust (o133).....	231
Figure 10-21	Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) .....	232
Figure 10-22	Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to district .....	233
Figure 10-23	Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to place of residence (place) .....	233
Figure 10-24	Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian State in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) by area of residence (o060).....	234
Figure 10-25	Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied (o274) by Israel in 1967 by region (o059) .....	234
Figure 10-26	Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to refugee status (o002) .....	235
Figure 10-27	Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to the poverty level (poverty 3).....	235
Figure 10-28	Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to factional trust (o133).....	236
Figure 10-29	Knowledge about reform (o176v2) and corruption in the Palestinian Authority, in general .....	237
Figure 10-31	Issues Palestinians are more concerned about: comparison between Feb 2004 and Oct 2004 (o178v2, o178v2a) .....	238
Figure 10-30	The level of bribe-offering to Palestinian officials: differences between reality and perceptions in general (o259).....	238
Figure 10-32	Most trusted source of information to the Palestinian public (o136v3a) .....	239
Figure 10-33	Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the poverty level (poverty 3).....	241
Table 10-1	Trust in political factions according to the employment situation .....	224
Table 10-2	Trust in political factions according to governorate .....	225



Table 10-3	Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to household income .....	231
Table 10-4	Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the educational level (educ) .....	240
Table 10-5	Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the faction most trusted □	242

# *Forward & Acknowledgments*

This study is the eighth report carried out by the Palestine Research Unit<sup>1</sup> (PRU) of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED, University of Geneva) since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000. It focuses on the impact of local and international aid on the living conditions of the civilian population in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt). The period under scrutiny in this report covers the six months prior to late October 2004.

These reports have been funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), who have been supporting the reports since their inception, and by several UN Agencies (UNDP, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, OCHA), in addition to OXFAM-UK and Panorama, a Palestinian NGO based in Ramallah.

The aim of these reports and studies is to provide the various UN agencies, international and local organizations, and the Palestinian Authority with timely and reliable information relevant to their work with the purpose of helping them better understand the views and concerns of the Palestinian public on issues pertaining to assistance, impact, and needs.

During the preparation of the questionnaire, the team discussed the content of the questions with different stakeholders. The scope of the questionnaire remained as the previous ones with some additional questions and modifications emanating from the deliberations and discussions with the stakeholders.

The questionnaire upon which this report was based, (see Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the Arabic version) was then drafted by the team members and reviewed once again by a number of stakeholders who pointed out the issues that they felt pertinent in drawing up an objective assessment of the living conditions and needs of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

We are particularly indebted to a number of people whose contributions and assistance have been, as usual, of primary importance. Special thanks is due to Mr. Fritz Froehlich (Deputy Director of the SDC, Gaza and West Bank Office), Mr. Andrea Tamagnini (Deputy Representative of UNDP, Jerusalem), Mr. Sufian Mushasha (UNDP, Jerusalem), Ms. Rohini Kohli (UNDP, Jerusalem), Mr. Lionel Brisson (Director of Operations, UNRWA Headquarters), Mr. Sam Rose (UNRWA Headquarters), Dr. Elena Mancusi (Program Officer, UNRWA, West Bank Field Office), Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot (Head of the World Food Program, Jerusalem), Mr. Rudi Luchmann (UNICEF, Jerusalem), Mr. David Shearer (Head of OCHA, Jerusalem), Dr. Ambrogio Manenti (Director of WHO, Jerusalem), Dr. Riad Malki (Director, Panorama), and Mr. Yousef Muheisen (WHO, Jerusalem).

The IUED subcontracted the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) for conducting the survey in late October 2004. More than 60 fieldworkers interviewed 1,498 people under the supervision of Ms. Manal Warrad.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Palestine Research Unit of the IUED is presently composed of eight members: Prof. Riccardo Bocco, political sociologist and team leader; Mr. Matthias Brunner, political scientist, lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Geneva; Dr. Isabelle Daneels, political scientist and researcher at the IUED; Mr. Luigi De Martino, programme officer, PRU-IUED; Dr. Jalal al-Husseini, political scientist, researcher at the IUED and associate researcher at the IFPO, Amman (Jordan); Prof. Frederic Lapeyre, economist, Institute of Development Studies of the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium); Mrs. Elisabeth Nyffenegger, communication and administrative officer, PRU-IUED; Mr. Jamil Rabah, political scientist and poll expert, researcher at the IUED.



The team work was conducted between Ramallah, Jerusalem, Amman, Brussels, and Geneva. We are particularly grateful to JMCC's Palestinian fieldworkers, coders, and data-entry personnel, whose dedication and work under difficult and sometimes stressful conditions, made this study possible. We are grateful to our colleague Dr. Isabelle Daneels for her relentless work in editing the entire manuscript. In Geneva, special thanks are due to the students of the Political Science Department at the University of Geneva who helped a lot on data checking: Ms. Claire Balbo, Mr. Mattias Buess, Mr. Benjamin Firmenich, and Ms. Evelyne Reusser. Special thanks are also due to Mr. Jack Rabah and Mr. Hanna Rabah who worked tirelessly in Ramallah helping in data analysis, presentation, and layout. Finally, we are very thankful to Mr. Ala Salih for allowing us to enrich the report with his pictures.

The data for this report were collected by the JMCC, but the data cleaning, weighting and interpretation of the results are the sole responsibility of the authors of this report.

Riccardo BOCCO  
on behalf of the team

Geneva, June 2005

# *List of Acronyms*

<b>ARIJ</b>	Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem
<b>EGP</b>	Employment Generation Programs
<b>FATEH</b>	(Arabic acronym for) Palestine Liberation Movement
<b>GS</b>	The Gaza Strip
<b>GSRC</b>	Gaza Strip refugee camps
<b>HAMAS</b>	(Arabic acronym for) Islamic Resistance Movement
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defense Forces
<b>ILO</b>	International Labor Organization
<b>IO</b>	International Organizations
<b>IUED</b>	(French acronym for) Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva
<b>JMCC</b>	Jerusalem Media and Communications Center
<b>MIFTAH</b>	Palestinian Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy
<b>MOPIC</b>	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, PNA
<b>NIS</b>	New Israeli Shekel
<b>OAPT</b>	Occupied and Autonomous Palestinian Territories
<b>OCHA</b>	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>oPt</b>	Occupied Palestinian Territory
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority
<b>PCBS</b>	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
<b>PECDAR</b>	Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
<b>PFLP</b>	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
<b>PNA</b>	Palestinian National Authority
<b>PLC</b>	Palestinian Legislative Council
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organization
<b>PRCS</b>	Palestine Red Crescent Society
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNRWA</b>	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East
<b>UNSCO</b>	United Nations Special Coordinator's Office in Palestine
<b>UNWFP</b>	United Nations World Food Program
<b>WB</b>	The West Bank
<b>WBRC</b>	West Bank refugee camps
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

# Objectives & Methodology

Matthias Brunner

The main objective of this study is to provide government officials, donors and civil society representatives with tools for monitoring the situation and the assistance in Palestine. It relies on polls that measure Palestinians' perceptions about the situation and its evolution, the assistance received, its impact and their satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals and organizations involved in assistance in Palestine.

In this part of the report, we will briefly describe the objectives of the study, the methodology used and a short description of our independent variables will be provided.

## 1 Objectives

Since January 2001, eight relevant polls were conducted<sup>1</sup>. The fact that most questions remained the same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of monitoring information. Whenever possible and meaningful, the analysis in each chapter will refer to this evolution. For the purpose of our analysis, we standardized the results of seven of these eight polls to allow precise monitoring of the evolution of answers over time<sup>2</sup>.

The results of this standardization can be found on <http://www.dartmonitor.org> or <http://www.unige.ch/iued/palestine> where the interested reader can find all the relevant information, from question wording to distribution frequencies as well as bivariate analysis with our list of independent variables. For this reason, no table of frequencies is included with this report.

Because of data standardization, it is not possible to use question numbers to designate the variables used for the analysis. In the present report, the variables are referred to in the format **o###** where **###** is the number of the variable. To find the name of the variable that is related to a particular question, the interested reader can use the correspondence table that is presented in Annex I just before the questionnaire.

The questionnaire for the study (see Annex II and III) was elaborated in order to offer data on Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that correspond to the nine parts of the report.

In the outline below, we present these nine chapters and give the list of relevant variables for each of them.

---

<sup>1</sup> Representative polls of the Palestinian population living in the oPT were conducted in January, June and November 2001, in April and November 2002, July 2003 as well as March and October 2004.

<sup>2</sup> In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army's reoccupation of the Autonomous Palestinian Territories. However, due to the difficult conditions, the data were collected by phone on a sample that is not totally random (see Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this poll - covering only the West Bank - were not standardized with the other polls.

## Chapter 1 Mobility and security conditions

The general situation in terms of mobility and security conditions is presented in the first part.

Variables: **o031, o113, o114, o115, o116, o118, o140, o164, o195.**

## Chapter 2 Socio-Economic Conditions

A portrait of the socio-economic conditions is given in the second part of the report. It helps the reader in assessing change in the evolution of the perceptions on poverty and of Palestinians' strategies for sustaining the hardship and coping with the situation.

Variables: **poverty3, o040, o057, o095, o108, o109, o131, o156, o162, o163, o177, o194, o248.**

## Chapter 3 Labor Market

The labor market and the employment status (including the place of work, occupation and the effects of the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.

Variables: **o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o017, o019, o063, o100, o157, o196, o197, o198, o199, o200, o201, o202, o204, o205, o206, o207, o208, o243, o244, o245, o246.**

## Chapter 4 Needs and Infrastructure

Part 4 is a new chapter in report no8. It covers both the perceptions of the Palestinians on the territories' infrastructure and of general services as well as an assessment of the needs and priorities for assistance they express.

Variables: **o079, o080, o124, o174, o175, o254, o255, o278.**

## Chapter 5 Assistance Delivered in General

An overview of the assistance delivered according to type, value and source with emphasis on employment generation programs is offered in Part 4.

Variables: **o024, o025, o026, o035, o036, o037, o038, o123, o180, o250, o251, o252.**

## Chapter 6 Food

All the questions in Part 6 pertain to food. They cover perceived effectiveness of food distribution, type and source of food assistance provided, changes in food consumption patterns and types of food required.

Variables: **o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o131, o166, o173, o181.**

## Chapter 7 Health and Education

Additional questions relate to health and education. They concern assistance received, priorities, access to basic services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of Part 7.

Variables: [educ](#), [o056](#), [o091](#), [o126](#), [o168](#), [o169](#), [o186](#), [o187](#), [o188](#), [o190](#).

## Chapter 8 Women and Children

Other questions in Part 8 concern Women and Children. The effect of the Intifada on children, parents' responses, psychological support, children's work and women's contribution to the household's income are investigated in this part.

Variables: [o061](#), [o086](#), [o105](#), [o187](#), [o192](#), [o193](#), [o219](#), [o220](#), [o221](#), [o222](#), [o223](#), [o224](#), [o225](#), [o226](#), [o227](#), [o228](#), [o229](#), [o230](#), [o231](#), [o232](#), [o233](#), [o234](#), [o253](#).

## Chapter 9 Refugees and UNRWA

An assessment of UNRWA's strategies during the past months, the type of assistance provided by the UN Agency (in particular food aid, employment generation and financial assistance), the patterns of aid distribution and its effectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its beneficiaries are the content of Part 9.

Variables: [o002](#), [o263](#), [o264](#), [o265](#).

## Chapter 10 Politics and Government

The last chapter of the report addresses issues related to politics and government such as the faction or leader Palestinians feel closest to, support for the PA and its executive as well as issues pertaining to the media.

Variables: [o133](#), [o134](#), [o136](#), [o176](#), [o178](#), [o256](#), [o257](#), [o258](#), [o259](#), [o260](#), [o261](#), [o262](#).

The sampling and data collection was done by JMCC in the same way as for the previous polls (Bocco, Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah 2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Al Hussein, Lapeyre and Rabah 2003). There was an over-sampling of refugee camps by 179 cases in the West Bank and 99 cases in the Gaza Strip.

A representative sample of 1,498 Palestinians aged 18 and over, was interviewed face-to-face in late October 2004. The unweighted cases in the West Bank were 800 (762 after weighting) Palestinians, 540 (542 after weighting) in the Gaza Strip and 158 (194 after weighting) in East Jerusalem.



## 2 Methodology

Although each part of this report has its own logic of analysis, all the questions of the poll that were analyzed in this report were tested in their relationship with eight important independent variables. They are presented in the adjacent box.

Results were systematically tested for statistical significance at a 95% confidence level<sup>3</sup>.

On the <http://www.dartmonitor.org> web site, the interested reader will find the bivariate analysis between the dependent and the independent variables with their level of statistical significance and the detailed number of cases. For this reason, the numbers of cases (N) and significance levels have been omitted in this report.

Finally, whenever possible, consideration was given to data of our previous polls to analyze the evolution of the situation since the beginning of the second Intifada. The reader will also find the frequencies and analysis for the previous polls on the web site.

## 3 Presentation of the main independent variables

Palestinian society is rather unique because refugees constitute up to 50% of its population. The territory is split between areas that are not geographically contiguous, and this separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip renders coordination and economic cooperation very difficult. This situation enforces a set of legal and socio-economic structures that are not homogenous. The split between the two areas and the forced detachment of Jerusalem from them further complicates efforts at obtaining a uniform system that is essential and a prerequisite for developing a viable and efficient economic, social, and political system. In addition to the damaging consequences of the occupation, other social and internal barriers such as a very large population growth rate (around 6%) and a large number of

### Independent Variables

#### Region of residence (o059):

West Bank  
Jerusalem  
Gaza Strip

#### Area of residence (o060):

City  
Village  
Refugee camp

#### Place of residence (place):

West Bank refugee camps  
West Bank outside camps  
Gaza Strip refugee camps  
Gaza Strip outside camps  
East Jerusalem

#### Poverty (poverty3):

Hardship cases  
Those below the poverty line  
Those above the poverty line.

#### Refugee Status (o02):

Refugees  
Non-refugees

#### Education (educ):

Low  
Medium  
High

#### Age category (agec):

18 – 24 years  
25 – 34 years  
35 – 49 years  
50 years or more

#### Gender (o061):

Male  
Female

#### Wall (wall):

Directly affected by the wall  
Not directly affected by the wall


<sup>3</sup> For categorical or ordinal dependent variables we used Chi-square tests, for interval variables one-way analysis of variance.

dependent children (almost 50% are below the age of fifteen) supplement the political difficulties that characterize and influence the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The use of nine explanatory variables for analysis in this report is intended to reflect the specificities of the Palestinian population.


The Palestinians in the OPT are divided in three different areas: the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Place of residence, as shown in Figure 0.1, summarizes these different geographical areas and divides the Gaza Strip and the West Bank according to refugee camps. Of the entire data, 63% of the respondents are from the West Bank and Jerusalem and 37% are from the Gaza Strip.

Figure 0.1 Place of Residence (place)



According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), more than two million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and more than one million in the Gaza Strip. Refugees constitute approximately one third of the West Bank population and over 60% of the population in the Gaza Strip. The number of refugees residing in camps is estimated at approximately half a million of which about 130,000 live in 19 refugee camps in the West Bank, and about 370,000 reside in eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.

Figure 0.2 Refugee status (o002)



As shown in Figure 0.2, of all respondents, 43% said that they are refugees or descendants of refugees; 57% stated that they are neither refugees nor descendants of a refugee family.

Throughout Palestine, the majority of refugees (registered and unregistered) live in the Gaza Strip (55%, see Figure 0.3). On the other hand, more than two-thirds (68%) of non refugees live in the West Bank.

While 33% of all refugees live in camps, less than 1% of non-refugees do. One non refugee respondent out of ten lives in Jerusalem; for refugees, this proportion is one out of six .


According to *area of residence*, a bit more than one half of our sample (51%, N=756) live in cities, 17% (N=258) in refugee camps and 32% in villages (N=484).

In the November 2001 report, we introduced the *poverty* variable to highlight the economic situation of the Palestinian households. Since November 2002, this variable not only takes into account the reported income of the respondent's household but also the number of adults and children in the household.

In the present report, we use the third revision of the poverty variable. It is based on the reported household income (o057) but takes into account the number of adults (adults) and children (children) in the household. In November 2002, according to the PCBS figures, the average Palestinian household of two adults and four children was considered to be *below poverty line* if its income was lower than NIS 1,600. If it was lower than NIS 500, they were considered to be *hardship cases*. Since the PCBS published a new poverty line


at NIS 1,760 at the beginning of 2003 and at NIS 1,800 in 2004 we adjusted to this evolution: For the eighth report, we consider the standard household to be below poverty line if its income is less than NIS 1800;

**Figure 0.3 Place of Residence (place) by Refugee Status (o002)**



for the sixth and seventh at 1,760 while for the 2002 and 2001 reports, the figures remained unchanged<sup>4</sup> in the third and fourth revision.

**Figure 0.4 Poverty level (poverty3)**



The evolution of poverty in the OPT can be seen in Figure 0.4. While the percentage of those below the poverty line remained almost perfectly stable from 2001 to 2004, the percentage of hardship cases increased in November 2002, then decreased back to its previous level in July 2003, increased very slightly in February 2004 and decreased by the end of 2004.

Education and gender will be analyzed respectively in parts 7 and 8. We won't go into much detail about them for this brief methodological introduction.

<sup>4</sup> It must be noted though that, for November 2001, we only recently calculated the value of poverty adjusted by household size. This is why it was not mentioned in that previous report.

# Chapter

# 1



# Mobility & Security

*Jalal Al Hussein*



## Introduction

The period under scrutiny, from early March to late October 2004, was marked by the “preventive” assassination of two Hamas top leaders, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and Abdel-Aziz Rantissi, on 22 March and 17 April 2004, respectively. This period also saw Israel launch its largest-scale military operations in the oPt since 2002. Conducted under the “fight against terrorism” banner, these operations hit several Gazan refugee camps, notably in Nusseirat and Bureij (in March), Rafah (in May) and Jabaliya (in October), resulting in the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians. During the same period, and despite the intense security measures adopted by the Israeli authorities, Palestinian militants affiliated to Islamist factions and to the Al-Aqsa Brigades, managed to carry out a few attacks in Israel, causing the death of several dozens of Israeli civilians.

This deterioration of the relations between Israelis and Palestinians was paralleled by internecine feuds among various Palestinian security forces and political factions. Fueled by the release of Sharon’s disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip in March 2005, these feuds—including armed clashes, assassination attempts, and kidnapping of PA officials - have further weakened the already crippled Palestinian Authority. The degradation of the internal security situation in the oPt was highlighted when, for the first time ever, foreign voluntary workers working on behalf of the Palestinians in several locations of the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank city of Nablus were temporarily kidnapped in July 2004. The feeling of chaos emerging from the oPt was pointedly reported by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (Terje Roed-Larsen), who referred to a “steadily emerging chaos in Palestinian areas, lawlessness and gang rule are becoming common”. (Terje Roed Larsen, 2004)

Despite those internal and external pressures, the PA managed to preserve its very existence: monthly salaries to the PA personnel continued to be paid, and its health and educational systems continued to function relatively smoothly. Furthermore, the above-mentioned internal disturbances in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have not (yet) led to the collapse of the socio-political structure of the oPt; a phenomenon that observers have ascribed to the emergence of local formal and informal institutions, such as municipal and kinship-based networks, that have acted as a stabilizing forces. (ICG, 2004: 5-7)

The inhabitants of the oPt have continued to suffer from the closure policy Israel has imposed on them since the start of the Intifada in September 2000, mainly in the form of a network of roadblocks, ditches, fences, military checkpoints and curfews. Aside from these restrictions within the oPt, Israel deprived the Palestinians from free access to its territory, which economy used to absorb a significant of them prior to the Intifada. The neighboring Arab countries, namely Jordan and Egypt, have also drastically restricted the immigration of Palestinians, lest Israel takes advantage of the uprising to expel them permanently from the OPT.

Finally, affecting both the Palestinians’ freedom of movement and directly undermining their economy as a whole, the construction of the “Separation Wall” started by the Israelis in the West Bank in June 2002 has continued to expand, despite its condemnation by the International Court of Justice in July 2004.

Using data drawn from the survey carried out for this report and complementary secondary sources, this chapter will be devoted to the impact of such developments on the Palestinian population in the oPt, both in terms of facts on the ground and of perceptions.

The first section of the chapter deals with security issues. It analyzes the feeling of security/insecurity among the Palestinians in the oPt during the period under scrutiny and looks into the causes of such feelings, including occurrences of casualties and incurred damage to public and private property.

The second section studies Israel’s closure policy, including the construction of the Separation Wall, in terms of the impact it has had on the mobility, access to services and business performance of the Palestinians.




## 1.1 Security assessment

### 1.1.1 Feeling secure/insecure


The continuous degradation of the security situation in the oPt during the period under scrutiny is illustrated by the higher percentage of Palestinians feeling insecure, from 76% in February 2004 to 82% in late October 2004. This surge in the feeling of insecurity was far more marked in the Gaza Strip, where most Israeli military incursions occurred, than in the other regions surveyed. For the first time, the Gazans even became more concerned with regard to their security than the West Bankers and the Jerusalemites. These results are portrayed in figure 1.1, below.

**Figure 1.1. The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to region of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 2004**



Taking a closer geographical look, one finds that the feeling of insecurity has become more prevalent in the camps than in the cities or villages, with a percentage of camp respondents sharing this feeling jumping by a margin of 16% between March 2004 and November 2004. The breakdown of results according to place of residence shows that this jump is mainly due to the desperate security situation in the Gaza camps, where the percentage of residents feeling insecure grew from 72% to 92%, while it also grew, but in a less dramatic way, in the West Bank camps from 85% to 92% during the same period of time.<sup>1</sup>

**Figure 1.2. The feeling of insecurity (o118) according to area of residence, July 2003-February 2004-November 2004**




<sup>1</sup> Feeling of insecurity is also a matter of socio-economic status. Our surveys shows that those respondents whose income posits them as "poor" (below the poverty line: 1,800 NIS) or as "hardship cases" (i.e. 900 NIS) do feel more insecure (77% and 79%, respectively) than those whose income posits them as non-poor (73%).

<sup>2</sup> See introduction of the chapter. According to a leading Fatah member, the PA security forces in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank were running the services as if they were private fiefdoms. (Abu Toameh, K., October 20,


How do Palestinians account for this feeling of insecurity? A priori, three main factors, particularly applicable to the security situation in the Gaza Strip during the period under survey, were likely to be brought up by the respondents. One factor is related to internal disorders within the Palestinian society, due mainly to internecine fighting among different armed factions (PA various security forces, armed militias affiliated to political factions, etc.) and to increased criminality due to the collapse of the PA security network.<sup>2</sup> Another factor is of a socio-economic nature and has to do with the lack of positive signs for improvement of current living conditions. However, as is indicated in the following figure, in all three regions, including Jerusalem, the leading insecurity factor remained the occurrence of Israeli military incursions in the oPt.

Fear of Israeli incursions remained the main cause for insecurity feelings, whatever the area of residence (village, city, refugee camp) or the place of residence (inside/outside camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and in Jerusalem). One may notice that, although most military incursions perpetrated by the Israeli military took place in Gaza's refugee camps, economic insecurity, i.e. negative socio-economic expectations, is much more prevalent there than in other place or residence in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. One may also see that internal security problems are not, comparatively speaking, a significant factor for insecurity, except in the Jerusalem region where Palestinians are less subject to Israeli incursion and to economic chaos than in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 1.3. Reasons for feeling insecure according to region of residence (o119xo059)**



**Figure 1.4. Reasons for feeling insecure according to place of residence (o119xplace)**



The following sub-chapters will mainly focus on the Palestinians' main reason for feeling insecure: i.e. the Israeli policies in the oPt and their impact in terms of casualties, destruction of infrastructure and property.


## 1.1.2 Casualties

### 1.1.2.1. General Figures

The number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces during the period under scrutiny was at 694 (86 deaths per month), with peaks during Israel's military assaults in the Gaza Strip, namely in March (92 killed), in May (128 killed), in September (111 killed) and in October (142 killed). This per-month figure is significantly higher than the figures obtained during previous periods under scrutiny: On average, 64 were killed per month during the January-July 2003 period and 42 were killed between August 2003 and February 2004.<sup>3</sup> (Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS a) 2004)

Overall, the March-October 2004 period was among the deadliest since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000.<sup>4</sup> As shown in the following figure:

**Figure 1.5. Average number of Palestinians killed monthly by 8-9 months period from 29 September 2000 to 31 October 2004**




Source: [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org)

The violent turn taken by the Intifada during the period under consideration is also illustrated by the rise in the number of Palestinians that sustained injuries. The number rose to 3145, i.e. an average of 393 per month, which is significantly more than during previous periods, when the per-month average usually remained below 300 per month. (PRCS (a), November 2004) In addition, illustrating an ever-increasing trend toward the militarization of the conflict, this augmentation of the numbers of injuries stems chiefly from an increase in the number of occurrences of bomb and shrapnel and live ammunition injuries.

<sup>3</sup> According to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), during the same period, 12 Israeli civilians and 27 Israeli security forces personnel were killed by Palestinians in the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem). (B'Tselem, December 2004)

<sup>4</sup> Only the months of March and April 2002, when the Israelis re-occupied most West Bank cities causing the death of 234 and 245 Palestinians, respectively, were deadlier.

Figure 1.6. Average number of Palestinians injured per months/5-6 months periods and per type of injury (September 2000 to October 2004)<sup>5</sup>



Source: [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org)

As noticed in previous reports, the major causes of injuries during the March-October 2004 are related to the use by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) of miscellaneous war devices such as bomb fragments and shrapnel (1236 occurrences, i.e. 39.3% of total injuries), and live ammunition (966 occurrences, i.e. 31%). In contrast, 10% and 18% of injuries were caused by rubber bullets and tear gas, respectively.<sup>6</sup> (PRCS (a), November 2004)

Estimates of the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000 vary according to the source of information consulted. According to the Palestine Red Crescent Society, - which takes into account indirect Intifada-related causes of death and injuries such as prevention or delay of medical treatment, and heart attacks following clashes -, **3,417** Palestinians died between 29 September 2,000 until 31 October 2004, while 28,113 were injured during the same period of time. (PRCS (c), November 2004) Conversely, the estimates provided by Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem), which refer only to casualties directly incurred during Israeli military actions, are lower: **2,998** Palestinian killed for the same period of time.<sup>7</sup> (B'Tselem (b), November 2004)

#### 1.1.2.2. Profile of casualties

##### Location


Most Palestinians killed and injured were residents of the Gaza Strip, where respectively over 76% and 59% of the Palestinians were killed and injured. (PRCS (b), November 2004) In the West Bank, Nablus and Hebron were the worst hit locations during the period under scrutiny. This information is overviewed in figure 1.7, below.

<sup>5</sup> The number of injured Palestinians in the first two months of the Intifada was far higher than average, reaching 5,984 in October 2000 and 3,838 in November 2000. However, most of these injuries were then caused by non-military means: 72% of the injuries in late September-early October 2000 and 67% of them in November 2000 were caused by rubber/plastic bullets and tear gas. (PCRS a)

<sup>6</sup> According to the Palestine Monitor, most injured people (44%) had wounds all over their body, 21% were hit at the head and neck, 15% at the chest, 5% at the abdomen, and less than 1% at the lower limb. For 15% of the injured people, the location of the wound could not be specified. (Palestine Monitor, December 2004)

<sup>7</sup> According to B'Tselem, 210 Israeli civilians and 211 Israeli security personnel were killed by Palestinians in the September 2000-October 2004 period in the oPt (including East Jerusalem). (B'Tselem, December 2004)

Figure 1.7. Number of Palestinians killed and injured according to locations from March 2004-October 2004



Source: [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org)

Roughly speaking, these location-related figures reflect the general trend since the outbreak of the Intifada. Overall, **Gaza** communities have emerged as the worst hit with 1,639 people killed and 9,957 people injured during the September 2000-October 2004 period, followed by **Nablus**, with 496 killed and 2,991 injured during the same period of time. However, due to the heavy military actions the Israeli army undertook in **Jenin** and **Ramallah** during its “Defensive Shield” campaign in March-April 2002, the number of casualties in these two cities is on average higher than in Hebron. In Jenin, 313 people were killed and 2,236 were injured, and 240 were killed and 5,030 were injured in Ramallah, whereas in **Hebron**, 230 people were killed and 2,737 were injured. (PRCS (c), November 2004)

#### Involvement of casualties in suspected “terrorist activities”

According to B’Tselem, at least 181 Palestinians were executed extra-judicially by Israel, either by the Israeli Air Force or by ground forces, on account of their involvement in “terrorist activities” against Israeli targets. In the course of these assassinations, 106 additional Palestinians were killed, 29 of them being underage. (B’Tselem (a), December 2004)

Overall, more than half of the Palestinians killed were not involved in military hostilities when they were killed (at least 1,661 of 3,040 by late November 2004). (B’Tselem (a), December 2004) Among them are the women killed during Israeli attacks. According the PRCS, 176 women were killed within the framework of the Intifada, 24 of them during the March-October 2004 period under scrutiny in this report.<sup>8</sup> (PRCS (d), December 2004) Another “innocent victim category” is composed of the children. Their case is discussed in the following sub-section.

#### Age

During the period under scrutiny, 135 Palestinians below the age of 18 were killed. This represents 19.5% of the total number of Palestinians killed during the same period. Of these 135 underage Palestinians, 26 were younger than 12 years old. Reflecting a more general trend, the number of underage casualties amongst the young in May (30 killed), September (22 killed) and October (24 killed) are amongst the highest obtained since the outbreak of the Intifada. Only the two first months of the uprising (October and November 2000) were deadlier with respectively 33 and 37 underage Palestinians killed. (PCRS (d), December 2004)

<sup>8</sup> The Palestine Monitor indicates that 209 women and girls (the latter not included in its account of women killed by the PRCS) were killed in the September 2000-September 2004 period. (Palestine Monitor, December 2004)




According to the PRCS, most of the Palestinians killed within the context of the Intifada belong to the 19-25 age category and about a quarter of them were still in school. (PCRS (d), December 2004)

Palestinian and international stakeholders have condemned the brutality of the Israeli raids in the Gaza Strip, especially with regard to their disproportionate use of force and indiscriminate targeting against civilians, arguing that such tactics betrayed a lack of respect for fundamental human rights principles.<sup>10</sup> They also pointed out that the children were bearing the brunt of Israeli military activities. (Defence for Children International/Palestine Section, 5 October 2004; Amnesty International, 5 October 2004; UN Children's Fund, 6 October 2004)

Voicing deep concern over the deteriorating security situation in the Gaza Strip in general, several human rights institutions, backed by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (Terje Roed-Larsen), also condemned Israel's breach of international law and called on it to respect international conventions, and more particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention and the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. (UN News Service, 26 October 2004; Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2004; International Federation for Human Rights, 12 October 2004) Other humanitarian agencies continued to call for effective international intervention on behalf of the civilian population. (Oxfam, 8 October 2004)

**Figure 1.8. Distribution of Palestinian Deaths by age (September 29, 2000-30 November 2004)<sup>9</sup>**



Source:

[www.palestinercs.org/graphs/agedistribution2.jpg](http://www.palestinercs.org/graphs/agedistribution2.jpg)

### 1.1.2 Damage to private and public property

This sub-section examines damage to Palestinian property caused by the Israeli military's major incursions in the oPt, including damage caused by the erection of the Wall in western regions of the West Bank.

#### 1.1.2.1 Damage to homes

Although destruction of property in the oPt occurred throughout the period under survey, most destructions took place during the two massive military incursions undertaken by the Israeli military in the Gaza Strip: in Rafah (southern Gaza) in May 2004 ("Operation Rainbow") and October 2004; and in Jabalia (northern Gaza Strip) during the "Days of penitence" operation in October 2004.

"Operation Rainbow", which aimed both at widening the buffer zone between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (along the "Philadelphi Route") and to prevent the construction of illegal tunnels allegedly used by Palestinian militants to smuggle arms from Egypt, led to the destruction or partial damage of more than 200 buildings, housing about 418 families (about 3,800 individuals) in the Rafah area.<sup>11</sup> (European Commission, 11 August

<sup>9</sup> The figures displayed by B'Tselem are slightly different. For instance, according to B'tselem 587 underage Palestinians were killed (B'Tselem (a), December 2004), versus 777 according to the PRCS.

<sup>10</sup> A case in point is the Israeli military's use of tanks and helicopters to fire on non-violent demonstrators in the southern Gaza Strip in May 2004, which resulted in eight of these demonstrators being killed and dozens injured. (Human Rights Watch, 20 May 2004)

<sup>11</sup> During "Operation Rainbow" itself (18-24 May 2004), a total of 167 buildings, housing 379 families (3,451 individuals) were destroyed in Rafah.

2004; UNRWA, 26 May 2004) UNRWA and other international bodies have condemned these destructions as disproportionate “collective punishment” contrary to international law regulations (the Fourth Geneva Convention more specifically) and have urged Israel to respect the UN Security Council Resolution 1544 of 19 May 2004 that expressed grave concern at the demolitions of homes. (AFP, 14 May 2004; UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 May 2004; International Federation for Human Rights, 12 October 2004) Rafah saw more house destruction take place later in the year, for instance in August when six houses were destroyed and in mid-October 2004 when another thirty houses destroyed. (Human Rights Watch, 18 October 2004) In the southern part of the Gaza Strip, the Khan Younis camp was severely hit in July 2004 when the Israeli troops invaded it, totally destroying 30 houses where 44 families (about 250 people) lived and partially damaging 10 other houses. (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 8 July 2004)

In late September 2004, the Israeli army launched the military operation “Days of Penitence” in Northern Gaza around the Jabalia camp, the Izbet Hanoun and the Beit Lahia areas in an attempt to prevent the firing of Palestinian rockets into the Israeli town of Sderot.<sup>12</sup> This incursion led to the destruction of 91 homes housing 143 families, namely about 675 Palestinians. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)

From January to October 2004, house demolitions rates across the Gaza Strip have reached peaks turning on average 1,360 Gazans (mainly refugees) per month, or 45 each day, into homeless people. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004) Overall, since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, the Israeli military have demolished in the Gaza Strip over 2,500 homes housing over 16,000 Palestinians. Two-thirds of these destructions, i.e. 1,500 houses, occurred in the Rafah camp area alone.<sup>13</sup> (Human Rights Watch, 18 October 2004) According to Palestinian sources, the total number of houses demolished and damaged across the oPt since the start of the Intifada reaches respectively 6,250 and 58,000. (Jerusalem Times, 8 December 2004)

Re-housing efforts by institutions involved, starting with UNRWA and the PA, have failed to keep pace with the rhythms of the destructions. Funding is a crucial problem in this regard, re-housing costs being estimated at about 20,000 dollars per family. As far as UNRWA is concerned, the Agency had as of May 2004 managed to find new housing for only 1,000 people in the Gaza Strip. (AFP, 14 May 2004) UNRWA's unfunded shortfall for re-housing the eligible refugees category alone is estimated at over 35 million dollars, whereas the total sum required for re-housing all homeless in June 2004 was estimated at approximately 45 million dollars. (AFP, 24 June 2004)

“Routine” destruction of houses conducted by the Israeli authorities in pursuance of their occupation policies is chronicled in Arij Monthly Reports on Israeli Colonization Activities. ([www.arije.org](http://www.arije.org))

#### 1.1.2.2. Damage to public installations and to physical infrastructure

Israeli military incursions continued to damage the oPt's public installations during the period under scrutiny: Public premises including factories, commercial properties, PA security compounds, mosques, and even governmental and UNRWA schools were hit by Israeli shelling or by bulldozers. During the operation “Days of Penitence” for example, 19 public and commercial premises were destroyed and a further 16 buildings were damaged, including five UNRWA schools, one governmental school and a private kindergarten. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)

Damage to roads, water and sewage systems, as well as to electrical lines in areas targeted for incursions by the Israeli army has incurred heavy reconstruction costs. Total damage to physical infrastructure for the sole operation “Days of Penitence” was estimated at 355,000 dollars. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)

<sup>12</sup> Palestinian rockets fired into Sderot have killed at least four Israeli citizens in months that preceded operation “Days of Penitence” in late September 2004. (UNRWA, 20 October 2004)

<sup>13</sup> The figures displayed by the PA are much higher.

In the West Bank, the Israeli “pro-settlement” policy continued to create various types of infrastructural damage including, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of August 2004, the demolition by the Israeli army of three 600 year-old archeological buildings in Hebron in order to enable the Israeli authorities to continue the construction of a road between the Ibraheemi mosque and the Kyriat Arba Israeli settlement. (Palestinemonitor, 10 August 2004) Other “routine” destruction of public places in the West Bank is chronicled in Arij Monthly Reports on Israeli Colonization Activities. ([www.arije.org](http://www.arije.org))

#### 1.1.2.3 Destruction of agricultural land and property

In the Gaza Strip, operation “Rainbow” and operation “Days of Penitence” in May and October 2004 as well as smaller scale offensives led by the Israeli military against the northern areas of the Gaza Strip on 28 June 2004 (Beit Hanoun) and on 11 September (Jabaliya, Beit Lahiya, etc.) have also caused the leveling and razing of large swathes of agricultural land, including olive groves, citrus trees, and the destruction of water sources, irrigation systems and property, thus contributing to deeply undermine Palestinian livelihoods and prevent any kind of short-term socio-economic rehabilitation. Over 1,100 dunums (110 hectares) of agricultural land and 30 greenhouses were destroyed during operation “Days of Penitence” and at least 1,400 dunums (140 hectares) were destroyed during the offensive in Beit Hanoun. Since the beginning of the Intifada, this locality has lost more than half of all arable land and most of its irrigation systems need to be rehabilitated. (UN Commission on Human Rights, 28 May 2004; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 8 July 2004; UNRWA, 20 October 2004; Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, 31 August 2004) Large-scale military operations and other “routine” destruction of agricultural land in the Gaza Strip resulted during the three last months of the period under survey (August-October) in the confiscation of 1,073 dunums (107 hectares) and the destruction of 15,105 olive trees. Such destructions are chronicled in Arij Monthly Reports on Israeli Colonization Activities. ([www.arije.org](http://www.arije.org))

In the West Bank, Israeli settlement policy led to further confiscation and damage to agricultural land. More destruction and dispossession of Palestinian land is expected in the West Bank, as the Israeli Government approved the construction of 600 new homes there in August 2004. Around 245,000 settlers already live in the West Bank. (AFP, 2 August 2004) However, it is the continuous construction of the “Separation Wall” within the West Bank territory that continues to cause major concern among the Palestinians and the international community. Despite two landmark rulings in the summer of 2004 denying at different levels the Israeli undertaking<sup>14</sup>, new sections of it were constructed in the northern Jerusalem area and in the Hebron region in September 2004, thereby causing the razing of significant pieces of land. As of July 2004, some 13,230 dunums (1,323 hectares) of land had already been cleared or damaged due to the Separation Wall construction. (OCHA a, 30 July 2004)

In the last three months of the period under survey, 2,271 dunums (227 hectares) of land were confiscated by the Israeli authorities, mostly in the Hebron Region in August 2004 for the Separation Wall and the expansion of existing settlements such as the Qiryat Arba colony to the east of the city of Hebron. In addition, vast areas of arable land were damaged and about 11,200 olive trees were uprooted during this period of time, also at the hand of Israeli settlers. (see details of destruction in: [www.arije.org](http://www.arije.org)) The Israeli army and Jewish settlers also regularly prevented Palestinian farmers from getting access to their lands, especially in the olive harvest season around October. (Palestine Monitor, 12 October 2004)

---

<sup>14</sup> On the 30 June 2004, a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the re-routing of parts of the Separation Wall for 18 miles northwest of Jerusalem. This stretch of the Wall would have separated 35,000 Palestinians from their crops. This ruling followed and preceded a number of temporary injunctions prohibiting construction of certain sections of the Wall: on 28 June, in al-Ram (between Jerusalem and Ramallah); on 1 July in Nu'man (Southeast of Jerusalem); on 11 July in Deir Ballut, Rafat, A-Zawiya (Salfit District). On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice stated that the construction of the Wall constitutes a breach of international humanitarian law and should be dismantled.

In various localities, the Israeli army and/or the settlers also hindered the provision of water. In the Hebron area for instance, poisoning of water cisterns – probably by the members of the Ma'on settlement south east of Hebron – was signaled in mid-July; in the Bethlehem region, Israeli soldiers prevented in early August the Palestinian municipality of Janata from installing water pipes aimed at providing drinking water to one of its neighborhoods; and later that month, Halmish Jewish settlers repeatedly tried to stop the supply of water to Bani Zeid al-Gharbiyeh (near Jericho) by closing the valve on several occasions. (Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, 3 August 2004; 31 August 2004) More generally, the destruction and lack of maintenance of the water infrastructure systems have led to a degradation of the quality of the water supplies and in some case to their contamination.

Despite these developments, and maybe due to a break in the construction of the Separation Wall between June and September 2004 and its re-routing according to a line closer to the 1967 border (see above), damage inflicted to agricultural land seems to have impacted business to a lesser extent than was the case in the 7<sup>th</sup> Perceptions report. Indeed, whereas in the November 2004 survey, 27% of the respondents ascribed business losses to damage done to their agricultural land, this was still the case for 36% of the respondents in the February 2004 survey. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 48)

Bowing to pressure of the international community, the Israeli authorities have approved in late November 2004 the disbursement of 1 billion NIS to improve the living conditions of the Palestinian communities living in the vicinity of the Separation Wall through the rehabilitation and expansion of physical infrastructure, such as paving of roads, building of underground passages between separated villages, and setting up of agricultural advancements. (Maariv International, 30 November 2004) However, it is doubtful whether these adjustments will be sufficient to mend the agricultural, physical and social damage caused by the construction of the Separation Wall so far and, more broadly, to reverse its undermining impact on the building of a viable Palestinian state in the oPt.

## 1.2 Israeli closure policies and their impact on mobility

### 1.2.1. Overview of the closure policies

As already emphasized in the previous Perceptions reports, Israel's closure policies in the oPt have aimed at restricting the Palestinians' mobility for alleged security reasons through a series of internal and external closure measures including roadblocks, military checkpoints, curfews, and closure of the entry points to Israel. These measures, as well as the construction of the Separation Wall in the West Bank, are believed to be one of the main factors behind the socio-economic crisis prevailing in the oPt. Restrictions on mobility have disrupted businesses, commerce, access to work and routine social exchange, and have fragmented the oPt landscape, thus severing vital economic ties between rural and urban centers. They have also led to the deterioration of social services, including health and education. (World Bank, October 2004 (a); WFP, 10 March 2004; UN Children's Fund, 3 October 2004)

#### 1.2.1.1. Internal closure

Internal closure measures take the form of a network of about 700 military checkpoints of various types (fixed or moving, manned or unmanned) and the imposition of curfews. The following map illustrates this network.



Map 1.1. Mobility Restrictions in the West Bank (see below for possible option)



Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem [www.arij.org](http://www.arij.org)

The relative relaxing of the internal closure policy announced in the 7<sup>th</sup> Perceptions report (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 42-43) was short-lived. The period under scrutiny witnessed a re-activation of the few roadblocks that had been de-activated in late 2003. Curfews, the most severe form of closure, were also re-imposed by the Israeli military whenever it carried out military operations, but their use was less frequent than before. Curfews were mostly used in the Gaza Strip (May, June and October), but were also occasionally imposed in the West Bank. In early September for instance, an Israeli military curfew was in force in several villages in the Jenin area as troops were conducting a massive search operation for wanted Palestinian militants. Completing the closure system, a discriminatory West Bank road regime has been informally established by the Israeli authorities, restricting Palestinian travel on forty-one roads crossing the West Bank, totaling more than 700 kilometers of roadway through a total or limited ban, or only accessible through special permits.<sup>15</sup> (B'tselem (c), 9 August 2004)

Mobility restrictions have also undermined the work of the various humanitarian service providers such as UN agencies, NGOs, the PRCS and the PA Ministry of Health. All of those agencies have experienced problems providing assistance to beneficiaries. In the sole month of September 2004, PRCS and UNRWA ambulance operators reported a total of 54 access incidents in which the provision of first aid and/or medical evacuations were hindered by the Israeli army, including 11 humanitarian access denials and 34

<sup>15</sup> The rules and regulations that constitute this regime for years have never been issued in writing.

delay incidents in excess of the 30 minutes; furthermore, nine incidents were reported in which crews came under IDF attack. (OCHA, September 2004:2,3; PCRS (e), 14 September 2004.) Obstructions against UNRWA, the largest international humanitarian agency operating in the oPt, affected its services as a whole that also comprise regular health, educational, relief and social services. In September 2004, the Agency reported 47 incidents in which its employees encountered problems at Israeli military checkpoints. In these incidents, 360 staff members were affected and UNRWA lost more than 623 working hours. (OCHA, September 2004: 2, 3)

More specifically, in Gaza, year 2004 has been the worst year by far since the start of the *intifada* for the movement of both personnel and commodities. Heightened security measures at the Karni commercial checkpoint forced the Agency to suspend its emergency food distribution program on two occasions. The most recent round of emergency distributions, due to begin on 10 June 2004, did not start until the beginning of October, affecting around 600,000 persons - almost two-thirds of the refugee population. In the West Bank, incidents of denied and delayed access continue to affect Agency operations. In September 2004 alone, 1,228 duty hours were lost due to access problems.<sup>16</sup> (UNRWA, 2005: 9).

UNRWA's top management was also affected by closure measures. In an unprecedented development, on 1 September 2004, Israel barred the Agency's Commissioner-General from leaving the Gaza Strip to perform his duties in the West Bank; a step that was condemned by UNRWA as a failure by Israel – a signatory of the Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations - to live up to its obligations under international law. (UN News Service, 1 September 2004)

On 5 October 2004, twelve UN agencies operating in the Gaza Strip, including UNRWA, formally voiced their concern over the degradation of the humanitarian situation prevailing in this region and called on Israel to facilitate humanitarian operations through unrestricted and secure access of personnel and relief supplies into the Gaza Strip and free movement within it, and to respect its obligations under international law. (OCHA, 5 October 2004) Throughout the period under scrutiny, local and international NGOs such as Medecins du Monde (MdM), Médecin sans Frontières (MSF) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) also criticized Israel for restricting access to the wounded in the Gaza Strip. (PHR, 18 May 2004; AFP, 4 October 2004; MSF, 9 October 2004)

#### 1.2.1.2. External closure

As the World Bank clearly put it, easing internal closure may well elicit some economic growth in the oPt, but it would not be sufficient to spur economic activity to reduce unemployment and poverty. Ending the current socio-economic crisis in the oPt depends chiefly on the opening of these territories' external borders, which does not only entail a rise of the number of Palestinians employed in the Israeli economy to pre-Intifada levels (i.e. 140,000 in 2000 instead of 57'000 in 2003); it also means opening PA borders to foreign trade and enable its private sector to trade in international markets.<sup>17</sup> According to the Bank's scenario, by 2006 exports would spur job creation and this would both reduce unemployment from a current 34% to 23%, and the number of Palestinians with a monthly household income below the poverty line from a current 56% to 46%. In the longer run, priority should also focus on establishing sound educational and birth control policies. (World Bank, October 2004 (a): xi; World Bank, October 2004 (b), 34-38)

Opening the oPt's external borders also concerns the passage of Palestinians to the neighboring Arab countries, starting with Egypt and Jordan. Israel's frequent closure of the Rafah Terminal (southern border of the Gaza Strip), the only access point for 1.4 million Gazans to the rest of the world, and alleged harassment of young Palestinians (between 16 and 35) by the Shin Bet, Israel's internal intelligence

<sup>16</sup> These difficulties in the West Bank were compounded by the staff strike in the autumn of 2004.

<sup>17</sup> According to the World Bank's projections, the mere removal of internal closure would only reduce the percentage of people living below the poverty line by 1%. Raising the number of Palestinians employed in Israel to pre-Intifada levels would reduce that percentage by 3%. (World Bank, October 2004 (b): 36-37)




apparatus, at the Terminal have exemplified the hardships faced by Palestinians when leaving or re-entering the oPt. About 3,000 people, including children, elderly and persons in ill health have been stranded on both sides of the Terminal in the summer-autumn of 2004. They have received relief assistance by such humanitarian bodies as the Red Cross. (IFRC, 4 August 2004; ICRC, 2 August 2004)

Restriction of the Palestinians' external mobility has also been imposed by the above-mentioned Arab neighboring countries. In order to prevent a Palestinian exodus from the oPt, these countries have since September 2000 imposed immigration restrictions on the Palestinians (see Palestinian Public Perceptions VI and VII, chapters 1), the removal of which may well also contribute to improve the Palestinians' living conditions.

Map 1.2. Section of the Separation Wall

### 1.2.1.3. The Separation Wall

In the previous Perceptions report, the main characteristics of the Separation Wall were outlined.<sup>18</sup> A barrier composed of a series of concrete walls, barbed wire, electrified fencing, control towers and trenches, the Wall was about 205 km long in November 2004. (OCHA b, November 2004; Palestinian Public Perceptions, VII, August 2004: 48-50) Allegedly aimed at temporarily securing Israel and the Jewish settlements against Palestinian attacks, the Wall has been officially criticized by a wide range of actors including Palestinian and international bodies (see footnote 14) for disrupting the lives of the Palestinians residing in its vicinity, and for grabbing chunks of the West Bank territory in order to impose definitive borders with the future Palestinian state.



Map 1.3. The Wall from north to south

After a temporary halt in the construction of the Wall following the 30 June 2004 Israeli Supreme Court and the 9 July International Court of Justice rulings that questioned both the Wall's route and its very existence, the Israeli authorities resumed the construction in the Jerusalem and Hebron regions. In November 2004, 72 kilometers of the Wall were under construction. (OCHA b, November 2004) However, the Wall is now expected to follow a route closer to the 1967 border line so as to encroach less on Palestinian territory.

So far, about one-third of the Israeli undertaking with regard to the Wall has been achieved. Ultimately, according to B'tselem, the Wall is expected to measure 600km-700 km and affect the lives of about 875,000 West Bankers (38% of the total population) living in the areas crossed by the Wall, whether they live to the west of the Wall annexed de facto to Israel or whether they live to the east of it in terms of access



<sup>18</sup> The construction of the Separation Wall started in June 2002.

to relatives, to farmlands and jobs, and to educational and health facilities. (B'tselem (d), 1.11.04)


In the previous Perceptions report, we had depicted the West Bankers directly affected by the Wall as an emerging specific underprivileged segment of the oPt community, one comparatively more affected by problems of mobility and socio-economic difficulties than the rest of the population. (Palestinian Public Perceptions, August 2004: 22) One of the aims of the survey conducted for this report is to see whether or not Israel's commitment to redefine the Wall's route closer to the 1967 border has somewhat cushioned its adverse socio-economic impacts (see below 1.2.2.3.).

## 1.2.2 Palestinians' perceptions of mobility status

### 1.2.2.1 Mobility in general


Despite the lack of progress in allaying Israeli closure policy during the period under scrutiny, the oPt population at large did not express more concern about their mobility status in general (which includes such criteria as access to work, schools, and relatives) than previously. All in all, a large percentage of Palestinians continued to face either stiff or slight mobility problems, but the level of Palestinians affected remained relatively stable at 88% in November versus 90% in February 2004.

Figure 1.9. Impact of mobility restrictions on Palestinians (o031), February - November 2004



However, this apparent status quo situation does not account for significant trends that occurred at regional/area levels. The results show that whereas mobility problems remained the highest in the West Bank, with 92% of respondents saying they had experienced a lot or a few problems, it somewhat improved since February, when 95% of the respondents stated that they faced such problems. Conversely, the situation somewhat worsened in Jerusalem, probably on account of increased mobility restrictions (including the wall in construction there) with a larger percentage of Jerusalemites experiencing some kind of mobility problem, from 81% in February 2004 to 91% in November 2004. In the Gaza Strip also, the percentage of people affected by mobility restrictions receded region-wide from 85% to 80%, but severe problems persisted in the refugee camps where the percentage of respondents attesting to a lot of problems with regard to mobility increased by 16% (from 48% to 64%), an evolution due mainly to the relentless Israeli incursions in these places of residence during the period under scrutiny.


**Figure 1.10. Impact of mobility restrictions (o031) according to place of residence (place), February - November 2004.**



#### 1.2.2.2 Socio-economic impact of internal mobility restrictions


The respondents were much more assertive when it came to the negative impact of mobility restrictions during the period under scrutiny on their socio-economic status. Indeed, the percentage of those Palestinians who found it difficult, very difficult or almost impossible to work in the past six months rose by a 12% margin, from 47% in February to 59% in November 2004.

**Figure 1.11. Possibility to go to work in the past six months (o114), February – November 2004.**



The worsening access to the place of work can be noticed in all regions but, in line with the findings on overall mobility outlined above, it was far more prevalent in (east) Jerusalem, where 59% of the respondents stated having faced problems in accessing their place of work in November 2004 versus 24% in February 2004 (i.e. +35%), than in the West Bank (from 55% to 60%, i.e. +5%) and in the Gaza Strip (from 41% to 58%, i.e. +17%) during the same period. As indicated in the figure 1.12, below, in the two latter regions the worsening trend was particularly marked for camp residents.


Figure 1.12. Difficulties in accessing place of work (o114) according to place of residence (place), February - November 2004



The heavier strain on access to work places impacted directly on the Palestinians' employment status. Indeed, among those respondents having experienced a change in their employment situation, inability to reach the place of work was referred to by 59% of them as the main cause of this change, largely ahead of work-related problems (employer no longer able to pay salary, bankruptcy, etc.). In the previous Perceptions survey, mobility restrictions were also referred to by a majority of respondents as a factor behind employment changes, but to a lesser extent (51%). (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 48) In the same vein, this survey also highlighted increased impact of mobility restrictions on business losses. Inability to reach the place of work, which was already referred to as the main factor behind business problems by half of the respondents in the previous February 2004 survey (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 48), was mentioned by 55% of the respondents in November 2004 (0140 c, e).<sup>19</sup>

One important social impact of mobility restrictions concerns children's access to schools. The results show that in general, the situation in November remained stable compared to that in February 2004, when 29% of the population had declared that their children had arrived late at school or missed classes due to closures in the past six months. Unlike the general oPt picture, however, the results indicate that while the situation in this regard improved in the West Bank and Jerusalem, it has greatly deteriorated in the Gaza Strip, surely due to the frequent military incursions in this region.<sup>20</sup>

Figure 1.13. Children late or missed classes due to closures last 6 months (0113b) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004 - November 2004.



<sup>19</sup> Conversely, curfews saw their impact on business decrease from 35% to 29%. The socio-economic impact of closure will be analyzed in more detail in Part Two (Socio-economic conditions) and Part Nine (Refugees and UNRWA) of this report.


<sup>20</sup> The issue of children and education will be analyzed in more detail in Part Eight of this report.

In the Gaza Strip, children residing in the camps – the Israeli incursions' main targets - were the worst hit as the percentage of them arriving late or missing classes jumped from 18% in February 2004 to 44% (+26%) in November 2004. During the same period, the percentage of Gazan school children living outside camps affected by mobility restrictions rose by 17%, from 10% to 27%.

### 1.2.2.3 Impact of the Separation Wall on mobility


A majority (54%) of the inhabitants of Jerusalem and the West Bank admitted being directly affected by the Separation Wall. However, the results of the survey indicate that, in general, the negative socio-economic impact of the construction of the Wall has diminished significantly since February 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice rulings (see above and footnote 14). It may also be explained by an increasing number of Palestinians adapting to the existence of the Wall, notably through coping strategies and new social and economic behaviors that take into account the existence of the Wall.

Figure 1.14 Various socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 a-i), February 2004 - November 2004.



However, these rather positive developments are at variance with the specific situation experienced by the inhabitants of the Jerusalem region, where the Wall is currently being extended. On several accounts, except for such factors as separation from relatives or from land and forced migration, this survey has found Jerusalemites worse-off than eight months ago. To a lesser extent, this also applies to the inhabitants of the West Bank camps in such fields as access to job and to basic services and increased prices for material and transport.

**Figure 1.15 Selected socio-economic impacts of the Separation Wall (o194 c,f,i) according to place of residence (place), February 2004 - November 2004.**





### 1.3 Conclusion

- The period under scrutiny was one of the deadliest since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000. The Gaza region, that witnessed several large-scale military incursions in May and October 2004, was the worst hit. For the first time, the level of insecurity there overtook that in the West Bank and in Jerusalem.
- Fear of Israeli incursions remained the main cause for insecurity feelings, well ahead of economic uncertainties and internal security problems, whatever the region of residence (West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza), the area of residence (village, city, refugee camp) or the place of residence (inside/outside camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and Jerusalem).
- Continuous Israeli military incursions and the pursuance of Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and the Jerusalem region, including the construction of the Separation Wall, have resulted in the destruction of agricultural land in all parts of the oPt. However, the survey conducted for this report indicates that the impact of those destructions on business has decreased from February to November 2004. This may be due to re-routing of the Separation Wall according to a line closer to the 1967 borders following several rulings by the Israeli High Court of Justice in June 2004.
- The Israeli closure policy has continued to affect the lives of the Palestinians, in the West Bank particularly, where over 90% of respondents were affected. In terms of trend, however, the inhabitants of Jerusalem and of the Gaza refugee camps have seen their mobility status deteriorate since February 2004.
- While access to schools and to relatives somehow improved, access to place of work deteriorated during the period under survey, for the inhabitants of Jerusalem and of the Gaza refugee camps more particularly. Also, problems in accessing the place of work have had more negative impact on the job status and on business than in the February 2004 survey.
- Although the Wall has continued to be an object of main concern for the majority of the oPt population, the results show that, except for the inhabitants of Jerusalem (and for those of the West Bank refugee camps to a lesser extent), the negative socio-economic impact of the construction of the Wall has diminished significantly since February 2004. This may be explained by the re-routing of the Wall and increased passage opportunities through it following the Israeli High Court rulings in June 2004 and to an increasing number of Palestinians adapting to the existence of the Wall.

# *Chapter*

# 2



## **Socio-economic Conditions**

*Frédéric Lapeyre*

## Introduction

The Israeli military strategy toward the oPt has deeply compromised Palestinian household welfare in the long run as many families have endured long periods without income generating activities. The transitory characteristic of mass poverty which is clearly associated to politics must be considered more and more as permanent as it has lasted now for over four years since the beginning of the second Intifada. Palestinian households had to cope with this situation by spending their savings, selling assets, borrowing money and making debt or changing their consumption pattern regarding both quantity and quality. The poorest have now exhausted their savings and are very vulnerable to malnutrition, while the economic vulnerability of the Palestinian society as a whole has greatly increased and many households are dependent on the humanitarian assistance mechanism to secure their livelihood.


This chapter will provide a socio-economic profile of the Palestinians from the oPt aiming at analyzing the main trends regarding the evolution of poverty, understanding the factors determining the evolution of household's income, identifying vulnerable groups, providing some information on social cohesion and finally assessing main coping strategies and the remaining means to cope with the hardship of the poorest.

### 2.1 Poverty: current situation and trends

The oPt continues to face a critical situation of mass poverty with an overall poverty rate of 55%. Since the poverty rate has remained at almost the same level as it stood in February 2004, there is no sign of improvement. Figure 2.1, below, shows that the rate of extreme poverty remains also very high at 22% which underlines the present level of harsh material deprivation in the oPt. Since the Israeli imposed paralysis of the Palestinian economy – through internal and external closure - is the main cause of the major socio-economic crisis faced by the Palestinian population in the oPt, it is clear that there will be no improvement of their material situation until a clear change occurs in Israeli politics towards removing its mobility restriction measures.


