


August  
2004  
Report

# PALESTINIAN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REPORT VII





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# THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL & LOCAL AID DURING THE SECOND INTIFADA

## Report VII

An Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion  
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip  
on their Living Conditions

(August 2003 - February 2004)

Polls for this study were conducted in cooperation with  
the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre(JMCC)

*Geneva, September 2004*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF FIGURES .....	6
FOREWORD & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	20
LIST OF ACRONYMS .....	22
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	24
OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY	32
Objectives .....	32
Methodology .....	34
<b>1 MOBILITY &amp; SECURITY CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION .....</b>	<b>38</b>
1.1 Security assessment .....	39
1.2 Casualties .....	40
1.3 Damage to property and land confiscation .....	42
1.4 The impact of closures and mobility restrictions on livelihood .....	44
1.5 The Wall and mobility: local and regional impacts .....	50
<b>2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS .....</b>	<b>56</b>
2.1 Main results .....	56
2.2 Business environment .....	58
2.3 Poverty: Current situation and trends .....	62
2.4 Poverty and coping strategies .....	74
<b>3 LABOR MARKET .....</b>	<b>82</b>
3.1 Main results .....	82
3.2 The evolution of the labor market .....	85
3.4 Types of occupation and employer .....	95
3.5 Employment and risk of poverty .....	97
<b>4 ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL .....</b>	<b>102</b>
4.1 Assistance distribution .....	103
4.2 The value of the assistance delivered .....	109
4.3 Nature of assistance delivered .....	113
4.4 Employment assistance .....	119
4.5 Sources of assistance .....	123
<b>5 THE IMPACT OF AID &amp; PALESTINIANS' PERCEPTIONS .....</b>	<b>128</b>
5.1 Individual needs for assistance .....	128
5.2 Palestinians' priorities for their household .....	131
5.3 Palestinians' priorities for the community .....	136



## February 2004 Surveys

5.4 Satisfaction with assistance provided .....	141
<b>6 FOOD .....</b>	<b>148</b>
6.1 Need for food .....	149
6.2 Change in household food consumption .....	151
6.3 Change in household food consumption according to poverty .....	151
6.4 The most needed food items in the household .....	153
6.5 The most needed food items in the household, according to poverty .....	153
6.6 Source of food .....	154
6.7 Primary source of food, according to the poverty level .....	154
6.8 Primary source of food, according to refugee status .....	155
6.9 Primary source of food, according to region .....	155
6.10 Primary source of food, according to the Wall .....	156
6.11 Food assistance .....	156
6.12 Source of food assistance .....	158
6.13 Frequency of food assistance .....	161
6.14 Attitudes towards food assistance .....	163
6.15 Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution .....	164
6.16 Level of satisfaction with food assistance .....	165
6.17 Value of assistance .....	167
<b>7 HEALTH &amp; EDUCATION .....</b>	<b>170</b>
7.1 Health and education in general .....	170
7.2 Health .....	171
7.3 Education .....	204
<b>8 WOMEN &amp; CHILDREN .....</b>	<b>212</b>
8.1 Impact of the Intifada on women .....	212
8.2 Women and employment .....	213
8.3 Impact of the Intifada on children .....	220
8.4 Children and the Intifada .....	226
<b>9 REFUGEES &amp; UNRWA .....</b>	<b>234</b>
9.1 Socio-economic conditions of the refugees .....	235
9.2. Socio-economic assistance and refugee status .....	243
<b>10 POLITICS &amp; GOVERNMENT .....</b>	<b>256</b>
10.1 Trust in Palestinian political factions .....	258
10.2 Trust in Palestinian political leadership .....	265
10.3 Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority .....	269
10.4 Attitudes towards Palestinian local government .....	275
10.5 Attitudes towards the future direction of the Palestinian state .....	287
10.6 Trust in media .....	291
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>ANNEXES .....</b>	<b>299</b>
Tables of Variables .....	299
English Questionnaire .....	305
Arabic Questionnaire .....	321



# TABLE OF FIGURES

	<b>OBJECTIVES &amp; METHODOLOGY</b>	<b>24</b>
	Figure 0-1: Place of residence (place) ...	27
	Figure 0-2: Refugee status (o002 & o004) .....	28
	Figure 0-3: Place of residence (place) by refugee status (o002) .....	28
	Figure 0-4: Poverty level (poverty3) .....	29
	<b>1 MOBILITY &amp; SECURITY</b>	
	<b>CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION</b> .....	<b>30</b>
	Figure 1-1: Percentage of the population who feels insecure (o118) by region, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	31
	Figure 1-2: Number of Palestinians killed, January 2003 - February 2004 .....	32
	Figure 1-3: Causes of injuries, August 2003 - February 2004 .....	33
	Figure 1-4: Number of Palestinians killed and injured according to region, August 2003 - February 2004 .....	34
	Figure 1-5: Mobility Restrictions in the West Bank .....	39
	Figure 1-6: Percentage of time under curfew, according to West Bank municipality, June 2002 - February 2004 .....	40
	Figure 1-7: Impact of mobility restrictions (o032), July 2003 - January 2004 .....	40
	Figure 1-8: Impact of mobility restrictions (o032) by area of residence .....	41
	Figure 1-9: Physical access to place of work (o114) according to region of residence .....	41
	Figure 1-10: Impact of mobility restrictions on economic activity: changes in employment status (o013) and difficulties faced by businesses (o140) ....	42
	Figure 1-11: Concern over the Wall (o165) by region .....	44
	Figure 1-12: Feeling of security (o118) by Wall .....	45
	Figure 1-13: Problems of mobility (o031, o114, o140e, o113a, o102b) according to the Wall .....	46
	Figure 1-14: Percentage of the population who report various problems created by the Wall (o164) .....	46
	Figure 1-15: Preferred area for emigration, December 2001 - February 2004 .....	47
	<b>2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS</b> .....	<b>48</b>
	Figure 2-1: Business decline due to inability to market products to areas (o140a) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	51
	Figure 2-2: Business decline due to difficulties in buying raw materials or products (o140b) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	51
	Figure 2-3: Business decline due to problems in reaching the workplace (o140c) according to places of residence .....	52
	Figure 2-4: Business suffered due to inability to work because of curfews (o140e) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	52
	Figure 2-5: The Wall: difficulties in operating business in the agriculture sector (o164) .....	53



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure2- 6: Business suffered due to damage to agriculture lands (o140f) according to place of residence .....	54
Figure 2-7: Evolution of poverty, 2002-2004 .....	54
Figure 2-8: Poverty according to region of residence .....	55
Figure 2-9: Poverty according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	55
Figure 2-10: Poverty according to area of residence .....	56
Figure 2-11 : Poverty in areas crossed by the Wall .....	57
Figure 2-12: Poverty according to refugee status, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	57
Figure 2-13: Poverty according to level of education .....	58
Figure 2-14: Household income evolution (o108), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	58
Figure 2-15: Household income evolution (o108) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	59
Figure 2-16: Household income in the past 6 months (o108), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	60
Figure 2-17: Household income evolution in the past 6 months (o108) according to poverty .....	60
Figure 2-18: Main cause of income decline (o109), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	60
Figure 2-19: Main cause of income decline (o109) according to poverty .....	61
Figure 2-20: Main cause of income decline (o109) according to place of residence ..	61
Figure 2-21: The average amount needed by the household to meet basic needs (o040) according to region of residence .....	62
Figure 2-22: How household income compares to what is required to supply basic needs (o041), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	63
Figure 2-23: How household income compares to what is required to supply basic needs (o041) by place of residence .....	63
Figure 2-24: Perception of household's financial situation (o128) .....	64
Figure 2- 25: Perception of household's financial situation (0128) according to poverty .....	65
Figure 2-26: Perception of household's financial situation (o128) according to place of residence .....	65
Figure2- 27: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to place of residence .....	67
Figure 2-28: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to poverty .....	67
Figure 2-30: Available means of relieving the hardship (o177) according to poverty ..	68
Figure 2-31: Main coping strategies for managing the hardship (o131) .....	68
Figure 2-32: Reducing expenses to cope with material deprivation (o131h) according to place of residence .....	69
Figure 2-33: Using past savings to cope with material deprivation (o131b) according to place of residence .....	69
Figure 2-34: Using past savings to cope with material deprivation (o131b) according to poverty .....	70
Figure 2-35: Buying on credit to relieve the hardship (o131j) according to place of residence .....	70
Figure 2-36: Not paying bills (water, electricity, etc.) (o131g) to relieve the hardship, according to place of residence .....	70
Figure 2-37: Cultivating land to relieve the hardship (o131d) according to place of residence .....	71
Figure 2-38: Selling jewelry/gold to relieve the hardship (o131i) according to place of residence .....	71
Figure 2-39: More adult going into the labor market to relieve the hardship (o131e) according to poverty .....	72



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 2-40: More children going into the labor market to relieve the hardship (o131f) according to poverty .....	72
Figure 2-41: Receiving assistance from family and friends (o163e, o163f) according to poverty .....	73
<b>3 LABOR MARKET .....</b>	<b>74</b>
Figure 3-3: Tried to find a job if unemployed (o014) according to place of residence .	78
Figure 3-1 Employment conditions in the labor force (o008), 2002-2004 .....	78
Figure 3-2: Current conditions in employment status (o008), July 2003 - February 2004 (o008) .....	78
Figure 3-4: Employment conditions of the labor force (o008) according to place of residence .....	79
Figure 3-5: Employment conditions in the labor force (o008) according to refugee status, July 2003 – February 2004 .....	80
Figure 3-6: Employment conditions among the labor force (o008) according to education .....	81
Figure 3-7: Employment conditions in the labor force (o008) according to age .....	81
Figure 3-8: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner .....	81
Figure 3-9: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner (o100) according to place of residence .....	82
Figure 3-10: Change in employment situation over the last six months (o012) .....	82
Figure 3-11: Change in employment situation over the last six months, in areas crossed by the Wall (o012) .....	83
Figure 3-12: Change in employment status over the past six months (o012) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	83
Figure 3-13: Main cause of job change related to the current situation (o013) .....	84
Figure 3-14: Main cause of change in employment status (o013) according to place of residence .....	84
Figure 3-15: Ability to go to work over the last six months (O114) .....	85
Figure 3-16: Ability to go to work over the last six months (o114) in the area crossed by the Wall .....	85
Figure 3-17: Wall as obstacle to job access (o164c) according to region and area of residence .....	85
Figure 3-18: Ability to go to work over the last six months (o114) according to place of residence .....	86
Figure 3-19: Ability to cultivate land over the last six months (o0115) according to region of residence .....	86
Figure 3-20: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) .....	87
Figure 3-21: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) according to place of residence .....	87
Figure 3-22: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) according to level of education .....	88
Figure 3-23: Type of employer (o063) .....	88
Figure 3-24: Type of employer (o063) according to area of residence .....	89
Figure 3-25: Risk of poverty according to employment status (o008) .....	89
Figure 3-26: Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100) according to poverty .....	90
Figure 3-27: Risk of poverty according to place (or most recent place) of work (o011) .....	90
Figure 3-28: Risk of poverty according to the type of employer (o063) .....	91





## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 3-30: Respondents reporting a salary from a long-term job in their household (o163a) according to .....	92
Figure 3-29: Risk of poverty according to receipt of salary (o099) .....	92
Figure 3-31: Respondents reporting a salary from a short-term job in their household (o163b) .....	93
according to poverty level .....	93
<b>4 ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL .....</b>	<b>94</b>
Figure 4-1: Yearly average international support for Palestine by type, average 2001-2003 .....	95
Figure 4-2: Assistance received during the past six months (o035) in general and by place of residence, 2001 - 2004 .....	96
Figure 4-2: Assistance received during the past six months (o035) in general and by place of residence, 2001 - 2004 .....	96
Figure 4-3: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by region, 2001-2004 .....	97
Figure 4-4: Percentage of the total population who received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada (o035b) .....	97
and during .....	97
the past six months (o035) .....	97
Figure 4-5: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by area of residence, 2001-2004 .....	98
Figure 4-6: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o035), by wall and by poverty, 2001-2004 .....	99
Figure 4-7: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o035), .....	99
by poverty level, 2001-2004 .....	99
Figure 4-8: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by refugee status and poverty level, 2002-2004 .....	100
Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by place of residence .....	100
Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by place of residence .....	101
Figure 4-10: Median value of the assistance received .....	102
by type (o036), 2001 - 2004 .....	102
Figure 4-12: Distribution of the value of assistance (o036) and of levels of poverty .	104
Figure 4-11 Median value of assistance received .....	104
in general (o036v) by poverty, 2001-2004 .....	104
Figure 4-13: Types of assistance as reported by the interviewed (o036a, o036b) .....	106
Figure 4-14: Type of assistance received (o036), 2001-2004 .....	107
Figure 4-16: Type of assistance received (o036) according to area of residence .....	108
Figure 4-15: Type of assistance received (o036) .....	108
according to place of residence .....	108
Figure 4-17: Type of assistance received (o036) according to refugee status .....	109
Figure 4-18: Type of assistance received (o036) according to poverty .....	109
Figure 4-19: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) and personally (o024), 2001 - 2004 .....	111



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 4-20: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) by place of residence, November 2002 - February .....	112
Figure 4-21: Types of personal (o024) and household (o026) employment assistance, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	112
Figure 4-22: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) in general and by place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	113
Figure 4-23: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) by poverty .....	114
Figure 4.24 Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) by education .....	114
Figure 4-25: Main sources of the assistance received (o036t), 2001 - 2004 .....	115
Figure 4-26: Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	116
Figure 4-27: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main sources of assistance (o036t) by poverty .....	117
Figure 4-28: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main sources of assistance .... (o036t) by region .....	118
Figure 4-29: Composition of the beneficiaries of main sources of assistance (o036t) by area .....	118
Figure 4-30: Composition of the beneficiaries of main sources of assistance (o036t) by refugee status .....	119
<b>5 THE IMPACT OF AID &amp; PALESTINIANS' PERCEPTIONS .....</b>	<b>120</b>
Figure 5-1: Need for assistance (o38r), 2001 - 2004 .....	121
Figure 5-2: Need of assistance (o38r) according to poverty, 2001 - 2004 .....	121
Figure 5-3: Need of assistance for those who did not receive it (o38r) according to refugee status, 2001 - 2004 .....	121
Figure 5-4: Need of assistance (o38r) according to place of residence .....	122
Figure 5-5: Need of assistance for those who did not receive it (o38r) according to place of residence and level of poverty1 .....	123
Figure 5-6: Assistance priorities for the household (o079) of those who receive or need assistance, July 2003- February 2004 .....	124
Figure 5-7: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance by level of poverty .....	125
Figure 5-8: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to area of residence .....	126
Figure 5-9: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to region of residence .....	127
Figure 5-10: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to whether the area is crossed by the Wall or not .....	127
Figure 5-11: Priorities for the community (o080), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	128
Figure 5-12: Priorities for the community (o80) according to area of residence .....	129
Figure 5-13: Priorities for the community (o080) according to region of residence ..	130
Figure 5-14: Priorities for the community (o080) according to level of poverty .....	130
Figure 5-15: Connection to infrastructure networks (o174) .....	131
Figure 5-16: Infrastructure priorities for the community (o124) .....	131
Table 5-1: Connection to the infrastructure networks (o174) by place of residence .....	132
Table 5-2: First priority for infrastructure assistance (o124) by place of residence .....	132



## February 2004 Surveys

Table 5-3: First & second priorities for infrastructure assistance (o124) by place of residence .....	132
Figure 5-17: Satisfaction with the assistance provided (o037), 2001 - 2004 .....	134
Figure 5-18: Satisfaction with assistance provided (o37) according to level of poverty . .....	135
Figure 5-19: Reasons for dissatisfaction with the provided assistance (o123) in general and according to place of residence and poverty .....	135
Figure 5-20: Satisfaction with food, financial and in-kind assistance (o036) 1 .....	136
Figure 5-21: Satisfaction with food assistance (o36) by level of poverty .....	136
Figure 5-22: Satisfaction with employment assistance (o101) 2002 - 2004 .....	137
Figure 5-23: Reason for dissatisfaction with employment assistance (o120) in general, according to region and refugee status, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	138
6 FOOD .....	140
Figure 6-1: The two most important needs of Palestinian households (o079), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	140
Figure 6-2: Most important unmet need of Palestinian households (o180), in general and by poverty, refugee status, area and place of residence .....	141
Figure 6-3: The two most important needs of the community .....	142
Figure 6-4: Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty, education, age, and refugee status .....	142
Figure 6-5: Need for food (o180) according to region, area, place of residence, and the Wall .....	142
Figure 6-6: Change in the consumption of various food items in the household (o081), July 2003 - February 2004 .....	143
Figure 6-7: Change in consumption of dairy products and meat (o081) according to the poverty level .....	144
Figure 6-8: Change in consumption of dairy products and meat (o081) according to Wall .....	144
Figure 6-9: Most important household food need (o107) .....	145
Figure 6-10: Most important household need (o107) according to poverty level .....	145
Figure 6-11: Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077) .....	146
Figure 6-12: Primary source of food (o077) according to the poverty level .....	147
Figure 6-13: Primary source of food (o077) according to refugee status .....	147
Figure 6-14: Primary source of food (o077) according to region .....	147
Figure 6-15: Source of food (o077) according to the Wall .....	148
Figure 6-16: Proportion of food assistance compared to the overall assistance provided (o035, o036) .....	148
Figure 6-17: Food distribution (o036) according to area and region of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 .....	149
Figure 6-18: Food distribution (o036) according to place of residence: first and second types of assistance .....	149
Figure 6-19: Food distribution (o036) according to district .....	149
Figure 6-20: Food distribution (o036) according to poverty, July 2003 and February 2004 150	150
Figure 6-21: Providers of food assistance (o036) .....	151
Figure 6-22: Food distribution (o036) according to source and poverty .....	151



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 6-23: Food distribution (o036) according to source and refugee status .....	152
Figure 6-24: Food distribution (o036) according to source and region .....	153
Figure 6-25: Food distribution (o036) according to source and area of residence .....	153
Figure 6-26: Food distribution (o036) according to source and place of residence ..	153
Figure 6-27: Frequency of food distribution (o074) .....	154
Figure 6-28: Frequency of food distribution (o074) by source of food assistance ....	154
Figure 6-29: Frequency of food distribution (o074) according to region of residence ...	154
Figure 6-30: Frequency of food distribution (o074) according to area of residence ..	155
Figure 6-31: Main benefit from food assistance (o173) .....	155
Figure 6-32: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to region, area and place of residence .....	156
Figure 6-33: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to poverty and source of food assistance .....	157
Figure 6-34: Level of satisfaction with food assistance .....	157
Figure 6-35: Level of satisfaction with food assistance, according to food assistance provider .....	158
Figure 6-36: Level of satisfaction with food assistance, according to refugee status and area of residence .....	158
Figure 6-37: Level of satisfaction with food assistance according to poverty level ..	158
Figure 6-38: Average value and median of food assistance according to place, region, and area of residence .....	159
Figure 6-39: Average and median value of food assistance, according to poverty and refugee status .....	160
Figure 6-40: Average value and median of food assistance, according to source of food assistance .....	160
Figure 6-41: Perceptions about the targeting of food assistance (o166) .....	161
<b>7 HEALTH &amp; EDUCATION .....</b>	<b>162</b>
Figure 7-1: The two most important needs of the household (o079) .....	162
Figure 7-2: The most important unmet need of the household (o180) .....	162
Table 7-1: Effect of the construction of the Wall on access to basic services such as education or health (o164f) .....	163
Figure 7-3: The two most important needs of the community (o080) .....	163
Table 7-4: The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168) in general and according to region and area of residence .....	164
Figure 7-5: The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168) according to poverty level, educational level and Wall .....	164
Figure 7-6: Drugs prescribed and provided for chronic or acute problems over the past six months in general (o169a1, o169a2, o169b1, o169b2) .....	165
Figure 7-7: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the past six months (o169a) according to area of residence, refugee status and Wall .....	165
Figure 7-8: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the past six months (o169a) according to poverty level and age .....	165
Figure 7-9: Drugs provided for acute problems in the past six months (o169b) according to area of residence, Wall, poverty level and age .....	166
Figure 7-10: Drugs prescribed for chronic problems over the past six months (o169a) according to region of residence, poverty level and age .....	166
Figure 7-11: Drugs provided for chronic problems over the past six months (o169b) according to poverty level and age .....	167



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 7-12: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) in general, according to region of residence and Wall .....	167
Figure 7-13: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) according to area of residence, refugee status and place of residence .....	168
Figure 7-14: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) according to poverty level and educational level .....	168
Figure 7-15: Type of medical care needed in the past six months (o102) .....	168
Figure 7-16: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them (o172) in general and according to region of residence .....	169
Figure 7-17: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them (o172) according to refugee status and level of poverty .....	171
Figure 7-18: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six months (o102h) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	170
Figure 7-19: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six months (o102h) according to area of residence and Wall .....	172
Figure 7-20: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months (o102g) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	173
Figure 7-21: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months (o102g) according to area of residence and Wall .....	172
Figure 7-22: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102b) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	173
Figure 7-23: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102b) according to area of residence and Wall .....	175
Figure 7-24: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102c) in general, according to region .....	175
Figure 7-25: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102c) according to area of residence and Wall .....	174
Figure 7-26: Restrictions on the provision of vaccinations in the past six months (o102d) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	175
Figure 7-27: Restrictions on the provision of vaccinations in the past six months (o102d) according to area of residence and Wall of residence and poverty level .....	175
Figure 7-28: Restrictions on the provision of family planning in the past six months (o102f) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	176
Figure 7-29: Restrictions on the provision of family planning in the past six months (o102f) according to area of residence and Wall .....	176
Figure 7-30: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care in the past six months (o102e) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	177
Figure 7-31: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care in the past six months (o102e) according to area of residence and Wall .....	177
Figure 7-32: Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102i) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level .....	178
Figure 7-33: Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102i) according to area of residence and Wall .....	178
Figure 7-34: Restrictions on the delivery of health care for a sick child in the past six months (o102j) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level.....	178
Figure 7-35: Restrictions on the delivery of health care for a sick child in the past six months (o102j) according to area of residence and Wall.....	178



Figure 7-36: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the past six months (o102k) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level .....	180
Figure 7-37: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care over the past six months (o102k) according to area of residence and Wall .....	180
Table 7-2: Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o102l) .....	180
Figure 7-38: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six months (o102m) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level .....	180
Figure 7-39: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six months (o102m) according to area of residence and Wall .....	181
Figure 7-40: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167) in general and according to region of residence .....	182
Figure 7-41: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167) according to area of residence and Wall .....	182
Figure 7-42: Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the following services in the past six months (0126) .....	182
Figure 7-43: Providers of hospital services (o126as) in the past six months, in general and according to place of residence .....	183
Figure 7-44: Level of satisfaction with medication services in the past six months (o126b) in general and according to region and area of residence, refugee status and poverty level .....	184
Figure 7-45: Providers of medication services in the past six months (o126bs) in general and according to place of residence .....	187
Table 7-3: Level of satisfaction with hospital services (o126a) in the past six months ... ..	185
Figure 7-46: Level of satisfaction with primary health care services (o126g) in the past six months (o126b) in general and according to region of residence, poverty level, and the Wall .....	186
Figure 7-47: Providers of primary health care services in the past six months (o126gs) in general and according to place of residence .....	187
Figure 7-48: Level of satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services (o126h) .....	188
Figure 7-49: Provision of physical rehabilitation services over the past six months (o126hs) in general and according to refugee status .....	189
Figure 7-50: Level of satisfaction with specialized care services (o126i) in general, according to region and poverty level .....	191
Figure 7-51: Providers of specialized care over the past six months (o126is) in general and according to place of residence .....	190
Figure 7-52: Level of satisfaction with ambulance services (o126j) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level .....	191
Figure 7-53: Providers of ambulance services over the past six months. (o126js) in general and according to place of residence .....	192
Figure 7-54: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and according to area of residence (excluding Jerusalem respondents) .....	193
Figure 7-55: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and according to region of residence and Wall (excluding Jerusalem respondents) .....	194
Table 7-4: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to household income level (excluding Jerusalem respondents) (o057v3) .....	194
Figure 7-56: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to poverty level (excluding Jerusalem) .....	195



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 7-57: Sources of health coverage (o089) for hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem) .....	197
Figure 7-58: Level of satisfaction with school services in the past six months (o126c) in general and according to region of residence .....	196
Figure 7-59: Providers of schools in the past six months (o126cs) in general and according to place of residence .....	197
Figure 7-60: Educational attainment (o056 and educ) .....	198
Figure 7-61: Educational attainment according to gender .....	198
Figure 7-62: Educational attainment according to refugee status .....	198
Figure 7-63: Educational attainment according to region and area of residence .....	199
Table 7-5: Educational attainment according to poverty level .....	200
Table 7-6: Educational attainment and change in the employment situation (o012) .....	200
Figure 7-64: Educational attainment according to place of work (o011) of those who are employed and unemployed .....	201
<b>8 WOMEN &amp; CHILDREN .....</b>	<b>204</b>
Table 8-1: Do you think of emigrating? (o094a) according to gender .....	205
Table 8-2: Ability to go to work in the past six months (o114) according to gender .....	205
Figure 8-1: Number of women employed per household (o018b) in general and according to educational level .....	206
Figure 8-2: Number of employed women per household (o0018b) according to house- hold income level (o057) .....	206
Table 8-3: Number of women employed per household (o018b) according to age .....	206
Figure 8-3: Poverty level according to whether or not female household members are employed (o018b) .....	207
Figure 8-4: Ability of households to cope financially (o044) according to whether or not female household members are employed (o018b) .....	207
Figure 8-5: Occupation (o009), according to gender .....	208
Figure 8-6: Type of employer (or last type) (o063), according to gender .....	208
Figure 8-7: Employment situation (o008), according to gender .....	208
Figure 8-8: Salary regularity and amount (o099), according to gender .....	209
Figure 8-9: Main place of work (or most recent place of work) (o011), according to gender .....	209
Figure 8-10: Change in employment situation in the past six months (o012), according to gender .....	209
Figure 8-11: Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender .....	210
Table 8-4: Reasons for not searching for another job (o140), according to gender ..	210
Figure 8-12: Willingness to work (o015) according to gender .....	211
Figure 8-13: Hours per day of work at home for housewives (o159) in general, accord- ing to poverty level, and age .....	211
Figure 8-14: Number of hours spent for work not related to the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.) (o160) in general, according to poverty level (poverty3), and according to educational level (educ) .....	212
Figure 8-15: Number of hours spent for work not related to the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.) (o160), according to region of resi- dence, and area of residence.....	212
Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, according to poverty level (poverty3).....	213



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 8-16: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, in general and according to region of residence .....	213
Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, according to poverty level .....	214
Figure 8-18: Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as a coping strategy (o131f) in general and according to region of residence, poverty level, and Wall .....	214
Figure 8-19: Type of work of employed children below the age of 18 (o065o) .....	215
Figure 8-20: Ability to attend school or university in the past 6 months (o113a) in general and according to region of residence .....	215
Figure 8-21 Ability to attend school or university in the past 6 months (o113a), according to area of residence and Wall .....	216
Figure 8-22: Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or of arriving late at school due to curfews/closures (o113b) in general and according to region of residence, and area of residence .....	217
Figure 8-23: Frequency in the past six months of children not being taught by their regular teacher because the teacher was unable to come due to curfews/closures (o113c) in general, according to region of residence, and area of residence ....	218
Table 8-5: Moved from original place of residence to another town, city or village since the beginning of the Intifada so that children can continue with their education (o161) .....	218
Figure 8-24: Impact of the second Intifada on children (o033a, b, c, d) .....	219
Figure 8-25: Aggressive behavior by children (o033a) according to region and, area of residence, refugee status, poverty level and Wall .....	219
Figure 8-26: Bad school results by children (o033b) according to region of residence and poverty level .....	220
Figure 8-27: Bedwetting by children (o033c) according to region of residence, area of residence and poverty level .....	221
Figure 8-28: Have the children (below the age of 18) in your household suffered from nightmares since the beginning of the second Intifada? (o033d) according to region of residence, area of residence and poverty level .....	221
Figure 8-29: Care and protection needs of children (o171) in general and according to region and area of residence .....	221
Figure 8-30: Care and protection needs of children (o171) according to refugee status, and Wall .....	222
Figure 8-31: Most important need of children (o105) in general and according to region and area of residence .....	222
Figure 8-32: Most important need of children (o105) according to poverty level and Wall .....	223
<b>9 REFUGEES &amp; UNRWA</b> .....	<b>226</b>
Figure 9-1: Distribution of refugees according to area of residence .....	226
Figure 9-2 Refugee status according to place of residence .....	227
Figure 9-3: Poverty according to refugee status .....	228
Figure 9-4: Poverty according to place of residence .....	228
Figure 9-5: Evolution of employment situation (o008) according to refugee status .....	229
Figure 9-6: Perceptions of income's conformity to needs (o041) by refugee status .....	230





## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 9-7: Perceptions of the refugees' living conditions (o144)	230
by refugee status	230
Figure 9-8: Perceptions of the refugees' living conditions (o144)	231
by area of residence	231
Figure 9-9: Various impacts of mobility restrictions (o031, o114, o140e, o164c) by refugee status	232
Figure 9-10: Job losses as main cause of income decrease (o109)	233
by place of residence	233
Figure 9-11: Most important needs (o180) according	234
to refugee status	234
Figure 9-12: Most desired service in refugee camps and refugee areas (o146)	234
Figure 9-13: Access to infrastructure	235
(o174a, o174b, o174c) by area of residence	235
Figure 9-14: Assistance received (o035, o035b) according to refugee status, 2001- 2004	237
Figure 9-15: Assistance received (o035) by place of residence	237
Figure 9-16: Perceptions of levels of received assistance (o145) by refugee status	238
Figure 9-17: Main source of food in refugee households (o077), July 2003-February 2004	240
Figure 9-18: Received financial assistance (o036fin) by area of residence, July 2003- February 2004	240
Figure 9-19: Job assistance received in the past six months, by place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 (o023)	241
Figure 9-20: Source of first most important assistance received (o036c1) according o refugee status	241
Figure 9-21: Main sources of regular services (o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es, o126fs) for refugees	242
Figure 9-22: UNRWA as the source of regular services (o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es, o126fs, o126gs) by area of residence	243
Figure 9-23: Percentage of the total population who received and were satisfied with regular services (o126b, c, d, e, f, g) by refugee status	245
Figure 9-24: Future of UNRWA (o147) according to refugee status	245
<b>10 POLITICS &amp; GOVERNMENT</b>	<b>248</b>
Figure 10-1: Trust in political and religious factions	250
Figure 10-2: Most trusted factions, according to region	251
Figure 10-3: Most trusted factions, according to area of residence	252
Figure 10-4: Most trusted faction, according to place of residence	253
Figure 10-5: Trust in factions, according to refugee status	253
Figure 10-6: Trust in factions, according to poverty level	254
Figure 10-7: Trust in factions, according to employment status	254
Figure 10-8: Factional support, according to gender	255
Figure 10-9: Factional trust, according to educational attainment	255
Figure 10-10: Factional trust, according to the model country	256
Table 10-1: Most important source of information, according to trust in faction	257
Figure 10-11: Trust in leadership	258
Figure 10-12: Trust in leadership, according to region and area of residence	259
Figure 10-13: Palestinian trust in political and religious leaders, according to refugee status	259



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 10-14: Trust in leadership, according to poverty .....	260
Figure 10-15: Trust in leadership, according to education, gender, and age .....	260
Figure 10-16: Attitudes towards the urgency of reform of the Palestinian Authority .	261
Figure 10-17: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority .....	261
Table 10-2: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to education .....	262
Table 10-3: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, .....	262
Table 10-4: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority according to area of residence according to region .....	262
Table 10-5: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to the poverty level .....	263
Table 10-6: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to the most trusted political or religious faction .....	263
Figure 10-18: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to region .....	264
Figure 10-19: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to area	264
Figure 10-20: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to area of residence .....	265
Figure 10-21: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to poverty .....	265
Figure 10-22 Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to age	265
Figure 10-23: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to educational attainment .....	266
Figure 10-24a: Attitudes towards the reform of the Palestinian Authority, according to trust in political factions .....	266
Figure 10-24b: Attitudes towards reform of the Palestinian Authority, according to the most preferred model for Palestine .....	267
Figure 10-25: Attitudes about municipal and local councils .....	268
Figure 10-26: Knowledge about the activities of the local council, according to place of residence .....	269
Figure 10-27: Knowledge about local council activities, according to poverty .....	269
Figure 10-28: Knowledge about local council activities, according to refugee status	270
Figure 10-29: Knowledge about local council activities, according to region .....	270
Table 10-7: Knowledge about local council activities, according to trust in political factions .....	271
Table 10-8: The ability of residents to express their opinions regarding local council activities, according to trust in political factions .....	271
Figure 10-30: Knowledge about local council activities, according to gender and education .....	271
Figure 10-31: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to place of residence .....	272
Figure 10-32: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to refugee status .....	273
Figure 10-33: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to region of residence .....	273
Figure 10-34: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to poverty .....	274



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 10-35: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to area of residence .....	274
Figure 10-36: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to trust in political factions .....	274
Figure 10-37: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to area of residence .....	275
Figure 10-38: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to place of residence .....	276
Figure 10-39: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to region .....	276
Figure 10-40: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to poverty level .....	277
Figure 10-41: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to refugee status .....	277
Figure 10-42: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to level of education .....	278
Figure 10-43: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to trust in political factions .....	278
Table 10-9: Preferred country for Palestine to be modeled after .....	279
Figure 10-44: System of government for Palestine to be modeled after .....	280
Figure 10-45: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to region and place of residence .....	280
Figure 10-46: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to poverty and employment .....	281
Figure 10-47: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to age and education .....	281
Figure 10-48: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to most trusted leader and faction .....	282
Figure 10-49: The source of information Palestinians trust most .....	283
Table 10-10: Most important source of information according to area of residence ..	284
Table 10-11: Most important source of information according to place of residence	285
Table 10-12: Most important source of information according to poverty .....	285
Table 10-13: Most important source of information according to age .....	285
Table 10-14: Most important source of information, according to trust in political factions .....	286
Table 15: Most important source of information, according to levels of education ..	286
Figure 10-50: Attitudes towards Al-Hurra TV .....	286



# FOREWORD & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study is the seventh report carried out by the Palestine Research Unit (PRU)<sup>1</sup> of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED) of the University of Geneva since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, on the impact of local and international aid on the living conditions of the civilian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), which has supported the reports from the start, has been joined by several United Nations Agencies (UNDP, UNRWA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, OCHA<sup>2</sup>) and by a local NGO (PANORAMA<sup>3</sup>) to co-fund this report.

The period under scrutiny in this report covers the fall and winter 2003-2004. During the same period, a number of international organizations, NGOs, private and public local research centers, and Palestinian Authority institutions have published several important studies on topics that complement the data of our survey. At the end of the report, several references have been included in the bibliography for the reader to consult.

As usual, during the phase of preparation of the questionnaire, the team discussed the content of the new poll with different stakeholders. Due to the prevailing difficult situation in the OPT, the scope of the questionnaire has been further expanded to include a substantive number of questions that could offer more specific information to the interested parties. In this regard, it is the aim of this study to be of use to the Palestinian Authority, many UN and other international agencies, as well as local NGOs as the findings provide a wider picture of Palestinian public perceptions on their living conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> The PRU is presently composed of seven members: Prof. Riccardo Bocco, political sociologist and head of the PRU at the IUED; Mr. Matthias Brunner, political scientist, lecturer at the Department of Political Science of the University of Geneva; Dr. Isabelle Daneels, political scientist, researcher at the IUED; Dr. Jalal Al Hussein, political scientist, researcher at the IUED and associate researcher at the Near East French Institute in Amman (IFPO, Jordan); Prof. Frédéric Lapeyre, economist, Institute of Development Studies of the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium); Mr Luigi de Martino, program officer at the IUED; Mr. Jamil Rabah, political scientist and polls' expert, researcher at the IUED and SDC consultant in Ramallah (Palestine).

<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.undp.org>, <http://www.unrwa.org>, <http://www.unicef.org>, <http://www.wfp.org>, <http://www.who.org>, <http://ochaonline.un.org/>.

<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.panoramacenter.org>.



## February 2004 Surveys

For the survey conducted for this report, a sample of 1,499 Palestinian individuals was utilized. The areas affected by the Wall were over-sampled by 299 cases, and the remaining 1,200 were conducted in all the areas of the OPT. It is important to note that the results that will be presented hereafter are weighted so as to be representative of the whole OPT.<sup>1</sup>

The poll's questionnaire (see Annex I for the English version and Annex II for the Arabic version) was drafted by the above-mentioned expert team and reviewed by a number of stakeholders, all of whom identified the variables pertinent to drawing an objective assessment of the needs and living conditions of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We are particularly grateful to Mr. Fritz Froehlich (deputy director of the SDC, Gaza and West Bank Office); Mr. Sufyian Mushasha (UNDP, Jerusalem); Mr. Lionel Brisson (Director of Operations, UNRWA Headquarters); Mr. Sam Rose (UNRWA Headquarters); Dr. Elena Mancusi (Program Officer, UNRWA, Jerusalem); Mr. Jean-Luc Siblot (Head of the World Food Program, Jerusalem); Ms. Monica Awad (UNICEF, Jerusalem); Mr. John Wetter (World Bank, Jerusalem); Mr. David Shearer (Director of OCHA office in Jerusalem); Ms. Netta Ammar (OCHA, Jerusalem); Dr. Ambrogio Manenti (Director of WHO office in Jerusalem); and Mr. Yousef Muheisen (WHO, Jerusalem).

The IUED subcontracted the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) for conducting the survey in late February 2004. More than 70 fieldworkers interviewed 1,499 people under the supervision of Ms. Manal Warrad.

The teamwork was conducted between Jerusalem, Ramallah, Brussels and Geneva. We are particularly grateful to the JMCC Palestinian fieldworkers: without their dedication under difficult circumstances, this study could not have materialized.

In Ramallah, Ms. Charmaine Seitz did a great job on the edition and the layout of the present report. In Geneva, special thanks are due to the students of the Political Science Department and of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies both at the University of Geneva that helped us a lot on data cleaning, standardization and checking: Mr. Jérôme Begey, Mr. Jean-Marc Binois, Ms. Nadia Boulifa, Ms. Céline Calvé, Ms. Julie Conti, Ms. Emilie Converset, Ms. Tania Gaulis, Ms. Claudia Hametner, Mr. Fabien Messeiller, Mr. Sabi Mihalyi, Mr. Jean-David Moynat, Mr. Lionel Ricou and Ms. Jessica Saulle. We are also very grateful to Mr. Markus Peter of DataDoxa and Mr. Antoine Mach, head of Covalence.ch for their valuable assistance on the whole process of data handling and checking. Last but not least, we wish to thank our program officer at the PRU, Mr. Luigi de Martino for his role in information and coordination and Mr. Rico Glaus of the IUED for administration and accounting.

The data for this report were collected by the JMCC, but the data cleaning, weighting and interpretation of the results are the sole responsibility of the authors of this report.

*Geneva, September 2004*

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, our file is always weighted except when the data are split between areas affected and areas not affected by the Wall.



# LIST OF ACRONYMS

<b>IUED</b>	(French acronym for) Graduate Institute of Development Studies, University of Geneva	<b>ARIJ</b>	Applied Research Institute in Jerusalem
<b>JMCC</b>	Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre	<b>EGP</b>	Employment Generation Programs
<b>MIFTAH</b>	Palestinian Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy	<b>GS</b>	The Gaza Strip
<b>MOPIC</b>	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, PNA	<b>GSRC</b>	Gaza Strip refugee camps
<b>NIS</b>	New Israeli Shekel	<b>HDIP</b>	Health Development Information Project
<b>OAPT</b>	Occupied and Autonomous Palestinian Territories	<b>IDF</b>	Israeli Defense Forces
<b>OCHA</b>	UN Office for the Coordination for the Humanitarian Affairs		
<b>OPT</b>	Occupied Palestinian Territories		
<b>PCBS</b>	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics		
<b>PECDAR</b>	Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction		
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority		
<b>PNA</b>	Palestinian National Authority		
<b>PRCS</b>	Palestine Red Crescent Society		
<b>SDC</b>	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation		
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization		
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children and Education Fund		
<b>UNRWA</b>	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestine Refugees in the Near East		
<b>UNSCO</b>	United Nations Special Coordinator's Office in Palestine		
<b>UNWFP</b>	United Nations World Food Program		
<b>WB</b>	The West Bank		
<b>WBRC</b>	West Bank refugee camps		





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## MOBILITY & SECURITY CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

● The escalation of clashes in the OPT after August 2003 resulted in an increase in the number of casualties and restrictions on mobility as compared to the situation in July 2003.

● Both the number of persons killed and injured has risen since July 2003. Overall, however, the period under scrutiny (August 2003 to February 2004) saw fewer casualties than previous periods covered by earlier surveys. Confirming the now well-established militarized characteristic of the Intifada, most victims were hit by shrapnel and live ammunition.

- While Palestinians generally report that their mobility has improved, especially access to their places of work or education, restrictions of mobility continue to be named as the prime cause for business or employment-related problems. During the period under scrutiny, Israel has eased its closure policy, but roadblocks remain physically intact and curfews have been re-imposed locally whenever military incursions are underway.
- The Wall is leading to the emergence of a new underprivileged segment of the OPT community, one which is comparatively more affected by problems of mobility and socioeconomic difficulties than the rest of the population.
- Contrary to fears expressed in the OPT and neighboring Arab countries, the construction of the Wall has not yet triggered a new wave of Palestinian emigration abroad.

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- This study's results show a severe deterioration of the business environment in the Gaza Strip since July 2003. In the West Bank, the situation has slightly improved - especially inside refugee camps - but the Wall is a growing problem for businesses in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
  - Poverty in the OPT remains widespread, with 57% of the population being poor and 23% of the population being extremely poor. The overall poverty and extreme poverty rates remained almost the same, as compared to the rates in July 2003. The poverty rate among respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall (a rate of 65%) was significantly higher than the average poverty rate in the Occupied Territories (a rate of 57%).





## February 2004 Surveys

- One striking finding is the sharp deterioration of the material situation of residents of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the percentage of extremely poor increased from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. This means that that rate of extreme poverty in Gaza Strip refugee camps is now more than twice that of the average rate in the Occupied Territories as a whole.
- Less than half of respondents reported that they still have means of relieving their hardship. One-fourth of respondents reported that their means will be exhausted soon.
- Among survey respondents, 41% reported that their business had suffered due to inability to market their products. In villages, this problem is most severe, with 51% of village residents emphasizing it over other difficulties. Forty percent of city residents cited the inability to market products, while only 27% of refugee camps cited this hardship.
- Overall, there are signs that the socio-economic situation in the West Bank has improved. The rate of respondents reporting an inability to market products decreased from 54% to 49% since July 2003. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, there has been a deterioration: 21% in July 2003 reported an inability to market products, as compared with 37% today. In East Jerusalem, the situation has not changed.
- The Wall has created obstacles for marketing agricultural products, especially for respondents from the West Bank who live outside refugee camps. Thirty-nine percent said that the Wall was a problem in marketing produce.
- In general, there is no sign of social fragmentation based on a process of income differentiation. Overall, 69% of respondents have the feeling that the financial situation of their household is about the same as the people in their community whereas only 16% think it is worse.

### LABOR MARKET

- The overall unemployment rate decreased from 25% to 23% between July 2003 and February 2004 but still less than half of all workers have access to full-time employment.
- The OPT labor market is characterized by widespread underemployment which is affecting more than a quarter of the labor force.
- The results show a severe deterioration of the labor market in East Jerusalem where the unemployment rate reached 33%, as compared to 15% in July 2003. Meanwhile, the rate of full-time employment in East Jerusalem dropped from 51% to 39%.
- In the Gaza Strip, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee camps and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps, while the proportion of respondents who reported working part-time or few hours a day increased respectively from 27% to 30% and from 29% to 34%.
- The results show a significant increase in job precariousness and underemployment among non-refugees. Overall, the employment situation of non-refugees is now more precarious than that of refugees, having worsened between July 2003 (our last survey) and February 2004.

- The unemployment rate is four times higher for the group of respondents with a low level of education than for those with a high level of education (44% compared to 11%). Moreover, young workers and workers above the age of 50 are particularly vulnerable to unemployment.
- Problems of access to the workplace were much more severe for workers living in areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of respondents from these areas reported that it was “almost impossible” to go to work, while another 25% reported that it was “very difficult” to go to work. These numbers are a stark comparison with the 5% of workers in the OPT as a whole who reported it “almost impossible” and the 11% who reported it “very difficult” to go to work.
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and especially local NGOs, are increasingly playing a role as employers. The proportion of respondents stating that they work for a local NGO increased from 1% to 5% between July 2003 and February 2004, while those stating that they work for an international NGO increased from 2% to 4%.

### ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL

- In the Gaza Strip, around 5% of the population did not receive assistance during the past six months, while they had received assistance earlier in the Second Intifada.
- The general level of assistance delivery has decreased significantly since the first half of 2003.
- This decrease was more marked in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, in villages than in cities and refugee camps. The decrease may be partly explained by delays in the handover of ICRC’s beneficiaries in rural areas to the WFP.
- Areas that were affected by the Wall benefit much less from assistance than the rest of the OPT. It appears that the poor that live in such areas don’t receive enough assistance.
- Although the general level of assistance has declined, targeting of the poor seems to have improved: the decline is more severe for those above the poverty line than for those that live below it, especially hardship cases.
- Consistently since the beginning of the second Intifada, refugees received more assistance than non-refugees. Our results hint at a comparative deficit in assistance to non-refugees.
- Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, there was a clear increase in the overall value of the assistance delivered, which then remained stable throughout the second half of 2003 and the first months of 2004. While the median value of food assistance has evolved in a similar manner, one should note the important increase in the value of employment assistance since the last poll in July 2003.
- Between September 2003 and February 2004, the overall value of assistance delivered was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. It was also higher outside refugee camps than inside refugee camps.



## February 2004 Surveys

- The level of financial assistance has declined less since last summer: only 3% fewer respondents received it in February 2004. Here, the sharpest decline is observed in refugee camps where it decreased from 25% in July 2003 to 11% this year. In villages, there was a decrease of 4% from 10% while in cities, financial assistance increased slightly from 9% to 11%.
- Approximately one-sixth of households received financial assistance but only 9% of the respondents cited this kind of assistance among the two most important types of assistance they received.
- There was a clear decrease in delivery of all assistance types except employment and coupons. The largest absolute decline was in food: its delivery receded especially in villages, to a lesser extent in cities, while increasing in camps. Financial assistance declined much less and essentially in refugee camps.
- Huge geographical differences in the level of assistance delivery for the different places, areas and regions of residence emerge. Food was delivered to two-thirds of camp residents in the Gaza Strip but only to one-quarter of households living outside camps in the West Bank. In general, food is more targeted at the refugee camps and the Gaza Strip where the living conditions are worse. Financial assistance is also primarily targeted at Gaza but not particularly at refugee camps. Villages get less assistance of all types.

## THE IMPACT OF AID & PALESTINIANS' PERCEPTIONS

- Twenty-seven percent of Palestinians reported that they needed assistance but did not receive it. This proportion has increased by 7% since July 2003, going back to levels registered in 2001 and breaking the improving trend in the focusing of aid towards those who need it most.
- The most spectacular evolution concerns people below the poverty line, among which those needing assistance have more than doubled from July 2003 to February 2004.
- There are an increased number of people needing aid without receiving among both refugees and non-refugees.
- The need for assistance is higher outside than inside refugee camps
- Employment is first assistance priority for 47% of Palestinians (an increase of 18% since July 2003).
- Seventy percent of hardship cases place employment among their two most important needs. More than six out of ten Palestinians cite employment as the most important need for the community.
- In villages, fewer people cite employment as a priority, but many more cite food and education.
- More people need food and money in areas crossed by the Wall than elsewhere.
- The most important infrastructure needed is water supply.



- Highest priorities are water in the West Bank, and electricity in Jerusalem.

### FOOD

- The proportion of the overall food assistance delivered to respondents living above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February 2004. Conversely, the proportion of food assistance reaching hardship cases increased from 34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.
- There is a sharp decline of 9% in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they received assistance in recent months. More specifically, whereas 48% of the respondents said that they received some type of assistance in July 2003, the percentage dropped to 39% in February 2004.
- There has been a decline in the number of Palestinians who rely on food assistance as their primary source of food, and a parallel decrease in the number of households who rely on the extended family for food.
- There has been a relative improvement in the dietary intake of food.
- The food situation in areas that are directly affected by the Wall is deteriorating and might need extra targeting in the future.
- Food is the second most important priority for the household. The fact that only 10% of respondents said that food is the most important unmet need indicates the successful effort conducted by food assistance providers in distributing food assistance to the needy.

### HEALTH & EDUCATION

- Health, but especially education, have lost importance as needs both for the household and for the community since the September 2003 report. Compared to other types of unmet needs of the household, health and education are not high on the priority list, which might suggest that those needs are already quite well covered.
- The main three factors influencing Palestinians' choice of a health facility are (1) the health facility being free or cheaper (42%), (2) the distance or availability of a health facility (23%), and (3) trust in the quality of services (18%). The results showed that the highest percentages of Palestinians choosing their health facility based on the first reason can be found in the West Bank, in refugee camps and villages, among the poorer segments of society, among the low educated, and among Palestinians residing in areas that are directly affected by the Wall.
- Concerning the need for drugs for acute and chronic diseases in the past six months, 19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute diseases and 29% were prescribed drugs for chronic diseases. The results point to a gap of a few percent between the prescription of drugs for both acute and chronic diseases and the actual provision of the drugs for these problems. The prescription of drugs for acute diseases was the highest in villages, among non-refugees, among residents directly affected by the Wall, among



## February 2004 Surveys

the poorest in Palestinian society, and among respondents who are 50 years or older. The discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for acute problems never exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by the Wall.

- The private pharmacy is the main source of medication, followed by the Ministry of Health clinic, the UNRWA clinic, and much less frequently, the NGO clinic. The UNRWA clinic is the main source of medication in the Gaza Strip, among refugees, and in both West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. The reliance on a private pharmacy for medication is highest in Jerusalem, in villages, among non-refugees, among the economically better-off in society, and among the high educated.

- The need for any type of care, with the exception of birth care, was consistently highest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are directly affected by the Wall. Birth care and specialized care were most needed in villages, while health care for a sick child was most needed in cities. Furthermore, concerning restrictions, delays and denials for the provision of any of the 12 analyzed types of medical care, generally difficulties occurred most often in the West Bank, in villages (often least frequently in refugee camps), among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are crossed by the Wall.

- Thirty-nine percent of the total sample of interviewees reported that they had been forced to find an alternative health facility, with these numbers being higher in the West Bank, in villages, among non-refugees, and among residents in areas that are crossed by the Wall. The most frequently reported problems resulting from having to find an alternative health facility were additional costs, delay in the needed care, and more suffering.

- Considering the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of six different types of health services, 71% were satisfied with hospital services, 68% were satisfied with medication, and 78% were satisfied with primary health care. Furthermore, 51% of the beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services were satisfied, while 61% were satisfied with specialized care and 72% were satisfied with ambulance services. Results indicate that the PA and - to a lesser extent - UNRWA, are the main providers of health care, except for physical rehabilitation services where UNRWA's place is taken in by local NGOs.

- Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main health insurance providers. Although, in general, the percentage of Palestinians covering their medical expenses from their own pocket has dropped by 5% (26%) since the September 2003 report, alarmingly, the percentage of households below the poverty line that cover their own medical bills has increased by 8% (54%) since last September.

- A large majority (87%) of respondents are satisfied with their school services. The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the PA focusing its attention mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and UNRWA mainly targeting the refugee population whether inside or outside camps. Furthermore, the largest portion of Palestinians with high educational levels can be found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip. The low- and medium-educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the-



high educated rely more on the Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low- and medium-educated are far less able to maintain their employment than the high-educated.

### WOMEN & CHILDREN

- In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December 2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one woman employed (26%). In fact, the percentage dropped to the level it stood at in the December 2001 report. Interestingly, the percentage of households with at least one woman employed swells with an increased level of education and is also highest in the households that fall in the age category of 24 to 35 years.
- When women in the household are employed, it has a clear positive effect on the household's financial status, as these households tend to have a higher monthly income level and can more often position their financial status above the poverty line. Furthermore, those households seem to be in a better position to cope financially in the future.
- Women in the labor market less frequently lost their jobs than their male counterparts. However, those women who did lose their employment tried less hard than men to find alternative employment. Furthermore, although less women than men are employed full-time in the labor force, women more than men seem to be able to bring home a regular and full salary. Lastly, men more than women are willing to compromise on their wages as long as they can keep a job and avoid total unemployment.
- In general, housewives spend an average of seven hours a day on work at home. Housewives who also spend time on work not related to the house or children, on average do so for about three hours and 20 minutes a day.
- In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December 2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one child below the age of 18 employed (11%). The decision to have children work is influenced by the financial situation of the household.
- Albeit that about 30% of the household members of respondents continue to face difficulties in getting to their place of education, there appears to be a considerable improvement in the ability of Palestinians to attend school or university since September 2003.
- Since the beginning of the Intifada, 36% of parents reported aggressive behavior among their children, 31% noticed bad school results, 25% mentioned that their children are bedwetting, and 28% reported that their children have nightmares. Although the results are striking, they represent an improvement on the answers to the same question in the September 2003 report. All four types of behavioral problems are most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among the poorer segments of society.
- A majority of 53% of parents admit to being unable to fully meet the needs of their children for care and protection. Again, this phenomenon is most pronounced in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer elements of society and among refugees.



## February 2004 Surveys

- The need for children to attend school regularly is the priority for the majority of parents.

### REFUGEES & UNRWA

- The survey indicates that the socioeconomic status of refugees improved between July 2003 and February 2004, with hardship cases in decline and a higher percentage of refugees reporting themselves above the poverty line.
- These findings hide important spatial differences. In terms of place of residence, only West Bank camps (98% of their residents being refugees) were affected by the improvement in socioeconomic conditions, perhaps able to benefit from the slight relaxing of Israel's closure policy during the period under scrutiny. For instance, the percentage of hardship cases in the West Bank refugee camps decreased by 12%, while increasing by 10% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
- In absolute terms, however, refugees remained poorer than non-refugees. Our survey found that the main reason for increased poverty among refugees lies in their lack of alternative sources of income (availability of land and capital).
- Employment and financial aid are among the main unmet needs aired by the refugee respondents. Refugees are in general more "service-demanding" than non-refugees, except in sectors where UNRWA distributes free services, such as education and health, to the entire refugee population.
- Refugees have remained the main targets of socioeconomic assistance. The percentage of refugee recipients was twofold the percentage of non-refugee recipients. However, responding to the favorable evolution of the refugees' socioeconomic situation, the percentage of refugees assisted dwindled by 14% in the July 2003-2004 period, while decreasing by 5% for non-refugees. The only places of residence not affected by decline in assistance were the Gaza refugee camps where, contrary to conditions in the rest of the OPT, hardships were on the rise.
- Regarding emergency assistance, refugees considered food the most important item received. Employment was considered as a relatively marginal assistance item mainly because it was composed mostly of short-term job schemes.
- UNRWA remained by far the main source of assistance of emergency and regular assistance items for refugees. However, likely due to budgetary restrictions, its importance declined in the July 2003 - February 2004 period from 66% to 60%. Conversely, the PA saw its share of emergency assistance provision among refugees increase from 5% to 10%.
- Our respondents, refugees and non-refugees alike, underscored the operational and political salience of UNRWA's mandate by stating that it should be preserved until to the settlement of the refugee issue, rather than the advent of a Palestinian state.

# OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY

The main objective of this study is to provide government officials, donors and civil society representatives with tools for monitoring conditions and assistance in Palestine. It relies on polls that measure Palestinians' perceptions about conditions and their evolution, assistance received, its impact and Palestinians'

satisfaction with it, as well as many other topics relevant for individuals and organizations involved in assistance in Palestine.

In this part of the report, we will briefly describe the objectives of the study, the methodology used and a short description of our independent variables will be provided.

## OBJECTIVES

Since January 2001, seven relevant polls have been conducted.<sup>1</sup> The fact that most questions remained the same throughout this period provides a unique wealth of monitoring information. Whenever possible and meaningful, the analysis in each chapter will refer to this evolution. This year we also set up a standardized file which makes it possible to quickly compare the evolution of answers over time. In this report, instead of using the question number in captions for graphs, we use standardized variable names (in the form o####). The reader will find correspondence tables for question numbers at the beginning of Annex I just before the questionnaire.

The results of this standardization can be found at <http://www.dartmonitor.org> where the interested reader can find all the relevant information, from the wording of questions to distribution frequencies, as well as bivariate analysis with our list of independent variables. For this reason, no table of frequencies is included with this report.

The questionnaire for the study (see annexes I and II) was elaborated in order to offer data on Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on nine main topics that correspond to the nine parts of the report:

<sup>1</sup> In January, June and November 2001, in November 2002, in July 2003 and in February 2004. In April 2002, we conducted a poll in the aftermath of the Israeli army's reoccupation of the Autonomous Palestinian Territories. However, due to the difficult conditions, the data were collected by phone on a sample not entirely random (see Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2002b). The data from this poll - covering only the West Bank - were not standardized.





## February 2004 Surveys

- General conditions in terms of mobility and security are presented in the first part.

### *Part 1 - Mobility and security conditions*

Variables: o031, o034, o093, o113, o114, o115, o118, o140, o161, o164, o165.

- A portrait of socio-economic conditions is offered in the second part of the report. It is intended to help the reader in assessing changes in the evolution of both poverty and Palestinians' strategies for sustaining this hardship.

### *Part 2 - Socio-economic Conditions*

Variables: poverty3, o040, o041, o057, o095, o108, o131, o156, o162, o163, o174, o177.

- The labor market and employment status (including the place of work, occupation and the effects of the Intifada on jobs) are under scrutiny in Part 3.

### *Part 3 - Labor Market*

Variables: o008, o009, o011, o012, o013, o014, o015, o017, o018, o019, o063, o065, o099, o100, o157, o158.

- An overview of the assistance delivered according to type, value and source with emphasis on employment generation programs is offered in Part 4.

### *Part 4 - Assistance Delivered in General*

Variables: o024, o026, o035, o036, o126, o131, o180.

- A review of the impact of the assistance delivered for measuring the perceptions of the Palestinians is also provided in Part 5. This section includes an analysis of the people's perceptions of individual and community assistance, aid priorities, as well as the visibility, importance and effectiveness of the assistance delivered.