The estimates in the Palestinian Perceptions reports of the percentage of the population living in poverty or extreme poverty highlight the socio-economic impact of over four years of Intifada that have caused a dramatic decline in living standards of the Palestinians in the oPt - at the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, the World Bank estimated the poverty rate to be 21%. (World Bank, 2004: 15) Various other estimates have been made to evaluate and monitor poverty and whatever is the exact poverty rate, there is a large consensus to stress such a high rate. The latest World Bank estimates pointed to a poverty rate ranging between 38% and 51% and a subsistence poverty rate (identifying those individuals whose consumption is below subsistence level) of 16% for 2003. (World Bank, 2004: 11) The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) for the period July-September 2004 gave a higher estimate as it reported an overall poverty rate of 64% and a poverty rate of 53% in the West Bank and 83% in the Gaza Strip. (PCBS, 2004: 8)

Figure 2.1: Evolution of poverty (poverty3), November 2002 – November 2004



However, poverty rates significantly differ from one place to another and a more detailed poverty analysis shows that individuals living in the Gaza Strip are far more likely to be poor (71% are poor) than those living in the West Bank (55% are poor) or Jerusalem (15% are poor). The region of residence has also a great impact on the depth of poverty as 31% of the individuals living in the Gaza Strip are extremely poor as compared to 21% in the West Bank and 15% in Jerusalem. From a dynamic perspective, figure 2.2, below, shows that the poverty rate barely changed in the different regions between February and November 2004. However, the distribution of the poor below the poverty line has changed as extreme poverty has increased in the West Bank from 18% to 21%, whereas it has decreased from 35% to 31% in the Gaza Strip. As will be discussed below, this trend is the result of the evolution of the situation in the refugee camps in both regions. Another important result is the sharp increase in the rate of extreme poverty in Jerusalem where it reached 6% as compared to 2% in February 2004. This negative trend is new as in the previous surveys extreme poverty was almost insignificant in Jerusalem. It is very likely the consequence of the continuation of the building of the wall around East Jerusalem which has a great negative impact on the living and working conditions of the Palestinians from Jerusalem.

**Figure 2.2: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004 – November 2004**




Another very important variable to assess the poverty risk of the individuals is not only their region of residence but also their place of residence, and more specifically whether they live in refugee camps or not. Within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the incidence of extreme poverty is higher in the refugee camps than outside. Extreme poverty rates in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank refugee camps were respectively 33% and 29% as compared to 30% and 16% outside refugee camps. From a dynamic perspective, figure 2.3 shows that the poverty gap according to the place of residence in the Gaza Strip has dropped as a consequence of the sharp decrease of extreme poverty in the refugee camps.

This is an interesting result as one of the striking findings of the February 2004 poll was the sharp deterioration of the material situation of the Gaza Strip refugee camps' residents, with an increased rate of extreme poverty from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. The main cause of this evolution was the repeated incursions of the Israeli military forces into the Gaza Strip and the following mobility restriction, destruction of civilian property and socio-economic infrastructures.


Since February 2004, Israeli military forces have escalated attacks against Palestinian civilians and properties in the Gaza Strip and they have continued to close most border crossings of the Gaza Strip as it was stressed in Part One of this report. Moreover, following the Israeli Government approval in May of a plan to further expand the buffer zone in the southern end of the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military forces incursions went deep inside Rafah and at the end of September, Israeli forces began a large scale military operation called "Harvest of Flowers" - one of the largest in the four years of conflict - in the heavily populated areas of the northern Gaza Strip. Thus, one could have expected between February and November 2004 a deterioration of the situation in the Gaza Strip, especially in the refugee camps, but this

did not happen. At the opposite, one can see a relative improvement of the situation in the refugee camps. This evolution may indicate the implementation of effective and well-targeted safety nets inside refugee camps by local and international organizations and the PA to compensate the negative effects of Israeli military interventions.

**Figure 2.3: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to place of residence (place)**



**Figure 2.4: Importance of assistance in household budget (o250) according to place of residence (place)**



Meanwhile, the Israeli military forces have continued to impose a tightened siege on the West Bank and maintained severe restrictions on the movement of Palestinian civilians, especially in Hebron, the North of the West Bank and Jerusalem. This situation has led to a sharp increase of the poverty and extreme poverty rates in the West Bank refugee camps where they reached respectively 62% and 29% in November 2004 as compared to 55% and 16% in February 2004. In a context of scarce resources for humanitarian and social policies, the mobilization of the system to relieve the hardship in the Gaza Strip refugee camps may have affected negatively the situation in the West Bank refugee camps. As the results in figure 2.4, above, seem to indicate, 40% of the respondents stressed that the importance of assistance in their household budget has decreased between February and November 2004 as compared to 33% in the Gaza Strip



refugee camps. It is very likely that part of this perception about the evolution of assistance in household budget is linked to the results of PCBS estimates about the evolution of the median value of assistance from the main providers. PCBS shows that the value of assistance has sharply decreased in the West Bank between April-June and July-September 2004. The median value of assistance from UNRWA decreased from 44 to 27 US\$, while that from the Ministry of Social Affairs decreased from 35 to 22 US\$ and that from other PA institutions went down from 48 to 33 US\$. On the other hand, the decline was less severe in the Gaza Strip where the median value of assistance declined respectively from 44 to 33 US\$, from 35 to 24 US\$ and from 48 to 37 US\$. (PCBS, 2004: 11 and 13)

There are also some significant differences in poverty rates between rural, urban and camp areas of residence. As indicated above, the poverty risk is much higher in the refugee camps than in the other areas as the poverty rate in the refugee camps overall is 65% compared to 53% in both urban areas and villages. Figure 2.5 gives also additional information as it indicates that extreme poverty has increased significantly in the villages reaching 21% in November 2004 compared to 17% in February 2004. Lastly, as discussed before, the improvement of the situation in the refugee camps is the result of the sharp decrease of extreme poverty in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.

Figure 2.5: Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to area of residence (o060)





Figure 2.6: Evolution of household income in the past six months (o108v2), July 2003 - November 2004




The prevailing public perception among Palestinians from the oPt is that their income has remained the same in the past six months. This situation explains the persistent mass poverty as it means that they are trapped in a situation characterized by a lack of income generating activities that could improve their livelihood. Figure 2.6 indicates that 59% of the respondents declared that their household income has remained the same in the past six months whereas 38% stressed it has declined and only 3% stated that their household income has increased.



The main cause of the decline of household income is the problem of access to employment and decent jobs which has a very negative effect on income generation. Figure 2.7 indicates that in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, job loss and working hour loss were considered as the main cause of income decline. In the West Bank, 42% of the respondents declared that their income has decreased as a result of a job loss and 28% explained that it decreased as a result of working hour loss. In the Gaza Strip, these rates were respectively 37% and 23%. Moreover, in the Gaza Strip, business and damaged land have also played an important role in the decline of household income as 20% of the respondents mentioned them as a cause compared to 10% in February 2004. This result must be linked to a very intense Israeli military intervention in the Gaza Strip during the summer and fall of 2004. In Jerusalem, job loss is also the first cause of income decline, but one can see another important factor which is the increase in prices of inputs and transportation related to the construction of the Wall and mobility restrictions (stated by 18% of the respondents).

Figure 2.7, below, also illustrates about the cause of income decline according to poverty levels. The results show that the poorest are much more vulnerable to job loss as 52 % of them stated that it was the main cause of income decline compared to 20% of the non-poor. As will be discussed in Part Three of this report, this result can be explained by the fact that the poorest are characterized by a very high degree of vulnerability in the labor market because they are trapped in unemployment or very precarious jobs.

**Figure 2.7: First cause if income decreased (o109v2) according to region of residence (o059) and to poverty level (poverty3)**



**Table 2.1: Poverty risk 9poverty3) according to the level of education (educ)**

	Hardship cases	Below poverty line (excl. hardship cases)	Above poverty line
Until elementary	31%	35%	34%
Until secondary	25%	39%	36%
College and above	3%	29%	69%

When examining poverty risk, it is also important to stress that the educational level seems to protect individuals against poverty as two thirds of individuals who have completed their education until elementary school are below the poverty line whereas, by contrast, only one third of individuals who have completed their education until college and above are poor. Table 2.1 shows also that the rate of extreme poverty among the respondents that have a low level of education (until elementary school) is 10 times higher than among those that have a high level of education (college and above).

Finally, when examining the poverty rate according to the age group of the respondents, one can see that the young respondents (between 18 and 24 years) are more likely to be poor than the other age groups; 60% of them were poor as compared to respectively 54% of the age group 25-34 years old, 55% of the age group 35-49 years old and 49% of those of 50 years or older. This is an important result for policy planning as services and programs for youth – especially to promote their access to decent jobs - by local and international organizations are rather limited while they are a very vulnerable group. Table 2.2 indicates that young people are also more likely to be extremely poor than the respondents of the other age groups at the exception of the age group 35-49 years which has the highest incidence of extreme poverty. This result may be explained by the impact of the family size which is a key variable determining the poverty situation of the individuals. Indeed, the age group 35-49 years is traditionally associated with a period of building and developing a family when most of the units of the household are too young for income generating activities. In the fifth Perceptions report (Bocco et al., 2002: 18) it was already highlighted that the rate of extreme poverty was five times higher for a family with 8 members than of that of a family with 4 members.


**Table 2.2: Poverty (poverty3) according to age group (agec)**

Level of poverty Age group	Hardship cases	Below poverty line (excl. hard; Cases)	Above poverty line
<b>18-24</b>	24%	36%	40%
<b>25-34</b>	18%	36%	46%
<b>35-49</b>	25%	30%	45%
<b>&gt; 50</b>	22%	33%	45%

## 2.2 Subjective poverty

In the previous section, the measure of poverty was based on income whereby the PCBS poverty line was used to cut off between the poor and non-poor. In the current section, the poverty analysis based on the objective measure of poverty will be complemented by a poverty analysis based on a subjective measure of poverty. The objective is to get the perception of the Palestinian people themselves about the magnitude of material deprivation.

**Figure 2.8: Average amount needed by the household to meet basic needs (o041) according to region of residence (o059)**



To that end, a subjective financial satisfaction poverty line has been elaborated. Respondents were asked to estimate the average amount of money they need to meet the basic needs of their household. As illustrated in figure 2.8, the average amount was about 2400 NIS in the West Bank, 2150 NIS in the Gaza Strip and 3560 NIS in Jerusalem. The differences from one region to another reflect some differences in

the cost of living; meeting basic needs in Jerusalem being more expensive than in the other regions.

Once the respondents estimated what they need to meet their household basic needs, they were asked how close their household income was to this amount. It is important to note that this subjective poverty line is higher than the objective poverty line that was used before (2400 NIS instead of 1800 NIS in the West Bank for example). Giving a voice to the population about their living conditions leads to a better understanding of the impact of the economic crisis on household welfare. It is interesting to stress first that the subjective poverty rate (adding the percentage of respondents having stated that they had much less or slightly less of the minimum amount to meet their household basic needs) is very close to the picture given by the objective poverty line; 58% as compared to 55%. But according to the respondents, the depth of poverty is much worse than the picture given before as 37% of the respondents stated they had much less than what is needed whereas the rate of extreme poverty presented in figure 2.1 was 22%.

Figure 2.9: Subjective poverty (o041)





Figure 2.10: Subjective poverty (o041) according to place of residence (place)



When examining the results according to place of residence, as presented in figure 2.10, above, one can see that it is in the Gaza Strip refugee camps that the perception of severe material deprivation is the


highest as 51% of respondents reported that their household's income was much less than required to meet basic needs. The situation is also very difficult in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and in the West Bank refugee camps where this rate reached about 40% whereas respondents from the West Bank outside refugee camps reported less often (36%) that their household income was much less than needed to meet basic needs. It is also important to stress that about one fourth of the respondents from Jerusalem have the feeling of severe material deprivation.

## 2.3 Income differentiation and social cohesion

Despite the economic and humanitarian crisis, the Palestinian society has displayed great social cohesion and coping capacities. Family and friends solidarity networks are still functioning and widespread even if some coping strategies are now exhausted or starting to become exhausted. This cohesion and resilience explain why the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been able to absorb such level of poverty and unemployment that would have led to the tearing of the social ties and the breaking of the social fabric in many other societies.


To check the level of social cohesion, interviewees were asked how they would evaluate their financial situation in comparison to that of others in their community. Overall, a very large majority of the respondents (68%) stated that they consider the financial situation of their household to be similar to that of others in their community. This means that the socio-economic crisis initiated by the second Intifada was not associated with any major trend towards income differentiation that could have led to social fragmentation.

Figure 2.11: Perception of household's financial situation (o095), July 2003 – November 2004




However, the proportion of respondents who thought that their household's financial situation is worse than the rest of their community has increased from 16% to 21% between February and November 2004. This growing discontent has affected the three regions, but it mainly stems from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank refugee camps where the respondents have reported much more often the feeling of income differentiation. As illustrated in figure 2.12, below, the percentage of those who stated that their household's financial situation was worse than that of others in their community increased from 19% to 25% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps and more striking from 9% to 25% in the West Bank refugee camps. The latter result must be linked with the analysis of the evolution of poverty that was provided above, where a sharp increase of extreme poverty in the West Bank refugee camps was evident.

Figure 2.12: Perception of household's financial situation (o095) according to place of residence (place)



There is, however, a significant increase among the poorest of those thinking that they are the big losers of the deep socio-economic crisis and that their household situation is worse than that of the rest of their community. According to the results in figure 2.13, more than half of the poorest respondents had that feeling in November 2004 as compared to 45% in February 2004. In the long run, the persistence of that trend could erode social cohesion and could have a very negative impact on the Palestinian society.

Figure 2.13: Perception of household's financial situation (o095) according to poverty level (poverty3)




## 2.4 Poverty and coping strategy

As discussed in the previous sections, there is no doubt that the Palestinians in the oPt have suffered a large decline in well-being since the beginning of the second Intifada. Still, they are not passive and entirely dependent on humanitarian assistance mechanisms. At the opposite, they have developed a set of coping strategies to balance the sharp decline in the average income and the paralysis of the labor market by the Israeli policy of mobility restrictions.


Overall, one third of the respondents has stated that they can cope financially for as long as it takes, whereas one half stressed that they could barely manage or were in serious conditions. It is in the refugee camps that the situation is the most dramatic as the percent of those who reported that they were in serious conditions was 18% in the West Bank refugee camps and 25% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. These results are detailed in figure 2.14, below.

Figure 2.14: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to place of residence (place)



As expected, the poorest ability to cope with hardship is under serious stress. Figure 2.15, below, shows that 34% of the poorest are in financially serious conditions, while 43% can barely manage. Only 6% of them declared that they can manage as long as it takes as compared to 33% of the poor (excluding the poorest) and 51% of those above the poverty line. It is also important to emphasize that one fourth of the non-poor respondents stressed that they can barely manage, while 4% are in serious conditions.


Figure 2.15: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to poverty level (poverty3)



There are clear signs that it is increasingly difficult to cope with economic hardship in the oPt. Figure 2.16 shows that only 43% of the respondents declared that they still have some available means to cope with the hardship whereas 35% explained that they never had such means available or that they were already exhausted. This is a very important finding because it highlights a major emerging challenge as about 22% of the respondents have reported that their means will soon be exhausted which could lead to a great pressure on local and international humanitarian assistance institutions that will have to balance it to avoid any dramatic humanitarian crisis. Indeed, between February and November 2004, the percent of respondents who stressed that they still have some available means to cope with the hardship decreased from 47% to 43%.



Figure 2.16: Available means to cope with the hardship (o177)



When considering coping capabilities according to place of residence, the results in figure 2.17, below, indicate that it is in the West Bank refugee camps that the situation is the worse as only 29% of the respondents declared they still had available means to cope with the hardship and 24% specified that they will be exhausted soon. Moreover, it seems that the situation is deteriorating very rapidly as these rates were respectively 46% and 20% in February 2004. In the Gaza Strip, the situation is also very problematic as about one fourth of the respondents in this region declared that their means to cope with hardship will soon be exhausted.

Figure 2.17: Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to place of residence (place)





Figure 2.18: Available means for relieving the hardship (o177) according to poverty level (poverty3)




Despite targeted humanitarian assistance policies which tend to reduce the negative impact of the crisis on the poor, the poorest tend to be disproportionately worse-off as a consequence of the duration of the crisis. It is clear that for the poorest, many coping strategies are exhausted and it is much more difficult to relieve

the hardship. Figure 2.18 shows that among the poorest, the rate of the respondents who declared that they still have available means dropped from 30% to only 19% between February and November 2004. Thus, more than half of the poorest have now no available means to cope with the hardship which is a very worrying situation from a humanitarian perspective.

Coping strategies play a crucial role for managing the hardship so it is crucial to understand the main strategies used by the poorest in their effort to secure their livelihood and to maintain the highest possible consumption levels. It is also very important to identify the changes that can occur in the households' coping strategies because they give additional information on the level of economic deprivation.

Figure 2.19 presents the main coping strategies used by households. The most common one is reducing expenses and was stated by 66% of the respondents. The other widely used coping strategies are using past savings (46%), buying on credit (48%) and not paying bills (46%), followed by selling jewelry or gold (27%) and receiving assistance from family and friends in the oPt or abroad (15% for each).

**Figure 2.19: Main coping strategies (o131), February 2004 – November 2004**




The first coping strategies used by households at the beginning of the second Intifada were to reduce their expenditures and to draw on their savings. They also relied on selling jewelry and other assets as a way to compensate for their reduced income. However, these strategies are not sustainable in a context where there are no income generating activities to regenerate savings and assets. The four consecutive years of deep socio-economic crisis have exhausted the savings of the poorest and have pushed them to reduced expenditure (both in terms of quantity and quality) as far as possible. Therefore, it appears that these coping strategies are no longer available for a growing number of poor leading to a rapid deterioration of the poorest.

Indeed, the results show a significant decrease of the percent of the poorest who were relying on past saving, reducing their expenditures or selling assets as a coping strategy. One must admit that the decreased use of some of these coping strategies could reflect an improvement of their material situation and thus a decreased need for those coping strategies. However, this scenario seems very unlikely taking into account the persistence of mass poverty and unemployment. Given the considerably reduced consumption by the poor during the past four years of Intifada, it is not a surprise to see that the percent of the poorest relying on reducing expenses to cope with the hardship has declined from 94% to 80%. The


results in figure 2.20, below, also indicate that a growing number of the poorest are no longer relying on savings as the rate dropped from 77% in July 2003 to only 40% in November 2004. The main reason of this trend is simply that a growing part of them no longer have savings to relieve the hardship.

**Figure 2.20: Using past savings (o131b), July 2003 – November 2004**




As some of the main initial coping strategies of the poor tend to be exhausted, they must rely heavily on other coping strategies such as not paying the bills and buying on credit. The results show that the poorest are much more likely to use such coping strategies than the non-poor as 71% of the poorest were not paying their bills and 75% were buying on credit compared to respectively 27% and 31% of the non-poor.

**Figure 2.21: Not paying the bills (o131g)**




From a geographic point of view, figures 2.21 and 2.22 show that these coping strategies are widely used in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but it is in the West Bank refugee camps that they are the most common as the rates of respondents stressing that they are not paying bills or buying on credit are respectively 61% and 65%.

**Figure 2.22: Buying on credit (o131j)**




Another way to keep access to basic needs for the poor households is to increase the number of the household members earning an income. As a consequence of their reduced income, households tend to send more adult members into income generating activities to relieve the hardship. The results in figure 2.19, above, indicated that 25% of the respondents reported that more adults from their household went to work to cope with material deprivation, whereas 6% declared that more children entered the labor market. Moreover, the poor tend to put more adults and children into the labor market than the non-poor. For child labor, for example, figure 2.23 shows that 12% of the poorest relied on that coping strategy as compared to only 3% of the non-poor. Child labor is concentrated where extreme poverty is the most severe which means in the Gaza Strip and in the refugee camps.

**Figure 2.23: Child labor (o131f) according to poverty level (poverty3) and place of residence (place)**




Lastly, to finish, it is valuable to stress the importance of assistance for households' coping strategies. The results in figure 2.24, next page, indicate that assistance is crucial in the Gaza Strip refugee camps where one fourth of the respondents stressed that their household could not manage without it. Assistance also plays an important role in the West Bank refugee camps and more surprisingly in the West Bank outside camps where 18% of the respondents stated they could not manage without it even when assistance to the population of that region is more limited. Overall, figure 2.24 shows that, in the present situation, assistance plays a key role as it helps a large part of the population to cope with the hardship.

**Figure 2.24: Importance of assistance for households' coping strategy (o250) according to place of residence (place)**



Finally, the results in figure 2.25, below, indicate that only 5% of the poorest and 12% of the poor could manage without assistance. Therefore, assistance is crucial to reduce the negative impact of the crisis on the poorest as about 37% of them could not manage without it or could only manage with great difficulties.

**Figure 2.25: Importance of assistance for households' coping strategy (o250) according to poverty level (poverty level)**



## 2.5 Conclusion

In short, the main findings on the socio-economic conditions in the oPt that are worth reiterating are summarized below:

- There is a sharp deterioration of the poverty situation in the West Bank refugee camps.
- Both the depth of poverty and the poverty rate in the Gaza Strip refugee camps have decreased.
- Extreme poverty in Jerusalem has increased.
- The main cause of the decline of household income is the problem of access to employment and decent jobs leading to either job loss or working hour loss which very negatively impact on income generation.
- There is a growing feeling of income differentiation among the poorest. This trend may affect social cohesion.
- There is an exhaustion of the main coping strategies of the poorest (reducing expenses and using past savings) as a consequence of the duration of the crisis which explains that the poorest tend to be disproportionately worse-off
- There are clear signs that it is increasingly difficult to cope with economic hardship in the oPt. Less than half of the respondents declared that they still have some available means to cope with the hardship, whereas about one fourth of the respondents have reported that their means will soon be exhausted. This situation could lead to a great pressure on local and international humanitarian assistance institutions that will have to balance it to avoid any dramatic humanitarian crisis.
- The results pointed to the great importance of assistance for coping strategies, especially in the Gaza Strip refugee camps and - more surprisingly - in the West Bank outside refugee camps.



# Chapter

# 3



# The Labor Market

*Frédéric Lapeyre*

## Introduction

As was the case with poverty in Part Two of this report, unemployment also remains difficult to measure accurately in a context such as the oPt during the second Intifada. However, there is no doubt about the broad picture which is a situation of mass unemployment and underemployment resulting from the paralysis of the Palestinian economy by Israeli military forces. Unemployment according to ILO standards (those who do not work, but are seeking a job) was estimated at 27% for the period July-September 2004 (PCBS, *Labor Force Survey*: 4), while this rate was only about 10% mid-2000 at the eve of the second Intifada. (ILO, *Report from the Director General, 90<sup>th</sup> session, Annex on the situation of the workers from the oPt*, 2002: 11)

Since the beginning of the second Intifada, Palestinian workers face two major problems: Firstly, the crisis of the domestic Palestinian labor market marked by depressed labor demand and falling wages in the private sector, and secondly, the loss of access to work in Israel and the Israeli settlements marked by the long-term substitution of Palestinian workers by foreign workers.


In the first section of this chapter, the main trends regarding the evolution of employment, unemployment, job precariousness and some characteristics of the vulnerable groups in the labor market will be analyzed. The next section will assess how mobility restrictions and the very negative business environment affect the workers' ability to reach their workplace and the employers' ability to run business. The following section will focus on the distribution of workers according to the type of occupation and of employers. Finally, we will highlight the poverty risks related to the labor market will be highlighted.

### 3.1 Employment, underemployment, unemployment and job precariousness

Figure 3.1 shows a clear deterioration of the employment situation between February and October 2004 as the rate of full-time employment decreased from 49% to 44%. This is a very worrying result taking into account that full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. However, this decline of full-time employment did not lead to an increase of unemployment which decreased slightly from 23% to 21%, but instead led to a sharp increase of underemployment and precarious jobs from 25% to 38% (when summing those working part-time – which is mainly involuntary part-time – and those working a few hours per day).

This trend means an increase of the poverty risk for Palestinian workers. Although unemployment is a key factor of poverty, a significant proportion of the poor are currently working. PCBS estimates that the percentage of employees whose monthly wages are below poverty line increased from 43.5% in the third quarter of 2000 to 55.8% in the third quarter of 2004. (PCBS, 2004, *Labor Force Survey*: 5)

Figure 3.1: Distribution of the labor force (o008r), November 2002-November 2004



The decline of full-time employment was especially severe in the West Bank refugee camps where it decreased from 54% to 37% between February 2004 and October 2004. As illustrated in figure 3.2, in

the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, one can see the same negative evolution as full-time employment decreased from 50% to 39%. This trend is very likely the cause of both the sharp increase of extreme poverty in the West Bank refugee camps and of the slight deterioration of the poverty situation in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps during the period under study.

It is important to note that the decline of full-time employment led in the West Bank refugee camps to a sharp increase of underemployment and job precariousness as the proportion of those working a few hours per day increased from 3% to 22%, whereas unemployment decreased from 30% to 26%. At the opposite, in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, unemployment increased from 16% to 21% whereas the proportion of those working a few hours per day increased from 22% to 26%. Figure 3.2 also indicates an improvement of the employment situation in Jerusalem as 55% of the respondents stated they were full-time employed and 15% that they were unemployed as compared to respectively 39% and 33% in February 2004. This positive evolution on the labor market could explain why the rate of subjective poverty has decreased in Jerusalem as the proportion of those stating they had much less income than they needed to meet the basic needs of their household decreased from 48% to 24%. However, this result should be interpreted very cautiously. It could be linked to some bias as there are a relatively limited number of individuals interviewed in Jerusalem.

Figure 3.2 : Distribution of the labor force (o008r) according to place of residence (place)





Figure 3.3 : Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2), February 2004-November 2004



In the oPt, less than half (47%) of main breadwinners of the household did have a job at any time during the second Intifada, whereas more than one-quarter (28%) of all respondents were long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than 12 months). Moreover, the results in figure 3.3, above, show that the very long-




term unemployed (without work for more than two years) represent as much as 15% of the respondents. Mass and persistent unemployment of family breadwinners was a dramatic shock to Palestinian society, as income-generating activities by the main breadwinner were the main source of income. This evolution explains the sharp increase of the economic dependency ratio (number of population divided by number of employed persons) which increased in the oPt from 4.8 in 2000 to 6.2 at the end of 2004 (the change rate is 29.2%). The ratio in the West Bank increased from 4.3 to 5.4 (the change rate is 25.6%) and it increased in the Gaza Strip from 5.9 to 8.5 (the change rate is 44.1%). (PCBS, 2004, *Labor Force Survey*: 5)

When the duration of unemployment for the main breadwinner is analyzed by place of residence, it appears that Gaza Strip respondents living outside refugee camps report a lower unemployment risk for the main breadwinner, as 54% were never unemployed compared to 41% in Gaza Strip refugee camps, 52% in Jerusalem and 44% in the West Bank both inside and outside refugee camps.


The results also indicate that a significant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip and West Bank refugee camps belong to the category of the long-term unemployed (more than one year) which affects respectively 35% and 37% of the main breadwinners. Very long-term unemployment is especially high in the West Bank refugee camps where 22% of the main breadwinners were unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada as compared to about 15% elsewhere in the oPt.

**Figure 3.4: Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100v2) according to place of residence (place)**



The oPt labor market is not only characterized by mass unemployment and underemployment, but also by a great job precariousness. As can be seen in figure 3.5, below, a growing number of workers are trapped in unstable jobs associated to a short-term horizon and a great insecurity of the income generating activity. Only 54% of the respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability to loose it is very unlikely, while 16% stated it was very likely. This is a very important result as poverty is closely related to unemployment or employment in the bad segments of the labor market.


**Figure 3.5 : Probability of loosing job in the coming year (o244)**



As was shown in figure 3.5, above, stable employment is not the most usual pattern of work in terms of stock. Job insecurity is not only affecting jobs in the informal sector, but also jobs in the formal sector as the private sector is absorbing the full force of the economic crisis. Stable jobs have become rare and are principally provided by the PA and local and international humanitarian/development organizations. The growth of insecure jobs is responsible for the rising vulnerability of the Palestinian workers in the oPt, leading to a growing number of working poor.


The poorest are more likely to be unemployed but also to lose their current job. As one can see in figure 3.6, only 19% of the poorest declared to have stable jobs compared to 66% of the non-poor. Fighting poverty should then also include a pro-active employment policy to secure jobs for the most vulnerable workers so as to avoid such a negative process that pushes individuals from a zone of job precariousness and to a zone of exclusion from the labor market with the well-known consequence on poverty.

**Figure 3.6 : Probability of losing job in the coming year (o244) according to poverty level (poverty3)**



The results indicate that 61% of respondents that reported that their household received a salary from a long-term job were above the poverty line, whereas only 29% of workers who reported that their household received a salary from a short-term job were above the poverty line. Moreover, 6% of respondents reporting the receipt of a salary from a long-term job in their household were extremely poor, while 34% of workers reporting the receipt in their household of a salary from a short-term job were extremely poor. Thus secure long-term jobs are shown here to considerably reduce poverty risk and the depth of poverty, whereas short-term jobs do not ward off poverty. Figure 3.7 illustrates from a different perspective the dramatic job precariousness from the poorest as it indicates that in the past six months 26% of them had to search for a new job and 40% became unemployed, whereas 90% of the respondents who were above the poverty line did not face any change in their employment situation.

**Figure 3.7 : Change in employment situation in the past 6 months (o012v2) according to poverty level (poverty3)**




The main causes of change in the employment status of the Palestinian workers were all related to the Israeli policies towards the oPt. Figure 3.8 indicates the various ways the current crisis has negatively affected the oPt labor market. The inability to reach the workplace was identified everywhere as the main cause of change in employment status. However, the percentage of respondents who stressed it is especially high in the West Bank as a consequence of the severity of the mobility restriction regime. Curfews, roadblocks, checkpoints and the Wall have cut off many workers in the West Bank from their workplace and forced them to find another job or to lose their current job and remain unemployed. Mobility restrictions were reported as the cause of change in employment status by 65% of the respondents outside West Bank



refugee camps and 70% inside those camps, whereas this problem is less pronounced in Jerusalem or in the Gaza Strip. However, for the latter, it is worthwhile to stress that as many as 58% of respondents in Gaza Strip refugee camps also named inability to reach the workplace as the main cause of their change in employment status.

The second most important cause of change in employment status is the deterioration of the business environment and the fact that employers can no longer pay for the salaries of their workers. This problem is particularly severe in Jerusalem, where 41% of the respondents declared it was the cause of change in their employment status. Some explanations will be given about this trend in section 3.2 regarding the evolution in the business environment and the impact of the Wall, especially on Jerusalem. The results in figure 3.8 also indicate a high rate of bankruptcy of family businesses in the Gaza Strip which changed the employment status of 22% of the workers outside refugee camps and 17% of the workers inside refugee camps.

**Figure 3.8: Main cause of change in employment status (o013) according to place of residence (place)**



The next figure aims at highlighting the lack of relevance of the ILO unemployment definition in a context such as the current one in the oPt. The ILO standard stresses that to be considered as unemployed, individuals must have sought actively for a job in the past weeks. However, when the labor market is paralyzed by mobility restrictions, searching actively for a job is most often a waste of time as the problem is not on the supply side, but on the demand side. This situation explains why only 45% of the non-poor – who are also the more educated and trained – did try hard to find a job and 43% did not try at all. There are very few job opportunities for them and as long as they can cope they will not start searching for any income generating activities in the bad segments of the labor market. The situation is different for the poor and, especially, for the poorest as 77% of the latter stressed that they had tried a lot to find a new job. As they have exhausted their coping strategies, the poorest are desperately searching for any source of income. Figure 3.10 shows that 44% of them stressed that their job did not match at all their training compared to 11% for the non-poor.

**Figure 3.9 : Attempts to find a job when unemployed (o014) according to poverty level (poverty3)**





Figure 3.10: Extent of job matching training (o245) according to poverty level (poverty3)



Finally, it is interesting to see how Palestinians heard about their current employment. As indicated in figure 3.11, below, 50% of the respondents stated they heard about their current job through relatives and friends, 21% work in the family business, while 25% of the respondents stressed the role of newspapers and radio in their search for their current employment.

Figure 3.11: Source of information about current employment (o243)





Figure 3.12 shows that social capital plays a crucial role for the poorest as 73% of them declared that they got their job through information provided by relatives and friends. For the non-poor respondents, newspapers and radio play a more important role as 31% of these respondents declared that they heard about their current job through the media compared to only 11% of the poorest.

Figure 3.12: Source of information about current employment (o243) according to poverty level (poverty3)




## 3.2 Business environment and mobility restrictions

The great difficulties to conduct business in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada have aggravated the situation of domestic employment. Mobility restrictions, curfews and closures imposed by the Israeli military forces have generated major disruptions in production and marketing processes

leading to significant transaction costs, loss of economies of scale, and loss of access to markets. These phenomena are at the heart of the crisis of the private sector and the related drop in the domestic labor demand.


As illustrated in the following figures, a large part of the respondents stated that their business had suffered in many ways in the past six months. Problems are more or less severe depending on the place of residence, but the results indicate that it is still very difficult to run business – and thus to create wealth and employment – in the oPt. This situation explains why business investments have been reduced to a minimum amount during the second Intifada. The results in figure 3.13, below, indicate that only 15% of the respondents have invested in business activities since the beginning of the second Intifada. The percentage is especially low in Jerusalem where only 9% said so as compared to 15% in the West Bank and 18% in the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 3.13 : Business investment since the beginning of the second Intifada (o162) according to region of residence (o059)**



Among the main problems to run business is the inability to market products which is especially high in the West Bank outside camps as a consequence both of the more severe mobility restriction regime in this region and of the construction of the Wall. The percentage of respondents reporting such a problem was 39% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and 29% inside refugee camps as compared to 30% in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and 29% inside refugee camps. The results show an improvement of the situation outside refugee camps but a slight deterioration inside refugee camps as compared to February 2004. However, one can also see a sharp deterioration of the situation in Jerusalem where the percentage of the respondents who stated business suffered due to the inability to market products increased from 16% to 23% between February and November 2004. The main factor of this trend is the progress in the construction of the wall which is increasingly isolating Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank.


**Figure 3.14: Business suffered due to inability to market products (o140a) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004**



Another important problem to run business is the difficulty to buy raw materials or inputs. As illustrated in figure 3.15, below, the trends are the same as for the difficulty to market products. The situation has improved outside refugee camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whereas it remained about


the same inside refugee camps and it has deteriorated sharply in Jerusalem where the percentage of respondents who stated that their business suffered due to difficulties in buying raw material increased from 17% to 25% between February and November 2004.

**Figure 3.15: Business suffered due to difficulties to buy raw material and products (o140b) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004**



The Wall has a very negative impact on business in the agriculture sector in both the West Bank and Jerusalem. About one fourth of the respondents from the West Bank stated that the Wall separated them from land and that agriculture was difficult or impossible as a consequence of it. Moreover, 17% of them stressed that the Wall cut their land from access to water. In Jerusalem, the situation is less severe as only 6% of the respondents declared that agriculture was difficult or impossible, while 15% declared that the Wall separated them from land. The producers and businessmen in the agriculture sector from the area crossed by the Wall are not the only ones to carry the economic cost of it as it leads to higher prices for material and transport which lead to higher prices and to a lost of welfare for the consumers. Indeed, as overviewed in figure 3.15, 55% of the respondents from the West Bank and 74% of those from Jerusalem declared that the Wall has increased prices for material and transport.

**Figure 3.16 : Various business problems in the agricultural sector related to the separation wall (o164)**




Mobility restrictions are not only for goods, but also for people in the oPt and this is a major obstacle for the business sector to operate on a regular basis. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews are all contributing to the very negative business environment. Overall, 55% of the respondents stressed that business suffered due to problems in reaching the workplace. This problem is especially severe in the West Bank where about 64% of the respondents stressed it as compared to 47% in Jerusalem, 44% in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and 49% inside those camps. Figure 3.17, below, indicates that the situation worsened sharply in the refugee camps between February and October 2004 and especially in the West Bank


refugee camps where the rate increased from 40% to 63%, while it increased from 39% to 49% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. One can also see a very worrying evolution in Jerusalem where the percentage of those who declared that their business suffered due to problems in getting to the workplace increased from 24% to 47%.

As a whole, the problem of reaching the workplace is more severe in the West Bank as a consequence of the higher intensity of mobility restrictions and, especially, of the curfews that the Israeli military forces have enforced periodically since the Spring of 2002. Indeed, 46% of the respondents from the West Bank outside refugee camps and 39% of those inside the camps stressed the problem of the curfews as compared to 11% of the respondents from the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps and 14% of those inside the camps. However, curfews are less problematic than before in the West Bank as a consequence of a relative softening of the curfew regime (indeed, in February 2004, the proportion of the respondents from the West Bank that stressed the negative impact of curfews on business was 54% outside refugee camps and 45% inside refugee camps).

**Figure 3.17 : Business suffered due to problems to reach the workplace (o140c) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004**



**Figure 3.18: Ability to go to work in the past six months (o0114v2) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004**




When considering the impact of mobility restrictions on the access of workers to their workplace, the results in figure 3.18, above, illustrate a significant deterioration of the situation in the oPt. Overall, only 37% of the respondents declared that it was not difficult to go to work as compared to 53% in February 2004. The evolution is particularly dramatic in Jerusalem where the proportion of the respondents who stressed it

was difficult to reach their workplace jumped from 15 to 48% and those who declared it was very difficult or impossible increased from 9% to 12%. The workers of the Gaza Strip are also paying a high price for the intensification of Israeli military operations in the region as the proportion of the respondents who declared it was difficult to reach their workplace increased from 25% to 43% outside refugee camps and from 33% to 47% inside refugee camps, while the proportion of those stating it was very difficult or impossible to reach the workplace did not change. The West Bank is marked by some diverging trends as the problem of access to the workplace increased slightly outside refugee camps, but it increased very sharply inside refugee camps where the proportion of workers who faced some difficulties to go to work increased from 28% to 42% between February and November 2004. Moreover, the intensity of the obstacles to go to work increased as the proportion of respondents who stated that it was very difficult or almost impossible to reach their workplace increased from 18% to 23%.

Mobility restrictions are also affecting the access to land for the farmers. The results in figure 3.19, below, indicate that the current situation is very negative for cultivating land which is a crucial sector for the Palestinian economy. The situation remained approximately the same in the West Bank between February and November 2004, but has worsened in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip where the level of obstacles is now much higher than in the West Bank, whereas six months ago they were at the same level. Indeed, the proportion of respondents who stated that it was not difficult to cultivate land dropped from 43% to 24% in Jerusalem and from 48% to 27% in the Gaza Strip. However, the situation seems much more severe in Jerusalem where the proportion of respondents who stated that it was very difficult or almost impossible to cultivate land increased from 29% to 36%.

**Figure 3.19: Ability to cultivate land in the past six months (o0115v2) according to region of residence (o059), February 2004-November 2004**




### 3.4 Types of occupation and employer

When examining the employment situation according to the type of occupation, one can note that the employees are the largest group of workers, representing 36% of them, while the second largest group consists of the skilled workers (29%) and the third largest group are the unskilled workers and the self-employed (respectively 11% and 10%). One can find the higher proportion of employees in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps (43%) and inside refugee camps (39%) as compared to 32% in the West Bank overall. The proportion of unskilled workers is much higher in the West Bank refugee camps (28%) than in the other places as it reached 15% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and respectively 5% and 9% in the Gaza Strip outside and inside refugee camps. This situation could explain the higher poverty risk in the West Bank refugee camps.




Figure 3.20: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009)




The collapse of the private sector, the deep economic crisis and the large involvement of domestic and international organizations to avoid a major humanitarian crisis have all considerably changed the structure of employment in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada. Indeed, the share of local and international NGOs and of international agencies in the structure of employment is astonishingly high (9%) and reflects the current dramatic socio-economic situation. The private sector represents now one third of the total employment and remains the main employer before the PA which is the second largest employer as it employs 23% of the workers. From a dynamic perspective, figure 3.21 shows that the share of the PA in the distribution of workers decreased from 29% to 23% between February and November 2004, whereas the share of the private sector increased from 24% to 33%. In the same period, petty trade – of agriculture or manufacture products – increased from 10% to 15%. The results show that the PA plays a crucial role for employment by securing a job and an income to a large group of workers and their family. The donors are aware of this situation and financially support the PA to fight poverty through securing employment in the public sector and delivering basic services.

Figure 3.21: Type of employer (o063v2), July 2003-November 2004



To conclude, one can look at the distribution of employers according to the level of poverty of the workers. It is striking to see in figure 3.22 that one third of the non-poor work for the PA, 7% for international agencies and 8% for international and local NGOs, which is a very peculiar distribution.

Figure 3.22: Type of employer (o063v2) according to poverty level (poverty3)




### 3.5 Employment and poverty risk

The integration into the labor market and the quality of this integration are two crucial elements to explain poverty and vulnerability. The strength of the links between the employment situation and other dimensions of economic and social life (family, health, income or living conditions) suggests that those people in situations of occupational precariousness - whether they are in an insecure job or whether they are unemployed - are at great risk of becoming poor. In the oPt, the rise in unemployment and the changing structure of employment causing an increase in precarious jobs, represent the main source of uncertainty and vulnerability. One can see two main processes contributing to that: (i) high unemployment and job precariousness for groups of people who were more or less well integrated before into the labor market (before the second Intifada, for example, a large number of the current poor were working in Israel and in the Israeli settlements), and (ii) greater difficulty in entering the labor market for young people.

Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. Figure 3.23, next page, indicates that the poverty risk is relatively low among full-time workers as 72% of them are above the poverty line. At the opposite, the poverty risk is very high among the unemployed and the workers trapped in precarious jobs as only 13% of the unemployed, 22% of those working only a few hours per day, and 38% of those working part-time are above the poverty line. Unemployment and precarious jobs are also associated to severe material deprivation as the percentage of extremely poor respondents among the unemployed is 14 times higher than among the full-time employed (56% compared to 4%)


The results also indicate a dramatic level of working poor. The income generated by workers working few hours a day is too low and uncertain to secure their livelihood. Thus, the poverty rate of this group of workers is as high as 78%, and their extreme poverty rate as high as 32%. Working poor are also numerous among those working part-time (62%) and more surprisingly among those working full-time as more than one quarter of them are below the poverty line.

Figure 3.23: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to employment status (o008r)




In order to better understand which kinds of workers have been particularly vulnerable to unemployment and precarious jobs, it is useful to compare their characteristics to those of the remainder of the labor force. The unemployed tend to have less education than the employed workers. They also tend to be younger. As detailed in figure 3.24, below, young workers are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate of the age group 18-24 is much higher than the one of the other age groups as one third of the former are unemployed compared to about one fourth of the age group of 25-49 years. Moreover, when they have a job they have less often a full-time job than the workers of the other age groups as only 44% of young workers held a full-time job compared to about half of the workers in the age group of 25-49 years. The level of full-time employment is also relatively low for the workers of 50 years or more as only 44% of them are full-time employed; meanwhile 35% of respondents in this age group work only a few hours a day or part-time compared to 28% in the age group of 25-49 years and 23% in the age group of 18-24 years.

Figure 3.24: Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to age group (agec)




The results in figure 3.25, below, show that the unemployment rate is nearly six times higher among respondents with a low level of education than among those with a high level of education (46% compared to 8%). The proportion of respondents stating that they work part-time or a few hours a day is also much higher among the former (40%) than among the latter (25%). Thus, the level of education is a key variable to explain workers' vulnerability in the labor market and should be a key element of any policy aiming at fighting poverty. Considering the importance of the access to full-time jobs on the poverty risk, it is striking to see that only 15% of the low educated workers are full-time employed.

Figure 3.25: Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to level of education (educ)




Individuals living in households where the main breadwinner is unemployed are more likely to be poor than others. It is the same for those living in households with many non-working dependents and few workers. Figure 3.26, below, shows a strong link between the employment status of the main breadwinner and the poverty risk. Indeed, the poverty risk is relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain access to employment and secure a main source of income to the household. Indeed, 63% of the respondents above the poverty line stated that the main breadwinner of their household had never been unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, while only 12% stated that he or she had been unemployed for more than 12 months. Alternatively, only 13% of the extremely poor reported that the main breadwinner of their household had never been unemployed during the Intifada, whereas 59% reported that he or she had been unemployed more than 12 months.

**Figure 3.26: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to unemployment duration of main household breadwinner (o100)**



In a context marked by both the exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market and mobility restrictions, the place (or most recent place) of work has a great correlation with the poverty risk. Figure 3.27 shows that the rate of poverty among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (67%) or in Israel (79%) is much higher than the average for the oPt. These workers are the big losers of the closures because there is very little hope of returning to pre-September 2000 employment levels inside Israel and the settlements. This exclusion put great pressure on the oPt labor market and will require an even greater effort to create employment opportunities in Palestine. One can also note that compared to February 2004, the rate of extreme poverty among the workers working in Jerusalem increased sharply from 5% to 13% which is very likely the consequence of the expansion of the Wall.

**Figure 3.27: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to workplace (o011)**




The type of employer also has a very significant impact on the poverty risk. The private sector is associated with a high poverty risk as only 38% of the respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty line, while 31% of them are extremely poor. Harshly hit by closures, infrastructure destructions, and the deep economic crisis, the private sector is less and less able to provide decent jobs as one can see from

the deterioration of the situation since February 2004. At that time, still 43% of the respondents employed in the private sector were above the poverty line and 29% of them were in a situation of extreme poverty. The results in figure 3.28, below, show that the PA, international agencies and local and international NGOs guarantee many of their employees a better level of income and job security and, as such, protect them from poverty as the poverty rates among respondents in this group are much lower than the average. Moreover, the extreme poverty rate is only 4% for the workers employed by the PA, 3% for those employed by international agencies and nearly non-existent for those employed by local and international NGOs.

Self-employment (including the various forms of petty-trade) is the type of employment that has the highest risk of poverty. The situation is particularly dramatic for the workers employed in agricultural petty-trade activities as only 17% are above the poverty line and nearly half of them are extremely poor. The depth of poverty is less extreme for those employed in manufacture petty trade activities and the other self-employed, but the poverty rates still reached respectively 60% and 70%.

**Figure 3.28: Poverty risk (poverty3) according to type of employer (o063v3)**



### 3.6 Conclusions

- The results show a clear deterioration of the employment situation between February and November 2004 as the rate of full-time employment decreased from 49% to 44%, while the rate of underemployment and precarious jobs increased from 25% to 38%.
- The decline of full-time employment was especially severe in the West Bank refugee camps where it decreased from 54% to 37% between February 2004 and November 2004, while the proportion of those working a few hours per day increased from 3% to 22%.
- The results indicate that a significant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip and West Bank refugee camps belong to the category of the long-term unemployed (more than one year), with respectively 35% and 37% of the main breadwinners in these places affected.
- The oPt labor market is characterized by great job precariousness. One can see a growing number of workers trapped in unstable jobs that are associated with a short-term horizon and a great insecurity of the income generating activity. Only 54% of the respondents stated that their current job is stable and that the probability to lose it is absolutely or very unlikely, while 16% stated it was very likely.
- The main causes of change in the employment status of the Palestinian workers in the oPt are all related to the Israeli politics toward the oPt. The inability to reach the workplace was identified everywhere as the main cause of change in employment status.
- The great difficulties to conduct business in the oPt since the beginning of the second Intifada have aggravated the situation of domestic employment. Mobility restrictions, curfews and closures imposed by the Israeli military forces have generated major disruptions in production and marketing processes leading to significant transaction costs, loss of economies of scale, and loss of access to markets.
- Among the main problems to run business, the inability to market products is especially high in the West Bank outside camps as a consequence of both the more severe mobility restriction regime in the West Bank and the construction of the Wall.
- The Wall has a very negative impact on business in the agriculture sector in both the West Bank and Jerusalem. About one fourth of the respondents in the West Bank stated that the Wall separated them from land and that agriculture was difficult or impossible as a consequence of it. Moreover, 17% of them stressed that the wall cut their land from access to water.
- Mobility restrictions are not only for goods, but also for people in the oPt and this is a major obstacle for the business sector to operate on a regular basis. Roadblocks, checkpoints, and curfews are all contributing to the very negative business environment. Overall, 55% of the respondents stressed that business suffered due to problems in reaching the workplace.
- When considering the impact of mobility restrictions on the access of workers to their workplace, the results indicate a significant deterioration of the situation in the oPt. Overall, only 37% of the respondents declared that it was not difficult to go to work as compared to 53% in February 2004. The evolution is particularly dramatic in Jerusalem where the proportion of the respondents who stressed it was difficult to reach their workplace jumped from 15% to 48%, while those who declared that it was very difficult or impossible to reach the workplace increased from 9% to 12%.



- Mobility restrictions are also affecting the access to land for the farmers. The current situation is very negative as agriculture is a crucial sector for the Palestinian economy. The situation remained approximately the same in the West Bank between February and November 2004, but has worsened in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip where the level of obstacles is now much higher than in the West Bank.
- Full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. The poverty risk is relatively low among full-time workers as 72% of them are above the poverty line. At the opposite, the poverty risk is very high among the unemployed and the workers trapped in precarious jobs as only 13% of the unemployed, 22% of those working only a few hours a day, and 38% of those working part-time are above the poverty line. Individuals living in households where the main breadwinner is unemployed are more likely to be poor than others.
- The type of employer also has a very significant impact on the poverty risk. The private sector is associated with a high poverty risk as only 38% of the respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty line, while 31% of them are in a situation of extreme poverty. Harshly hit by closures, infrastructure destructions, and a deep economic crisis, the private sector is less and less able to provide decent jobs as is obvious from the deterioration of the situation since February 2004.

# Chapter

# 4



## Needs & Infrastructure

Isabelle Daneels

## Introduction


Before analyzing various issues related to assistance in part 5 of the report, it is necessary to first establish what the needs are of the Palestinian people, both on a household level and on the community level, but also more specifically with regard to needed community and communication facilities. In addition, it is important to overview which services – and to what extent – are already available in the occupied Palestinian territory. These are the main concerns of this part of the report.

### 4.1 Household needs

Respondents were asked to state the two most important household needs from a predetermined list. When the *two most important needs* are examined *together* – as is the case in figure 4.1, below, – food is clearly the most frequently cited household need, followed by the need for employment. In comparison to the results to the same question in the survey conducted in February 2004, the importance of employment and –especially – of food has increased considerably. Since February 2004, the importance of the remaining household needs, such as health, financial assistance, housing and re-housing, and education has decreased.

When the *first most important need* is considered *separately*, food (30%) is no longer the most important household need, but is superseded by the need for employment (44%) in the household. One can also notice in figure 4.1, below, that the importance of food as a first household need has almost doubled since February 2004 (from 16% to 30%).


Figure 4.1: The two most important household needs (o079), November 2004 - February 2004



When analyzing the most important household needs *together* according to the region in which respondents reside, one can see that the household need for employment in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip is higher than in Jerusalem, while the need for food in the household is – perhaps unexpectedly – higher in Jerusalem than in the West Bank and even the Gaza Strip. Also clear from figure 4.2, next page, is that the importance of financial assistance as a household need is higher in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip than in Jerusalem, while the importance of education as a household need is similar in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, and is lower in the Gaza Strip.

When examining the first most important household need *separately*, the results indicate a similar importance of employment as a household need in all three regions under study, while the household need of food is much more a concern for respondents in the Gaza Strip than it is for respondents in the West Bank and Jerusalem.


Figure 4.2: The two most important household needs (o079) according to region of residence (o059)



When analyzing the two most important household needs *together* according to the area in which respondents reside, the results in figure 4.3, below, indicate that there is no substantial difference in the need for employment in the household according to whether interviewees reside in cities, villages or refugee camps. This is not the case concerning food as food seems to be much more of an issue in households in cities than in households in refugee camps or villages. Conversely, the need of financial assistance seems more pressing in households in refugee camps and villages than in households in cities. Finally, it is worth noting that the household need of housing and re-housing is the highest in refugee camps.

When examining the first most important household need *separately* according to area of residence, it is clear that employment is more frequently a first most important household need in villages than in cities and refugee camps, while the opposite is the case concerning food as a first most important household need. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents who indicated that financial assistance is their first most important household need is the lowest in cities, while the proportion of respondents specifying that education is their household's first most important need is the highest in villages.

Figure 4.3: The two most important household needs (o079) according to area of residence (o060)




When considering the two most important household needs *together* according to poverty level, it is clear that employment is a more pressing need in households living in hardship than in households with a living

standard below or above the poverty line. Conversely, food is an important household need to a higher percentage of the respondents in households with a monthly income above the poverty line and below the poverty line than to respondents in households living in hardship. Similarly, the results in figure 4.4, below, indicate that the household needs of health and education are more an issue to the relatively better-off in Palestinian society than to the extremely poor segments of the population. As for the household need of financial assistance, not surprisingly, the need for such assistance increases according to the increased poverty endured by the households.

When studying the first most important household need *separately* according to poverty level, similar trends appear as when the two most important household needs were analyzed *together*, whereby a higher percentage of the poorer households than the relatively better-off attach importance to the household needs of employment and financial assistance, while a lower percentage of the former than the latter consider food, health, or education to be their first most important household need.

**Figure 4.4: The two most important household needs (o079) according to poverty level (poverty3)**



Lastly, a statistically significant relationship also exists between the two most important household needs and the educational attainment of the respondents. When examining the two most important household needs together according to educational level, it appears that the household need for employment is the highest among the medium educated, while the need for health is the lowest in this subgroup. Furthermore, the household need for food is the lowest among the least educated, while the importance attached to education as a household need is the highest among the high educated.

When considering the first most important household need *separately*, the importance given to food and education is the highest among the high educated, while the importance given to the household needs of employment and financial assistance is the lowest in this subgroup.

When the analysis purely focuses on the first most important household need, the results in figure 4.6, next page, clearly indicate that employment is by far the first most important household need (44%). However, its importance differs according to the subgroups within Palestinian society that one chooses to concentrate on. While there is, for example, no major difference in the importance attached to employment as a first household need according to the region in which respondents reside, there is such a difference when looking at the issue according to area of residence, poverty level and educational level. As such, the results show that a higher percentage of respondents in villages than in cities or refugee camps consider



employment to be their first most important household need. Furthermore, the importance of employment as a first household need swells with an increase in poverty. Lastly, employment is considered to be the first most important household need among a larger proportion of medium educated than among low or high educated respondents.

Figure 4.5: The two most important household needs (o079) according to educational level (educ)





Figure 4.6: The first most important household need (o079) according to different variables




While employment is the most important household need, it is also the most important *unmet* household need. As the results in figure 4.7, next page, indicate 32% of the respondents stated that employment is their most important unmet household need, which is an increase of 3% compared to the results on the same question in the survey of February 2004. The importance of food as an unmet household need has also increased since February 2004, from 10% to 15%. Notice also that the importance of financial assistance as the most important unmet household need has increased from 23% in February 2004 to 27%




in November 2004, making it the second most important unmet household need. The remaining unmet needs of health, education, and housing and re-housing have all lost importance since February 2004.

**Figure 4.7: The most important unmet household need in general, November 2004 - February 2004**




When considering the most important unmet household need according to different variables such as region and area of residence or refugee status, several interesting findings appear. Concerning employment, for example, the results in figure 4.8, below, portray how employment is more of an unmet need in households in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in households in the West Bank (31%) and Jerusalem (28%). Also, employment is more of an unmet concern to households in cities (34%) than to households in villages (31%) and refugee camps (27%). Lastly, employment is much more of an unmet household need among non-refugees (34%) than among refugees (28%). Similarly, concerning the second most important unmet household need, i.e. financial assistance, the results indicate that it is more of an unmet need in the Gaza Strip (28%) than in the West Bank (26%) and Jerusalem (24%), and also more of an unmet need in refugee camps (31%) and among refugees (30%) than in villages (28%) and cities (24%), or – more generally – among non-refugees (24%).

**Figure 4.8: The most important unmet household need according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002)**



Interesting differences were also detected in the analysis of the most important unmet household need according to the poverty level, the educational level and the gender of the respondents. With regard to employment, its importance as an unmet household need is higher among the poorer segments of society than among the relatively better-off. Furthermore, employment is considered to be an unmet need more frequently among the medium educated (34%) than among the high (30%) and low (27%) educated, and also among male (34%) than among female (29%) respondents. As for the second most important unmet household need of financial assistance, again, its importance swells with increased poverty, while it decreases with increased levels of educational attainment. Lastly, a higher percentage of female (30%) than male (25%) respondents consider financial assistance to be the most important unmet household need.

**Figure 4.9: The most important unmet household need according to poverty level (poverty3), educational level (educ) and gender (o061)**



## 4.2 Community needs


As was the case with the analysis of household needs, the question of the two most important community needs will be discussed first as the two most important community needs *together* and, secondly, as only the first most important community need *separately*.

When looking at the two most important community needs *together* in general and in comparison to the results on the same question in the February 2004 survey, the importance of employment as a community need has remained quite stable and quite high. Also noticeable is that the importance of food and – to a lesser extent – financial assistance has gained in importance as needs for the community since February 2004. The importance of health as a need for the community has remained quite stable since February 2004, while the importance of housing and re-housing, and education have decreased since February 2004.

When analyzing the first most important need of the community *separately*, employment (60%) remains by far the most important community need and is only followed in a distance by food (16%) and financial

assistance (14%) as important community needs. These results are detailed in figure 4.10, below.


Figure 4.10: The two most important needs of your community (o80), in general, November 2004 - February 2004



When considering the two most important community needs *together* according to the region in which respondents reside, employment is perceived to be the most pressing need for the community in all three regions, but even more so in the Gaza Strip. Food and financial assistance are considered least a concern to the community in Jerusalem, while the importance of the need of housing and re-housing for the community is by far the highest in Jerusalem. Also apparent from the results detailed in figure 4.11, below, is that health as a need for the community is far less important in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

When examining the first important community need *separately*, a significantly lower percentage of respondents in Jerusalem (49%) than in the West Bank (59%) and in the Gaza Strip (62%) think of employment as the most important need of their community. Food as a first important community need is also slightly less important to respondents in Jerusalem (13%) than to their colleagues in the West Bank (17%) and the Gaza Strip (17%), while the community needs of housing and re-housing, and education are perceived to be considerably more important in Jerusalem than in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 4.11: The two most important needs of your community (o80) according to region of residence (o059)




A statistically significant relationship could also be established between the two most important needs of the community and the educational level of the respondents. When studying the two most important

community needs *together*, the importance of employment and education as needs for the community swells with increased levels of education of the respondents, while the perceived importance of financial assistance as a community need decreases with increased levels of education.


When considering the first most important need of the community *separately* according to educational attainment, a larger percentage of respondents with high educational attainment (61%) than those with medium (59%) or low educational attainment (54%) stated that employment is the first most important need of the community. Conversely, financial assistance is seen as the first most important community need by a far larger proportion of low educated respondents (23%) than it is by respondents with medium (15%) or high levels of educational attainment (9%).

Figure 4.12: The two most important needs of your community (o080) according to educational level (educ)



Moving on from the two most important needs in the community to the two most important facilities needed in the community, it is clear that – whether one looks at the two most important facilities together or only at the first most important facility needed – water is by far considered to be the most important facility needed in the community. When looking at the two most important facilities *together*, the results in figure 4.13, below, suggest that there is no significant difference between the need in the community for a sewage network or a solid waste disposal network. However, when only the first most important need is analyzed, a higher percentage of respondents believed that a sewage network (26%) is the most important facility needed in their community than respondents stating that the solid waste disposal network (16%) was the first most important facility needed. The lowest proportion of respondents specified that, in their opinion, an electricity network is the most important facility needed in their community.


Figure 4.13: The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) in general



When studying the question of the two most important facilities needed in the community according to refugee status, the results indicate that a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees believe a water network and an electricity network to be the most important facilities needed in their community. Conversely, a higher percentage of non-refugees than refugees stated that a sewage network and a solid


waste disposal network are the two most important facilities needed in their community. These results are detailed in figure 4.14, below.

**Figure 4.14: The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to refugee status (o002)**




The perceived importance of the various facilities needed in the community also varies according to the poverty level of the respondents' household. Whether one examines the two most important facilities needed in the community combined or merely the first most important facility needed, the perceived need for a water network in the community is lower in households living in extreme poverty than in households that are relatively better-off, while, on the other hand, the perceived need for a sewage network in the community is higher in the households living in hardship than it is in households with a living standard either below or above the poverty line. These results are overviewed in figure 4.15, below.

**Figure 4.15 The two most important facilities needed in your community (o124) according to poverty level (poverty3)**



Moving from the two most important facilities needed in the community to the even more specific need in the community for communication facilities, respondents were asked from a predetermined list to specify which communication facility (fixed phone line network, mobile phone network, or permanent connection to the internet or satellite) is, in their opinion, the most needed in their community. In general, 60% of the respondents thought that a fixed phone line network is the most needed communication facility in their community, 23% specified that it was a permanent connection to the internet, 13% indicated that it is a mobile phone network, while 4% stated that to have satellites is the most important communication facility needed in their community.


**Figure 4.16: The most important communication facility needed in the community in general (o278)**






When examining the issue of the most needed communication facility in the community according to region of residence and refugee status, the results in figure 4.17, below, indicate that the highest percentage of respondents specifying that a fixed phone line network is the most needed communication facility in their community are the ones residing in Jerusalem (78%) and the refugees (65%). The highest percentage of respondents considering that a mobile phone network is the most important communication facility needed in their community reside in the Gaza Strip (18%). Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of respondents in the West Bank (28%) than in the Gaza Strip (18%) and in Jerusalem (13%) consider a permanent connection to the internet to be the most important communication facility needed by the community. This is also the case when one compares the views of non-refugees (26%) to the ones of refugees (19%) on this issue.

**Figure 4.17: The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to region (o059) and refugee status (o002)**



Lastly, a statistically significant relationship could be established between the issue of the most important communication facility needed in the community and the poverty level and educational level of the respondents. The importance attached to both a fixed phone line network and a mobile phone network as needed communication facilities in the community is higher in household living in hardship or below the poverty line than in households with a monthly income above the poverty line, while the importance attached to a permanent connection to the internet was higher among the respondents above the poverty line than among those below the poverty line and those living in extreme poverty. As for the most important communication facility needed in the community according to the level of education attained by the respondents, the results in figure 4.18, below, illustrate that a higher percentage of low educated respondents than medium or high educated respondents felt that a fixed phone line network is the most important communication facility needed in the community. Furthermore, a higher percentage of high educated respondents than medium or low educated ones specified that a permanent connection to the internet is the most important communication facility needed in the community.

**Figure 4.18: The most important communication facility needed in the community (o278) according to poverty (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**




### 4.3 Availability of services

Having overviewed different types of needs of the Palestinian population, it is important first to overview what services are available to Palestinians and, secondly, to see if the importance attached to the need for certain community facilities and communication facilities might be affected by the availability - or lack thereof - of certain services.

In general and as summarized in figure 4.19, below, the large majority of Palestinians are connected to an electricity network (97%) and a water network (94%), and an as large majority have in their household their own latrines, sewer or septic tank (97%). Slightly more than 40% of the respondents make use of a well, 64% are connected to a sewage disposal network, while 53% benefit from a solid waste disposal service. Concerning the availability of communication facilities, the coverage by a mobile phone network (61%) is nearly as large as the coverage of the fixed phone line network (66%). More than two thirds of the respondents specified that their households have satellite TV (69%), while 17% of the households have a permanent connection to the internet.


Figure 4.19: Availability of services in general



Hereunder, each of the services under study will be overviewed separately in order to check if their availability varies according to the different independent variables at hand.


Starting with the household connection to the electricity network, it is clear that electricity is widely available in the occupied Palestinian territory and, therefore, the only statistically significant difference that could be established was according to the poverty level of the households. As illustrated in figure 4.20, below, only 93% of the households living in extreme poverty are connected to the electricity network compared to 98% of the households with a monthly income below the poverty line and 99% of the households with a living standard above the poverty line.

Figure 4.20: Household connection to the electricity network (n174) according to poverty level (poverty3)




As for the household connection to the water network, the results in figure 4.21, below, illustrate that about the same percentage of households in the West Bank (93%) and the Gaza Strip (94%) are connected to the water network, while the percentage reaches 100% in Jerusalem. When analyzing the issue according to area of residence, one can notice that the household connection to the water network is lowest in villages (90%), followed by camps (93%), while it is the highest in cities (97%).

**Figure 4.21: Connection to the water network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060)**



In general, the results showed that 42% of the households have a well. This percentage, however, varies considerably depending on the region and area of residence of the respondent and the refugee status of the respondent. As the results in figure 4.22, below, indicate a far larger percentage of households in the West Bank (58%) than in the Gaza Strip (27%) and in Jerusalem (23%) make use of a well. This is also the case for a far larger percentage of households in villages (65%) than for those in cities (34%) and in refugee camps (25%). Lastly, a larger percentage of non-refugees (48%) than refugees (35%) make use of a well.


**Figure 4.22: Availability of a well (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060), and refugee status (o002)**



The household connection to a sewage disposal network varies according to region and area of residence, refugee status, and level of poverty of the households. While in general, 64% of the households in the occupied Palestinian territory are connected to a sewage disposal network, this is far less often the case in the West Bank (50%) than in the Gaza Strip (76%) and in Jerusalem (87%). According to area of residence, household connection to a sewage disposal network is far more frequent in refugee camps (86%) and in cities (75%) than it is in villages (36%). Furthermore, a higher percentage of refugee respondents (76%) than non-refugee respondents (55%) stated that their household is connected to a sewage disposal network. Lastly, household connection to a sewage disposal network seems to be more available in households with a living standard above the poverty line (72%) than in households below the poverty line (58%) or households that live in hardship (59%).


The findings concerning the household connection to a sewage disposal network according to refugee status and poverty level might explain why – in the previous section - a lower percentage of refugees and respondents with a monthly household income above the poverty line than non-refugees and relatively poorer respondents attached great importance to the need of a sewage network in their community.

**Figure 4.23: Household connection to a sewage disposal network (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)**



The availability in the households of their own latrines, sewer or septic tank is widespread. Still, some varying degrees of availability of latrines, a sewer or a septic tank to the households could be found according to the region in which respondents reside and the educational level attained by the respondents. As indicated in figure 4.24, below, fewer households in Jerusalem (91%) than in the West Bank (98%) and in the Gaza Strip (98%) have their own latrines, sewer or septic tank. Moreover, fewer respondents with low levels of education than those with medium or high levels of education ascertained that their household has their own latrines, sewer or septic tank.

**Figure 4.24: Availability to the household of own latrines, sewer or septic tank (o174) according to region of residence (o059) and educational level (educ)**




With regard to the availability to the household of solid waste disposal services, the results show that these services are more available in cities (57%) and camps (56%) than in villages (46%), among a higher percentage of refugees (58%) than non-refugees (50%), and among a higher percentage of households with either a monthly income above (56%) or below the poverty line (54%) than among those households facing extreme poverty (48%).<sup>1</sup>

Again, the findings concerning the availability to the household of solid waste disposal services according

<sup>1</sup> Although there is a 6% and 8% difference between the hardship cases and the households with either an income below or above the poverty line concerning the availability of solid waste disposal services, it is worth pointing out that strictly there is no statistically significant relation between those variables as the Chi square is 0.055.

to refugee status and poverty level might explain why – in the previous section - a lower percentage of respondents who are relatively better-off and the refugees than the extremely poor respondents and the non-refugees attached great importance to the need of a sewage network in their community.

**Figure 4.25: Availability to the household of solid waste disposal services (o174) according to area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)**




Moving on to the availability of more communication-related services and facilities, such as the connection to a fixed phone line network, the connection to a mobile phone network, a permanent connection to the internet, and the availability of a satellite TV in the household, one can see in the figures below, that the availability of these services to the household systematically varies according to the region and area of residence of the respondents, their poverty level and their educational attainment.

Beginning with the household connection to a fixed phone line network, the results indicate that the availability of such a service is higher in Jerusalem (85%) than in the West Bank (65%) and in the Gaza Strip (61%), and higher in cities (69%) than in villages (64%) and refugee camps (61%). Moreover, a higher percentage of respondents from households with a monthly income above the poverty line (80%) than those from households with a living standard below the poverty line (67%) and those from households living in hardship (40%) specified that their household is connected to a fixed phone line network. Lastly, the results in figure 4.26, below, show that a higher percentage of high educated respondents (77%) than medium (63%) or low (45%) educated respondents ascertained that their household is connected to a fixed phone line network.

The findings on the household connection to a fixed phone line network according to poverty level and educational level, again, could help explain why in the previous section a higher percentage of the poorer and less educated respondents than the relatively better-off and the higher educated stressed the importance of a fixed phone line network as a needed communication facility in the community.


**Figure 4.26: Household connection to a fixed phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**



Moving along to the household connection to a mobile phone network, one sees the same variety in the availability of such a service as was the case with the household connection to a fixed phone line network. As overviewed in figure 4.27, below, the highest percentage of households with a connection to a mobile phone network can be found in Jerusalem (84%), in cities (66%), among the better-off (76%), and among the higher educated (70%).

When comparing these results with the ones regarding the most important communication facility needed in the community (see the previous section), it is noticeable that the importance attached to the need of a mobile phone network is highest in the Gaza Strip, where such a service is least available to the household, and also highest among the poorer segments of society, who also seem to be least connected to a mobile phone network.


**Figure 4.27: Household connection to a mobile phone line network (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**



As for the availability of a permanent internet connection to the household, such a service seems to be most widely available in Jerusalem (28%), in cities (21%), in households with a living standard above the poverty line (24%), and among the high educated (25%).

Against the backdrop of the results regarding the most important communication facility needed in the community (see the previous section), it seems that the respondents with a high level of education and those from households that are relatively better-off who represent the segment of society that most frequently enjoys the availability of a permanent internet connection to the household, sees the potential of the availability of such a service, as it is this subgroup who also most frequently stressed the importance of such a communication facility as a need for the community.


**Figure 4.28: Availability of a permanent internet connection to the household (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**





Lastly, concerning the availability of satellite TV to the household, the results in figure 4.29, below, indicate that satellite television is most widely available in households in Jerusalem (80%), in cities (74%), among the high educated (80%) and in households with a living standard above the poverty line (80%).

**Figure 4.29: Availability of satellite TV to the household (o174) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**



## 4.4 Conclusion

The main findings concerning needs and availability of services can be summarized as below:

- Employment and food are the two most important household needs. About the same level of importance is attached to employment as a first household need in the three regions of the oPt, whilst employment is considered to be the most important household need in villages, among the hardship cases and among people having a medium level of education. Food as a first household need is most important in the Gaza Strip, among the higher educated and the relatively better-off, whilst it is considered least important in villages.
- Employment is the most important unmet household need, whilst financial assistance is the second most important unmet household need. The importance of both unmet household needs has increased since the February 2004 survey conducted for the seventh Palestinian Perceptions Report. Employment is most frequently mentioned as an unmet household need in the Gaza Strip, in cities, among non-refugees, among the poorer segments of society, among the medium educated, and by men. Financial assistance is most often referred to as an unmet household need in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among refugees, among the hardship cases, by the least educated, and by women.
- Employment and food are also the two most important community needs. Employment as a first community need is most important in the Gaza Strip and among the high educated. About the same degree of importance is attached to food as a first community need in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, whilst food is also considered to be the most important among the highest educated.
- The two most important facilities needed in the community are a water network and a sewage network. The perceived need for a water network in the community is the highest among refugees and the relatively better-off. On the opposite, the perceived need for a sewage network in the community is highest among non-refugees and among Palestinians living in hardship.
- A fixed phone line network is the most important communication facility needed in the community, while a permanent connection to the internet comes as a distant second most important communication facility. A fixed phone line network is most frequently mentioned as the most important communication facility needed in the community in Jerusalem, among refugees, among the hardship cases, and among the low educated. A permanent internet connection is most often referred to as the most important communication facility needed in the community in the West Bank, among non-refugees, among the financially better-off, and among the high educated.
- Concerning the availability of services to Palestinians, it is worth remembering that – although the availability of services often varies according to different independent variables – in general, the ten services under study in this report are widely available to the population. It is, however, interesting to see that there is a clear link between the availability – or lack thereof – of certain services and the indicated need by respondents for certain community and communication facilities.

# Chapter

# 5



## Assistance Delivered in General

Isabelle Daneels

## Introduction

When analyzing assistance, it is important to first establish the need for assistance in its different degrees. Once this is clear, one can examine the delivery of assistance itself in its different facets (types of assistance, source and value of assistance, etc). Only after this analysis, it makes sense to evaluate the provision of the various types of assistance by determining the recipients' level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the delivered assistance. All these components of assistance are the subject of analysis in this part of the report. In addition, a special section will be devoted to employment assistance in its various aspects.


### 5.1 Individual needs for assistance

While it is important to analyze the percentage of households who received assistance, the analysis becomes far more relevant when one links the reception of assistance with the household need for assistance. Such an approach, on the one hand, allows for a better understanding of where the gaps are in the distribution of assistance, and, on the other hand, provides an indication of where the targeting of assistance can be improved.

As the results in figure 5.1, below, indicate, in general, 46% of the households received assistance in the past six months. Of the remaining 54% who did not receive assistance, 29% of the households were in need of it, while 25% did not need any assistance. More concretely and compared to the results on this question in the February 2004 survey, these results indicate that in the survey conducted for the current report 6% more households received assistance, 8% less did not receive and did not need assistance (which points to an improved targeting of assistance), while 2% more did not receive assistance although they were in need of it (which points to a slight deterioration in the targeting of assistance). Overall, however, compared to the last survey, a higher percentage of households have received assistance and the targeting of such assistance seems to have slightly improved.

For the first time in this report, the households that received assistance were further divided between those who needed assistance and those who did not need it. As also illustrated in figure 5.1, below, of the 46% of households who received assistance, the large majority of 41% were in need of such assistance, while 5% of the recipients of assistance were not in need of it. In practical terms, these results show that, in general, 5% of the provided aid was ill-targeted.


Figure 5.1: Household need for assistance, in general, February 2001-November 2004




The general analysis of the provision of assistance and the household need for it can be taken a step further by examining this issue according to the various independent variables at hand.

More specifically, when looking into the household need for assistance according to region and area of residence and according to refugee status, one can notice that consistently in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among refugees, the percentage of households needing and receiving assistance is higher than in the other categories. Furthermore, as the results in figure 5.2, below, indicate, also the percentage of households that received assistance and do not need it is consistently higher in those three subgroups. Conversely, the percentage both of households that did not receive assistance, although they need it and of households that did not receive assistance and do not need it, is consistently the lowest in the Gaza Strip, in the refugee camps and among refugees.

**Figure 5.2: Household need for assistance according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002)**



**Figure 5.3: Household need for assistance according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**




When examining the household need for assistance according to the poverty and educational levels, further statistically significant relationships could be established. A closer look at the categories of the hardship cases and the low educated respondents in figure 5.3, above, reveals that these subgroups contain the largest percentage of households that received assistance and needed it, while they hold the lowest percentage of households that received assistance, although they did not need it, and the lowest percentage of households that did not receive assistance and were in no need of it. Still, it is worth pointing



out that the percentage of households that did not receive assistance, although they were in need of it in those two categories is also relatively high. In fact, the percentage of households that did not receive assistance, although they needed it is higher among hardship cases (35%) than among those with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line (30%) and the relatively better-off (26%).


A further and more specific manner to verify the need and importance of assistance is to check the evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months. As overviewed in figure 5.4, below, 24% of the respondents stated that the importance of assistance in the household budget had increased in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey, 43% declared that it did not change much, while 34% said that the importance of assistance in the household budget had decreased during that period. In other words, in general, the percentage of respondents indicating that the importance of assistance in the household budget has decreased in the past six months is larger than the percentage of respondents who specified that the importance of assistance in their household has increased in the past six months.

**Figure 5.4: Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251), in general**



When analyzing the evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months according to region of residence, the results show that only in the Gaza Strip a higher percentage of respondents said that the importance of assistance in the household budget has increased (31%) rather than decreased (24%). These results are detailed in the figure, below.


**Figure 5.5: Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) according to region of residence (o059)**



There are also noticeable differences in opinions about the evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey according to area of residence. As illustrated in figure 5.6, below, the highest percentage of respondents who specified that the importance of assistance in the household budget increased can be found in the refugee camps (31%). The opinion that the importance of assistance in the household budget has decreased in the past six months is by far more prevalent in villages (46%) than in refugee camps (35%) and in cities (27%).




**Figure 5.6: Evolution in the importance of assistance in the household budget in the past six months (o251) according to area of residence (o060)**



Respondents in the survey were not only queried about the evolution in the importance of assistance to their household budget “in the past six months”, but they were also asked to specify the importance of assistance in the household budget “since the beginning of the Intifada”.

In general, nearly half of the respondents (46%) stated that the received assistance only helps to alleviate the hardship under difficult circumstances, 17% explained that for them assistance is a useful component to the regular household budget, while 15% admitted that they could not manage without the assistance and another 10% specified that they would only be able to manage with great difficulty. Of the remaining 12% of the respondents, 9% declared that they would manage without the assistance, while another 3% said that assistance was not important to their livelihood.

**Figure 5.7: Importance of assistance in the household budget since the beginning of the Intifada (o250), in general and according to poverty level (poverty3)**



When studying the importance of assistance in the household budget since the beginning of the Intifada according to poverty level, it is clear that Palestinians facing hardship are considerably more dependent on assistance than their compatriots that live in households with a monthly income below and above the poverty line. As the results in figure 5.7, above, indicate, the highest percentage of respondents who

explained that they could not manage without assistance (24%) or that they would only be able to manage with great difficulty (13%) can be found among the hardship cases. Furthermore, least respondents facing hardship mentioned that they would manage without assistance (4%) or said that assistance is not important to their livelihood (1%).

## 5.2 Assistance distribution

Having established the need for assistance, this section will concentrate on the actual distribution of assistance, whether it concerns the assistance delivery, the value of the delivered assistance, the nature of such assistance, the providers of assistance, or the level of satisfaction with the provided assistance.

### 5.2.1 Distribution of assistance


#### 5.2.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001

Respondents were asked both whether or not they or any of the household members received any type of assistance “since the beginning of the Intifada”, and whether or not they or any of the household members received any type of assistance “in the past six months”.

In general, 51% of the respondents reported that their households received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada, which constitutes an increase of 3% since the February 2004 survey. Furthermore, in the survey conducted for the current report 44% of the respondents stated that their households received assistance in the past six months, which is an increase of 5% since the February 2004 survey.

When analyzing the issue of received assistance in the past six months according to region of residence, the results indicate that the highest percentage of households that received assistance are situated in the Gaza Strip (60%), followed by the West Bank (37%), and only then by Jerusalem (25%). Furthermore, while the percentage of households in the Gaza Strip that have received assistance in the past six months has remained stable since the February 2004 survey, the percentage of households that have received assistance has increased since then by 6% in the West Bank and by 20% in Jerusalem. These results are detailed in figure 5.8, below.


**Figure 5.8: Received assistance in the past six months (o035), in general and according to region of residence (o059), February 2001-November 2004**




### 5.2.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery

The results in figure 5.9, below, compare the answers of respondents who said that their household has received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada with the answers of the respondents who specified that their household has received assistance in the past six months according to place of residence. Logically, the percentage of households that received assistance in the past six months is lower in all places of residence than the percentage of households that have received assistance since the outbreak of the Intifada. The results also indicate that the highest percentage of assistance received –whether in the past six months or since the beginning of the Intifada – can be found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, closely followed by the West Bank refugee camps. Furthermore, and both concerning received assistance in the past six months and received assistance since the start of the Intifada, the percentage of received assistance is significantly higher outside refugee camps in the Gaza Strip than it is outside refugee camps in the West Bank.

**Figure 5.9: Percentage of received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada (o035b) and during the past six months (o035) according to place of residence (place)**



**Figure 5.10: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to area of residence (o060), February 2001–November 2004**



When examining the geographical trends in the delivery of assistance according to area of residence, more interesting results appear. As detailed in figure 5.10, above, the percentage of respondents in refugee camps who declared that their household has received assistance in the past six months has decreased by 4% since the February 2004 survey and has reached its lowest level since November 2001. Furthermore,


the percentage of respondents in villages who stated that their household has received assistance in the past six months has increased by 11% since the February 2004 survey. These results help to understand the earlier findings that - in comparison to February 2004 – the delivery of assistance in the West Bank has increased, while this delivery has remained stable in the Gaza Strip as there are more camp residents and fewer villages in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Lastly, the delivery of assistance in cities since the November 2001 survey until the survey conducted for the current report follows about the same path as the delivery of assistance to the overall population during this time-frame.

### 5.2.1.3 Targeting the poor and the refugees

Logically one would assume that the provision of assistance mainly concentrates on the poorer segments of society and, perhaps, also on the refugee population as on average they are poorer than the non-refugee Palestinians. However, as the analysis below will indicate, in reality the picture is not always as straightforward.

When examining the percentage of the population who received assistance in the past six months according to poverty level, it is clear that the highest percentage of respondents who received assistance in the past six months are those living in hardship, whilst the lowest percentage are the households with a living standard above the poverty line. Still, as illustrated in figure 5.11, below, major changes have occurred in the delivery of assistance since the February 2004 survey. More specifically, the results show that since the February 2004 survey assistance delivery to Palestinians facing hardship has decreased by 6%, while the delivery of assistance to Palestinians with a living standard above the poverty line has increased by 9%. Assistance to respondents with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line has increased by 6%. As such, it appears that although the percentage of respondents who received assistance in the past six months has increased considerably since the February 2004 survey, the main additional beneficiaries of such assistance are not the hardship cases as one would expect, but the households with a living standard above the poverty line.

**Figure 5.11: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to poverty level (poverty3), February 2001-November 2004**




Analysis of the issue of received assistance in the past six months according to refugee status reveals that - as has traditionally been the case - a far higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees have received assistance. Since the February 2004 survey the percentage of non-refugees receiving assistance has increased slightly more than the percentage of refugees receiving assistance. The results are detailed in table 5.1, below.

**Table 5.1: Percentage of the total population who received assistance in the past six months (o035) according to refugee status (o002), November 2001-November 2004**

	Date	Refugee status	
		Refugees	Non-refugees
Received assistance in the past six months	November 2004	58%	33%
	February 2004	54%	27%
	July 2003	68%	32%
	November 2002	67%	30%
	November 2001	64%	23%

When one takes the analysis a step further and looks into the percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months according to poverty level, the results show that the extremely poor refugees are more catered for than the extremely poor non-refugees. Indeed, whereas 75% of the refugee hardship cases have received assistance in a six month time-frame, this is the case for only 52% of the non-refugee hardship cases. Similarly, concerning the households with a living standard that falls below the poverty line, 74% of the refugees in this category received assistance compared to 39% of the non-refugees. In addition to the fact that quite a high percentage of the relatively better-off segments of society have received assistance in the six months prior to the survey, this is again more the case for the refugees in this category than for the non-refugees. These findings are overviewed in figure 5.12, below.


**Figure 5.12: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) according to refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3), November 2002-November 2004**



As was established previously in this chapter, assistance delivery in the six months prior to the survey conducted for this report had decreased in refugee camps, but it still had increased for refugees. The analysis of assistance delivery to refugees and non-refugees according to place of residence can help to understand these findings. As overviewed in figure 5.13, below, even outside the camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a higher percentage of refugees than non-refugees receive assistance. Moreover, the visible gap in assistance delivery between refugees and non-refugees residing outside refugee camps is more pronounced in the Gaza Strip (34%) than in the West Bank (9%). Lastly, compared to the results in the February 2004 survey, irrespective of the place of residence in the oPt, the delivery of assistance to

refugees has increased to a larger extent than compared to this delivery to non-refugees.

**Figure 5.13: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance in the past six months (o035) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004**



## 5.2.2 The value of delivered assistance

After analyzing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is important to consider the value of the distributed assistance, in general, and then for the most important types of assistance. However, before doing so, it is worth remembering that the *real* value of the assistance disbursements made in Palestine does not fall in the scope of the analysis. Rather the analysis evolves around the *perceived value* of the assistance received in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey conducted for this report. The perceived value of the delivered assistance will be presented in New Israeli Shekels (NIS). At the time of the writing of this report, currency rates were as follows:

**NIS 100 = US\$ 23.25 (US Dollars) = EUR 17.5 (Euro) = CHF 27 (Swiss Francs)**

### 5.2.2.1 The median value of various assistance types and their evolution over time

In figure 5.14, below, the median values<sup>1</sup> of the reported types of assistance received by the household are presented in the time-frame between the February 2001 survey and the November 2004 survey. In the figure, the median values of food, financial, employment, in-kind, coupon and medical assistance are presented as well as the median values for all those types of assistance combined ("any type of assistance").


As displayed in figure 5.14, below, the total value of the received assistance has increased almost constantly since February 2001 and stands for the current report at NIS 400. Concerning the various types of received assistance, the median value of food assistance has not increased since the February 2004 survey and is NIS 200, while the median value of financial assistance has increased by NIS 100 since February 2004 and reaches NIS 600. The median value of employment assistance has remained stable at NIS 900 since February 2004, while the median value of medical assistance reaches NIS 150. The median values of in-

<sup>1</sup> The median was used instead of the mean because it is far more robust for the extreme values that were sometimes reported by the respondents. The medians were only calculated if the respondents gave a value for the received assistance types. Furthermore, medians based on less than 20 cases are not used nor displayed in the analysis.



kind assistance and coupon assistance are not provided because they were respectively mentioned only on 4 and 9 occasions.

Figure 5.14: The median value of the received assistance (o036), February 2001–November 2004



#### 5.2.2.2 Differences according to geographical area and poverty

When looking into the median of the total reported value of received assistance according to region of residence, it is clear that the value is far higher in Jerusalem with NIS 800 (N is only 44), than it is in the West Bank (NIS 396) and in the Gaza Strip (NIS 380). Still, compared to the results in February 2004, the median values have increased both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but especially so in the latter region (from NIS 260 to NIS 380).

There are also significant differences in the total reported value of assistance according to place of residence. As detailed in table 5.2, below, the total value of assistance is highest outside refugee camps, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (NIS 400). While in the February 2004 survey the value of received assistance was lower in the Gaza camps (NIS 200) than in the West Bank refugee camps (NIS 300), the opposite results were obtained in the survey conducted for the current report.


At this stage it is worth mentioning that there were no statistically significant differences concerning the total reported value of assistance according to the area of residence and the refugee status of the recipients of assistance.

Table 5.2: Median value of received assistance (o036v1v) according to place of residence (place)

Mentioned assistance types: value in NIS		
Place of residence	N	Median
West Bank outside camps	237	NIS 400
West Bank refugee camps	29	NIS 286
Jerusalem	44	NIS 800
Gaza Strip outside camps	193	NIS 400
Gaza Strip refugee camps	115	NIS 320
<b>Total</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>NIS 400</b>

Figure 5.15, below, depicts the median value of assistance according to the poverty level of the recipients over a time-span of three years. The analysis over time clearly shows that the median value of assistance has increased considerably for the three poverty categories since November 2001. However, it is important to notice that, whereas in February 2004 the median value of assistance to hardship cases was higher than that of the assistance delivered to respondents below the poverty line and above the poverty line, the picture has reversed since. In the November 2004 survey, the median value of assistance to hardship cases remained stable at NIS 350, while the median value of assistance to recipients with a living standard below and above the poverty line has increased to NIS 400, which signifies an increase in the median value of about NIS 100.


Figure 5.15: Median value of the received assistance (o036v1v) according to poverty level (poverty3), November 2001-November 2004



### 5.2.3 Nature of delivered assistance

Having analyzed the distribution of assistance as well as its perceived value, the focus in this section will be on the various types of delivered assistance.

Figure 5.16: Type of received assistance (o036), in general, February 2001-November 2004




In general, and as can be discerned from figure 5.16, above, about 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the households in the oPt have received food assistance, 13% have received financial assistance, while 9% have benefited from employment assistance. None of the remaining types of assistance were received by more than 3% of the respondents in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey.

More specifically, the percentage of the recipients of food assistance has remained quite stable since the February 2004 survey. However, the percentages of the distribution of both financial assistance and employment assistance have increased by respectively 4% and 6%. The distribution of coupon assistance and in-kind assistance has been reduced to quasi zero.

As food assistance is the largest type of delivered assistance, it will be discussed in detail in a separate part (Part Six) of this report. For in-kind, coupon and medical assistance, the small number of cases of these types of assistance does not allow any significant or relevant analysis. As such, in this section of the report, only the percentages of the total population who received financial and employment assistance will be analyzed further according to the various significant independent variables at hand.

Concerning financial assistance, statistically significant differences could be established in the percentage of the total population who received such assistance according to region and area of residence, place of residence, refugee status and poverty level. More specifically, the highest percentages of respondents receiving financial assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey can be found in the Gaza Strip (21%), in refugee camps (18%), and especially in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip (24%). Furthermore, financial assistance was delivered to a higher percentage of refugees (16%) than non-refugees (10%), and to a higher percentage of households facing hardship (17%) and living below the poverty line (17%) than to households with a living standard above the poverty line (7%). These results are detailed in figure 5.17, below.

**Figure 5.17: Received financial assistance (o036fin) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)**



Concerning received employment assistance<sup>2</sup>, no statistically significant differences could be detected, except according to poverty level. As overviewed in table 5.3, below, 10% of the households living in

<sup>2</sup> Employment assistance and its different types will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.3 of this chapter.

hardship, 13% of the households with an monthly income below the poverty line, and 5% of the households with a living standard above the poverty line have received employment assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey conducted for this report.

Table 5.3: Received employment assistance (o036emp) according to poverty level (poverty3)


	Received employment assistance		Total
	No	Yes	
Hardship cases	90%	10%	100%
Below poverty line	87%	13%	100%
Above poverty line	95%	5%	100%
Total	91%	9%	100%

## 5.2.4 Sources of assistance

This section will concentrate on the *perceived* sources of assistance. Once again, it is important to stress that the analysis concerns the *perceptions* by Palestinians on which organizations or bodies provide them with assistance. As such, it is in no way within the aim of this chapter to provide the actual and broader picture of the sources behind assistance delivery in the oPt. However, focusing on the perceived sources of assistance to the Palestinian households is useful as it allows one to comprehend the smaller picture that shows which sources of assistance are visible to the Palestinian public.

In general, when looking at the main sources of received assistance, the main provider remains UNRWA (20%), followed by the Palestinian Authority (13%), and - in third place - the trade unions (9%). Concerning the remaining sources of assistance delivery, the visibility of NGOs and of private sources has increased by respectively 2% since February 2004, while the visibility of Islamic organizations (- 1%), international organizations (- 3%) and Arab organizations/governments (- 1%) has decreased within that time-frame.

Figure 5.18: Main sources of received assistance (o036t), in general, February 2001-November 2004




As illustrated in figure 5.18, above, since February 2001, UNRWA has been the single most cited source of assistance. As for the Palestinian Authority, the percentage of respondents that perceive it as the source

of their received assistance has increased by 3% since February 2004. Lastly, concerning the trade unions as a perceived source of received assistance, they were only included in the surveys conducted for the Perception reports since November 2001. After a sharp decrease in the visibility of trade unions as sources of received assistance between November 2002 and February 2004, recently their visibility seems to be improving.

From the general overview of the main sources of assistance, one can perform analyses that provide a better picture of where and to which subgroups of Palestinian society the various assistance providers have been delivering their assistance. These profiles of the beneficiaries of assistance will be presented in the remainder of this section for the following providers: The Palestinian Authority/municipalities, UNRWA, trade unions, NGOs, Islamic organizations, and international organizations.


Starting off with the Palestinian Authority/municipalities, the largest percentages of the beneficiaries of their assistance can be found in the West Bank (57%), in cities (54%), among non-refugees (68%), and among the poorer segments within Palestinian society. As detailed in figure 5.19, below, 38% of the hardship cases and 37% of the households with a monthly income below the poverty line reported the PA/municipalities as their sources of assistance.

**Figure 5.19: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the Palestinian Authority/municipalities (o036tpna) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)**




Whereas the PA/municipalities seem to have a larger percentage of beneficiaries in the West Bank and among non-refugees, the majority of UNRWA's beneficiaries reside in the Gaza Strip (69%) and are refugees (94%). Confirming that UNRWA's assistance is far from limited to refugee camps is the composition of its beneficiaries according to area of residence. As indicated in figure 5.20, below, 47% of UNRWA's beneficiaries live in cities, 42% reside in refugee camps, and 11% can be found in villages. Whereas the PA quite evenly provides assistance to households living in hardship and to households with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line, UNRWA's beneficiaries are more often classified as "below the poverty line" (47%) than as "hardship cases" (29%). As was the case with the PA, about 1/4<sup>th</sup> of UNRWA's beneficiaries have a monthly household income that is above the poverty line.

Figure 5.20: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from UNRWA (o036tunr) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)



As was the case with the beneficiaries of UNRWA's assistance, the majority of the beneficiaries of assistance received from trade unions can also be found in the Gaza Strip (56%), and more in cities (49%) than in refugee camps (26%) and villages (25%). Furthermore, the beneficiaries of assistance from trade unions are quite evenly divided between refugees (49%) and non-refugees (51%). As for the composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from trade unions according to poverty level, compared to the beneficiaries of assistance from the PA and UNRWA, there is a lower percentage of beneficiaries of trade union assistance with a household income above the poverty line (18%).


Figure 5.21: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from the trade unions (o036ttu) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)



Very much like the PA/municipalities, NGOs concentrate their assistance mostly in the West Bank (72%), more in cities (52%) than in villages (41%) and in refugee camps (7%), and more on non-refugees (79%) than on refugees (21%). NGOs have as many beneficiaries facing hardship (39%) as beneficiaries with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line (39%). These findings are detailed in figure 5.22, below.




Figure 5.22: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from NGOs (o036tngo) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)




As for the composition of beneficiaries of assistance from Islamic organizations, they are mainly residing in the Gaza Strip (79%) and more in cities (54%) than in refugee camps (37%) and villages (9%). Islamic organizations also provide more assistance to refugees (59%) than to non-refugees (41%). Lastly, of all the assistance providers under review, assistance from Islamic organizations is best targeted towards the households with a monthly income below the poverty line (47%) and the hardship cases (36%). As indicated in the figure, below, only 17% of the beneficiaries of assistance from Islamic organizations have a living standard above the poverty line.

Figure 5.23: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from Islamic organizations (o036tisI) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)



Lastly, concerning the beneficiaries of assistance provided by international organizations and in comparison with the beneficiaries of other main providers of assistance that were discussed above, the international organizations have the largest percentage of beneficiaries that reside in Jerusalem (25%) and the largest percentage of beneficiaries that enjoy a living standard above the poverty line (53%). Moreover, the results in figure 5.24, below, show that although there are less beneficiaries of assistance from international organizations in refugee camps (22%) than in villages (28%) and cities (50%), there is a larger percentage of refugees (67%) than non-refugees (33%) who specified that international organizations provided them with assistance.

**Figure 5.24: Composition of the beneficiaries of assistance received from international organizations (o036tio) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), and poverty level (poverty3)**




### 5.2.5 The level of satisfaction with the provided assistance

Having looked into assistance in all its facets in the previous sections of this chapter, this section will provide an evaluation of the provided assistance by examining the respondents' level of satisfaction with the assistance that they have received.

In general, the majority of the beneficiaries of assistance evaluate this provision positively. More concretely, 3% of the beneficiaries are very satisfied with the received assistance and 53% are satisfied, while 36% are dissatisfied with the received assistance and 9% are very dissatisfied with it. Compared to February 2004, the evaluation of assistance by its beneficiaries is slightly less favorable. Indeed, although the percentage of the satisfied and dissatisfied beneficiaries has remained quite stable since February 2004, the percentage of the very satisfied and the very dissatisfied have swapped places. The 9% of beneficiaries who were very satisfied with the received assistance in February 2004 shrunk to a mere 2% in the survey conducted for the current report. In addition, the 2% of very dissatisfied beneficiaries in February 2004 have increased to 9% in the November 2004 survey. Still, in comparison to the February 2001 survey the general level of satisfaction with the provided assistance has considerably improved. Whereas at that time the majority of 70% of the recipients of assistance were dissatisfied with it, in the November 2004 survey conducted for this report 44% remain dissatisfied. These findings are detailed in figure 5.25, below.

**Figure 5.25: Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037), in general, February 2001-November 2004**




Although further analysis of the results on the level of satisfaction with received assistance has shown that the general level of satisfaction does not differ according to region, area or place of residence, nor does it vary according to refugee status, educational level or age, it does fluctuate according to the poverty level of the households.

A comparative look between the results on the evaluation of received assistance between February 2004 and November 2004 reveals that the percentage of very dissatisfied households living in hardship has increased by 6% from 2% to 8%, while the percentage of very satisfied households in this subgroup has decreased by 9% from 11% to 2%. In addition, the percentage of the satisfied households that are classified as being above the poverty line has increased from 54% to 68% between the February 2004 and the November 2004 survey.

When one merely concentrates on the results of the November 2004 survey in figure 5.26, below, it is clear that the households living in hardship are far less satisfied with the received assistance than those with a living standard above the poverty line. More concretely, whereas the majority of 52% of the beneficiaries who live in hardship evaluate the received assistance negatively, “only” 27% of those with a monthly household income above the poverty line do so.

The significantly more negative evaluation of received assistance by the extremely poor in comparison to the relatively better-off could be partly explained by the decrease in the percentage of the former and the increase in the percentage of the latter receiving assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey (see figure 5.11 in section 5.2.1.3 above). In addition, the obvious greater discontent among the extremely poor than among the better-off could also be further explained by the perceived lower median value of the received assistance by the former in comparison to the median value of the received assistance by the latter (see figure 5.15 in section 5.2.2 above).

**Figure 5.26: Level of satisfaction with the received assistance (o037) according to poverty level (poverty3), February 2004-November 2004**



Respondents who were dissatisfied with the received assistance were asked to state the reason behind their negative evaluation. In general, 48% of the dissatisfied beneficiaries of assistance were dissatisfied because of the low frequency of the assistance, 33% were discontented because of the small quantity of the received assistance, while another 15% were unhappy with the quality of the received assistance. The results of the reasons behind the negative evaluation of the received assistance are quite different from the results in the February 2004 survey. Since then, the discontentment because of the low frequency of the assistance has decreased by 12% and the dissatisfaction because of the bad quality of the assistance


has also declined by 2%. It is the dissatisfaction with the small quantity of the received assistance that has increased by 12% since February 2004.

When one examines the reasons behind dissatisfaction with received assistance according to poverty level, more significant differences appear. The results in figure 5.27, below, show that dissatisfaction with assistance because of the small quantity and the bad quality of the received assistance is particularly high in the households with a living standard above the poverty line and lowest in the households living in hardship. It is in the latter (58%) that the concern about the frequency of the assistance is a lot higher than in households that are relatively better-off (24%). One could perhaps even argue from these results that the need for assistance in the extremely poor households is so dire that they do not really care about the quantity or quality of the assistance, as long as they receive the assistance frequently enough and on a regular basis.

In any case, to sum up, for the extremely poor households and those with a living standard below the poverty line, the low frequency of the provided assistance is by far the main reason for their dissatisfaction, followed by the small quantity of the assistance, and only in last instance because of the poor quality. The main concern for the households with a monthly income above the poverty line is the small quantity of the assistance, followed by the poor quality of it, and only in third place because of the low frequency of the distribution of assistance.

Lastly, although not visualized in the figure below, it is worth noting the differences in the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with received assistance according to the region and area of residence of the beneficiaries, and according to their refugee status. The data reveal that concern about the low frequency of assistance is most prevalent in the Gaza Strip (58%), in refugee camps (55%) and among refugees (52%). The small quantity of assistance is of greatest concern to beneficiaries in the West Bank (44%), those in villages (43%), and among non-refugees (45%). As for the poor quality of assistance, the level of dissatisfaction is similar in the West Bank (15%) and the Gaza Strip (15%), while it is most pronounced in refugee camps (23%) and among refugees (20%).


**Figure 5.27: Reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received assistance (o123), in general, February 2004-November 2004, and according to poverty level (poverty3)**



Finally, respondents were not only queried about their level of satisfaction with all the types of assistance combined, but also about their evaluation of specific types of received assistance. However, the evaluation of food assistance will be discussed in detail in Part Six of this report. Employment assistance in its several aspects and the perceptions about such type of assistance will be discussed in section 5.3, below. As for in-kind and coupon assistance, there were too few cases in the November 2004 survey to be able to analyze these types of assistance. As such, the only remaining analysis concerns the general level of satisfaction with the provided financial assistance and medical assistance. Here, once more, the analysis has to be kept on a general level as all cross-tabulations with the various independent variables at hand proved to be statistically insignificant.

Concerning financial assistance, the large majority of 77% of the beneficiaries evaluated this type of assistance positively (respectively 6% were very satisfied and 71% were satisfied). Of those who viewed received financial assistance in a less favorable manner, 20% were dissatisfied, while the remaining 2% were very dissatisfied. The results in figure 5.28, below, also show the level of satisfaction with received medical assistance, with 69% of satisfied beneficiaries, 29% of dissatisfied beneficiaries and 2% of very dissatisfied recipients of such type of assistance.

**Figure 5.28: Level of satisfaction with financial (o036fint) and medical assistance (o036medt), in general**



## 5.3 Employment assistance

As employment assistance has gained importance since the beginning of the Intifada, as the analysis tackles both employment assistance received personally and received by the household, and as employment assistance is divided into different types of such assistance (long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds, and resources for the self-employed), it deserves special attention in a separate section of this chapter.

At this stage it is also worth remembering that in Part Four of this report on needs and infrastructure, employment was the top priority for the household and for the community. Employment in the November 2004 survey also remained the most important unmet household need.

### 5.3.1 In general

Since the beginning of the Intifada, unemployment (and consequently poverty levels) has risen dramatically. As a result, several new or intensified efforts were taken to provide employment assistance to the Palestinians, albeit in an 'artificial' economic environment that is characterized by closures, checkpoints, movement restrictions of persons and goods, restricted possibilities for export, and so on.

The efforts to alleviate the unemployment rates in the oPt are noticeable in the surveys conducted for the

Perceptions reports. As illustrated in figure 5.29, below, both the percentages of employment assistance received by the household and employment assistance received personally have been increasing over time. More specifically, whereas in February 2004, 22% of the respondents said that their household has received employment assistance in the six months prior to the survey, this was the case for 29% in the survey conducted for the current report. Similarly, concerning personal employment assistance, the percentage of respondents who specified that they had personally benefited from such assistance increased from 10% in the February 2004 survey to 18% in the November 2004 survey.

**Figure 5.29: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) and personally (o024), in general, November 2002-November 2004**





Figure 5.30, below, presents the differential evolution of household employment assistance since February 2004 according to place of residence. The results clearly indicate an increase in received household assistance in all places of residence, except in the Gaza refugee camps where such assistance remained stable since February 2004. The largest increase of beneficiaries of household employment assistance occurred in the West Bank refugee camps, where between February 2004 and November 2004 the percentage increased from 9% to 33%. Still, the highest percentage of beneficiaries of household assistance remains to be found in the Gaza refugee camps (45%), followed by the Gaza Strip outside camps (34%), and only then the West Bank refugee camps (33%). In the West Bank outside camps, 26% of the respondents reported that their household had received employment assistance, while this was the case for 20% of the Jerusalem respondents. As such, one can easily deduce from these findings that household employment assistance remains the highest in the Gaza Strip, although between February 2004 and November 2004, the percentages of such assistance have increased far more in the West Bank and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 5.30: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) according to place of residence (place), February 2004-November 2004**






### 5.3.2 Types of employment assistance

Figure 5.31, below, provides an insight into the various types of personal and household employment assistance, and compares the distribution of the answers on those types of employment assistance between February 2004 and November 2004.

With regard to household employment assistance, 13% of household beneficiaries received long-term employment, 38% obtained a short-term job, 40% benefited from unemployment funds, while the remaining 9% received resources for the self-employed in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. In comparison with the February 2004 results, the proportion of long-term employment has increased by 3%, the proportion of received short-term employment has increased by 2%, while the proportion of received unemployment funds has decreased by 4% and that of received resources for the self-employed has decreased by 1%.


With regard to personal employment assistance, 10% of personal beneficiaries received long-term employment, 35% obtained a short-term job, 46% benefited from unemployment funds, while the remaining 9% received resources for the self-employed in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. In comparison with the February 2004 results, the proportion of long-term employment has increased by 3%, the proportions of received short-term employment and that of received unemployment funds have remained stable, while the proportion of received resources for the self-employed has decreased by 3%.

**Figure 5.31: Types of household (o026) and personal (o024) assistance, February 2004-November 2004**




When looking at the various types of employment assistance from a different perspective, it is clear that since February 2004 all types of received household employment assistance have increased. As overviewed in figure 5.32, below, the percentage of received long-term jobs by the household has doubled since February 2004. Moreover, in comparison to the February 2004 survey, an additional 6% of the respondents in the November 2004 survey specified that their household had benefited from short-term jobs and an additional 5% reported that their household had received unemployment funds. Between February 2004 and November 2004, the percentage of households receiving resources for the self-employed increased only slightly by 1%.

Figure 5.32: Types of employment received by the household (o026a, b, c, d), in general, February 2004-November 2004




When examining the various types of received household employment assistance according to place of residence, it appears that the highest percentage of households that have received all these types of assistance are residing in the Gaza refugee camps, while the lowest percentage of households that have received all these types of assistance are residing in Jerusalem. More in detail, long-term job distribution is considerably higher in the Gaza and West Bank refugee camps (respectively 16% and 10%) than outside the camps in those regions. The same is valid for short-term jobs. Also apparent from the results in figure 5.33, below, is that the distribution of unemployment funds is about the same to households inside and outside camps in the West Bank, while it is considerable higher in the Gaza Strip, especially inside the refugee camps. Finally, the distribution of resources for the self-employed is about 4-5% in all places of residence.

Figure 5.33: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to place of residence (place)



Finally, concerning the received household employment assistance according to poverty level, in general, a far higher percentage of households living in hardship (45%) and below the poverty line (37%) than those with a living standard above the poverty line (15%) have benefited from such assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. As detailed in figure 5.34, below, the most marked differences between the extremely poor and the poor households, on the one hand, and the relatively better-off households, on the other hand, concerns the received short-term jobs and the unemployment funds, whereby a far higher percentage of the former than the latter have benefited from such types of employment assistance. There are no such striking differences across the poverty levels concerning the distribution of resources for the self-employed. Finally, concerning long-term jobs, twice as many households facing hardship (8%) than those with a living standard above the poverty line (4%) have benefited from such type of employment assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey.

Figure 5.34: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026, o026a, b, c, d) according to poverty level (poverty3)




### 5.3.3 Sources of employment assistance

Having overviewed the distribution of the various types of assistance, in this section the perceived providers of employment assistance will be briefly overviewed.

Figure 5.35, below, details the mentioned sources of employment assistance that was personally provided to the respondent, both in the February 2004 survey and in the November 2004 survey.

In the survey conducted for this report, it is clear that UNRWA is the main perceived provider of personal employment assistance. Moreover, compared to February 2004, 7% more respondents mentioned UNRWA as the source of their personal employment assistance. The second main perceived provider of personal employment assistance are the trade unions (16%), closely followed by the Palestinian Authority (15%). Both trade unions and the Palestinian Authority were mentioned by respectively 6% less respondents in November 2004 than in February 2004. However, in parallel to the employment provision by the PA, it is also important to mention the increase by 4% of the provision of personal employment assistance provided by municipalities, from 10% in February 2004 to 14% in November 2004. Lastly, it is worth noting the increased visibility of international organizations as providers of personal employment in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. Whereas a mere 2% of the respondents in February 2004 mentioned international organizations as the sources of their personal employment assistance, this is the case for 7% of the respondents in November 2004.

Figure 5.35: Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), in general, February 2004-November 2004




### 5.3.4 Level of satisfaction with employment assistance

The beneficiaries of employment assistance were also asked to evaluate this type of assistance. Those who evaluated employment assistance negatively, were asked to explain the reasons behind their dissatisfaction.

In general, a majority of 59% of the employment assistance beneficiaries evaluated it positively, while the remaining 41% of the beneficiaries held a more negative view. As the results detailed in figure 5.36, below, indicate, the level of satisfaction with the provided employment assistance has improved substantially over time.


Although not portrayed in the figure, below, it is worth mentioning that the level of satisfaction with the received employment assistance is clearly influenced by the poverty level of the households, whereby the level of dissatisfaction with such assistance increases in parallel with increased levels of poverty. More specifically, whereas 52% of the extremely poor respondents and 59% of the respondents in households with a monthly income below the poverty line evaluated the received employment assistance positively, this is the case for 69% of the respondents in households with a living standard above the poverty line.

**Figure 5.36: Level of satisfaction with employment assistance, received personally and/or by other household members (o025), in general, February 2004-november 2004**



As for the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance, 38% of the beneficiaries are dissatisfied because the amount is too little, while 59% of them are dissatisfied because the employment period is very short. Compared to the results in the February 2004 survey, there is an increase of 10% in the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance because the amount is too little, while there is a decrease of 6% in the dissatisfaction with employment assistance because the employment period is very short. These findings are overviewed in figure 5.37, below. On a final note, the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance do not vary when analyzed according to any of the independent variables at hand.

**Figure 5.37: Reasons behind dissatisfaction with the received employment assistance (o025d), in general, February 2004-November 2004**



## 5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, there are several findings with regard to the delivered assistance that are worth remembering. They are summarized in the bullets, below:

- In general, 46% of the households received assistance in the six months prior to the November survey. Of these 46%, 41% were in need of such assistance, while 5% of the recipients were not in need of it. Of the 54% who did not receive assistance, 29% of the households were in need of it, while 25% did not need any assistance. Overall and compared to the February 2004 survey, a higher percentage of households have received assistance and the targeting of such assistance seems to have slightly improved.
- The percentage of respondents indicating that the importance of assistance in the household budget has decreased in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey is larger than the percentage of respondents who specified that the importance of assistance in their household budget has increased during that period.
- In general, 51% of the respondents reported that their households received assistance since the beginning of the Intifada, while 44% stated that their households received assistance in the six months prior to the November 2004 survey. This constitutes an increase of 5% since the February 2004 survey. The highest percentage of households receiving assistance in the six months prior to the survey can be found in the Gaza Strip, in the refugee camps, among refugees and among the poorer segments of society.
- The total perceived median value of the received assistance has increased almost constantly since the outbreak of the Intifada and stands for the current report at NIS 400. The total reported median value of assistance is the lowest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, and among the extremely poor Palestinian households.
- Concerning the various types of delivered assistance, about 1/3<sup>rd</sup> of the households in the oPt have received food assistance, 13% have received financial assistance, while 9% have benefited from employment assistance. The percentage of recipients of food assistance has remained quite stable since the February 2004 survey, while the percentages of the distribution of both financial and employment assistance have increased substantially. A mere 3% of the households received medical assistance, while only 1% of the households received in-kind assistance.
- Regarding the main perceived sources of received assistance, the main provider remains UNRWA, followed by the Palestinian Authority, and – in third place – the trade unions. The visibility of NGOs and of private sources as providers of assistance has increased since February 2004, while the visibility of Islamic organizations, international organizations and Arab organizations/governments has decreased within that time-frame.
- A majority of 56% of the beneficiaries of assistance evaluate the provided assistance positively, while 44% evaluate it negatively. This constitutes a slightly less favorable evaluation of the provided assistance than in February 2004, but it is still way more positive than in the beginning of the Intifada. A majority of 52% of the extremely poor households evaluate the received assistance negatively, compared to 27% of those with a monthly household income above the poverty line.
- Concerning the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the received assistance, 48% of the dissatisfied beneficiaries were discontented because of the low frequency of the assistance, 33% were dissatisfied because of the small quantity of the received assistance, while another 15% were unhappy with the quality of the received assistance.

- Both percentages of employment assistance received by the household and received personally have increased since the February 2004 survey. Employment assistance remains the highest in the Gaza Strip, although between February 2004 and November 2004, the percentages of such assistance have increased far more in the west Bank and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, a far higher percentage of extremely poor and poor households than the relatively better-off households have received employment assistance. Since February 2004, all types of received employment assistance under study – whether it concerns long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds or resources for the self-employed – have increased. UNRWA is the main perceived provider of employment assistance, followed by the trade unions, which are closely followed by the Palestinian Authority. The visibility of municipalities and international organizations as providers of employment assistance has increased since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, a majority of the 59% of employment assistance beneficiaries evaluated it positively, while the remaining 41% of the beneficiaries held a more negative view. The level of dissatisfaction with employment assistance increases in parallel with the increased levels of poverty. As for the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with employment assistance, 59% are dissatisfied because the employment period is very short, while 38% are dissatisfied because the amount is too little.



# Chapter

# 6



# Food

Jamil Rabah

## Introduction


Food assistance is one of the main types of assistance that is delivered to the Palestinian people. Traditionally, food was distributed primarily by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine People (UNRWA) as well as by a few other international agencies. The deterioration of the living conditions in the past four years that resulted from the strict closure of the oPt and the subsequent increase in unemployment and the reduction in the income sources of the Palestinian households, prompted other local and international organizations to intervene and to intensify their relief efforts to the Palestinian people.

This chapter will examine the perceptions of the Palestinian public with respect to the households' food situation, food assistance, targeting of food assistance, sources and value of food assistance, and the level of satisfaction. However, an assessment of the extent to which the Palestinians prioritize the need for food, relative to other priorities, will provide an overview of the food situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

### 6.1 Need for food

The percentage of the Palestinians who stated that food is the main priority of the Palestinian households has increased rather sharply. As explained in figure 6.1, below, 30% of the respondents in November 2004 stated that food is the main priority of their household compared to 16% in February 2004, an increase of 14% within an eight month period. Moreover, when adding the two first most important priorities, food comes out more often than any other need, including the need for employment, despite the fact that the need for employment emerged as the top most important need for the Palestinian households with 44% of the respondents identifying employment as their household's main priority.

**Figure 6.1 The two most important needs of the Palestinian households (o079), a comparison between February 2004 and November 2004**



Food, as a first priority, differs according to the different sectors and locations of the Palestinian population. As can be seen in figure 6.2, below, the above the poverty line respondents, for example, stated that

food is the main household need with about 33% of them stating that food is the most important household need compared to 23% of the hardship cases. Also noticeable is the higher proportion of higher educated respondents, city dwellers, refugees, and Gaza Strip non-camp respondents than their counterparts who identified food as their households' most important need.

Figure 6.2 Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty (poverty3), educational level (educ), age (agec), and refugee status (o002)






Figure 6.3 Most important unmet need of the Palestinian households (o180)



The need for food comes even clearer when respondents were asked what their household's most important unmet need is. As illustrated in figure 6.3, above, 15% of the respondents identified food as the most important unmet need. This can imply that approximately 15% of the Palestinian households recognize food as their main need that is not even met. When analyzing this question according to a number of explanatory variables, it shows that food as an unmet need is highest among those who are below the poverty line (17%), among refugees (15%), among city and refugee camp respondents (19%), and among the Gaza Strip non-camp respondents (18%).

The importance of food to the households is also evident when respondents were asked to state what they perceive as the most important need of their community. Again, food came out the second most important after employment with 16% of the respondents considering food as the most important need of the community they live in. However, the percentage reached 32% when the respondents were prompted to state what they believe is the second most important need of their community. These results are described in figure 6.4, below.


**Figure 6.4 The two most important needs of the community (o080)**



## 6.2 Change in household food consumption

An analysis of the changes in the consumption patterns of various food items provides an indication about the quality of food intake. When comparing the results of the food consumption patterns between February and November 2004, not much has changed with the exception of fruits and vegetables where it seems that the decrease in the consumption of these food items was much higher in November 2004 than in February 2004. Whereas 41% of the respondents said that their consumption of fruits and vegetables had increased in February 2004, the percentage is only 13% in November 2004. The changes in food consumption are outlined in figure 6.5, below.


**Figure 6.5 Change in the consumption of various food items in the household (o081), comparison between February 2004 and November 2004**



### 6.2.1 Change in household food consumption according to poverty

Although the food consumption of various food items has generally remained relatively unchanged, further examination of food consumption reveals that while the consumption of dairy and meat products remained unchanged, it is clear that not much improvement has occurred, especially not for the Palestinian households who live below the poverty line. As illustrated in figure 6.6, below, respondents living in abject poverty feel that 63% of their consumption of dairy products and 70% of their meat consumption has decreased in the six months prior to November 2004.

Figure 6.6 Change in consumption of dairy products (o081v1a) and meat (o081v1b) according to the poverty level (poverty3)




### 6.3 The most needed food items in the household

It is evident from the above that while the situation did not worsen with respect to food consumption, not much improvement has occurred between February and November 2004. It is also evident that the importance the Palestinians give to food has increased significantly.

The following paragraphs will examine what Palestinians feel are the most important food items for their households. This analysis will help to understand the expectations of the food assistance recipients from the food assistance providers with respect to the types of food assistance provision.

Figure 6.7 The two most needed food items in the household (o107)



As can be deduced from figure 6.7, above, 69% of the respondents, irrespective of their living standard or




where they reside, mentioned commodities as the main needed food item in the household. Although - as was discussed earlier - the consumption of dairy and meat products have not witnessed any increase, the emphasis on commodities could be attributed to the fact that these are the main types of food that could be stored and consumed through a large part of the food assistance cycles without any damage. Since, as will be discussed later in this chapter, food assistance distribution is generally carried out approximately twice a year, it is also logical that the respondents emphasize commodities as the most important needed food item rather than such food items as meat and dairy products that are perishable and at the same time are consumed on such a regular basis that it is not possible for the food assistance providers to distribute it.

## 6.4 Source of food


More Palestinian households rely on food assistance in November 2004 than they did in February 2004. As can be seen in figure 6.8, below, 12% of the respondents stated that they rely primarily on food assistance compared to 8% in February 2004. Reliance on family assistance remained almost unchanged with 8% saying that the family is their main source of food, compared to 7% in February 2004. Accordingly, 20% of the Palestinian households rely on sources other than their own for their food.

Figure 6.8 Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077)



### 6.4.1 Primary source of food according to the poverty level

Figure 6.9 Primary source of food (o077) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)




Naturally, the reliance on outside sources for food is more among the economically less advantaged, especially those who live under extreme poverty conditions. An examination of figure 6.9, above, reveals that around 45% of the hardship cases rely on either the extended family or on relief assistance for their households' food needs. This is much higher than even those who live below the poverty line, but not under such extreme poverty conditions. As is also evident in figure 6.9, only 15% of the below poverty level respondents rely on sources other than their personal resources. A possible explanation for that is the emphasis that the food assistance providers put on the special hardship cases.



### 6.4.2 Primary source of food according to refugee status


The role of UNRWA as the major food assistance provider explains why more refugees than non-refugees rely on outside sources for their food. While 23% of the refugee respondents rely on food assistance, (whether from family or from various local and international organizations) the proportion is 18% among the non-refugee respondents. These findings are elaborated in figure 6.10, below.

Figure 6.10 Primary source of food (o077) according to refugee status (o002)




The role of UNRWA also explains why more respondents from the refugee camps rely on outside sources for food than city or village dwellers. Whereas 23% of camp respondents rely on food assistance, the percentage is respectively 9% and 11% among city and village respondents. The results are illustrated in figure 6.11, below.

Figure 6.11 Primary source of food (o077) according to area (o060)



It is also worth noting that the reliance on family for food is significant among many respondents who said that they did not receive assistance. As illustrated in figure 6.12, below, of the respondents who said that they did not receive assistance, 6% said that they rely on the extended family for food.

Figure 6.12 Main source of food in the household (o077) according to those receiving assistance



## 6.5 Food assistance

The importance of food for the Palestinians could explain why food is the main type of provided assistance to the Palestinians. Of course, one may argue that employment assistance is more important, however, food assistance is logistically much easier to organize, it can be distributed to a much larger segment of the population, and it is also less costly and perhaps more urgent than other types of assistance, even compared to employment assistance. Another possible explanation could be the difficulties associated with the provision of employment assistance under severe mobility restrictions.

As can be shown in figure 6.13, below, there has been a 5% increase in the number of people reported to have said that they have received assistance. While the percentage was 39% in February 2004, the proportion increased to 44% by November 2004.

The major part of the reported assistance received (main assistance) was food which comprised 58% of the assistance provided in the six months prior to November 2004. As can also be noticed from figure 6.13, the proportion of food assistance has in fact dropped from the February 2004 figure. Whereas food assistance comprised 76% of all types of assistance in February, the proportion in November 2004 was 58%: a drop of 18%.

Figure 6.13 Proportion of food assistance compared to the overall assistance provided (o035)





Figure 6.14: Food distribution (o036foo) according to area (o060) and region of residence (o059), a comparison with July 2003



As illustrated in figure 6.14, above, 51% of the food assistance was distributed in cities, 26% in refugee


camps, and 24% in villages. When compared to the distribution of food assistance in February 2004, the main increase was observed in the villages where the proportion has increased from 19% in February 2004 to 24% by November 2004.

The results also revealed that the proportion of respondents who stated that they received food assistance was 47% in the West Bank, 46% in the Gaza Strip, and 7% in Jerusalem. The most significant change occurred in the Gaza Strip where the percentage dropped by 9% from 55% of the overall distribution in February 2004 to 46% by November 2004.