### *Part 5 - The Impact of Aid and Palestinians' Perception*

Variables: o023, o036, o037, o038, o079, o080, o123, o124.

- All the questions in Part 6 pertain to food. They cover perceived effectiveness of food distribution, type and source of food help assistance received, changes in food consumption patterns and types of food required, the source of food and nutrition, as well as the perceived price of some basic commodities.

### *Part 6 - Food*

Variables: o074, o075, o077, o081, o107, o166, o173, o181.

- Questions related to health and education include assistance received, priorities, access to basic services and educational attainment, and constitute the bulk of Part 7.

### *Part 7 - Health and Education*

Variables: o056, o089, o102, o126, o167, o168, o169, o170, o172, o175.

- Other questions in Part 8 concern women and children. The effect of the Intifada on children, parents' responses, psychological support, child labor and women's contribution to the household income are investigated here.



### Part 8 - Women and Children

Variables: o033, o061, o105, o113, o141, o159, o160, o171.

● An assessment of UNRWA's strategies during the past months, the type of assistance provided by the UN agency (in particular food aid, employment generation and financial assistance), the patterns of aid distribution and its effectiveness, as well as the satisfaction of its beneficiaries are the content of Part 9.

### Part 9 - Refugees and UNRWA

Variables: o002, o144, o145, o146, o147.

## METHODOLOGY

A representative sample of 1,499 Palestinians over the age of 18, was interviewed face-to-face in late February 2004. There was an over-sampling of 299 cases in the areas that were directly affected by the Wall. All the data in this report are weighted so as to be representative of the entire OPT. Only those crosstabulations that involve the variable wall (area affected or not affected by the Wall) are not weighted. Nine-hundred and ten Palestinians were interviewed in the West Bank, ,, 439 in the Gaza Strip and 150 in East Jerusalem.

The sampling and data collection was done by JMCC in the same manner as in previous polls (Bocco, Brunner and Rabah 2001a and 2001b; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels and Rabah 2001; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah 2002; Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Lapeyre and Rabah 2003).

Although each part of this report has its own logic of analysis, all the questions of the poll that were analyzed in this report were tested in their relationship with eight important independent variables. They are presented in the box to the right. In addition to these standard

variables, another independent variable "wall" was utilized to distinguish between the areas that were directly affected by the Wall that is currently under construction by Israel and those not directly affected by the Wall.

#### **Region of residence (o059):**

West Bank  
Jerusalem  
Gaza Strip

#### **Area of residence (o060):**

City  
Village  
Refugee camp

#### **Place of residence (place):**

West Bank refugee camps  
West Bank outside camps  
Gaza Strip refugee camps  
Gaza Strip outside camps  
East Jerusalem

#### **Poverty (poverty3):**

Hardship cases  
Those below the poverty line  
Those above the poverty line

#### **Refugee Status (o002):**

Refugees  
Non-refugees

#### **Education (educ):**

Low  
Medium  
High

#### **Age category (agec):**

18 - 24 years  
25 - 34 years  
35 - 49 years  
50 years or more

#### **Gender (o061):**

Male  
Female

#### **Wall (wall):**

Directly affected by the wall  
Not directly affected by the wall



## February 2004 Surveys

Results were systematically tested for statistical significance at a 95% confidence level.<sup>1</sup>

On the <http://www.dartmonitor.org> website, the interested reader will find the bivariate analysis between all of the dependent and the independent variables with their level of statistical significance and the detailed number of cases. For this reason, the numbers of cases (N) and significance levels have been omitted in this report.

Finally, whenever possible, consideration was given to data gathered in our previous polls so as to analyze the evolution of conditions since the beginning of the second Intifada. The reader will also find the frequencies and analysis for the previous polls on the <http://www.dartmonitor.org> website.

### Description of the explanatory variables

Palestinian society is rather unique because refugees constitute up to 50% of its population. The territory is split between areas that are not geographically contiguous, and this separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip renders coordination and economic cooperation very difficult. This situation enforces a set of legal and socio-economic structures that are not homogeneous. The split between the two areas and the forced detachment of Jerusalem from both of them further complicates efforts at attaining a uniform system essential prior to developing a viable and efficient economic, social, and political system. In addition to

the damaging consequences of the occupation, other social and internal barriers such as a very rapid population growth rate (around 6%) and a large number of dependent children (almost 50% are below the age of fifteen) supplement the political difficulties that characterize and influence the living conditions of Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The use of nine explanatory variables for analysis in this report is intended to reflect the specificities of the Palestinian population.

The Palestinians in the OPT are divided in three different areas: the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Place of residence, as shown in Figure 0.1, summarizes these different geographical areas. Sixty-three percent of the respondents represented in this poll are from the West Bank and Jerusalem, and 37% are from the Gaza Strip.




Figure 0-1: Place of residence (place)

<sup>1</sup> For categorical or ordinal dependent variables we used Chi-square tests, for interval variables one-way analysis of variance.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), more than two million Palestinians live in the West Bank and Jerusalem, and more than one million in the Gaza Strip. Refugees constitute approximately one-third of the West Bank population and over 60% of the population in the Gaza Strip. The number of refugees residing in camps is estimated at approximately half a million, of which about 130,000 live in 19 refugee camps in the West Bank, and about 370,000 reside in eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.

As shown in Figure 0.2, of all respondents, 45% said that they are refugees or descendents of refugees; 54% stated that they are neither refugees nor descendents of a refugee family.




Figure 0-2: Refugee status (o002 & o004)

Throughout Palestine, the majority of refugees (registered and unregistered) live in the Gaza Strip (54%, see Figure 0.3). On the other hand, almost two-thirds (65%) of non-refugees live in the West Bank.


While 31% of all refugees live in camps, less than 1% of non-refugees do. In both groups, one respondent out of ten lives in Jerusalem.

According to area of residence, a bit more than one half of our sample (55%, N=818) live in cities, 16% (N=238) in refugee camps and 30% in villages (N=443).

In the November 2001 report, we introduced the poverty variable to highlight the economic situation of the Palestinian households. Since November 2002, this variable not only takes into account the reported income of the respondent's household but also the number of adults and children in the household.

In the present report, we use the third revision of the poverty variable. It is based on the reported household income (o57) but takes into account the number of adults (adults) and children (children) in the household. In November 2002, according to the

Figure 0-3: Place of residence (place) by refugee status (o002)



## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 0-4: Poverty level (poverty3)

PCBS figures, the average Palestinian household of two adults and four children was considered to be below poverty line if its income was lower than NIS 1,600. If it was lower than NIS 500, they were considered to be hardship cases. Since the PCBS published a new poverty line at NIS 1,760 at the beginning of 2003, we adjusted to this evolution: For the sixth poll, we consider the standard household to be below poverty line if its income is less than NIS 1,760; for the 2002 and 2001 polls, the figures remained unchanged<sup>1</sup> in the third and fourth revision.

The evolution of poverty in the OPT can be seen in Figure 0.4. While the percentage of those below the poverty line remained stable from 2001 to 2004, the percentage of hardship cases increased in November 2002, then decreased back to its previous level in July 2003, and increased slightly in February 2004.

This evolution of poverty will be analyzed more thoroughly in Part 2, but it is important to note that this slight decrease in hardship cases is confirmed by many other questions of the poll: for example, while in November 2002 two-thirds (66%) of the respondents said their income decreased during the previous six months (o108), this was the case for only 45% in February 2004.

Education and gender will also be analyzed respectively in parts 7 and 8.

<sup>1</sup> It must be noted though that, for November 2001, we only recently calculated the value of poverty adjusted by household size. This is why it was not mentioned in that previous report.



# 1 MOBILITY & SECURITY CONDITIONS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

From late July 2003 to late February 2004, Palestinian daily life in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) was marked by the failure of what became known as the Roadmap, the international peace initiative presented in April 2003 by the “Quartet” mediators (United States, Russia, European Union and the United Nations) and adopted by the Palestinian and Israeli governments in June 2003. Following a spate of incidents in August 2003 - including the stakeholders’ inability to agree on the terms for the handover of four West Bank cities to Palestinian security control, suicide bombings in Israel and targeted assassination of Palestinian activists - the cease fire came to an end.

While the Roadmap has continued to be endorsed internationally, it has gradually been replaced de facto by an Israeli “unilateral disengagement” policy. Officially presented by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a necessary step for ensuring the security of the Israeli population, it has been pursued during the period under scrutiny, mainly through the erection of a series of walls, fences, military towers, ditches and razor wire (hereafter referred to as the “Wall”) through the West Bank and Jerusalem. In February 2004, Israel’s Likud government announced that it was considering dismantling most of the Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip.

Using our survey and other empirical studies, this chapter will highlight the various impacts of these events on the Palestinian population.<sup>1</sup>

The first section of the chapter deals with security issues throughout the OPT, focusing on two trends: casualties incurred through death and injury, and material damage to public and private property, including land confiscation.

<sup>1</sup> Mainly drawn from the regular surveys carried out by the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), the Palestine Monitor, Arij, the United Nations Relief Works Association (UNRWA) and OCHA.



## February 2004 Surveys

The second section tackles the impact of the closure policy imposed by Israel, in both its socioeconomic and humanitarian aspects.


The third section will discuss, as a case study, the impact of the Wall on the mobility, morale and migration patterns of the Palestinian OPT population. It will also tackle the regional dimension of the Wall by examining whether this new development further encouraged West Bankers to emigrate to neighboring countries or elsewhere.

### 1.1 SECURITY ASSESSMENT

#### 1.1.1 General feeling of insecurity

The worsening security situation after late July 2003, the date of the last survey,<sup>1</sup> is reflected in a higher percentage of interviewees who admit feeling insecure, up from 72% to 76%. While the West Bank remains in absolute terms the region where respondents feel the most insecure, the increase was more marked in Gaza. This may be a result of the Israeli military incursions that were taking place at the time of the interviews.

Figure 1-1: Percentage of the population who feels insecure (o118) by region, July 2003 - February 2004



Against that background, local advocacy groups have continued to call for international protection on behalf of the Palestinian population, arguing that humanitarian aid alone cannot address Palestinians' problems within the context of the uprising. These calls have so far remained unanswered.<sup>2</sup>

Factors of insecurity relate to the rise in the number of casualties and of destruction of property that occurred as a result of the escalation in the Intifada in August 2003. Before looking into such factors, one should also mention the growing sentiment of helplessness that has pervaded the Palestinian population as a result of the weakened Palestinian National Authority (PNA) security appara-

<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, *Report VI*.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance BADI's press release, "Badil expert Seminar Discusses Urgent Need to Protect Palestinian Refugees," February 16, 2004.




tus' inability to enforce the rule of law. Family feuds, gang gunfights, beatings of officials and other types of internecine violence have become commonplace in the OPT areas formally under its jurisdiction, adding to the daily hardships caused by Israeli military activities.<sup>1</sup> However, as our survey shows, the PNA's operational inability to maintain public order is not seen as the main concern: only 7% thought it was. Factors more worrying to our respondents were those pertaining to lack of good governance such as corruption and unaccountability (35% of the sample), nepotism (19% of the sample), inefficiency in the management of public affairs (11% of the sample), and inability to deal with international security problems (10% of the sample) (o178).

### 1.2 CASUALTIES

#### 1.2.1 General figures

The number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces rose from nine in July 2003 to a monthly average of 42 between August 2003 and February 2004, and a peak in October 2003. During that month, 63 people were killed, mainly as a result of Israeli military operations in the southern Gaza Strip.<sup>2</sup> Still, the total number of Palestinians killed over those six months - 252 people - remained significantly lower than during the January - July 2003 period, when 444 people were killed (an average of 64 per month).

Figure 1-2: Number of Palestinians killed, January 2003 - February 2004



Source: [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org)

The rate of injuries incurred by Palestinians within the context of the Intifada follows the same pattern. According to Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) figures, the number of injured Palestinians rose from 34 in July 2003 to a monthly average of 217 between August 2003 and February 2004. The total number of injured

<sup>1</sup> See Lara Sukhtian, "Vigilantes take control of West Bank Streets," *The Daily Star*, February 2004, p.2.

<sup>2</sup> PRCS, *The human suffering in Rafah continues*, January 27, 2004, [www.reliefweb.org](http://www.reliefweb.org).



## February 2004 Surveys

Palestinians during the period under survey was 1,301, comparatively lower than the 1,856 injuries incurred between January and July 2003 (an average of 265 per month).

### 1.2.2 Causes of casualties

The major causes of injury during the August 2003-February 2004 period confirm the advancing militarization of the Intifada that has been highlighted in previous reports.<sup>1</sup> As shown in Figure 1.3 below, the bulk of the victims (about 80%) were injured after being hit by miscellaneous war devices, such as bomb fragments and shrapnel (555 occurrences), and live ammunition (453 occurrences).<sup>2</sup>


Overall, the total number of Palestinians injured from September 2000 to February 2004 were 24,451, of whom 27% were hit by shrapnel and bomb fragments, 26% by live ammunition, 24% by rubber bullets and 23% by tear gas.<sup>3</sup>

Estimates of the total number of Palestinians who were killed by Israeli forces in the OPT since the outbreak of the Intifada as of late February 2004 range from a low 2,268 (PCRS figure) to a high 2,775 (Palestine Monitor figure).<sup>4</sup>

According to the Palestine Monitor, over 80% of the deaths were caused by live ammunition from Israeli soldiers (88.6%), Jewish settlers (2%) and Israeli police/citizens (1.1%).<sup>5</sup>

In addition, according to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (Btselem), 48 Palestinians within Israel have been killed by Israeli security forces since September 2000. None of these incidents took place during the period from July 2003 to February 2004.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 1-3: Causes of injuries, August 2003 - February 2004



<sup>1</sup> See for instance Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, *Report VI*: 25.

<sup>2</sup> Bomb fragments and shrapnel are subsumed as "miscellaneous" by the PCRS reports. By way of comparison, in December 2001, the PCRS reported that injuries were caused more by non-lethal devices, such as rubber bullets (32%) and tear gas (28%), than by shrapnel (19%) and live ammunition (21%).

<sup>3</sup> "Palestine Red Crescent Society Conflict Related Statistics", [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org).

<sup>4</sup> The Palestine Monitor figure includes as immediate cause of death: prevention of medical treatment, and miscellaneous causes such as hit-and-run car accidents, stabbings, experiencing a heart attack after an attack or causes listed as unknown.

<sup>5</sup> "Palestinians killed", [www.palestinemonitor.org](http://www.palestinemonitor.org).

<sup>6</sup> See Btselem website information on casualties ([www.btselem.org](http://www.btselem.org)). According to the same source, 577 Israeli civilians have been killed by Palestinians since September 2000, 198 of them in the OPT (including East Jerusalem) and 377 within the Green Line. The number of Israeli security forces personnel killed by Palestinians during the same time frame amounts to 263, of which 183 were killed in the OPT (including East Jerusalem).



**1.2.3 Places of casualties**

As observed in our previous report for the period of January to July 2003,<sup>1</sup> the killing and injury of Palestinians occurred mostly in regions that were the focus of Israeli military activity, namely the Gaza Strip (where 58% of the killed and 51% of the injured were recorded) and the West Bank city of Nablus (where 17% of the killed and 26% of the injured were recorded).<sup>2</sup> In these areas, casualties, curfews, destruction of property and forced evacuations have put the population under heavy strain. Conversely, cities previously impacted by a high number of casualties, such as Qalqilya, Salfit, Jerusalem and Jericho, came out this time relatively unscathed.

**1.3 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND LAND CONFISCATION**

This sub-section examines damage to Palestinian property caused by the Israeli military's major military incursions in the OPT. It does not, however, cover damage caused by the erection of the Wall in western regions of the West Bank. All issues related specifically to the Wall will be tackled in Chapter 1.5.


**1.3.1 Damage to homes from Israeli military incursions**

Estimates of economic damage inflicted by Israeli forces vary according to assumptions, methodology, definitions, time frames and availability of data. According to a statement from the Auditing Bureau of the Islamic Development Bank in Palestine addressed to the Secretary-General of the Arab League, total losses and damage inflicted on Palestinians (as individuals) after three years of Intifada amounted to US\$17,262,500.<sup>3</sup>

During the period under scrutiny, most destruction of property took place during two massive incursions undertaken by Israeli forces in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Nablus.

In Nablus, the Israeli military started launching limited incursions in mid-

Figure 1-4: Number of Palestinians killed and injured according to region, August 2003 - February 2004



Source: www.palestinercs.org

<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Hussein and Rabah, *Report VI*: 23.

<sup>2</sup> "Search Palestinian casualties database", www.palestinercs.org/Database

<sup>3</sup> Security Council S/2003/1072, November 11, 2003. This figure does not include the raw physical damage resulting from the conflict, which jumped in estimates from US\$305 million at the end of 2001 to US\$930 million by the end of 2002 (The World Bank. *Twenty-seven Months of Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis - An Assessment*, May 2003).



## February 2004 Surveys

December 2003. Following a suicide attack on December 25, 2003 in Petah Tikva (north of Tel Aviv), Israel launched a full-scale operation described as one of the largest military operations in Nablus since Operation “Defensive Shield” in the spring of 2002.<sup>1</sup> It ended 11 days later and resulted in heavy casualties (six Palestinians killed and 50 injured) and the destruction of inhabited and historical buildings such as the Qasr Abdel-Hadi. Overall, three homes were entirely destroyed, 35 residences rendered uninhabitable, and tens of homes partially damaged by explosives or bulldozers. In addition, 20 to 25 families of the old city (in the Qarioun area) were forced to flee because their homes were sealed or evacuated and used as military positions. Another 70 families (400 people) were not allowed to leave their homes.<sup>2</sup>

In the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military undertook two major military attacks, allegedly for the purpose of unearthing weapons smuggling tunnels. From October 9 to 11, 2003, the Israeli military invaded Tel al-Sultan and the Rafah border (in the southern Gaza Strip), demolishing or rendering uninhabitable 114 refugee shelters and 6 houses belonging to non-refugee families, and causing some form of damage to 117 other buildings.<sup>3</sup> According to UNRWA’s first assessment, over 1,240 individuals were made homeless as a result of this operation.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the water and sanitation networks were destroyed and many streets rendered unsuitable for travel, hindering access to casualties and families requiring assistance.<sup>5</sup>

In the second half of February 2004, the Israeli military carried out a series of military incursions in the Rafah area. Between January 17 and 22, it demolished entirely or in part 72 homes, rendering 584 people homeless. These demolitions have led to the creation of a “buffer zone” stretching several kilometers from the Rafah passenger terminal to the east and down to the Mediterranean coast; in some places, that zone is 200 meters deep.<sup>6</sup> Since October 2000, some 15,000 people have been made homeless by Israeli military house demolitions. Two-thirds of those affected live in the Rafah area.<sup>7</sup>

Aside from these large-scale demolitions, the Israeli military authorities and Jewish settlers partially or totally damaged Palestinian houses and shelters on a semi-daily basis. Various pretexts have been utilized to justify those actions: unlicensed dwellings, “antiterrorism warfare”, retaliation, etc.<sup>8</sup> In some cases, for example in the Tulkarem refugee camp in February 2004, the Israeli military also took over inhabited dwellings, turning them into military barracks.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> OCHA, *Initial Report: Humanitarian Consequences of the IDF Operation in the Old City of Nablus*, February 6, 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid; and “Statistics on the Palestinian Intifada”, Palestine Monitor, February 5, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> UNRWA press release, “UNRWA Completes its Assessment of Rafah Destruction,” October 13, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> PCRS press release, “Palestine Red Crescent Society Responds to Humanitarian Emergency in Rafah,” October 14, 2003. PCRS figures about physical damage differ from those provided by UNRWA. According to the PCRS, 107 homes were completely destroyed, leaving 187 families homeless, and 20 homes were partially destroyed, leaving 20 homes without shelter.

<sup>6</sup> OCHA, *Report to the LACC on humanitarian consequences of Israeli Defence Forces operations in Rafah*, Southern Gaza Strip, February 28, 2004,.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed overview of such attacks, see Applied Research Institute (ARIJ), *Monthly Reports on the Israeli Colonization Activities in the West Bank* on the Arij website, [www.arij.org](http://www.arij.org).

<sup>9</sup> Arij, “Case Studies archives: February 2004”, [www.poica.org](http://www.poica.org).

International relief and development organizations operating in the OPT have tried to alleviate the resulting humanitarian crisis by providing immediate housing assistance. However, that assistance has so far fallen short of meeting the needs of all the homeless families. As the commissioner general of the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) put it at a UN meeting in November 2003, while major rehousing projects were under construction in Jenin, Khan Younis and Rafah, the agency was unable to keep pace with the rate of destruction. In 2002 and 2003, he said, 616 refugee shelters were demolished in Gaza, and nearly 100 were demolished in the West Bank.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.3.2 Destruction of Agricultural Land

Destruction and confiscation of Palestinian land as a means of creating new and extending existing Jewish settlements and their accompanying bypass roads and security systems continued throughout the whole of the OPT during the period under scrutiny outside the context of the construction of the Wall.

In February 2004 alone, in a spate of damage to private Palestinian agricultural lands unrelated to the erection of the Wall, hundreds of dunums were razed either by the Israeli military or Jewish settlers in the West Bank areas of Bethlehem (al-Khadr), Nablus (Deir Balut, 15 dunums), Hebron (Yatta, over 1000 dunums, Idhna, 5 dunums; Wad al-Nasara; Arab al-Ramadin, 150 dunums) and Jenin (not specified).<sup>2</sup> Thousands of olive and other fruit trees were razed, further aggravating the hardships of the Palestinian peasantry.

In the Gaza Strip, the areas most affected by damage to lands were Deir al-Balah (about 200 dunums), Khan Younis (45 dunums), Beit Lahya (tens of dunums), Khaz'a (two dunums) and Rafah (not specified).<sup>3</sup>

## 1.4 THE IMPACT OF CLOSURES AND MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS ON LIVELIHOOD

During the period under scrutiny, Israel has continued to implement its closure policy in the OPT, which has resulted in various kinds of restrictions on Palestinian mobility. This closure policy consists of:

- Internal closure within the OPT, be it partial or total, in the form of a network of military checkpoints, fixed or moving, manned or unmanned. The most severe form of closure, i.e. curfews placed on the Palestinian population, has at times reinforced the internal closure.
- Total or partial external closure of the border between Israel and the OPT.
- Partial external closure of international crossings between Gaza and Egypt, and the West Bank and Jordan.

Since early November 2003, Israeli authorities have announced that, with the exception of Jenin and Nablus, the Israeli military would ease restrictions on movement in order to "preserve conditions for a normal way of life for

<sup>1</sup> UN General Assembly; 30/10/2003, Fifty-eighth session, Fourth committee, 17th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Arij, "Case Studies archives: February 2004", [www.poica.org](http://www.poica.org).

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



## February 2004 Surveys

Palestinians who are not implicated in terrorist activities.” In late February 2004, apparently bowing to US pressure, Israel “softened” the external closure between the West Bank and Israel by allotting entry permits for between 9,000 and 12,000 West Bank businessmen and workers (except those from the Jenin and Nablus regions).<sup>1</sup> All in all, by March 2004 about 33,000 Palestinian workers were allowed to work in Israel, that is 92,000 less than in January 2000 before the outbreak of the Intifada.<sup>2</sup>

Concerning the internal closure, observers noted that despite some limited improvements in the southern West Bank and around Qalqilya and Tulkarem, the blockade of Palestinian towns had not been significantly removed despite Israel’s announcements.<sup>3</sup> At best, Palestinians were allowed to pass freely through roadblocks (as in the north of Ramallah) but the physical obstacles remained intact, and could be - and actually were - reimposed at very short notice. Accordingly, the Palestinians were not yet afforded the right to lead normal lives, including planning regular economic activities or enjoying regular access to basic services.<sup>4</sup> In September 2003, 25 foreign non-governmental organizations, including ANERA, Care International, Save The Children and World Vision, highlighted Israel’s contravention of key international laws that were occurring as a result of restrictions on movement and access. They also called for free and unrestricted movement for all.<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, curfew has been frequently imposed on populations living in areas where the Israeli military was conducting military operations. In Jenin, for example, the city’s population was under curfew for more than one week in October 2003 after the Israeli military moved into the city and its refugee camp upon learning the identity of the Palestinian bomber that hit Haifa on October 4, 2003. Overall, according to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the city most affected by curfews in the last 20 months (June 2002 - February 2004) has been Hebron, which was under curfew 40% of the time (5,800 out of 14,257 hours) followed by Nablus (32%), Tulkarem (31%), Jenin (26%), Bethlehem (18%), Ramallah (17%) and Qalqilya (15%).<sup>6</sup>

Life in the Gaza Strip has also disrupted by mobility restrictions imposed by the Israeli military. The entire Gaza Strip is sealed off via an “electronic wall” which enforces the external closure and virtually imprisons the Gaza Strip’s 1.2 million inhabitants. At times, the Israeli authorities have allayed this external closure by allowing some 15,000 Gazans who possess the required pass documents to work in Israel. This measure has generally been short-lived, and mobility restrictions re-established with the return of tensions. Even when it is permitted, passage into Israel has continued to be a dreadful experience, with workers waiting hours to pass through the extensive security checks.

Gazans were also affected by an internal closure regime. On the one hand, Israeli checkpoints such those situated at Abu Huli-Gush Qatif (the only passable road connecting the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip) were frequently closed,

<sup>1</sup> “Israel reopens Gaza border crossing to Palestinian workers”, February 27, 2004, AFP.

<sup>2</sup> European Institute for Research on Mediterranean and EuroArab Cooperation, *Palestinian Workers in Israel*, June 2004, [www.medeade.be](http://www.medeade.be).

<sup>3</sup> OCHA, *Comment on Israel’s announcement that closure will be eased in the West Bank*, 6 November 2003 and OCHA, “OCHA Humanitarian Update Occupied Palestinian Territories 16 Dec. 2003 - 19 Jan. 2004,” February 19, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> *International aid agencies call for free and unrestricted movement for all*, [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int); September 28, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> “Curfew Tracking days/hours by district”, [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org).



thus disrupting all movement of people and goods. On the other hand, areas of the Strip situated near Jewish settlements, such as the Mawasi enclave (population 5,000), have experienced shortages of medication and restricted access to medical services and schools outside of the enclave.<sup>1</sup>

The following subsections aim at determining the Palestinians' own perceptions of their mobility status during the period from August 2003 to February 2004, in light of developments in Israel's closure policy.

### **1.4.1 Palestinian perceptions of their mobility status**

The slight relaxing of Israel's closure policy has positively impacted on mobility in the OPT. The percentage of interviewees and their families for whom restrictions on mobility had created "a lot" of problems in the past six months decreased from 63% in July 2003, when our last survey was conducted, to 59% in February 2004.

Conversely however, the percentage of interviewees stating that those restrictions had affected them "a little" increased from 26% to 31%, while the percentage of interviewees "not affected" decreased from 11% to 10% (o031). By and large, these findings indicate that Israel's closure policy during the period under scrutiny was less harsh than in earlier stages of the Intifada, albeit simultaneously affecting greater numbers of Palestinians.

On account of the higher number of roadblocks in the West Bank and the spectacular expansion of the Wall, West Bankers seemed to be more affected by mobility problems. Indeed, 96% of West Bankers said that they experienced "a lot" or "a few problems" in that respect, versus 81% in the Jerusalem area and 85% in Gaza who experienced "a lot" or "a few problems".

As highlighted in our previous surveys, the inhabitants of villages are those most affected by restrictions on movement.<sup>2</sup> In February 2004, 69% of villagers stated that they had been affected "a lot" by mobility restrictions versus 56% of city inhabitants and 52% of the camp dwellers who gave the same response.

### **1.7.1. The economic impact of closure on individuals**

This survey found that access to places of employment had largely improved during the period under scrutiny.<sup>3</sup> The percentage of respondents who declared that they or their family had found it difficult or very difficult to go to work decreased from 66% in July 2003 to 47% in August 2004 (o114).

From a regional perspective, difficulty of physical access to respondents' place of employment remained significantly more acute in the West Bank than in the Gaza and Jerusalem areas:

Despite this improvement of access to places of employment, Israel's closure policy continued to impact negatively on the economy of the OPT.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, *Report VI*: 15.

<sup>3</sup> The overall socioeconomic impact of Israel's closure policy on the economy will be discussed at length in the chapter of the report on socioeconomic conditions.



Segregation of the West Bank




Figure 1-5: Mobility Restrictions in the West Bank

Source: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, [www.arij.org](http://www.arij.org)



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

For example, the inability to get to their place of work was the reason given by a majority (51%) of those who admitted having lost their jobs or having to search for new employment (235 respondents in total) in the past six months, as the main cause for the negative change in their employment status (o012 and o013).<sup>1</sup> Likewise, problems related to mobility restriction, such as difficulty arriving at work, inability to work because of curfew or to market products in particular areas, were all major causes of losses suffered by private businesses in the six months preceding our survey.

As previously, internal disruption of movement and trade was worsened by external closure of the OPT's borders from the outside world. Access to the Israeli labour market remained limited to some 10,000-15,000 workers,

i.e. about 10% of the average number of work permits granted before the Intifada. Jordan, fearing a new Palestinian exodus, continued to impose on West Bankers restrictions on their entry in the Kingdom.<sup>2</sup> On the more positive side however, the Jordanian government announced in late December 2003, that it would exempt all Palestinian products entering Jordan from paying customs. In addition, Palestinian businessmen would be given VIP status for entering Jordan.<sup>3</sup>

### 1.4.2 Closure's impact on humanitarian intervention

From July 2004 to February 2004, physical access to education, health, and relief services provided by the Palestinian Authority and other local and international agencies continued to be undermined by Israel's closure policy, though to a lesser extent than in earlier periods of the Intifada.




Figure 1-6: Percentage of time under curfew, according to West Bank municipality, June 2002 - February 2004




Figure 1-7: Impact of mobility restrictions (o032), July 2003 - January 2004

<sup>1</sup> The same variable was at 56% in July 2003.

<sup>2</sup> See Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini and Rabah, *Report VI*: footnote 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Jerusalem Times*, December 25, 2003.



**1.4.2.1 Relief and health emergency aid**

Our last report underscored the political dilemma inherent in relief assistance, namely that international assistance on behalf of Palestinians living in the OPT could be de facto construed as relieving Israel of its obligations to provide for the needs of Palestinians under the Fourth Geneva Convention. To add to the dilemma, it was becoming obvious that without political solutions for lifting the closures, curfews and other restrictions, relief efforts could only have a limited impact, not least because those restrictions were also affecting aid agencies' ability to access needy communities. In this respect, OCHA and the Palestine Red Crescent Society have continued to chronicle on a weekly basis the numerous incidents of Israeli military denials and delays of access to medical teams in the field. Delays usually range from 15 minutes to several hours (in one case in the Balata refugee camp, medical teams waited seven hours for access on December 26, 2003).<sup>1</sup>





Figure 1-8: Impact of mobility restrictions (o032) by area of residence

UNRWA has also protested to the Israeli military, charging it with serious breaches of international law, damage to its installations (mainly in the southern Gaza Strip) and the forced entry of UNRWA facilities.<sup>2</sup> On one instance, Israeli troops made an incursion into UNRWA's Qalqilya hospital, resulting in the disruption of its medical operations and raising the risk of cross-contamination in sterile areas.

Figure 1-9: Physical access to place of work (o114) according to region of residence



<sup>1</sup> See for instance the PRCS's Weekly Press Releases on [www.palestinercs.org](http://www.palestinercs.org) and OCHA's *Humanitarian Updates (Occupied Palestinian Territories)* on [www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int).  
<sup>2</sup> *Twenty-third progress report October - December 2003*, UNRWA, December 31, 2003.



In late 2003, the International Committee for the Red Cross responded to the dilemma of providing aid in the context of closure by ending the food aid distribution scheme it had launched in mid-2002. The move, it said, was an attempt to get Israel to confront its binding legal obligations under international law.<sup>1</sup> Still, regular complaints leveled by Palestinians and members of the international community concerning Israel's refusal to abide by the obligations of occupying powers towards civilians (as stated in the Geneva Convention) have not succeeded in improving the situation.




Figure 1-10: Impact of mobility restrictions on economic activity: changes in employment status (o113) and difficulties faced by businesses (o140)

### 1.4.2.2 Education

Our survey found that students' access to schools and universities had improved during the period under scrutiny. The percentage of respondents who experienced various degrees of difficulty in reaching educational facilities decreased by half, from 54% in July 2003 to 29% in February 2004 (o113). Logically, pupils in villages found it most difficult to get to educational facilities but their conditions also improved: 38% rather than the 68% recorded in July 2003 said it was difficult or impossible to attend classes.

While relative improvement in access to educational facilities is a welcome development, this improvement should not conceal the gravity of the broad condition of education in the OPT. Having, as our survey found, approximately one-third of the population finding it difficult to get access to educational facilities remains a serious problem that may have serious consequences on the future of the OPT.

## 1.5 THE WALL AND MOBILITY: LOCAL AND REGIONAL IMPACTS

Since its inception in June 2002, the Wall that Israel is constructing in the West Bank - a barrier composed of a series of concrete walls, barbed wire, electrified fencing, control towers and trenches in some places as wide as 25 meters - has caught the attention of world media and diplomats.

Officially presented by Israel as a means of arresting Palestinian suicide attacks, the Wall actually goes deep - at times as deep as six kilometers - into Palestinian territory, de facto annexing the main West Bank Jewish settlements and Palestinian agricultural land to Israel. Ninety percent of the Wall is

<sup>1</sup> "Aid gets political," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 26, 2003.



located in West Bank territory. Once completed, the Wall's current length of more than 160 kms will ultimately extend over 700 - 750 kms from the north-western Jenin-Tulkarem-Qalqilya triangle down to the south of Hebron, directly encircling as many as 400,000 people (18% of the West Bank population) and indirectly impacting more than double that number.<sup>1</sup>

Among the Wall's disastrous socio-economic and political side-effects on the OPT population are the following:

### **1.5.1 Land confiscation and destruction**

The Wall has so far "appropriated" to Israel 107 sq. km (nearly 2% of the West Bank) including 16 villages and 12,000 residents. Its construction has necessitated the uprooting of over 100,000 olive and citrus trees and the demolition of 75 acres of greenhouses and 23 miles of irrigation pipes. In addition, hundreds of buildings, stores, factories and homes in areas adjacent to the Wall have been destroyed. As a result, the entire regional economy is now under jeopardy. A Palestinian official recently stated that the West Bank city of Jenin was losing \$US 4 million monthly due to the construction of the Wall, and consequently was on the brink of catastrophe.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.5.2 Separation from land and resources**

As of February 2004, the Wall had severed 115 communities from their land and resources. Its construction had also isolated 36 groundwater wells and over 200 cisterns from their communities, with an additional 14 wells threatened for demolition.<sup>3</sup>

### **1.5.3 Job losses**

The combined impact of land confiscation, the destruction of orchards, and restrictions on movement caused by the Wall is shrinking the job market for Palestinians and further undermine their job status. In the Tulkarem area, for instance, unemployment rates have risen from 18% in 2000 to 78% in 2003.<sup>4</sup>

### **1.5.4 Difficulty in accessing educational and health facilities**

The Wall's crippling impact on access to educational and health facilities has been felt the hardest in Tulkarem, Qalqilya and East Jerusalem. Up to 71 primary health clinics are gradually being isolated from the rest of the West Bank, although they are also not fully equipped to serve communities in close proximity. In addition, according to the PNA Ministry of Education, around 3,000 students from the governorates of Jenin, Tulkarem and Qalqilya are not able to continue their education as a direct result of the Wall.<sup>5</sup>

### **1.5.5 Other psychological and political ramifications**

Aside from its specific social and economic impact, construction of the Wall has also been observed as severely undermining the morale of the inhabitants of areas crossed by the Wall.<sup>6</sup> In this respect, separation from relatives and friends may have contrib-

<sup>1</sup> *Statistics on the Wall Barrier*, [www.btselem.org](http://www.btselem.org); and Palestine Monitor. Fact Sheet - Apartheid Wall", [www.palestinemonitor.org](http://www.palestinemonitor.org).

<sup>2</sup> *Idem*, and *Jenin City Losses \$7 Million a Month due to the Israeli Practices*, Information Palestinian Center (IPC), March 20, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Palestine Monitor Fact Sheet.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> "The Psychological Implications of Israel's Separation Wall on Palestinians," Palestinian Counseling Center (PCC).



uted to worsening other accompanying psychological impacts of the Wall and its physical effects. From a political perspective, the construction of the Wall seems to be undermining the advent of a viable state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It has also contributed to spread in the OPT and in the neighboring Arab countries the fear that it may well trigger a mass migration process to Jordan.

The following section aims at grasping Palestinians' perceptions of the Wall, particularly in relation to mobility issues. By using the variable of "residence in an area crossed by the Wall" as the main independent variable, it also tackles the Wall's regional dimension and examines whether the Wall is inducing Palestinian emigration.

### 1.5.6 General perceptions of the Wall

A wide majority of 97% of our total sample expressed some concern about the Wall. This concern was prevalent across all segments of the OPT population. Virtually all of the respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall admitted being concerned (90%) or rather concerned (10%). Percentages of respondents not residing in areas crossed by the Wall were lower but significant - 80% said they were concerned and 18% said they were rather concerned (o165). Respondents living in Jerusalem were the most concerned, ahead of West Bankers and Gazans.

The higher of degree of concern among Jerusalemites may explained by the fact that construction the Wall near Jerusalem was underway when the survey took place, whereas sections in the West Bank had already been officially completed (see Map I which tracks Phase I in the West Bank and Phase II in Jerusalem). Responses from Gaza Strip respondents may result from two factors. Gazans are certainly concerned over a scheme that deeply harms their fellow countrymen and, moreover, undermines the state formation process in the OPT as a whole. Gazans' concern may also stem from their own experience of the wall that surrounds the Gaza Strip, a border control on the Strip's boundaries imposed by the Israeli military. In addition, a new 55 km-long electrified barrier is also been planned for Gaza. Some 10 km of that fence have already been constructed.<sup>1</sup>



Figure 1-11: Concern over the Wall (o165) by region

### 1.5.7 Insecurity and mobility perceptions: towards a "Wall areas status"

This survey highlights the increased hardships faced by the OPT population living in areas crossed by the Wall, as compared with the rest of the population. It also underscores the emergence of a new underprivileged segment of the OPT community, the "Wall people." This comparative disadvantage is already clear regarding heightened feelings of insecurity.

<sup>1</sup> Fact Sheet - Apartheid Wall, [www.palestinemonitor.com](http://www.palestinemonitor.com).



This heightened feeling of insecurity appears to reflect a comparatively higher incidence of problems of mobility for the respondents living in close proximity to the Wall. Overall, 79% of them admit encountering “a lot” of problems of mobility versus 57% of respondents residing in other areas. More precisely, 75% of them found it difficult or almost impossible to get to their place of work and 67% suffered losses in their businesses due to an inability to work under Israeli-imposed curfew. By comparison, in areas not crossed by the Wall, 43% of respondents found it difficult or almost impossible to get to their place of work, and 48% suffered losses in their businesses due to curfew (o140). Likewise, respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall reported comparatively more problems in getting access to social services. The percentage of them who needed hospitalization and ambulance services, but were denied such services or obtained them after delay, was over twice that of respondents not living in areas crossed by the Wall. The same disadvantage is apparent in reported access to educational services.

The socioeconomic repercussions of decreased mobility for inhabitants of areas crossed by the Wall will be discussed at length later in this report. Suffice it to say that only 21% of these respondents believed they could sustain themselves financially for “as long as it takes” - half of those who said the same among other OPT residents.


### 1.5.8 Scaling problems caused by the Wall

In the opinion of our respondents, what are the main problems caused by Israel’s construction of the Wall? “Separation from relatives” was named as the main problem created by the construction of the Wall, and this problem was named well ahead of the increased price of goods, agricultural problems or forced displacement.

These findings reflect the situation as it stood in early 2004, and therefore must be interpreted with care. The lower percentages ascribed to agricultural factors such as separation from water, difficulty in farming or inability to market agricultural produce may only indicate that farmers who could not work on their lands anymore, especially in the Jenin-Tulkarem-Qalqilya triangle where construction of the Wall was completed early,

had already abandoned agricultural work. As to forced displacement (within the OPT), one may believe that its choice as the least important result reflects some degree of “steadfastness” or a Palestinian attachment to the land. This may also indicate, however, that displacement is not, or is no longer, a practicable option, or that most displaced have already emigrated abroad (see section 1.5.4).


Figure 1-12: Feeling of security (o118) by Wall



**1.5.9 The Wall as a factor in emigration**

Since the start of the Intifada in September 2000, fears have been expressed in the OPT and the Arab world that the worsening of Palestinian living conditions may lead to a now exodus from the OPT to neighboring countries like Jordan, where many OPT residents have relatives, or elsewhere. That nightmare scenario has prompted Jordanian authorities to impose since 2001 restrictions on the entry of OPT residents.<sup>1</sup> Since the construction of the Wall and the subsequent worsening of conditions in the West Bank, Jordanians' fears have been heightened.

Figure 1-13: Problems of mobility (o031, o114, o140e, o113a, o102b) according to the Wall



As such, the question must be asked: has the construction of the Wall affected emigration patterns? At the end of 2001, our survey had found that 8% of the respondents had an immediate family member who had emigrated abroad. While less than 10% of respondents were seriously thinking of emigration, nearly twice that number stated they may possibly emigrate in the future.<sup>2</sup> The February 2004 survey shows that this picture has not changed significantly. The percentage of respondents with an immediate family member that had emigrated increased slightly to 9%, but respondents thinking of emigration in the future decreased to 7% and 16% respectively (o094).




Figure 1-14: Percentage of the population who report various problems created by the Wall (o164)

<sup>1</sup> Kamal Dorai, Jalal Al Hussein and Jean-Christophe Augé, "De l'émigration au transfert? Réalités démographiques et craintes politiques en Jordanie," *Revue Maghreb-Machrek*, N°176 (été 2003): 75-92.

<sup>2</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, and Rabah, *Report III*: 36.



## February 2004 Surveys

As to the specific impact of the Wall on emigration patterns, the survey shows that the independent variable “area crossed by the Wall” is not conclusive for analyzing migration patterns.<sup>1</sup> This is also the case for the “poverty status” independent variable, which reflected that the poor and non-poor share similar perceptions and practice about emigration. This was not the case at the end of 2001, when our survey found that rich Palestinians more often had relatives that had emigrated, but that the poorest Palestinians thought more seriously of leaving.<sup>2</sup>




Figure 1-15: Preferred area for emigration, December 2001 - February 2004

Again, this status quo may be interpreted as reflecting either steadfastness or the lack of emigration options. The latter hypothesis is supported somewhat by respondents’ answers when asked their choice of country of emigration. Probably due to restrictions imposed by the Jordanian and Egyptian authorities on the entry of Palestinians, emigration (or future emigration) has since the beginning of the Intifada mainly targeted Europe and the United States, which are relatively difficult countries to emigrate to, requiring social networks and enhanced financial means.

<sup>1</sup> Chi2 > 0.5 for all question related to emigration.

<sup>2</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, and Rabah, *Report III*: 37.



## 2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

### 2.1 MAIN RESULTS

#### 2.1.1 Objective and subjective poverty

Since our most recent survey, Israeli military forces have undertaken repeated incursions into the Gaza Strip that have restricted the population's mobility, destroyed civilian property and economic capabilities, and introduced new higher levels of violence.

This study's results show a severe deterioration of the business environment in the Gaza Strip since July 2003. In

the West Bank, the situation has slightly improved - especially inside refugee camps - but the series of walls, fences, barbed wire, patrol roads and electronic monitors that Israel is building in the West Bank (hereafter the "Wall"), is a growing problem for businesses in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) remains widespread, with 56% of the population being poor and 23% of the population being extremely poor. The overall poverty and extreme poverty rates remained almost the same, as compared to the rates in July 2003. But the Wall has impacted levels of poverty in the OPT. The poverty rate among respondents living in areas crossed by the Wall was significantly higher than the average poverty rate in the OPT (65% as compared to 56%).

The poverty rate is much higher in the Gaza Strip region, affecting 70% of the population there as compared with 54% of West Bankers and 15% of East Jerusalem residents. Moreover, the difference between the Gaza Strip and West Bank regions can be seen in the depth of poverty as well as the proportion of residents who are poor. In Gaza, 35% of those surveyed were extremely poor, as compared with 18% of those surveyed in the West Bank and 2% in East Jerusalem.

While the rate of poverty remains relatively low in East Jerusalem, it is an escalating phenomenon, gradually rising from 9% in November 2002 to 12% in July 2003 to the most recent rate of 15% in February 2004. Moreover, poverty and extreme poverty is very likely underestimated in East Jerusalem as a result of the poverty line chosen. Indeed, 48% of East Jerusalem respondents reported that their income is much less than required. This self-assessment of poverty has risen significantly from the 35% of respondents who reported the same in July 2003.

One striking finding of this survey is the sharp deterioration of the material situation of residents of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the percentage of extremely poor increased from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February





## February 2004 Surveys

2004. This means that that rate of extreme poverty in Gaza Strip refugee camps is now more than twice that of the average rate in the Occupied Territories as a whole.

In contrast, among Gaza Strip residents not living in refugee camps the poverty rate and the extreme poverty rate decreased from 75% to 67% and 34% to 29%, respectively.

In the West Bank, the number of poor outside refugee camps remained the same, while the number of poor inside the camps decreased significantly. Since July 2003, the poverty rate inside West Bank camps decreased from 66% to 55%. This positive trend appears to have mostly benefited the poorest West Bankers, as the rate of extreme poverty in West Bank refugee camps dropped from 28% to 16%.

In that context, it is no surprise that the percentage of respondents in West Bank refugee camps who said they were in “serious” condition and did not know how to make ends meet decreased from 23% to 5%. The economic situation remains precarious, nevertheless, given that the proportion of those who “can barely manage” in West Bank refugee camps increased from 30% to 49% during the same period.

An analysis of poverty rates according to refugee status indicates that refugees are experiencing a higher rate of poverty than non-refugees, at 60% compared to 53%. But the level of extreme poverty between the two groups remains very similar, with 22% of non-refugees and 24% of the refugees reporting income levels of extreme poverty.

When compared to our July 2003 survey, the poverty rate among non-refugees has increased from 51% to 53%, including a significant increase from 19% to 22% in the proportion of extremely poor. The poverty rate among refugees decreased from 66% to 60% since July 2003, including a decline in the proportion of extremely poor from 30% to 24%.

### 2.1.2 Coping strategies

Significantly, less than half of respondents in our survey reported that they still have means of relieving their hardship and one-fourth of respondents reported that their means will be exhausted soon.

Moreover, the results indicate that only 40% of the poor (excluding the extremely poor) and 30% of the extremely poor report still having available means to relieve hardship, while 32% of both groups reported that their means would be exhausted soon.

The significance of this finding is that a continuation of the current situation will lead to dramatic new pressures on those providing humanitarian assistance as the population’s coping strategies are progressively exhausted.

For example, savings are gradually depleted and subsequently less important as a coping strategy with the prolonging of the socio-economic crisis. Our survey shows that among the extreme poor, the proportion of those who are using savings to manage their hardship has decreased from 77% to 52% between July 2003 and February 2004.



Land cultivation is another important method that has been used to cope with material deprivation. Twenty-two percent of respondents reported using this strategy. Still, land cultivation is a strategy used mostly in the West Bank, outside refugee camps, where 34% of respondents reported its use, as compared with 18% in the Gaza Strip outside camps.

Finally, this survey indicates that 57% of the extremely poor have the sense that their household is in about the same financial straits as the people of their community and only 39% think that their household is in a worse situation. When compared with the findings of July 2003, there is a significant decrease in the proportion of extremely poor respondents stating that they were in a worse situation than the other people of their community - from 45% to 39%.

Thus, the growing discontent of the poorest regarding their household's financial situation as compared to the rest of their community that was identified in the July 2003 survey has been reversed. And the risk of social fragmentation and social conflict which may have been aggravated by the persistence of this trend is now less important.

## 2.2 BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

Mobility restriction, destruction of economic facilities, mass poverty and a high level of violence and incertitude have all contributed to a severe economic depression in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which has had dramatic consequences for the business sector. The private sector's ability to run businesses and create wealth has been greatly reduced due to lack of access to domestic and export markets; increasing transportation costs; shortages in raw material; decreasing demand; and the inability to work or to cultivate land. In this context, private investment has nearly vanished and the potential for development has been reduced.

Among survey respondents, 41% reported that their business had suffered due to inability to market their products. In villages, this problem is most severe, with 51% of village residents emphasizing it over other difficulties. Forty percent of city residents cited the inability to market products, while only 27% of refugee camps cited this hardship.

This result reflects a slight deterioration since July 2003 when 38% of all respondents said that they were unable to market their products. The main factor explaining this change is the severe deterioration of the business environment in the Gaza Strip region.

Overall, there are signs that the socio-economic situation in the West Bank has improved. The rate of respondents reporting an inability to market products decreased from 54% to 49% since July 2003. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, there has been a deterioration: 21% in July 2003 reported an inability to market products, as compared with 37% today. In East Jerusalem, the situation has not changed.



## February 2004 Surveys

West Bank refugee camps show the most improvement, with the proportion of respondents reporting some inability to market products dropping from 44% to 27% since our last survey. Outside the refugee camps, this decreased to a lesser degree, from 55% to 51%. In the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, the percentage of respondents reporting some inability to market products has increased sharply from 25% to 41% among those residing outside refugee camps, and from 14% to 28% inside refugee camps.





Figure 2-1: Business decline due to inability to market products to areas (o140a) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

In another indication of the slightly improved West Bank business climate, the proportion of respondents reporting business decline due to an inability to repay bank loans decreased from 36% to 25% between July 2003 and February 2004.

Still, our results indicate that business investment during the second Intifada has been very low. Overall, only 10% of respondents reported investing in business activities. This rate is higher for the respondents who reside in the West Bank outside refugee camps (at 13%), whereas 5% of refugee camp residents in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip reported new investments. Nine percent of those living outside Gaza Strip refugee camps reported investing in business activities. It is also interesting to note the very low level of business investment in East Jerusalem since the start of the second Intifada. Only 7% of respondents from that region reported some business investment.

Figure 2-2: Business decline due to difficulties in buying raw materials or products (o140b) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004



Others results reflect the growing difficulties of doing business in the Gaza Strip. For example, the percentage of respondents in the West Bank who stated that their business suffered due to difficulties in buying raw materials



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

or products decreased from 58% to 50%, as compared with 22% to 17% in Jerusalem, and an increase from 26% to 37% in the Gaza Strip. The most marked improvement in the regard was found in the West Bank refugee camps where the percentage of respondents reporting difficulties in buying raw materials or

products dropped from 49% to 32%. In contrast, a growing number of Gaza Strip residents reported difficulties in buying raw materials or products; outside refugee camps, the percentage of respondents increased from 31% to 41%, inside refugee camps the percentage increased from 16% to 28%.

Mobility restrictions affecting access to the workplace was one of the main problems confronting the business sector in previous surveys; it was especially an acute problem in the West Bank. The results of this survey show that this has improved. The proportion of respondents stating that business declined due to problems in getting to the workplace decreased from 67% in July 2003 to 50% in January 2004. This overall showing results from a very impressive drop in the number of West Bank respondents reporting that problem (a decline in percentage from 80% to 58%).

This trend was very pronounced both inside and outside the refugee camps of the West Bank. The percentage of respondents stating that business suffered due to mobility restrictions also decreased in East Jerusalem from 38% to 24%, and in the Gaza Strip both outside refugee camps from (59% to 49%) and inside the refugee camps (from 53% to 39%).

Curfews were less a problem for business than before as the percentage of respon-

dents who named it as a problem decreased from 52% to 35% between July 2003 and February 2004. This evolution is a sign of the softening of the curfew regime in the West Bank. Broken down by place of residence, the proportion of respondents who stated their business suffered due to inability to work because of curfews decreased from 83% to 54% in the West Bank outside

Figure 2-3: Business decline due to problems in reaching the workplace (o140c) according to places of residence






Figure 2-4: Business suffered due to inability to work because of curfews (o140e) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

## February 2004 Surveys

refugee camps and from 66% to 45% inside refugee camps. The situation has also slightly improved in the other places where the curfew regime was less severe such as in Jerusalem and outside refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it has slightly worsen in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.

Figure 2-5: The Wall: difficulties in operating business in the agriculture sector (o164)



The Wall is a growing problem for businesses in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. It has created obstacles for marketing agricultural products, especially for respondents from the West Bank who live outside refugee camps. Thirty-nine percent said that the Wall was a problem in marketing produce.

The results also demonstrate that the Wall has resulted in increased prices for material and transport. About 45% of West Bank respondents outside refugee camps, and Jerusalem resident, emphasized this problem. Moreover, villages had the largest percentage of respondents (nearly half as compared to 31% in the cities) who emphasized increasing prices for material and transportation related to the Wall. The main victims of this situation are the producers in the area crossed by the Wall who have to pay a higher price for their inputs and consumers who have to pay higher prices for food.

Among many other problems, access to water seems to be a major concern in the West Bank; 29% of respondents living outside refugee camps stated that the Wall severed their access to water. In conclusion, 37% of West Bank respondents living outside the refugee camps declared that agriculture was now difficult or impossible as a result of the Wall.

Another important economic finding was the sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who reported business losses as a result of damage to agricultural lands. Thirty-six percent of respondents in February 2004 cited this problem as compared to 27% in July 2003.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

This problem was especially pronounced and had taken an upward turn in areas outside refugee camps both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But the deterioration was more severe in the Gaza Strip, where those who cited business losses as a result




Figure 2- 6: Business suffered due to damage to agriculture lands (o140f) according to place of residence

of damage to agricultural land increased from 27% to 42% (as compared to an increase from 36% to 44% in the West Bank). The results also indicate a significant increase in the percentage of respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps who emphasized damage to agriculture lands as a problem for business.


## 2.3 POVERTY: CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS

### 2.3.1 Material deprivation

Poverty in the Occupied Palestinian Territories remains widespread, with 56% of the population falling under the poverty line. The overall poverty rate remained almost the same as that in July 2003. These results show that the signs of poverty alleviation that appeared after June 29 (see Report 6), 2003 dissipated with the return of high levels of violence and Israeli military operations, especially in the Gaza Strip. The rate of extreme poverty also remained nearly the same between July 2003 and February 2004, while it had dropped from 28% to 24% between November 2002 and July 2003.

Poverty in the OPT has special features related to region, refugee status, education, employment, gender and other variations. Some of these issues will be analyzed in detail in other chapters of this report. We will focus here on general trends regarding poverty in the OPT.

Figure 2-7:  
Evolution  
of poverty,  
2002-2004



## February 2004 Surveys

One must first highlight strong differences in poverty levels according to region. For example, the poverty rate is much higher in the Gaza Strip region (at 70%) than in the West Bank (at 54%) and East Jerusalem (at 15%).




Figure 2-8: Poverty according to region of residence

Moreover, the differences visible between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are also characterized by the depth of poverty. In the Gaza Strip, the rate of extreme poverty is 35%, as compared to 18% in the West Bank.

The poverty rate is relatively low in East Jerusalem, but follows an ascending trend, increasing from 9% in November 2002 to 12% in July 2003, and reaching 15% in February 2004.




Figure 2-9: Poverty according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

A more detailed poverty analysis, according to place of residence, shows that the highest levels of poverty are found in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, where the poverty rate is 78% as compared to 67% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps, 54% outside West Bank refugee camps and 55% inside West Bank refugee camps.

A striking result of this survey is the sharp deterioration of the material conditions of the residents of Gaza Strip refugee camps where the proportion of the extremely poor increased from 36% to 47% between July 2003 and February 2004. This deterioration means that the extreme poverty rate in the Gaza Strip refugee camps is now more than two times higher than the average rate in the OPT as a whole.

One of the main reasons for this trend is the resumption and escalation of Israeli military activity in the Gaza Strip region after August 2003. However, the subsequent deterioration of conditions only seemed to affect the refugee



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

camp inhabitants. Outside the refugee camps, the poverty rate and extreme poverty rate have actually decreased since our last study from 75% to 67% and 34% to 29%, respectively.

This comparative difference can be explained by the fact that Israeli security forces undertook in the interim between our studies repeated incursions in the southern Gaza Strip in a concentrated area of refugee camps. The result has been greater restrictions on mobility, destruction of civilian property and economic facilities, and added obstacles before the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, material deprivation is now affecting significantly more people and in a more acute way inside rather than outside Gaza refugee camps.

In the West Bank, the poverty rate among those living outside the refugee camps remained the same, while conditions inside the refugee camps improved very significantly. Inside the camps, the poverty rate decreased from 66% in our July 2003 study to 55% in February 2004. Further, this positive trend benefited mainly the poorest residents, as the rate of extreme poverty dropped from 28% to 16% over the same time.

There are several possible explanations for these trends. In the West Bank, Israeli military activity was less intense and curfews imposed less frequently than in 2002 or in the first semester of 2003. Therefore, West Bank refugee camp

inhabitants may have had easier access to income-generating activities. Another factor that might explain this 50 percent reduction in the number of extremely poor is the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance agencies in targeting the poorest and improving their material conditions. The results for the West Bank show that the poverty rate is about the same inside and outside refugee camps but that extreme poverty is now affecting a higher proportion of people outside than inside those camps. This finding is particularly important as aid agencies continue to try to extend humanitarian assistance towards the poorest Palestinians.

Universally throughout the OPT, refugee camp inhabitants are substantially more poor than those living in cities or villages. Rates of poverty and extreme poverty in the refugee camps are 75% and 42%, respectively, as compared to 57% and 24% in cities.

Comparatively, villages have the lowest rate and least depth of poverty: the average rate of poverty is 55%, while extreme poverty measures at 17%. The main explanation for this is a high level of self-sufficiency in rural areas attained through subsistence farming.




Figure 2-10: Poverty according to area of residence





## February 2004 Surveys

When compared with our July 2003 study, the proportion of extremely poor villagers decreased slightly from 21% to 17%, whereas the proportion of extremely poor refugee camp residents increased sharply, likely as a consequence of the deterioration in Gaza refugee camps mentioned above. Conditions in the cities remained approximately the same over time.




Figure 2-11 : Poverty in areas crossed by the Wall

The Wall has also had a notable impact on poverty in the OPT. The poverty rate among respondents in areas intersected by the Wall (at 65%) was significantly higher than the average for the OPT as a whole (at 57%).

When analyzing poverty according to refugee status,<sup>1</sup> the rate of poverty among refugees was higher than that of non-refugees; 60% compared to 53%. However, the level of extreme poverty is very similar between the two, found at a rate of 22% among non-refugees and 24% among refugees.