Further examination of the data shows that refugee camps received 24% of the overall food assistance and the remainder went to non-camp areas. As indicated in figure 6.15, above, 17% of the respondents who stated that they have received food assistance were from Gaza Strip refugee camps, 7% from West Bank refugee camps, 40% from West Bank non-camp areas, and 29% from Gaza Strip non-camp areas. The remaining 7% who received food assistance reside in Jerusalem.

Figure 6.16, below, shows the distribution of food assistance, as reported by the respondents, in the various districts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The largest distribution of food assistance was in the Tulkarem District with 10% of all reported food assistance, and Gaza City, with a percentage of 16% making it the district that received most food assistance compared to all other districts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 6.15: Food distribution (o036foo) according to place of residence (place)**




**Figure 6.16: Food distribution (o036foo) according to district**



When examining food distribution according to the poverty level, it is clear that the majority of food distribution was to the respondents who are either below the poverty line or to those who live in abject poverty. As illustrated in figure 6.17, below, 37% of the received food assistance was reported by the extremely poor respondents and 38% by the respondents who are below the poverty line. These figures, when compared to the results of the February 2004 survey, shows that more food assistance was delivered to respondents who are economically better-off in the period prior to November 2004. While in February 2004, 15% of the food recipients had a living standard above the poverty line, this was the case for 26% of them in November 2004.

Figure 6.17: Food distribution (o036foo) according to poverty (poverty3), comparison with February 2004



## 6.6 Source of food assistance

As mentioned earlier, UNRWA is the single most important source of food assistance. As can be seen in figure 6.18, adjacent, 49% of the food recipients stated that the UNRWA was the main source of their received food assistance, followed by the Palestinian Authority with 16%, local NGOs with 15%, trade unions with 12%, and religious organizations with 5%. Although international organizations are one of the main providers of food assistance, especially to non-refugee Palestinians, the proportion of food assistance by these organizations, as reported by the respondents did not exceed 2%.<sup>1</sup> This is attributed primarily to the fact that the main part of the food assistance provided by such international organizations as the World Food Program, is carried out through the Ministry of Social Services and through their partner organizations and NGOs such as the Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC).

Figure 6.18: Providers of food assistance (o036foos)





Figure 6.19: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and poverty level (poverty3)




Generally speaking, 74% of the provided food assistance is distributed to households with a living standard that is below the poverty line and 26% was distributed to respondents who are economically better-off. As illustrated in figure 6.19, above, 50% of the Palestinian Authority's food assistance goes to the special hardship cases, compared to 26% of UNRWA's distribution, and 56% of the food distribution of the trade unions, and 45% of the NGOs. Only 20% of the food assistance provided by the religious organizations reached the households that are living under extreme poverty conditions.

<sup>1</sup> Not much analysis can be made due to the small number of cases. Only 8 respondents said an international organization (other than UNRWA) had provided their household with food assistance.


Due to the role UNRWA plays with respect to the provision of services to the Palestinian refugees, it is natural that the bulk of the organization's food distribution targets the refugees. As shown in figure 6.20, below, 96% of the food assistance provided by UNRWA targets the refugee population. Conversely, the 86% of the food distribution carried out by the Palestinian Authority is distributed to the non-refugee population. Similarly, NGOs also target the Palestinian non-refugee population with 95% of their food distribution efforts focusing on this subgroup.

**Figure 6.20: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and refugee status (o002)**




It is also natural that the distribution of food assistance by UNRWA is concentrated more where the refugee population is concentrated. Accordingly, very little of UNRWA's food assistance reaches the villages, while the bulk is distributed in refugee camps and in cities. It is for this reason that 44% of the Palestinian Authority's food distribution and 47% of the NGO's food distribution is geared towards the rural population. A brief examination of figure 6.21, below, reveals that the trade unions and the religious organizations also distribute a sizeable proportion of their food distribution in the refugee camps, although they also distribute in cities and villages.

**Figure 6.21: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and area of residence (o060)**



**Figure 6.22: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and region of residence (o059)**




Thus, when examining the manner by which food assistance is distributed by the various food assistance providers, it becomes increasingly clear that some food assistance providers focus more on one region, while others focus on another. As illustrated in figure 6.22, above, 96% of the food assistance recipients

who stated that their source of food assistance were NGOs were from the West Bank. Naturally the high concentration of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip explains why 64% of the UNRWA food assistance recipients come from the Gaza Strip and why 64% of the Palestinian Authority's food distribution reside in the West Bank.

Closer analysis of the food distribution of the various food assistance providers reveals that 14% of the respondents stating that UNRWA is the main provider of their most important assistance are from West Bank refugee camps compared to 41% in Gaza Strip refugee camps. A small amount of the Palestinian Authority's food assistance is reported to have been distributed to the Gaza Strip refugee camps (3%) compared to 16% of the PA's food distribution reported in the West Bank refugee camps. As for the food distribution of the NGOs, 91% were in the West Bank outside camps, and none in the Gaza Strip outside camps. These results are outlined in figure 6.23, below.

**Figure 6.23: Food distribution according to source (o036foos) and place of residence (place)**




## 6.7 Frequency of food assistance

It has been established above that food assistance is the primary source of food for a significant number of Palestinian households, particularly those households who live in extreme poverty. Accordingly, the frequency of food distribution is an essential aspect of the food assistance efforts given the role this effort plays with respect to those beneficiaries.

According to the respondents, 35% received food assistance only one time during the six month period before the November 2004 survey, 16% said three times, 7% four times, and 41% said that they received food assistance almost on a monthly basis. These results are indicated in figure 6.24, adjacent.

**Figure 6.24: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3)**




As illustrated in figure 6.25, next page, trade unions, NGOs, and the religious organizations provided food more often than the major food assistance providers, such as UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority<sup>2</sup>. Understandably, and given UNRWA's large proportion of beneficiaries, 48% of the organization's food

<sup>2</sup> It is important to note at this juncture that the survey was carried out in the period of Ramadan when many local organizations increase their food assistance.




assistance recipients said that they received it only once during the six months under scrutiny. A possible explanation is the suspension of the emergency food distribution rounds between the months of June 2004 and September 2004 (i.e. three months out of the six months covered by this survey) as a consequence of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip.

**Figure 6.25: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) by source of food assistance (o036foos)**




When examining the frequency of food assistance according to area of residence, refugee camps residents seem to be receiving food assistance more frequently than their counterparts in villages and cities. Whereas, for example, 49% of food assistance recipients in the refugee camps said that they received food assistance almost monthly (five times during a six-month period), the percentage is 41% in villages and 37% in cities. Conversely, the one-time distribution is higher in cities than it is in villages or refugee camps. These findings are detailed in figure 6.26, below.

**Figure 6.26: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to area of residence (o060)**




The highest frequency of food distribution is reported in the West Bank where 53% of the respondents received it almost on a monthly basis, compared to 31% in the Gaza Strip. In this context, it is important to note that although food assistance seems to be more prevalent in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, the frequency in the latter is significantly higher than in the former. These findings are clearly established in figure 6.27, below.

**Figure 6.27: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to region of residence (o059)**



As for the food distribution according to the standard of living, the results in figure 6.28, below, clearly show that food assistance is more regularly distributed to those households whose living standard is below the poverty line, particularly to those living under abject poverty. Whereas 49% of the hardship cases stated that they have received food assistance on an almost monthly basis, the percentage is only 30% among those whose standard of living is above the poverty line. As is also indicated in figure 28, only 6.28% of the hardship cases that have received food assistance said that they received it only once during the six-month period under scrutiny.

Figure 6.28: Frequency of food distribution (o074v3) according to the poverty level (poverty3)




## 6.8 Attitude towards food assistance

In addition to the frequency of food assistance, the attitudes of the recipients of food assistance are, undoubtedly, instrumental in generating a better picture about the environment surrounding food assistance. In the following pages an assessment of the Palestinian attitude towards food assistance will be provided with respect to targeting, the organization of food distribution, the level of satisfaction of the recipients, and the value of the provided food.

### 6.8.1 Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance


As illustrated in figure 6.29, below, 26% of the respondents feel that food assistance targets the needy, and 24% said that food assistance is carried out indiscriminately. However, the majority of the respondents believe that although the food assistance targets the needy, often those who do not need it also receive it.

Figure 6.29: Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166)




The attitudes towards targeting of assistance differ from one place to another. The West Bank is significantly more positive about the targeting of food assistance than the Gaza Strip. As can be seen in figure 6.30, below, only 17% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip believe that the food assistance targets the needy, compared to 33% in the West Bank. However, more respondents in the West Bank said that the food assistance is distributed indiscriminately compared to their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. Whereas 26% of the former believe this is the case, the percentage is 21% among the latter. Respondents from Jerusalem were the most positive with over 40% stating that food assistance primarily targets the needy.

Figure 6.30 Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to region of residence (o059)



The more positive attitude towards the targeting of food assistance in the West Bank is not attributed to the higher concentration of the village population in this region or the higher concentration of refugees in the Gaza Strip. As indicated in figure 6.31, below, the attitudes of the West Bank camps regarding the targeting of food assistance is closer to the West Bank non-camps than it is to the Gaza Strip camps. Similarly, the attitudes of the Gaza Strip camp respondents are closer to the Gaza Strip non-camp respondents, than to the attitudes of the West Bank camp respondents on this issue.


Figure 6.31: Attitudes toward the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to place of residence (place)



The living conditions of the respondents provide an explanation as to why there are differences in attitude

among the Palestinians on the issue of targeting. A close look at figure 6.32, below, shows that the better-off the respondents, the less positive they are about the targeting of food assistance. Whereas 33% of the respondents who live under extreme poverty conditions stated that food assistance targets primarily the needy, the percentage among the respondents whose living condition is above the poverty line is only 14%.


Figure 6.32: Attitudes towards the targeting of food assistance (o166) according to poverty level (poverty3)



## 6.8.2 Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution

The attitude of food beneficiaries about the manner in which food distribution is organized, is also mixed. While 13% of the respondents stated that food distribution is organized, 28% stated that it was badly organized. As illustrated in figure 6.33, below, 59% believe that there is still room for improvement.


Figure 6.33: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution in general (o075)



This negative attitude towards the organization of food assistance runs through most sectors of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip irrespective of the place, area, or region of residence, who is the provider of the food assistance, or the refugee status, gender, or the educational level of the beneficiaries.

The only variable that is statistically significant with the attitudes towards the organization of food distribution is the poverty level. As indicated in the first part of figure 6.34, next page, the beneficiaries whose living condition is below the poverty line are less positive about the organization of food distribution than the respondents whose economic condition is relatively better. Whereas 20% of the beneficiaries who are above the poverty line think that the food organization efforts are negative, the percentage is 30% among the hardship cases and 29% among the beneficiaries who are slightly better-off, yet still considered as falling below the poverty line.

Figure 6.34: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to poverty level (poverty3) and source of food assistance (o036foos)




The second part of figure 6.34, above, clearly shows that the attitude towards the organization of food distribution is similar concerning all the food assistance providers.

### 6.8.3 Level of satisfaction with food assistance

Despite the generally negative attitude of the food beneficiaries have the organization and targeting of food assistance, 71% of them remain either satisfied or very satisfied, and 29% are very dissatisfied or satisfied with the food assistance they have received.

When examining the reasons behind those who are not satisfied with the delivered food assistance, it is clear that the main reason is the infrequency of the food distribution. As illustrated in figure 6.35, below, 44% of the beneficiaries said that their dissatisfaction with food assistance is due to its low frequency. In addition to frequency, 33% of the dissatisfied beneficiaries attributed their dissatisfaction to the low quantity of food distribution and 22% attributed it to the low quality of the distributed food.


Figure 6.35: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot)



Dissatisfaction with food assistance differs depending on the region of residence and the provider of food assistance. No statistical difference was observed with regard to area or place of residence, refugee status, educational level, or the poverty level.


Satisfaction with food assistance seems to be slightly more positive in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. As can be observed in figure 6.36, below, 67% of the West Bank respondents said that they were satisfied with the food assistance compared to 74% of the Gaza Strip respondents. As for Jerusalem, the small number of cases does not warrant any statistical interpretation although it seems unlikely that the position of the food beneficiaries in this district will be significantly different from that of their counterparts in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 6.36: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to region of residence (o059)



With respect to the level of satisfaction with the food assistance provided by the various organizations, it is apparent that the level of satisfaction is generally positive across the various organizations involved in food assistance. As indicated in figure 6.37, below, about 70% of the food assistance beneficiaries are satisfied with the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA, while around 30% are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. NGOs scored slightly better with approximately 75% of their food assistance beneficiaries stating that they are satisfied. The highest level of satisfaction, however, was among the food beneficiaries who received this assistance from the various religious organizations.

Figure 6.37: Level of satisfaction with food assistance (o036foot) according to food assistance provider (o036foos)






## 6.9 Value of food assistance

In general, the median value of food assistance that was reported by the respondents was around 150 NIS (approximately US\$ 35). The highest median was reported in the villages where the median value of the provided food assistance was 200 NIS (approximately US \$47). The lowest , however, was reported in the Gaza Strip refugee camps with a reported median value of 130 NIS (US\$ 30).

As for the value of food assistance received from the various food providers, respondents receiving food assistance from UNRWA reported the lowest value with a median value of 100 NIS (US\$ 23). The highest value was reported by the respondents who received food assistance from the religious organizations (NIS 200 which is equivalent to US\$ 47). These results are overviewed in figure 6.38, below.

Figure 6.38: Average value and median of food assistance (o036foov) according to place (place), region (o059), area (o060), refugee status (o002), and source of assistance (o036foos)



## 6.10 Conclusion

In conclusion, following are the main results:

- There has been a significant increase in the percentage of the Palestinians who said that food is the priority of their household. While in February 2004 16% of the respondents said that food is their main priority, the proportion increased to 30% in November 2004. The importance of food is higher among the refugees (35%), in cities (34%), and in Gaza Strip non-camp areas (38%).
- Basic commodities are the most important needed food item for 69% of the respondents, followed by baby food. The importance of baby food has increased from 14% in February 2004 to 22% in November 2004.
- Food assistance comprises 58% of the primary assistance delivered to the Palestinians between May and October 2004. This proportion dropped from 76% in February 2004. The most likely reason for this drop was the inability of UNRWA and other food assistance providers to deliver food aid in the Gaza Strip during this period as a result of major Israeli operations there.
- About 80% of the Palestinian households rely on their own sources for food (compared to 85% in February 2004) and 12% rely on relief assistance (compared to 8% in February 2004) and 8% rely on family and friends (compared to 7% in February 2004).
- The proportion of extremely poor households who rely on food assistance is 28%, compared to 9% among those who are below the poverty line and 5% among those who live above the poverty line. Moreover, more refugees than non-refugees rely on food assistance (respectively 16% and 9%).
- Refugee camps received 26% of the provided food assistance, cities received 51% of the overall food assistance and villages received 24%.
- 75% of the provided food assistance reaches those who are below the poverty line. Although the remainder is distributed among those classified as falling above the poverty line, further analysis reveals that the bulk of those households are close to the poverty line.
- UNRWA is the main provider of food assistance (49%) followed by the Palestinian Authority (16%), local NGOs (15%), and trade unions (12%).
- While UNRWA food distribution is concentrated among the refugee population, the non-refugee population is catered primarily by the Palestinian Authority and the local NGOs.
- Most of the food distribution carried out by UNRWA, trade unions, and religious organizations is in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority and the local NGOs concentrate their food distribution efforts in the West Bank.
- One third of the food distribution drives is done once every six months, and 41% of the respondents receive food assistance five times every six months. The almost monthly distribution of food assistance is more frequent in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. More than half of the special hardship cases receive assistance almost on a monthly basis.
- One fourth of the respondents believe that food assistance primarily targets the needy and 50% believe that it targets the needy but often some of those who do not need assistance also receive it. Approximately 24% of the respondents think that food distribution is carried out indiscriminately. Special hardship cases are slightly more positive about the targeting of food assistance than those who are economically better-off.
- About 13% of the respondents believe that food distribution is organized, 59% believe that it is somewhat organized, and 28% think that it is badly organized.
- More than 70% of the food assistance beneficiaries are satisfied with food assistance. The 30% who are dissatisfied attribute their dissatisfaction to the quantity of provided food (33%), the quality of food (22%), and to the frequency of food assistance (44%).
- The median value of the provided food assistance during the six month period, as stated by the beneficiaries, is NIS 150 (US\$ 35). The value is higher in the villages and cities than in the refugee camps.

# Chapter

# 7



## Health & Education

*Isabelle Daneels*

## Introduction


In this part of the study, issues related to health and education will be overviewed. In subsequent sections, more specific questions concerning the respondents' attitudes about health and education will be dealt with according to the various relevant independent variables at hand.

### 7.1 Health and education in general

Before going into depth into issues related to health and education, it is important to briefly evaluate the importance of the needs of health and education both for the household and for the community.


When the interviewees were asked about the two most important needs of their household,<sup>1</sup> both health and education keep their rank of importance in comparison with the results in report 7, i.e. health remains the third most important need of the household, while education maintains its fifth place in order of importance.

Figure 7-1 The two most important needs of your household (o079)



When taking into consideration only the unmet needs of the household,<sup>2</sup> the importance of education is ranked in fourth place (12%), while health as an unmet need stands in fifth place. These rankings of health and education suggest that these needs are already quite well catered for as there are other more important unmet needs, such as employment, financial assistance, and food.

Figure 7-2 Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most important need of your household? (o180)




When the question to interviewees concerned the two most important needs of their community, health is ranked in fourth place and education is ranked in fifth place together with need for housing and re-housing.

<sup>1</sup> This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the study.

<sup>2</sup> This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 4 of the study.

In comparison with the survey conducted in February 2004 for report 7, both health and education have lost importance as community needs.

**Figure 7-3 The two most important needs of the community (o080)**



Respondents were also asked to rank the 5 main expense types of the household in order of importance. Among the types of expenses were health and education. The results are summarized in table 7.1, below. It is clear that food (69%) is by far the first main expense type of the household, while education (12%) and health (8%) come in a distant second and third place. In the second main expense type of the household, education (32%) and health (31%) take the lead, while food (20%) comes in third place. Concerning the third main expense type of the household, health (33%) continues to be the most important, while education takes third place (21%) after the expense of household items (22%). Only in the fourth and fifth main expense types do the expenses for health and education in the household really diminish. As such, it is safe to conclude that the importance of health and education cannot be overestimated as expense types in Palestinian households and that assistance towards these two services would greatly impact the manner in which household organize their expenses.

**Table 7-1 Please rank in order of importance the 5 main expense types your household income is primarily devoted to (o194 a, b, c, d, e)**

	Importance ranking of main expenses (1 to 5) in percent				
	1 <sup>st</sup> expense	2 <sup>nd</sup> expense	3 <sup>rd</sup> expense	4 <sup>th</sup> expense	5 <sup>th</sup> expense
Food	69%	20%	6%	2%	1%
Education	12%	32%	21%	8%	6%
Health	8%	31%	33%	11%	6%
Rent	3%	3%	3%	5%	2%
Household items	5%	9%	22%	29%	10%
Sustaining the family business	1%	1%	3%	5%	4%
Transportation	0.4%	1%	6%	21%	19%
Buying house, car or business	2%	1%	2%	5%	7%
Clothes	0.2%	1%	3%	13%	39%
Leisure	0.2%	0.1%	1%	1%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

As the construction of the separation wall has become one of the major issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, interviewees were asked whether or not the wall affected their household in different manners.<sup>3</sup> One of the issues that the interviewees were queried about was whether or not the construction of the wall had made access to basic services such as education and health more difficult. As detailed in table 7.2, below, 35% of the respondents stated that the construction of the separation wall had hampered their access to basic services such as education and health. In comparison with the results from February 2004 to the same question, this indicates an increase of 10% of respondents who declared that the construction of the wall has affected their ability to access basic services such as health and education.

<sup>3</sup> Questions related to the separation wall are discussed in more depth in Part 1 of the study.



Table 7-2 Effect of the construction of the separation wall on access to education or health (o164f)

<b>Effect of the construction of the separation wall on access to education or health</b>		
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Valid Percent</b>
<b>It affected</b>	321	35%
<b>It did not affect</b>	610	65%
<b>Total</b>	931	100%

## 7.2 Health

This section is divided into four main parts: (1) issues pertaining to the need for medical care, (2) restrictions on the delivery of medical care, (3) the level of satisfaction with benefited from health services and their providers, and (4) the provision and source of health coverage. Before entering into these specific parts, however, it is good to start off with more general health related issues, such as the main reason for choosing a specific health facility.

In general, the main reason for respondents to choose their health facility is because they are only insured to receive services from a specific facility (51%). The second reason influencing the choice of the health facility is because the respondents are not insured and services in a certain facility are either cheaper or free (16%), followed by respectively 11% stating that they chose their health facility based on the trust in the quality of care and another 11% making their choice based on the distance of the health facility or because it is the only one available. The remaining reasons for choosing a health facility, such as drugs availability (5%), short waiting time (3%), the humanity of the caretakers (3%) or the physician's gender (1%) do not seem to be such important factors in the decision of choosing one or another health facility.


As overviewed in figure 7.4, adjacent, the reasons behind Palestinians' choice of their health facility vary according to their poverty level and educational level. As can be expected, a higher percentage of respondents living in hardship (18%) and below the poverty line (19%) than those with a living standard above the poverty line (12%) attach importance to their health facility being free or cheaper than others. Conversely, a considerably higher percentage of respondents from households with a monthly income above the poverty line (15%) than those from households below the poverty line (10%) or those living in hardship (5%) base their choice of the health facility on the trust in the quality of care. The same trend is noticeable when examining the question according to educational level. On the one hand, a higher percentage of respondents with low (17%) and medium (18%) levels of education than those who obtained high education (13%) chose their health facility on the basis of it being free or cheaper. On the other hand, a higher percentage of respondents with high levels of education (16%) than those with medium (8%) or low (10%) levels of education based their choice on the trust in the quality of care in the health facility.

The reasons behind Palestinians' choice of their health facility also vary according to the region and area in which they reside, and according to their refugee status. Respondents in the Gaza Strip (21%) are very much more concerned than their counterparts in the West Bank (12%) and Jerusalem (14%) about the health facility being cheaper than others or free of charge. Interestingly, the same is true for refugees (19%) as opposed to non-refugees (14%), and for respondents residing in refugee camps (20%) in comparison with respondents residing in cities (15%) or villages (14%). Furthermore, the results indicate that the distance of the health facility or the fact that it is the only facility available are mostly a concern for Gazans (13%), camp residents (16%) and refugees (13%). Similarly, a higher concern can be noticed in those subgroups concerning drugs availability in health facilities (Gaza Strip (9%), refugee camp (8%), and refugee (7%)). Conversely, a higher percentage of respondents basing their choice of health facility on the trust in the quality of care can be found in the West Bank (14%), in cities (15%) and among non-refugees (14%). These findings are overviewed in figure 7.5, next page.




One way to learn more about the health status of the population is to try and gauge the percentage of people who – in the past six months – needed or were prescribed drugs for chronic or acute problems. Furthermore, it is also important to find out in how far people who were prescribed drugs for chronic or acute problems were also provided with the necessary drugs.

**Figure 7-4 The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) in general and according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**




**Figure 7-5 The main reason for choosing your health facility (only one answer) (o168v2) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and refugee status (o002)**




Concerning drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months, in general, 59% of the respondents were not prescribed any drugs for chronic problems, 37% were prescribed and provided the necessary drugs for chronic problems, while the remaining 5% were not provided the drugs, although the drugs had been prescribed to them. As overviewed in figure 7.6, next page, the older generation of respondents (35-49 years and 50+) more so than the younger generation were in need of drugs prescriptions for chronic diseases. Logically, the former more so than the latter were also provided the necessary medicine for their chronic problems.

**Figure 7-6 Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) in general and according to age (agec)**



The results in figure 7.7, below, suggest that the poorer segments of society most need drugs for chronic problems. More specifically, whereas only 53% of the respondents living in hardship stated that they were not prescribed drugs for chronic problems in the past six months, this was the case for 57% of the respondents in household with a monthly income below the poverty line and 62% of the respondents with a living standard above the poverty line. Furthermore, the need for drugs treating chronic problems is higher in refugee camps than outside those camps both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. The particularly low percentage of respondents residing in West Bank refugee camps (43%) specified that they were not prescribed drugs, while the highest percentage of respondents that were prescribed drugs for chronic problems, but were not provided with it can be found in Gaza Strip refugee camps (10%).

**Figure 7-7 Drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems in the past six months (o169) according to place of residence (place) and poverty level (poverty3)**



Concerning drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months, in general, 67% of the respondents were not prescribed any drugs for acute problems, 28% were prescribed and provided the necessary drugs for acute problems, while the remaining 5% were not provided the drugs, although the drugs had been prescribed to them. When comparing these results to the results on the prescription and provision of drugs for chronic problems, one can deduce that the need for drugs treating chronic problems is higher than the need for drugs treating acute problems. As was the case with regard to drugs for chronic problems, a higher percentage of the respondents of the older generation (35-49 years and 50+) than of the younger generation has been in need for drugs treating acute problems in the past six months. Furthermore, the results in figure 7.8, next page, also indicate that the need for drugs treating acute problems is higher among the poorer sections of society than among the better-off.

The need for drugs treating acute problems in the past six months is lower in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and is lowest in Jerusalem. Nonetheless, the lowest percentage of respondents who were not prescribed any drugs in the past six months for acute problems reside in West Bank refugee camps (47%). As was the case concerning drugs prescription and provision for chronic problems, the highest percentage of respondents who were prescribed drugs for acute diseases, but were not provided with it can be found in Gaza Strip refugee camps (12%).

Figure 7-8 Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) in general and according to age (agec) and poverty level (poverty3)






Figure 7-9 Drugs prescription and provision for acute problems in the past six months (o169) according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place)



For the first time in this report, interviewees were asked if any of their household members suffer from mental, physical or visual impairment<sup>4</sup> and if so, what the cause of the impairment is. This information again provides a pointer about a specific aspect of health among the Palestinian population.

Figure 7-10 Frequency of impairment (Q105)




<sup>4</sup> The WHO differentiates between impairment and disability, and they could be described as follows: **impairment** concerns any temporary or permanent loss or abnormality of a body structure or function, whether physiological or psychological. An impairment is a disturbance affecting functions that are essentially mental (memory, consciousness) or sensory, internal organs (heart, kidney), the head, the trunk or the limbs. **Disability** is a restriction or inability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human being, mostly resulting from impairment.

As overviewed in figure 7.10, previous page, 85% of the household members stated that none of the members in their household are impaired, 12% specified that one member in the household is impaired, 3% explained that two members in their household are impaired, while 6 respondents reported that three or more household members are impaired. When one only examines the 15% of households that include impaired persons, one can see that 76% of the household members have one member impaired, 22% have two household members impaired, while 3% have three or more members of their household impaired.

Taking the analysis on impairment a step further by examining the type of the impairment, the results in the survey indicate that when all age groups of the impaired are considered, 44% are physically impaired, 42% are visually impaired, while 14% suffer from mental impairment. When considering impairment among children who are 14 years old or younger, 48% are physically impaired, 27% are visually impaired, while 25% are mentally impaired.

As for the cause for the impairment, the results differ according to whether one examines all age groups or merely the age groups of children who are not older than 14 years of age. As the results in figure 7.11, below, illustrate, the percentage of the impaired since birth is higher when one only considers the age group of 14 years or younger than when one includes all age groups in the analysis (respectively 76% and 56%). Conversely, the percentage of the impaired as a result of an accident (respectively 21% and 12%) or as a result of the Intifada (respectively 22% and 13%) is higher when one includes all the age groups in the analysis than when one considers merely the age group of children aged 14 years or below.

**Figure 7-11 Type and reason for impairment in general and for children of 14 years and younger (Q105)**



### 7.2.1 Need for medical care in the past six months


In an attempt to monitor the need for medical care among Palestinians, interviewees were asked from a predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their household members had been in need of in the past six months.<sup>5</sup> In general, and as overviewed in figure 7.12, below, in the past six months 62%

<sup>5</sup> It is worth pointing out that in the February 2004 survey for Report 7, the same question was asked. However, at that time the predetermined list included many more types of needed medical care than is the case for the current report.

of the respondents were in need of primary health care, while 46% needed a hospital. Furthermore, 29% of the surveyed households were in need of specialized care, while an ambulance was needed in 20% of these households. Finally, 14% of the respondents specified that either they themselves or their household members had been in need of physical rehabilitation in the past six months and 11% were in need of birth care.

Compared to the results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey, the need for hospitalization in the past six months has decreased by 9%, the need for an ambulance by 6%, and the need for birth care by 17%. Still in comparison to the results in February 2004, the need for specialized care has increased by 12%, while the need for physical rehabilitation has increased by 7%.


**Figure 7-12 Type of medical care needed in the past six months (o102v2)**



## 7.2.2 Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months

In order to be able to get a better idea about the delivery of medical care, respondents were also asked to specify whether or not the delivery of medical care has been restricted in the past six months. In this section, the need for such care and the restrictions faced in the reception of such care will be discussed separately according to the relevant variables that prove to be significant.

**Figure 7-13 Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place)**




When examining the issue of the delivery of primary health care in the past six months, in general, 40% of the respondents stated that they did not face any restrictions, 16% were faced with a delay, while for 6% of the respondents the provision of primary health care was denied. As illustrated in figure 7.13, above,

the need for primary health care was more than twice as high in the Gaza Strip (21%) than in the West Bank (46%) and Jerusalem (53%). Denial of the provision of primary health care happened slightly less in the Gaza Strip (5%) than in the West Bank (7%), while it occurred least in Jerusalem (3%). Delays in the provision of primary health care, however, occurred considerably more frequently in the Gaza Strip (20%) than in the West Bank (15%) and in Jerusalem (11%). A far larger percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (32%) and in Jerusalem (33%) did not face any restrictions in the delivery of primary health care. When analyzing the Gaza Strip and the West Bank further according to respondents residing in refugee camps or outside those camps, one can notice that the need for primary health care is the highest both in the refugee camps in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in comparison with the non-camp residents in those regions.

Similarly as the results above already indicated, the analysis in figure 7.14, below, shows that the need for primary health care has been considerably higher among refugees (68%) than among non-refugees (57%), and in refugee camps (76%) than in cities (64%) and villages (52%). Also, the results clearly indicate that the need for primary health care is significantly higher among households that live in hardship (69%) or those that have an income below the poverty line (67%) than among those with a living standard above the poverty line. Lastly, households living in hardship faced most frequently delays in the delivery of primary health care (27%).

**Figure 7-14 Restrictions on the delivery of primary health care (curative services) in the past six months (o102nv2) according to refugee status (o002), area of residence (o060) and poverty level (poverty3)**




In general, 54% of the respondents did not need hospitalization in the past six months. Of the 46% who did need hospitalization, 28% did not face any restrictions, but 5% were denied hospitalization and 13% saw their hospitalization delayed. When examining the need for hospitalization according to region and place of residence, the results in figure 7.15, next page, clearly illustrate that the need for hospitalization is considerably higher in the Gaza Strip (54%) than in the West Bank (43%) and Jerusalem (36%). Moreover, within the Gaza Strip the need for hospitalization in the past six months was far greater in refugee camps (65%) than outside those camps (48%).


The results portrayed in figure 7.16, next page, show that although the need for hospitalization in the past six months was higher in refugee camps (56%) than in cities (45%) and villages (43%), the delays and denials faced in the provision of such services has been quite similar in the three areas under discussion. When examining the issue of hospitalization according to poverty level, the results not only indicate that the need for hospitalization among the hardship cases is the highest (56%), but also that this subgroup of Palestinian society faces most frequently denials (8%) and delays (18%) in the provision of hospital services.



**Figure 7-15 Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place)**




**Figure 7-16 Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102nv2) according area of residence (o060) and poverty level (poverty3)**




In general, 80% of the interviewees stated that nobody in their household had been in need of an ambulance in the past six months. Of the 20% who were in need of an ambulance, 11% faced no restrictions at all, while 6% experienced a delayed provision of an ambulance and 3% were denied this service. The need for an ambulance was slightly higher in cities (22%) than in villages (19%) and refugee camps (18%). The results in figure 7.17, next page, further indicate that the need for an ambulance was slightly higher among the respondents older than 35 years than among those younger than this age. The delays and denials faced in obtaining an ambulance in the past six months are quite similar across all age groups under examination. It is also worth pointing out that no other significant relationships were found between the issue of ambulances and the other various independent variables at hand than those described in the figure below.

Concerning birth care, 89% of the total sample had no such need in the past six months. Of the 11% who were in need of such care, 2% were denied the delivery of birth care, 3% faced delays in the delivery of such care, while 6% faced no restrictions at all. More specifically, the only statistically significant relationship that could be established with regard to the issue of birth care was according to the region in which the interviewees reside. The results portrayed in figure 7.18, next page, show that the need for birth care in the West Bank (22%) and the Gaza Strip (22%) was the same, while it was lowest in Jerusalem (6%).

**Figure 7-17 Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102cv2) in general and according to area of residence (o060) and age (agec)**



**Figure 7-18 Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102iv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059)**




Moving on to the delivery of specialized care, in general, 71% of the interviewees pointed out that nor they nor their household members were in need of such care in the past six months, 4% said that the delivery of such care had been denied, 9% specified that it had been delayed, while 16% stated that the delivery of specialized care had not been restricted at all. The need for specialized care is highest in the Gaza Strip (32%), followed by the West Bank (28%), and only then, Jerusalem (25%). However, the results in figure 7.19, next page, indicate that it was slightly more difficult for Westbankers than for Gazans and Jerusalemites to receive specialized care without restrictions, denials or delays. When examining the issue of specialized care according to area of residence, the results show that the need for specialized care is the highest in cities (33%), followed by refugee camps (27%) and then villages (24%). The restrictions, denials and delays faced by the residents in these three areas do not show major differences. Lastly, the results in the figure, below, also indicate that the need for specialized care is higher in the 35-49 age category (32%) and in the 50+ category (38%) than in the 18-24 yrs (26%) and 25-34 yrs (23%) categories.


Finally, concerning physical rehabilitation, the large majority of 86% of the sample stated that they or any of their household members had not been in need of such care in the past six months. Of the 14% that were in need of physical rehabilitation, 3% saw their need for such care denied, 4% faced a delay in the provision of such care, while the remaining 7% were provided with the needed physical rehabilitation without restrictions. When examining the issue of physical rehabilitation according to region of residence, it appears that the need for physical rehabilitation is the greatest in the Gaza Strip (18%) and the lowest in Jerusalem (7%). There are no major differences in the level of difficulties faced in receiving physical rehabilitation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The results in figure 7.20, next page, further

indicate that the need for physical rehabilitation in cities (16%) and in refugee camps (17%) is quite similar, while the need for such care in villages is significantly lower (10%). Again, according to area, there are no significant differences between the denials and delays faced in receiving physical rehabilitation.


**Figure 7-19 Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the past six months (o102kv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060) and age (agec)**



**Figure 7-20 Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and area of residence (o060)**



**Figure 7-21 Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102lv2) according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**



The results in figure 7.21, above, mainly indicate that - when analyzing the need of physical rehabilitation


according to the poverty level and the educational level of the interviewees - , a higher percentage of respondents living in hardship (17%), the respondents with a household income below the poverty line (17%) and the respondents with low levels of education (20%) are in need of physical rehabilitation than the interviewees in households with a living standard above the poverty line (11%) and those who enjoyed either medium (13%) or high (13%) levels of education. When examining the results in the figure, below, no major differences could be established according to poverty level or level of education in the difficulties faced by respondents and/or their household members in obtaining the needed physical rehabilitation

### 7.2.3 Level of satisfaction with benefited from services in the past six months and their providers

As the title suggests, this section is concerned about the level of satisfaction with benefited from health services, while it also tries to gauge who the main providers of these services are. Before going into this analysis, however, it is important to overview the percentage of respondents who have benefited in the past six months from different types of health services.

As summarized in figure 7.22, below, 49% of the respondents stated that they or their household members have benefited from hospital services in the past six months, 60% made use of primary health care services, 33% benefited from specialized care, and 24% from ambulances.

Figure 7-22 Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the following services in the past six months (o126)



Having established the percentage of respondents who benefited from various types of health care in the past six months, the level of satisfaction with each of these types of health care and the providers of each type of health care will be discussed separately and sequentially below.

#### Hospital services

Starting off with the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries with hospital services, the results in table 7.3, below, indicate that 78% of the respondents were satisfied, while 22% were dissatisfied. Compared to the results on this question in the survey conducted in February 2004 for the 7<sup>th</sup> report, there is a noticeable increase of 7% of the respondents who are satisfied with such services. It is also worth noting that no statistically significant differences were found when cross-tabulating the issue of satisfaction with hospital services with any of the independent variables at hand.


Table 7-3 Level of satisfaction with benefited from hospital services in the past six months (o126a) in general

Satisfaction with benefited from hospital services		
	Frequency	Valid percent
Satisfied	566	78%
Dissatisfied	136	22%
Total	709	100%

As for the providers of hospital services, in general, 62% of the respondents stated that this service had been provided to them by the Palestinian Authority, 15% referred to UNRWA as their main provider, while

8% specified that local NGOs were the providers of their hospital services. An overview that includes the other providers of such services is provided in figure 7.23, below. Although throughout the Palestinian occupied Territories the PA is the main provider of hospital services, the extent of its predominance in this field varies considerably according to the different variables. According to place of residence, for example, it is clear from the results in figure 7.23 that UNRWA takes up a far larger share in West Bank and Gaza camps (respectively 40% and 36%) than elsewhere. Furthermore, in Jerusalem, only 36% of the respondents said that the PA provided them with hospital services, while 19% referred to the Israeli health services as their provider. Also interesting concerning hospital services in Jerusalem is that local NGOs (11%), private institutions (10%) and Arab governments (11%) seem to be far more frequently used than in other parts of the oPt. In fact, with regard to hospital services, the latter is exclusively mentioned by Jerusalemite respondents.

**Figure 7-23 Providers (Q111) of hospital services in the past six months (o126as) in general and according to place of residence (place)**



Given the abundance of information and differences according to the various independent variables concerning the providers of each type of health service, under each figure a short summary will be provided of the remaining main findings that are statistically valid, but are not described in the figures. Concerning the providers of hospital services, the main findings can be summarized as follows:

➤ According to region of residence (West Bank, Jerusalem, Gaza Strip) (o059)

The Palestinian Authority is mentioned as a source for hospital services by a higher percentage of Palestinians in the West Bank (72%) than in the Gaza Strip (57%). Conversely, a far higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (28%) than in the West Bank (5%) refer to UNRWA as the source of their hospital services. In fact, the reliance on UNRWA for such services is even higher in Jerusalem (11%) than in the West Bank (5%). The results further indicate that the reliance on local NGOs for hospital services stands at about 8% in each of the three regions.

➤ Area of residence (city, village, camp) (o060)

The Palestinian Authority is more often cited as a provider of hospital services in villages (75%) than in cities (58%) and in refugee camps (54%). In those camps, of course, UNRWA (38%) is mentioned by a higher percentage of respondents than in cities (14%) or villages (1%). International organizations do not provide any hospital services in refugee camps and seem to concentrate their activities in villages (7%) and cities (5%).

➤ Refugee status (refugee, non-refugee) (o002)

As can be expected, the Palestinian Authority is more prominent as a provider of hospital services to non-

refugees (72%) than to refugees (52%), while UNRWA's provision of hospital services is nearly exclusively focused on the refugee population (31% refugees vs. 2% non-refugees).


➤ Poverty level (above poverty line, below poverty line, hardship cases) (poverty3)

The data reveal that the Palestinian Authority is most frequently a provider of hospital services to respondents with a living standard below the poverty line (67%). The provision of hospital services by the Palestinian Authority to the remaining sectors according to poverty level seems to be quite evenly spread (hardship cases 61% and those above poverty line 60%). The poorer sections of Palestinian society rely more on UNRWA as a provider of hospital services (hardship cases 23% and those below the poverty line 18%) than Palestinians with a living standard above the poverty line (7%). The Israeli health services are exclusively used as a provider of hospital services by respondents in the sample that have a household income above the poverty line (5%), while, in addition, private institutions are nearly exclusively relied upon by this segment of society (7% vs. 1% respectively among hardship cases and those below the poverty line).


### Primary health care

The second type of health care respondents were queried about concerns primary health care. As illustrated in figure 7.24, below, in general 81% of the respondents who benefited from primary health care are satisfied, while 19% are dissatisfied. When examining the level of satisfaction with primary health care services according to refugee status, a noticeable higher percentage of refugees (84%) than non-refugees (78%) are satisfied with those services. Lastly, no statistically significant relationships could be established between the levels of satisfaction with benefited from primary health care in the past six months and any of the other independents variables at hand.

**Figure 7-24 Level of satisfaction with benefited from primary health care in the past six months (o126g) in general and according to refugee status (o002)**



**Figure 7-25 Providers (Q113) of primary health care in the past six months (o126gs) in general and according to place of residence (place)**



Concerning the providers of primary health care in the past six months, in general the Palestinian Authority is the main provider with 49%, while UNRWA comes second with 29%. As indicated by the results in figure 7.25, above, the PA is the largest provider of primary health care outside refugee camps both in the West



Bank (66%) and the Gaza Strip (47%). The role of the PA inside camps both in the West Bank (17%) and the Gaza Strip (34%) in providing primary health care is far smaller and is largely taken over by UNRWA (respectively 83% and 63%). It is also worth pointing out that UNRWA's role in primary health care outside camps in the Gaza Strip is relatively large (40%). This could be explained by the large number of refugees in the Gaza Strip who do no longer reside in camps, but still benefit from UNRWA services. In Jerusalem, the picture is more evenly split between various providers of primary health care with UNRWA taking up a 22% share, the Israeli health services 19%, the Palestinian Authority 15%, and both the local NGOs and the Arab governments respectively providing primary health care to 14% of the Jerusalemite beneficiaries.

Regarding the providers of primary health care, the main findings in addition to the ones described in figure 7.25 can be summarized as follows:

➤ Region of residence (o059)

A far larger percentage of respondents in the West Bank (62%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%) and Jerusalem (15%) referred to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care. Conversely, UNRWA seems to provide most primary health care in the Gaza Strip (48%), while the beneficiaries of primary health care provided by local NGOs are the lowest in this region (5%).

➤ Area of residence (o060)

A considerably higher percentage of villagers (66%) than respondents residing in cities (48%) and camp dwellers (30%) reported that the Palestinian Authority is their source of primary health care. Expectably, a far higher percentage of camp residents (65%) than those residing in cities (26%) and villages (6%) referred to UNRWA as their source of primary health care. Also, international organizations and local NGOs seem to provide more primary health care in villages (respectively 7% and 10%) than in cities (respectively 4% and 8%) and refugee camps (respectively 1% and 3%).

➤ Refugee status (o002)

Predictably, the Palestinian Authority is clearly the main provider of primary health care to non-refugees (69% vs. 29% refugees) and, conversely, UNRWA is the main provider of primary health care to the refugee population (56% vs. 3% non-refugee).

➤ Poverty level (poverty3)

When examining the source of primary health care according to poverty, it is clear that UNRWA provides more to those living in hardship (35%) and below the poverty line (36%) than to those with a family income above the poverty line (18%). The provision of primary health care by the Palestinian Authority is more evenly spread over the poverty levels with 51% of those living in hardship, 52% of those below the poverty line and 47% of those above the poverty line referring to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care.

➤ Age (agec)


With regard to the relationship between the provision of primary health care and the age of the beneficiaries, it is interesting to concentrate on the age group that is 50 years old or older. While the Palestinian Authority clearly caters most for this age group (60%), the results indicate that international organizations, UNRWA and Arab governments concentrate the provision of their services least on the 50-plussers.

### Specialized care


Regarding the level of satisfaction with benefited from specialized care services, in general, 77% of the respondents are satisfied with the provision of those services, while 23% are dissatisfied. The results in figure 7.26, below, also clearly indicate that satisfaction with specialized care services is considerably lower in the West Bank (71%) than in the Gaza Strip (80%) and Jerusalem (82%). Furthermore, the level of satisfaction with specialized care services is far greater among refugees (85%) than among non-refugees (69%).

As for the providers of specialized care in the past six months, in general, the four main providers of such care are (1) the Palestinian Authority (42%), UNRWA (16%), local NGOs (13%), and private sources (12%). It is interesting to note in figure 7.27, below, that – unlike with any of the types of health services discussed above – the PA is also the main provider of specialized care in the Gaza Strip refugee camps (39%). In fact, with regard to specialized care in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA seems to provide slightly more such care outside the refugee camps (23%) than inside the camps (20%). Furthermore, Islamic organizations and international organizations concentrate their provision of specialized care mainly on non-camp residents, both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In Jerusalem, the delivery of specialized care is divided quite evenly between three main providers, whereby the Israeli health services take care of 18% of the beneficiaries, and so do the Palestinian Authority (18%) and UNRWA (18%).

**Figure 7-26 Level of satisfaction with benefited from specialized care in the past six months (o126i) in general and according to region of residence (o059) and refugee status (o002)**



**Figure 7-27 Providers (Q115) of specialized care in the past six months (o126is) in general and according to place of residence (place)**



Concerning the providers of specialized care, the main findings in addition to the ones described in figure 7.27, above, can be summed up as follows:

➤ **Region of residence (o059)**

A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the West Bank (48%) than in the Gaza Strip (41%) mentioned that the Palestinian Authority is their source of specialized care. The opposite is the case concerning UNRWA, with more than double the percentage in the Gaza Strip (22%) than in the West Bank (10%) mentioning UNRWA as their provider of specialized care.

➤ **Area of residence (o060)**

The provision of specialized care by the Palestinian Authority is highest in villages (50%), followed by cities (41%) and refugee camps (33%). UNRWA is the main provider of specialized care in refugee camps (33%), but was also referred to as a source in cities (16%) and – to a lesser extent - in villages (4%). The local NGOs seem to slightly more focus their provision of specialized care on refugee camps (16%) and

villages (15%) than on cities (12%), while international organizations focus their efforts in providing such care mostly on cities (7%) and villages (6%).

➤ Refugee status (o002)

When examining the source of specialized care according to refugee status, it is clear that a higher percentage of non-refugees (54%) than refugees (29%) report that the Palestinian Authority is their provider of specialized care. As for UNRWA, 31% of refugees specified it as their source of specialized care compared to 2% of non-refugees. The provision of specialized care by international organizations, local NGOs and private sources seems to be quite evenly spread between refugees and non-refugees.

➤ Poverty level (poverty3)

The Palestinian Authority as a provider of specialized care is mentioned by a considerably higher percentage of beneficiaries with a family income below the poverty line (50%) and those living in hardship (44%) than by beneficiaries of such care with a living standard above the poverty line (35%). UNRWA's focus with specialized care is definitely more on the hardship cases (26%) and Palestinians with a family income that falls below the poverty line (18%) than on those above the poverty line (8%). A higher percentage of beneficiaries of specialized care above the poverty line than those below the poverty line or those living in hardship were provided with such care by local NGOs and private sources.

➤ Education (educ)


When examining the provision of specialized care according to the educational level of the beneficiaries, it is clear that the Palestinian Authority (47%), UNRWA (21%) and the Israeli health services (8%) cater considerably more for the low educated than for the medium or highly educated. Conversely, Islamic organizations (5%), international organizations (6%), and local NGOs (16%) seem to cater more for the higher educated. Interestingly, with respect to specialized care from private institutions, the results indicate that their provision of such care to the low educated (13%) and the highly educated (14%) is about even.

### Ambulance transportation

Lastly, beneficiaries of ambulance services in the past six months were asked about their satisfaction with those services. In general, 79% of the respondents are satisfied with those services, while the remaining 21% are dissatisfied. More specifically and according to area of residence, the highest percentage of satisfaction with ambulance services can be found in villages (85%), followed by beneficiaries residing in cities (79%), while the lowest percentage of satisfaction is among refugee camp residents (67%).


Concerning the providers of ambulance services in the past six months, in general, 36% have been provided by the Palestinian Authority. The other main providers of such services include the international organizations (30%), local NGOs (14%), and UNRWA (12%). When analyzing this question according to place of residence, it becomes apparent that the Palestinian Authority is the main provider of ambulance services in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and both inside and outside refugee camps. UNRWA barely provides ambulance services

**Figure 7-28 Level of satisfaction with benefited from ambulance transportation in the past six months (o126j) in general and according to area of residence (o060)**



to non-camp residents in the West Bank (3%)<sup>6</sup>, while in the Gaza Strip its share in the provision of ambulances is larger outside camps (21%) than within the camps (17%).

**Figure 7-29 Providers (Q117) of ambulance transportation (o126js) in general and according to place of residence (place)**



Finally, concerning the providers of ambulance services, the main findings in addition to the ones described in figure 7.29, above can be summarized as follows:

➤ **Region of residence (o059)**

A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (48%) than in the West Bank (32%) stated that the Palestinian Authority was the source of their ambulance service. The same is valid for ambulance services provided by UNRWA (Gaza Strip 20% vs. West Bank 3%). Ambulance services by international organizations were more concentrated in the West Bank (37%) than in the Gaza Strip (20%). The same is true for ambulance services provided by local NGOs (West Bank 29% vs. Gaza Strip 7%).

➤ **Area of residence (o060)**

While the provision of ambulance services by the Palestinian Authority seem to be quite evenly spread over cities (37%), villages (34%) and refugee camps (38%), the remaining main providers of such services seem to have a specific focus. More specifically, international organizations provided far more ambulance services in villages (44%) than in cities (21%) and in refugee camps (24%). Local NGOs concentrated their ambulance provision more in cities (18%) than in villages (9%) or in refugee camps (9%), while UNRWA, of course, focused mainly on refugee camps (29%), followed by cities (11%) and villages (2%).

➤ **Refugee status (o002)**

The Palestinian Authority in the past six months provided a higher percentage of refugee respondents (40%) than non-refugee respondents (33%) with ambulances. Ambulance services provided by UNRWA were also referred to by a far higher percentage of refugees (21%) than non-refugees (4%). Provision of ambulance services by international organizations and local NGOs provide the opposite picture as a far higher percentage of non-refugee respondents (respectively 37% and 19%) than refugee respondents (respectively 18% and 8%) referred to these organizations with regard to such services.

➤ **Poverty level (poverty3)**

When examining the provision of ambulances in the past six months according to the poverty level, it appears that the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA catered more for the respondents living in hardship

<sup>6</sup> It is worth noting that UNRWA West Bank is endowed with only four ambulances.

(respectively 40% and 23%) and below the poverty line (respectively 47% and 9%) than for those with a household income above the poverty line (respectively 27% and 7%). The opposite is the case for the provision of ambulances by international organizations, local NGOs, and Islamic organizations as they were all referred to by a significantly higher percentage of respondents with a living standard above the poverty line than by respondents with a household income below the poverty line or those living in hardship.

#### ➤ Age (agec)

A statistically significant relation appeared in the results between the provision of ambulances and the age of the respondents as a considerably higher percentage of the 50-plussers than their younger colleagues mentioned the Palestinian Authority and local NGOs as the providers of ambulances. On the opposite, a significantly lower percentage of respondents above the age of 50 than the younger respondents referred to international organizations and UNRWA as the providers of their ambulances.

### 7.2.4 Health coverage<sup>7</sup>

As health coverage forms an important aspect of health and the provision of its services, interviewees were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in covering their medical expenses. As indicated in figure 7.30, below, 26% of the respondents still cover their medical sources from their own sources. When the respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main providers are the government health insurance with 40% and UNRWA with 17%.<sup>8</sup> Another 8% cover their medical bills through private health insurance and 4% have their health coverage provided by charitable organizations. The remaining 5% of the respondents did not specify who provided them with health insurance, but did say that they delayed the payment of the fees. In comparison with the results on the same question in February 2004, health coverage by government insurance decreased by 3% and so did UNRWA's health coverage, private health insurance increased by 1%, while coverage by charitable organizations increased by 2%. The percentage of the respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket has decreased by 5% since the September 2003 report and has remained the same since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, the percentage of respondents specifying that they had delayed the payment of the fees has increased by 3% since February 2004.


The results in figure 7.30, next page, also illustrate that the sources of health coverage vary considerably according to the area of residence of the respondents. Government health insurance is the main provider of health coverage in cities (46%) and villages (39%), but is largely superseded by UNRWA in refugee camps, where it only provides to 23% of the residents. Expectedly, UNRWA provides assistance through health insurance mostly in camps (56%) and not so often in cities (14%) and villages (3%). Respondents in villages seem to receive the least assistance in covering their medical expenses as – in comparison with respondents in cities (25%) and refugee camps (13%) – they far more frequently cover medical bills from their own sources (34%). Also, a considerably higher percentage of villagers (10%) than residents in cities (3%) and refugee camps (2%) declared that they had delayed the payment of their fees. Finally, coverage by private insurance is seen most frequently in villages (11%), followed by cities (7%) and then refugee camps (6%).

<sup>7</sup> It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in Jerusalem are excluded. Jerusalemites are entitled to Israeli government health coverage and as such their inclusion into the analysis would provide inaccurate results about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.

<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that UNRWA does not offer its own health insurance scheme, although the Agency (partially) covers hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.




Figure 7-30 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) in general and according to area of residence (o060) (excluding Jerusalem respondents)



Sources of health coverage also significantly differ according to the region and place of residence of the respondents. The results in figure 7.31, below, indicate that although the percentage of the respondents stating that they are covered by government health insurance does not differ much between the West Bank (41%) and the Gaza Strip (38%), the percentage of respondents specifying that their medical bills are covered by UNRWA is far lower in the West Bank (6%) than in the Gaza Strip (33%). In fact, the higher percentage of refugees among the total Gaza Strip population as compared to the West Bank could explain this finding. Supporting this argument, the results indicate that UNRWA only covers a small percentage of medical bills in the West Bank outside camps, whilst it still provides assistance through health insurance to 22% of the respondents residing outside camps in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, the percentage of respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket is more than twice as high in the West Bank (34%) than in the Gaza Strip (15%). When taking the analysis slightly further according to place of residence, it appears that the highest percentage of respondents that do cover their medical expenses from their own sources can be found in the West Bank outside camps (35%). The highest percentage of respondents that delayed the payment of their fees is also residing in the West Bank outside camps (7%).

Figure 7-31 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to region of residence (o059) and place of residence (place)





### Health coverage and income

The source of health coverage among Palestinians does not only vary depending on where they live in the occupied Palestinian territory, it also differs according to the income level of the household. As the results in table 7.4, below, indicate coverage by government health insurance seems to be quite evenly spread over the households with an income level between NIS 500 to NIS 5000, while a significantly lower percentage of households with an income level above NIS 5000 (23%) and an income level of less than NIS 500 (30%) are covered by government health insurance. Furthermore, the results show that more low income households than high income households cover their medical bills through using UNRWA services. More specifically, whereas 32% of the households with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 cover their health expenses through UNRWA, only 4% of the households with an income level over NIS 5000 do so. Generally, households with a higher monthly income seem to be covered more frequently by private health insurance than households with a lower income level. Moreover, the former cover medical expenses from their own sources more often than the latter. Still, it is worth pointing out that 19% of households with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 cover their medical bills from their own pocket. This is an increase of 5% since the February 2004 survey. Lastly, it is again the most vulnerable group of respondents with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 that most frequently resorts to delaying to payment of fees (9%).

**Table 7-4 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to household income level (excluding Jerusalem respondents)<sup>9</sup>**

	Household income in NIS						Total
	Over 5000	3000-4999	2000-2999	1500-1999	500-1499	Less than 500	
<b>Government health insurance</b>	6	52	99	108	167	39	471
	23%	36%	46%	41%	42%	30%	40%
<b>UNRWA</b>	1	9	29	40	81	42	202
	4%	6%	13%	15%	21%	32%	17%
<b>Private health insurance</b>	8	20	14	19	24	6	91
	31%	14%	7%	7%	6%	5%	8%
<b>Charities</b>		1	5	11	20	7	44
		1%	2%	4%	5%	5%	4%
<b>Cover own medical expenses</b>	11	57	62	69	80	24	303
	42%	40%	29%	26%	20%	19%	26%
<b>Payment delayed</b>		5	7	16	22	12	62
		4%	3%	6%	6%	9%	5%
<b>Total</b>	26	144	216	263	394	130	1173
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%


### Health coverage and poverty

As was discussed earlier, the government (40%) and UNRWA (17%) are the main sources of health coverage. When examining the beneficiaries according to the variable of poverty, one notices that both

<sup>9</sup> It is worth noting that although the results in table 7.3 show a statistically significant relation between the sources of health coverage and the monthly household income level of the respondents, the numbers for some of the categories under examination are rather small. Therefore, some caution when interpreting the results in table 7.3 is advisable.


government and UNRWA provide more health coverage to Palestinians with a household income that falls below the poverty line (respectively 63% and 80%). However, there are quite a few alarming findings that stand out in figure 7.32, below. Firstly, 51% of households below the poverty line cover their medical expenses from their own pocket. Furthermore, 51% of the households below the poverty line cover their medical expenses through private health insurance. Lastly, while 75% of the respondents from households with a monthly income below the poverty line declared that they had delayed paying their fees, this is also the case for 25% of the respondents from households with a living standard above the poverty line. This is an increase of 18% since the February 2004 survey and indicates that an increasing number of Palestinians with a household income level above the poverty line began to resort to the coping mechanism of delaying the payment of bills or fees.

Figure 7-32 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) according to poverty level (poverty3) (excluding Jerusalem)



When examining the source of health coverage for the respondents living in hardship, it is clear that the government health insurance is the main provider (36%), followed by 25% who cover their medical bills through using UNRWA services. In this report, the percentage of respondents living in hardship who cover their own medical expenses has again slightly risen by 2% since the last report, and now stands at 19%. Also, the percentage of respondents living in hardship mentioning that they delayed payment of their medical fees has increased from 5% in the February 2004 survey to 8% in the survey conducted for the current report.

Figure 7-33 Sources of health coverage (o089v2) for hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem)




## 7.3 Education

As was the case in the section of health, it is valuable to first find out the general level of satisfaction with benefited from education services and schools in the past six months, and also to find out more concretely who were the main providers of such services.

The results pointed out that 50% of the total sample of interviewees benefited from school services in the


past six months. As overviewed in figure 7.34, below, the large majority of 85% of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the education services provided to their households in the past six months. However, the level of satisfaction is considerably greater in the West Bank (88%) and in Jerusalem (84%) than in the Gaza Strip (74%). Although not illustrated in the figure, below, it is worth noting that the level of satisfaction with benefited from education services in the past six months was significantly higher among female respondents (88%) than among their male counterparts (82%).

**Figure 7-34 Level of satisfaction with benefited from education services in the past six months (o126k) in general and according to region of residence (o059)**



As for the providers of education, in general, the Palestinian Authority (50%) and UNRWA (34%) are the main providers of such services. The provision of schools by Islamic (4%) or international (2%) organizations, local NGOs (4%), Arab governments (3%) or organizations (1%), and private institutions (1%) are minimal and do not exceed 4% respectively. When analyzing the provision of schools according to place of residence, one can clearly notice that whereas the PA is the main provider outside refugee camps both in the West Bank (78%) and in the Gaza Strip (47%), UNRWA is the main provider inside camps both in the West Bank (81%) and in the Gaza Strip (77%).<sup>10</sup> Surprisingly different from the results in the survey of February 2004, is the relatively high percentage in Jerusalem of UNRWA (31%), Islamic organizations (21%) and Arab governments (15%) as providers of education and the relatively low percentage of the PA as a provider of education in Jerusalem compared to the results in February 2004. These results are detailed in figure 7.35, below.

**Figure 7-35 Providers of education services in the past six months (o126ks) in general and according to place of residence (place)**



In addition to the information in figure 7.35, above, there are more significant differences according to several independent variables with regard to the issue of the providers of education. They are briefly overviewed below.

<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of information, it is worth mentioning that there is an agreement in place between the PA and UNRWA, according to which UNRWA will enroll non-refugee students (preferably girls) in UNRWA schools if: (a) there is no PA school in the surrounding 3 km, or (b) they reside in a frontier village, or (c) they reside in Shu'fat camp and meet certain conditions.

➤ Region of residence (o059)

A far higher percentage of Westbankers (72%) than Gazans (37%) and Jerusalemmites (15%) identified the Palestinian Authority as their provider of education. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently mentioned source of education (53%), compared to 9% in the West Bank. The provision of education services by international organizations and local NGOs is quite evenly divided between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

➤ Area of residence (o060)

A considerably higher percentage of villagers (87%) than respondents residing in cities (49%) or camp dwellers (14%) stated that the Palestinian Authority provides them with education. UNRWA, of course, is the main provider of education in the refugee camps (79%), but was also mentioned by 29% of the respondents in cities and barely 1% of the respondents in villages.