When compared to conditions in July 2003, these results show that the poverty rate has increased slightly for non-refugees from 51% to 53%. As well, the proportion of extremely poor among non-refugees increased from 19% to 22% since July 2003. By comparison, the poverty rate for refugees decreased from 66% to 60% and the rate of extremely poor among refugees decreased from 30% to 24% over time.




Figure 2-12: Poverty according to refugee status, July 2003 - February 2004

<sup>1</sup> Not all Palestinian refugees in the OPT live in refugee camps.



This, too, is another indication of how humanitarian assistance might be better targeted to reach the poorest Palestinians.

Finally, the results of our study show a direct correlation between levels of education and the risk of poverty. This correlation is clearest among those with a high level of education, where the risk of falling into poverty and extreme poverty is substantially lower than groups with other levels of education.





Figure 2-13: Poverty according to level of education

**2.3.2 Household's income evolution**

Household income distribution as a whole has changed very slightly between July 2003 and February 2004. In our study, respondents were asked to evaluate their economic situation by placing their monthly income in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) on a scale. One of the main changes in this study was that the middle income group with a monthly income of NIS 1,600 - NIS 3,000 decreased in size from 44% to 40%. This change did not translate into an increase of the low income group (less than NIS 1,600 a month) but rather in an increase from 13% to 17% of the high income group (monthly income ranging between NIS 3,000 - NIS 5000). Moreover, the percentage of the very low income group (less than NIS 500 a month) decreased slightly during the same period from 9% to 8%.

An examination of household income distribution according to place of residence offers additional information about the dynamic of changes in income distribution. The most favorable changes took place in West Bank refugee camps where the proportion

Figure 2-14: Household income evolution (o108), July 2003 - February 2004



## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 2-15: Household income evolution (in 108) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

of the low-income group (monthly income of less than NIS 1,600) decreased from 55% to 37%, whereas the proportion of the middle-income group (monthly income from NIS 1,600 to 3,000) increased from 30% to 53%.

Nevertheless, this positive evolution only benefited the upper fringe of the low income group (those with a monthly income from NIS 500 - NIS 1,600) and was associated with an increase of the proportion of households in the very lowest income group (monthly income less than NIS 500) , which increased from 5% to 9% over time.

On the other hand, household income has deteriorated greatly in Gaza refugee camps where the proportion of the low-income group (monthly income from NIS 1,600 to less than NIS 500) increased from 49% to 55% as a result of the increase in the percentage of the lowest income group (less than NIS 500 a month) from 11% to 16%. These results are a complete reversal of a trend noted in our previous survey, where the lowest household income group in Gaza refugee camps decreased in percentage, and the low income group in West Bank refugee camps increased in percentage.

All these results show the importance of guaranteeing households' access to decent income as a means of preventing poverty. Where the households' income has deteriorated, as in the Gaza refugee camps, poverty and extreme poverty have increased sharply.

The prevailing public perception among Palestinians is that their household income has not improved over the past six months, and that conditions continue in a very negative vein. Nearly half of respondents declared that their household's income has remained the same, while 45% said that it has decreased. In July 2003, by comparison, 52% of respondents declared that their household income has remained the same, while 42% said it had worsened. Therefore, for a very large and growing part of the population, the feeling is that their income is worsening.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

In particular, it was the poor and especially the extremely poor who felt that the income of their household had declined in the past six months. Indeed, among the extremely poor 71% reported that their household income had decreased, whereas only 27% of those above the poverty line said the same. The results indicate a strong feeling of income deterioration among the extremely poor in February 2004, as compared to July 2003 when 83% of respondents stated that their income remained the same. Still, there are some signs of stabilization for those above the poverty line.

Figure 2-16: Household income in the past 6 months (o108), July 2003 - February 2004






Figure 2-17: Household income evolution in the past 6 months (o108) according to poverty



When respondents were asked why their household income had decreased, they most often responded with reasons related to the labor market. This issue will be analyzed extensively in Chapter 3, but it is interesting to emphasize here that 29% of respondents declared that income loss was the result of job loss, whereas 25% emphasized a

Figure 2-18: Main cause of income decline (o109), July 2003 - February 2004



## February 2004 Surveys

loss in working hours, and 10% mentioned damage to business or land. When compared to our July 2003 survey, the results show an important decrease in the rate of respondents giving job loss as the main cause of their income loss, and a sharp increase in those who named damage to business or land, or other causes.




Figure 2-19: Main cause of income decline (n=109) according to poverty

Figures 2.19 and 2.20 show a great diversity in responses to this question, when divided by poverty level and place of residence. Job loss was named as the cause of the income loss for 44% of the extremely poor, whereas it was the cause for income loss for only 19% of both the non-poor and the poor (excluding the extremely poor). For the two later groups, the main cause was a decline in working hours: 23% of non-poor reported this cause, and 30% of the poor also concurred. When compared to July 2003, the main change has been a great decline in the extremely poor who reported job loss as a cause of income decline.

This group decreased proportionally from 71% to 44%, while the same group among the poor (excluding the poorest) decreased from 48% to 19%.

In both the Gaza Strip and West Bank refugee camps, job loss was clearly considered the

main cause of income decline by 52% of Gaza Strip respondents and 39% of West Bank respondents. Loss in working hours was the other main cause for income loss for 22% of Gaza Strip refugee camp residents and 28% of West Bank refugee camp residents. Outside refugee camps in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, job loss and working hour loss were seen as equally important but damage to business or land also played a significant role for




Figure 2-20: Main cause of income decline (n=109) according to place of residence

13% and 10% of the respondents, respectively. Interestingly, 10% of the respondents in Gaza refugee camps named damage to business or property as the cause for income loss, while only 3% of their West Bank counterparts said the same.

The survey's results indicate a sharp decrease in the incidence of job loss as a factor in income loss in the Gaza Strip both inside refugee camps and outside them. Between July 2003 and February 2004, the rate of respondents that were emphasizing job loss as the main cause of income decline has dropped from 72% to 52% inside refugee camps and from 54% to 22% outside refugee camps. In the West Bank among non-refugee camp residents, this rate has also decreased sharply from 44% to 26%, whereas it has not changed among refugee camp residents.

### 2.3.3 Subjective poverty

Poverty has been defined in our study according to an objective poverty line (a monthly income of NIS 1,900 for a family with two adults and four children). The purpose of this section is to give additional information on the respondents' perception of their material living conditions. This method gives a voice to the people, as they are asked to assess for themselves the magnitude of material deprivation that is affecting their lives.

In order to get this information, respondents were asked to estimate the average amount of money they need to meet the basic necessities of their household. This average differs by region of residence, reported as NIS 2,544 in the West Bank and NIS 2,746 in the Gaza Strip. East Jerusalem respondents gave a much higher average monthly cost of basic needs due to a much higher cost of living.

Once the respondents estimate what they need to meet the basic needs of their household, it is then possible to define a subjective financial satisfaction poverty line. It is important to emphasize that respondents do not tend to exaggerate the minimum amount they require, but report what they consider a decent income for making ends meet. Because the official poverty line for the OPT is set at a relatively low level, it is only logical that the subjective poverty line is on average higher. By gathering this information, we learn that the perception of poverty among the public is more widespread than the picture offered by official poverty statistics.

Sixty-six percent of respondents reported that their income was less than the minimum amount they required to meet basic needs, and 39% thought their income was much less than required. Overall,

the perception of material deprivation in February 2004 was not as

severe as that of July 2003 when 50% of respondents stated that their household income was much less than the minimum amount needed.




Figure 2-21: The average amount needed by the household to meet basic needs (o040) according to region of residence



## February 2004 Surveys

Meanwhile, the proportion of those who stated that their household income was slightly less than the minimum amount needed increased from of 23% to 27%. Those who reported that their household income was slightly higher than the minimum amount needed increased incrementally from 8% to 11%.





Figure 2-22: How household income compares to what is required to supply basic needs (o041), July 2003 - February 2004

In East Jerusalem, the perception of poverty is the highest; 48% of respondents reported that their household's income was much less than required. When compared to the results of July 2003, only 35% of East Jerusalem respondents reported the same. In the Gaza Strip and West Bank, subjective poverty is higher among those living inside refugee camps than those outside. Respondents in the West Bank outside refugee camps reported least often (at 34%) that their household income was much less than what's needed.

When analyzing subjective poverty, conditions in Gaza Strip refugee camps are much the same as West Bank refugee camps, whereas conditions are overall better outside refugee camps in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.

Figure 2-23: How household income compares to what is required to supply basic needs (o041) by place of residence



The fact that in East Jerusalem the poverty rate is increasing (see above) and the employment situation is worsening (see Chapter 3) could explain why the proportion of the respondents who have stated that their household income was much less than that required increased from 35% to 48% between July 2003 and February 2004. It is interesting to note that today in East Jerusalem the perception of poverty is the highest of all OPT areas.

### 2.3.4 Income Differentiation and Social Cohesion

The social fabric of Palestinian society is under stress as a consequence of the large-scale socio-economic crisis and the high level of violence that has characterized the second Intifada. In this context, it is crucial to assess the impact of the growing income insecurity on social cohesion. In order to do so, interviewees were asked how they would evaluate their financial situation in comparison with that of others in their community.

In general, there is no sign of social fragmentation based on a process of income differentiation. Overall, 69% of respondents have the feeling that the financial situation of their household is about the same as the people in their community whereas only 16% think it is worse.

More striking is the fact that 57% of the extremely poor have the sense that their household is in about the same financial straits as the people of their community and only 39% think that their household is in a worse situation. When compared with the findings of July 2003, there is a significant decrease in the proportion of respondents stating that they were in a worse situation than others - from 45% to 39%.




Figure 2-24: Perception of household's financial situation (o 128)

Thus, the growing discontent of the poorest regarding their household's financial situation as compared to the rest of their community that was identified in the July 2003 survey has been reversed. And the risk of social fragmentation and social conflict which may have been aggravated by the persistence of this trend is now less important.

West Bank refugee camp residents report more often that their household's financial situation is about the same as that of other households in the community; 85% reported this equality, whereas only 9% said their household's financial situation was worse.





## February 2004 Surveys

At the opposite end of the spectrum were respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps, who reported more often a feeling of household income inequality; only 58% of respondents thought that their household's financial situation was about the same as that of others in their community. Nineteen percent thought it was worse than the people of their community and 24% that it was better.





Figure 2-25: Perception of household's financial situation (0128) according to poverty

When compared to July 2003, these results indicate important shifts in the feelings of West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camp respondents. Since that time, the proportion of respondents who thought that their household's financial situation was about the same as others in their community increased from 63% to 85% in the West Bank and decreased from 71% to 58% in the Gaza Strip.

This result is likely related to both the economic deterioration in Gaza refugee camps which is more deeply affecting already vulnerable groups, and the improvement of poverty conditions in the West Bank refugee camps.

In East Jerusalem, on the other hand, the proportion of respondents stating that their household's financial situation is worse than that of others in their community increased sharply from 6% to 16% between July 2003 and February 2004. This process of

Figure 2-26: Perception of household's financial situation (0128) according to place of residence



income differentiation is the result of both increasing impoverishment and the rise of unemployment and precarious employment in East Jerusalem.

Other results show that about two-thirds of the respondents who work or use to work before the Intifada in settlements have the feeling that their household's financial situation is worse than that of others in the community. This is a proportion four times higher than the OPT average.

Finally, the feeling of comparatively worse economic straits was more pronounced among respondents from the area crossed by the Wall; 21% of this group said that their household income was comparatively worse than that of their neighbors, as compared with an OPT average of 16%.

## 2.4 POVERTY AND COPING STRATEGIES

### 2.4.1 Available means for relieving hardship

In the context of widespread poverty, mobility restrictions and limited access to income generating activities, coping strategies play a crucial role in securing the livelihood of a large part of the population. The risk is that the extent and the duration of the socio-economic crisis affecting the OPT will progressively exhaust these coping strategies and lead to a major humanitarian crisis, as well as growing dependence on humanitarian assistance.

This studies results show no major shift since July 2003. Overall, the proportion of respondents stating that they are able to cope financially "as long as it takes" has increased slightly from 34% to 36%. The percentage of those who report that they are "in serious condition and don't know how to live" decreased slightly from 19% to 15%.

Conditions have improved the most in this regard in the West Bank outside refugee camps and in East Jerusalem. The proportion of the respondents who stated that they are able to cope financially "as long as it takes" increased from 34% to 38% among West Bank non-camp residents and from 20% to 35% among East Jerusalemites between July 2003 and February 2004.

In the West Bank refugee camps, financial problems are much less severe than previously. The percentage of those who reported that they were "in serious condition and don't know how to live" decreased from 23% to 5% (coherent with the sharp decrease of extreme poverty that we have noted above). But the situation is still very precarious, as the proportion of those who "can barely manage" has increased from 30% to 49% in the same period. In addition, the combined proportion of respondents who stated they can manage "as long as it takes" or "about a year" decreased from 48% to 40%.

This study also indicates a deterioration of conditions in the Gaza Strip, particularly among refugee camp residents where the proportion of respondents who stated that they "can barely manage" increased from 33% to 42% since July 2003. Those who reported that they can manage "as long as it takes" decreased from 38% to 33%.



## February 2004 Surveys

The proportion of the extremely poor who are “in serious condition and don’t know how to live” decreased from 41% to 34% between July 2003 and February 2004. But the proportion of those who “can barely manage” has increased from 42% to 47%, which means that the problem of coping financially is less severe but still affects about 80% of the extremely poor. It is also important to emphasize that one-quarter of the respondents who are above the poverty line reported that they “can barely manage.”




Figure 2-27: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to place of residence

Other results show that less than half of the respondents declared that they still have means of relieving the hardship, and 24% reported that their means will be exhausted soon. Another seventeen percent reported that their available means were already exhausted, and 12% said that they had no means of alleviating the hardship from the beginning. This last group is more prominent in refugee camps and in Jerusalem.

These findings show that the means available for relieving the hardship have already been exhausted for a large portion of respondents in the West Bank. An even larger group reports that its resources will be exhausted soon. In West Bank refugee camps,




Figure 2-28: Ability to cope financially (o044) according to poverty

14% said their resources had been depleted and 20% said their resources would be exhausted soon. Outside the camps, 21% reported that their means of alleviating the hardship had been depleted and 27% said that those resources would be exhausted soon. In East Jerusalem, 22% of respondents reported that they had already exhausted their means of relieving the hardship.



In the Gaza Strip, the proportion of those who declared that their available means were already exhausted was smaller than in the West Bank, a finding that fits with the fact that conditions in the Gaza Strip were less severe during the first stage of the second Intifada.




Figure 2-30: Available means of relieving the hardship (o177) according to poverty

The rapid deterioration of the situation since, however, means that those with no available means of alleviating the hardship will soon increase markedly, as 24% of the respondents outside refugee camps and 28% of those inside refugee camps reported that their available resources will be soon exhausted.

Only 40% of the poor (excluding the hardship cases) and 30% of the extremely poor stated they still have means of relieving the hardship. Moreover, thirty-two percent of the poor and of extremely poor reported that their resources will soon be exhausted.

This is a significant finding because it means that the continuation of the current situation will lead to dramatic pressure on the humanitarian assistance system to compensate for the progressive exhaustion of coping strategies in the OPT.

**2.4.2 Strategies for managing the hardship**

Palestinians use various coping strategies for managing their hardship. These strategies vary according to the level of poverty, place of residence or region of residence. With the continuation of the socioeconomic crisis, some strategies tend to become exhausted, as for example, in the case of using savings.

The most common way of coping with material deprivation is reducing expenses. Indeed, 77% of the respondents stated that they had reduced expenses to sustain




Figure 2-31: Main coping strategies for managing the hardship (o131)



## February 2004 Surveys

hardship. This strategy is widely used by the extremely poor; 90% of them stated they had reduced expenses as compared to 83% among the poor (excluding the extremely poor), and 64% among those above the poverty line.

When compared to our survey of July 2003, these findings show that the proportion of those who stated that they had reduced expenses to sustain hardship decreased from 89% to 79% in the West Bank outside refugee camps and from 74% to 64% in East Jerusalem. In other areas that proportion also decreased, but more slightly.

The other most common way of coping with material deprivation is by making use of savings. However, the results indicate a drop in the proportion of respondents reporting the use of savings to sustain hardship from 64% to 49% between July 2003 and February 2004.

This evolution is mainly the result of a decrease in the use of past savings in the West Bank - from 76% to 54% among residents living outside of refugee camps and from 56% to 25% among residents of the refugee camps - and in East Jerusalem, where use of savings decreased from 54% to 32%. Those results must be related to the results illustrated in Figure 2.29 above indicating the exhaustion of available means of relieving hardship in both the West Bank and Jerusalem. In the Gaza Strip the changes are minor by comparison.

With the continuation of the crisis and ongoing obstacles to income-generating activities, savings are depleted and to play a less important role as a coping strategy. Among the extreme poor, 52% stated they were using past saving to sustain the hardship as compared with 77% in July 2003. Figure 2.34 illustrates this declining trend, which is also visible among the poor (excluding hardship cases) and among those above the poverty line.






Figure 2-32: Reducing expenses to cope with material deprivation (o131h) according to place of residence

Figure 2-33: Using past savings to cope with material deprivation (o131b) according to place of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Other common ways of coping with material deprivation are buying on credit and not paying the bills, used by 44% and 42% of respondents, respectively.



Buying on credit is widely used in West Bank

refugee camps by 69% of respondents. It is used by 47% of respondents living in the West Bank outside refugee camps, by 36% of respondents outside Gaza Strip refugee camps, and by 41% of respondents living in Gaza Strip refugee camps. Moreover, a small proportion of the respondents above the poverty line are using this coping strategy (28%) as compared to the poor (51%) and the extremely poor (63%).

Not paying the bills is a strategy widely used inside and outside refugee camps, in the Gaza Strip as well as in the West Bank. It is less common in Jerusalem but it is important to note that the proportion of East Jerusalem respondents who stated that they were not paying the bills increased from 15% to 24% between July 2003 and February 2004. Other results show that 24% of the respondents above the poverty line are not paying the bills to sustain the hardship.

Figure 2-34: Using past savings to cope with material deprivation (o131b) according to poverty





Figure 2-35: Buying on credit to relieve the hardship (o131j) according to place of residence

Figure 2-36: Not paying bills (water, electricity, etc.) (o131g) to relieve the hardship, according to place of residence



## February 2004 Surveys

Cultivating land is also an important way to cope with material deprivation; 22% of respondents reported using this strategy. Nevertheless, it is a strategy mainly used in the West Bank among those living outside refugee camps.

Thirty-four percent of these respondents reported cultivating land to sustain hardship, as compared to 18% of Gaza Strip residents outside of refugee camps. Elsewhere, the strategy is used by nearly no one.





Figure 2-37: Cultivating land to relieve the hardship (o131d) according to place of residence

Selling jewelry/gold is another important coping strategy used by 29% of respondents. In the Gaza Strip refugee camps, 35% of respondents reported using this strategy as compared with 27% of respondents living outside Gaza Strip refugee camps, 15% living inside West Bank refugee camps, and 29% living outside West Bank refugee camps.

These findings show that the proportion of the respondents who had to sell jewelry/gold have greatly increased in the Gaza Strip refugee camps while simultaneously decreasing in West Bank refugee camps. These results are likely linked to the sharp increase in extreme poverty in the Gaza Strip refugee camps. It is the extremely poor who have the highest tendency to sell jewelry/gold to sustain hardship (39% as compared to 18% among the non-poor).

Selling real estate is another means used in the OPT to endure hardship, however it naturally implies that one owns property and is a one-off opportunity. Once property is sold, it is no longer available for sustaining hardship. Results show that only 6% of respondents had sold property to sustain the hardship. Most of these respondents (10%) were living in the West Bank outside of refugee camps.

Figure 2-38: Selling jewelry/gold to relieve the hardship (o131i) according to place of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Finally, there are two other coping strategies, injecting more members of the household into income-generating activities, and receiving assistance from family and friends.

Regarding the first, results of our survey show that 18% of respondents reported that more adults from their household

entered the labor market to sustain the hardship, and 10% reported that more children entered the labor market. The former does not reflect any change from July 2003, whereas the later decreased from 16% to 10%.

Figures 2.39 and 2.40 indicate that the poor tend to put more adults and children into the labor market than the non-poor. Among the extremely poor, the proportion of respondents who reported that more adults entered the labor market decreased from 26% to 18% between July 2003 and February 2004. But among the poor (excluding the extremely poor), the proportion has increased from 20% to 24%. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who stated that more children went into the labor market decreased from 26% to 15% among the extremely poor and from 19% to 11% among the poor (excluding the extremely poor).

When considering the use of children's labor as a coping strategy, the results show that this proportion is higher in villages (11% as compared to 9% in refugee camps and cities). This is mainly due to the participation of children in various agricultural activities in rural areas. Moreover, such coping strategy are hardly used at all in East Jerusalem, where only 3% of the respondents reported its use as compared to 7% in West Bank refugee camps, 10% outside West Bank refugee camps, 9% in Gaza Strip refugee camps and 11% outside Gaza Strip refugee camps.

Fifteen percent of respondents reported receiving assistance from family and friends living abroad, and 12% reported receiving assistance from the family and friends living in the OPT or Israel. Those solidarity networks, particularly assistance from the family and friends from the OPT or Israel, are very





Figure 2-39: More adult going into the labor market to relieve the hardship (o131e) according to poverty

Figure 2-40: More children going into the labor market to relieve the hardship (o131f) according to poverty





## February 2004 Surveys

important for the poorest. Twenty-four percent of the poorest respondents reported relying on such assistance from the OPT or Israel, while 12% of the poor (excluding the poorest) and 5% of the non-poor reported the same. Assistance from family and friends living abroad is much more evenly distributed among the different income groups: its use was reported by 15% of the poorest, 18% of the poor (excluding the poorest), and 12% of the non-poor.




Figure 2-41: Receiving assistance from family and friends (o163e, o163f) according to poverty

These results also show that the proportion of those getting assistance from family and friends living in Palestine or Israel is bigger in the Gaza Strip - 16% in the refugee camps and 13% outside them - than in the West Bank - 11% in the refugee camps and 8% outside them. But assistance from family and friends living abroad is much more important as a coping strategy in the West Bank outside refugee camps (reported by 19% of respondents) whereas only 5% of West Bank refugee camp respondents reported its use and 13% of all Gaza Strip respondents reported its use.



# 3 LABOR MARKET

## 3.1 MAIN RESULTS

### 3.1.1 The employment situation

The overall unemployment rate decreased from 25% to 23% between July 2003 and February 2004 but still less than half of all workers have access to full-time employment.

The OPT labor market is characterized by widespread underemployment which is affecting more than a quarter of the labor force.

The results show a severe deterioration of the labor market in Jerusalem where the unemployment rate reached 33%, as compared to 15% in July 2003. Meanwhile, the rate of full-time employment in Jerusalem dropped from 51% to 39%.

The evolution of unemployment has been very different inside the West Bank refugee camps, as compared to outside them. The unemployment rate decreased from 29% to 25% outside the refugee camps, while increasing from 20% to 30% inside refugee camps.

In the Gaza Strip, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee camps and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps, while the proportion of respondents who reported working part-time or few hours a day increased respectively from 27% to 30% and from 29% to 34%.

The results show a significant increase in job precariousness and underemployment among non-refugees. Overall, the employment situation of non-refugees is now more precarious than that of refugees, having worsened between July 2003 (our last survey) and February 2004. This result explains the significant increase in hardship cases among non-refugees and the parallel decrease of hardship cases among the refugees that was emphasized in Part 2.

The unemployment rate is four times higher for the group of respondents with a low level of education than for those with a high level of education (44% compared to 11%). Moreover, young workers and workers above the age of 50 are particularly vulnerable to unemployment.

### 3.1.2 The Wall

The Wall has had a great negative impact on the labor market as it dramatically affects the employment situation of Palestinian workers living in areas crossed by the series of walls, fences, and patrol roads that Israel is constructing in the West Bank.



Problems of access to the workplace were much more severe for workers living in areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of respondents from these areas reported that it was “almost impossible” to go to work, while another 25% reported that it was “very difficult” to go to work. These numbers are a stark comparison with the 5% of workers in the OPT as a whole who reported it “almost impossible” and the 11% who reported it “very difficult” to go to work. Only one-quarter of the respondents from the area crossed by the Wall stated that it was “not difficult” to go to work.

### 3.1.3 Mobility restrictions

Mobility restrictions have greatly improved, with more than half of all respondents (53%) stating that it was “not difficult” to go to work in the last six months, as compared to one-third who reported such in July 2003. During the same period, the proportion of respondents stating that it was “very difficult” or “almost impossible” decreased from 32% to 16%.

Mobility restrictions were much less severe in the West Bank, as the proportion of those who stated that it was almost impossible or very difficult to go to work decreased from 37% to 18% among respondents living outside refugee camps and from 35% to 18% among respondents living inside refugee camps.

In the Gaza Strip among those living outside refugee camps, the situation is much less severe and has also improved, with 62% of respondents stating that it was not difficult to go to work as compared to 45% who reported such in July 2003. In the Gaza Strip refugee camps where mobility restrictions were more pronounced, the situation has also improved. The proportion of respondents who stated that it was “almost impossible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 35% to 15%.

It was also easier to cultivate land in both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, but this change was more marked in the Gaza Strip where the proportion of the respondents stating that it was “not difficult” to cultivate land increased from 17% to 48% while those stating it was “almost impossible” decreased from 21% to 15%.

### 3.1.4 Occupation

The share of the private sector as employer continues to decline as a consequence of the economic recession, mobility restrictions and destruction of economic facilities. The percentage of respondents that reported working in the private sector decreased from 31% to 24% between July 2003 and February 2004.

The economic recession had a greater impact on private sector employees hiring workers from refugee camps. The proportion of respondents who reported that their private sector employer could no longer pay salaries rose to 27% in the West Bank refugee camps from 13%, and to 26% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps from 16% in July 2003.

The proportion of the self-employed is much more significant outside refugee camps in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip than inside the refugee camps. Nineteen percent of respondents outside West Bank refugee camps and 18% outside Gaza refugee camps reported being self-employed, as compared with 8% of respondents living inside West Bank refugee camps



and 13% living inside Gaza Strip refugee camps. Self-employment is especially significant in rural areas, where 24% of respondents report being self-employed, as compared to 14% in cities and 12% in refugee camps.

One interesting finding was the growing role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and especially local NGOs, as employers. The proportion of respondents stating that they work for a local NGO increased from 1% to 5% between July 2003 and February 2004, while those stating that they work for an international NGO increased from 2% to 4%.

The proportion of respondents who stated that they work for local NGOs reached 13% inside West Bank refugee camps and 12% inside Gaza Strip refugee camps, while the proportion of those living in the camps who reported working for an international NGO was 10% in West Bank refugee camps and 5% in Gaza Strip refugee camps.


### 3.1.5 Poverty risk

Full-time employment is clearly the best way to escape poverty, according to our study. Among full-time workers, 68% registered above the poverty line and only 7% were found to be extremely poor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the risk of poverty is extremely high for those who are unemployed: in their ranks, 44% were extremely poor, and the overall poverty rate was 77% as compared to 32% for those working full-time.

In a context where Palestinian workers are being excluded from the Israeli labor market and subject to frequent mobility restrictions, respondents' location (or last location) of work had a great correlation with incidence of poverty. The rate of poverty among laborers who work or used to work in the settlements or in Israel is extremely high, as high as 90% (in the settlements) and 82% (in Israel). Similarly, the rate of extreme poverty among these two groups was 33% and 47%, respectively.

The risk of poverty is relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain access to employment and secure the income. Indeed, 67% of the respondents above the poverty line stated that the main breadwinner of their household had never been unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, while only 14% stated that he or she had been unemployed more than 12 months. On the other hand, only 21% of the extremely poor reported that the main breadwinner of their household was never unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, whereas 45% reported that he or she was unemployed more than 12 months.

The rate and severity of poverty are correlated with the duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner of the household. For example, the rate of poverty for respondents stating that the main breadwinners of their household had been unemployed more than 24 months was as high as 81% and the rate of extreme poverty as high as 46%.



The type of employer has also had a very significant impact on the incidence of poverty. The Palestinian Authority, international agencies and international NGOs guarantee most employees an adequate income level and job security that staves off poverty.

The private sector is associated with a high incidence of poverty among workers - only 43% of the respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty line, while the proportion of extremely poor employed in the private sector is as high as 29%.

However, self-employment (excluding petty trade) is the type of employment associated with the highest incidence of poverty. Only 22% of the self-employed are above the poverty line, while 36% are extremely poor.

Finally, the risk of poverty is greatly related to job precariousness. Workers who regularly and fully receive their salary are relatively preserved from poverty (62% were above the poverty line whereas 11% were in a state of extreme poverty). At the same time, 38% of workers who did not receive their salary fully and on time were extremely poor and only 17% were above the poverty line. Thus the informalization of the labor market and the increase in self-employment has also aggravated the vulnerability of workers to the kind of practices that deeply affect their material condition.

### 3.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR MARKET

This study shows a decrease in the unemployment rate, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The number of respondents who don't work and define themselves as unemployed decreased from 25% to 23% between July 2003 and February 2004. However, the proportion of respondents reporting full-time employment remains nearly the same - 49% as compared to 48% - which means that less than half of the labor force has access to the most effective means of reducing incidence of poverty.