➤ Refugee status (o002)


The Palestinian Authority provides education to 81% of the non-refugees and 21% of the refugees, while UNRWA mainly provides these services to refugees (65%) and to only 1% of the non-refugee respondents.

➤ Poverty level (poverty3)

The Palestinian Authority's education services seem to be quite equally provided to Palestinians across the poverty levels, with 47% of the hardship cases, 53% of the respondents with a family income below the poverty line and 48% of those above the poverty line having benefited from these services in the past six months. The poorer sections of society (41% hardship cases, 38% below the poverty line) more so than those Palestinians with a household monthly income level above the poverty line (22%) seem to benefit from schooling provided by UNRWA. Those respondents with a living standard above the poverty line rely more for education on Islamic organizations (8%), local NGOs (7%), and international organizations (4%).

### 7.3.1 The overall situation


Figure 7-36 Educational attainment (both o056 and educ) in general



As illustrated in figure 7.36, above, 4% of the respondents said that they are illiterate, 8% stated that they only went to elementary school, and 17% specified that they only went to preparatory school. About 33% of the respondents finished secondary school, while a relatively high percentage either attained some level of college education (25%) or college and above (13%). For the purposes of analysis in this study, the various levels of education were categorized into three categories: low education (illiterate and elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary), and high education (some college, and college and above). When the various levels of educational attainment are grouped in such a manner, one can see that 11% of the total sample of interviewees are low educated, 50% are medium educated and 39% are highly educated.

When examining the educational attainment among Palestinians according to gender, one can see that a higher percentage of women than men are low (15% vs. 9%) or medium (52% vs. 48%) educated, while a higher percentage of men than women obtained high education (43% vs. 34%). These results are overviewed in figure 7.37, below.


**Figure 7-37 Educational attainment (educ) according to gender**



### 7.3.2 Educational attainment according to place of residence

Educational attainment also differs significantly according to the region, place and area of residence of the interviewees. First, according to region of residence, in the sample the lowest level of education can be found in Jerusalem, followed by the West Bank, while the highest level of education is in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, whereas 16% of the Jerusalemites are low educated, this is the case for 12% in the West Bank and only 9% in the Gaza Strip. Conversely, while only 26% of Jerusalemites and 37% of the respondents in the West Bank obtained high educational levels, this is the case for 45% of the Gaza Strip respondents. Secondly, when taking the analysis a step further into place of residence, it appears that the highest percentage of low educated respondents reside in West Bank refugee camps (23%), while the lowest percentage of low educated and the highest percentage of respondents with high levels of education reside in the Gaza Strip, both inside (respectively 9% low and 47% high) and outside refugee camps (respectively 8% low and 45% high). Thirdly, the analysis according to area of residence reveals that the lowest level of education can be found in the refugee camps, followed by villages, while the highest level of education can be found in cities. The results on educational attainment according to region, place and area of residence are detailed in figure 7.38, below.


**Figure 7-38 Educational attainment (Educ) according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place) and area of residence (o060)**



### 7.3.3 Education and place of work

There seems to be a correlation between the level of educational attainment and the place of work of the respondents. As illustrated in figure 7.39, below, a considerably higher percentage of medium educated respondents than high educated respondents rely on the Israeli labor market and, as such, are employed in Israel proper or in settlements. The highest percentage of low educated seem to work either in Israel proper or in Jerusalem, while the high educated more so than the low and medium educated seem to rely on the Palestinian labor market in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.

Figure 7-39 Educational attainment (educ) according to place of work (o011v2) of those who are employed and unemployed



### 7.3.4 Education and income

There is a clear statistical significance between the level of education and income as a considerably higher percentage of respondents with a high level of education (59%) than those with medium (35%) or low (38%) levels of education enjoy a living standard above the poverty line. Logically, this implies that the majority of 63% of the low educated respondents and 65% of the medium educated respondents come from a household with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line, whereas this is the case for 'only' 41% of the high educated respondents. The overall results are overviewed in table 7.5, below.

Table 7-5 Educational attainment (Educ) according to poverty level (poverty3)

	Poverty level		Total
	Above poverty line	Below poverty line	
Low	38%	63%	100%
Medium	35%	65%	100%
High	59%	41%	100%
Total	45%	55%	100%

There is also a very strong correlation between the level of education of Palestinians and their ability to maintain jobs, or – in case of job loss – to change employment. The results in table 7.6, below, indicate that a far higher percentage of high educated than low or medium educated managed to retain their employment. More specifically, whereas in the past six months 89% of the high educated remained in the same job, this was the case for 57% of the medium educated and only 50% of the low educated. Also, whereas a mere 5% of the high educated lost their employment in the past six months, this was the case for 24% of the medium educated and 28% of the low educated respondents. In comparison with the results in report 7, it is worth noting that there is a considerable increase in the ability of both low and medium educated respondents to change their employment after having lost their job in the past six months. Indeed, in the survey of February 2004, a mere 8% of the low educated and 12% of the medium educated



managed to change their employment after having lost their job, while this is the case now for 22% of the low educated and 19% of the medium educated.

**Table 7-6 Educational attainment (Educ) and change in the employment situation (o012v2)**

	Change in employment situation in the past six months			
	No	Changed	Lost job	Total
Low	50%	22%	28%	100%
Medium	57%	19%	24%	100%
High	89%	7%	5%	100%
Total	71%	13%	16%	100%

## 7.4 Conclusion

The main findings concerning health and education can be summarized as follows:

- Health and education have kept the same importance since February 2004 as household needs, but have lost importance as community needs. Compared to other types of unmet household needs, health and education are not high on the priority list, which might suggest that these needs are already quite well catered for. However, when one looks at the households' five main expense types, it is hard not to overestimate the importance of health and education as expense types in Palestinian households.
- The main three factors influencing Palestinians' choice of a health facility are (1) because they are only insured to receive services from a specific facility (51%), (2) because they are not insured and services in a certain facility are either cheaper or free (16%), and (3) because they trust the quality of care in the health facility of their choice (11%). The lowest percentage of Palestinians choosing their health facility based on the first reason can be found in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among refugees, among those with a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line, and among the high educated.
- Concerning drugs prescription and provision for both chronic and acute problems in the past six months, the results indicate that the need for drugs treating chronic diseases is higher than the need for drugs treating acute problems. The need for drugs treating both chronic and acute problems is most pressing among the older generation, among the poorer segments of society, and within the refugee camps both in the Gaza Strip and – especially - in the West Bank. In the sample, the highest percentage of respondents that were prescribed drugs in the past six months for both chronic and acute problems, but were not provided with it can be found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
- In 85% of the Palestinian households nobody is impaired. In the 15% of households that include impaired persons, 76% have one person impaired, 22% have two persons impaired, while 3% have three or more impaired household members. When considering the type of impairment in all age groups, 44% are physically impaired, 42% are visually impaired, and 14% are mentally impaired. When considering impairment among children of 14 years or younger, 48% are physically impaired, 27% are visually impaired, and 25% are mentally impaired. As for the cause of impairment in all age groups, 56% are impaired since birth, 21% are impaired from an accident, and 22% are impaired as a result of the Intifada. When looking at the cause of impairment in the age group of children aged 14 years or younger, 76% have been impaired since birth, 12% are impaired through an accident, and 13% are impaired as a result of the Intifada.

- Concerning the need for any of the six types of medical care in the past six months under review in this report, and compared to results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey, the need for hospitalization, the need for an ambulance and the need for birth care have all considerably decreased. The need for specialized care and physical rehabilitation has increased since February 2004. With the exception of the need for ambulances, all different types of needs under study have been highest in the Gaza Strip. Except for the need of birth care, all different types of needs for medical care have been lowest in villages. Overall, no real patterns could be established about the restrictions, denials or delays faced in the provision of the six types of medical care being more prevalent in one or other subgroup of Palestinian society.
- Concerning the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries with four different types of health services, 78% were satisfied with hospital services, 81% were satisfied with primary health care, 77% were satisfied with the specialized care, while 79% were satisfied with the ambulance services. The level of satisfaction by beneficiaries with those four health services has increased in comparison to the results on a similar question in the February 2004 survey. Regarding the providers of these four different types of health services, in general, the results indicated that the PA and – to a lesser extent – UNRWA, are the main providers, with the exception of ambulance services where UNRWA's place is preceded by international organizations and local NGOs.
- Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main providers of assistance through covering Palestinians' medical expenses. The analysis further indicates that a higher percentage of households in the West Bank – particularly those residing outside camps and in villages in that region – than those in the Gaza Strip cover their medical expenses from their own resources or even resort to delaying the payment of their fees.
- Concerning education, 85% of the beneficiaries are satisfied with their education services. The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the PA focusing its attention mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and UNRWA mainly targeting the refugee population whether inside or outside camps. Furthermore, the largest portion of Palestinians with high educational levels can be found in cities and in the Gaza Strip. The low and the medium educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the high educated rely more on the Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low and medium educated are far less able to maintain their employment than the high educated. Still, in comparison to the results in Report Seven, there is a considerable increase in the ability of both low and medium educated respondents to change their employment after having lost their job. Finally, the results indicated that the low and medium educated are more likely than the high educated to belong to households with an income level that falls below the poverty line.

# *Chapter*

# 8



## **Women & Children**

*Isabelle Daneels*

## 8.1 Impact of the Intifada on women

Part 8 of the study is focusing on issues pertaining to women and children.

In the first section on women, all issues where cross-tabulation with the independent variable of gender shows a statistically significant difference will be discussed. In addition and more concretely, the main focus in this section lies on the employment situation of women.


In the section pertaining to the impact of the Intifada on children, several main issues will be addressed such as child labor and children's contribution to domestic activities, the two most important needs of children, children and education, and children and their diet.

### 8.1.1 In general

As has been the case in previous report, specific issues discussed elsewhere in the report are not examined according to the independent variable of gender as, usually, opinions between male and female respondents do not differ in a significant manner. As such, they are overviewed in this section. However, important differences in opinion according to gender with regard to both employment and children will be discussed in the appropriate sections of this chapter.


First, however, it was thought worthwhile to include some general information about women in the household structure. As overviewed in figure 8.1, adjacent, on average, Palestinian households count 1.7 women over the age of 18. Translated into percentages, this implies that only 1% of the households included in the sample have no women over the age of 18 years, 51% of the households have only one woman older than 18 years, 31% have two women, 12% count three women, 4% count four women, while only 1% of the households in the sample count more than four women older than 18.

Figure 8-1: Number of women living in the household




Moving on to the overview of issues where gender makes an important difference in the opinions of respondents, it is clear that female and male respondents attach varying degrees of importance to the unmet needs of the household. Whereas 34% of the male respondents believe that employment is the most important unmet need in the household, this is the case for 29% of the female respondents. Furthermore, the results detailed in figure 8.2, below, show that food, health and financial assistance are important unmet needs for a higher percentage of female respondents than their male counterparts.

Figure 8-2: Most important unmet household needs (o180) according to gender (o061)




Another difference in opinion between male and female respondents concerns their evaluation of received assistance, whereby a higher percentage of female interviewees than male interviewees evaluated the received assistance positively. These results are detailed in figure 8.3, below.

**Figure 8-3: General level of satisfaction with received assistance (o037) by gender (o061)**



Gender was also a relevant variable with regard to the issue of the reception of personal employment assistance, and even concerning the specific types of employment assistance that respondents personally benefited from such as short-term jobs and unemployment funds. As illustrated in figure 8.4, below, whereas of the male respondents, 23% personally received employment assistance, 11% personally received short-term jobs, and 15% personally received unemployment funds, among the female respondents the percentages that benefited from such types of assistance are far lower at respectively 13%, 6% and 7%.


**Figure 8-4: Reception of personal employment assistance (o024), short-term job assistance (o024b) and unemployment funds (o024c) according to gender (o061)**



Also concerning the most important source of information, men and women's opinions differ significantly. The results overviewed in figure 8.5, below, a higher percentage of female respondents than male respondents rely on local media (Palestinian TV and radio) and their friends and relatives as the most important sources of information. Conversely, a higher percentage of male than female respondents stated that their most important source is the al-Jazeera satellite TV station, or al-Quds newspaper, or political/religious factions. About the same level of importance was attached by male and female interviewees to the remaining sources of information.



Figure 8-5: Most important sources of information (o136v3a) according to gender (o061)



### 1.1.2 Women and employment

Although issues related to employment and the labor market have been discussed in detail in Part Three of the report, it is valuable to take a closer look at some of these issues from a gender perspective. This is the main aim of this section.

#### Women and employment in general


The results in this section provide a general overview of women's share in employment and their contribution to domestic chores. The results will clearly indicate that most women's occupation is to be a mother and housewife, but it still remains interesting to also have a closer look at the minority of women who are involved in the labor market.

Respondents were asked whether the main breadwinner in the household is male or female or whether both males and females in the household are significantly contributing to the household.<sup>1</sup> In general, a large majority of 87% of the respondents stated that the male is the main breadwinner, 6% said that the female is the main breadwinner, while 7% of the respondents specified that both contribute significantly to the household. When looking at the issue of the main breadwinner according to different independent variables at hand, significant differences in the answers appear according to area of residence, poverty and educational level, and age. As overviewed in figure 8.6, below, the highest percentage of households where the man is the main breadwinner can be found in villages (92%), among the poorer segments of society, among the medium educated (93%), and among the youngest age group of 18-24 years (93%). Furthermore, the results indicate that the percentage of households where the woman is the main breadwinner is about the same in cities (7%) and in refugee camps (7%), while the percentage of households with a female main breadwinner is the highest among those with a monthly income above the poverty line (8%), among the low educated (13%), and among those who are 50 years or older (15%). The percentage of respondents who specified that both men and women contribute significantly to the household is the highest in cities (10%), among the relatively better-off (12%), among the high educated (14%), and among those who fall in the age group of 25-49 years of age.

<sup>1</sup> It is important to note that the option of both females and males contributing significantly to the household was not read by the interviewer to the interviewee. As such, the interviewer only ticked this option in the questionnaire when respondents specifically stated that both males and females contribute significantly to the household.




**Figure 8-6: The main breadwinner in the household (o196) according to area of residence (o060), poverty level (poverty3), educational level (educ), and age (agec)**



When analyzing women's share in domestic and economic work, it is clear, in general, that only a minority of 10% of the women in the household are not at all involved in domestic work (10%), while the large majority (83%) or not at all involved in economic activities. The results in figure 8.7, below, indicate that the share of women involved in domestic work is quite equally divided between those who work between 1-19 hours per week (29%), those who work between 20-39 hours per week (31%), and those who work 40 hours and more per week in the house (30%). As for women's economic activity, the lowest percentage (4%) concerns the women who work 40 hours or more per week.

The respondents were asked to specify for each woman in the household whether or not they are involved in either domestic or economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. These detailed results are also displayed in figure 8.7, below. In general, it is worthwhile noting that the older women in the household (woman #1) are least frequently involved in domestic work, while they are most frequently involved in economic activity. On the opposite, it is the younger female household members (woman #5 and woman #6) who take more often care of the domestic work and least often are involved in economic activities.


Figure 8-7: Women domestic and economic work



### Type of employment and place of work according to gender


Generally, it is clear that women can be found more in certain types of employment and less in other types. As illustrated in figure 8.8, below, in the Palestinian labor market, women are seen more often than men in the role of employees (59% vs. 30%) and professionals (6% vs. 4%). Men are more often employed as skilled (33% vs. 14%) or unskilled workers (12% vs. 7%) or technicians (9% vs. 6%) than their female counterparts. Also in this sample, a higher percentage of employed males than employed females are self-employed (12% vs. 6%)

Figure 8-8: Occupation (o009) according to gender (o061)




Also, when examining type of employment from the perspective of the type of employer, there are clear differences according to gender. The government (33% vs. 21%), international agencies (7% vs. 3%), international NGOs (3% vs. 2%) and local NGOs (4% vs. 3%) are more frequently the employers of female employees than male employees. Furthermore, in this sample, a higher percentage of males than females are employed in the private sector (34% vs. 31%), in agricultural petty trade (6% vs. 3%), and in manufacture petty trade (11% vs. 6%), while also a considerably higher percentage of males (22%) than females (13%) are self-employed.

**Figure 8-9: Type of employer (or last type) (o063v2) according to gender (o061)**



For the first time in this report, employed respondents were asked how they heard about their current employment. The results in figure 8.10, below, show that about the same percentage of males and females (about 25%) heard about their employment from the newspaper or the radio, while the highest percentage of male (48%) and female (55%) respondents heard about their current employment from relatives and friends. Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of female (8%) than male (2%) respondents heard about their current employment through PA ministries, while a far higher percentage of male (24%) than female (9%) interviewees specified that they are employed in the family business.


**Figure 8-10: How did you hear about current employment?, according to gender (o061)**



When looking at the total sample, the employment situation also significantly differs according to gender. As the results in figure 8.11, below, overview, a higher percentage of male respondents than female respondents are not employed (19% vs. 6%), while 61% of the female interviewees are housewives. When examining the employed, it is clear that a higher percentage of the male respondents than female


respondents are full-time employed (37% vs. 15%), part-time employed (12% vs. 6%) or employed for a few hours a day (18% vs. 4%). In the sample, about an equal percentage of male and female interviewees are students (9% vs. 8%).

**Figure 8-11: Employment situation (o008v2) according to gender (o061)**




When examining the issue of the main place of work of the employed interviewees according to gender, one can notice that a significantly higher percentage of males than females work in Israel proper (16% vs. 7%), while a higher percentage of female than male employed interviewees work in the West Bank (52% vs. 46%) and in the Gaza Strip (32% vs. 29%). These results could suggest that working women more so than working men have their place of work closer to where they reside. These results are portrayed in figure 8.12, below.

**Figure 8-12: Main place of work (or last place) (o011v2) according to gender (o061)**



Also, it appears that when women are employed their job matches their technical or academic training more so than is the case with employed men. Indeed, the results in figure 8.13, below, indicate that 64% of the female respondents affirmed that their current job fully matches their technical or academic training, while only 53% of the male respondents felt that this is the case for them. Furthermore, whereas 21% of the male interviewees specified that their current job does not at all match their training, only 14% of women were of this opinion concerning their job.


**Figure 8-13: Job matches technical or academic training (o245) according to gender (o061)**



### Loss of employment according to gender


Loss of employment, and the manner or the effort Palestinians invest in trying to find another job, clearly varies according to gender. When interviewees were asked whether or not their employment situation had changed in the past six months, a higher percentage of female respondents than male respondents (79% vs. 68%) managed to maintain their job. Furthermore, as overviewed in figure 8.14, below, a higher percentage of male respondents (19%) than female respondents (7%) has lost their job, while the percentage of male and female respondents who managed to change their employment in the past six months is quite similar (13% vs. 14%).

Figure 8-14: Change in employment situation in the past six months (o012v2) according to gender (o061)



Among the unemployed respondents, men clearly tried much harder than their female counterparts to find different employment. As illustrated in figure 8.15, below, of the male unemployed 75% tried very hard to find another job, while only 13% did not try at all to seek alternative employment. In comparison, only 34% of the female unemployed tried a lot to find work and 53% did not try at all to find employment.

Figure 8-15: Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender (o061)



As the results in table 8.1, below, indicate, the reasons for not searching for alternative employment vary considerably according to gender. The main reasons for men not to search for another job include: (1) financial conditions of the job (37%), (2) lack of job opportunities (24%), and studying (16%). The reasons for women not to look for another job are totally different, with a majority of 57% of the female respondents arguing that they want to devote more time for home commitments and children. Interesting in this sample is that an as high percentage of female respondents as male respondents cite that they did not really search for employment because they want to devote time for studying (16%).


Table 8-1: Main reason for not trying or not trying very hard to find a job (o140) according to gender (o061)

Reasons for not searching for another job	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
1. Devote time for studying	16%	16%	16%
2. Devote time for home commitments/kids	7%	57%	33%
3. Old age	1%	0%	1%
4. Because of sickness	5%	0%	2%
5. Lack of job opportunities	24%	8%	16%
6. Because of financial conditions	37%	13%	25%
7. I am waiting to travel abroad	7%	1%	4%
8. Personal reasons	1%	6%	4%
9. No one helped me to get a job	1%	0%	1%
Total (n=173)	100%	100%	100%

## 8.2 Impact of the Intifada on children

This section on children will be devoted to several aspects related to children, including child labor, children's two most important needs, education, and children's diet. First, however, it was thought worthwhile to include some general information about children in the household structure. As overviewed in figure 8.16, adjacent, on average, Palestinian households count 2.64 children below the age of 18. Translated into percentages, this implies that 19% of the households included in the sample have no children below the age of 18, 10% of the households have only one child younger than 18 years, 19% have two children, 20% count three children, 14% count four children, 10% have five children, 4% have six children, while 3% of the households in the sample have seven or more children below the age of 18. Simplified, these percentages indicate that 68% of the households do not have more than three children below the age of eighteen.

**Figure 8-16: Number of children below the age of eighteen living in the household**




### 1.1.1 Children and employment

The results in this section provide a general overview of children's share in employment and their contribution to domestic chores.

When analyzing children's share in domestic and economic work, it is clear, in general, that only a minority of 14% of the children below the age of 18 in the household are involved in domestic work, while an even lower percentage of 3% are involved in economic activities. Indeed, with regard to children's domestic work, the results in figure 8.17, below, indicate that 86% of the children below the age of 18 in the household do not get involved in domestic chores. Of the remainder, 11% work between 1 to 19 hours per week at home, while 3% work between 20 to 39 hours per week in the house. With regard to children's economic activities, 97% of the children below the age of 18 in the household are not engaged in any economic activity. Of the remainder, 2% are economically active between 1 and 19 hours per week, while 1% is involved in economic activity between 20 and 39 hours per week.

**Figure 8-17: Number of hours children below the age of 18 are involved in domestic work and in economic activity, in general**






## DOMESTIC WORK


The respondents were asked to specify for each child in the household whether or not they are involved in either domestic or economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. The detailed results pertaining to children's domestic activities are displayed in figure 8.18, below. In general, the results illustrate that the older the children are, the more they do domestic chores in the household. On the opposite, the younger children in the household are performing less domestic chores than their older brothers or sisters. It is, however, worthwhile noting that although the analysis concerns children below the age of 18, the median age of the children is important to keep in mind. More specifically, the median age of child #1 in the household is 13 years, the median of child #2 in the household is 10 years, while the median age of child #3 in the household is only 7 years.

Figure 8-18: Child domestic work




When one examines the issue of domestic work of children below the age of 18 for the three oldest children in the household according to gender, one can see that the girls in the household much more than the boys get involved in domestic chores. The results in figure 8.19, below, illustrate that 89% of the oldest boys compared to 47% of the oldest girls in the household do no domestic chores whatsoever. Still looking at the oldest child, 37% of the girls compared to only 11% of the boys help between 1 to 19 hours a week in domestic work, while 14% of the girls and none of the boys work between 20 to 39 hours a week in domestic chores. The same trends are noticeable when examining domestic work of the second and third oldest child in the household according to gender. They are overviewed in the figure, below.

Figure 8-19: Domestic work of children below the age of 18 according to gender



The respondents were also asked to specify for each child in the household whether or not they are involved in economic activities, and, if so, for how many hours per week. The detailed results pertaining to children's economic activities are displayed in figure 8.20, below. In general, the results illustrate that the older the children are, the more they get involved in economic work. On the opposite, the younger children in the household are less often doing any economic activity than their older brothers or sisters. Again, it is worth remembering that although the analysis concerns children below the age of 18, the median age of the children is important to keep in mind. More specifically, the median age of child #1 in the household is 13 years, the median of child #2 in the household is 10 years, while the median age of child #3 in the household is only 7 years.

Figure 8-20: Child economic work




Furthermore, when one looks at the issue of children's' involvement into economic activity according to gender, it is quite unexpected to see that the oldest girls (6%) in the household slightly more so than the oldest boys (5%) are involved in economic activity. This is no longer the case when one focuses on the second oldest child in the household, where a higher percentage of boys (5%) than girls (2) are involved in economic activity.

The interviewees were also asked about their various strategies used in order to be able to cope with the hardship.<sup>2</sup> In answering this question, the respondents were given the opportunity to specify from a predetermined list which coping strategies they had used. In this list, there was one question asking the interviewees whether or not they had sent more household members below the age of 18 into the labor market.

In general, 6% of the respondents stated that they had sent more household members below the age of 18 into the labor market as a method to deal with the hardship. It is worth remembering here, that this percentage has dropped significantly over the past 18 months as in September 2003 this percentage still stood at 16% and in February 2004 the percentage still reached 10%.

As illustrated in figure 8.21, below, there are clear differences in the percentage of respondents that opted for sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a coping strategy according to their region and place of residence, and their poverty level. According to region, the percentage of households sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market is highest in the Gaza Strip (8%), followed by the those in the West Bank (5%), while this coping mechanism is least frequently used in households in Jerusalem (1%). Furthermore, within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a higher percentage of households residing in refugee camps than those residing outside camps have opted to send children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a strategy to cope with the hardship. Finally, the reliance on the strategy of sending children below the age of 18 to work expands with an increase in poverty. More concretely, whereas 3% of households with a family income above the poverty line sent children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a coping strategy, this percentage doubles to 6% among households with a living standard below the poverty line and swells to 12% among households living in hardship.

**Figure 8-21: Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as a coping strategy (o131f) in general, according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), and poverty level (poverty3)**



<sup>2</sup> Coping strategies of Palestinian households were discussed in more detail in Part Two of this report.


### 8.2.2 Children and needs

Since the outbreak of the Intifada over four years ago, the Perception reports have been monitoring the most important needs of children in the household. For the current report, parents were not only asked to specify from a predetermined list of needs what their children's first most important need is, but they also had to spell out their children's second most important need. As such, the analysis, below, will study both the results of *the two most important needs of children together* and will also consider *the first most important need separately*.

When the two most important needs of children in the household are examined *together*, attending school regularly (67%) is by far the most frequently cited need, followed by the need for safe opportunities to play (53%) and the need for psychological support for the children (40%). In comparison, the need for unrestricted access to medical care (18%) and the need for children to eat better (12%) or more (9%) than before the Intifada seem relatively less relevant to parents.

When one looks at the first and second most important need *separately*, the results in figure 8.22, below, clearly illustrate that the need for children to attend school regularly is by far more frequently mentioned as a first need (52%) than as a second need (15%) for children. The opposite is true for the need of children to have safe opportunities to play, to get psychological support, and to get unrestricted access to medical services. They are all more frequently mentioned by parents as a second most important need than as a first most important need.


Figure 8-22: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) in general



When analyzing the two most important needs of children *together* according to the region in which the parents of those children reside, one can see that the need for children to attend school regularly is important to a higher percentage of parents in the West Bank (73%) and Jerusalem (74%) than it is to parents in the Gaza Strip (58%), while the importance of the need for children to have safe opportunities to play is more important in the Gaza Strip (60%) than it is in the West Bank (49%) and Jerusalem (51%). The importance of the needs for children to receive psychological support and to eat better than before the Intifada is markedly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and Jerusalem, while the importance attached by parents to the need of their children to get unrestricted access to medical care is the lowest in the Gaza Strip.

When examining the first important need of children *separately*, the results indicate the same trends as when one examines the two most important needs together. Still, it is worth noting that the importance attached to children receiving psychological support as a first most important need is significantly higher in the Gaza Strip (17%) than in the West Bank (8%) and Jerusalem (5%). These results are overviewed in figure 8.23, below.


Figure 8-23: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to region of residence (o059)



When analyzing the two most important needs of children in the household together according to the area of residence in which the respondents' parents reside, the results in figure 8.24, below, indicate that the need for children to attend school regularly, the need for children to have safe opportunities to play, and the need for children to have unrestricted access to medical services are more of concern to parents in villages than to parents in cities and refugee camps. The lowest percentage of parents attaching importance to the need for their children to receive psychological support can be found in refugee camps, while in these camps one can detect the highest of parents giving high importance to their children eating better than before the Intifada.


The importance attached to various needs of children whether as a first most important need or a second most important need, are overviewed in detail and *separately* in the figure below.

Figure 8-24: The two most important needs of the children in the household (o105v3a, o105v3b) according to area of residence (o060)



As no additional questions were asked about children and their need for psychological support in this report, it was thought useful to single out this need and have a closer look. In general, 11% of the respondent parents still consider psychological support to be the first most important need of their children. As illustrated in figure 8.25, below, the extent of this perceived need differs significantly according to the region and area of residence of the respondents. A far higher percentage of parents in the Gaza Strip (17%) than parents in the West Bank (8%) and Jerusalem (5%) specified that psychological support is the first most important need for their children. Also, a higher percentage of parents in cities (14%) and refugee camps (11%) than in villages (8%) consider that psychological support is the first most important need of their children.

**Figure 8-25: The first most important need (o105v3a), in general and according to region (o059) and area of residence (o060)**




### 8.2.3 Children and education

Although this section traditionally deals with the children's ability or inability to reach school and their presence in or absence from school, this time it also includes children's activities during the summer holidays as this report also covers the period of June, July and August 2004.

In broad terms, 81% of the respondent parents stated that their children played in the neighborhood, 49% reported that their children attended summer camp, 21% said that they attended clubs, while 20% conveyed that their children attended remedial classes. As further illustrated in figure 8.26, below, 6% of the parents said that their children had been working during the holidays, while a mere 5% of the children seems to have traveled abroad. Compared to the results on the same question in report 6 of October 2003, 20% more parents in the survey conducted for the current report stated that their children played in the neighborhood during the summer, while the percentage of parents who specified that their children have worked during the holidays has halved since October 2003.

**Figure 8-26: Children's activities during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086a until o086f), in general**




When examining the various listed activities of children during the summer holidays according to different relevant variables, many interesting findings and differences appear. For the purpose of clarity, each of the listed activities will hereunder be discussed separately according to the different variables that by cross-tabulation have proved to be statistically significant.




Concerning children playing in the neighborhood, there are significant differences when examining the answers according to the region of residence of the respondents, and the poverty and educational level of the respondent parents. As illustrated in figure 8.27, below, about the same percentage of children in the West Bank (82%) and the Gaza Strip (83%) played in the neighborhood last summer, while this was least the case in Jerusalem (66%). Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of children in households facing hardship played in the neighborhood last summer (90%) than children in households below the poverty line (83%) and above the poverty line (72%). The occurrence of children mainly playing in the neighborhood appears higher in households where the respondent has a low level of education (86%) than in households where the respondent has a medium (83%) or high level (77%) of education.

**Figure 8-27: Children playing in the neighborhood during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086a) according to region of residence (o059), poverty level (poverty) and educational level (educ)**




Attendance of summer camps is clearly highest in the Gaza Strip (55%) and is at about the same level in Jerusalem (46%) as it is in the West Bank (44%). Furthermore, a higher percentage of parents with a high level of education (56%) than parents with a medium (45%) or low (39%) level of education reported that their children had attended summer camp during the summer holidays.

**Figure 8-28: Children attending summer camp during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086b) according to region of residence (o059) and educational level (educ)**




With regard to children going to clubs during the summer vacation of 2004, the percentage is the lowest in the Gaza Strip (14%), in the refugee camps (13%), among refugees (15%), among the poorest (12%) and amongst the lowest educated (11%). The results are overviewed in the figure, below.

Figure 8-29: Children going to clubs during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086c) according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)



Concerning children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004, the lowest percentage of children attending such classes can be found in Jerusalem (9%). When analyzing this issue according to place of residence, the results show that attendance of remedial classes is lower in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank, and within those regions, attendance by children of remedial classes is lower inside camps than outside camps. Also, the results in figure 8.30, below, illustrate that a higher percentage of respondent parents how are relatively better-off and have a higher level of education than parents how are poorer and are less educated have sent their children to remedial classes in the last summer holidays.

Figure 8-30: Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086d) according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)



As for children working during the summer of 2004, there are visible differences according to the region of residence of the respondents. As the results in table 8.2, below, indicate, about the same percentage of parents in the West Bank (6%) and the Gaza Strip (7%) stated that their children had been working during the summer vacation of 2004, while none of the parents residing in Jerusalem said that this had been the case.


Table 8-2: Children working during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086e) according to region of residence (o059)

Region of residence	Children working during summer vacation		
	No	Yes	Total
West Bank	94%	6%	100%
Jerusalem	100%	0%	100%
Gaza Strip	93%	7%	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>94%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Lastly, concerning children traveling abroad during the summer vacation of 2004, not unexpectedly the results show that the percentage of children traveling abroad during that period is highest in households who can afford it (9%) and among the respondent parents with a high level of education (9%). These


results are overviewed in the figure 8-31, below.

**Figure 8-31: Children attending remedial classes during the summer vacation of 2004 (o086f) according to poverty level (poverty3) and educational level (educ)**



Moving on from the summer holidays to the beginning of the school year, interviewees with school-age children were asked how often in the past six months their children had been unable to attend school or were late to school due to curfews and closures. In general, 71% of the respondents replied that in past six months their children had never or almost never been unable to attend school or arrived late as a result of closures or curfews. Of the remainder of the respondents, 24% said that their children were unable to go to school or arrived late less than ten times a month, while 5% stated that this happened ten times or more a month in the past six months.

**Figure 8-32: Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or late arrivals due to curfews/closures (o113b), in general and according to region of residence (o059), place of residence (place), area of residence (o060), and poverty level (poverty3)**




As overviewed in figure 8.32, above, the inability to attend school or late arrival at school due to curfews or closures varies considerably according to the respondents' region, place and area of residence, and

the poverty level of the household. Concretely, a markedly higher percentage of respondents in Jerusalem (93%) than in the West Bank (69%) and the Gaza Strip (67%) said that their children were never or almost never unable to reach school or late at school as a result of curfews or closures. More specifically, the results indicate that the main places where parents faced trouble sending their children to school are the refugee camps, both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, it is in the villages (83%) that the highest percent of respondents relaying that their children were never or almost never unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures can be found. Lastly, a distinctly higher percentage of parent respondents in households with a living standard above the poverty line (82%) than those in households with a monthly income below the poverty line (70%) or those facing extreme poverty (57%) explained that their children were never or almost never unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures. In short, these results seem to indicate that the main trouble spots for attending school in the past six months are in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in particular in the refugee camps in those regions and among the poor.

For the first time in this report, parents were also asked whether or not their children in the past six months had been absent from school for more than two weeks for other reasons than illness or Israeli measures.<sup>3</sup> In general, 14% of the respondent parents replied that this had been the case. However, the results in figure 8.33, below, clearly show that the issue of children being absent from school for over two weeks since the beginning of the school year for other reasons than illness or Israeli measures is most prevalent in the Gaza Strip (19%), in refugee camps (28%), among refugees (19%), and among those facing hardship (22%).

**Figure 8-33: Children in the household absent from school for more than two weeks since the beginning of the school year for reasons other than illness or Israeli measures (o192), in general and according to region of residence (o059), area of residence (o060), refugee status (o002) and poverty level (poverty3)**



<sup>3</sup> It is worth mentioning here that in October 2004 over 4,000 UNRWA employees in the West Bank and in the northern Gaza Strip launched a strike in a dispute over the increase of salaries. This strike might have had an impact on the absenteeism of children attending UNRWA schools.

### 8.2.4 Children and their diet

Another first-timer in this report is that parents were asked some questions about the eating and drinking habits of their children. More specifically, respondents were asked how many meals a day the children in the household take, and, also what the two main drinking water sources are for the children in the household who are aged 14 or less.


Concerning the number of meals a day, on average children have 3.12 meals a day (median =3.00). Although these results do not point to the quality of those meals a day, it is possible to deduce from these results that, in general, children in the occupied Palestinian territories are not underfed. The results are overviewed in table 8.3, below.

**Table 8-3: Number of meals a day for children in the household (o253), in general**

Number of meals a day for children in the household	
<b>N</b>	1090
<b>Mean</b>	3.12
<b>Median</b>	3.00

Moving on to the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 or younger, when one looks only at the first main drinking water source, it is clear that the first three sources of drinking water are quite evenly used as 20% of the respondents explained that their children drink mainly water from a public tap, 19% of the respondents said that the first main drinking water source of their children is a protected well, while 18% stated that the main drinking water consists of piped water. However, when one merely considers the second main drinking water source of children of 14 years or less in the household, it is by and large piped water (65%). These results are overviewed in figure 8.34, below.

**Figure 8-34: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a), in general**



Below, there are three tables with results that indicate several differences in the two main drinking water sources of children aged 14 or less in the household depending on the region and area of residence of the respondents and varying according to the refugee status of the respondents. The tables provide an in

depth view of the various differences, while the text merely refers to some main findings.

When examining the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according to region, one can see from the results in table 8.4, below, that Westbankers far more than Jerusalemites and Gazans rely on protected wells and tanker trucks as their main drinking water sources. Respondents in the Gaza Strip far more than their colleagues in the West Bank and in Jerusalem specified vendor-provided water as the main drinking water source of their children. The reliance on bottled water as a main drinking source for children aged 14 or less in the household is higher in Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank.

**Table 8-4: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to region of residence (o059)**

The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)							
		Region of residence					
Source of drinking water		West Bank		Jerusalem		Gaza Strip	
1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>		1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>
	Piped water	11%	74%	39%	67%	21%	53%
	Public tap	25%	8%	21%	24%	15%	8%
	Borehole or pump	5%	2%	7%	0%	2%	1%
	Protected well	30%	13%	9%	1%	7%	1%
	Protected spring or rain water	4%	1%	4%	0%	1%	1%
	Vendor-provided water	2%	0%	0%	0%	33%	29%
	Bottled water	7%	1%	20%	7%	15%	5%
	Tanker trucks	16%	1%	1%	0%	6%	3%
	Unprotected wells/springs	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%
	<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

When looking at the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according to area of residence, the results in table 8.5, below, show that respondents in villages considerably more than respondents in cities and camps rely on protected wells, boreholes or pumps, tanker trucks, and even protected rain or spring water as drinking water sources. Bottled water is more frequently used as a main drinking water source for children aged 14 or less in cities and camps than in villages.

**Table 8-5: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to area of residence (o060)**

The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)							
		Region of residence					
Source of drinking water		City		Village		Camp	
1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>		1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>
	Piped water	20%	61%	13%	73%	19%	65%
	Public tap	18%	12%	23%	8%	24%	8%
	Borehole or pump	2%	2%	8%	2%	3%	1%
	Protected well	17%	5%	27%	15%	7%	1%
	Protected spring or rain water	1%	1%	6%	1%	1%	0%
	Vendor-provided water	19%	15%	2%	1%	22%	20%
	Bottled water	13%	5%	6%	2%	16%	2%
	Tanker trucks	10%	1%	14%	1%	7%	4%
	Unprotected wells/springs	1%	0%	3%	0%	2%	0%
	<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Finally, when considering the two main drinking water sources for children aged 14 years or less according



to the refugee status of the respondents, the results in table 8.6, below, indicate that refugees considerably more than non-refugees rely on vendor-provided water as their main water source. On the opposite, non-refugees more than refugees specified protected wells, bottled water and tanker trucks as the main sources of drinking water for the children aged 14 or less in the household.

**Table 8-6: The two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) in the household. (o193b, o193a) according to refugee status (o002)**

The two main drinking water sources for children (<15 yrs.)					
		Region of residence			
Source of drinking water		Refugee		Non-refugee	
1 <sup>st</sup> & 2 <sup>nd</sup>		1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>	1 <sup>st</sup>	2 <sup>nd</sup>
	Piped water	19%	61%	16%	69%
	Public tap	19%	9%	22%	10%
	Borehole or pump	3%	1%	4%	2%
	Protected well	11%	3%	24%	10%
	Protected spring or rain water	2%	1%	3%	1%
	Vendor-provided water	21%	20%	9%	5%
	Bottled water	5%	4%	9%	3%
	Tanker trucks	9%	2%	12%	1%
	Unprotected wells/springs	1%	0%	2%	0%
	<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%

### 8.3 Conclusion

In conclusion, when examining specific issues related to women and children, a number of interesting findings can be identified. These results are summarized in the bullets below.

- The average number of women over the age of eighteen in the Palestinian households is 1.7 (median=1)
- In the majority of the households, the man is the main breadwinner. However, it is interesting to note that the highest percentage of households where the woman is the main breadwinner or where both males and females contribute significantly to the household can be found among those with a monthly household income above the poverty line.
- A large majority of 83% of women in the household are not at all involved in economic activities, while a minority of 10% of women in the household are not at all involved in domestic work. The older women in the household are least frequently involved in domestic work, while they are most frequently involved in economic activities. On the opposite, the younger female household members take most often care of the domestic work and are least often involved in economic activities.
- There are far less women than men in the labor market. However, women in the labor market less frequently than their male counterparts lost their jobs. Furthermore, when women are employed, their job matches their technical or academic training more so than is the case with employed men. When asked how they heard about their current employment, the main source of information seems to come from relatives and friends, followed by the newspaper and radio. Four times more employed men than women heard about their current employment through PA ministries. Lastly, once unemployed, women clearly tried less hard than men to find alternative employment.

- The average number of children below the age of eighteen in the Palestinian household is 2.64. Put differently, 68% of the households do not count more than three children below the age of eighteen.
- A minority of 14% of the children below the age of eighteen are involved in domestic chores, while an even lower percentage of 3% are involved in economic activities. The older the children are, the more they do domestic chores in the house and the more they get involved in economic activities. Girls below the age of eighteen far more than boys below the age of eighteen do domestic chores, while a comparison between the oldest girls and oldest boys in the households shows that about the same percentage of these boys and girls are involved in economic activities.
- The need for children to attend school regularly is by far the priority for the majority of parents. The importance of the needs for children to receive psychological support and to eat better than before the Intifada is markedly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
- During the summer vacation of 2004, 81% of the children played in the neighborhood, 49% attended summer camp, 21% attended clubs, 20% attended remedial classes, 6% were working and 5% traveled abroad. Since the summer vacation of 2003, 20% more children played in the neighborhood during the summer of 2004 and the percentage of children who have worked during the holidays has halved.
- About 71% of the school-going children in the past six months have never or almost never been unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures. This percentage has remained stable since the February 2004 survey. However, child attendance of school due to closures or curfews was most problematic in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, particularly in the refugee camps and among the poor. Moreover, 14% of the children have been absent from school for more than two weeks in the past six months for other reasons than illness or Israeli measures. This was mostly the case in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among refugees, and among those facing hardship.
- The median number of meals a day for children in the Palestinian household is 3.00.
- When considering the first main drinking water sources for children aged 14 or younger, the first three drinking water sources are quite evenly divided between the reliance on the (1) public tap, (2) a protected well, and (3) piped water. When one merely considers the second main drinking water source of children of 14 years or less it is by far piped water.

# *Chapter*

# 9



# Refugees & UNRWA

*Jalal Al Hussein*

## Introduction

Part nine of the report investigates the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) and the impact of international aid on their livelihoods.

The chapter is divided into three sections.

- The first section establishes a demographic profile of the refugee population residing in the oPt based on the survey's refugee sample.
- The second section sets out to establish a basic socio-economic profile of the refugees with regard to poverty and income levels, employment, needs and unmet needs.
- The third section focuses both on the Palestinians' perceptions of the socio-economic assistance programs undertaken on behalf of the refugees and on the future of such assistance.

The main explanatory variable utilized in this part of the report is the "refugee status" independent variable (o002). However, when relevant, the "camp resident" variable will also be used, either vis-à-vis inhabitants of other areas of residence (i.e. villages and cities, *including non-camp refugees*) or other places of residence (i.e. non-camp dwellers, *including non-camp refugees*). Independent variables related to age, gender, education and poverty are excluded from this analysis as they are dealt with in other parts of the report, although poverty will be used as an important dependent variable in the second section of the chapter. Also generally excluded is Jerusalem as a place of residence.


## 9.1 Demographic profile of the Palestinian refugees

### 9.1.1 Distribution of refugees per region

Refugees constitute 43.4% of the survey's population sample, i.e. 639 out of 1474 respondents.<sup>1</sup> This corresponds to the PA's estimates of the percentage of refugees within the oPt's total population, i.e. 42.6%. (Ministry of Health; July 2004: 3) Of the total refugee sample, 45%, i.e. 288 refugees, live in the West Bank and Jerusalem regions, while 55%, i.e. 351 refugees, live in the Gaza Strip.<sup>2</sup>

The refugees in the West Bank and Jerusalem constitute 30.7% of the total population -25.2% in the West Bank and 53.3% in Jerusalem - which is close to the figure of 29.4% obtained by the Palestinian official institutions. The same goes for the Gaza sample that is composed of 65.5% of refugees, a percentage similar to the Palestinian official figures. (Ministry of Health, July 2004)


Figure 9.1. Distribution of refugees (o002) according to region (o059)



<sup>1</sup> Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (around 97%) were registered with UNRWA.

<sup>2</sup> This is in line with UNRWA's figures. According to the Agency, out of 1,614,201 Palestine refugees registered in the oPt (including Jerusalem), 41.9% are West Bankers (including Jerusalemites) and 58.1% are Gazans. (UNRWA, 30 June 2004).

Figure 9. 2. Percentage of refugees (o002) according to region of residence (o059)



### 9.1.2 Refugees inside camps versus refugees outside camps\_

Similar to previous refugee samples (see Palestinian Public Perceptions, Report VII:232), about half of the refugee respondents reside in cities, while more than 1/3<sup>rd</sup> live in refugee camps and less than 1/5<sup>th</sup> reside in villages.

In the sample of the survey conducted for this report, 24% of the West Bank refugees and 47% of the Gaza refugees live in camps, which is generally in line with UNRWA statistics.<sup>3</sup> Conversely, camps are mostly inhabited, but not exclusively, by refugees, with a high 100% in the West Bank and a low 95.3% in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, although a majority of refugees in the oPt live outside the camps, they remain an important component of the analysis as “refugee pockets”.<sup>4</sup>

Figure 9.3.: Distribution of refugees (o002) according to area of residence (o060)





Figure 9.4. Percentages of refugees (o002) according to place of residence (place)



<sup>3</sup> According to UNRWA, 26% of its registered refugees in the West Bank and 49% of its registered refugees in the Gaza Strip are camp refugees. (UNRWA, August 2004)

<sup>4</sup> The majority of the refugees included in the sample of the survey conducted for this report can be found in Gaza outside camps (29%), followed by the Gaza camps (26%), the West Bank outside camps (23%), Jerusalem (15%), and finally the West Bank camps (7%).

## 9.2 Socio-economic conditions of the refugees: reality and perceptions

This section aims at determining the refugees' socio-economic characteristics, as compared to the non-refugees and the oPt population at large. Analysis is mainly based on data related to three interrelated themes:

- Evolution of poverty status in terms of secured household income.
- Employment status of the refugees.
- Evolution of needs and unmet needs at the household level.

### 9.2.1 Refugees and poverty: overview

Poverty analysis is conducted at two levels: the general "refugee status level" (i.e. refugees vs. non-refugees) and the refugee camp level (i.e. camp residents vs. non-camp residents –including refugees– in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank). As we will see below, the November 2004 findings witness relatively positive trends among refugees and refugee camps residents, except in the West Bank camps.


#### *The refugee status perspective*

One of the most striking findings of the survey is that the poverty status (as defined in strictly monetary terms) is no longer a differentiating criterion between the refugees and the non-refugees. In the previous report dated August 2004, it was already noticeable that the poverty gap between refugees and non-refugees, a constant feature of the Perception surveys since their inception in early 2001, had dwindled dramatically. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 234) This drive towards socio-economic uniformity between the two population categories, which stems from a continuous improvement of the refugees' socio-economic status and, simultaneously, a slight decrease in the non-refugees' living standards, was confirmed during the period under scrutiny for the current report.

The results of the survey indicate that, in line with the overall oPt population, 55% of the refugees are below the poverty line (8% less than in July 2003 and 5% less than in February 2004), of which 22% are hardship cases (8% less than in July 2003 and 2% less than in February 2004).

These figures indicate less poverty for refugees than those obtained in the February 2004 survey, when 60%, i.e. 5 percent more, were considered to be below the poverty line and hardship cases. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 233) The poverty figures for the non-refugees are slightly worse than in February 2004, as percentages of those non-refugees below the poverty line climbed from 53% to 55%.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 9.5. Evolution of poverty (poverty3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 - November 2004



<sup>5</sup> The trend is similar to the one outlined in the seventh report that had already noticed a decrease in the poverty figures (below the poverty line and hardship cases) for refugees from 66% in July 2003 to 60% in February 2004. Simultaneously, the non-refugee poverty figures had increased from 51% to 53%. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 234)




### *The refugee camps perspective*

From a geographical perspective, refugee camps still emerge, as already noticed in previous surveys, as the main “poverty pockets”, with significantly higher percentages of residents below the poverty line and those living in hardship (65% and 38%, respectively), than in cities (53% and 20% respectively) and villages (53% and 21% respectively).

In retrospect, however, one can notice that between February and November 2004 the overall socio-economic status of camp refugees has improved significantly with a 6% to 8% decrease in the percentages of them belonging to households with an average monthly income below the poverty line (including the hardship cases).<sup>6</sup> This relative improvement can be explained by the situation in the Gaza Strip, where poverty figures have somewhat returned to “normal” after the sharp economic deterioration during the July 2003-February 2004 period. However, this should not be interpreted as actual long-term improvement of living conditions at a time when the security situation and working conditions were becoming increasingly precarious (see Part One, section 1.1). Rather, it may reflect the expansion of employment assistance programs (mostly short-term jibs, see below sections 9.2.3 and 9.3.2), see further informalization of the labor market. Whatever its causes, this trend prevailed over the deterioration of the socio-economic status that affected the West Bank camp residents<sup>7</sup> and which may be due chiefly to the increased mobility restrictions in the West Bank and the Jerusalem regions, including the expansion of the Wall in those regions during the period under scrutiny (see Part One, Figure 1.12).

In retrospect, these findings emerge as a striking reversal of situation as compared with the February 2004 survey that witnessed an increase in the poverty levels in the Gaza camps and a decrease in those of the West Bank. (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 234-5)

**Figure 9.6. Poverty status (poverty3) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004**



### **9.2.2 Income and purchasing power**


The trend towards uniformity between refugees and non-refugees with regard to socio-economic status during the period under study may be inferred from the evolution of family incomes. On the one hand,

<sup>6</sup> While the situation in the cities is stable, the villages saw during the same period of time a significant increase in the percentage of hardship cases that jumped from 15% to 21%.

<sup>7</sup> Poverty levels outside camps remained relatively stable during the period under survey, with a percentage of people below the poverty line (including hardship cases) stable at 54% in the West Bank and increasing by 4%, from 67% to 71% in the Gaza Strip.


the “family income” variable is no more a distinctive pattern for refugee status, that is, the percentage of refugee families earning low incomes below 2,000 NIS (60%), medium incomes between 2,000 and 3,500 NIS (25%) and higher incomes above 3,500 NIS (15%) are similar to the percentages of the overall oPt population. On the other hand, comparison between these figures and those obtained in the February 2004 survey indicate a relative increase in the refugees’ family incomes since then. Indeed, whereas the percentage of refugees with lower family incomes remained stable, it increased from 57% to 60% among non-refugees. Likewise, among the higher family incomes the refugees were more represented in November 2004 (15%) than in February 2004 (9%), while the non-refugees saw their percentages in that salary bracket dwindle from 18% to 15% during the same period of time. These findings are overviewed in figure 9.7, below.

**Figure 9.7. Family income (o057v3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**



Confirming the comparative improvement of the refugees’ living conditions since February 2004, is the finding that many more refugees admitted that their income was about the same (+6%) or higher than needed (+6%), while the percentage of refugees who thought their income was less than needed decreased by 12%. During the same period, the non-refugees’ perceptions of their purchasing power remained similar to the ones in the February 2004 survey. These results are detailed in the figure below.

**Figure 9.8. Household income close to needs (o041) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**



The improvement in the refugees’ perception of their living conditions is warranted by other variables, such financial sustainability (o044). Comparison between the February 2004 and November 2004 data indicate that the percentage of refugees admitting that they were desperate or could barely manage receded from 56% to 50%, with half of them feeling able to keep up financially during the coming period or indefinitely<sup>8</sup>. In contrast, fewer non-refugees considered themselves able to keep up indefinitely in November 2004 than in February 2004 (from 40% to 34% respectively), resulting in refugees and non-refugees being on par with regard to their assessment of their ability to keep up financially in the coming period.

<sup>8</sup> The positive trend amongst refugees with regard to financial sustainability is at odds with the situation in the refugee camps. In these areas, the percentage of camp residents admitting that they were desperate or could barely manage increased: from 54% to 63% in the West Bank and from 60% to 64% in Gaza (o044xplace).

### 9.2.3 Employment status


Another striking finding of this survey is the change in the refugees' employment structure and the latter's impact on poverty levels.

#### *Employment structure*


Surprisingly, and in contrast with the findings in the previous Perceptions surveys, the employment situation of the labor force did not emerge in this survey as a distinctive pattern between refugees and non-refugees. While the August 2004 report had highlighted a sharp improvement in the refugees' employment status with a significant increase in the percentage of full-time employed and a decrease in the number of unemployed (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII, August 2004: 235), the present survey indicates more employment precariousness among refugees: fewer refugees have full-time jobs (minus 10%) and more have part-time jobs and work a few hours a day (plus 9%). Moreover, unemployment remained relatively stable amongst refugees, whereas it decreased amongst non-refugees. These trends led to a situation whereby refugees lost their edge vis-à-vis non-refugees with regard to their employment status.

The shift towards employment precariousness was, geographically speaking, especially marked in the West Bank refugee camps. The percentage of people with full-time jobs declined by 10% (from 54% to 44%) during the period under scrutiny, while the percentage of part-time workers or those working a few hours a day doubled from 17% to 34%. Nevertheless, the number of unemployed declined from 30% to 27%.<sup>9</sup>

**Figure 9.9. Employment situation of the labor force (o008r) according to refugee status (o002), February - November 2004**



**Figure 9.10. Type of employer (o063v2) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**



Confirming this shift, the percentage of refugees whose salaries were earned from long-term jobs declined from 59% in February 2004 to 48% in November 2004, whereas the percentage of non-refugees in the

<sup>9</sup> This trend is also clearly noticeable in the West Bank outside camps and to a lesser extent in the Gaza camps where slightly fewer people held full-time jobs (from 45% to 44% between February and November 2004) and were unemployed (from 24% to 21%) and where more people held part-time jobs (from 30% to 35%).


same situation increased from 46% to 48%. Simultaneously and as illustrated in figure 9.10, below, during the same period far fewer refugees were to be found in the sectors offering long-term contracts such as the government (-10%) and more in the private sector (+14%) and petty industrial or agricultural trades (+8%). The same shift from public to private sector also occurred amongst non-refugees, but to a lesser extent.

It is in mainly in the West Bank that private sector seemed to encroach on the government sector, including in camps where the percentage of those employed in public institutions decreased by 6% (from 20% to 14%), while the percentage of those employed in private sector grew by 33% (3% to 36%).<sup>10</sup> In the Gaza Strip, the same phenomenon occurred, but in the camps only: the percentage of camp dwellers engaged in the government sector decreased by 3% (from 27% to 24%), whereas those engaged in the private sector increased by 16% (from 17% to 33%).

### *Employment and poverty levels*

Overall, it has to be stated that, in view of the poverty figures outlined above (indicating less poverty among refugees), employment status was not the most influential factor in influencing poverty status. Actually, the percentage of refugees stating that job losses had a bearing on income increased by only 4% between February and November 2004 (from 34% to 38%), whereas it increased by 15% among non-refugees during the same period (from 25% to 40%, respectively). This may have to do with the comparatively higher level of assistance, particularly in the employment sector, received by the refugees as compared to non-refugees. In this regard, it is worth noting UNRWA's recent enhanced efforts to stimulate the job market through the direct hiring of employees on a short-term contract in connection with its regular and emergency programs (e.g. teachers in its schools, engineers on project sites, clerical offices in field and headquarters offices, etc.) and the indirect hiring of manpower involved in the development of the Agency's facilities (construction of additional classrooms, new libraries, rehabilitation of pathways, etc.).<sup>11</sup> (UNRWA, June 2004:4-5)

#### 9.11. Household employment assistance, general and specific (o026a, b, c), according to refugee status (o002)



### 9.2.3 Household needs and unmet needs


Employment was considered by refugees and non-refugees alike as the main household need. This finding does not come as a surprise given the deterioration of the employment crisis in the oPt since

<sup>10</sup> Outside camps, the percentage of governmental workers declined by 9%, while the percentage of those in the private sector increased by 13%. This balancing trend between public and private sector is in line with the World Bank assessment of the economic situation in the West Bank, which was marked by relatively stable employment figures "because of a large increase in part-time jobs, full-time jobs declined by almost 17,000 in the first half of 2004". (World Bank, 2004)

<sup>11</sup> Between January and June 2004, UNRWA offered about 12,000 temporary employment contracts, 78% of them in the Gaza Strip. (UNRWA, June 2004: 4) The importance of such efforts on the refugee population is discussed below, see section 9.3.3, footnote 15.

early 2004. According to the World Bank, during the first half of this year, the Palestinian economy lost more than 22,000 jobs. Moreover, in its second quarter, PCBS reported the lowest number ever of Palestinians working in Israel, a mere 186. (World Bank, 2004) However, probably on account of the higher percentage of employment assistance schemes beneficiaries among the refugees since early 2004 (see figure 9.11), refugees were fewer to consider employment a “first most household important need” in November 2004 than in February 2004, contrary to the non-refugees, who were much more numerous to consider employment a first most important need. The same trend emerged with regard to need for financial assistance that appeared to be less of a matter of concern for refugees in November 2004 than in February 2004, contrary to non-refugees. Conversely, need for food<sup>12</sup> is the only item that has increased as a household need – and dramatically so – for refugees during the period under scrutiny, which may be explained by an overall decrease in the food assistance levels during this period (see below section 9.3).<sup>13</sup> These findings are overviewed in figure 9.12, below.

**Figure 9.12. First most important household need (o079av3) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**



From a geographical perspective, one finds that West Bank refugee camps sometimes differ from the “refugee trend”. This is the case of need for employment that did not subside as a “first most important need” during the period under scrutiny, stabilizing at 42% (while it decreased in the Gaza camps from 46% to 40%). Furthermore, fewer West Bank camp dwellers stressed the importance of medication (from 15% in February 2004 to 10% in November 2004), whereas opinions remained about the same in Gaza camps (at 9-10%). Also, the need for education did not decline in the West Bank camps, stabilizing at 8%, whereas it declined in the Gaza camps (in line with the “refugee trend”) from 6% to 1% during the same period of time.


“Unmet needs” is a variable that differs from the “most important needs” variable in that, contrary to the latter, it refers to needs that are not necessarily seen as vital for the individual or the household, but which are nonetheless considered as not adequately catered for by the main services providers. It is therefore no surprise that financial assistance, which sets the burden directly on services providers, emerges as the main unmet need for refugees. Furthermore, financial assistance has never been considered a priority

<sup>12</sup> Food assistance is discussed in detail in Part Six of this report.

<sup>13</sup> Perceptions of refugees about their community needs also emphasize the fact that although employment is still considered paramount among refugees (and non-refugees), it was less the case in November 2004 than in February 2004 (from 63% to 57%, respectively), while need for employment at a communal level remained stable at about 60%. For both categories, food gained importance as a most important community need, the percentage of refugees referring to it in these terms increasing from 15% to 21%.

for assistance providers who prefer to focus on other basic – and/or more developmental - services, such as employment, food, education, and medication. It is also no surprise, given the employment assistance figures displayed above in figure 9.11, that employment emerges more as an unmet need amongst non-refugees than amongst refugees. Statements about food may also be explained by trends related to the levels of assistance, and particularly emergency assistance, a topic that will be tackled below in section 9.3.2.

**Figure 9.13. Most important unmet needs (o180) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**



A close look at the data from a geographical perspective shows that the situation in the refugee camps was, roughly speaking, in keeping with the one among refugees. Thus, “financial assistance” also emerged as the most important unmet need during the February-November 2004 period in the refugee camps of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (from 21% to 25% in the former and 22% to 32% in the latter), while employment’s importance as an unmet need dwindled from 31% to 21% in the West Bank camps and from 35% to 32% in the Gaza camps. Differences between the refugees’ situation at large and that of refugee camp dwellers occurred chiefly for unmet needs, such as food assistance, of which importance increased only in the West Bank camps, from 2% to 16% (and in all places of residence outside camps), but decreased in the Gaza camps from 8% to 5%.