Considering that most respondents who work part-time or a few hours a day do so because they lack the opportunity to work more, one can say that the OPT labor market is characterized by widespread underemployment affecting more than a quarter of the labor force. The severity of underemployment may even have increased since the time of our last survey, as the proportion of those stating that they work only a few hours a day increased from 15% to 18%, while the proportion of those working part-time decreased from 13% to 10%.

Another interesting result is the significant increase in the proportion of housewives when considering respondents as a whole and not only the paid labor force. Figure 3.2 shows that the rate of housewives increased from 28% to 32% between July 2003 and February 2004.

The main argument to explain this trend is the paralysis in the labor market and the lack of job opportunities, which has led to the exit of many women from the labor market. Other results show that the proportion of unemployed respondents who stated that they did not try at all to find a job rose from 21% in July 2003 to 35% in February 2004.


One can see a correlation between the proportion of housewives and the proportion of the unemployed who did not try at all to find a job. One explanation for this correlation could be that 44% of the total respondents who did



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

not try to find a job have instead devoted time to commitments at home and taking care of children. Under these economic conditions, women are more likely to report themselves as housewives rather than as unemployed members of the labor force.

Figure 3-1 Employment conditions in the labor force (o008), 2002-2004



Indeed, the results indicate that the proportion of housewives increased sharply in Jerusalem (from 21% to 38%) and in the West Bank outside refugee camps (from 27% to 33%) between July 2003 and February 2004. Figure 3.3 shows that during the same period the proportion of unemployed who stated that they did not try at all to find a job increased from 17% to 35% in the West Bank and from 30% to 61% in Jerusalem. The exclusion of Palestinian workers from the labor market is particularly severe in Jerusalem, where the lack of access to job opportunities can explain that only one quarter of the unemployed stated they tried hard to find a job despite a growing material deprivation. The lack of job opportunities is also very severe in West Bank refugee camps where the proportion of respondents who stated that they did not try at all to find a job sharply increased from 14% to 41%. But this evolution led a dramatic increase in unemployment rather than respondents' exit from the labor market (the employment rate remaining approximately the same).

Figure 3-2: Current conditions in employment status (o008), July 2003 - February 2004 (o008)





Figure 3-3: Tried to find a job if unemployed (o014) according to place of residence

## February 2004 Surveys


The fact that extreme poverty was less severe in Jerusalem and the West Bank may explain the much larger proportion of respondents who stated that they did not search hard for a job and instead remained unemployed or exited the labor market (i.e., conditions are not so severe as to require continued participation). This is very different from the Gaza Strip, for example, where the proportion of respondents stating that they tried hard to find a job increased from 60% to 65% over time. This trend was especially strong among respondents in Gaza Strip refugee camps where those who reported trying hard to find a job increased from 54% to 66%. This is very likely a consequence of the related sharp increase in extreme poverty in these areas that has resulted in harsh competition for jobs in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.

Figure 3.4 indicates that the unemployment rate decreased in all places of residence except in East Jerusalem and the West Bank refugee camps. Now East Jerusalem has the highest unemployment rate at 33%, compared to an unemployment rate recorded at 15% in July 2003. Meanwhile, the rate of full-time employment in East Jerusalem dropped from 51% to 39%, which means a severe deterioration of the Jerusalem labor market and a growing incidence of poverty, as discussed in Part 2.

In the West Bank, the rate of full-time employment increased both inside refugee camps (to 54%) and outside refugee camps (to 50%). On the other hand, it is interesting to note that the evolution of unemployment has been very different inside and outside refugee camps. Outside refugee camps in the West Bank, the unemployment rate decreased from 29% to 25%, while inside West Bank refugee camps, unemployment increased from 20% to 30%. Inside the refugee camps, growing unemployment is associated with a decline in the number of respondents who report working part-time or a few hours a day (from 28% to 30%).

In the Gaza Strip, full-time employment remained nearly the same inside the refugee camps and decreased slightly from 52% to 50% among those living outside refugee camps. This trend is associated with the rise in underemployment, rather than a rise in unemployment. In fact, unemployment decreased from 27% to 24% inside refugee

Figure 3-4: Employment conditions of the labor force (o008) according to place of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

camp and from 20% to 16% outside refugee camps. Still, the proportion of respondents who reported working part-time or a few hours a day increased from 27% to 30%, and from 29% to 34%, respectively. Thus, the slight decrease in the number of full-time employees is matched by the increase in workers taking on part-time labor or brief periods of hourly labor.

When examining employment conditions according to refugee status, as illustrated in Figure 3.5, results show a significant increase in job precariousness and under-employment among the non-refugees. The rate of full-time employment for non-refugees decreased from 49% to 43%, while conversely the rate of those working part-time or few hours a week increased from 25% to 30%. Otherwise, the rate of unemployment rate remained about the same between July 2003 and February 2004.




Figure 3-5: Employment conditions in the labor force (o008) according to refugee status, July 2003 – February 2004

On the other hand, employment conditions among the refugees have improved. The rate of full-time employment increased sharply from 47% to 54%, while the unemployment rate decreased from 23% to 20%, and the rate of those working part-time or few hours a day decreased from 30% to 26%.

Overall, employment conditions among non-refugees are now more precarious than those among refugees, having worsened between July 2003 and February 2004. This result also explains the significant increase in hardship cases among non-refugees, and the decrease in hardship cases among the refugees that was discussed in Part 2.

Figure 3.6 shows that the unemployment rate is four times higher among respondents with a low level of




Figure 3-6: Employment conditions among the labor force (o008) according to education



## February 2004 Surveys

education than among those with a high level of education (44% compared with 11%). The proportion of respondents stating that they work part-time or a few hours a day is also much higher for the former (39%) than the latter (19%). Employment conditions among workers with a low level of education are characterized by extreme unemployment and job instability. Only 16% of those with a low level of education have a full-time job.

Young workers and workers over 50 years of age are particularly vulnerable to unemployment. Figure 3.7 indicates that the unemployment rates among these respective groups are 32% and 31%, compared to an unemployment rate of 20% among workers between the ages of 25 and 49. Only 36% of young workers held down a full-time job while 32% of young workers engaged in part-time employment

or worked a few hours a day. The proportion of the employed working only few hours a day is higher among those more than 50 years of age (23%) compared to young workers (19%) and the workers between the ages of 24 and 49 (16%).




Figure 3-7: Employment conditions in the labor force (o008) according to age

In the OPT, less than half of main breadwinners of a household escaped unemployment during the entire period of the second Intifada. Figure 3.8 shows that about one-quarter of all respondents were long-term unemployed (unemployed for more than 12 months) whereas another 15% were very long-term unemployed (without work for more than two years). Mass and persistent unemployment of family breadwinners was a dramatic shock to Palestinian society, as income-generating activities by the main breadwinner were the main source of income. However, the persistence of unemployment is less severe in this study than it was in July




Figure 3-8: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

2003, as the incidence of long-term unemployment (more than 12 months) decreased from 35% to 26%. This means that some respondents who were considered long-term unemployed found work between July 2003 and February 2004.

When duration of unemployment for the main breadwinner is analyzed by region, it appears that Gaza Strip respondents living outside refugee camps report a lower unemployment risk for the main breadwinner, as 52% were never unemployed as compared to inside Gaza Strip refugee camps (46%), Jerusalem (45%), outside West Bank refugee camps (44%) and inside West Bank refugee camps (only 39%)..




Figure 3-9: Duration of unemployment of main breadwinner (o100) according to place of residence

The results also show that a significant proportion of main breadwinners in Gaza Strip and West Bank refugee camps have been unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada - 13% and 15%, respectively - as well as in East Jerusalem where this incidence was as high as 13%.

Our results indicate a stabilization of the employment situation, since 70% of respondents stated that their employment status had not changed in the last six months, as compared to 60% who reported no change in July 2003. Figure 3.10 also shows that the proportion of those who lost their jobs in the last six months decreased from 26% in July 2003 to 20% in February 2004.

This assessment is dramatically different in areas that are crossed by the Wall. In these parts, 29% of respondents reported losing their jobs over the last six months and 18% said that they were forced to find a new job. Thus the Wall has had a significant impact on the labor market and is negatively impacting job stability in the areas where it is located, as shown in Figure 3.11.




Figure 3-10: Change in employment situation over the last six months (o12)

## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 3.12, below, complements Figure 3.4, above, as it shows that the proportion of those who lost their jobs recently increased in Jerusalem (from 10% to 20%) and in the West Bank refugee camps (from 13% to 29%) between the time of our July 2003 poll and this February 2004 poll. Among respondents living outside Gaza Strip refugee camps, the proportion of those who had lost their jobs in the last six months was the lowest of all regions at 13%.




Figure 3-11: Change in employment situation over the last six months, in areas crossed by the Wall (o012)

According to 98% of the respondents, those who report a change in their employment status say that the dynamics of the labor market result from the current political situation. Figure 3.15 indicates the various ways that the current situation has brought about changes in employment status, according to the respondents. Access to the workplace was identified as the main problem; it was reported the cause of employment conditions by 52% of the respondents.

Not surprisingly, inability to reach the workplace was a bigger problem for workers from the West Bank. The West Bank is subject to various types of curfew, closure and checkpoint restrictions that are not as pronounced in the Gaza Strip. However, it is interesting to note that as many as 58% of respondents from Gaza Strip refugee camps also named inability to reach the workplace as the main cause of their change in employment status.




Figure 3-12: Change in employment status over the past six months (o012) according to place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

The other important problem facing 20% of respondents was that employers could no longer pay the salaries of their workers. Another 27% of respondents reported that the lack of jobs was the cause of current employment conditions.



Figure 3-13: Main cause of job change related to the current situation (o013)

When considering this question according to place of residence, results show a deterioration of the financial

situation in the private sector that employs workers from the refugee camps. Indeed, the proportion of the respondents who stated that their employer could no longer pay their salary rose from 13% to 27% in West Bank refugee camps and from 16% to 26% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.




Figure 3-14: Main cause of change in employment status (o013) according to place of residence

### 3.3 Mobility restrictions and access to workplace

Israeli-imposed restrictions on mobility have greatly disrupted the OPT labor market. However, Figure 3.15 shows that the situation has improved since July 2003. More than half of respondents (53%), as compared with one-third of respondents in July, reported that it was not difficult to go to work over the last six months. Over the same period, the proportion of respondents reporting that it was very difficult or almost impossible to go to work decreased from 32% to 16%.

Figure 3.16 shows that problems of access to the workplace were much more severe for workers in areas crossed by the Wall. Indeed, 15% of these respondents reported that it was “almost impossible” to go to work while 25% said it was “very difficult”, as compared to 5% who said it was “almost



## February 2004 Surveys

impossible” and 11% who said it was “very difficult” in the OPT as a whole. Only one-quarter of the respondents from the area crossed by the Wall stated that it was “not difficult” to get to work.

The Wall is mainly a problem for workers from the West Bank and East Jerusalem - and especially for workers from rural areas of the West Bank - when one considers the geographic location of the Wall. Figures 3.17 A and B show that 47% of respondents from the West Bank, and 22% from East Jerusalem, reported that the Wall was preventing their access to jobs. Moreover, 47% of respondents in villages reported that the Wall was an obstacle to employment, as compared to 22% of respondents from cities and 18% of respondents from refugee camps.




Figure 3-15: Ability to go to work over the last six months (O114)




Figure 3-16: Ability to go to work over the last six months (o114) in the area crossed by the Wall

Figure 3.18 indicates that mobility restrictions were much less severe in the West Bank in this most recent poll, as the proportion of those who stated that it was “almost impossible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 37% to 18% outside






Figure 3-17: Wall as obstacle to job access (o164c) according to region and area of residence

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII


Figure 3-18: Ability to go to work over the last six months (o114) according to place of residence



refugee camps and from 35% to 18% inside refugee camps. In the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, conditions have also greatly improved, as 62% of the respondents stated that it was “not difficult” to go to work compared to 45% who said this in July 2003. In Gaza Strip refugee camps, where mobility restrictions were more marked, the situation has also improved as the proportion of respondents who reported it was “almost impossible” or “very difficult” to go to work decreased from 35% to 15%.

Mobility restrictions are also affecting farmers' ability to cultivate land. Figure 3.19 shows that conditions have improved in this respect in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Changes were much more

Figure 3-19: Ability to cultivate land over the last six months (o0115) according to region of residence



## February 2004 Surveys

impressive in the Gaza Strip, however, where the proportion of the respondents who stated that it was “not difficult” to cultivate land increased from 17% to 48%, while those reporting it was “almost impossible” decreased from 21% to 15%.

### 3.4 TYPES OF OCCUPATION AND EMPLOYER

Employees are the largest group of workers, representing 41%, while the self-employed are the second largest group of workers, representing 17%. Figure 3.21, below, indicates that the proportion of self-employed is much more significant outside refugee camps in both the West Bank (19%) and the Gaza Strip (18%) than inside refugee camps in the West Bank (8%) and Gaza Strip (13%).




Figure 3-20: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009)

Self-employment is especially developed in rural areas where 24% of the respondents report being self-employed, as compared to 14% in the cities and 12% in the refugee camps. Simultaneously, the proportion of employees in West Bank refugee camps is larger than in other places, reaching 53% as compared to 41% of employees in the OPT as a whole.




Figure 3-21: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) according to place of residence

Workers with a low level of education were mainly unskilled workers or self-employed, representing 45% and 36%, respectively. Figure 3.22 shows that there were very few employees among respondents with a low level of education. On the other hand, the group of workers with a high level of education was characterized by many employees (61%), and the proportion of professionals (21%) was also much higher than in other groups.




Figure 3-22: Occupation or most recent occupation for the unemployed (o009) according to level of education

Figure 3.23 indicates some important changes in the composition of employers in the OPT. The Palestinian Authority remains the main employer, with 29% of respondents stating that they work for the PA; this share has barely changed since July 2003. The share of the private sector in the distribution of workers continues to decline as a consequence of the economic recession, mobility restrictions and destruction of economic facilities. The private sector has shrunk, decreasing from employing 31% to 24% of respondents in the time between July 2003 and February 2004. Another one-third of respondents report that they are self-employed (including 10% in petty trade activities).




Figure 3-23: Type of employer (o063)

An interesting result is the growing role of NGOs, particularly local NGOs, as employers. The proportion of respondents stating that they work for a local NGO increased from 1% to 5% between July 2003 and February 2004, while those reporting that they work for an international NGO increased from 2% to 4%. Considering that NGOs activities are mainly concentrated in refugee camps and that mobility restrictions are a reason for employing people living in the camps, the impact of this change has been much stronger in the refugee camps. The proportion of respondents who reported working for a local NGO was as high as 13% in West Bank refugee camps and 12% in Gaza Strip refugee camps. The same can be seen in respect to international NGOs, with 10% of respondents in West Bank refugee camps and 5% of respondents in Gaza Strip refugee





## February 2004 Surveys

camp reporting working for international NGOs. Moreover, the share of international agencies in the employment structure was also significant, as high as 10% in West Bank refugee camps and 13% in Gaza Strip refugee camps. Figure 3.24 illustrates this very specific structure of employment in the camps and emphasizes the immense impact of humanitarian activities in providing employment.




Figure 3-24: Type of employer (o063) according to area of residence

### 3.5 EMPLOYMENT AND RISK OF POVERTY

Since the start of the second Intifada, the evolution of the labor market has had profound effects on living standards and household welfare. The rapid increase in unemployment, job precariousness and underemployment have led to a decline in overall income associated with employment and also contributed greatly to an increase in poverty.

Figure 3.25 shows that full-time employment is the best way to escape poverty. Among full-time workers, 68% were above the poverty line and only 7% were extremely poor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the poverty risk is extremely high for those who are unemployed, as 44% were extremely poor and their overall poverty rate was 77% as compared with 32% for those employed full time.




Figure 3-25: Risk of poverty according to employment status (o008)

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

The results indicate also that material deprivation is also widespread among workers who only work few hours a day. The income generated by workers working a few hours a day is too low and uncertain to secure their livelihood. Thus, the poverty rate was as high as 71%, and the extreme poverty rate as high as 31%, among this group of workers.

The results indicate a strong link between the employment status of the main breadwinner and the risk of poverty. As illustrated in Figure 3.26, the risk of poverty is relatively low when the main breadwinner is able to maintain access to employment and secure the income.

Indeed, 67% of the respondents above the poverty line stated that the main breadwinner of their household had never been unemployed since the beginning of the second Intifada, while only 14% stated that he or she had been unemployed more than 12 months. On the other hand, only 21% of the extremely poor reported that the main breadwinner of their household was never unemployed during the Intifada, whereas 45% reported that he or she was unemployed more than 12 months.




Figure 3-26: Duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner (o100) according to poverty

Figure 3.26 also indicates that a large proportion of poor respondents stated that the main breadwinner of their household were unemployed from 7 to 12 months. This situation may lead to added material deprivation if they are unable to get out from the unemployment trap and become long-term unemployed.

Indeed, the rate and severity of poverty are correlated with the duration of unemployment of the main breadwinner of the household. For example, the rate of poverty for respondents stating that the main breadwinners of the household had been unemployed more than




Figure 3-27: Risk of poverty according to place (or most recent place) of work (o11)

## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 3-28: Risk of poverty according to the type of employer (o063)

24 months was as high as 81% and the rate of extreme poverty as high as 46%.

In a context marked by the exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market, as well as mobility restrictions, the place (or most recent place) of work has a great correlation with the risk of poverty. Figure 3.27 shows that the rate of poverty among workers who work or used to work in the settlements (89%) or in Israel (78%) is extremely high, while the rate of extreme poverty was 33% and 44%, respectively. These are the big losers in current conditions, as there is very little hope of returning to pre-September 2000 employment levels inside Israel and the settlements. These conditions put great pressure on the OPT labor market and require an aggressive employment component to a political solution in order to compensate for the massive exclusion of Palestinian workers from the Israeli labor market.

The type of employer also has a very significant impact on the risk of poverty. Figure 3.28 shows that the PA, international agencies and international NGOs guarantee most of their employees an adequate level of income and job security, thus warding off poverty. The extreme poverty rate is only 5% for the workers employed by the PA, 6% for those employed by international agencies and 10% for those employed by international NGOs. Local NGOs also secure livelihood for more than half of their employees, placing them above the poverty line, but the rate of extreme poverty is as high as 26% among those employed by local NGOs.

The private sector is associated with a high risk of poverty, as only 43% of respondents employed in the private sector are above the poverty line and the rate of extreme poverty is as high as 29%. Self-employment (excluding petty trade) is the type of employment that has the highest risk of poverty. Only 22% of the self-employed are above the poverty line, while 36% are extremely poor. The results also show that manufacture petty trade appears to allow adequate means for escaping poverty; 64% of respondents employed in manufacture petty trade activities are above the poverty line, while 17%



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

are extremely poor. Agricultural petty trade is not so profitable, as extreme poverty among its practitioners reached 32%. Still, it is a better means of warding off poverty than those who are otherwise self-employed.

Finally, Figure 3.29 shows that the risk of poverty is greatly related to job precariousness. Workers who regularly and fully receive their salary are relatively preserved from poverty (62% were above the poverty line and 11% were in a state of extreme poverty). At the same time, 38% of workers who did not receive their salary fully and on time were extremely poor and only 17% were above the poverty line. The informalization of the labor market and the increase in self-employment has also aggravated the vulnerability of workers to the kind of practices that deeply affect their material condition.




Figure 3-29: Risk of poverty according to receipt of salary (o099)

From a policy perspective, figures 3.30 and 3.31 demonstrate that any policy intended to fight poverty should emphasize the development of long-term jobs, which are shown here to considerably reduce the risk of poverty and guarantee a basic income. Short-term jobs, as shown here, do not ward off poverty.

Our results indicate that 69% of respondents that reported that their household received a salary from a long-term job were above the poverty line. Only 16% of workers who reported that their household




Figure 3-30: Respondents reporting a salary from a long-term job in their household (o163a) according to

## February 2004 Surveys

received a salary from a short-term job were above the poverty line. Moreover, 19% of respondents reporting the receipt of a salary from a long-term job in their household were extremely poor, while 35% of workers reporting the receipt in their household of a salary from a short-term job were extremely poor.




Figure 3-31: Respondents reporting a salary from a short-term job in their household (o163b) according to poverty level



## 4 ASSISTANCE DELIVERED IN GENERAL

This chapter of our report focuses on the strategies used by local and international organizations in response to the present crisis, specifically general assistance delivery.

In his excellent book on the “very political” economy of peace building and foreign aid, Brynen (2000:10) analyzes donor responsiveness to war-to-peace transitions along four dimensions: the mobilization, coordination, delivery and allocation of assistance. In this chapter we will analyze the perceived delivery of assistance to Palestinian households

and in the next, the perceived allocation of assistance. It must be made clear that the scope of these chapters do not extend beyond the perceptions of the Palestinian households: Only a small part of the general assistance picture will be analyzed here.

To help better situate this smaller picture within the broader, it is worthwhile quoting UNCTAD’s July 2003 report according to which international support to the Palestinian people amounted to \$2.297 billion between 2001 and the first quarter of 2003: an average of more than \$1 billion per year. Of this total amount, almost 46% went to budget support for the PNA, 27% for development assistance and 28% for emergency assistance (UNCTAD, 2003:2-7).

The Palestinian people see only the visible part of the iceberg:

- They can’t, for instance, view directly the huge effort in budget support for the PNA of which 77% comes from the League of Arab States and 21% from the European Union (UNCTAD, 2003:9). On the other hand, they might well benefit from a job in the PNA, as does almost one third of the employed population (see Part 3).
- Development assistance, because of its important goal of fostering local capacities, is very often not recognized as such by the people.
- Much of the disbursed assistance, even emergency assistance, flows through the PNA and local NGOs and, in many situations, the real donor is not visible to the end beneficiaries. Also, some organizations may mandate others to deliver assistance to particular areas as was the case when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delivered food assistance for the World Food Programme (WFP).






Figure 4-1: Yearly average international support for Palestine by type, average 2001-2003

In this chapter, we will first analyze the distribution of assistance by looking at the percentage of people who say they received assistance (Section 4.1). The value of the assistance received will be briefly analyzed in Section 4.2. The different types of assistance will be the object of Section 4.3. Section 4.4 will focus on employment assistance, and finally, in Section 4.5, we will briefly review the sources of assistance.

More detailed analysis of other important types of assistance can be found elsewhere in the report: food in Part 6, health and education in Part 7, as well as aid delivered to the refugees in Part 9.

## 4.1 ASSISTANCE DISTRIBUTION

### 4.1.1 The assistance received and its evolution since 2001

A first indicator of the assistance delivered in general can be found in the answers to question 40 of our questionnaire:

*Q.40 Looking back since the Intifada started, have you, or any of your household members received any type of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, financial assistance, educational assistance etc.)*

According to our respondents, 48% of the Palestinian households received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada.

In the next question, those who said they received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada were also asked whether they received assistance during the past six months.






Figure 4-2: Assistance received during the past six months (o35) in general and by place of residence, 2001 - 2004

Figure 4.2 presents the evolution of the percentage of households who received assistance during the past six months for the general population and for each place of residence. It shows that since July 2003 the distribution of assistance has decreased sharply in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank, especially in refugee camps.<sup>1</sup> In the Gaza Strip, where the assistance level is generally higher than in the West Bank because of the more difficult situation, this decrease is only felt outside camps and even there, it is a smaller decrease than that visible in the total population. Gaza refugee camps have received the highest level of assistance among all areas of residence since the beginning of the second Intifada, but underwent a marked decline in assistance of 14% between November 2002 and July 2003; since then, assistance in this area has remained stable.




Figure 4-3: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o35) by region, 2001-2004

<sup>1</sup> The marked increase of assistance in West Bank refugee camps should be situated in the aftermath of Operation "Defensive Shield".



### 4.1.2 Geographical trends in assistance delivery

Figure 4.3 confirms these results: there was a 13% decrease in the assistance delivered to the West Bank since July 2003, while a similar decline of only 5% was seen in the Gaza Strip. In East Jerusalem, where the general assistance level is much lower (5%), the relative decrease has been very marked (only -4% in absolute but -45% in relative terms).

Certainly, the design in which we ask first about the assistance received since 2001 and then for the last six months has an influence on the answers. If respondents were asked immediately about assistance received during the past six months, they might ask themselves “Did I really receive this assistance during the past six months?” Nevertheless, as can be seen in Figure 4.4, which compares these two proportions, the general logic of the responses is similar:

- In the Gaza Strip, around 5% of the population did not receive assistance during the past six months, while they had received assistance earlier in the Second Intifada.
- This difference amounts to around 14% in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank (14% outside camps and 12% in refugee camps).

These results clearly confirm the marked decrease in assistance delivery throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as opposed to the Gaza Strip.

The analysis in Figure 4.5 shows that the decrease in assistance distribution affected the villages much more than the cities and refugee camps. This might indicate access problems in some regions: the West Bank in general but especially villages suffer a great deal from restrictions on mobility and access.

On November 20, 2003, the ICRC officially ended its large-scale relief distribution for Palestinians in the West Bank. The press release for this new strategy for the West Bank reads as follows:

The ICRC’s large-scale distributions of relief aid to several hundred thousand Palestinians living in the towns and villages of the West Bank came to an end in mid-November 2003. Since June 2002, the ICRC had provided urgently needed aid to about 50,000 families (roughly 300,000 people)




Figure 4-4: Percentage of the total population who received assistance since the beginning of the second Intifada (o035b) and during the past six months (o035)

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

struggling to make ends meet. However, humanitarian aid is no longer the best way to help them. It is essential that the West Bank Palestinians' basic rights under international humanitarian law are respected.<sup>1</sup>

ICRC handed over its beneficiaries of relief assistance to WFP. But, according to WFP's second emergency report of January 2004, there seems to have been some delays in the negotiations with the Ministry of Social Affairs concerning the rural areas, although the handover of the urban voucher program was effective in a very short time:

The ICRC has officially terminated its operations in the West Bank; the Urban Voucher Program (UVP) and Rural Relief Program (RRP). WFP has finalized the negotiations with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) to start the hand-over in the urban areas. The MSA will be looking for new warehouses in Jericho and Ramallah since current ones have failed to meet WFP criteria. **The negotiations between WFP and the MSA on supervising the distribution of food rations to Hardship Social Cases in rural areas are still in process.**<sup>2</sup>

Another striking finding illustrates the problems of delivery in some areas. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, Palestinians who live in areas crossed by the Wall received much less assistance than the remainder of the OPT. Hardship cases and those living below the poverty line are particularly poorly targeted when they live in areas affected by the Wall.

In this section, it is notable that the decrease in assistance delivered in East Jerusalem and the West Bank is sharpest in villages and in areas that directly affected by the Wall. Part of the decrease in assistance in West Bank rural areas might also be explained by delays in implementing the handover of ICRC's beneficiaries to the WFP.




Figure 4-5: Percentage of the population who received assistance during the past six months (2001-2004) by area of residence, 2001-2004

<sup>1</sup> www.icrc.org.

<sup>2</sup> WFP, 2004 "Emergency Report n.2", 9.1.04, www.wfp.org.

## February 2004 Surveys

### 4.1.3 Targeting the poor and refugees

The above-mentioned decrease in assistance delivery is much less significant for hardship cases; as can be seen in Figure 4.7, the decrease is highest for those who are better off. It appears clear that, although assistance delivery has declined since July 2003, targeting of needy sectors of society has improved.




Figure 4-6: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (0035), by wall and by poverty, 2001-2004

Refugees received more assistance than non-refugees. Fifty-four percent of refugees received assistance during the past six months, as compared to 27% of non-refugees. In other words, the level of delivery is double for refugees. While a higher level of assistance delivery to refugees seems logical, because they are poorer on average than the rest of the population, such a large difference may also hint at a deficit of assistance to non-refugees.

As we can see in Figure 4.8, 84% of refugee hardship cases received assistance between August 2003 and February 2004. Hardship cases that were not refugees made up 55% of the assisted. It also appears that the decline in assistance since July 2003 has been more marked for refugees than for non-refugees.




Figure 4-7: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (0035), by poverty level, 2001-2004

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 4-8: Percentage of the total population who received assistance during the past six months (o335) by refugee status and poverty level, 2002-2004





Figure 4.9 further breaks down assistance delivery by place of residence. It appears that the visible gap in assistance delivery between refugees and non-refugees living outside refugee camps is more marked in the Gaza Strip (32%) than in the West Bank (10%). In East Jerusalem, the difference is small in absolute terms (7%) but high in proportion (3.3 times higher).

The results in figures 4.8 and 4.9 may indicate a problem in delivering assistance to non-refugees living outside of camps.

Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance during the past six months (o335) by place of residence



In conclusion, the following findings concerning assistance distribution are worth highlighting:



## February 2004 Surveys

- The general level of assistance delivery has decreased significantly since the first half of 2003.
- This decrease was more marked in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, in villages than in cities and refugee camps. The decrease may be partly explained by delays in the handover of ICRC's beneficiaries in rural areas to the WFP.
- Areas that were affected by the Wall benefit much less from assistance than the rest of the OPT. It appears that the poor that live in such areas don't receive enough assistance.
- Although the general level of assistance has declined, targeting of the poor seems to have improved: The decline is more severe for those above the poverty line than for those that live below it, especially hardship cases.
- Consistently since the beginning of the second Intifada, refugees received more assistance than non-refugees. Our results hint at a comparative deficit in assistance to non-refugees.