### 9.3 Socio-economic assistance and refugee status

Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, assistance has become a regular feature in the lives of the Palestinians, refugees and non-refugees alike. Only 12% of both categories declared that assistance was not important to the household’s livelihood or that they could manage anyway, whereas twice as many of them admitted that they could not manage without it or only with great difficulties. This section is divided in five subsections:


- Coverage of assistance provided to refugees and general relevance of coverage according to beneficiaries.
- Contents of assistance.
- Sources of assistance.
- Satisfaction with assistance.
- Palestinians’ opinions with regard to the participation of the oPt camp refugees in future municipal elections.



### 9.3.1 Socio-economic assistance coverage


As has been the case since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, the refugees have been the main recipients of assistance during the period under scrutiny. Nearly 60% of them received some kind of assistance versus one third for the non-refugees, a gap that may be explained by the prevalence of UNRWA's assistance programs amongst refugees<sup>14</sup>. During this period, both refugees and non-refugees saw their percentage of assistance recipients increase (plus 3% for refugees and 5% for non-refugees); but for each category the level of assistance remained lower than the average of assistance received since September 2000. These results are overviewed in the adjacent figure.

Figure 9.14. Assistance received (o035, o037) according to refugee status (o002)



In terms of places of residence, the increase in assistance benefited mostly the West Bank refugee camps, which had seen their level of assistance decrease dramatically in previous periods. Still, as illustrated in figure 9.15, below, levels of assistance in West Bank refugee camps remain lower than they were in July 2003. Conversely, Gaza camps received less assistance than was the case in the past, a trend that stems from the problems UNRWA faced in distributing emergency assistance during the period under survey due to funding shortfalls and closures imposed by the Israeli authorities (see chapter 1, section 1.2.1.1). This trend may also reflect the re-targeting of assistance according to changes in the socio-economic conditions per place of residence. Indeed, the increase in the level of assistance in West Bank camps corresponds to an increase in poverty in these places of residence, whereas the decrease in levels of assistance in the Gaza camps correspond to a relative improvement of the socio-economic situation in these places of residence (see figure 9.6 above).

Figure 9.15. Assistance received (o035) according to place of residence (place), July 2003 – November 2004




<sup>14</sup> UNRWA's latest definition of the "Palestine refugee" (1993) stipulates that "Palestine refugee shall mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict". Refugees within this definition and their direct descendants are eligible for Agency regular services (source: Consolidated Registration Instructions (Effective January 1993)). In the oPt, over 1.5 million refugees are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), accounting for more than 40% of the total population of these areas. Since May 1950 UNRWA has provided basic services in the fields of education, primary health care, housing, and relief/social services. UNRWA is the only agency to have worked for such a long time in the exclusive service of one particular category of refugees. Emergency services are granted to the refugees who satisfy UNRWA criteria on low economic conditions during times of conflict..


In spite of their being on par with non-refugees with regard to poverty incidence (see figure 9.5 above) and more covered by assistance programs, refugees were more numerous in their belief that they needed much more assistance than they actually received. These results are detailed in figure 9.16, adjacent.

The refugees' comparatively unsatisfactory stance may partly reflect the often-referred to "dependency syndrome", whereby refugees will keep voicing demands for more assistance, whatever the level of assistance. The same negative statements about the irrelevance of assistance were aired in the camps. Aside from the "dependency factor", other factors inherent to the camps' situation such as the substandard environmental and housing conditions continue to elicit feelings of dissatisfaction and frustration, whatever the appropriateness and relevance of assistance and its targeting.

**Figure 9.16. Assistance according to needs (o038) according to refugee status (o002)**



**Figure 9.17. Assistance according to needs (o038) according to place of residence (place)**




### 9.3.2 Contents of most important socio-economic assistance

Food was, as usual, referred to by the oPt population as the first *and* second most important source of assistance item received during the period under survey; but this was more the case among the refugees who were 43% to highlight the importance of food assistance versus 23% of the non-refugees. However, compared to the situation in February 2004, food was slightly less highlighted by refugees as an important assistance item, the bulk of food assistance having targeted chiefly the (impoverished) West Bank camps (from 38% in February 2004 to 56% in November 2004), while other more refugee-inhabited places of residence, where poverty happens to have receded during the period under survey, were less serviced: this is the case in the Gaza camps, where the percentage of respondents referring to food assistance as the first and second most important received item dwindled from 62% to 49% during the same period. Otherwise, most other significant assistance items, be it emergency employment assistance, medication or financial assistance, saw their importance increased in the eyes of the refugee respondents during the February-November 2004 period.<sup>15</sup> The results in figure 9.18 below also indicate that assistance has focused, as has usually been the case since the start of the Intifada, on food distribution, which is a proof

<sup>15</sup> These increases also occurred in the Gaza and West Bank camps where, for instance, financial assistance increased respectively from 12% to 24% and from 6% to 8% during that period.

of appropriate targeting on behalf of the service providers, starting with UNRWA. Indeed, although - as seen in Figure 9.12 above - refugees continued to consider employment as the main household need, the percentage of them stating so declined from 45% to 42%, whereas the percentage of refugees identifying food as their main household need increased by 21%.

**Figure 9.18. Most important items received (o036) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 – November 2004**




However, the slight decline in the importance ascribed to food assistance received from February to November 2004 may have accounted for the increase in refugees defining food as an unmet need. Conversely, increases in the importance of employment assistance may explain the decrease in the percentage of refugees considering employment an unmet need (see above in section 9.2.3). However, the significant increase in the importance of financial assistance from 11% to 16% during the February–November 2004 period (as indicated in figure 9.18) did not prevent more refugees from considering that type of assistance as their main unmet need during the same period, with an increase from 23% to 30% (see figure 9.13 above).

### 9.3.3 Source of most important socio-economic assistance

Despite the many sensitive, extra-humanitarian problems it had to face during the period under survey, the refugee respondents continued to consider UNRWA as the prime source of the most important received services.<sup>16</sup> Even more, its prevalence as a provider of such services was enhanced during the period under scrutiny.


<sup>16</sup> Besides the mobility restrictions suffered by UNRWA staff members (including the Agency's Commissioner-General: see chapter I, section 1.2.1.1), UNRWA was accused by Israeli authorities of directly assisting Palestinian militants by allowing the latter to use the Agency's facilities and means of transportation. UNRWA managed to rebuff Israel's accusations, especially with regard to the alleged use by Palestinian militants of its ambulances to transport Qassam rockets in the Gaza Strip (October 2004). In addition, in October 2004 over 4,000 UNRWA employees in the West Bank (but also UNRWA staff members in the Northern Gaza Strip) launched a strike in a

Figure 9.19. Source of first and second most important received services (o036) according to refugee status (o002), February 2004 - November 2004



Compared to the situation in the July 2003-February 2004 period, which saw the role of UNRWA decrease and that of the Palestinian Authorities increase as providers of the most important services amongst refugees (Palestinian Public Perceptions VII: 248, 249), the present period under survey witnessed a re-focusing of UNRWA on the refugees. The PA as well as Palestinian trade unions maintain their position amongst refugees, but concentrated their assistance efforts more on non-refugees. UNRWA's enhanced role among refugees is particularly obvious with regard to food assistance, as the percentage of refugees considering the Agency the primary provider of food assistance jumped from 34% to 57% during the period under study. The same trend is also noticeable with regard to financial assistance, medication and, to a lesser extent, employment, the percentage of refugees ascribing to UNRWA the prime role in distributing these items rising from 12% to 26%, 44% to 57% and 41% to 43%, respectively.<sup>17</sup> Confirming the finding that employment in governmental institutions has dwindled amongst refugees (see above in section 9.2.3), the percentage of refugees referring to the PA as the provider of employment dropped from 44% to 17%.

Figure 9.20. Source of most important received services (o036) according to place of residence (place), February 2004 - November 2004




<sup>17</sup> The apparent gap between UNRWA's increased efforts to promote employment (see above section 9.2.3.) and that of the minor importance ascribed to it by the refugees may be due to the fact that most of these jobs offered are short-time jobs, whereas refugees are looking for long-term contracts.

From a geographical perspective, UNRWA's enhanced role among refugees concerned mainly the West Bank camps, which indicates accurate socio-economic targeting on behalf of UNRWA, since the inhabitants of these camps have become comparatively more impoverished during the period under survey. In general, Palestinian providers of assistance primarily targeted Gaza refugee camps, which have traditionally been the main poverty pockets in the oPt.

### 9.3.4 Satisfaction about assistance in general

A majority of refugees and non-refugees alike (56%) expressed general satisfaction with the received assistance, which is less than during the previous period under survey (61%). What differentiates refugees and non-refugees is the reason for dissatisfaction with the received assistance. Whereas refugees insisted mostly on frequency of assistance, non-refugees expressed more concern about the quantity of the distributed assistance. Furthermore, quality problems as a reason for dissatisfaction seem to be far more prevalent amongst refugees than non-refugees. These findings are overviewed in the figure below.

Figure 9.21. Reason for dissatisfaction with assistance in general (o123) according to refugee status (o002)




### 9.3.5 Camp refugees and municipal elections

The participation of camp refugees in municipal elections is a relevant issue when gauging the future of the camps and the role UNRWA may be called upon to play in these areas. This issue was hotly debated among various Palestinian constituencies in the mid-late 1990's, as it touched on the controversial issue of refugee re-settlement and the preservation of the camps as symbols of the refugees' humanitarian and political rights at stake. A consensus finally emerged that camp refugees were, as a matter of principle, not to take part in any forthcoming municipal elections. Camps were to be regarded as one social and political unit where refugee committees would be elected, mainly in order to assist UNRWA. In the Gaza Strip, however, given the fact that the vast majority of the population is of refugee status, and because many camps had already been integrated by the Israeli occupation authorities in the municipalities, refugees would be allowed to participate in such elections. This section aims to gauge what the Palestinians' current opinions on this issue are after five years of Intifada.

The present survey found that 60% of the oPt population (refugees and non-refugees alike) believe that camp inhabitants should participate in forthcoming municipal elections, while 21% think that separate elections should be held at the camp level and only 18% that camp inhabitants should not engage in any kind of local elections. However, since opinions on this topic have traditionally differed between Westbankers and Gazans, more relevant analysis may be made using a geographical perspective. In this respect, one clearly sees that in the Gaza Strip (be it inside or outside camps), in Jerusalem and in the West Bank outside camps, a large majority of the population favors the idea of the participation of the camp dwellers in the municipal elections, which testifies to the latter's integration within the oPt society. Only in the West Bank camps, known to be the main strongholds of the refusal to compromise on the principle of non-participation, does one find a majority of the population endorsing separate elections for the camps.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Camp services committees already exist, but their members are appointed by the PLO/PA.

Figure 9.22. Camp refugees and municipal elections (o263) according to place of residence (place)





## 9.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the analysis on specific issues related to refugees and UNRWA have allowed for the identification of a number of interesting findings. These results are summarized in the bullets below.

- Refugees constitute 43.4% of the survey's population sample. Refugees in the West Bank and Jerusalem constitute 30.7% of the total population - 25.2% in the West Bank and 53.3% in Jerusalem - and 65.5% in the Gaza Strip. Although only 38% of the refugees live in camps, the latter are mostly inhabited by refugees, with a high 100% in the West Bank and a low 95.3% in the Gaza Strip.
- One of the most striking findings of the survey is that poverty status is no longer a differentiating criterion between refugees and non-refugees (regardless of place of residence). In line with the overall oPt population, 55% of the refugees have a monthly household income that falls below the poverty line (8% less than in July 2003 and 5% less than in February 2004), of which 22% are hardship cases (8% less than in July 2003 and 2% less than in February 2004).
- Refugee camps, which are predominantly –but not wholly- inhabited by refugees, still emerge as the main “poverty pockets”, with significantly higher percentages of households that fall below the poverty line and live in hardship. Overall, the poverty levels in the camps declined during the period under survey, despite a deterioration of the situation in the West Bank camps due chiefly to the increased mobility restrictions and the Jerusalem regions, including the expansion of the Wall during the period under scrutiny. But improvement of the living conditions in the Gaza camps proved more substantial than the West Bank deterioration.
- In comparison to the February 2004 survey, in the current survey refugees are more represented among the higher family income bracket and many more refugees admitted that their income was about the same or higher than needed, while the percentage of refugees who thought that their income was less than needed decreased significantly. The non-refugees' perceptions of their purchasing power remained quite similar to what they were during the previous February 2004 survey.
- Surprisingly, the present survey indicates more employment precariousness amongst refugees, with a lower percentage of them in full-time jobs and more of them having part-time jobs and working a few hours a day. This trend was offset by the comparatively higher level of employment assistance enjoyed by the refugees as compared to non-refugees.
- Employment continued to be the main refugee household need, but its importance as such decreased during the period under survey, together with most other traditional household needs, except for food. For refugees, food was also, with financial assistance, among the main unmet needs.
- Although refugees and camp refugee dwellers received more assistance than non-refugees and Palestinians living outside camps, respectively, they were more numerous to consider institutionalized assistance as insufficient to cover existing needs. A majority of refugees, however, expressed satisfaction with assistance schemes, while the main reasons for concern relate to the frequency of relief distribution and its quality. The quantity of assistance is more of a matter of concern among non-refugees.

- During the period under study in this report, food was considered by the refugees (and non-refugees, but to a lesser extent) as the most important received assistance item, especially in the West Bank camps. Except for employment assistance, refugees tended to ascribe more importance to assistance items than non-refugees. During the period under examination, the increase in non-refugees relaying that they rely on employment assistance was more dramatic than the increase of refugees adopting the same stance.
- Despite the many sensitive, extra-humanitarian problems UNRWA had to face during the period under study, refugee respondents continued to consider it as the prime source of their most important received services. Moreover, UNRWA's prevalence as a provider of such services was enhanced during the period under scrutiny.
- Of the total oPt population, 60% (refugees and non-refugees alike) believed that camp inhabitants should participate in forthcoming municipal elections, while 21% think that separate elections should be held at camp level and only 18% ascertained that camp inhabitants should not engage in any kind of local elections. The West Bank camps dwellers were the only population category promoting in majority separate elections at the camp level.

# *Chapter*

# 10



# Politics & Government

*Jamil Rabah*

## Introduction

This chapter examines the Palestinian perceptions about a number of political issues pertaining to political trust, attitudes towards the *Intifada*, the peace process, the media, and the public view about corruption in the Palestinian Authority.

As mentioned earlier in this report, the data was collected during the period when Arafat was flown to France for treatment in late October 2004. It was also a period of heavy Israeli incursions in the Gaza Strip.

### 10.1 The situation in general


#### 10.1.1 Feelings about personal security

As was discussed in chapter one, the majority of Palestinians feel insecure about the general situation. As indicated in figure 10.1, below, the feeling of insecurity differs primarily according to three independent variables, namely the poverty condition, region and area of residence. While 78% of respondents that are regarded as above the poverty line declared that they feel generally insecure, the percentage reached 88% among those whose economic condition is extremely difficult.

The feeling of insecurity is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. While the percentage is 87% in the former, the rate drops to 82% in the later. The sense of insecurity is lowest in Jerusalem with only 70% of respondents stating that they are insecure.

Not surprisingly, the feeling of insecurity is higher among refugee camp residents than among city or village dwellers with 91% of the former saying that they feel insecure compared to 82% in cities and 77% in villages. This feeling of insecurity could be contributed to the relatively more difficult conditions in camps as well as to the more frequent Israeli incursions there.

Figure 10-1: General feeling of security (o118)




#### 10.1.2 The economic situation

The feeling of insecurity is not unrelated to the hard economic conditions of the Palestinian people as well as to the difficult political reality that they are confronted with. As was discussed in chapter two, earlier,


55% of the Palestinians have a living standard the poverty line. As can be determined from figure 10.2, below, 41% of those designated as below the poverty line live in fact under extreme poverty conditions.

Figure 10-2: The poverty situation (poverty3)



Of course, the difficult economic conditions are strongly linked to the labor market situation. Only 44% of the Palestinians participating in the labor market have full-time employment (see figure 10.3, below). The remainder is distributed between those who are employed part-time (15%), employed for few hours a day (20%), and who are unemployed (21%). It is important to note here that the labor market figures exclude the women who identify themselves as housewives.

Figure 10-3: The labor market situation (o008r)



## 10.2 The political situation

The following information covers the period at the time when President Arafat fell ill and was flown to France for treatment. While it is too early to judge now, the elections for a new president, the renewal of the Palestinian-Israeli direct negotiations, and the renewed American commitment to the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict might have brought some changes in the Palestinian attitude towards the political conditions they live under. However, it is unlikely that any change in Palestinian political attitudes would be so significant as to render the following discussion irrelevant. On the contrary, one could argue that Palestinian political attitudes will not change significantly before tangible and concrete measures are



made that will (1) improve living conditions and (2) release them, at least partially, from the strong grip of the Israeli occupation.


In the following pages an attempt will be made to analyze and examine Palestinian attitudes towards three major political issues that are fundamental for the Palestinian political future, political stability and Palestinian integration in the regional and international political system. These issues are (1) the way Palestinians perceive their political movements and factions, (2) their attitudes towards political reconciliation with Israel, and (3) their attitudes towards reform of the Palestinian Authority and the shape of a future Palestinian state.

### 10.2.1 Trust in the Palestinian political factions and parties

One can argue that support for the Palestinian political factions is more related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and less so to the efficiency of the Palestinian Authority, and even less so to the support out of political conservatism.

If the support for a certain political faction would be based on religious fundamentalism or support for radical ideologies, then two things would certainly be observed: first, support for an Islamic system of government, and second refusal to accept any resolution with, or acceptance of, Israel. However, in the survey conducted in February 2004, only a small percentage (7%) of respondents mentioned that they would like Palestine to follow an Islamic system of government. A large percentage mentioned Western political systems as their preference. As indicated in figure 10.4, below, 31% stated that they would like Palestine to emulate a Western model. Only 7% specified that they would like an Islamic system of government and 44% stated that Arab governments follow their preferred model of government. It is important to note here that preference for a Western style system of government is higher among those who have a living standard above the poverty line, are more educated, and who are fully employed.

Figure 10-4: The system of government Palestinians would like Palestine to be modeled after (February 2004)




An examination of the Palestinian trust of the Palestinian political movements will highlight Palestinian political preferences and the underlying reasons for these preferences: i.e. whether they are ideological or in response to specific socio-economic or political realities such as the Israeli occupation, mismanagement or incompetence of the ruling political system, or the deteriorating living conditions.

As it has been in the recent years, the largest sector of the Palestinian society remains detached from most of the Palestinian political or religious organizations and movements. As illustrated in figure 10.5, below, 34%



of the respondents said that they do not trust any political or religious factions. Whereas 28% mentioned Fateh as the organization they trust most, 24% mentioned Hamas, and 5% mentioned the Islamic Jihad. The Palestinian secularist organizations that are on the left of the political spectrum are very weak with only 3% of the respondents, for example, mentioning the PFLP as the organization they trust most. Accordingly, when a classification is made between the secularist and the religious organizations, (excluding those who do not trust any factions or organizations) it appears that the trust in Islamic organizations equals that of the secularist organizations. These findings are also overviewed in the figure 10.5, below.

Figure 10-5: Factional trust (o133)



Further analysis of the data reveals that the trust in political factions is related to a number of variables, most interesting of which are the economic conditions of the respondents and where they live. Concerning the poverty, there is a clear correlation and significance between the level of poverty and trust in the political movements. As illustrated in figure 10.6, below, the extremely poor Palestinians seem to have more trust in the religious factions than those who are economically better-off. While 59% of the respondents who live in abject poverty trust religious parties and factions, the percentage is 47% among those living below the poverty line (but not in extreme poverty) and 48% among those with a living standard above the poverty line. In fact, when compared to the results of the February 2004 survey, more respondents classified as hardship cases trust Hamas now than Fateh. Whereas in February 2004 26% of the hardship cases trusted Fateh and 20% trusted Hamas, the results reveal that in October 2004, 25% of them trust Hamas and only 22% trust Fateh.

The lack of trust in the secularist factions by the extremely poor could be explained by the employment situation. As indicated in table 10.1, below, support for the secularists is higher among the fully employed. Whereas 52% of the trust in the secularist factions is derived from those who are fully employed, 59% of the trust for the religious factions comes from the respondents who are unemployed or under-employed.

Figure 10-6: Trust in political factions (o133) according to the poverty level (poverty3)





Table 10-1: Trust in political factions according to the employment situation

		Factional trust		Total
		Secularist factions	Religious factions	
Employment of the labor market	Full -time	52%	41%	47%
	Part-time	13%	15%	14%
	Employed for a few hours/day	17%	26%	21%
	Unemployed	17%	18%	18%
Total		100%	100%	100%

Trust in political factions also differs according to the area in which Palestinians reside. Clearly, as indicated in figure 10.7, below, the trust in secularist factions is stronger in villages than in refugee camps and cities. In fact, it is only in villages that secularists enjoy much more trust than the religious factions. Whereas the percentage of villagers trusting the religious factions is 43%, trust in secularist factions is 14% higher. Conversely, the religious factions enjoy stronger trust than the secularists both in cities and refugee camps.

Figure 10-7: Trust in political factions according to area of residence (o060)



The strong trust in secularist factions in villages may provide an explanation as to why the secularists enjoy stronger trust in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Whereas the support for the religious factions in the West Bank is 46%, trust in them is 55% in the Gaza Strip and 53% in Jerusalem. These results are detailed in figure 10.8, below.

Figure 10-8: Trust in political factions according to region of residence (o059)




Table 10.2, below, provides a more detailed assessment of the political and religious trust according to the various governorates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Of the ten West Bank districts, support for religious factions is stronger than the support for secularists in Nablus, Qalqilia, Ramallah, and Hebron districts. The situation is different for the other six West Bank districts where trust in the secularist factions is stronger. Only one district in the Gaza Strip, the District of Rafah, has better showing for the secularists than the religious factions, the remainder of the Gaza districts all showed stronger trust in religious factions than in secularist factions.

**Table 10-2: Trust in political factions according to governorate**

	<b>Factional trust</b>	
	<b>Secularist factions</b>	<b>Religious factions</b>
Jenin District	73%	27%
Tubas District	86%	14%
Nablus District	44%	56%
Salfit District	71%	29%
Qalqilya District	37%	63%
Tulkarem District	54%	46%
Ramallah District	41%	59%
Jerusalem District	47%	53%
Jericho District	67%	33%
Bethlehem District	68%	33%
Hebron District	46%	54%
North Gaza District	44%	56%
Gaza City	40%	60%
Rafah District	65%	35%
Deir al- Balah District	43%	57%
Khan Younis District	45%	55%
<b>Total</b>	<b>50%</b>	<b>50%</b>

### 10.2.2 Palestinian attitudes towards the Intifada

The attitude over the Palestinian-Israeli occupation is clearly an important factor in determining Palestinian political preferences. Since the religious groups constitute the real opposition to the current peace initiatives, it is safe to expect that a sizable proportion of the Palestinian population opt for the religious groups on political grounds and not on religious grounds.

In November 2004, the respondents were asked about peace with Israel. This section will examine Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process and will show how Palestinians differ on the issue of a peaceful resolution with Israel, what they expect from their leadership, and what guidelines they draw for their leadership with respect to the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This assessment of Palestinian attitudes towards the peace process will be provided according to a set of variables at hand that. However, before doing so, an examination of Palestinian attitudes towards the *Intifada* could help to better understand the Palestinian context


Since the *Intifada* started in September 2000, a large number of Palestinians have lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands have lost their livelihood. As was discussed in the first and second parts of this report, unemployment increased and restrictions on movement have intensified to a level that rendered economic activities more difficult.

While the *Intifada* broke out in response to the lack of progress in the peace process and while it intensified in the aftermath of the election of a right-wing Israeli government, all indications show that the Palestinian political and economic conditions have worsened ever since. As can be noticed in figure 10.9, adjacent, 84% of the Palestinians think that the general situation has worsened. Only 2% said that the situation has improved since the outbreak of the *Intifada*, while 14% believe that not much has changed.

### 10.2.3 According to residence


The frustration about the general situation is evident in all areas although, as illustrated in figure 10.10, below, only 1% of Gaza respondents said that the situation has improved since the beginning of the *Intifada*, compared to 3% in the West Bank. The Jerusalem respondents did not see any improvement in the general situations. Only 8% stated that the situation has remained the same and 92% of them felt that the situation has deteriorated as compared to 83% in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 10-9: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the *Intifada*



No relationship exists with age, refugee status, gender, place or area of residence or poverty


Figure 10-10: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the *Intifada* (q146) according to district and region of residence (O059)



### 10.2.4 According to level of education

When examining the attitudes towards the *Intifada*, the low educated respondents seemed more disturbed about it. As indicated in figure 10.11, below, 91% of the lower educated respondents, compared to 82% of the medium educated and 86% of the highly educated, said that the general situation has worsened in the aftermath of the *Intifada*.


10-11: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to education (educ)



### 10.2.5 According to trust in political and religious institutions

When examining Palestinian attitudes towards the Intifada according to their trust in one or another political or religious faction, it is perhaps surprising that Palestinians trusting religious organizations view the situation following the outbreak of the *Intifada* more negatively than those trusting the secularist organizations.

Figure 10-12: Feelings about the general situation in the aftermath of the Intifada (q146) according to trust in political factions (o133)



Concretely, as illustrated above in figure 10.12, whereas 87% of those trusting Hamas said that the situation

has worsened in the aftermath of the *Intifada*, the percentage among those trusting Fateh is 74%. This being the case, it is safe to argue that the feeling of frustration with the situation following the *Intifada* does not necessarily imply frustration with the *Intifada* per se because it is the religious groups, in particular, that insist on the continuation and intensification of the *Intifada*, while at the same time showing a higher level of frustration with its consequences.

### 10.3 Perceptions about peace

The above analysis shows that the Palestinian population in all its social, economic, and political sectors believes that the situation in the past four years has worsened. This may not be an expression of opposition to the *Intifada*, but rather a frustration with the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the Oslo process, support for peace with Israel was very strong among the Palestinian population. This support, however, dwindled gradually as a result of the lack of progress in the peace talks. Settlements continued to expand, restrictions on the movement of the Palestinian population and the Palestinian products did not ease, and the number of Palestinian casualties continued to rise. While the *Intifada* was an expression of unhappiness with the political development, it could be argued that it was not properly utilized or that it shifted from originally less violent resistance to a more violent one.

This section will provide an assessment of Palestinian attitudes towards peace with Israel in order to shed the light on the vision of the Palestinian public towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

As can be seen from figure 10.13, adjacent, 55% of the Palestinian public support a peace agreement with Israel and 45% oppose it. While the current support for a peace agreement with Israel is lower than the figures prior to the *Intifada*, it is important to stress that a large percentage of the Palestinian public do not trust and do not believe that a peace agreement can be reached with the current Israeli government. The current temporary 'ceasefire' that was brokered in February 2005 and the release of some Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons could help in improving the level of support for peace with Israel.

Figure 10-13: Attitudes about a peace settlement with Israel in general (o266)





Figure 10-14: Attitudes towards a peace settlement (o266) with Israel according to region of residence (o059)



#### 10.3.1 According to residence

Although the majority of Palestinians support a peace agreement with Israel, this level of support varies from one area to another. As indicated in figure 10.14, adjacent, the level of support for a peace agreement with Israel is stronger in the West Bank than it is in the Gaza Strip with 55% supporting peace in the former and 48% supporting it in the latter.



The stronger support for a peace agreement with Israel in the West Bank can be largely attributed to the strong support for peace in villages which are mostly concentrated in the West Bank. As indicated in figure 10.15, adjacent, 66% of village respondents support a peace agreement with Israel compared to 49% of the city respondents and 55% of the refugee camp respondents.

When the data were analyzed according to the districts in the oPt, strong support for peace was evident in the northern and middle districts of the West Bank, while support was far lower in the southern districts.

This was particularly the case in the Hebron district where support for peace did not exceed 34%. As for the Gaza districts, the level of support for a peace settlement is almost the same in the northern and southern districts. These findings are overviewed in figure 10.16, below.

10-15: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to area of residence (o060)






Figure 10-16: Attitudes towards a peace settlement (o266) with Israel according to district



Although the support for peace is stronger in the West Bank, careful examination of the data reveals that the West Bank camps are less likely to support a peace agreement with Israel than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. As illustrated in figure 10.17, adjacent, only 42% of West Bank camp dwellers stated that they support a peace agreement with Israel compared to 57% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. Conversely, however, support for peace is stronger in West Bank non-camp areas than in the Gaza Strip non-camp areas. Again, the strong support for a peace agreement in the villages explains this tendency.

Figure 10-17: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to place of residence (place)




### 10.3.2 According to age, educational level, gender, and refugee status

When examining the level of support for a peace agreement with Israel among the various age groups, it is found that the older generation is much more in support of a peace agreement than the younger generation. As indicated in figure 10.18, below, 64% of those over the age of 50 support a peace agreement with Israel compared to 52% among those between the ages of 18 and 24.

It is also interesting to note that the level of support for a peace agreement with Israel decreases with an increase in the level of education of the respondents. As indicated in figure 10.17, below, 66% of the lower educated respondents support a peace agreement compared to a mere 49% of the higher educated respondents. Women are also more likely than men to support a peace agreement. Whereas 52% of men support a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage is 58% among women. Whereas 52% of men support a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage is 58% among women.

When examining the level of support for a peace agreement according to the refugee status of the respondents, it is clear that Palestinians of a refugee origin are slightly less enthusiastic about a peace agreement with Israel than the non-refugee Palestinians. Although, still, the majority (53%) of the Palestinian refugees supports a peace agreement, the percentage is lower than among non-refugees where 57% support a peace agreement.

Figure 10-18: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to (age), educational level, gender (o061), and refugee status (o002)




### 10.3.3 According to the poverty level

The correlation between the poverty level and the level of support for a peace agreement is very evident. As indicated in figure 10.19, below, there is a much stronger support among the respondents from households with a monthly income above the poverty line than among respondents from households that are below the poverty line. Whereas 60% of the former are keen on a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage drops to 51% among the latter.

The importance of the economic situation of the respondents on the level of support for a peace agreement becomes even more striking when one looks at this issue according to the household income level of the interviewees. As indicated in table 10.3, below, 79% of the respondents whose household income is relatively high support a peace agreement, while this is the case for 60% of respondents from the households earning less than 500 NIS (approximately US \$ 115)

**10-19: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)**



**Table 10-3: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to household income**


	Attitudes about a peace settlement with Israel		Total
	Support a peace settlement with Israel	Oppose a peace settlement with Israel	
Over 5000 NIS	79%	21%	100%
3000-4999 NIS	58%	42%	100%
2000-2999 NIS	51%	49%	100%
2500-1999 NIS	51%	49%	100%
500-1499 NIS	53%	47%	100%
Less than 500 NIS	60%	40%	100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>55%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Sig. \*\*\*

#### 10.3.4 According to trust in political and religious organizations

Trust in political factions is also a strong indicator when analyzing the level of support for negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. Not surprisingly, the support for such an agreement comes primarily from organizations that carry a secularist ideology. As can be determined from figure 10.20, adjacent, the large majority of the respondents trusting Fateh support a peace agreement with Israel compared to only 35% of those trusting Hamas, and 29% of those trusting Islamic Jihad. Perhaps unexpectedly, 69% of those trusting the secularist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) also support a peace agreement with Israel, despite its traditionally hard position vis-à-vis the negotiations with Israel. Also interesting to note is that 58% of those who said that they do not trust any political or religious organization are in favor of a peace agreement with Israel, thus making this very large segment of the Palestinian population more in line with the position of those trusting the secularist groups.

**Figure 10-20: Attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel (o266) according to factional trust (o133)**



Thus, when grouping attitudes towards a peace settlement with Israel according to secularist versus religious organizations, it becomes clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is far more evident among those favoring the secularist organizations, as compared to those trusting the religious organizations. Still, it is worth noting that 35% of the respondents trusting the religious organizations do support a peace agreement, an issue that begs the questions as to whether the people trusting these organizations do so because of ideological tendencies or because of their lack of faith in the organizations that are linked to the Palestinian Authority whom they may consider as corrupt, inefficient, or incapable of solving their problems such as their economy and security.

## 10.4 The red lines


It is clear that support for a peace agreement with Israel is strong among the Palestinian population even though the time the survey was carried could not be characterized as a period of calm and stability. On the contrary, the survey was conducted during a period in which Palestinian positions were hardened with respect to a peace settlement with Israel.

The support for a peace agreement with Israel seems to be based on specific expectations that the Palestinian population have from such an agreement. It is certainly not unconditional. As will be discussed in the next pages, the Palestinian population believes that there are certain priorities and specific prerequisites that they identify with.

When respondents were asked about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state, only 1% of the respondents said that the Palestinian leadership should relinquish parts of East Jerusalem in return for a viable Palestinian state, 3% believe it is acceptable for the Palestinian leadership to sacrifice the right of return and 5% of the respondents were willing to compromise on anything that will lead to a Palestinian state. As illustrated in figure 10.21, adjacent, 86% of the respondents stated that they should not relinquish any of the Palestinian rights.

While the vast majority of the Palestinians feel that the Palestinian leadership should not relinquish anything in return for a viable Palestinian state, there are some differences among the respondents depending on residence, location, area and place of residence, the refugee status, the poverty level, and the trust in the political factions. On this issue, no relationship exists according to the age, gender, or educational level of the interviewees.

**Figure 10-21: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (n=274)**




### 10.4.1 According to residence

Rather unexpectedly, the respondents from the middle and southern districts in the Gaza Strip are the least adamant with respect to the compromises that the Palestinian leadership should make in return for a Palestinian state. As elaborated in figure 10.22, below, 79% of the respondents from the middle and southern districts of the Gaza Strip stated that the Palestinian leadership should not relinquish anything,


compared to 89% of the respondents in the Northern Gaza districts. Still, it remains evident that like the other districts, the vast majority of the respondents in those areas still feel that their leadership should not give away part of Jerusalem.

**Figure 10-22: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to district**




The relative flexibility of the respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps is also quite surprising. When compared, for example, to the West Bank refugee camps, more respondents from Gaza Strip refugee camps agree that some compromises have to be made with regard to Jerusalem, areas in the West Bank, control over borders. As indicated in figure 10.23, below, the percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip camps is only the same as those in the West Bank refugee camps when it concerns the issue of the refugee right of return.

**Figure 10-23: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to place of residence (place)**




Despite the differences between the West Bank and refugee camp respondents with regard to what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a state, refugee camp respondents seem to be the most flexible when compared to respondents residing in cities or villages. This is rather evident with respect to giving away parts of the West Bank to Israel in return for a state. While 5% of refugee camp respondents think that it is acceptable for the leadership to give away parts of the West Bank, the percentage is only 1% among village respondents who obviously attach a great value to land. More generally, whereas 17% of the respondents in refugee camps accept that the leadership can compromise on some of the Palestinian rights, the percentage is 14% among city and village dwellers. These findings are detailed in figure 10.24, below.

**Figure 10-24: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian State in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) by area of residence (o060)**



When examining the different perception on this issue according to the region of residence, the results show no evident differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respondents, except on the issue regarding relinquishing parts of the West Bank. As can be observed from figure 10.25, below, only 3% of West Bank respondents feel that it is worth giving up on 5 to 10% of the West Bank for a Palestinian state, the percentage is 5% among the Gaza Strip respondents. Again, the issue of the right of return is as important to West Bank respondents as it is to Gaza Strip respondents and this despite the significantly higher proportion of refugees in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.


**Figure 10-25: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied (o274) by Israel in 1967 by region (o059)**





The consensus on the importance of the issue of right of return seems to be independent of the refugee status of the respondents. Although one might expect that the refugees will be more likely than non-refugees to insist on the right of return, the results show that refugees and non-refugees alike attach importance to this issue. As the refugee, only 3% of non-refugee respondents said that the Palestinian leadership can relinquish the right of return for the sake of a Palestinian state. These results are overviewed in figure 10.26, below.

**Figure 10-26: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to refugee status (o002)**



#### 10.4.2 According to the poverty level

Although it has been established earlier in this chapter that support for a peace agreement is stronger among the respondents that are economically better-off, this subgroups has the strictest stance when it comes to giving away parts of the Palestinian rights. As can be seen in figure 10.27, below, the respondents that live in abject poverty, more than those who are financially better-off, tend to be prepared to relinquish some Palestinian rights. Even so, despite their miserable conditions, 79% of the respondents who are classified as hardship cases believe that a Palestinian state should not be at the expense of giving away any of the Palestinian rights.


**Figure 10-27: Perceptions about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)**



### 10.4.3 According to trust in political and religious organizations

When examining the perceptions of the Palestinian public with regard to the compromises their leadership could potentially make in return for a Palestinian state according to trust in political or religious factions, the differences between respondents trusting the different Palestinian factions are not that remarkable. This is particularly important because it clearly shows that the support which Fateh sympathizers give to the Palestinian Authority is not unconditional and could if their leadership embarks on policies that do not reflect the aspirations of the Palestinian people. The detailed findings on this issue according to trust in the various Palestinian factions are overviewed in the figure, below.

**Figure 10-28: Attitudes about what the Palestinian leadership should relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967 (o274) according to factional trust (o133)**



## 10.5 Perceptions about reform and corruption in the PA

The previous analysis indicates to what the Palestinians, in all their different classifications, expect from the Palestinian Authority with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The analysis showed that support for a peace agreement does not necessarily imply a willingness on the part of the Palestinians to give away to give away what they believe is their right.


The current section will concentrate on the expectations of Palestinians regarding some important Palestinian internal politics, such as priorities and expectations on issues pertaining to human rights, democracy, corruption, and reform.

When the issue of corruption is raised, a high percentage of Palestinians thinks that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority. What is not clear, however, is to what extent corruption is spread in the various Palestinian institutions.

In examining this issue, two questions were added in the survey conducted for this report. One question pertains to whether the Palestinian public knows about the recent reforms that targeted the financial structure of the Palestinian Authority, and the second attempts to see whether a major indicator of corruption, namely bribe giving, is a reality or simply a perception that is not necessarily based on the actual situation.

It is a well-known fact that major work has been done to improve the financial accountability of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Ministry of Finance has taken a major role in controlling the financial resources of the Palestinian Authority and its institutions, especially after the appointment of Dr. Salam Fayyad as the Minister of Finance more than 18 months ago. All indications have shown that the Palestinian Authority has, indeed, moved positively in managing its finances. Despite this progress, the Palestinian perceptions continue to be rather pessimistic about the attempts of reform within the Palestinian public institutions as well about the corruption within the Palestinian Authority. As indicated in figure 10.29, below, 25% of the Palestinians never heard about any reform in the Palestinian Authority and 61% believe that these reforms are not real and are reforms only in name. Only 15% of the respondents said that the current reform efforts were genuine. Moreover, 49% of the respondents strongly believe that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and 36% said that they only heard about corruption from friends and relatives.

**Figure 10-29: Knowledge about reform (o176v2) and corruption in the Palestinian Authority, in general**




The strong attitude Palestinians have towards reform and corruption in the Palestinian Authority may be justifiable, but it may also be exaggerated. When respondents were asked about whether they themselves or any of the members of their household offered any bribe for a Palestinian official in return for a service, 90% answered that they never did, 8% said that they did indeed offer a bribe to a Palestinian official but only on rare occasion and 3% said that a bribe was offered frequently. These results are illustrated in figure 10.30, below.

However, when the respondents were asked whether or not they have heard about anyone ever offering a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a service, only 49% said that they did not hear about such activities, while 51% replied that they have heard about others offering bribes to Palestinian officials.

The above analysis clearly shows that there is a strong perception among the Palestinian public that corruption is widespread, when it could be argued that this is not necessarily the case.


There is no doubt that the need to reform and monitor the performance of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian public institutions is important and vital as it is the case in all countries around the world. However, focusing on corruption as an issue that is endemic in Palestinian society could produce negative results as it could lead to both a lack of trust in the duly elected Palestinian leadership and a disproportionate distrust of the political institutions. This lack of trust could unnecessarily shift the emphasis from what are the real and needed priorities and could retard any attempts and efforts that aim at bringing peace and stability in the region.

**Figure 10-30: The level of bribe-offering to Palestinian officials: differences between reality and perceptions in general (o259)**



Thus, when the Palestinians were asked in the February 2004<sup>1</sup> about their main concerns with regard to the Palestinian Authority, corruption (nepotism, lack of transparency, and corruption in general) came out as the main issue of concern, more so than inefficiency and mismanagement, human rights and democracy, and much more so than the inability to deal with illegal weapons or security. However, as illustrated in figure 10.31, below, when the word 'corruption' was excluded from the question<sup>2</sup>, the concerns of the Palestinian public shifted away from corruption as the main concern with respect to the Palestinian Authority to issues such as mismanagement, unauthorized weapons, and internal security problems. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance to accurately understand both what corruption entails and to what extent it is a problem in the Palestinian Authority.

**Figure 10-31: Issues Palestinians are more concerned about: comparison between Feb 2004 and Oct 2004 (o178v2, o178v2a)**



<sup>1</sup> This 7<sup>th</sup> survey on Palestinian public perceptions was conducted in February 2004.

<sup>2</sup> In the November 2004 Survey carried out for the current perceptions report, the same question was asked as in the February 2004 survey, but without providing the respondent the option to answer 'corruption in general'.


Lastly, the fact that only 3% of the respondents considered lack of democracy and only 4% considered lack of respect for human rights as main issues of concern within the Palestinian Authority could lead one to conclude that the Palestinian public does not find the Palestinian Authority to be as authoritarian or disrespectful of human rights as depicted by some critics.

## 10.6 Attitudes towards the most trusted source of information

Normally, information about politics is acquired from a number of sources. In some areas, these sources are limited and/or restricted, in others; they are more relaxed and diverse. In the following pages, the most trusted sources of information will be examined in order to better understand how the Palestinian public establishes its attitudes and perceptions about various political issues.

As elaborated in figure 10.32, below, 39% of the Palestinian public trust the Palestinian sources of information (Palestinian Radio, Palestinian TV, and the Palestinian newspapers). However, Al-Jazeera TV is the single most trusted source of information with 29% of the respondents citing the Qatar-based satellite news channel. Only 5% trust the Palestinian religious or political factions, and 12% cited Al-Manar satellite TV station as their most trusted source of information.

10-32: Most trusted source of information to the Palestinian public (o136v3a)



Although Al-Jazeera continues to be the most trusted source of information, the survey reveals that the trust in Al-Jazeera dropped from 37% in February 2004 to 29% in October 2004. The same is also reflected on the trust for Al-Manar TV where the percentage dropped from 17% in February 2004 to 12% in October 2004. Conversely, trust in the Palestinian media increased from 24% to 39% during the same period.

### 10.6.1 According to education

An analysis of the most trusted source of information according to education reveals that higher educated respondents are less likely to rely on Palestinian radio than medium and lower educated respondents. Whereas only 9% of higher educated respondents said that they trust Palestinian radio, the percentage is higher among the lower (18%) and medium (16%) educated respondents. Conversely, higher educated respondents rely more on the political and religious factions and Al-Jazeera TV station for their information than lower and medium educated respondents. As presented in table 10.4, below, 17% of the lower educated respondents trust family and friends for their information, compared to only 4% of the medium educated and 2% of the higher educated.

**Table 10-4: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the educational level (educ)**

	Educational level			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
Palestinian Radio	18%	16%	→9%	14%
Palestinian TV	16%	16%	9%	13%
al-Quds newspaper	7%	8%	→13%	10%
al-Ayyam newspaper		2%	2%	2%
al-Hayat al Jadida newspaper		0%	1%	0%
The mosque/ the religious leaders	1%	3%	5%	3%
Political or religious faction	2%	3%	→8%	5%
Friends and relatives	→17%	4%	2%	5%
al-Jazeera	21%	28%	32%	29%
al-Arabyyah	6%	3%	3%	3%
Abu Dhabi	4%	4%	4%	4%
al-Manar	7%	12%	12%	12%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%


*Sig.000*



### 10.6.2 According to the poverty level

Trust in sources of information is also related to the poverty level of respondents. As illustrated in figure 10.33, below, Palestinians whose income falls below the poverty line are more likely to trust Palestinian radio and Palestinian TV than those who are more economically advantaged. Whereas 20% of the hardship cases and 16% of those below the poverty line trust Palestinian radio most, the percentage is only 9% among the respondents whose economic situation is above the poverty line. However, twice as many respondents of the latter trust the Al-Quds newspaper than respondents that are economically less advantaged. Trust in the Arabic satellite channels (such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabyiyah, and Al-Manar) are more or less equally divided between the respondents from all economic levels. These results are overviewed in figure 10.33, below.

10-33: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the poverty level (poverty 3)



### 10.6.3 According to trust in political and religious factions

Although there is a statistical significance between the most trusted source of information and the faction most trusted by the Palestinian respondents, it is noticeable that the differences are not as remarkable as one would expect given the supposedly ideological differences between the various political and religious factions and organizations. For example, one would expect respondents trusting Hamas to trust the mosque or the religious leaders more than they would trust, for example the Palestinian radio, which is a semi-government entity. As table 10.5 below reveals, 17% of respondents trusting Hamas trust the Palestinian radio, compared to 15% of the respondents trusting Fateh. Furthermore, although more of the respondents trusting Hamas and Islamic Jihad trust the mosques and the religious leaders than respondents trusting the secularist organizations, the percentage is only 6% for Hamas, and 5% for Islamic Jihad.

**Table 10-5: Most trusted source of information (o136v3a) according to the faction most trusted**

	Faction most trusted							Total
	Fateh	Hamas	Islamic Jihad	PFLP	Other secularist factions	Other Islamic factions	Do not trust any faction	
<b>Palestinian Radio</b>	15%	17%	11%	13%	4%	12%	13%	14%
<b>Palestinian TV</b>	17%	13%	15%	5%	18%	19%	10%	13 %
<b>al-Quds newspaper</b>	12%	6%	11%	13%	4%	4%	12%	10%
<b>al-Ayyam newspaper</b>	2%	2%			4%		1%	2%
<b>al-Hayat al Jadida newspaper</b>	0%	0%		3%	7%	2%	0%	1%
<b>The mosque/ the religious leaders</b>	2%	6%	5%			8%	3%	34%
<b>Political or religious faction</b>	6%	8%	8%	15%	11%	8%	1%	5%
<b>Friends and relatives</b>	2%	3%	1%		4%		10%	5%
<b>al-Jazeera</b>	27%	26%	23%	41%	39%	37%	30%	28%
<b>al-Arabyiyah</b>	3%	2%	1%	3%			5%	3%
<b>Abu Dhabi</b>	4%	3%	5%		4%	2%	4%	4%
<b>al-Manar</b>	11%	15%	20%	8%	7%	10%	10%	12%
<b>Total</b>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Clearly, the sources of information that the Palestinian public trusts are diverse. This diversity is attributed to the availability of TV stations and satellite channels<sup>3</sup> as well as to the relative flexibility of the Palestinian laws with regard to the dissemination of information: the Palestinian Press Law does not call for censorship and private TV and radio stations are allowed to operate.

The abundance of information sources and the ability of the Palestinian public to choose which medium of information to trust in the formation of their attitudes and beliefs about politics in general have been instrumental in preventing one or few sources of information that are ideologically motivated to monopolize what information should be filtered to the Palestinian public. The inability of such sources to manipulate Palestinian public opinion is demonstrated, as discussed above, by the large number of sources of information that go beyond political affiliation, or educational level, or economic condition. While this might be considered trivial, it is worth noting that this environment is rather unique in the Middle East where sources of information are often censored and restricted.

<sup>3</sup> According to this study, 69% of the respondents said that their households possess satellite dishes.

## 10.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, the most striking findings of this report are summed up below:

- The majority of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not feel generally secure. This feeling of insecurity is highest among the extremely poor (88%), among the residents of the Gaza Strip (87%), and among the refugee camp residents (91%).
- Many Palestinians are distrustful of the existing political or religious factions. As for those who do trust the existing ones, the percentage in general terms is evenly split between the secularists and the religious factions. The highest level of support for the secularist factions can be found in the West Bank, particularly in its villages. Support for religious groups is high among the Palestinians living in extreme poverty and those who are not fully employed. Accordingly, it is safe to argue that the socio-economic condition of the population has a major influence on their preference for various political or religious factions.
- The majority of the Palestinian public (84%) believes that life in general became much worse since the outbreak of the Intifada. This feeling is stronger in the central West Bank (90%) and in the northern Gaza Strip districts (90%). The feelings about life since the Intifada are more intense among those trusting the religious political factions than among those trusting the secularist political factions.
- Support for a peace agreement with Israel is reflected in the views of the majority of the respondents with 55% stating that they support a peace settlement between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Support is stronger in villages (66%) than in cities where only 49% of the city respondents said that they support a peace settlement with Israel. As for refugee camps, 55% of the respondents there stated their support for a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover, the highest support for a peace agreement can be found among the older respondents, the less educated, the non-refugees, the female respondents, and among the respondents whose economic condition is above the poverty line. When examining the support for a peace agreement with Israel according to the political or religious affiliation, a clear difference can be found. While 72% of the 'secularists' support a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage is only 35% among the respondents trusting the religious factions.
- Although the majority of the respondents support a peace agreement with Israel, still 87% of them believe that the Palestinian leadership should not relinquish any of the Palestinian rights such as Jerusalem, right of return, or any land in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. This percentage is high irrespective of place of residence, socio-economic condition, political affiliation, or educational background.
- There seems to be a misconception about the level of corruption in the Palestinian Authority. Although, for example, the majority of Palestinians think that there is a great deal of bribery given for Palestinian officials in return for a service, the actual situation seems to be quite contrary to this. When the respondents were asked whether they or any of their household members were given a bribe for a Palestinian official in return for a service, over 90% said no and only 3% said that they have been given bribes regularly.

- The majority of the Palestinian public is not very concerned about democracy and human rights. Only 7% of the respondents said that the issues of democracy and human rights are the main concern they have with respect to the Palestinian Authority. The main concern respondents have about the Palestinian Authority is the lack of resources and the inability to deal with internal security matters. These issues become less important when the respondents were provided the opportunity to give an opinion about corruption where, corruption then becomes the main issue of concern although the results indicated that the issue of corruption seems to be more of a perception than actual practice.
- The most trusted source of information is Al-Jazeera satellite channel. However, the Palestinian radio and TV and the Palestinian newspapers combined become more important as the source of information most trusted by the Palestinian public. In addition, support for Al-Jazeera dropped from 37% in February 2004 to 29% in October 2005.

# Bibliography

- Abu Toameh, K., "Fatah Leader: PA forces are private fiefdoms", *The Jerusalem Post*, 20 October, 2004.
- AFP, "Rafah a 'humanitarian catastrophe' says UN Refugee Agency", 14 May 2004.
- AFP, "Israel plans 600 new settlement homes", 2 August 2004.
- AFP, "French NGO slams Israel for limited access to wounded in Gaza", 4 October 2004, [www.reliefweb](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Amnesty International, "Israel/Occupied Territories: Excessive use of force", 5 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Arije, *Arij Monthly Report on the Israeli Colonization Activities in the West Bank*, in: [www.arij.org](http://www.arij.org).
- Bocco, R., Brunner, M., Daneels, I., Lapeyre, F., and Rabah, J., *Palestinian Public Perceptions on their Living Conditions. The Role of International and Local Aid during the Second Intifada (July-December 2002), Report 5*, Geneva: The Graduate Institute of Development Studies and the Swiss Development Cooperation, UNDP, UNRWA, UNICEF, UNWFP, December 2002. (see <http://www.unicef.org/palestine>)
- B'Tselem, (a) *Fatalities in the Al-Aqsa Intifada*, [www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al\\_Aqsa\\_Fatalities.asp](http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities.asp)  
(b) [www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al\\_Aqsa\\_Fatalities\\_Tables.asp](http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities_Tables.asp)  
(c) *The Forbidden Regime in the West Bank – An Apartheid Practice*, 9 August 2004, [www.btselem.org/English/Press](http://www.btselem.org/English/Press) releases.  
(d) *Statistics on the Separation Barrier*, [www.btselem.org/English/Separation\\_Barrier/Statistics.asp](http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp)
- Buhbut, A., "NIS 1 billion approved for Palestinians living near barrier", *Maariv International*, 30 November 2004.
- Defence for Children International/Palestine Section, "Children bear the brunt of Israeli war crimes against humanity in northern Gaza", 5 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- European Commission, "Commission provides a further 1,35 Euro in aid for victims of house demolitions in Rafah (Gaza Strip)", 11 August 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Hass, Amira, "Palestinians accuse Shin Bet of harassment at Rafah Border", *Haaretz*, 4 October 2004).
- Human Rights Watch, "Razing Rafah – Mass home demolitions in the Gaza Strip", 18 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Human Rights Watch, "Israel: End unlawful use of force against civilians in Gaza", 20 May 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)
- Ibrahim, M., "Rebuilding of demolished homes a distant dream for many", *Jerusalem Times*, 8 December 2004.

ICRC, *"The Red Cross/Red Crescent assists over 2500 people stranded at Rafah Terminal"*, News No.04/90, 2 August 2004.

IFRC, *"Egypt: Border closure at Gaza/Rafah Information Bulletin No.1"*, 4 August 2004.

International Crisis Group (ICG), *"Who Governs the West Bank? Palestinian Administration under Israeli Occupation"*, a Middle East Report, No.32, 2004, pp.5-7.

International Federation for Human Rights, *"Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights during "Operation Rainbow" (13-25 May 2004)"*, 12 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

ILO, *Report from the Director General, 90<sup>th</sup> session, Annex on the situation of the workers from the oPt*, 2002.

MSF, *"MSF asks for access to its patients in the Gaza Strip"*, 9 October 2004, [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

Ministry of Health, Palestinian Health Information Center, *Population and Demography – Health Status in Palestine*, July 2004.

OCHA, *Humanitarian Monitoring Report – September 2004*, [www.ochaopt.org](http://www.ochaopt.org).

OCHA, *"UN organizations say that the current violence is pushing Gaza is into a humanitarian Gaza"*, 5 October 2004.

OCHA a, *OCHA Barrier Statistics*, July 2004.

OCHA b, *OCHA Barrier Statistics*, November 2004

Oxfam, *"Aid Agency calls for effective international intervention in Gaza"*, 8 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, *"PCHR condemns the State of chaos in the Gaza Strip"*, 17 July 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int).

Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, *"7 Palestinians in Beit Hanoun and 40 houses destroyed in Khan Younis"*, 8 July 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

Palestine Monitor, *Fact Sheets – Intifada*, in: [www.palestinemonitor.org](http://www.palestinemonitor.org)

Palestine Monitor, *"Israel demolishes three archeological buildings in Hebron"*, 10 August 2004, in: [www.palestinemonitor.org](http://www.palestinemonitor.org)

Palestine Red Crescent Society, *Search Palestinian Casualties Database*

(a) *Total Daily Number of Deaths and Injuries – West Bank & Gaza (Figures inclusive during the Period Sept. 29 '00 – Nov. 10 '04*, in: [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org).

(b) *Total deaths/injuries for all regions March 2004-Oct.2004*, [www.palestinercs.org/Database/Region](http://www.palestinercs.org/Database/Region)

(c) *Total deaths/injuries by region Sept. 29 '00-October 30 '04*, [www.palestinercs.org/graphs/deaths](http://www.palestinercs.org/graphs/deaths) (or injuries)region2.jpg

(d) *Conflict Deaths by Age & Gender*, in: [www.palestinercs.org/conflict](http://www.palestinercs.org/conflict)

(e) *PCRS ambulance damaged by Israeli army*, 14 September 2004.



PCBS, *Demographic Survey - Current main Indicators*, Ramallah, April-July 1995 Demographic Survey, 12/30/04, in: [www.pcbs.org](http://www.pcbs.org)

PCBS, *Labor Force Survey*, Ramallah, July-September 2004.

PCBS, *Impact of the Israeli Measures on the Economic Conditions of Palestinian Households*, Ramallah, 9<sup>th</sup> round, April-June 2004.

Physicians for Human Rights, "*Medical Rights violated in Gaza Strip*", 18 May 2004, [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

Terje Roed-Larsen, "*The Situation in the Middle-East, including the Palestinian Question*" (UN doc. SI/PV.5002), 13 July 2004.

UN Children's Fund, "*Gaza offensive levels kindergarten*", 6 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

UN Commission on Human Rights, "*United Nations rights experts appeal to Israel on House demolitions*", 28 May 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

UN News Service, "*Reacting to deaths in Gaza, UN envoy calls on Israel to protect civilians*", 26 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

UNRWA, *UNRWA emergency appeal 2005*, UNRWA Headquarters Gaza, Department of External Relations.

UNRWA, "*UNRWA completes its demolition assessment of Operation Rainbow*", Press Release HQ/G/16/2004.

UNRWA, "*UNRWA field assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence*", 20 October 2004, in: [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int)

UNRWA, *UNRWA in Figures – Figures as of 30 June 2004*, Public Information Office, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza), August 2004.

UNRWA. *Emergency Appeal 2004*, 24<sup>th</sup> progress report January-June 2004, UNRWA Headquarters Gaza, 2004.

UN News Service, "*Israeli bars agency head from leaving Gaza in unprecedented ban on UN mobility*", 1 September 2004.

Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, *Weekly Report #10 (Aug 2004)*, 3 August 2004;

Water and Sanitation and Hygiene Monitoring Project, *Monitoring Project – Report #13*, 31 August 2004).

World Bank (a), "*Four Years - Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment*", The World Bank, October 2004.

World Bank (b), "*Deep Palestinian Poverty in the Midst of Economic Crisis*", The World Bank, Jerusalem, October 2004.

World Bank, *Country Brief*, in: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/0,,menuPK:294374~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:294365,00.html>

# Annex I: Correspondence Table

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
c1					
c2					
c3					
c4					
c5					
c6					
c7					
c8					
c9					
place					
q1	o118	Security	Feeling of security		
q2	o119	Security	Reason for insecurity	Why do you feel insecure?	
q3_1	o140a	Security	Business suffered due to inability to market products to areas	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to inability to market products to	
q3_2	o140b	Security	Business suffered due to difficulties to buy raw materials or products	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to difficulties in buying raw	
q3_3	o140c	Security	Business suffered due to problems to reach the place of work	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to problems pertaining to	
q3_4	o140d	Security	Business suffered due to inability to pay bank loans	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to inability to pay bank loans ?	
q3_5	o140g	Security	Business went bankrupt	My family business went bankrupt in the past six	
q3_6	o140e	Security	Business suffered due to inability to work because of curfew	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to inability to work because of	
q3_7	o140f	Security	Business suffered due to damage to agriculture lands	Did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months due to damage to agriculture lands ?	
q4	o143v1	Household structure	No. of adults in household	No. of adults in household	
q5	o155a	Household structure	Women in household	Women in household	
q6	o196	Labour Market	Main breadwinner	The main breadwinner in this household is: 1.Male / 2.Female / 3.Both contribute significantly to the household (DO NOT READ, ONLY IF	
q7	o017v1	Labour Market	No. of employed people	No. of employed people	
q8	o019	Labour Market	Household members lost their jobs in the past 6 months	Household members who lost their jobs in the past 6 months. Sometimes the category "Not applicable" was used	Beware! The number of months asked may be false in polls no1 (3-4 months), no2 (8 months) and no3
q9a	o055	Other Independent Variables	Age	Age	
q9b	o061	Main Independent Variables	Gender	Gender of the interviewee	
q9c	o203	Labour Market	Respondent's hours of work in		
q9d	o197	Labour Market	Respondent's hours of work in		
q10a	o209	Household structure	Age of adult no2		
q10b	o214	Household structure	Gender of adult no2		
q10c	o204	Labour Market	Adult no2 hours of work in domestic		
q10d	o198	Labour Market	Adult no2 hours of work in economic		
q11a	o210	Household structure	Age of adult no3		
q11b	o215	Household structure	Gender of adult no3		
q11c	o205	Labour Market	Adult no3 hours of work in domestic		
q11d	o199	Labour Market	Adult no3 hours of work in economic		
q12a	o211	Household structure	Age of adult no4		
q12b	o216	Household structure	Gender of adult no4		

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q12c	o206	Labour Market	Adult no4 hours of work in domestic		
q12d	o200	Labour Market	Adult no4 hours of work in economic		
q13a	o212	Household structure	Age of adult no5		
q13b	o217	Household structure	Gender of adult no5		
q13c	o207	Labour Market	Adult no5 hours of work in domestic		
q13d	o201	Labour Market	Adult no5 hours of work in economic		
q14a	o213	Household structure	Age of adult no6		
q14b	o218	Household structure	Gender of adult no6		
q14c	o208	Labour Market	Adult no6 hours of work in domestic		
q14d	o202	Labour Market	Adult no6 hours of work in economic		
q15	o141a	Household structure	Number of children (<18) in	How many children (under the age of 18) live in this	
q16	o141bv2	Household structure	Number of children (<15) in	Of these, how many are less than 15 years old?	
q17a	o219	Children	Age of child no1		
q17b	o225	Children	Gender of child no1		
q17c	o237	Children	Child no1 hours of work in domestic		
q17d	o231	Children	Child no1 hours of work in economic		
q18a	o220	Children	Age of child no2		
q18b	o226	Children	Gender of child no2		
q18c	o238	Children	Child no2 hours of work in domestic		
q18d	o232	Children	Child no2 hours of work in economic		
q19a	o221	Children	Age of child no3		
q19b	o227	Children	Gender of child no3		
q19c	o239	Children	Child no3 hours of work in domestic		
q19d	o233	Children	Child no3 hours of work in economic		
q20a	o222	Children	Age of child no4		
q20b	o228	Children	Gender of child no4		
q20c	o240	Children	Child no4 hours of work in domestic		
q20d	o234	Children	Child no4 hours of work in economic		
q21a	o223	Children	Age of child no5		
q21b	o229	Children	Gender of child no5		
q21c	o241	Children	Child no5 hours of work in domestic		
q21d	o235	Children	Child no5 hours of work in economic		
q22a	o224	Children	Age of child no6		
q22b	o230	Children	Gender of child no6		
q22c	o242	Children	Child no6 hours of work in domestic		
q22d	o236	Children	Child no6 hours of work in economic		
q23	o008v1	Labour Market	Employment Situation	Are you currently employed or not?	
q24	o243	Labour Market	How did you hear of your current		
q24	o243d	Labour Market	How did you hear of your current		
q25	o244	Labour Market	Probability of losing job during this		
q26	o245	Labour Market	Does your job match your training	If employed, do you consider your present job	
q27	o246	Labour Market	Unemployment period		
q28	o009o1	Labour Market	Occupation (or last occupation for the	Occupation (or last occupation for the unemployed)	
q28	o009o2v2	Labour Market	Occupation (or last occupation for the	Occupation (or last occupation for the unemployed)	
q29	o063v1	Labour Market	Type of employer (or last type)	Type of employment (or last type for the	
q29	o063v2	Labour Market	Type of employer (or last type)	Type of employment (or last type for the	Beware! "occasionally employed" was not asked
q30	o011v1	Labour Market	Place of work (or last place... ) ?	Place of work (or last place... ) ?	
q30	o011v2	Labour Market	Place of work (or last place... ) ?	Place of work (or last place... ) ?	

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q31	o012v2	Labour Market	Change in employment situation (past 6 months)	Change in the employment during the past 6 months	
q32	o013v3	Labour Market	Was this change a consequence of Vocational Training	Was this change a consequence of the current	
q33	o0247	Education		What are you trained for?	
q34	o014	Labour Market	If unemployed: did you try to find a job?	If unemployed: did you try to find a job?	
q35	o014o	Labour Market	Reasons for not trying to find a job		
q36	o100v1	Labour Market	Unemployment duration of main	Unemployment duration of main breadwinner	
q36	o100v2	Labour Market	Unemployment duration of main	Unemployment duration of main breadwinner	
q36	o100v3	Labour Market	Unemployment duration of main	Unemployment duration of main breadwinner	
q37	o095	Socio-Economic Conditions	Subjective poverty	How do you financially consider yourself and your	
q38	o157	Labour Market	Respondent's position regarding	Are you the main breadwinner of your household ?	
q39	o057v2	Socio-Economic Conditions	Family income	How much is your family income?	
q39	o057v3	Socio-Economic Conditions	Family income	How much is your family income?	
q40	o108v2	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income evolution (past 6	Did your household income increase in the past six	
q41a	o109v2a	Socio-Economic Conditions	If income decreased, first cause (1/2)		
q41b	o109v2b	Socio-Economic Conditions	If income decreased, second cause		
q42_1	o163a	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_2	o163b	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_3	o163c	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_4	o163d	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_5	o163e	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_6	o163f	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition: Help		
q42_7	o163g	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition: Help		
q42_8	o163h	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition:		
q42_9	o163i	Socio-Economic Conditions	Household income composition: Fin.		
q43_1	o194a	Socio-Economic Conditions	Importance ranking of main expenses (1/5)	Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily	
q43_2	o194b	Socio-Economic Conditions	Importance ranking of main expenses (2/5)	Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily	
q43_3	o194c	Socio-Economic Conditions	Importance ranking of main expenses (3/5)	Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily	
q43_4	o194d	Socio-Economic Conditions	Importance ranking of main expenses (4/5)	Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily	
q43_5	o194e	Socio-Economic Conditions	Importance ranking of main expenses (5/5)	Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily	
q44	o040	Socio-Economic Conditions	Money needed every month	Money needed every month	
q45	o041	Socio-Economic Conditions	Income close to what's needed	Income close to what's needed	
q46	o044	Socio-Economic Conditions	Ability to keep up financially during the	Keep up financially during the coming period	
q47	o162	Socio-Economic Conditions	Business investment since Intifada	Did you invest money in a business since the Intifada	
q48	o248	Socio-Economic Conditions	Status of the house		
q49	o156	Socio-Economic Conditions	Do you or your family own or rent land		
q50	o031	Mobility	Mobility problems	Mobility was a problem	
q51_1	o195	Mobility	Separation Wall: affected directly		
q51_10	o164i	Mobility	Separation Wall: prices for		
q51_2	o164a	Mobility	Separation Wall: separation from		
q51_3	o164b	Mobility	Separation Wall: separation from land		
q51_4	o164c	Mobility	Separation Wall: prevent job access		
q51_5	o164d	Mobility	Separation Wall: cut land from water		
q51_6	o164e	Mobility	Separation Wall: forced move		

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q51_7	o164f	Mobility	Separation Wall: access basic		
q51_8	o164g	Mobility	Separation Wall: diff. market for		
q51_9	o164h	Mobility	Separation Wall: agriculture		
q52	o114v2	Mobility	Possibility to go to work last 6 months	Possibility to go to work last 6 months	
q53	o115v2	Mobility	Possibility to cultivate land during the	Possibility to cultivate land	
q54	o192	Children	Child absent from school during 2 weeks or more this schoolyear ?	Has any of the children in this household been absent from school for more than two weeks since Looking back since the Intifada started, did you, or any of your household members receive any type of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job,	
q55	o035b	Assistance in General	Received assistance since beginning of Intifada	How important is the assistance received for the household's budget since the beginning of the Have you or your family received any assistance from any party in the past six months? (Assistance	
q56	o250	Assistance in General	Importance of assistance for household	Would you say your household is in need of	
q57	o035	Assistance in General	Received assistance during the past 6 months	During the past six months, did the importance of assistance increase or decrease in your household	
q58	o038v3	Assistance in General	Assistance needed or not enough	During the past six months and taking into account the assistance provided by the various Palestinian or international organizations, what is the proportion of Satisfaction for the assistance received	
q59	o251	Assistance in General	Evolution of assistance in household budget	If dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, what is your main Employment assistance: Did receive a long term job Employment assistance: Did receive a short term job Employment assistance: Did receive unemployment	
q60	o252	Assistance in General	Importance of income generating activities compared to assistance	Employment assistance: Did receive resources for If you personally received such assistance, what was Benefit for household: long term job Benefit for household: short term job	Beware in the questionnaire we asked for ilamic
q61	o037	Assistance in General	General satisfaction with assistance	Benefit for household: short term job	
q62	o123	Assistance in General	Reason for dissatisfaction with	Benefit for household: unemployed funds	
q63_1	o024a	Assistance in General	Personal emp. assist.: Long term job	Benefit for household: unemployed funds	
q63_2	o024b	Assistance in General	Personal emp. assist.: Short term job	If pther household memebers received such	
q63_3	o024c	Assistance in General	Personal emp. assist.: Unemp. Funds	In general, how do you evaluate this employment assistance received by you personally or by other If you are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this employment assistance, could you please give your	
q63_4	o024d	Assistance in General	Personal emp. assist.: Self-employed	What is the most important type of assistance that you or your family received in the 6 past months?	
q64	o024s	Assistance in General	Personal emp. assist.: Source	Value of the 1st type of assistance received	
q65_1	o026za	Assistance in General	HH emp. Assist. (only): Long term job	What is the most important type of assistance that you or your family received in the 6 past months?	
q65_2	o026zb	Assistance in General	HH emp. Assist. (only): Short term job	What is the second most important type of assistance that you or your family received in the 6	
q65_3	o026zc	Assistance in General	HH emp. Assist.(only): Unemp. Funds	Value of the 2nd type of assistance received	
q65_4	o026zd	Assistance in General	HH emp. Assist. (only): Self-employed	What is the most important type of assistance that you or your family received in the 6 past months?	
q66	o026s	Assistance in General	HH emp. assist.: Source	In polls 1 & 2, interviewees could answer "don't know"	
q67	o025	Assistance in General	Evaluation job assistance last 6 months		
q68	o025d	Assistance in General	Reason for dissatisfaction with employment assistance		
q69	o036a1	Assistance in General	1st assistance received: Nature		
q70	o036b1	Assistance in General	1st assistance received: Value		
q71	o036c1	Assistance in General	1st assistance received: Source		
q72	o036d1	Assistance in General	1st assistance received: Satisfaction		
q73	o036a2	Assistance in General	2nd assistance received: Nature		
q74	o036b2	Assistance in General	2nd assistance received: Value		
q75	o036d2	Assistance in General	2nd assistance received: Satisfaction		

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q76	o036c2	Assistance in General	2nd assistance received: Source	What is the most important type of assistance that you or your family received in the 6 past months?	
q77	o036v2	Assistance in General	Number of other assistance types received during the past 6 months	"Apart from the two above-mentioned assistance types, how many other assistance types have you received during the past six months?"	
q78	o036v2v	Assistance in General	Non-mentioned assistance types: Value in NIS	Apart from the two above-mentioned assistance types, how many other assistance types have you received during the past six months?	
q79a	o036v2s1	Assistance in General	Source of non mentioned assistance type no1	From what sources did you receive these other assistance types?	
q79b	o036v2s2	Assistance in General	Source of non mentioned assistance type no2	From what sources did you receive these other assistance types?	
q79c	o036v2s3	Assistance in General	Source of non mentioned assistance type no3	From what sources did you receive these other assistance types?	
q80	o074v3	Food	Frequency of food assistance	Frequency food assistance provided	
q81	o075	Food	Effectiveness of food distribution	Effectiveness of food distribution	
q82	o166	Food	Targeting of food assistance	What is your opinion about the targeting of food assistance in your community? To what extent would you target?	
q83	o077	Food	Main source of food in household	Main source of food in your household?	
q84a	o107a	Food	Your opinion: 1st most needed food	Your opinion: 1st most needed food item	
q84b	o107b	Food	Your opinion: 2nd most needed food	Your opinion: 2nd most needed food item	
q85	o081v1a	Food	Food consumption: dairy products	Household consumption: DAIRY products	
q85	o081v2a	Food	Food consumption: dairy products	Household consumption: DAIRY products	
q86	o081v1b	Food	Food consumption: meat	Household consumption: MEAT	
q86	o081v2b	Food	Food consumption: meat	Household consumption: MEAT	
q87	o081v1c	Food	Food consumption: carbohydrates	Household consumption: CARBOHYDRATES	
q87	o081v2c	Food	Food consumption: carbohydrates	Household consumption: CARBOHYDRATES	
q88	o081v1d	Food	Food consumption: Bread	Household consumption: BREAD	
q88	o081v2d	Food	Food consumption: Bread	Household consumption: BREAD	
q89	o081v1e	Food	Food consumption: Fruits and	Household consumption: FRUITS AND	
q89	o081v2e	Food	Food consumption: Fruits and	Household consumption: FRUITS AND	
q90	o253	Children	Number of meals of children per day		
q91a	o105v1	Children	What children need most	What children need most	
q91a	o105v2	Children	What children need most	What children need most	
q91a	o105v3a	Children	What children need most (1st)	What children need most	
q91b	o105v3b	Children	What children need most (2nd)	What children need most	
q92a	o193a	Children	Drinking water sources for children (<15) - Second	Which of the following are the two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or older)?	
q92b	o193b	Children	Drinking water sources for children (<15) - First	Which of the following are the two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or older)?	
q93_1	o086a	Children	Children summer activities: play		
q93_2	o086b	Children	Children summer activities: camps		
q93_3	o086c	Children	Children summer activities: clubs		
q93_4	o086d	Children	Children summer activities: classes		
q93_5	o086e	Children	Children summer activities: work		
q93_6	o086f	Children	Children summer activities: travel		
q94	o113b	Children	Children late or missed classes due to closures last 6 months	In the past 6 months, how often, on average, were your children unable to attend school or arrived late?	
q95	o102nv2	Health	Medical care needed: Health care	Medical care needed: Health care (curative services)	



OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q96	o102bv1	Health	Medical care needed: hospitalization	Medical care needed: hospitalization	
q96	o102bv2	Health	Medical care needed: hospitalization	Medical care needed: hospitalization	
q97	o102cv1	Health	Medical care needed: ambulance	Medical care needed: ambulance	
q97	o102cv2	Health	Medical care needed: ambulance	Medical care needed: ambulance	
q98	o102iv2	Health	Medical care needed: birth care	Medical care needed: birth care	
q99	o102kv2	Health	Medical care needed: specialized care	Medical care needed: specialized care	
q100	o102iv2	Health	Medical care needed: physical	Medical care needed: physical rehabilitation	
q101	o168v1	Health	Main reason for choosing health		
q101	o168v2	Health	Main reason for choosing health		
q102	o169a2	Health	Drugs for chronic diseases:		
q102	o169b2	Health	Drugs for chronic diseases: Provided		
q103	o169a1	Health	Drugs for acute diseases: Prescribed		
q103	o169b1	Health	Drugs for acute diseases: Provided		
q104	o089v1	Health	Assistance for covering medical	Assistance for covering the medical expenses	
q104	o089v2	Health	Assistance for covering medical	Assistance for covering the medical expenses	
q105a	o186a1	Health	Age of impaired hh member no 1		
q105b	o186b1	Health	Kind of impairment of impaired hh		
q105c	o186c1	Health	Reason for impaired hh member no 1		
q105d	o186a2	Health	Age of impaired hh member no 2		
q105e	o186b2	Health	Kind of impairment of impaired hh		
q105f	o186c2	Health	Reason for impaired hh member no 1		
q105g	o186a3	Health	Age of impaired hh member no 3		
q105h	o186b3	Health	Kind of impairment of impaired hh		
q105i	o186c3	Health	Reason for impaired hh member no 1		
q106	o187	Health	Number of people affected by physical impairment	How many people in this household suffer from PHYSICAL impairment (physical or psychological)	
q107	o187k	Children	Number of children (<=14) affected by	Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or	
q108	o188	Health	Number of people affected by visual	How many people in this household suffer from	
q109	o188k	Children	Number of children (<=14) affected by	Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or	
q110	o189	Health	Number of impaired caused by second Intifada	If you count the mentally, physically and visually impaired of your household all together, how many	
q111	o126as	Health	Source of hospital	In case anyone in your household benefited from the Hospital during the past six months, please tell me	
q112	o126a	Health	Satisfaction with hospital	In case anyone in your household benefited from the Hospital during the past six months, please tell me	
q113	o126gs	Health	Source of primary health care	In case anyone in your household benefited from the Financial assistance during the past six months,	
q114	o126g	Health	Satisfaction with primary health care		
q115	o126is	Health	Source of specialized care		
q116	o126i	Health	Satisfaction with specialized care		
q117	o126js	Health	Source of ambulances		
q118	o126j	Health	Satisfaction with ambulances		
q119	o126ks	Education	Source of education services	Source of education services (school or University)	
q120	o126k	Education	Satisfaction with education services	Satisfaction with education services (schools and	
q121a	o079av2	Priorities for Assistance	Household assistance: 1st most	Your opinion: 1st most important need	
q121a	o079av3	Priorities for Assistance	Household assistance: 1st most	Your opinion: 2nd most important need	
q121b	o079bv2	Priorities for Assistance	Household assistance: 2nd most	Your opinion: 2nd most important need	
q121b	o079bv3	Priorities for Assistance	Household assistance: 2nd most	Your opinion: 2nd most important need	

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q122	o180	Assistance in General	Most important unmet needs		
q123a	o080av3	Priorities for Assistance	Community assistance: 1st most	Community: 1st most important need	
q123b	o080bv3	Priorities for Assistance	Community assistance: 2nd most	Community: 2nd most important need	
q124a	o124av3	Infrastructure	Infrastructure assistance: 1st most important	Still about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important facilities	
q124b	o124bv3	Infrastructure	Infrastructure assistance: 2nd most important	Still about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important facilities	
q125	o278	Infrastructure	Most important communication facility	What about the following communication facilities, which in your opinion is the most important facility	
q126_1	o174a	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Water network		
q126_2	o174i	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Well		
q126_3	o174b	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Electricity		
q126_4	o174c	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Sewage		
q126_5	o174d	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Solid waste		
q126_6	o174e	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Fixed phone		
q126_7	o174f	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Mobile phone		
q126_8	o174g	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Internet		
q126_9	o174h	Infrastructure	Connected to services: Satellite TV		
q127	o175v2a	Infrastructure	Not connected to water: Total water consumption / day (tanks)	If you are not connected to a water network, how many tanks of water do you bring everyday for the	
q128	o175v2b	Infrastructure	Not connected to water: Drinking		
q129	o254	Infrastructure	Household needs more water	Do you think your household needs more water than this, less water than this, or the same amount of	
q130	o255	Infrastructure	Latrines, sewer or septic tank	Do you think your household needs more water than this, less water than this, or the same amount of	
q131	o002	Main Independent Variables	Refugee Status	Are you a refugee or descendant of a refugee	
q132	o056	Education	Educational level	Educational level	
q133	o058	Other Independent Variables	Marital status	Marital status	
q134_1	o131k	Socio-Economic Conditions	Assistance from family and friends		
q134_10	o131i	Socio-Economic Conditions	Selling jewelry/gold to sustain the	To sustain the hardship, are you selling jewelry/gold?	
q134_11	o131j	Socio-Economic Conditions	Buying on credit		
q134_12	o131m	Food	Reducing the quantity of food		
q134_13	o131n	Food	Reducing the quantity of food		
q134_14	o131o	Food	Buying less preferred food (quality)		
q134_2	o131l	Socio-Economic Conditions	Getting assistance from family and		
q134_3	o131b	Socio-Economic Conditions	Using past savings to sustain the	Is your household using past savings to sustain the	
q134_4	o131c	Socio-Economic Conditions	Selling estate property to sustain the	Is your household selling estate property to sustain the	
q134_5	o131d	Socio-Economic Conditions	Cultivating land to sustain the	Is your household cultivating land to sustain the	
q134_6	o131e	Socio-Economic Conditions	More adults going into the labor market to sustain the hardship	To sustain the hardship, are more household members over the age of 18 years going into the	
q134_7	o131f	Socio-Economic Conditions	More children going into the labor market to sustain the hardship	To sustain the hardship, are more household members below the age of 18 years going into the	
q134_8	o131g	Socio-Economic Conditions	Not paying the bills (water, electricity,	To sustain the hardship, do you not pay the bills	
q134_9	o131h	Socio-Economic Conditions	Reducing expenses to sustain the	To sustain the hardship, are you reducing expenses?	
q135	o177	Socio-Economic Conditions	Available means to relieve the		
q136	o133	Politics	Faction you trust most	Which political or religious faction do you trust most	
q137	o134	Politics	Leader you trust most	Which political or religious leader do you trust most	

OV	SV	Category	Label	description	note
q138	o256	Politics	Support for presidential elections	It is expected that presidential and national elections will take soon in the Palestinian areas, do you	
q139	o257	Politics	Support for Arafat's lead	Do you agree with the manner by which Yasser Arafat is leading the areas under the control of the	
q140	o258	Politics	Arafat's resignation will serve Palestinian goals	Some say that the resignation of President Arafat will serve the Palestinian goal. What is your view	
q141a	o178v2a	Politics	Biggest concerns about the PA (first)	Looking at the PA, what are the two issues you are	
q141b	o178v2b	Politics	Biggest concerns about the PA	Looking at the PA, what are the two issues you are	
q142	o176v2	Politics	Reform of the PA		
q143	o259	Politics	Bribe to a Palestinian official	Have you or any of your household members given a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a specific	
q144	o260	Politics	Heard of anyone who gave a bribe to	Have you heard of anyone who gave a bribe to a	
q145	o261	Politics	Corruption in the PA	What about corruption in the Palestinian Authority,	
q146	o262	Politics	Evolution of the situation in general	Since the beginning of the second Intifada, do you	
q147	o263	Refugees	Camp refugees and elections	In case municipal elections are held before a peace agreement is reached, should the camp refugees:	
q148	o264	Refugees	Assessment of camp and refugee institutions	How do you assess the camps services committees and other grassroots institutions work on behalf of	
q149	o265	Refugees	Reason for bad assessment of camp	In case you answered "bad" or "very bad", what is	
q150	o266	Peace Process	Support for peace settlement with Israel	How do you feel about peace in general, do you support a peace settlement with Israel or oppose it?	
q151	o267	Peace Process	Support for disengagement from the		
q151	o267r	Peace Process	Support for disengagement from the		
q152	o268	Peace Process	Support for the Road Map		
q152	o268r	Peace Process	Support for the Road Map		
q153	o269	Peace Process	Support for the Nusseibeh-Ayalon		
q153	o269r	Peace Process	Support for the Nusseibeh-Ayalon		
q154	o270	Peace Process	Support for the Geneva Initiative		
q154	o270r	Peace Process	Support for the Geneva Initiative		
q155	o271	Peace Process	Reasons for supporting the Geneva		
q155	o271d	Peace Process	Reasons for supporting the Geneva		
q156	o272	Peace Process	Reasons for opposing the Geneva		
q156	o272d	Peace Process	Reasons for opposing the Geneva		
q157	o273	Peace Process	From where did you first hear of the		
q158	o274	Peace Process	What should the PA relinquish for a		
q159	o275	Peace Process	Acceptance of an interim international force	As part of a peace process, and as a temporary measure, would you accept an interim international	
q160	o276	Peace Process	Outcome of an interim international force	Which of the following do you see as the most likely outcome a temporary international force could	
q161a	o136v3a	Media	Most important sources of information	What is the most important source of information that	
q161b	o136v3b	Media	Most important sources of information	What is the most important source of information that	
q162	o060	Main Independent Variables	Area of residence	Area of residence	
q163	o059	Main Independent Variables	Region of residence	Region of residence	
q165	o277	Other Independent Variables	Religion		
q166					
weight					

# Annex II: English Questionnaire

## Questionnaire for the 8th report (Final)

### PPP studies

#### Instructions

Answer questions as they relate to you. For most answers, check the boxes most applicable to you or fill in the blanks.

#### Security

##### 1. In general, do you feel secure?

1. I feel secure (**Skip to Q. 3**)
2. I do not feel secure
9. DK/NA

##### 2. Why do you feel insecure?

###### 1. (Select only one.)

1. ☐ Because of internal security problems
2. ☐ Because of Israeli incursions
3. ☐ Because there are no signs for socio-economic improvements
4. ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_
9. ☐ DK/NA

##### 3. How did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months?

###### (Select all that apply.)

1. Inability to market products to areas	1. Yes	2. No	
2. Difficulties in buying raw materials or products	1. Yes	2. No	
3. Problems pertaining to reaching the place of work	1. Yes	2. No	
4. Inability to pay bank loans	1. Yes	2. No	
5. My/family business went bankrupt in the past six months	1. Yes	2. No	
6. Inability to work because of curfew	1. Yes	2. No	
7. Damage to agricultural lands	1. Yes	2. No	

#### Household structure

##### 4. How many adults of 18 years or more (including yourself) live in this household?

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

##### 5. How many of these adults are women?

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

##### 6. The main breadwinner in this household is:

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both contribute significantly to the household (DO NOT READ, ONLY IF SPECIFIED BY RESPONDENT)
9. DK/NA

##### 7. How many of these adults are employed?

\_\_\_\_\_

**8. How many of these adults have lost their job in the past six months?**

What is....

	Age	Code	Gender	Code	Hours per week in domestic work or activity	Code	Hours per week in economic work or activity	Code
9.Respondent	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	
10. Adult #2	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	
11. Adult #3	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	
12. Adult #4	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	
13. Adult #5	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	
14. Adult #6	—		1. Male 2. Female		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40		1. none 2. 1-19 3. 20-39 4. >40	

**15. How many children aged less than 18 years live in this household?**

**16. Of these, how many are less than 15 years old?**

What is...

	Age	Code	Gender	Code	Hours per week in domestic work or activity	Code	Hours per week in economic work or activity	Code
17.Child #1	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	
18 Child #2	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	
19. Child #3	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	

20. Child #4	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	
21. Child #5	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	
22. Child #6	—		1 Male 2 Female		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40		1 none 2 1-19 3 20-39 4 >40	

### Labor Market

#### 23. Are you currently employed or not?

1. ☐ I am employed full-time
2. ☐ I am employed part-time
3. ☐ I am employed for few hours/day
4. ☐ I am not employed (**Skip to Q. 27**)
5. ☐ I am a housewife (**Skip to Q. 27**)
6. ☐ I am a student (**Skip to Q. 28**)
7. ☐ I am retired (**Skip to Q. 28**)
9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 24. How did you hear about your current employment?

1. ☐ From the newspapers
2. ☐ From relatives and friends
3. ☐ I am employed in the family business
4. ☐ Others \_\_\_\_\_
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 25. If you are employed now, how do you see the probability that you lose your job in the current year?

1. ☐ Very unlikely
2. ☐ Rather unlikely
3. ☐ Rather likely
4. ☐ Very likely
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 26. If employed, do you consider your present job matches your technical or academic training?

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ Not fully
3. ☐ Not at all
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 27. If you are unemployed, for how long have you been unemployed?

1. ☐ For less than six months
2. ☐ For less than one year
3. ☐ For one to two years
4. ☐ For over two years
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 28. Employment category (or previous one for the unemployed)?

1. ☐ Professional (physician, engineer, etc...)



- 2. ☐ Skilled worker
- 3. ☐ Unskilled worker
- 4. ☐ Technician
- 5. ☐ Employee
- 6. ☐ Self-employed
- 7. ☐ Others \_\_\_\_\_
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**29. Type of employment (or last type for the unemployed)**

- 1. ☐ Government employee
- 2. ☐ Employed by an international agency
- 3. ☐ Employed by an international NGO
- 4. ☐ Employed by a local NGO
- 5. ☐ Employed by the private sector
- 6. ☐ Self-employed in petty trade of agricultural products
- 7. ☐ Self-employed in petty trade of manufactured products
- 8. ☐ Other self-employed
- 9. ☐ Others \_\_\_\_\_
- 88. ☐ Not applicable
- 99. ☐ DK/NA

**30. Main place of work (or last place for the unemployed)?**

- 1. ☐ Jerusalem
- 2. ☐ West Bank
- 3. ☐ Gaza Strip
- 4. ☐ Settlements
- 5. ☐ Israel proper
- 6. ☐ In another country
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**31. Did your employment situation change in the past six months?**

- 1. ☐ No, it remained the same
- 2. ☐ Yes, I had to search for a different job
- 3. ☐ Yes, I lost my job
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**32. Was this change a consequence of:**

(Select only one.)

- 1. ☐ Inability to reach the place of work
- 2. ☐ Employer can no longer afford to pay my salary
- 3. ☐ The business had to close because of losses
- 4. ☐ Other : \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**33. What are you trained for?**

(Select only one.)

- ☐ Please specify \_\_\_\_\_
- 88. ☐ Not applicable
- 99. ☐ DK/NA

**34. If you are unemployed, did you try to find a job?**

- 1. ☐ Yes, a lot (Skip to Q. 36)
- 2. ☐ I tried, but not very hard
- 3. ☐ I did not try at all
- ☐ Not applicable (Skip to Q. 36)

9. ☐ DK/NA

**35. If you did not try to find a job or did not try very hard, please tell us your main reason?**

(Select only one.)

1. ☐ The pay is too low  
 2. ☐ I know others tried and failed  
 3. ☐ I want to emigrate  
 4. ☐ I want to pursue my studies  
 5. ☐ I want to stay at home  
 6. ☐ I want to get married  
 7. ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 8. ☐ Not applicable  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**36. Looking back to the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, for how long in total has the main breadwinner of your household been unemployed?**

1. ☐ Never  
 2. ☐ Less than two months  
 3. ☐ Between 2 to 6 months  
 4. ☐ Between 7 to 12 months  
 5. ☐ Between 13 to 24 months  
 6. ☐ Between 24 to 36 months  
 7. ☐ The whole period (41 months)  
 8. ☐ Not applicable  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**Economic Situation**

**37. How do you financially consider yourself and your household?**

1. ☐ Better-off than the people in my community  
 2. ☐ About the same as the people in my community  
 3. ☐ Worse-off than the people in my community  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**38. Are you the main breadwinner of this household?**

1. ☐ Yes  
 2. ☐ No, but I also bring income  
 3. ☐ No, I do not bring income  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**39. How much is your family income?**

1. ☐ NIS 5000 and over  
 2. ☐ Between NIS 4500-4999  
 3. ☐ Between NIS 4000-4499  
 4. ☐ Between NIS 3500-3999  
 5. ☐ Between NIS 3000-3499  
 6. ☐ Between NIS 2500-2999  
 7. ☐ Between NIS 2000-2499  
 8. ☐ Between NIS 1500-1999  
 9. ☐ Between NIS 1000-1499  
 10. ☐ Between NIS 500-999  
 11. ☐ Less than NIS 500  
 99. ☐ DK/NA

**40. In the past six months, did your household income increase, decrease, or remain the same?**

1. ☐ It increased (Skip to Q. 42)  
 2. ☐ It remained the same (Skip to Q. 42)  
 3. ☐ It decreased (Skip to Q. 41)

9. ☐ DK/NA (Skip to Q. 42)

**41. If your household income decreased in the past six months, what were the two most important causes for this change?**

The first cause	The second cause
1 Job loss of breadwinner	1 Job loss of breadwinner
2 Working hour loss	2 Working hour loss
3 Land for cultivation damaged	3 Land for cultivation damaged
4 Damage in personal business	4 Damage in personal business
5 Member of household in detention	5 Member of household in detention
6 Member of household died	6 Member of household died
7 Health problems of a family member	7 Health problems of a family member
8 Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation	8 Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation
9 Other _____	9 Other _____
99 DK/NA	99 DK/NA

**42. Of the following items, which constitute the income of the household?**

(Select all that apply.)

1. Salaries from long-term jobs	1. yes	2. No	
2. Salaries from short-term jobs	1. yes	2. No	
3. Income from independent activity or petty trade	1. yes	2. No	
4. Renting of property	1. yes	2. No	
5. Selling property	1. yes	2. No	
6. Financial help from family members living in Palestine	1. yes	2. No	
7. Financial help from family members living abroad			
8. Dividends			
9. Financial help from the PA, from local or international organizations	1. yes	2. No	

**43. Please rank in order of importance the five main expense types your household income is primarily devoted to:**

(Rank responses from 1 to 5.)

1. Food	1st main expense	<input type="checkbox"/>	
2. Education	2 <sup>nd</sup> main expense	<input type="checkbox"/>	
3. Health	3rd main expense	<input type="checkbox"/>	
4. Rent	4th main expense	<input type="checkbox"/>	
5. Household items	5th main expense	<input type="checkbox"/>	
6. Sustaining the family business			
7. Transportation			
8. Buying a house, a car or a business			
9. Clothes			
10. Leisure			

**44. How much money (in NIS) would you say your household needs monthly to be able to meet basic life necessities?**

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_ shekels

**45. To what extent would you say your household income is close to this number nowadays?**

1. ☐ Much higher than this
2. ☐ Slightly higher than this
3. ☐ About the same
4. ☐ Slightly less than this
5. ☐ Much less than this
9. ☐ DK/NA

**46. How long would you say you could keep up financially in the future?**

1. ☐ For as long as it takes
2. ☐ For about one year
3. ☐ For only few months
4. ☐ We can barely manage now
5. ☐ Our situation is serious and we do not have enough to live
9. ☐ DK/NA

**47. Did you invest money in a business since the Intifada started?**

1. ☐ Yes
2. ☐ No
9. ☐ DK/NA

**48. Does your family own or rent this house?**

1. ☐ The house is owned
2. ☐ The house is rented
3. ☐ The house is part of the refugee camp
9. ☐ DK/NA

**49. Do you or your family own or rent land?**

1. ☐ Yes, our family owns land since more than 10 years
2. ☐ Yes, our family bought land in the past 10 years
3. ☐ We rent land
4. ☐ We do not own or rent land
9. ☐ DK/NA

**Mobility****50. To what extent would you say that restrictions on your mobility were a problem for you and your family in the past six months?**

1. ☐ A lot
2. ☐ A little
3. ☐ Not at all
9. ☐ DK/NA

**51. How did the construction of the separation wall affect you and your household?****(Select all that apply.)**

1. Had a direct affect	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
2. It separated us from relatives	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
3. It separated us from our land	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
4. It prevented household members from reaching their place of work	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
5. It cut our land from water	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
6. It forced members of our household to move to another place	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
7. It made access to basic services such as education or health more difficult	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
8. It made it difficult/impossible to market agricultural produce	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	

9. It made it difficult/impossible to prepare, plough, plant, harvest the land	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	
10. It greatly increased the price of inputs and transportation costs	1. Affected	2. Didn't affect	

**52. In the past 6 months, was it possible to go to work for you or your family members?**

- 1. ☐ Not difficult
- 2. ☐ Difficult
- 3. ☐ Very difficult
- 4. ☐ Almost impossible
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**53. In the past 6 months, was it possible to cultivate land for you or your family members?**

- 1. ☐ Not difficult
- 2. ☐ Difficult
- 3. ☐ Very difficult
- 4. ☐ Almost impossible
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**54. Have any of the children in this household been absent from school for more than two weeks since the beginning of the school year for reasons other than illness or Israeli measures?**

- 1. ☐ Yes
- 2. ☐ No
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**Assistance**

**55. Looking back since the Intifada started, did you, or any of your household members receive any type of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, money, education, etc.)**

- 1. ☐ Yes
- 2. ☐ No
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**56. How important is the assistance received for the household's budget since the beginning of the second Intifada?**

- 1. ☐ We could not manage without it
- 2. ☐ We would manage with great difficulties
- 3. ☐ It constitutes a useful complement to the regular household income
- 4. ☐ It only helps alleviate the hardship under difficult circumstances
- 5. ☐ The household would manage anyway
- 6. ☐ Assistance is not important to the household's livelihood
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**57. Have you or your family received any assistance from any party in the past six months? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, money, education, etc.)**

- 1. ☐ Yes
- 2. ☐ No
- 3. ☐ DK/NA

**58. Would you say your household is in need of assistance or of more assistance ?**

- 1. ☐ Yes, a lot
- 2. ☐ Yes, a little

- 3. ☐ Not sure
- 4. ☐ No, we receive enough
- 5. ☐ No we do not need assistance
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**59. In the past six months, did the importance of assistance increase or decrease in your household budget?**

- 1. ☐ It increased: Six months ago, assistance was less important for my household than today
- 2. ☐ It decreased: Six months ago, assistance was more important to us than today
- 3. ☐ It did not change much
- 4. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**60. In the past six months and taking into account the assistance provided by the various Palestinian or international organizations, what is the proportion of your daily life expenditures/consumption which is covered by the money from your households' members income generating activities?**

- 1. ☐ None, no household members have an income
- 2. ☐ One third or less
- 3. ☐ One half or less
- 4. ☐ Two thirds or less
- 5. ☐ Entirely, we did not receive assistance

**61. In general, how do you evaluate the assistance provided to you and to your family in the past six months by various organizations?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**62. If dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, what is your main reason?**

- 1. ☐ Because of the quantity
- 2. ☐ Because of the quality
- 3. ☐ Because of the frequency
- 4. ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**63. Did you personally receive employment assistance of the following types in the past six months?**

(Select all that apply.)

- |   |        |       |
|---|--------|-------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> Long-term job (more than three months)            | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> Short-term job (less than three months)           | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Unemployment funds                                | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> Resources to sustain an activity as self-employed | 1. Yes | 2. No |

**64. Who provided this assistance?**

(Select only one.)

- 1. ☐ The Municipality/village council
- 2. ☐ The Palestinian Authority or any of its ministries or agencies
- 3. ☐ UNRWA
- 4. ☐ A Trade Union
- 5. ☐ An NGO (non governmental organization)
- 6. ☐ An international organization
- 7. ☐ A religious organization
- 8. ☐ A private source
- 88. ☐ Not applicable
- 99. ☐ DK/NA



**65. Did other household members receive employment assistance of the following types in the past six months?****(Select all that apply.)**

- |                             |   |        |       |
|-----------------------------|---|--------|-------|
| 1. <input type="checkbox"/> | Long-term job (more than three months)            | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 2. <input type="checkbox"/> | Short-term job (less than three months)           | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 3. <input type="checkbox"/> | Unemployment funds                                | 1. Yes | 2. No |
| 4. <input type="checkbox"/> | Resources to sustain an activity as self-employed | 1. Yes | 2. No |

**66. Who provided this assistance?****(Select only one)**

1. The Municipality/village council
2. The Palestinian Authority or any of its ministries or agencies
3. UNRWA
4. A Trade Union
5. An NGO (non governmental organization)
6. An international organization
7. A religious organization
8. A private source
88. Not applicable
99. DK/NA

**67. In general, how do you evaluate this employment assistance received by you personally and/or by other household members?**

1. ☐ Very satisfied **(Skip to Q. 69)**
2. ☐ Satisfied **(Skip to Q. 69)**
3. ☐ Dissatisfied
4. ☐ Very Dissatisfied
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

**68. If you are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this employment assistance, could you please give your main reason of dissatisfaction?**

1. ☐ The amount of assistance is too little
2. ☐ The period of employment is too short
3. ☐ Other
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

**69. What is the first most important type of assistance that you or your household received in the past six months?****(Select only one.)**

8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA
- ☐ Type: \_\_\_\_\_

**70. What was the value (in NIS) of this first most important assistance type?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ No value
2. ☐ No material value
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA
- ☐ Value: \_\_\_\_\_

**71. What was its source?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ The Municipality/village council
2. ☐ The Palestinian Authority/ministries/agencies
3. ☐ UNRWA

- 4. ☐ A Trade Union
- 5. ☐ An NGO (non governmental organization)
- 6. ☐ An international organization
- 7. ☐ A religious organization
- 8. ☐ A private source

**72. How satisfied are you with it?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**73. What is the second most important type of assistance that you or your household received in the past six months?**

(Select only one.)

- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA
- ☐ Type: \_\_\_\_\_

**74. What was the value (in NIS) of this second most important assistance type?**

- 1. ☐ No value
- 2. ☐ No material value
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA
- ☐ Value: \_\_\_\_\_

**75. How satisfied are you with it?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ DK/NA

**76. What was its source?**

(Select only one.)

- 1. ☐ The Municipality/village council
- 2. ☐ The Palestinian Authority/ministries/govt. agency
- 3. ☐ UNRWA
- 4. ☐ A Trade Union
- 5. ☐ An NGO (non governmental organization)
- 6. ☐ An international organization
- 7. ☐ A religious organization
- 8. ☐ A private source

**77. Apart from the two above-mentioned assistance types, how many other assistance types have you received in the past six months?**

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**78. What is the total value (in NIS) of these assistance types?**

- 1. ☐ Not applicable
- 2. ☐ DK/NA
- ☐ Value: \_\_\_\_\_

**79. From what sources did you receive these other assistance types?**

(Select the main three.)

1. <input type="checkbox"/> The Municipality/village council	1st source _____	
2. <input type="checkbox"/> The Palestinian Authority/ministries/govt. agency	2 <sup>nd</sup> source _____	
3. <input type="checkbox"/> UNRWA		
4. <input type="checkbox"/> A Trade Union	3rd source _____	
5. <input type="checkbox"/> An NGO (non governmental organization)		
6. <input type="checkbox"/> An international organization		
7. <input type="checkbox"/> A religious organization		
8. <input type="checkbox"/> A private source		

**80. How often did you receive food assistance in the past six months?**

1. ☐ More than six times
2. ☐ Six times
3. ☐ Five times
4. ☐ Four times
5. ☐ Three times
6. ☐ Two times
7. ☐ One time
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

**81. How effective was the distribution of food?**

1. ☐ It was organized
2. ☐ It was somewhat organized
3. ☐ It was badly organized
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

**82. What is your opinion about the targeting of food assistance in your community? To what extent would you say that food assistance is targeted to the needy?**

(Select only one.)

1. ☐ Food assistance is primarily targeted to the needy
2. ☐ Food assistance targets the needy, but often others who do not need such assistance also receive it
3. ☐ In general, food assistance is distributed without any distinction between the needy and those who do not need it
9. ☐ DK/NA

**83. What is the main source of food in your household?**

1. ☐ Household relies primarily on relief assistance
2. ☐ House relies primarily on support from its family or friends
3. ☐ House relies primarily on own income for food
9. ☐ DK/NA

**84. What are the two most needed food items in your household?**

1st most important need	2 <sup>nd</sup> most important need
1. <input type="checkbox"/> Baby food	1. <input type="checkbox"/> Baby food
2. <input type="checkbox"/> Basic commodities such as flour, sugar, lentils, beans, rice, oil	2. <input type="checkbox"/> Basic commodities such as flour, sugar, lentils, beans, rice, oil
3. <input type="checkbox"/> Milk and other dairy products	3. <input type="checkbox"/> Milk and other dairy products
4. <input type="checkbox"/> Canned food	4. <input type="checkbox"/> Canned food
5. <input type="checkbox"/> Fruits and vegetables	5. <input type="checkbox"/> Fruits and vegetables
6. <input type="checkbox"/> Meat and poultry	6. <input type="checkbox"/> Meat and poultry

**85. Did your household consumption of DAIRY PRODUCTS increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?**

1. ☐ It increased  
 2. ☐ It decreased  
 3. ☐ It remained the same  
 4. ☐ It could not be reduced any further  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**86. Did your household consumption of MEAT increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?**

1. ☐ It increased  
 2. ☐ It decreased  
 3. ☐ It remained the same  
 4. ☐ It could not be reduced further  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**87. Did your household consumption of CARBOHYDRATES (such as potatoes, rice, etc.) increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?**

1. ☐ It increased  
 2. ☐ It decreased  
 3. ☐ It remained the same  
 4. ☐ It could not be reduced further  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**88. Did your household consumption of BREAD increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?**

1. ☐ It increased  
 2. ☐ It decreased  
 3. ☐ It remained the same  
 4. ☐ It could not be reduced further  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**89. Did your household consumption of FRUITS AND VEGETABLES increase, decrease or remain the same in the past year?**

1. ☐ It increased  
 2. ☐ It decreased  
 3. ☐ It remained the same  
 4. ☐ It could not be reduced further  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**90. How many meals do the children of your household eat each day?****(Select only one.)**

8. ☐ Not applicable  
 9. ☐ DK/NA  
☐ Number of Meals: \_\_\_\_\_

**Children****91. What do you think the children of your household need most?****(Select two)**

1. <input type="checkbox"/>	Attend school regularly	1st most important need _____
2. <input type="checkbox"/>	Safe opportunities to play with friends	
3. <input type="checkbox"/>	Get psychological support	
4. <input type="checkbox"/>	Unrestricted access to medical services	
5. <input type="checkbox"/>	Eat more than before the Intifada	2 <sup>nd</sup> most important need _____
6. <input type="checkbox"/>	Eat better than before the Intifada	
8. <input type="checkbox"/>	Not applicable	
9. <input type="checkbox"/>	DK/NA	

**92. Which of the following are the two main drinking water sources for the children (aged 14 years or below) of this household?**

1st source of water	2 <sup>nd</sup> source of water
[1] Piped water	[1] Piped water
[2] Public tap	[2] Public tap
[3] Borehole or pump	[3] Borehole or pump
[4] Protected well	[4] Protected well
[5] Protected spring or rain water	[5] Protected spring or rain water
[6] Vendor-provided water	[6] Vendor-provided water
[7] Bottled water	[7] Bottled water
[8] Tanker trucks	[8] Tanker trucks
[9] Unprotected wells and springs	[9] Unprotected wells and springs

**93. Have any of the children in your household been involved in any of the following activities during the summer vacation?**

1. Playing in the neighborhood	1. yes	2. No	
2. Attending summer camp	1. yes	2. No	
3. Going to clubs	1. yes	2. No	
4. Attend remedial classes	1. yes	2. No	
5. Work/employment	1. yes	2. No	
6. Travel abroad	1. yes	2. No	

**94. In the past 6 months, how often, on average, were your children unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews/closures?**

1. ☐ Never or almost never
2. ☐ Less than 10 times per month
3. ☐ 10 times or more per month
8. ☐ Not applicable
9. ☐ DK/NA

## Health

**95. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive PRIMARY HEALTH CARE (curative services)?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**96. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive HOSPITAL SERVICES?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**97. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive AMBULANCE service?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**98. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive BIRTH CARE?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**99. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive SPECIALIZED CARE?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**100. In the past six months, did you or other household members need and receive PHYSICAL REHABILITATION?**

- 1 ☐ Nobody needed it
- 2 ☐ It was needed but we did not receive it
- 3 ☐ It was needed and provided with delay
- 4 ☐ It was needed and provided without restriction or delay
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**101. What was your main reason for choosing your health facility?**

- 1. ☐ Because I am insured and obliged to receive health services from this facility only
- 2. ☐ Because I am not insured and this health facility was free of charge or cheaper than others
- 3. ☐ Because of distance and time or because it is the only one available in the area
- 4. ☐ Because of short waiting time
- 5. ☐ Because of confidence in the quality of care
- 6. ☐ Because of the availability of drugs
- 7. ☐ Because of the humanity of care
- 8. ☐ Because of the physician's gender
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**102. In the past six months, were you or any other member of your family prescribed drugs for CHRONIC problems and did the pharmacy of your health facility provide them?**

- 1 ☐ It was not prescribed
- 2 ☐ It was prescribed and provided
- 3 ☐ It was prescribed but could not be provided
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**103. In the past six months, were you or any other member of your family prescribed drugs for ACUTE problems and did the pharmacy of your health facility provide them?**

- 1 ☐ It was not prescribed
- 2 ☐ It was prescribed and provided
- 3 ☐ It was prescribed but could not be provided
- 9 ☐ DK/NA

**104. Do you get any assistance for covering medical expenses?****(Select only one.)**

- ☐ Yes, through government health insurance
- ☐ Yes, through UNRWA
- ☐ Yes, through private health insurance
- ☐ Yes, through charitable organizations
- ☐ No, we cover our medical expenses from our own sources
- ☐ No, we had to delay paying for medical expenses for financial reasons



**105. Does any of your household members suffer from any mental or physical or visual impairment and what is the type and the cause of that impairment?**

	Age	Type of impairment			Cause of impairment		
1		1. Mental	2. Physical	3. Visual	1. Birth	2. Intifada/conflict	3. Accident
2		1. Mental	2. Physical	3. Visual	1. Birth	2. Intifada/conflict	3. Accident
3		1. Mental	2. Physical	3. Visual	1. Birth	2. Intifada/conflict	3. Accident

**106. How many people in this household suffer from PHYSICAL impairment (physical or psychological disturbances affecting internal organs, the head, the trunk or the limbs)?**

\_\_\_\_\_

**107. Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or less?**

\_\_\_\_\_

**108. How many people in this household suffer from VISUAL impairment?**

\_\_\_\_\_

**109. Of these, how many are children aged 14 years or less?**

\_\_\_\_\_

**110. If you count the mentally, physically and visually impaired of your household all together, how many were caused by the second Intifada?**

\_\_\_\_\_

**111. In case anyone in your household benefited from HOSPITAL SERVICES in the past six months, which was the service provider?**

(Select only one.)

1. ☐ A Palestinian Authority institution
2. ☐ An Islamic organization
3. ☐ Local NGO
4. ☐ Arab government
5. ☐ An Arab organization)
6. ☐ UNRWA
7. ☐ The Red Cross
8. ☐ World Food Programme
9. ☐ Other international organization
10. ☐ Other \_\_\_\_\_
88. ☐ Not applicable
99. ☐ DK/NA

**112. How satisfied were you with this service?**

1. ☐ Very satisfied
2. ☐ Satisfied
3. ☐ Dissatisfied
4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- ☐ Not applicable
- DK/NA

**113. In case anyone in your household benefited from PRIMARY HEALTH CARE in the past six months, which was the service provider?**

(Select only one.)

- 1 . A Palestinian Authority institution
- 2 . An Islamic organization
- 3 . Local NGO
- 4 . Arab government
- 5 . An Arab organization)
- 6 UNRWA
- 7 The Red Cross
- 8 . World Food Programme
- 9 Other international organization
- 10 Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 Not applicable
- 99 DK/NA

**114. How satisfied were you with this service?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**115. In case anyone in your household benefited from SPECIALIZED CARE in the past six months, which was the service provider?**

(Select only one.)

- 1 . A Palestinian Authority institution
- 2 . An Islamic organization
- 3 . Local NGO
- 4 . Arab government
- 5 . An Arab organization)
- 6 UNRWA
- 7 The Red Cross
- 8 . World Food Programme
- 9 Other international organization
- 10 Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 Not applicable
- 99 DK/NA

**116. How satisfied were you with this service?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- 8. ☐ Not applicable
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**117. In case anyone in your household benefited from AMBULANCE TRANSPORTATION in the past six months, which was the service provider?**

(Select only one.)

- 1 . A Palestinian Authority institution
- 2 . An Islamic organization
- 3 . Local NGO
- 4 . Arab government
- 5 . An Arab organization)
- 6 UNRWA

- 7 The Red Cross
- 8 World Food Programme
- 9 Other international organization
- 10 Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 Not applicable
- 99 DK/NA

**118. How satisfied were you with this service?**

- 1. ☐ Very satisfied
- 2. ☐ Satisfied
- 3. ☐ Dissatisfied
- 4. ☐ Very dissatisfied
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ DK/NA

**119. In case anyone in your household benefited from EDUCATION SERVICES (schools and Universities) in the past six months, which was the service provider?**

(Select only one)

- 1 A Palestinian Authority institution
- 2 An Islamic organization
- 3 Local NGO
- 4 Arab government
- 5 An Arab organization)
- 6 UNRWA
- 7 The Red Cross
- 8 World Food Programme
- 9 Other international organization
- 10 Other \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 Not applicable
- 99 DK/NA

**120. How satisfied were you with this service?**

- ☐ Very satisfied
- ☐ Satisfied
- ☐ Dissatisfied
- ☐ Very dissatisfied
- ☐ Not applicable
- ☐ DK/NA

**Assistance Priorities**
**121. Which of the following, in your opinion, are the two most important needs of your household?**

First most important	Second most important
1. Employment	1. Employment
2. Food	2. Food
3. Health	3. Health
4. Financial assistance	4. Financial assistance
5. Housing and re-housing	5. Housing and re-housing
6. Education	6. Education

**122. Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most important need of your household?**

(Select only one.)

- ☐ Employment
- ☐ Food

- ☐ Health  
☐ Financial assistance  
☐ Housing and re-housing  
☐ Education  
 8. ☐ Not applicable  
 9. ☐ DK/NA

**123. What about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important needs?**

First most important	Second most important
1. Employment	1. Employment
2. Food	2. Food
3. Health	3. Health
4. Financial assistance	4. Financial assistance
5. Housing and re-housing	5. Housing and re-housing
6. Education	6. Education

**124. Still about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important facilities needed?**

First most important	Second most important
1. Water network	1. Water network
2. Electricity network	2. Electricity network
3. Sewage disposal network	3. Sewage disposal network
4. Solid waste disposal network	4. Solid waste disposal network

**125. What about the following communication facilities, which in your opinion is the most important facility needed for your community?**

(Select only one.)

1. ☐ Fixed phone line network  
 2. ☐ Mobile phone network  
 3. ☐ Permanent connection to the Internet  
 4. ☐ Satellite TV  
☐ DK/NA

### Infrastructure

**126. Is your house connected to or does it receive the following services?**

1. Water network	1. Yes	2. No	
2. A well	1. Yes	2. No	
3. Electricity network	1. Yes	2. No	
4. Sewage disposal network	1. Yes	2. No	
5. Solid waste disposal service	1. Yes	2. No	
6. Fixed phone line network	1. Yes	2. No	
7. Mobile phone network	1. Yes	2. No	
8. Permanent connection to the Internet	1. Yes	2. No	
9. Satellite TV	1. Yes	2. No	

**127. If you are not connected to a water network, how many tanks of water do you bring everyday for the household?**

8. Not applicable  
 9. DK/NA

**128. Of those tanks of water brought every day to the household, how many are drinking water?**

8. Not applicable  
9. DK/NA

**129. Do you think your household needs more water than this, less water than this, or the same amount of water specified?**

1. ☐ More water  
2. ☐ The same amount  
3. ☐ Less water  
☐ Not applicable  
☐ DK/NA

**130. Does your household have its own latrines, sewer or septic tank?**

1. ☐ Yes, we have our own latrines, sewer or septic tank  
2. ☐ No, we have to use public latrines  
☐ DK/NA

**Social Condition****131. Are you a refugee or descendant of a refugee family?**

1. ☐ Yes, I am a refugee or a descendant of a refugee family  
2. ☐ No, we have never been displaced from our place of origin  
9. ☐ DK/NA

**132. What is your level of education?**

1. ☐ Never went to school  
2. ☐ Until elementary  
3. ☐ Until preparatory  
4. ☐ Until secondary  
5. ☐ Some college  
6. ☐ College & above  
☐ DK/NA

**133. What is your marital status?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ Single  
2. ☐ Married  
3. ☐ Divorced  
4. ☐ Widower  
9. ☐ NA

**Coping Strategies****134. In the past six months, did your household do the following to be able to relieve the hardship?**

1. We are getting assistance from family and friends living abroad	1. Yes	2. No	
2. We are getting assistance from family and friends living in Palestine or Israel	1. Yes	2. No	
3. We are using past savings	1. Yes	2. No	
4. We are selling estate property	1. Yes	2. No	
5. We are cultivating land	1. Yes	2. No	
6. More household members over the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market	1. Yes	2. No	
7. More household members below the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market	1. Yes	2. No	
8. We do not pay some bills (water, electricity, etc.)	1. Yes	2. No	
9. We are reducing expenses	1. Yes	2. No	
10. We are selling jewelry/gold	1. Yes	2. No	
11. We are buying on credit	1. Yes	2. No	
12. We are reducing the quantity of food	1. Yes	2. No	

13. We buy less preferred food (quality)	1. Yes	2. No	
14. We have moved our place of residency to another city or village	1. Yes	2. No	

**135. Of the above strategies utilized to relieve the hardship, would you say that those means are still available to your household, will be exhausted soon, are already exhausted, or were not available from the beginning?**

- 1. ☐ Those coping strategies are still available
- 2. ☐ Those coping strategies will soon be exhausted
- 3. ☐ Those coping strategies are already exhausted
- ☐ DK/NA

### Politics

**136. Which political or religious faction do you trust most?**

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**137. Which political or religious leader do you trust most?**

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

**138. It is expected that presidential and national elections will take place soon in the Palestinian areas, do you support such elections in under the current conditions?**

- 1. ☐ Strongly support
- 2. ☐ Support
- 3. ☐ Oppose
- 4. ☐ Strongly oppose
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**139. Do you agree with the manner by which Yasser Arafat is leading the areas under the control of the PA?**

- 1. ☐ I strongly agree
- 2. ☐ I agree
- 3. ☐ I disagree
- 4. ☐ I strongly disagree
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**140. Some say that the resignation of President Arafat will serve the Palestinian goal. What is your view regarding this issue?**

- 1. ☐ I strongly agree
- 2. ☐ I agree
- 3. ☐ I disagree
- 4. ☐ I strongly disagree
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

**141. Looking at the PA, what are the two issues you are most concerned about?**

The first issue that is of concern to you most	The first issue that is of concern to you most
1 Lack of financial means	1 Lack of financial means
2 Nepotism / Clientelism (assisting the relatives and friends)	2 Nepotism / Clientelism (assisting relatives and friends)
3 Inefficiency and mismanagement	3 Inefficiency and mismanagement
4 Inability to deal with internal security problems	4 Inability to deal with internal security problems
5 Inability to maintain public order	5 Inability to maintain public order
6 Lack of democracy	6 Lack of democracy



7 Lack of transparency/accountability	7 Lack of transparency/accountability
8 Lack of human rights	8 Lack of human rights
9 Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	9 Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons

**142. What is your opinion about reform in the Palestinian Authority?**

1. ☐ I did not hear of any such reform
2. ☐ I think reform is real
3. ☐ I think that the reform is only cosmetic
9. ☐ DK/NA

**143. Have you or any of your household members given a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a specific service?**

1. ☐ Yes, often
2. ☐ Yes, but rarely
3. ☐ No
9. ☐ DK/NA

**144. Have you heard of anyone who gave a bribe to a Palestinian official in return for a service?**

1. ☐ Yes, often
2. ☐ Yes but rarely
3. ☐ No
9. ☐ DK/NA

**145. What about corruption in the Palestinian Authority, would you say that:**

1. ☐ You think there is no corruption in the PA
2. ☐ You are not sure but heard about it from reliable sources
3. ☐ You are not sure but heard about it from friends
4. ☐ You are certain of it
9. ☐ DK/NA

**146. Since the beginning of the second Intifada, do you think the situation in general:**

1. ☐ Improved
2. ☐ Remained the same
3. ☐ Worsened
9. ☐ DK/NA

**147. In case municipal elections are held before a peace agreement is reached, should the camp refugees:****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ Hold separate elections at the camp level
2. ☐ Not engage in any kind of local elections
9. ☐ DK/NA

**148. How do you assess the camps services committees and other grassroots institutions work on behalf of the camp refugees?**

1. ☐ Very good **(Skip to Q. 150)**
2. ☐ Good **(Skip to Q. 150)**
3. ☐ Bad
4. ☐ Very bad
9. ☐ DK/NA **(Skip to Q. 150)**

**149. In case you answered "bad" or "very bad", what is your main reason for this answer?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ Lack of funds
2. ☐ Lack of expertise
3. ☐ Lack of staff

- 4. ☐ Corruption
- 5. ☐ Lack of technical cooperation with UNRWA and other actors
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

### Peace

#### 150. How do you feel about peace in general, do you support a peace settlement with Israel or oppose it?

- 1. ☐ I support a peace settlement with Israel
- 2. ☐ I oppose a peace settlement with Israel
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 151. Do you support the disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip?

- 1. ☐ I strongly support
- 2. ☐ I support
- 3. ☐ I oppose
- 4. ☐ I strongly oppose
- 5. ☐ I do not know enough to decide
- 6. ☐ I did not hear of it
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 152. Do you support the Road Map?

- 1. ☐ I strongly support
- 2. ☐ I support
- 3. ☐ I oppose
- 4. ☐ I strongly oppose
- 5. ☐ I do not know enough to decide
- 6. ☐ I did not hear of it
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 153. Do you support the Nusseibeh-Ayalon plan?

- 1. ☐ I strongly support
- 2. ☐ I support
- 3. ☐ I oppose
- 4. ☐ I strongly oppose
- 5. ☐ I do not know enough to decide
- 6. ☐ I did not hear of it
- 9. ☐ DK/NA

#### 154. Do you support the Geneva Initiative?

- 1. (Select only one.)
- 2. ☐ I strongly support
- 3. ☐ I support
- 4. ☐ I oppose (Skip to Q. 156)
- 5. ☐ I strongly oppose (Skip to Q. 156)
- 6. ☐ I do not know enough to decide (Skip to Q. 157)
- 7. ☐ I did not hear of it (Skip to Q. 157)
- 9. ☐ DK/NA (Skip to Q. 157)

#### 155. Why do you support the Geneva Initiative?

(Provide one response only.)

---

#### 156. Why do you oppose the Geneva Initiative?

(Provide one response only.)