### 4.2 THE VALUE OF THE ASSISTANCE DELIVERED

After analyzing the percentage of the population who received assistance, it is important to consider the value of the distributed assistance, in general, and then by the most important types of assistance.

The objective of this section is not to analyze the real value of the assistance disbursements made in Palestine. Our focus is limited to the perceived value.

In our questionnaire, we did not ask for the value of all assistance types received by the household. Only in question 42, respondents are asked to indicate the value of the two most important assistance types received in their household during the past six months.




Figure 4-9: Percentage of refugees and non-refugees who received assistance during the past six months (o035) by place of residence


The value will be analyzed in NIS (New Israeli Shekels). At the time of writing, June 2004, currency rates were as follows:

**NIS 100 = USD 22 (US dollars) = EUR 19 (Euros) = CHF 28 (Swiss Francs)**

### 4.2.1 The median value of various assistance types and their evolution over time

In Figure 4.10, the median values of the reported assistance types that appeared in Question 42 are presented for the six polls that were done between February 2001 and February 2004. The figure gives the median values of food, financial, in kind, employment and coupon assistance as well as for all of those combined ("any type of assistance").

Figure 4-10: Median value of the assistance received by type (o036), 2001 - 2004



The median was used instead of the mean because it is much more robust for the extreme values that were sometimes reported. The medians are calculated only in the case of those respondents who did give a value for given assistance types. For example, half of the 420 respondents who cited food assistance and gave it a value received NIS 200 or more; in fact the lowest reported value for food assistance was NIS 15 and the maximum NIS 3,650.

A few important findings are as follows:

- The median of the total value of the assistance received has increased almost constantly since February 2001. The total value of what was distributed is similar in February 2004 and July 2003.

## February 2004 Surveys

- Despite punctual variations, the value of food assistance also increased since the beginning of the second Intifada. Half of the people who received food assistance during the February 2003- February 2004 period received NIS 200 or less.
- Although it decreased in the course of 2001, the median value of financial assistance has been steady at NIS 500 since November 2001.
- There was a slight increase in the value of in kind assistance such as clothes and blankets since July 2003.
- The value of employment assistance underwent a sharp decline in the first half of 2003 but seems to increase sharply during the second half: the median distributed value increased from NIS 300 to NIS 900.

It must be said that these values rely on respondents' estimates and should not be considered rock solid estimates. Respondents may under-value some types of assistance and over-value others. The important result is not so much the actual value than its evolution across time and groups of respondents.

### 4.2.2 Differences according to geographic area and poverty

There does not seem to be significant differences in the total reported value of assistance between refugees and non-refugees. The same applies to reported value of assistance among various education levels.

There are slight differences across age groups: The youngest report a median value of NIS 250, the oldest NIS 350 while the two middle age groups are situated around NIS 290.<sup>1</sup>

The total value of assistance does differ significantly according to region. In the West Bank, the median value of assistance was NIS 378 (N=211) while it was only NIS 260 (N=306) in the Gaza Strip.<sup>2</sup>

According to place of residence, the differences are also significant:

- The total value of assistance delivered is highest in the West Bank outside refugee camps at NIS 400 (N=184).
- In the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, the median of the total value was NIS 300 (N=188).
- Inside refugee camps, the value is consistently lower than outside the camps but the regional pattern is similar: NIS 300 (N=28) in the West Bank and NIS 200 (N=119) in the Gaza Strip.

These results are confirmed when reported value is broken down by area (o060) of residence: The median distributed value in refugee camps is only NIS 200 (N=146) while it is NIS 350 (N=85) in villages and NIS 358 in cities (N=289).

<sup>1</sup> In fact, the 25-34 age group reports a median of NIS 300 while the 35-49 are at NIS 282.

<sup>2</sup> In East Jerusalem, the N is too low (3).



In Figure 4.11, which depicts the median value of assistance by level of poverty, the continuing improvement of the assistance targeting is clear. In 2001, the hardship cases received less than those below the poverty line. In 2003, those below the poverty line received the lowest value of assistance, much less than those above the poverty line. In 2002 and 2004, the differences in the median values are logical. The hardship cases receive the most while those above the poverty line receive the least. But we can see that the general level of assistance is higher (and thus preferable) in 2004 than in 2003.




Figure 4-11 Median value of assistance received in general (o036v) by poverty, 2001-2004

For each poverty level, Figure 4.12 presents the distribution of the value of food delivered, compared to population distribution. The results indicate good targeting of the value of the assistance distributed: hardship cases, which are 23% of the total population, receive 36% of the total value delivered; those below the poverty line also receive a larger share of the total value (38%) compared to their population weight (33%); those above the poverty, which account for 44% of the population, receive only 26% of the total value.

If the median values of the different assistance types are analyzed separately, the results differ significantly among assistance types and compared to the overall value. But such analysis would go beyond the scope of our report and not add much to




Figure 4-12: Distribution of the value of assistance (o036) and of levels of poverty



its results because they would repeat findings made when we analyze specifically the percentage of people who did receive assistance of each type.

Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, there was a clear increase in the overall value of the assistance delivered, which then remained stable throughout the second half of 2003 and the first months of 2004. While the median value of food assistance has evolved in a similar manner, one should note the important increase in the value of employment assistance since the last poll in July 2003.

Between September 2003 and February 2004, the overall value of assistance delivered was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip. It was also higher outside refugee camps than inside refugee camps.

During this period, there was also a marked improvement in the targeting of assistance: Hardship cases received the highest value of assistance, while those below the poverty line received more than those above the poverty line.

### 4.3 NATURE OF ASSISTANCE DELIVERED

Having analyzed the distribution of assistance as well as its perceived value, this section will concentrate on the type of the assistance delivered. In our questionnaire, several queries can be used to assess the distribution of various assistance types:

- In Question 42, which follows question 40 and 41 concerning assistance delivery, respondents were asked to cite the two most important assistance types they had received during the past six months. We will use this question in the present section.
- Many questions deal specifically with food assistance. They will be analyzed in Part 6 of the report. Because of different wording and perspective, these questions reaped slightly different percentages of respondents who received food assistance: According to Question 45, for example, 36% of the population received food assistance. Using Question 42, however, 33% of the population received food assistance, while Item 8 of Question 64 results in 39% of the population reporting food assistance.
- Financial assistance can also be analyzed with several questions that produce slightly different results. According to Item 10 of Question 64, and also Question 26 on income sources, 16% of the Palestinian households have received financial assistance. On the other hand, only 9% of the respondents mentioned financial assistance among the two most important types of assistance they received.
- Question 19 offers the greatest detail on employment assistance. Accordingly, 22% of respondent households received jobs or unemployment funds. In Item 9 of Question 64, 17% of the respondents reported employment assistance in the household during the past six months. Because employment assistance is not always perceived as such, and because its duration is not very long, only 3% of the sample mentioned employment assistance in Question 42 (see Section 4.4).

- Health services are an important topic in the questionnaire. Although many health services substantially rely on foreign or local aid, Palestinians don't perceive most of this as a form of assistance. Less than 2% of our respondents mentioned medical assistance in Question 42.
- Other types of assistance such as assistance in kind (clothes, blankets...) or coupons do exist but according to our analysis, they are minor compared to food, employment and financial assistance.

As mentioned above, in Question 42, the people that received assistance were asked to specify the nature, value and source of the two most important assistance types they received as well as their level of satisfaction with it. The emphasis of the present section lies on the type of assistance; for this reason, we will analyze the nature of the assistance mentioned. The source of the distributed assistance as well as Palestinians' satisfaction with it will be analyzed respectively in Section 4.5 and in Part 5 of this report. The value of the assistance was briefly presented in the previous section.

As can be seen in Figure 4.13, 993 valid responses (580 on the first assistance type and 413 for the second) were received from Question 42: 71% of these responses were related to food assistance; 14% to financial assistance; 5% to employment; 3% to in kind assistance, coupons and medication; and less than 1% to other types of assistance.




Figure 4-13: Types of assistance as reported by the interviewed (o36a, o036b)

Figure 4.14 depicts the percentages of respondents who mentioned one of these types of assistance among their two most important.

Food assistance was received by one third of the households in Palestine; financial assistance by 9% of the population. Apart from food and financial assistance, no other type of assistance was received by more than 5% of the respondents during the past six months.

The percentage of distribution for all assistance types except employment and coupons decreased since July 2003:

- The largest absolute decline in assistance was of food assistance, which declined by 8% since July 2003. Further analysis shows that there was a much more pronounced decline since 2003 in villages (where food assistance was reported by 39% in July 2003 and only 20% in February 2004) than in cities (where food assistance was reported by 38% in July 2003 and 34% in February 2004). In refugee camps, the percentage of people receiving food



## February 2004 Surveys

assistance increased from 51% to 55%. These results support our hypothesis that assistance in rural areas was hampered by the delays in the handover of the rural beneficiaries of ICRC to the WFP (see Section 4.1.2).

- The level of financial assistance has declined less since last summer: only 3% fewer respondents received it in February 2004. Here, the sharpest decline is observed in refugee camps where it decreased from 25% in July 2003 to 11% this year. In villages, there was a decrease of 4% from 10% while in cities, financial assistance increased slightly from 9% to 11%.
- In kind assistance also declined by 1%, while the levels for employment assistance and coupons remained stable since last July. The small number of cases of these types of assistance prevents any further analysis.




Figure 4-14: Type of assistance received (o036), 2001-2004

When we break down these results for February 2003 according to place of residence (Figure 4.15) and region, several interesting results appear:

- While one-third of all respondents reported receiving food assistance, by region, food assistance was received by 52% of respondents in the Gaza Strip; 27% of respondents in the West Bank; and 3% of respondents in East Jerusalem. As can be seen in Figure 4.12, the food assistance distribution rate is 14% higher in camps than outside camps for both regions.
- Financial assistance levels are also higher among Gazans (13%) than among West Bankers (8%) and Jerusalemites (1%); but financial assistance in refugee camps is 1-2% lower than in the rest of the territories.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII



- According to our respondents, hardly any employment assistance was delivered in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem (1% or less). In Gaza, where employment assistance is significant (7%), more employment assistance was delivered outside camps than inside.
- Clothes and blankets were distributed only in camps, and more frequently in the West Bank than in Gaza.
- The importance of coupons was confined to the Gaza Strip, slightly more often inside rather than outside refugee camps, where they are mainly exchanged for food aid parcels at UNRWA or local institutions' distribution centers.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 4.16, which shows the type of assistance delivered according to area of residence, does not offer much more new information, but does encourage a few observations:

Villages proportionally received less of all assistance types than cities. The distribution of employment assistance does not appear to differ significantly across areas. For financial assistance, the difference is hardly significant. For remaining assistance types, distribution was higher in refugee camps than in other areas.

Figure 4-16: Type of assistance received (o036) according to area of residence

Figure 4-15: Type of assistance received (o036) according to place of residence



<sup>1</sup> Coupons as vouchers that can be exchanged at certain stores for food, like the ones the ICRC used to provide until late 2003, are not used any more, except by some Islamic NGOs.

## February 2004 Surveys

The analysis of the distribution of assistance according to refugee status that appears in Figure 4.17 shows that food aid is targeted at refugees: 46% of them benefited from food

assistance, compared to only 23% of non-refugees. The same trend exists concerning financial assistance. While 11% of refugees receive financial assistance, only 7% of non-refugees do. For employment, coupons and in-kind assistance, the focus on refugees, although less pronounced, is also clear.




Figure 4-17: Type of assistance received (o036) according to refugee status

Consistent with our results, an analysis of assistance and the level of poverty of Palestinian households given in Figure 4.18 points to sharp differences in assistance:




Figure 4-18: Type of assistance received (o036) according to poverty

- Respondents with a household income below the poverty line received three and a half times more (43%) food assistance than those with a household income above the poverty line (12%); almost two-thirds (62%) of hardship cases received food assistance.
- The same trend can be observed for financial assistance. The general level of distribution is, of course, lower but the relative differences are comparable for those above and below poverty line; only hardship cases receive almost twice as much money than those living below the poverty line.
- The same trends can also be observed for assistance given in the form of clothes and blankets, employment and coupons, albeit less pronounced.



When we break down the types of assistance by level of education, it appears that 39% of the low and medium educated received food assistance, while this is the case for only 25% of those with higher education. Conversely, those with a lower level of education more often received cash assistance (16%) than those with a medium level of education (10%) or a high level of education (6%). Employment, coupons and in-kind assistance do not differ significantly across educational levels.

Also worth noting is that there no significant relationship between the types of assistance delivered and the various age groups or gender.<sup>1</sup>

Section 4.5 of the present chapter will deal more thoroughly with employment assistance and Part 6 of the report is entirely devoted to issues related to food.

A few important results for this section can be underscored:

- More than one-third of Palestinian households received food assistance during the past six months.
- Approximately one-sixth of households received financial assistance but only 9% of the respondents cited this kind of assistance among the two most important types of assistance they received.
- There was a clear decrease in delivery of all assistance types except employment and coupons. The largest absolute decline was in food: its delivery receded especially in villages, to a lesser extent in cities, while increasing in camps. Financial assistance declined much less and essentially in refugee camps.
- Huge geographical differences in the level of assistance delivery for the different places, areas and regions of residence emerge. Food was delivered to two-thirds of camp residents in the Gaza Strip but only to one-quarter of households living outside camps in the West Bank. In general, food is more targeted at the refugee camps and the Gaza Strip where the living conditions are worse. Financial assistance is also primarily targeted at Gaza but not particularly at refugee camps. Villages get less assistance of all types.
- Refugees are the largest beneficiaries of food assistance.
- All types of assistance are targeted at the poorest Palestinians. The differences according to poverty level are most pronounced in the case of food assistance, where those above the poverty line receive assistance five times less frequently than hardship cases.

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<sup>1</sup> There's only one exception to this rule: employment assistance differs significantly across age groups. The youngest Palestinians (18-24 years, 1%) and those between 35 and 49 years (3%) receive less than those between 25 and 34 (5%) and the 50+ (4%).



4.4 EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE

The coming chapter, Part 5, emphasizes that employment generation is a top priority for Palestinians and their struggle to stave off poverty. In Question 19, our sample was to state if they received employment assistance personally or in their households, while also

reporting the nature of that assistance. In February 2004, according to our interviewees, 10% of the Palestinian population benefited from personal employment assistance, while 21% have at least one person in their household who received such a benefit (see Figure 4.19).



Figure 4-19: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) and personally (o024), 2001 - 2004

Figure 4.19 also clearly shows an increase in employment assistance delivery since 2001. The proportion of households that received employment assistance during the past six months increased from 7% in June 2001 to three times more (21%) in February 2004. This evolution is a consequence of the progressive receding of the labor market in the OPT since the beginning of the second Intifada.

To say that more than one-fifth of Palestinian households report having received employment assistance may seem quite high when weighed against the 3% of respondents who named employment assistance among the two most important assistance types. Even compared to the 9% who reported receiving financial assistance, the figure seems very high.

In fact, when we examine this in more detail, it appears that those who said they received employment assistance or unemployment funds personally cite more often employment assistance among the two most important types of assistance than those who received it in their household. Also, long-term jobs are more likely to be cited among the two types than short-term jobs or unemployment funds. Finally, the question on employment assistance (Q19) is located much earlier in the questionnaire than the one about the two most important assistance types: Some respondents may have decided not to mention employment assistance already mentioned when asked for the two main assistance types.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

In other words, it appears that many employment assistance beneficiaries did not cite employment assistance among the two most important assistance types received during the past six months. Some of them thought that they had already cited it in Question 19. Others seem not to have considered this assistance very important because they were not personally the beneficiaries or because its value was objectively not high (it came in the form of a very short-term job or small unemployment funds).





Figure 4-20: Employment assistance received by the household (o026) by place of residence, November 2002 - February

Figure 4.20 presents the differential evolution of household employment assistance according to place of residence. It appears that employment assistance has diminished since November 2002 in West Bank refugee camps; it was stable in the West

Figure 4-21: Types of personal (o024) and household (o026) employment assistance, July 2003 - February 2004





## February 2004 Surveys

Bank outside camps while clearly increasing a great deal in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, especially in refugee camps where as much as 43% of households received employment assistance, especially unemployment funds, during the past six months.

Figure 4.21 gives a better insight into the nature of employment assistance: In February 2004, only 11% of household beneficiaries received a long-term job; 40% received a short-term job, while almost one-half of beneficiaries received only unemployment funds. Still for February 2004, the same general result is found for personal employment assistance, the only difference being a relatively smaller proportion of long-term jobs.

A comparison of the results for 2004 and 2002 in Figure 4.21 shows that the proportion of long-term jobs almost tripled (4% to 11% for the household) among employment benefits. On the other hand, the proportion of short-term jobs also diminished in favor of unemployment funds.




Figure 4-22: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) in general and by place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

Figure 4.22 gives the detailed story. It shows the proportion of households who received long-term jobs, short-term jobs, unemployment funds or resources for the self-employed household during the past six months. The differences in the breakdown by place of residence and time are also highlighted. A few interesting observations can be made:


- The delivery of long-term jobs and unemployment funds has substantially increased since November 2002. In relative terms, it might be said that three times more households report a long-term job now.
- Long-term job distribution is far more common in East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. In West Bank refugee camps, no respondents reported receiving a long-term job in their household.

- Short-term jobs appear to be in decline. This decline is only found in the West Bank. In East Jerusalem and in the Gaza Strip, especially in camps, the delivery of short-term jobs has increased since 2002.
- Although the general level of unemployment funds delivery has increased by 4%, there was a marked decrease in the West Bank.
- Resources for the self-employed were received by 5% of camp households in the Gaza Strip. Outside refugee camps and all over the OPT, only 3% of households report receiving them. The figures are lower in West Bank refugee camps (2%) and in East Jerusalem (1%).

After this brief analysis of the geographical distribution of employment assistance, our focus will be poverty and targeting. Figure 4.23 presents the percentage of households who received employment assistance during the past six months.

Generally, resources appear to be well-targeted. Almost four hardship cases out of ten received some kind of employment assistance, as did slightly more than a fourth of those living below the poverty line and 11% of those above it.

Figure 4-23: Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) by poverty



The delivery of short-term jobs and unemployment funds or resources for the self-employed are also well-targeted. It is interesting to note that hardship cases receive proportionally more unemployment funds than short-term jobs, while those below the poverty line (excluding hardship cases) more frequently receive short-term jobs over funds. This

reflects the fact that there are more unemployed among the very poor than among the less poor.




Figure 4.24 Types of employment assistance received by the household (o026) by education

## February 2004 Surveys

Finally, the delivery of long-term jobs does not follow the same pattern. These are delivered most often to those below the poverty line. This striking fact is related to the higher delivery of long-term employment to those above the poverty line than to hardship cases.

This incongruous finding is explained by two factors. First, many of the households who received a long-term job were able to exit poverty and rise above the poverty line. Second, as seen in Figure 4.24, it appears that long-term jobs are less often delivered to people with a low level of education.

This section on employment can be summarized by the following:

- The delivery of employment assistance increased since the beginning of the second Intifada, especially throughout 2003.
- The level of employment assistance delivered to West Bank refugee camps underwent a sharp decline. In the West Bank, the level remained stable since November 2002, while in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem there was a clear increase.
- Almost half of the provided employment assistance consisted of unemployment funds. Long-term jobs represent only 11% of this amount, but their relative proportion doubled since November 2002.
- The delivery of long-term jobs and unemployment funds increased since November 2002, especially in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Short-term jobs were less frequently distributed in the West Bank, but more in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

### 4.5 SOURCES OF ASSISTANCE

In our introduction, we pointed out that Palestinians only see the “visible part” of the assistance iceberg. Namely, they don’t see the real donor in many situations. In this last section, we will briefly analyze the perceived sources of the assistance delivered.




Figure 4-25: Main sources of the assistance received (o036t), 2001 - 2004

The analysis in sections 4.2 and 4.3 relied on Question 42 about the two most important assistance types that the donor’s household received during the past six months. Figure 4.25 shows the distribu-



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

tion of the sources of this assistance. For example, 20% of Palestinian households cited the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) as the source of at least one of the two named main assistance types.

From the graph, a few observations can be made:

- UNRWA was always the most cited single source of assistance. Since November 2002, our respondents cite UNRWA less frequently. Between the February - July 2003 period and the August 2003 - February 2004 period, the percentage fell from 25% to 20%.
- Perceived support from the PNA decreased in a very substantive way throughout the first year of the second Intifada; it fell from 17% in January 2001 to 7% in November 2001. Since November 2002, support from the PNA has again increased to 10% in February 2004 so as to make the PNA the second most cited source of assistance.
- Perceived support from trade unions has only been included in our survey since November 2001. After rising sharply throughout 2002, it declined steadily until February 2004.
- International organizations are not cited a great deal by our respondents; around 6% cited them in 2004. It must be noted, though, that the perceived support for international organizations rose from 1% by the end of 2001 to 7% in July 2003. This increase is certainly attributed to the gradual shift from development assistance to humanitarian aid that most international organizations underwent (UNCTAD 2003:3).
- Other assistance sources such as NGOs, Islamic organizations, Arab governmental or private sources were less cited. Their evolution over time is also harder to narrate.




Figure 4-26: Source of personal employment assistance (o024s), July 2003 - February 2004

## February 2004 Surveys

Turning to employment, Figure 4.25 shows the sources mentioned when assistance was delivered personally to the respondent.<sup>1</sup>

Municipalities account for 21% of the mentioned sources in 2003 and for only 11% in 2004. In 2004, the PNA and UNRWA are both cited by one-fifth of the respondents. But while the PNA has been stable in our survey since 2003, UNRWA's presence has increased by 4%. Trade unions were the single most important source mentioned in 2004; there was also an increase of 4% since 2003. In 2004, NGOs accounted for 11% of the responses. Like municipalities; they also saw an increase of 3% since 2003. Private sources are mentioned almost as often as NGOs. Islamic organizations were mentioned by 5% of the 2004 respondents while international organizations were the least mentioned source garnering 2% of responses.

Having briefly analyzed the main sources of assistance, we will now, in the remainder of this section, perform a series of composition analysis by poverty, region and area of residence, as well as refugee status. For this, we will again use Question 42 and consider the sources mentioned for all types of assistance, be it food, financial or employment.




Figure 4-27: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main sources of assistance (o036t) by poverty

<sup>1</sup> In July 2004, the question used (q20, o024s) asked for general employment assistance received, not only that received during the past six months as in the later survey of in February 2004. As can be seen in the graph, it is still possible to compare the sources of this assistance.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

In Figure 4.26, we see, for instance, that roughly two-thirds of the interviewees that mentioned trade unions or Islamic organizations as the source of their two main types of assistance are hardship cases. Although the percentage of hardship cases who report them as sources is lower, the PNA, UNRWA and international organizations share

a common pattern, with roughly 40% to 49% of their beneficiaries living below the poverty line. Finally, it appears that NGOs are concentrating their resources on those living below the poverty line, as this group counts for 59% of their beneficiaries.

Figure 4.27 presents the geographical distribution of the main sources' beneficiaries. Trade Unions, UNRWA and, to a lesser extent, Islamic organizations seem to have more beneficiaries in the Gaza Strip, while international organizations concentrate on the West Bank. The resources of the PNA and NGOs are more evenly distributed between the two regions.

According to area of residence, we can see that trade unions and NGOs have more urban beneficiaries than UNRWA, which counts almost four beneficiaries out of ten living in refugee camps. International organizations and, to a lesser extent, the PNA are the only very significant sources reported in villages.




Figure 4-28: Composition of the beneficiaries of the main sources of assistance (o036t) by region





Figure 4-29: Composition of the beneficiaries of main sources of assistance (o036t) by area

## February 2004 Surveys

The reader won't be surprised to see, in Figure 4.29, that 89% of those who cited UNRWA were refugees. Also, 77% of international organizations' beneficiaries are not refugees. Beneficiaries are more evenly distributed by refugee status among other sources, although refugees are represented a bit more proportionally.

Figure 4-30: Composition of the beneficiaries of main sources of assistance (o036t) by refugee status



# 5 THE IMPACT OF AID & PALESTINIANS' PERCEPTIONS

The previous chapter discussed assistance delivered to the Palestinians, analyzing its coverage, nature, value and source. This chapter will cover the impact of this assistance on the Palestinian population, as well as the people's priorities concerning assistance that should be delivered to the OPT.

In the first section, gaps in the distribution of assistance will be highlighted in order to identify Palestinians that are in need of assistance and are not receiving it.

Section two and three will thoroughly analyze the public's perceptions regarding the assistance that should

be delivered in the OPT: assistance priorities for the household and for the community will be discussed separately.

The fourth section concerns satisfaction with the assistance provided in general, while the last section will provide a more detailed analysis of satisfaction with the employment assistance delivered to the Palestinian population.

## 5.1 INDIVIDUAL NEEDS FOR ASSISTANCE

In Question 50 (see Annexes I & II), those who did not receive assistance were asked if they were in need of it. Of these, 45% reported to be in need of help (February 2004). This proportion has risen since July 2003 (39%), indicating a slowing of the improvement that was observed from 2001 to 2003 in the targeting of aid.

What follows in this section considers those who need assistance in the total population, and not only among those who did not receive it. This will provide a broader picture in the actual gaps in the distribution of assistance.

In Figure 5.1, while 40% of the population received assistance during the past eight months, 27% did not receive any and are still in need of it. This is the highest level observed since the first study in February 2001 (32%), confirming the impression of a changing trend in the improved focusing of aid towards those who need it.





## February 2004 Surveys

At this point it is useful to take a closer look at the evolution of the need for assistance according to the level of poverty.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the evolution of the need for assistance according to poverty level. In February 2004, an increase of the proportion of people who needed assistance and didn't receive it was observed in all three categories of economic status: hardship cases (from 24% to 26%), below the poverty line (from 19% to 33%) and above the poverty line (from 18% to 25%). The most spectacular increase concerns people below the poverty line, among which those needing assistance have increased by 14% from July 2003 to February 2004.




Figure 5-1: Need for assistance (o38r), 2001 - 2004

The following chart concentrates on people who need assistance and did not receive any. While the proportion of refugees in this situation has been gradually decreasing since February 2001 (from 23% to 9%), in the last 6 months it has gone up to 20%; more than doubling. Non-refugees are also more frequently in February 2004 (34%) than in July 2003 (28%) among those who needed assistance and did not receive any.




Figure 5-2: Need of assistance (o38r) according to poverty, 2001 - 2004





Figure 5-3: Need of assistance for those who did not receive it (o38r) according to refugee status, 2001 - 2004

Figure 5-4: Need of assistance (or 38x) according to place of residence



These results, and the need for assistance, can be further explained by taking into consideration the place of residence:

- The highest proportion of people who needed assistance and did not receive it is found in East Jerusalem (50%), and the lowest proportion in Gaza Strip refugee camps (8%). Although it is generally seen as an environment where people are much better-off, East Jerusalem is characterized by marked under-assistance. When the standard of living is higher in a place of residence, the needy appear to be harder to reach.
- In the West Bank, more respondents living outside refugee camps (33%) than those living inside refugee camps (25%) are in need of aid without getting it, illustrating the difficulties of delivering assistance to isolated parts of the West Bank.
- In the Gaza Strip, although figures are lower, the tendency is similar: the need is higher outside than it is inside refugee camps (16% outside, 8% inside).

In Figure 5.5 below, the analysis is taken further by combining place of residence and level of poverty. Whenever the data allow it, the segments of the population who need aid most are identified. The findings on the poorest Palestinians are quite impressive:

- In the West Bank outside camps, 39% of the hardship cases are in need of assistance but did not receive it (an increase of 1% compared to July 2003)
- The same is true for 24% of the hardship cases living in the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps (an increase of 5% compared to July 2003).
- In Gaza Strip refugee camps, this percentage has gone down to 1% (a decline of 5% compared to July 2003).

Considering those who live below the poverty line (excluding the hardship cases), the following results appear:

- In the West Bank outside refugee camps, 44% of poor people who reported needing assistance did not receive it. This is almost half of this group. In July 2003, the result for the same question was “only” 28%.



## February 2004 Surveys

- In the Gaza Strip, although the percentages are lower, an increase in the need of assistance was also observed in recent months: 17% of respondents living outside refugee camps (an increase of 6% since our last poll) and 12% of respondents living inside refugee camps (an increase of 8% since our last poll and three times more in relative terms) reported needing assistance and not receiving it.




Figure 5-5: Need of assistance for those who did not receive it (o38r) according to place of residence and level of poverty<sup>1</sup>

These results indicate that refugee camps and the Gaza Strip in general are much better covered for assistance than the West Bank, especially outside refugee camps. Therefore, the latter should again be seen as a priority target for future assistance delivery.

- Twenty-seven percent of Palestinians reported that they needed assistance but did not receive it.
- This proportion has increased by 7% since July 2003, going back to levels registered in 2001 and breaking the improving trend in the focusing of aid towards those who need it most.
- The most spectacular evolution concerns people below the poverty line, among which those needing assistance have more than doubled from July 2003 to February 2004.
- There are an increased number of people needing aid without receiving among both refugees and non-refugees.
- The need for assistance is higher outside than inside refugee camps
- In the West Bank among those living outside refugee camps, 39% of hardship cases and 44% of those below the poverty line did not receive assistance.

## 5.2 PALESTINIANS' PRIORITIES FOR THEIR HOUSEHOLD

In Part 4, we have taken a look at what kind of assistance is being distributed throughout Palestine. The object of this section is to examine Palestinians' priorities regarding the types of assistance that should be delivered to their household. Following, we will analyze their priorities for their community.