---

**157. From where did you first hear about the Geneva Initiative?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ Palestinian radio
2. ☐ Palestinian TV
3. ☐ Al-Quds newspaper
4. ☐ Al-Ayyam
5. ☐ Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah
6. ☐ Foreign media
7. ☐ The mosque/ the religious leaders
8. ☐ Political or religious faction
9. ☐ Friends and relatives
10. ☐ Al-Jazeera
11. ☐ Al-Arabyyah
12. ☐ Abu Dhabi
13. ☐ Al-Manar
14. ☐ Flyer in my mailbox
15. ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

**158. Which in your opinion should the Palestinian leadership relinquish in return for a viable Palestinian state in the land occupied by Israel in 1967?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ Part of Jerusalem
2. ☐ 5-10% of the land of the West Bank
3. ☐ Refugee right of return
4. ☐ Palestinian control over borders
5. ☐ Should relinquish anything if this will lead to ending occupation
6. ☐ They should not relinquish anything of the Palestinian rights even if this keeps occupation
9. ☐ DK/NA

**159. As part of a peace process, and as a temporary measure, would you accept an interim international force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?**

1. ☐ Yes and without reservation
2. ☐ Yes, but under certain conditions
3. ☐ No, I do not accept an interim international force
9. ☐ DK/NA

**160. Which of the following do you see as the most likely outcome a temporary international force could achieve if it happens?****(Select only one.)**

1. ☐ An end to the occupation
2. ☐ An end to the violence on both sides
3. ☐ It will only guarantee my personal security
4. ☐ It will not achieve anything
9. ☐ DK/NA

**Media****161. What is the source of information that you trust most? What is the second?**

Most important source of information	Second most important source of information
1 Palestinian radio	1 Palestinian radio
2 Palestinian TV	2 Palestinian TV
3 Al-Quds newspaper	3 Al-Quds newspaper
4 Al-Ayyam	4 Al-Ayyam
5 Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah	5 Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah
6 The mosque/ the religious leaders	6 The mosque/ the religious leaders
7 The political/religious faction I trust most	7 The political/religious faction I trust most
8 Friends and relatives	8 Friends and relatives
9 Al-Jazeera	9 Al-Jazeera

10 Al-Arabyyah	10 Al-Arabyyah
11 Abu Dhabi	11 Abu Dhabi
12 Al-Manar	12 Al-Manar

### Interview

#### 162. INTERVIEWER: Area of residence:

1. ☐ City
2. ☐ Village
3. ☐ Refugee Camp

#### 163. INTERVIEWER: Governorate?

(Select only one.)

1. ☐ Jenin District
2. ☐ Toubas District
3. ☐ Nablus District
4. ☐ Salfit District
5. ☐ Qalqilia District
6. ☐ Tulkarem District
7. ☐ Ramallah District
8. ☐ Jerusalem District
9. ☐ Jericho District
10. ☐ Bethlehem District
11. ☐ Hebron District
12. ☐ North Gaza District
13. ☐ Gaza City
14. ☐ Rafah District
15. ☐ Deir Al-Balah District
16. ☐ Khan Younis District

#### 164. INTERVIEWER: Name of the place of residence

(Provide one response only.)

\_\_\_\_\_

#### 165 Religion of the respondent

1. Moslem
2. Christian
3. Other
9. DK/NA

#### 166. INTERVIEWER: Duration of interview (in minutes):

\_\_\_\_\_ minute

# Annex III: Arabic Questionnaire

يرجى من الباحث/ة تعبئة الاستمارة بنفسه/ها وعدم إعطائها للمستفتي

السؤال	الجواب	Code
١. بشكل عام، هل تشعر أنك آمن؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة)	١. أشعر بالأمن (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٣) ٢. لا أشعر بالأمن ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q1:
٢. لماذا لا تشعر بالأمن؟ (أختر أهم إجابة واحدة فقط)	١. بسبب مشاكل أمنية داخلية ٢. بسبب الإجراءات الإسرائيلية ٣. لأنه لا يوجد مؤشرات حول تحسن الوضع الاجتماعي/الاقتصادي ٤. غيرها (حدد) ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q2:

٣. كيف عانى عملك التجاري أو العمل التجاري الخاص بعائلتك في آخر ستة أشهر؟

١. عدم القدرة على تسويق المنتجات في المناطق	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-1:
٢. صعوبات في شراء المواد الخام أو المنتجات	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-2:
٣. مشاكل تتعلق بالوصول إلى مكان العمل	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-3:
٤. عدم القدرة على سداد القروض	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-4:
٥. عانى عملي التجاري (أو عمل العائلة) من ظروف مالية صعبة في آخر ستة أشهر	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-5:
٦. عدم القدرة على العمل بسبب منع التجول	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-6:
٧. الدمار الذي لحق بالأراضي الزراعية	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q3-7:

٤. ما هو عدد أفراد الأسرة البالغين (١٨ عام فما فوق) الذين يعيشون في الأسرة (بما فيهم أنت)؟ (أعط إجابة واحدة فقط)	_____	Q4:
٥. ما عدد النساء من أفراد الأسرة البالغين (١٨ عام فما فوق)؟	_____	Q5:

٦. معيل الأسرة الرئيسي؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى ٣. الذكر والأنثى يشاركون بشكل كبير في دخل الأسرة (لا تقرأ ذلك مطلقاً) ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q6:
٧. كم عدد أفراد الأسرة البالغين (١٨ فما فوق) الذين يعملون؟	_____	Q7:
٨. كم عدد أفراد الأسرة البالغين (١٨ فما فوق) الذين فقدوا عملهم في آخر ستة أشهر؟	_____	Q8:

ما هو؟	عمر	Code	الجنس	Code	ساعات العمل البيتي اسبوعياً	Code	ساعات العمل الاقتصادي اسبوعياً	Code
٩. المجيب / المستطلع	_____	Q9a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q9b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q9c:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q9d:
١٠. البالغ رقم ٢	_____	Q10a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q10b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q10b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q10d:
١١. البالغ رقم ٣	_____	Q11a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q11b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q11c:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q11d:
١٢. البالغ رقم ٤	_____	Q12a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q12b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q12c:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q12d:
١٣. البالغ رقم ٥	_____	Q13a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q13b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q13c:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q13d:
١٤. البالغ رقم ٦	_____	Q14a:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q14b:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q14c:	١. صفر ٢. ١-١٩ ٣. ٢٠-٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q14d:

السؤال	الجواب	Code
١٥. عدد أفراد الأسرة ما دون الثامنة عشرة الذين يعيشون مع	_____	

Q15:			الأسرة؟					
Q16:			١٦. كم منهم ما دون الخامسة عشر؟					
Code	ساعات العمل الاقتصادي اسبوعيا	Code	ساعات العمل البيتي اسبوعيا	Code	الجنس	Code	عمر	ما هو؟
Q17d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q17c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q17b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q17a:		١٧. الطفل رقم ١
Q18d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q18c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q18b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q18a:		١٨. الطفل رقم ٢
Q19d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q19c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q19b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q19a:		١٩. الطفل رقم ٣
Q20d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q20c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q20b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q20a:		٢٠. الطفل رقم ٤
Q21d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q21c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q21b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q21a:		٢١. الطفل رقم ٥
Q22d:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q22c:	١. صفر ٢. ١ - ١٩ ٣. ٢٠ - ٣٩ ٤. ٤٠ فما فوق	Q22b:	١. ذكر ٢. أنثى	Q22a:		٢٢. الطفل رقم ٦
Q23:	١. أعمل بوظيفة كاملة ٢. أعمل بوظيفة جزئية ٣. أعمل لبضع ساعات في اليوم ٤. لا أعمل (أذهب إلى سؤال ٢٧) ٥. أنا ربة بيت (أذهب إلى سؤال ٢٧) ٦. أنا طالب (أذهب إلى سؤال ٢٨) ٧. أنا متقاعد (أذهب إلى سؤال ٢٨) ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب				٢٣. هل تعمل حالياً أم لا؟			
Q24:	١. من الصحيفة ٢. من أقارب وأصدقاء ٣. أعمل في عمل تجاري تابع للعائلة ٤. غيرها (حدد) ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب				٢٤. كيف سمعت عن عملك الحالي؟			
Q25:	١. غير محتمل بتاتا ٢. غير محتمل إلى حد كبير ٣. محتمل ٤. محتمل جدا ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب				٢٥. إذا كنت تعمل حالياً، كيف ترى احتمالية أن تفقد عملك في العام الحالي؟			
Q26:	١. نعم ٢. ليس بشكل كبير ٣. لا يناسب ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب				٢٦. إذا كنت تعمل حالياً، هل تعتقد أن عملك الحالي يناسب تدريبك الفني أو الأكاديمي؟ (اختر إجابة واحدة فقط)			

Code	الجواب	السؤال
	١. لإقل من ستة أشهر ٢. لأقل من سنة ٣. ما بين سنة إلى سنتين ٤. لأكثر من سنتين	٢٧. إذا كنت عاطلاً عن العمل، ما هي المدة التي كنت فيها عاطلاً عن العمل؟



Q27:	<p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	
Q28:	<p>١. مهني (طبيب، مهندس...الخ)</p> <p>٢. عامل ماهر</p> <p>٣. عامل غير ماهر</p> <p>٤. فني</p> <p>٥. موظف</p> <p>٦. موظف مستقل</p> <p>٧. غيرها (حدد) _____</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	٢٨. تصنيف العمل (أو العمل السابق للعاطل عن العمل)؟
Q29:	<p>١. موظف حكومي</p> <p>٢. موظف في مؤسسة دولية</p> <p>٣. موظف في منظمة غير حكومية دولية</p> <p>٤. موظف في منظمة غير حكومية محلية</p> <p>٥. موظف في القطاع الخاص</p> <p>٦. موظف في تجارة صغيرة في مجال المنتجات الزراعية</p> <p>٧. أعمل في تجارة صغيرة للمنتجات المصنعة</p> <p>٨. غيرها من الأعمال الحرة</p> <p>٩. غيرها (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٢٩. نوع العمل (أو نوع آخر عمل للعاطل عن العمل)؟</p> <p>(أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q30:	<p>١. القدس</p> <p>٢. الضفة الغربية</p> <p>٣. قطاع غزة</p> <p>٤. المستوطنات</p> <p>٥. إسرائيل</p> <p>٦. في دولة أخرى</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	٣٠. مكان العمل الرئيسي (أو آخر مكان عمل رئيسي للعاطل عن العمل)؟
Q31:	<p>١. لا بقي كما هو</p> <p>٢. نعم اضطررت أن أبحث عن عمل آخر</p> <p>٣. نعم فقدت عملي</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	٣١. هل تغير وضعك الوظيفي في آخر ستة أشهر؟
Q32:	<p>١. عدم القدرة على الوصول إلى مكان العمل</p> <p>٢. لا يستطيع صاحب العمل تحمل أن يدفع راتبي</p> <p>٣. أضطر العمل التجاري أن يغلق بسبب الخسارة</p> <p>٤. غيرها (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٣٢. هل كان التغيير نتيجة التالي:</p> <p>(أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q33:	<p>١. حدد _____</p> <p>٨٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	٣٣. ما هو التدريب الذي حصلت عليه / التخصص؟

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q34:	<p>١. نعم كثيراً (أذهب إلى سؤال ٣٦)</p> <p>٢. حاولت لكن ليس بشكل كبير</p> <p>٣. لم أحاول</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق (أذهب إلى سؤال ٣٦)</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	٣٤. إذا كنت عاطل عن العمل، هل حاولت أن تبحث عن عمل؟
	<p>١. الراتب ضئيل جداً</p> <p>٢. أعرف آخرين حاولوا وفشلوا</p>	٣٥. إذا لم تحاول أن تبحث عن عمل أو حاولت لكن ليس بشكل كبير، الرجاء أن تذكر السبب لذلك؟

Q35:	<p>٣. أريد أن أهاجر</p> <p>٤. أريد أن أتابع دراستي</p> <p>٥. أريد أن أبقى في البيت</p> <p>٦. أريد أن أتزوج</p> <p>٧. غيرها (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p>	(أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q36:	<p>١. لم يكن عاطل عن العمل</p> <p>٢. أقل من شهرين</p> <p>٣. بين ٢ - ٦ أشهر</p> <p>٤. بين ٧ - ١٢ شهر</p> <p>٥. بين ١٣ - ٢٤ شهر</p> <p>٦. بين ٢٤ - ٣٦ شهر</p> <p>٧. الفترة كاملة (٤١ شهراً)</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٣٦. بالنظر إلى الوراثة إلى بداية الانتفاضة الثانية في أيلول ٢٠٠٠، ما هي المدة التي بقي فيها معيل الأسرة عاطل عن العمل؟</p>
Q37:	<p>١. أفضل من الناس في مجتمعي المحلي / المحيطي</p> <p>٢. تقريباً مثل الناس في مجتمعي المحلي / المحيطي</p> <p>٣. أسوأ من الناس في مجتمعي المحلي / المحيطي</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٣٧. كيف تصنف وضعك ووضع عائلتك المالي؟</p>
Q38:	<p>١. نعم</p> <p>٢. لا لكنني أجب دخل للأسرة</p> <p>٣. لا أجب دخل للأسرة</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٣٨. هل أنت المعيل الرئيسي في العائلة؟</p>
Q39:	<p>١. ٥٠٠٠ شيكل فما فوق</p> <p>٢. بين ٤٥٠٠ - ٤٩٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٣. بين ٤٠٠٠ - ٤٤٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٤. بين ٣٥٠٠ - ٣٩٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٥. بين ٣٠٠٠ - ٣٤٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٦. بين ٢٥٠٠ - ٢٩٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٧. بين ٢٠٠٠ - ٢٤٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٨. بين ١٥٠٠ - ١٩٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>٩. بين ١٠٠٠ - ١٤٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>١٠. بين ٥٠٠ - ٩٩٩ شيكل</p> <p>١١. أقل من ٥٠٠ شيكل</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>٣٩. كم دخل أسرتك؟</p>
Q40:	<p>١. ازداد (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٤٢)</p> <p>٢. بقي بدون تغيير (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٤٢)</p> <p>٣. أنخفض (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٤١)</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٤٢)</p>	<p>٤٠. خلال آخر ستة أشهر هل زاد دخل أسرتك أو انخفض أو بقي بدون تغيير؟</p>

٤١. إذا أنخفض دخل الأسرة في آخر ستة أشهر، ما هما أهم سببان لهذا التغيير؟

السبب الأول	السبب الثاني
١. فقدان وظيفة معيل الأسرة	١. فقدان وظيفة معيل الأسرة
٢. فقدان ساعات عمل الأسرة	٢. فقدان ساعات عمل الأسرة
٣. حدوث خراب للعمل الأراضي الزراعية	٣. حدوث خراب للعمل الأراضي الزراعية
٤. حدوث خراب في عملي الخاص	٤. حدوث خراب في عملي الخاص
٥. فرد من افراد الأسرة قيد الاعتقال	٥. فرد من افراد الأسرة قيد الاعتقال
٦. فرد من افراد الأسرة توفي	٦. فرد من افراد الأسرة توفي
٧. فرد من افراد الأسرة يعاني من مشاكل صحية	٧. فرد من افراد الأسرة يعاني من مشاكل صحية
٨. تزايد أسعار المدخلات والمواصلات	٨. تزايد أسعار المدخلات والمواصلات
٩. غيرها (حدد) _____	٩. غيرها (حدد) _____
٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q41a:	Q41b:

٤٢. من بين هذه البنود، أي منها يشكل دخل الأسرة؟

١. رواتب من فرص عمل طويلة الأمد	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-1:
٢. رواتب من فرص عمل قصيرة الأمد	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-2:
٣. دخل من نشاط مستقل أو عمل تجاري صغير الحجم	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-3:
٤. تأجير ممتلكات	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-4:
٥. بيع عقارات	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-5:
٦. مساعدة مالية من أعضاء الأسرة الذين يقطنون في فلسطين	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-6:
٧. مساعدة مالية من أعضاء الأسرة الذين يقطنون في الخارج	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-7:
٨. أسهم	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-8:
٩. مساعدة مالية من السلطة الفلسطينية، أو منظمات محلية أو دولية	١. نعم	٢. لا	Q42-9:

٤٣. الرجاء ترتيب هذه البنود طبقاً لأهميتها من ناحية المصاريف الخمسة الرئيسية التي تركز عليها أسرته؟ (ضع الرقم في المربع حسب الأولوية من الأهم إلى الأقل أهمية)

١. الغذاء	المصرف الرئيسي الأول	Q43-1:
٢. التعليم	المصرف الرئيسي الثاني	Q43-2:
٣. الصحة	المصرف الرئيسي الثالث	Q43-3:
٤. الآجار	المصرف الرئيسي الرابع	Q43-4:
٥. اللوازم البيتية	المصرف الرئيسي الخامس	Q43-5:
٦. الانفاق على العمل التجاري الخاص بالعائلة		
٧. المواصلات		
٨. شراء بيت، أو سيارة أو عمل تجاري		
٩. الملابس		
١٠. الترفيه		
٤٤. كم تحتاج اسرتك (بالشكل) لتلبية الاحتياجات الرئيسية للإسرة شهرياً؟ (الرجاء إعطاء إجابة واحدة فقط)		Q44:
٤٥. لأي مدى تعتقد أن دخل الأسرة يقارب هذا الرقم حالياً؟	١. أعلى بكثير ٢. أعلى قليلاً ٣. تقريباً نفس الشيء ٤. أقل قليلاً ٥. أقل كثيراً ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q45:
٤٦. ما هي المدة الزمنية التي تعتقد أنك تستطيع الصمود فيها مادياً خلال الفترة المقبلة؟	١. لفترة بدون أي سقف زمني ٢. لمدة عام تقريباً ٣. لبضعة شهور فقط ٤. بالكاد نتحمل الوضع الحالي ٥. وضعنا خطير ولا يوجد لدينا ما يكفينا للعيش ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q46:
٤٧. هل استثمرت مالا في أي عمل تجاري منذ بدء الانقضاة؟	١. نعم ٢. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q47:
السؤال	الجواب	Code
٤٨. هل تملك عائلتك البيت الذي تسكن فيه أم هل هو استئجار؟	١. البيت ملك العائلة ٢. استئجار	

Q48:	٣. البيت جزء من مخيم للاجئين ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	
Q49:	١. نعم أسرتي تملك قطعة أرض منذ ما يزيد عن ١٠ سنوات ٢. نعم اشترت أسرتي قطعة أرض في آخر ١٠ سنوات ٣. مستأجر قطعة أرض ٤. لا تملك أو تستأجر أية قطعة أرض ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٤٩. هل تملك أنت أو أسرتك قطعة أرض أو هل أنت مستأجر لقطعة أرض؟
Q50:	١. كثيراً ٢. قليلاً ٣. لم تسبب مشكلة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٠. لأي مدى يمكنك القول أن القيود على التنقل شكلت مشكلة بالنسبة لك وعائلتك في آخر ستة أشهر؟

٥١. (يسأل السؤال فقط لأهل الضفة والقدس) كيف أثر جدار الفصل في الضفة الغربية عليك وعلى أسرتك؟

Q51-1:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	١. أثر بشكل مباشر
Q51-2:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٢. فصلنا عن العائلة
Q51-3:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٣. فصلنا عن أرضنا
Q51-4:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٤. منع أفراد الأسرة من الوصول إلى العمل
Q51-5:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٥. فصل بين أرضنا والمياه
Q51-6:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٦. أجبر أفراد أسرتنا على الانتقال للعيش في مكان آخر
Q51-7:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٧. أوجد صعوبات في الوصول إلى الخدمات الأساسية مثل التعليم والصحة
Q51-8:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٨. جعل من الصعوبة وعدم الامكان من تسويق المنتج الزراعي
Q51-9:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	٩. جعل من حرث وزراعة وحصد المحصول الزراعي صعباً أو غير ممكناً
Q51-10:	٢. لم يؤثر	١. أثر	١٠. زاد بشكل كبير من تكاليف المواصلات

Q52:	١. لم يكن صعباً ٢. كان صعباً ٣. كثير الصعوبة ٤. شبه مستحيل ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٢. في آخر ستة أشهر، هل كان من الممكن لك أن تذهب إلى العمل أو أن يذهب أفراد أسرتك إلى العمل؟ (الرجاء أختار إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q53:	١. لم يكن صعباً ٢. صعباً ٣. كثير الصعوبة ٤. شبه مستحيل ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٣. في آخر ستة أشهر، هل كان من الممكن لك أو لأفراد أسرتك زراعة الأرض؟ (الرجاء أختار إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q54:	١. نعم ٢. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٤. هل تغيب أحد أطفال أسرتك عن المدرسة لأكثر من أسبوعين منذ بداية السنة الدراسية الحالية لإسباب عدا عن المرض أو الإجراءات الإسرائيلية؟
Q55:	١. نعم ٢. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٥. بالنظر إلى الوراثة منذ بداية الانتفاضة، هل حصلت أنت أو أي من أفراد أسرتك على أي نوع من المساعدات؟ (مساعدات مثل طعام، أدوية، وظيفة، أموال، تعليم...الخ)
Q56:	١. لم يكن بالإمكان التدبر بدونها ٢. يمكن أن نتدبر بدونها ولكن بصعوبة ٣. تساهم بشكل مهم لدخل الأسرة الاعتيادي ٤. تساعد فقط على تخفيف الضيق في الأوضاع الصعبة ٥. دخل الأسرة مدبر بكل الأحوال ٦. المساعدات غير ضرورية لدخل الأسرة المعيشي ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٦. ما مدى أهمية المساعدات التي حصلت عليها منذ بداية الانتفاضة الثانية في ميزانية دخل الأسرة؟
Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q57:	١. نعم ٢. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٧. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل حصلت أنت أو أي من أفراد أسرتك على أي مساعدات من أي جهة؟ (مساعدات مثل طعام، أدوية، وظيفة، أموال، تعليم...الخ)
	١. نعم كثيراً ٢. نعم قليلاً ٣. غير متأكد	٥٨. هل يمكن القول أن الأسرة بحاجة إلى مساعدة أو إلى مساعدة إضافية؟

Q58:	٤. لا، ما نحصل عليه كافي ٥. لا نحتاج إلى مساعدة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	(الرجاء إختار إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q59:	١. زادت، حيث في الستة أشهر الماضية كان لها أهمية أقل في دخل الأسرة من حالياً ٢. أنخفضت، حيث في الستة أشهر الماضية كان لها أهمية أكبر في دخل الأسرة من حالياً ٣. لم تغير كثيراً ٤. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٥٩. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل زادت أم انخفضت أهمية المساعدات في ميزانية دخل الأسرة ؟
Q60:	١. بالمرة، ليس هناك من أعضاء الأسرة له دخل ٢. ثلث أو أقل ٣. نصف أو أقل ٤. ثلثين أو أقل ٥. بشكل كامل، لم نحصل على مساعدات	٦٠. مع الأخذ في الحسبان المساعدات التي حصلت عليها من المؤسسات المختلفة فلسطينية أم دولية خلال الستة الأشهر الماضية. ماذا كانت مساهمة أعضاء الأسرة في مصاريف الحياة اليومية؟ (أختار إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q61:	١. راض جداً (انتقل إلى سؤال ٦٣) ٢. راض (انتقل إلى سؤال ٦٣) ٣. غير راض ٤. غير راض مطلقاً ٥. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٦١. بشكل عام، خلال الستة الأشهر الماضية، كيف تقيم المساعدات المعطاة لك ولعائلتك من المؤسسات المختلفة؟ (أختار إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q62:	١. بسبب الكمية ٢. بسبب النوعية ٣. بسبب عدد التوزيع ٤. غيرها (حدد) _____ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٦٢. إذا كنت غير راض أو غير راض مطلقاً، ما هو السبب الرئيسي؟ (أختار إجابة واحدة فقط)

٦٣. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت شخصياً حصلت على مساعدة عمل من البنود التالية؟

Q63-1:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١. عمل طويل الأمد (أكثر من ثلاثة أشهر)
Q63-2:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٢. عمل قصير الأمد (أقل من ثلاثة أشهر)
Q63-3:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٣. دعم للعاطلين عن العمل
Q63-4:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٤. مصادر لإمكانية القيام بنشاطات عمل خاص
Q64:			٦٤. ما هي الجهة التي أعطت المساعدة؟ (أختار إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. السلطة الفلسطينية أو إحدى وزاراتها أو مؤسساتها ٣. وكالة غوث اللاجئين UNRWA ٤. إحدى نقابات العمال / المهن ٥. منظمة غير حكومية NGO ٦. منظمة أجنبية ٧. منظمة دينية ٨. مصدر خاص / عائلة / أصدقاء ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب

٦٥. خلال الأشهر الستة الماضية، هل حصل أحد أفراد أسرتك على مساعدة عمل من البنود التالية؟

Q65-1:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١. عمل طويل الأمد (أكثر من ثلاثة أشهر)
Q65-2:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٢. عمل قصير الأمد (أقل من ثلاثة أشهر)
Q65-3:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٣. دعم للعاطلين عن العمل
Q65-4:	٢. لا	١. نعم	٤. مصادر لإمكانية القيام بنشاطات عمل خاص
Q65-5:			٦٦. ما هي الجهة التي أعطت المساعدة؟ (أختار إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. السلطة الفلسطينية أو إحدى وزاراتها أو مؤسساتها ٣. وكالة غوث اللاجئين UNRWA ٤. إحدى نقابات العمال / المهن ٥. منظمة غير حكومية NGO

Q66:	٦. منظمة أجنبية ٧. منظمة دينية ٨. مصدر خاص / عائلة / أصدقاء	
Q67:	١. راض جداً (انتقل إلى سؤال رقم ٦٩) ٢. راض (انتقل إلى سؤال ٦٩) ٣. غير راضي ٤. غير راض بالمرة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٦٧. بشكل عام، كيف تقيم مساعدة العمل التي حصلت عليها أنت شخصياً أم أحد أفراد أسرتك؟
Q68:	١. حجم المساعدة قليل جداً ٢. فترة العمل قصيرة جداً ٣. غيرها (حدد) _____ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٦٨. إذا كنت غير راض أو غير راض بالمرة بمساعدة العمل، هل تستطيع أن تحدد سبب عدم رضاك؟
Q69:	النوع (حدد) _____ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٦٩. خلال الأشهر الستة الماضية، ما هو أول أهم نوع من المساعدات التي حصلت أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك عليها؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q70:	القيمة (حدد) _____ ١. لا قيمة ٢. لا قيمة مادية ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٠. ماذا كانت القيمة بالشيكول لأول أهم نوع من المساعدات؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q71:	١. البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. السلطة الفلسطينية أو إحدى وزارتها أو مؤسساتها ٣. وكالة غوث اللاجئين UNRWA ٤. إحدى نقابات العمال / المهن ٥. منظمة غير حكومية NGO ٦. منظمة أجنبية ٧. منظمة دينية ٨. مصدر خاص / عائلة / أصدقاء	٧١. ما هي الجهة التي أعطت المساعدة؟
Q72:	١. راض جداً ٢. راض ٣. غير راض ٤. غير راض بالمرة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٢. ما مدى رضاك عنها؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q73:	النوع (حدد) _____ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٣. خلال الأشهر الستة الماضية، ما هو ثاني أهم نوع من المساعدات حصلت عليها أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q74:	القيمة (حدد) _____ ١. لا قيمة ٢. لا قيمة مادية ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٤. ماذا كانت القيمة بالشيكول لثاني أهم نوع من المساعدات؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q75:	١. راض جداً ٢. راض ٣. غير راض ٤. غير راض بالمرة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٥. ما مدى رضاك عنها؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)



Q76:	١. البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. السلطة الفلسطينية أو إحدى وزاراتها أو مؤسساتها ٣. وكالة غوث اللاجئين UNRWA ٤. إحدى نقابات العمال / المهن ٥. منظمة غير حكومية NGO ٦. منظمة أجنبية ٧. منظمة دينية ٨. مصدر خاص / عائلة / أصدقاء	٧٦. ما هي الجهة التي أعطت المساعدة؟  (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q77:		٧٧. عدا عما تم ذكره في الأعلى من أنواع مساعدات، ما هو عدد أنواع المساعدات التي حصلت عليها خلال السنة الأشهر الماضية؟  (أعطي إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q78:	القيمة (حدد): ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٧٨. ما هو مجمل قيمة هذه المساعدات بالشيكل؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)

٧٩. من أي جهة حصلت على الأنواع الأخرى من المساعدات التالية؟ إذكر أهم ثلاثة مصادر للمساعدات حسب الأكثر أهمية لك؟

Q79a:	<input type="checkbox"/> مصدر المساعدة الأولى (ضع رقم المصدر في المربع)	١. البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. السلطة الفلسطينية أو إحدى وزاراتها أو مؤسساتها ٣. وكالة غوث اللاجئين UNRWA ٤. إحدى نقابات العمال / المهن ٥. منظمة غير حكومية NGO ٦. منظمة أجنبية ٧. منظمة دينية ٨. مصدر خاص / عائلة / أصدقاء
Q79b:	<input type="checkbox"/> مصدر المساعدة الثانية (ضع رقم المصدر في المربع)	
Q79c:	<input type="checkbox"/> مصدر المساعدة الثالثة (ضع رقم المصدر في المربع) ٨٨. لا ينطبق ٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	
Q80:	١. أكثر من ستة مرات ٢. ستة مرات ٣. خمس مرات ٤. أربع مرات ٥. ثلاث مرات ٦. مرتين ٧. مرة واحدة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٠. خلال السنة الأشهر الماضية، كم مرة حصلت على مساعدات غذاء؟  (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q81:	١. منظمة ٢. منظمة نوعاً ما ٣. منظمة بشكل سيئ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨١. كيف كانت فعالية عملية توزيع الغذاء؟  (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q82:	١. مساعدات الغذاء تستهدف بشكل أساسي ذوي الحاجة ٢. مساعدات الغذاء تستهدف ذوي الحاجة، ولكن عادة آخرين لا يحتاجون لمثل هذه المساعدات يحصلون عليها ٣. بشكل عام، مساعدات الغذاء توزع بدون أي تفرقة بين ذوي الحاجة أو هؤلاء ممن لا يحتاجون ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٢. ما هو رأيك بالمستهدفين من مساعدات الغذاء في مجتمعك المحلي؟ إلى أي مدى يمكن القول بأن مساعدات الغذاء تستهدف ذوي الحاجة؟  (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q83:	١. أسرتي تعتمد بشكل أولي على مساعدات الغذاء ٢. البيت يعتمد بشكل أولي على دعم من العائلة أو الأصدقاء ٣. البيت يعتمد بشكل أولي على دخله الخاص من الغذاء ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٣. ما هو المصدر الرئيسي للغذاء في أسرتك؟

٨٤. ما هي أهم حاجتين لإسرتك من بنود الغذاء التالية؟

الحاجة الثانية الأهم	الحاجة الأولى الأهم
----------------------	---------------------

١. غذاء الأطفال	١. غذاء الأطفال
٢. المواد الأساسية مثل الطحين، السكر، العدس، ، الأرز، الزيت	٢. المواد الأساسية مثل الطحين، السكر، العدس، ، الأرز، الزيت
٣. الحليب ومنتجات البان أخرى	٣. الحليب ومنتجات البان أخرى
٤. أطعمة معلبة	٤. أطعمة معلبة
٥. فواكة وخضار	٥. فواكة وخضار
٦. لحوم ودجاج	٦. لحوم ودجاج
<b>Q84b:</b>	<b>Q84a:</b>

<b>Q85:</b>	١. ازداد ٢. انخفض ٣. بقي كما هو عليه ٤. لا يمكن أن يقل أكثر ٥. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٥. هل ازداد أم انخفض أم بقي كما هو عليه استهلاك أسرتك لمنتجات الألبان خلال السنة الماضية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
<b>Q86:</b>	١. ازداد ٢. انخفض ٣. بقي كما هو عليه ٤. لا يمكن أن يقل أكثر ٥. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٦. هل ازداد أم انخفض أم بقي كما هو عليه استهلاك أسرتك للحوم خلال السنة الماضية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
<b>Q87:</b>	١. ازداد ٢. انخفض ٣. بقي كما هو عليه ٤. لا يمكن أن يقل أكثر ٥. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٧. هل ازداد أم انخفض أم بقي كما هو عليه استهلاك أسرتك للمواد النشوية (مثل البطاطا، الأرز... الخ) خلال السنة الماضية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
<b>Q88:</b>	١. ازداد ٢. انخفض ٣. بقي كما هو عليه ٤. لا يمكن أن يقل أكثر ٥. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٨. هل ازداد أم انخفض أم بقي كما هو عليه استهلاك أسرتك للخبز خلال السنة الماضية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
<b>Q89:</b>	١. ازداد ٢. انخفض ٣. بقي كما هو عليه ٤. لا يمكن أن يقل أكثر ٥. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٨٩. هل ازداد أم انخفض أم بقي كما هو عليه استهلاك أسرتك للفواكة والخضار خلال السنة الماضية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
<b>Q90:</b>	عدد الوجبات (حدد): _____ ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	٩٠. كم عدد الوجبات التي يتناولها الأطفال في أسرتك كل يوم؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)

#### ٩١. بأعتقادك، ما هما أهم حاجتين للأطفال في أسرتك؟

<b>Q91a:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> الحاجة الأهم الأولى (ضع رقم الحاجة في المربع)	١. الحضور إلى المدرسة بشكل منتظم ٢. فرص أمانة للعب مع الأصدقاء ٣. الحصول على دعم نفسي ٤. وصول غير مقيد للخدمات الطبية ٥. يأكلوا أكثر مما قبل الانتفاضة ٦. يأكلوا أحسن مما قبل الانتفاضة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q91b:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> الحاجة الأهم الثانية (ضع رقم الحاجة في المربع)	

#### ٩٢. أي من التالية هما المصدران الرئيسيان لشرب الماء عند الأطفال (١٤ سنة وأقل) في أسرتك؟

المصدر الأول لشرب الماء	المصدر الثاني لشرب الماء
١. مياه أنابيب	١. مياه أنابيب
٢. حنفية عامة	٢. حنفية عامة
٣. حفر جوفية أو مضخة	٣. حفر جوفية أو مضخة
٤. بئر محمي	٤. بئر محمي
٥. ينبوع أو مياه أمطار محمية	٥. ينبوع أو مياه أمطار محمية
٦. بائع يزود مياه	٦. بائع يزود مياه

٧. مياه معدنية (زجاجات)	٧. مياه معدنية (زجاجات)
٨. ناقل صهرج ماء	٨. ناقل صهرج ماء
٩. ينابيع وآبار غير محمية	٩. ينابيع وآبار غير محمية
Q92b:	Q92a:
٩٣. هل قام الأطفال في أسرته بأحد النشاطات التالية خلال فترة الصيف الماضي؟	
Q93-1:	١. اللعب في الحارة
Q93-2:	٢. الذهاب إلى مخيم صيفي
Q93-3:	٣. الذهاب إلى النوادي
Q93-4:	٤. أخذ حصص دراسية للتقوية
Q93-5:	٥. العمل / وظيفة
Q93-6:	٦. السفر إلى الخارج
Q94:	٩٤. منذ بداية العام الدراسي الحالي، ما هو معدل المرات التي لم يستطع فيها أطفالك من الذهاب إلى المدرسة أو الوصول متأخر بسبب منع التجول والإغلاقات؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. مطلقاً أو تقريباً مطلقاً ٢. أقل من عشر مرات في الشهر ٣. ١٠ مرات أو أكثر في الشهر ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q95:	٩٥. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو حصل على خدمات صحية أولية (خدمات علاج)؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q96:	٩٦. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو حصل على خدمات مستشفى؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q97:	٩٧. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو استخدم سيارة أسعاف؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q98:	٩٨. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو حصل على رعاية في فترة الولادة؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Code	السؤال
Q99:	٩٩. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو حصل على علاج اختصاصي؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q100:	١٠٠. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك احتاج أو حصل على علاج طبيعى؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. لم يحتاج أحد ٢. كان هناك حاجة ولم نحصل عليها ٣. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها لكن بعد تأخير ٤. كان هناك حاجة وحصلنا عليها دون قيود أو تأخير ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
	١٠١. ماذا كان السبب الرئيسي لاختيارك للخدمات الصحية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. بسبب أنني مؤمن ومجبر على الحصول على الخدمات الصحية من هذا المكان فقط ٢. بسبب أنني غير مؤمن والعلاج كان مجاني أو أرخص من غيره ٣. بسبب المسافة والوقت أو بسبب كونها الوحيدة المتوفرة في المنطقة ٤. بسبب قلة وقت الانتظار ٥. بسبب الثقة والنوعية في العلاج ٦. بسبب توفر الأدوية

Q101:	٧. بسبب الإنسانية في العلاج / المعاملة الجيدة ٨. بسبب نوع جنس الطبيب ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٠٢. في السنة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك صرف له أدوية لمشاكل صحية مزمنة وهل الصيدلي الخاص بتسهيلتك الصحية قام بتوفيرها لك أو لكم؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q102:	١. لم يصرف ٢. صرف وحصلنا عليه ٣. صرف ولكن لم نستطع الحصول عليه ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٠٣. في السنة أشهر الماضية، هل أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك صرف له أدوية لمشاكل صحية حادة وهل الصيدلي الخاص بتسهيلتك الصحية قام بتوفيرها لك أو لكم؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q103:	١. لم يصرف ٢. صرف وحصلنا عليه ٣. صرف ولكن لم نستطع الحصول عليه ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٠٤. هل حصلت على أي مساعدة لتغطية تكاليف العلاج؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q104:	١. نعم، من خلال التأمين الصحي الحكومي ٢. نعم، من خلال وكالة الغوث للاجئين UNRWA ٣. نعم، من خلال التأمين الصحي الخاص ٤. نعم، من خلال مؤسسات خيرية ٥. لا، غطينا تكاليف العلاج من مصادرها الخاصة ٦. لا، كان علينا تأجيل دفع تكاليف العلاج لإسباب مالية	

١٠٥. هل يعاني أحد أفراد العائلة من أي إعاقة جسدية أو عقلية أو نظرية وما هي نوع الإعاقة وسببها؟

عمر الفرد الذي يعاني من إعاقة	نوع الإعاقة	سبب الإعاقة	
١	١. عقلي ٢. جسدي ٣. النظر	١. ولادة ٢. الانتفاضة/ الصراع ٣. حادث	Q105a:
٢	١. عقلي ٢. جسدي ٣. النظر	١. ولادة ٢. الانتفاضة/ الصراع ٣. حادث	Q105b:
٣	١. عقلي ٢. جسدي ٣. النظر	١. ولادة ٢. الانتفاضة/ الصراع ٣. حادث	Q105c:
	Q105d:	Q105e:	Q105f:
	Q105g:	Q105h:	Q105i:

Q106:	١٠٦. كم عدد الأشخاص في أسرتك الذين يعانون من ضعف جسدي (اضطرابات جسدية أو نفسية تؤثر على الأعضاء الداخلية، الرأس، الجسم أو الأطراف)
Q107:	١٠٧. من هؤلاء، كم منهم أطفال من سن ١٤ وأقل؟
Q108:	١٠٨. كم عدد الأشخاص في أسرتك الذين يعانون من ضعف في النظر (اضطرابات جسدية أو نفسية تؤثر على الرؤية)
Q109:	١٠٩. من هؤلاء، كم منهم أطفال من سن ١٤ وأقل؟
Code	السؤال
Q110:	١١٠. إذا جمعت عدد أفراد أسرتك الذين يعانون من الضعف العقلي أو الجسدي أو النظر فكم منهم كان سببه الانتفاضة الثانية؟
Q111:	١١١. في حالة أن أحد أفراد أسرتك استفاد من خدمات مستشفى خلال السنة أشهر الماضية، أي من التالية كان مزود الخدمة؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية ٢. منظمة إسلامية ٣. منظمة غير حكومية محلية ٤. حكومة عربية ٥. منظمة عربية ٦. الأونروا UNRWA ٧. الصليب الأحمر ٨. برنامج الغذاء العالمي ٩. منظمة دولية أخرى ١٠. أخرى (حدد) ٨٨. لا ينطبق ٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب
Q112:	١١٢. ما مدى رضاك عن هذه الخدمات؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط) ١. راض جدا ٢. راض ٣. غير راض ٤. غير راض بالمرّة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب

Q113:	<p>١. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية</p> <p>٢. منظمة إسلامية</p> <p>٣. منظمة غير حكومية محلية</p> <p>٤. حكومة عربية</p> <p>٥. منظمة عربية</p> <p>٦. الأونروا UNRWA</p> <p>٧. الصليب الأحمر</p> <p>٨. برنامج الغذاء العالمي</p> <p>٩. منظمة دولية أخرى</p> <p>١٠. أخرى (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٣. في حالة أن أحد أفراد اسرتك استفاد من خدمات علاج أولية خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، أي من التالية كان مزود الخدمة؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q114:	<p>١. راض جدا</p> <p>٢. راض</p> <p>٣. غير راض</p> <p>٤. غير راض بالمرة</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٤. ما مدى رضاك عن هذه الخدمات؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q115:	<p>١. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية</p> <p>٢. منظمة إسلامية</p> <p>٣. منظمة غير حكومية محلية</p> <p>٤. حكومة عربية</p> <p>٥. منظمة عربية</p> <p>٦. الأونروا UNRWA</p> <p>٧. الصليب الأحمر</p> <p>٨. برنامج الغذاء العالمي</p> <p>٩. منظمة دولية أخرى</p> <p>١٠. أخرى (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٥. في حالة أن أحد أفراد اسرتك استفاد من خدمات علاج اختصاصية خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، أي من التالية كان مزود الخدمة؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q116:	<p>١. راض جدا</p> <p>٢. راض</p> <p>٣. غير راض</p> <p>٤. غير راض بالمرة</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٦. ما مدى رضاك عن هذه الخدمات؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q117:	<p>١. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية</p> <p>٢. منظمة إسلامية</p> <p>٣. منظمة غير حكومية محلية</p> <p>٤. حكومة عربية</p> <p>٥. منظمة عربية</p> <p>٦. الأونروا UNRWA</p> <p>٧. الصليب الأحمر</p> <p>٨. برنامج الغذاء العالمي</p> <p>٩. منظمة دولية أخرى</p> <p>١٠. أخرى (حدد) _____</p> <p>٨٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٧. في حالة أن أحد أفراد اسرتك استفاد من خدمات سيارة إسعاف خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، أي من التالية كان مزود الخدمة؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q118:	<p>١. راض جدا</p> <p>٢. راض</p> <p>٣. غير راض</p> <p>٤. غير راض بالمرة</p> <p>٨. لا ينطبق</p> <p>٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>١١٨. ما مدى رضاك عن هذه الخدمات؟</p> <p>(إختر إجابة واحدة فقط)</p>

Q119:	١. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية ٢. منظمة إسلامية ٣. منظمة غير حكومية محلية ٤. حكومة عربية ٥. منظمة عربية ٦. الأونروا UNRWA ٧. الصليب الأحمر ٨. برنامج الغذاء العالمي ٩. منظمة دولية أخرى ١٠. أخرى (حدد) _____ ٨٨. لا ينطبق ٩٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١١٩. في حالة أن أحد أفراد اسرتك استفاد من خدمات تعليمية (مدارس وجامعات) خلال السنة أشهر الماضية، أي من التالية كان مزود الخدمة؟ (أختر الإجابة الأهم)
Q120:	١. راض جدا ٢. راض ٣. غير راض ٤. غير راض بالمرّة ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٢٠. ما مدى رضاك عن هذه الخدمات؟

١٢١. برأيك، أي من التالية هي أهم حاجتان لإفراد أسرتك؟

الحاجة الثانية الأهم	الحاجة الأولى الأهم
١. العمل	١. العمل
٢. الغذاء	٢. الغذاء
٣. الصحة	٣. الصحة
٤. المساعدات المالية	٤. المساعدات المالية
٥. السكن وإعادة السكن	٥. السكن وإعادة السكن
٦. التعليم	٦. التعليم
Q121b:	Q121a:

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q122:	١. العمل ٢. الغذاء ٣. الصحة ٤. المساعدات المالية ٥. السكن وإعادة السكن ٦. التعليم ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٢٢. بالأخذ بعين الاعتبار المساعدات التي لم يتم الحصول عليها، برأيك أي من التالية هي المساعدة الأهم لإسرتك؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)

١٢٣. ماذا عن محيطك، أي من التالية يمكن أن تقول بأنّها أهم حاجتان؟

الحاجة الثانية الأهم	الحاجة الأولى الأهم
١. العمل	١. العمل
٢. الغذاء	٢. الغذاء
٣. الصحة	٣. الصحة
٤. المساعدات المالية	٤. المساعدات المالية
٥. السكن وإعادة السكن	٥. السكن وإعادة السكن
٦. التعليم	٦. التعليم
Q123b:	Q123a:

١٢٤. ما زلنا نسأل عن محيطك، أي من التالية أهم خدمتين يحتاجهما محيطك أو مجتمعك المحلي؟

الخدمة الثانية الأهم	الخدمة الأولى الأهم
١. شبكة مياه	١. شبكة مياه
٢. شبكة كهرباء	٢. شبكة كهرباء
٣. شبكة مجاري	٣. شبكة مجاري
٤. شبكة التخلص من النفايات الصلبة	٤. شبكة التخلص من النفايات الصلبة
Q124b:	Q124a:

	١. شبكة خط الهاتف الأرضي ٢. شبكة هاتف خلوي	١٢٥. ماذا عن خدمات الاتصال التالية، برأيك ما هي أهم خدمة يحتاجها محيطك؟
--	---	---



Q125:	٣. اتصال دائم مع الانترنت ٤. ستلايت ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	(أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
١٢٦. هل بيتك موصول أو يستقبل الخدمات التالية؟		
Q126-1:	١. نعم ٢. لا	١. شبكة مياه الشرب
Q126-2:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٢. بئر
Q126-3:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٣. شبكة كهرباء
Q126-4:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٤. شبكة مجاري
Q126-5:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٥. خدمات التخلص من النفايات الصلبة
Q126-6:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٦. شبكة خط الهاتف الأرضي
Q126-7:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٧. شبكة هاتف خلوي
Q126-8:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٨. اتصال دائم مع الانترنت
Q126-9:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٩. ستلايت
Q127:	٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٢٧. إذا لم تكن موصول بشبكة مياه الشرب، كم عدد تنكات المياه التي تحضرها لإسرتك يومياً؟
Q128:	٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٢٨. من هذه التنكات التي تجلبها معك يومياً لإسرتك، كم منها مياه للشرب؟
Q129:	١. كمية مياه أكبر ٢. نفس الكمية ٣. كمية مياه أقل ٨. لا ينطبق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٢٩. هل تعتقد أن أسرتك تحتاج إلى كمية مياه أكبر أم أقل، أم نفس الكمية من المياه التي يحضرها المنزل؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q130:	١. نعم، نملك مرحاض، بالوعة، وحفرة امتصاصية ٢. لا، نضطر لإستخدام المراحيض العامة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣٠. هل أسرتك تملك مرحاض، بالوعة، أو حفرة امتصاصية؟
Q131:	١. نعم، أنا لاجئ أو أنحدر من عائلة لاجئة ٢. لا، لم تكن أبداً نازحين ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣١. هل أنت لاجئ أو منحدر من عائلة لاجئة؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q132:	١. لم اذهب إلى المدرسة مطلقاً ٢. حتى ابتدائي ٣. حتى اعدادي ٤. حتى ثانوي ٥. بعض جامعي ٦. جامعي وفوق ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣٢. ما هو مستواك التعليمي؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q133:	١. أعزب ٢. متزوج ٣. مطلق ٤. أرمل ٩. لا جواب	١٣٣. ما هو وضعك الاجتماعي؟
١٣٤. خلال الستة أشهر الماضية، هل أسرتك استخدمت/أو حصلت على التالي من أجل أن تتغلب على الضيق؟		
Q134-1:	١. نعم ٢. لا	١. نحصل على مساعدة من عائلة وأصدقاء يعيشون في الخارج
Q134-2:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٢. نحصل على مساعدة من عائلة وأصدقاء يعيشون في فلسطين وإسرائيل
Q134-3:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٣. نستخدم مدخراتنا
Q134-4:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٤. نقوم ببيع ممتلكات عقارية
Q134-5:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٥. نقوم بزراعة الأرض
Q134-6:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٦. معظم أعضاء الأسرة فوق سن ١٨ سنة ذهبوا إلى سوق العمل
Q134-7:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٧. معظم أعضاء الأسرة أقل من سن ١٨ ذهبوا إلى سوق العمل
Q134-8:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٨. لا ندفع بعض الفواتير (مياه، كهرباء...الخ)
Q134-9:	١. نعم ٢. لا	٩. نقلل من المصاريف
Q134-10:	١. نعم ٢. لا	١٠. نقوم ببيع المجوهرات/الذهب

Q134-11:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١١. نشترى بالدين
Q134-12:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١٢. نقل من كمية الأغذية
Q134-13:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١٣. نقل من نوعية وجودة الأغذية
Q134-14:	٢. لا	١. نعم	١٤. انتقلنا من مكان إقامتنا إلى مدينة أو قرية أخرى

Q135:	١. استراتيجيات التغلب على الضيق هذه ما زالت متوفرة ٢. استراتيجيات التغلب على الضيق سوف تستنزف قريباً ٣. استراتيجيات التغلب على الضيق استنزفت أصلاً ٤. استراتيجيات التغلب على الضيق لم تكن متوفرة منذ البداية ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣٥. من الاستراتيجيات المذكورة أعلاه، للتغلب على الضيق، هل يمكن القول بأن هذه الطرق ما زالت متوفرة في أسرتك، سوف تستنزف قريباً، استنزفت أصلاً، أو لم تكن متوفرة منذ البداية؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q136:		١٣٦. أي من التنظيمات السياسية أو الدينية تثق بها أكثر؟ (أذكر الأهم فقط)
Q137:		١٣٧. أي من الشخصيات السياسية أو الدينية تثق بها أكثر؟ (أذكر الأهم فقط)
Q138:	١. أؤيد بشدة ٢. أؤيد ٣. أعارض ٤. أعارض بشدة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣٨. من المتوقع حدوث انتخابات رئاسية ووطنية قريباً في المناطق الفلسطينية، هل تؤيد إجراء هذه الانتخابات في الظروف الراهنة؟

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q139:	١. أؤيدها بشدة ٢. أؤيدها ٣. لا أؤيدها ٤. لا أؤيدها بشدة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٣٩. هل تؤيد الطريقة التي يقود به ياسر عرفات المناطق تحت سيطرة السلطة الفلسطينية؟
Q140:	١. أؤيد بشدة ٢. أؤيد ٣. لا أؤيد ٤. لا أؤيد بشدة ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٤٠. البعض يقول بأن استقالة الرئيس ياسر عرفات سوف تخدم المصلحة الفلسطينية. ما هي وجهة نظرك بهذا الخصوص؟

١٤١. بالنظر إلى السلطة الفلسطينية، ما هي أهم قضيتان تشغلك أكثر؟

القضية الأولى التي تشغلك أكثر	القضية الثانية التي تشغلك أكثر
١. نقص في الموارد المالية	١. نقص في الموارد المالية
٢. محاباة الأقارب في التوظيف / الوساطة	٢. محاباة الأقارب في التوظيف / الوساطة
٣. عدم الكفاءة وسوء إدارة	٣. عدم الكفاءة وسوء إدارة
٤. عدم المقدرة على التعامل مع المشاكل الأمنية الداخلية	٤. عدم المقدرة على التعامل مع المشاكل الأمنية الداخلية
٥. عدم المقدرة على المحافظة على النظام العام	٥. عدم المقدرة على المحافظة على النظام العام
٦. نقص في الديمقراطية	٦. نقص في الديمقراطية
٧. نقص في الشفافية/المحاسبة	٧. نقص في الشفافية/المحاسبة
٨. نقص في حقوق الإنسان	٨. نقص في حقوق الإنسان
٩. عدم المقدرة على التعامل مع الاسلحة الغير مرخصة	٩. عدم المقدرة على التعامل مع الاسلحة الغير مرخصة
Q141b:	Q141a:

Q142:	١. لم أسمع عن أي إصلاحات ٢. الإصلاحات باعتقادي هي إصلاحات حقيقية ٣. الإصلاحات بالإسم فقط ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٤٢. ما هو رأيك بالإصلاح في داخل السلطة الفلسطينية؟
Q143:	١. نعم، كثيراً ٢. نعم، لكن نادراً ٣. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٤٣. هل قمت أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك بدفع رشوة لأحد المسؤولين الفلسطينيين مقابل خدمات محددة؟
	١. نعم، كثيراً	١٤٤. هل سمعت عن أحد قام بدفع رشوة لأحد الفلسطينيين

المسؤولين مقابل خدمات؟	٢. نعم، لكن نادراً ٣. لا ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q144:
١٤٥. ماذا عن الفساد في السلطة الفلسطينية، هل تقول بأنك:	١. لا تعتقد بوجود فساد في السلطة الفلسطينية ٢. لست متأكد لكنك سمعت عن ذلك من مصادر موثوقة ٣. لست متأكد لكنك سمعت من الناس ٤. أنت متأكد من وجودها ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q145:
١٤٦. منذ بداية الانتفاضة الثانية، هل تعتقد بأن الوضع بشكل عام:	١. تحسن ٢. بقي على ما هو عليه ٣. أصبح أسوأ ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q146:
١٤٧. في حالة حدوث انتخابات البلدية / المجلس القروي قبل التوصل إلى تسوية سلمية، هل على مخيمات اللاجئين:	١. المشاركة في انتخابات البلدية / المجلس القروي ٢. القيام بانتخابات منفصلة على صعيد المخيم ٣. عدم المشاركة في أي من الانتخابات المحلية ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q147:

السؤال	الجواب	Code
١٤٨. كيف تقيم أهمية خدمات لجان المخيمات والمؤسسات الشعبية الأخرى التي تعمل لمنفعة مخيم اللاجئين؟	١. جيد جداً (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٠) ٢. جيد (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٠) ٣. سيء ٤. سيء جداً ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q148:
١٤٩. في حال أنك أجبت على السؤال السابق بأنه "سيء" أو "سيء جداً"، برأيك ما هو السبب الرئيسي لهذه الإجابة؟	١. قلة الدعم المادي ٢. قلة الخبرة ٣. قلة العاملين ٤. الفساد ٥. قلة التعاون التقني مع وكالة الغوث للاجئين UNRWA وغيرها من الهيئات ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q149:
١٥٠. بشكل عام ماذا تشعر حيال السلام، هل تؤيد تسوية سلمية مع إسرائيل أم تعارضها؟	١. أؤيد تسوية سلمية مع إسرائيل ٢. أعارض تسوية سلمية مع إسرائيل ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q150:
١٥١. هل تؤيد خطة الفصل احادية الجانب من قطاع غزة؟	١. أؤيدها بشدة ٢. أؤيدها ٣. أعارضها ٤. أعارضها بشدة ٥. لا أعرف الكثير حتى أقرر ٦. لم أسمع بها ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q151:
١٥٢. هل تؤيد خارطة الطريق؟	١. أؤيدها بشدة ٢. أؤيدها ٣. أعارضها ٤. أعارضها بشدة ٥. لا أعرف الكثير حتى أقرر ٦. لم أسمع بها ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	Q152:
١٥٣. هل تؤيد خطة نسيبه-آيلون؟	١. أؤيدها بشدة ٢. أؤيدها ٣. أعارضها ٤. أعارضها بشدة ٥. لا أعرف الكثير حتى أقرر ٦. لم أسمع بها	

Q153:	٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٥٤. هل تؤيد مبادرة جنيف؟
Q154:	١. أويدها بشدة ٢. أويدها ٣. أعارضها (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٦) ٤. أعارضها بشدة (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٦) ٥. لا أعرف الكثير حتى أقرر (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٧) ٦. لم أسمع بها (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٨) ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب (انتقل إلى سؤال ١٥٨)	١٥٥. لماذا تؤيد مبادرة جنيف؟ (إعط إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q155:		١٥٦. لماذا تعارض مبادرة جنيف؟ (إعط إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q156:		

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q157:	١. راديو فلسطين ٢. تلفزيون فلسطين ٣. جريدة القدس ٤. جريدة الأيام ٥. جريدة الحياة الجديدة ٦. الصحافة الأجنبية ٧. الجامع / القادة الدينيين ٨. منظمة سياسية أو دينية ٩. أصدقاء وأقارب ١٠. محطة الجزيرة ١١. محطة العربية ١٢. محطة أبو ظبي ١٣. محطة المنار ١٤. نشرة في البريد / إعلانات ١٥. غيرها (حدد):	١٥٧. في أي من التالية أول مرة سمعت بها عن مبادرة جنيف؟ (أختر الإجابة الأهم فقط)
Q158:	١. جزء من القدس ٢. ٥ - ١٠% من أراضي الضفة الغربية ٣. حق العودة للاجئين ٤. سيطرة الفلسطينيين على المعابر ٥. عليها التخلي عن أي شيء إذا كان هذا سيؤدي إلى إنهاء الاحتلال ٦. عليهم عدم التخلي عن أي شيء من حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني حتى لو بقي الاحتلال ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٥٨. برأيك، ما هو الذي على القيادة الفلسطينية التخلي عنه مقابل دولة فلسطينية قابلة للتطبيق على الأرض التي أحتلت من قبل إسرائيل عام ١٩٦٧؟ (أختر إجابة واحدة فقط)
Q159:	١. نعم وبدون تحفظات ٢. نعم، ولكن تحت شروط معينة ٣. لا، لا أوافق على تدخل قوات فصل دولية ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٥٩. كجزء من عملية السلام، هل توافق على تدخل قوات فصل دولية مؤقتة في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة؟
Q160:	١. إنهاء الاحتلال ٢. إنهاء العنف من كلا الطرفين ٣. فقط تضمن الأمن الشخصي ٤. لا يمكن أن تحقق شيء ٩. لا أعرف / لا جواب	١٦٠. في حال وجود قوات فصل دولية مؤقتة، من من التالي تعتقد أن مثل هذا الوجود يمكن أن يحقق؟

١٦١. ما هو أهم مصدر للمعلومات الذي تثق به أكثر وما هو المصدر الثاني؟

أهم مصدر للمعلومات	ثاني أهم مصدر للمعلومات
١. راديو فلسطين	١. راديو فلسطين
٢. تلفزيون فلسطين	٢. تلفزيون فلسطين
٣. جريدة القدس	٣. جريدة القدس

٤. جريدة الأيام	٤. جريدة الأيام
٥. جريدة الحياة الجديدة	٥. جريدة الحياة الجديدة
٦. الجامع / القادة الدينيين	٦. الجامع / القادة الدينيين
٧. التنظيم السياسي أو الديني الذي أثق به أكثر	٧. التنظيم السياسي أو الديني الذي أثق به أكثر
٨. أصدقاء وأقارب	٨. أصدقاء وأقارب
٩. محطة تلفزيون الجزيرة	٩. محطة تلفزيون الجزيرة
١٠. محطة تلفزيون العربية	١٠. محطة تلفزيون العربية
١١. محطة تلفزيون أبو ظبي	١١. محطة تلفزيون أبو ظبي
١٢. محطة تلفزيون المنار	١٢. محطة تلفزيون المنار
<b>Q161b:</b>	<b>Q161a:</b>

Code	الجواب	السؤال
<b>Q162:</b>	١. مدينة ٢. قرية ٣. مخيم للاجئين	١٦٢. منطقة سكن المقيم؟
<b>Q163:</b>	١. منطقة جنين ٢. منطقة طوباس ٣. منطقة نابلس ٤. منطقة سلفيت ٥. منطقة قلقيلية ٦. منطقة طولكرم ٧. منطقة رام الله ٨. منطقة القدس ٩. منطقة أريحا ١٠. منطقة بيت لحم ١١. منطقة الخليل ١٢. منطقة شمال غزة ١٣. منطقة غزة المدينة ١٤. منطقة رفح ١٥. منطقة دير البلح ١٦. منطقة خان يونس	١٦٣. المحافظة التي يسكن فيها المقيم / المستطلع؟
<b>Q164:</b>		١٦٤. أسم منطقة السكن؟
<b>Q165:</b>	١. مسلم      ٢. مسيحي      ٣. غير ذلك	١٦٥. الديانة؟
<b>Q166:</b>		١٦٦. مدة المقابلة (بالدقائق)؟

## NOTES



## NOTES

## NOTES

## NOTES