<sup>1</sup> East Jerusalem residents and West Bank respondents living outside refugee camps could not be incorporated in this analysis because there were too few cases in those places to have significant results.



As it would have been too difficult to ask every respondent an open question about the type of assistance that his household needs, we chose to ask the respondents, in Question 50, to give their first and second priority from a list of six broad assistance types: education, employment, health, food, money as well as housing and re-housing.




Figure 5-6: Assistance priorities for the household (o079) of those who receive or need assistance, July 2003- February 2004

When we ask about the household's needs, it is important not to take into account the answers of those who have no needs. For this reason, the remainder of the section will not include the answers of those who said they were *not* in need of assistance.<sup>1</sup>

Figure 5.6 indicates that 47% of the Palestinians say that the first assistance priority for their household is employment. This impressive response underwent a very sharp increase (+18%) since July 2003 where the figure was, as can be seen in the bottom part of the graph, only 29%. Six Palestinians out of ten chose employment assistance either as the first or the second priority for their household.

Food assistance is the first priority for slightly more than one-sixth of Palestinian households. This type of assistance also increased significantly (+5%) as the first priority selected by respondents when compared with the results from 2003, and there were also many more respondents (+11%) who cited it as the second priority. Palestinians' prioritizing of financial assistance increased only marginally (+1% as the first priority and +2% as the second) and is ranked third after employment and food.

Compared to July 2003 when it was the most frequently cited first priority (*ex aequo* with employment), education is now cited by almost four times fewer respondents as a first priority (-21%). The proportion of those who selected education as the second priority did not change much. Apparently, most of those who did not cite education again in 2004 valued employment as more important. The same downward prioritizing can be observed for health. This type of assistance is the first priority for less than 10% of the households. Housing and re-housing are cited as a first or second priority by less than 10% of the households. This figure has remained constant since July 2003.

<sup>1</sup> In previous reports, we analyzed the entire population including those who did answer but were not in need of assistance; the reader should be cautious when comparing with previous results. If we analyze the priorities of those who are not in need of assistance, they choose mainly education, health and housing assistance.

## February 2004 Surveys

In interpreting these results, one could say that nearly half of Palestinians are asking to be given jobs so that they might earn a living. This is consistent with our other polls. Approximately another third of the households need food or money above all else. Less than one-fifth of our respondents put a first priority on education, health or housing which are, in an emergency relief perspective, less immediate needs.




Figure 5-7: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance by level of poverty

The evolution since July 2003 clearly shows that the situation is worse this year: many respondents who did cite secondary needs (education and health) as the first assistance priority for their household last year shifted back to basic needs (employment, food and money) this year.


At this point, it is important to consider the priorities of assistance needed by households according to their level of poverty. In Figure 5.7, it appears that income has a clear influence on the priorities for assistance.

- Employment appears to be the most important need for almost 60% of the hardship cases. Seven out of ten respondents in hardship place employment among the two most important needs. All other needs are minor for this group as they set their first priority but food and money are cited almost two times more often than education and health. Housing needs are minor.
- The results for those living below the poverty line are comparable in global terms: Employment is the most important need while health and education are cited less often. The first difference resides in the much higher proportion of people putting food assistance as their first priority (23% compared to 14% among the hardship cases). The second difference resides in the higher percentage who report housing needs as the second most important priority. Finally, it must be mentioned that, globally, the differences among the assistance types are a bit less pronounced for those living below the poverty line than for the hardship cases.
- While the relative importance of education assistance for those living above the poverty line is not much higher than for the poor, the most important difference is observed concerning the priority of financial assistance: 23% of those who are better off view it as their first priority, but less than



12% of the poorer Palestinians report the same. There are also many more respondents in this group citing health as their first priority (two times more than those living below the poverty line and almost three times more than hardship cases).

Figure 5-8: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to area of residence



The analysis shows that the distribution of assistance priorities also differs significantly according to area, region and place of residence. Only area and region will be analyzed here, because the trends observed in those two variables perfectly reflect what can be found when analyzing place of residence.

There is not much difference between the priorities of assistance between residents of cities and refugee camps (Figure 5.8). Compared to cities, slightly more people in refugee camps cite employment as the first priority; this is understandable as camps are home to the poorest of Palestinian society. Also money is prioritized bit lower in refugee camps.

Priorities in villages are quite different: less people cite employment as a priority, but many more respondents cite food and education. This important result invites one to think about problems in accessing villages as well as the delay in handing over ICRC's beneficiaries to the WFP (see Part 4, Section 1).

In Figure 5.9, it appears very clear that priorities for assistance vary across regions. In the Gaza Strip, jobs are the first priority for assistance. In the West Bank almost all other types of assistance are, comparatively, higher priority: 6% more respondents cite food, 4% more cite education, 3% more cite money and 2% more cite health. Only housing needs are similar in both regions. Again, these differences seem to implicate mobility problems in the West Bank.

In East Jerusalem, priorities differ substantially: much less importance is given to employment assistance, which is cited by two times fewer respondents than in the Gaza Strip, for example. On the other hand, twice as many Jerusalemites cite financial assistance as their top priority. Food and health are minor problems in East Jerusalem as compared to the rest of the OPT, but housing is cited as the top priority by 18% of respondents. Almost 40% cite housing and re-housing needs among their two most important priorities. Housing assistance is the second most important need if we consider both the first and the second priority of respondents.

## February 2004 Surveys

These results on East Jerusalem should be considered in light of the 50% of Jerusalemites who reported being in need of assistance (Figure 5.4). Section 5.1 emphasized that this is the highest percentage of needy people among all regions. Financial and housing assistance seem to be the two specific types of assistance needed in this region.





Figure 5-9: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to region of residence

The impact of the separation wall on assistance priorities is evident in Figure 5.10: many more respondents prioritize food (+16%) in areas crossed by the Wall. Also, more people need money. In fact, the results point to the growing difficulties faced by Palestinians living in areas crossed by the Wall, difficulties where food is lacking due to mobility problems.

Figure 5-10: Priorities for the household (o079) of those who received or are in need of assistance according to whether the area is crossed by the Wall or not



- Employment is first assistance priority for 47% of Palestinians (an increase of 18% since July 2003).
- Seventy percent of hardship cases place employment among their two most important needs.
- Many people shifted back to basic needs when citing first assistance priority, after a period in which those needs were met.
- In villages, fewer people cite employment as a priority, but many more cite food and education.



- More people need food and money in areas crossed by the Wall than elsewhere.

### 5.3 PALESTINIANS' PRIORITIES FOR THE COMMUNITY

The preceding section offered an overview of Palestinians' priorities for themselves and their household in terms of assistance. The present section describes priorities for the community.

The analysis will be made easier in this section by the fact that even those respondents who personally did not need assistance have answered the question of what they consider their community's greatest priorities.

#### 5.3.1 General assistance needed by the community

In Question 51, respondents were asked to list the two needs they perceived to be the most important for their community. Results in Figure 5.11 below confirm what has been stated previously by setting employment assistance as top priority for assistance in the OPT: more than six Palestinians out of ten cite it as the most important need for the community and three quarters of the population cite employment among the first two priorities.

Compared to July 2003, the relative priority given to employment underwent a very sharp increase; the proportion of people viewing it as top priority rose by 25%. This denotes a worsening of the situation for many households.

Financial and food assistance are each prioritized highly by some 10% of respondents. Both types of assistance are viewed as first or second priority by roughly one-third of the population each. Figures did not change much on financial and food assistance as first priority since July 2003, but increased on financial and food assistance as second priority. This evolution also demarks a degradation of economic conditions in the OPT.

Health, education and housing assistance are less important needs for Palestinians, while still being considered first or second level priorities by roughly one-fifth of the population




Figure 5-11: Priorities for the community (o080), July 2003 - February 2004



each. The importance given to health and particularly to education decreased in a substantial way since 2003. In fact, as the situation worsens, the public's needs get more basic.

As respondents were asked about priorities for their community, it might be expected that there would be no significant relationship between priorities and whether or not respondents received or needed assistance. However, this happened not to be the case. Priorities of those who received aid differed slightly from those who did not receive it, whether they needed it or not. This effect is easily explained by considering the respondent's location: as discussed before, far more people receive assistance in refugee camps and community needs are clearly different there (see below). For this reason and because those differences will be highlighted when analyzing standard independent variables, priorities will not be broken down according to the need for assistance as in the previous section.

Figure 5.12 shows community needs vary considerably according to the area of residence:




Figure 5-12: Priorities for the community (o80) according to area of residence

\* In refugee camps, employment is seen as the first priority for assistance by a larger share of the population than elsewhere. When considering first and second choices, 84% of camp dwellers cited this

type of assistance. Educational, health and food assistance are proportionally less cited in camps while financial assistance is slightly more important. As seen in the previous chapter, these services are mainly provided by UNRWA in refugee camps.

- Because of mobility problems, education and especially health are prioritized more highly in villages.
- In cities, the relative priority for financial assistance is slightly higher.
- Housing and re-housing needs do not vary much according to area of residence.

In areas crossed by the Wall, priorities differ from the rest of the OPT: the proportion of respondents citing food as their first priority is almost double in those regions (17% versus 9% in areas not crossed by the Wall). Also, the first and second level prioritization of financial assistance is higher in those areas (54% versus 30%).



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

In Figure 5.13, the evaluated needs of the community are presented for each region of residence:

- In absolute terms, the Gaza Strip is characterized by the highest percentage of respondents saying their community first needs employment assistance. Education is mentioned in the same proportion as in the West Bank, while health assistance seems less important in the Gaza Strip which has a more unified territory than the West Bank and therefore better access. While housing needs are a bit higher than in the West Bank, money and food are less frequently priorities.

- In the West Bank, employment is also the first priority, but slightly less than it is in the Gaza Strip. Proportionally, the need for food, financial and health assistance is higher.

- In East Jerusalem, where fewer people need assistance, the situation is quite different: Jobs are much less needed than elsewhere, while financial, housing and education assistance are prioritized much more highly.

A detailed analysis of the relationship between community assistance priorities and place of residence brings us to figures 5.12 and 5.13.

When analyzing results according to the level of poverty, it appears in Figure

5.14 that employment

assistance is more needed among hardship cases than in the rest of the population. Food assistance is more needed by those living below the poverty line rather than hardship cases, certainly because of the good targeting of

Figure 5-13: Priorities for the community (o080) according to region of residence





Figure 5-14: Priorities for the community (o080) according to level of poverty

food assistance that we highlighted in the preceding chapter. Other types of assistance, namely education, health, money and housing, do not vary much across levels of poverty.

**5.3.2 Infrastructure assistance needed by the community**

In the present questionnaire, we asked respondents about their household’s connection to infrastructures: electricity, water, waste and sewage disposal, phone network and even satellite TV. As shown in Figure 5.15, it appears that electricity and water are distributed to almost everyone. Seven Palestinians out of ten have a solid waste disposal service and satellite TV. Fewer are connected to the sewage disposal network. According to our data, mobile phone network’s coverage is very close to that of fixed lines. One household out of ten has a permanent internet connection.

In Question 55, we asked our respondents’ their priorities in infrastructure. As shown in Figure 5.16, the most important facility needed by the community is water supply; more than half of the population ranks it as the top priority.




Figure 5-15: Connection to infrastructure networks (o174)

While a great deal fewer Palestinians view electricity as their first priority, almost half view it as the second.

Access to the sewage disposal network is more important than institution of a solid waste disposal service - but both are less important than water and electricity.

Other types of infrastructure such as phone, internet or TV are viewed as much less important.

Priorities given to various other types of infrastructure assistance don’t vary much according to poverty levels but they do vary sensibly according to geographical differences.




Figure 5-16: Infrastructure priorities for the community (o124)



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

As results for area and region can be deducted from those for place of residence, we chose to only display the latter in the following tables.

Interestingly, needs are prioritized by what is lacking in the West Bank and provided in East Jerusalem. Villages of the West Bank are usually those areas still not connected to water and electricity networks (Table 5.1 above); higher priority is given to water outside refugee camps in the West Bank (See tables 5.2 (detailing first priority) and 5.3 (detailing first and second priorities). For electricity, the picture is different: in East Jerusalem, where all respondents prioritized being connected to the electricity network, the highest percentage of the population cited this type of assistance as its first or second priority.

According to Table 5.1, many people in Gaza Strip refugee camps do not have access to solid waste disposal services, while sewage disposal networks seem much less available in the West Bank outside refugee camps. Also, quite logically according to the size and the urban nature of the area, one observes the better condition of the infrastructure in East Jerusalem where, for example, almost 30% of all households are connected to the Internet.

Table 5-1: Connection to the infrastructure networks (o174) by place of residence

	% connected to				
	West Bank outside camps	West Bank Refugee Camp	Jerusalem	Gaza Strip outside camps	Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
Electricity network	97	100	100	99	99
Water network	92	100	100	99	99
Solid waste disposal service	68	75	86	72	57
Satellite TV	65	63	85	72	67
Sewage disposal network	42	85	89	82	84
Fixed phone network	58	50	90	65	43
Mobile phone network	61	67	87	53	46
Internet (permanent)	14	4	29	13	4

Table 5-2: First priority for infrastructure assistance (o124) by place of residence

	First priority (%)				
	West Bank outside camps	West Bank Refugee Camp	Jerusalem	Gaza Strip outside camps	Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
Water network	62	52	43	43	51
Electricity network	14	8	24	24	12
Sewage disposal network	17	12	11	13	16
Solid waste disposal service	5	12	15	13	6
Fixed phone line network	1	13	0	1	8
Mobile phone network	1	4	0	3	3
Internet (permanent connection)	2	0	7	3	3
Satellite TV	0	0	0	0	1

Table 5-3: First & second priorities for infrastructure assistance (o124) by place of residence

	First + second priorities (%)				
	West Bank outside camps	West Bank Refugee Camp	Jerusalem	Gaza Strip outside camps	Gaza Strip Refugee Camp
Water network	75	62	67	63	62
Electricity network	67	57	68	60	56
Sewage disposal network	32	20	23	31	34
Solid waste disposal service	13	22	26	27	14
Fixed phone line network	3	16	1	3	13
Mobile phone network	2	8	1	7	10
Internet (permanent connection)	6	12	12	10	5
Satellite TV	1	4	2	1	6

In Tables 5.2 and 5.3, many interesting results appear:

- In the Gaza Strip outside refugee camps, priorities are similar to those in Jerusalem. Water is relatively less important than elsewhere but electricity is more of a priority. The size and urban nature of these places are certainly an explanation for this similarity.
- Refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank also share common priorities: for instance, communications infrastructure is a bigger priority in the camps. Still, electricity and sewage disposal are more important in the Gaza Strip, while solid waste disposal is more important in the West Bank.
- Water and sewage networks are top level priorities in the West Bank outside refugee camps.

- 
- More than six out of ten Palestinians cite employment as the most important need for the community.
  - Eighty-four percent of refugee camp residents cite employment as a first or second priority.
  - Education and health are badly needed in villages.
  - The most important infrastructure needed is water supply.
  - Highest priorities are water in the West Bank, and electricity in Jerusalem.

### 5.4 SATISFACTION WITH ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

Palestinians' priorities for the assistance that they would like to be receiving are one thing; their satisfaction with assistance they have received is another. Information provided in this section should be useful for evaluating past efforts.

In the first section, we will analyze satisfaction with the assistance delivered in general. The second section will specifically address employment assistance.

#### 5.4.1 Satisfaction with assistance received in general


In Question 42, respondents who received assistance during the past six months had to indicate the two most important items of assistance they received. As we saw in the preceding chapter, the nature, source and value of these items were included. The interviewees also had to evaluate their satisfaction with this assistance. In Question 43, these respondents were asked more broadly about their satisfaction with the assistance received during the past six months.

The evolution of respondents' general level of satisfaction (Question 42) since the beginning of the second Intifada is presented in Figure 5.17. It is quite clear that general satisfaction with the assistance provided has improved steadily since February 2001; the proportion of recipients that are not



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 5-17: Satisfaction with the assistance provided (o037), 2001 - 2004



satisfied decreased from 70% to 42%. In February 2004, a majority of beneficiaries are satisfied with assistance received during the past six months, and nearly 10% of respondents are even very satisfied with it.

Satisfaction is clearly related to the level of poverty. Results in Figure 5.18 clearly indicate that across all levels of poverty, a majority of respondents is satisfied with the assistance provided. However, it is worth noting that satisfaction is highest among those who live below the poverty line. The least satisfied beneficiaries are those categorized as hardship cases.

Apart from poverty, no other independent variable is significantly related to general satisfaction with assistance. The level of satisfaction is uniform across places, regions, areas, refugee status, education and age.

A better understanding of the causes of dissatisfaction can be very helpful in improving assistance programs. Thus, the analysis of Question 44 will focus on the percentage of respondents who declared themselves dissatisfied with assistance received. According to Figure 5.17, in February 2004, the proportion of respondents who received assistance during the past six months was 41% of the population.

Figure 5.19 below confirms the growing general satisfaction with assistance; 60% complained about the frequency of delivery and a minority criticized the quality and quantity of assistance received.

When the reasons of dissatisfaction are broken down according to place of residence in Figure 5.19, it appears that respondents living outside of refugee camps in the West Bank complain much more frequently about the quality,

## February 2004 Surveys

and, to a lesser extent, the quantity of assistance provided; throughout the Gaza Strip almost 70% of those who are not satisfied complain about the frequency of assistance.

Finally, still in Figure 5.19, an analysis by poverty level puts the frequency of aid as the most often cited reason for dissatisfaction among all three categories of Palestinians.

Frequency is the main reason of dissatisfaction for almost three-quarters of hardship cases. Under two-thirds of respondents living below and above the poverty line cite frequency of aid as the reason for dissatisfaction.

While quantity is more important than quality as a reason for dissatisfaction among hardship cases and those who live above the poverty line, the relationship is inverted among those living below the poverty line; for them, quality is cited more often as a problem.

In sum, hardship cases are the most dissatisfied aid recipients; they wish to see aid given more frequently and in a greater quantity. Those who are below the poverty line have the same concern about the frequency of assistance distribution but in their opinion, quality is more important than quantity. Interestingly, those above the poverty line are more similar to the hardship cases in their reasons for dissatisfaction.




Figure 5-18: Satisfaction with assistance provided (o37) according to level of poverty





Figure 5-19: Reasons for dissatisfaction with the provided assistance (o123) in general and according to place of residence and poverty




In Figure 5.20, it appears that food and financial assistance are slightly less appreciated by their beneficiaries than assistance in kind such as clothes and blankets: while around two-thirds of those who received the former are satisfied, more than three-quarters of beneficiaries of the latter are.

Figure 5-20: Satisfaction with food, financial and in-kind assistance (o036)<sup>1</sup>



On the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that the majority of the population receiving assistance was satisfied with it, regardless of the type of assistance received.

Figure 5-21: Satisfaction with food assistance (o36) by level of poverty



As far as food assistance is concerned, satisfaction varies significantly although not much according to area of residence: in villages, respondents are less satisfied (57%) than in refugee camps (61%), while respondents in cities are the most satisfied (71%). Also, refugees are less satisfied (61%) than non-refugees (73%).

Still for food assistance, the biggest differences are related to level of poverty, as can be seen in Figure 5.21: 42% of hardship beneficiaries are not satisfied with food assistance, while this proportion is only around 30% for the richer part of the population.

<sup>1</sup> Some respondents mentioned a particular kind of assistance twice. In this case, we computed the mean of their responses concerning their satisfaction and recoded the result in the extreme value. For example, if someone mentioned food two times and was "very satisfied" one time and "satisfied" the second, we would have recoded his answer to "very satisfied." In case the final value was between "dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied," it was recoded as the latter. If the mean ended between "satisfied" and "dissatisfied," it would have been considered a non-response.





## February 2004 Surveys

For financial and in kind assistance, there is no significant relationship with any of our independent variables. This could be partly explained by the small number of beneficiaries of these types of assistance, but more broadly, it seems that satisfaction with the assistance provided does not vary much according to geographic or socio-demographic differences. The biggest determinant for satisfaction seems to be the economic situation of the household.

- Respondents dissatisfied with assistance decreased from 70% to 42% since our last survey.
- Satisfaction is clearly related to the level of poverty.
- Respondents living outside refugee camps in the West Bank complain more about the quality and the quantity of assistance provided.
- Frequency of aid is the main reason for dissatisfaction.
- Food and money are slightly less appreciated than clothes and blankets.

### 5.4.2 Satisfaction with employment assistance

As noted in the preceding chapter and in sections about Palestinians' priorities, employment assistance is of central importance: it is widely distributed and viewed as a top priority by the population. In the present section, we will see whether this kind of assistance is appreciated by its beneficiaries.

Figure 5.22 depicts a very positive evolution during the past six months: 53% of the beneficiaries of employment assistance are now satisfied with it; in July 2003 and in November 2002, this proportion was over 20% lower.

Further analysis shows that there are no significant differences in employment assistance satisfaction for any of our independent variables: the level of satisfaction is similar over the various socio-demographic characteristics, but also across geographical areas and even levels of poverty.



Figure 5-22: Satisfaction with employment assistance (o101) 2002 - 2004



As can be seen in Figure 5.23, when asked to specify the reasons for their disappointment with employment assistance, some two-thirds of the interviewees responded that employment period was too short. Three respondents out of ten thought that the amount of assistance was too little and fewer than 8% of the respondents gave other explanations.

Again, reasons for dissatisfaction do not vary when analyzed by any of our independent variables. They also have not varied significantly since July 2003.




Figure 5-23: Reason for dissatisfaction with employment assistance (n=120) in general, according to region and refugee status, July 2003 - February 2004

- A very positive evolution during the past six months: 53% of the beneficiaries of employment assistance are now satisfied with it.
- Two thirds answered employment period was too short.
- Level of satisfaction is comparable over socio-demographic characteristics but also across geographical areas or even levels of poverty.





# 6 FOOD

Food security has often been regarded as an important need for Palestinians living under the Israeli occupation. The harsh economic realities and the constant deterioration of living conditions resulting from restrictions on movement, strict closures, lack of jobs, destruction of agricultural land and dismantling of agricultural sector infrastructure were reasons behind the concentration of international and local assistance providers engaging in food assistance to the Palestinian population, primarily to economically disadvantaged households.

In the next few pages an effort will be made to examine Palestinian public perception towards food and food assistance, and to gauge which households are the neediest households, and what attitudes exist towards food assistance and food assistance providers. It is hoped that such analysis will provide a glimpse at the evolution of food need and food assistance over the past six months according to a set of independent variables such as poverty, area and place of residence, and according to the impact of the Wall on areas that are directly affected by its construction.





Figure 6-1: The two most important needs of Palestinian households (n=79), July 2003 - February 2004

### 6.1 NEED FOR FOOD

The need for food, as a first priority, has increased from 10% in July 2003 to 16% in February 2004. In fact, it is the second most important priority after employment. As indicated in Figure 6.1, when respondents were asked to select the second most important priority for their household, food was the first choice, with 23% saying that it is the second most important priority.

When respondents were asked about the most important unmet need of their households, 10% of the respondents reported needing food. As indicated below in Figure 6.2, below, the highest percentage of people who said food was an unmet need is found among those below the poverty line (13%), village respondents (13%), as well as respondents living outside refugee camps - both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, the fact that only 10% said food was an unmet need indicates relatively good distribution of food assistance, given the importance of food to the household.

Figure 6-2: Most important unmet need of Palestinian households (n180), in general and by poverty, refugee status, area and place of residence



While 16% of respondents reported that food is their household's main priority, only 10% of them said that food is the main priority of the community they live in, as indicated below in Figure 6.3. However, when queried as to the second most important priority of the community, food was the most important according to 24% of respondents.



# Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 6-3: The two most important needs of the community



The need for food is highly influenced by a number of factors such as education, age, poverty, refugee status, and the area and place of residence of respondents. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 clearly show that food becomes more significant to respondents who are below the poverty line (not hardship cases covered by food assistance from various providers), non-refugees, lower educated and older respondents. For example, whereas food is a priority for 12% of the 18-24 age group, this percentage climbs to 18% among respondents who are above the age of 50.

Figure 6-4: Food as a first priority (o079) according to poverty, education, age, and refugee status





Figure 6-5: Need for food (o180) according to region, area, place of residence, and the Wall



It is also clear that respondents residing in areas that are not primarily covered by UNRWA's



## February 2004 Surveys


food assistance are more likely to state food as their household's main priority. Whereas 15% of city and refugee camp residents named food as their priority, among village respondents, the proportion is 18%. Also evident is that the need for food is higher among non-refugee camp areas in the West Bank. While 13% of Gaza Strip respondents living outside refugee camps named food as their main priority, the figures increase to 18% among non-camp respondents of the West Bank.

It is also interesting to note that 3% more respondents residing in areas directly affected by the Wall (18%) than respondents in areas that are not directly affected by it (15%) consider food as the main priority of their households.

### 6.2 CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION

While the need for food as a priority has increased in the past six months, there are indications in this survey that the dietary intake has been relatively better over the past six months than it was in the months prior to July 2003. As shown in Figure 6.6, below, 23% of respondents said that their consumption of dairy products increased in February 2004 compared to only 18% who said that in July 2003. Similarly, the percentage of people who reported that their households' consumption of meat products increased grew from 5% in July 2003 to 11% in February 2004.

Figure 6-6: Change in the consumption of various food items in the household (o081), July 2003 - February 2004



The relative improvement in the situation is also reflected in the percentage of respondents who said that the consumption of specific food items has decreased. Whereas respectively 36% and 49% of households reported in February 2004 that their consumption of dairy products and meat products decreased, the percentage of respondents who reported thus was slightly higher in July 2003. At that time, the decrease in consumption of dairy products and meat products amounted to 39% and 57%, respectively.


### 6.3 CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION ACCORDING TO POVERTY

Further examination of the data reveals, however, that the increase in the consumption of dairy products and meat occurred more among the economically better-off than among those who are disadvantaged. This is



particularly true regarding meat products. As indicated in Figure 6.7, below, only 6% of hardship cases and 7% of respondents below the poverty line said that their

Figure 6-7: Change in consumption of dairy products and meat (o081) according to the poverty level



consumption of dairy products has increased in the past six months, compared to 18% of respondents who are above the poverty line. In the previous report of September 2003, only 7% of respondents in households above the poverty line stated that their meat consumption had increased compared to 4% of respondents below the poverty line. As such, and in comparison with the September 2003 report, it is safe to conclude that the relative increase in the consumption of some food items has been more marked amongst those economically better off.




Figure 6-8: Change in consumption of dairy products and meat (o081) according to Wall

Respondents who live in areas affected by the Wall also seem to have experienced a change in the intake of specific food items. As can be discerned from Figure 6.8, 46% of respondents from areas crossed by the Wall said that their consumption of dairy products had decreased, as compared to 35% of respondents who reported a decrease in “non-wall areas.” As for meat products, 64% of respondents in “wall areas” reported that their meat consumption has decreased, compared to 48% who reported a decline in meat consumption among “non-wall” respondents. The fact that a mere 26% of respondents in “wall areas” (compared to the 41% of the respondents in the non-wall affected areas) said that their meat consumption has remained unchanged is indicative of the impact the Wall is having on the living conditions of this segment of society.






### 6.4 THE MOST NEEDED FOOD ITEMS IN THE HOUSEHOLD

When examining the food priorities of Palestinian households compared to their priorities six months ago, the most interesting change is in the increase in the percentage of respondents naming basic commodities as their main food priority. While this percentage was 66% in July 2003, the rate increased to 73% in February 2004. Also interesting, is the drop in the need for baby food, which decreased as a food priority by 10% to become 14% in February 2004.

Figure 6-9: Most important household food need (o107)



### 6.5 THE MOST NEEDED FOOD ITEMS IN THE HOUSEHOLD, ACCORDING TO POVERTY

Although basic commodities such as sugar, tea, and flour are the main needed food items in Palestinian households, the data in Figure 6.10 reveals that some food items are more important than others, depending on the poverty level of the respondents.




Figure 6-10: Most important household food need (o107) according to poverty level



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Whereas 20% of respondents identified as hardship cases named baby food as their most important food item, the percentage drops to 13% among respondents that are above the poverty line. Also noticeable is the higher concentration on meat among the respondents who are above the poverty line than among respondents who are living in hardship. Whereas 5% of the former group named meat as their main needed food item, only 1% of the latter stated the same.

### 6.6 SOURCE OF FOOD

Despite the intensive effort by local and international organizations to provide food to those most needy within Palestinian society, a large number of households continue to rely on their own resources for food. The following pages will describe the role of food assistance as a primary source of food according to a several independent variables.




Figure 6-11: Primary source of food in the Palestinian household (o077)

As indicated in Figure 6.11, the percentage of households that rely on their own resources for food increased from 76% in July 2003 to 85% in February 2004. Only 8% of Palestinian households rely on food assistance as the main source of food to their households. This percentage dropped from 12% in July 2003. Also important to note is that the reliance on food from family members has also dropped from 12% in July 2003 to 7% in July 2004, a decline that could be due to family members' inability to sustain their relatives regularly.


### 6.7 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO THE POVERTY LEVEL

An examination of the source of food according to poverty level demonstrates that 20% of respondents falling in the hardship case category rely on food assistance, compared to 6% of respondents below the poverty line and

## February 2004 Surveys

1% of respondents above the poverty line. In addition, more respondents living in hardship rely on support from the extended family than do other respondents. While only 3% of respondents above the poverty line rely on the extended family for food, the percentage is 13% among those living in hardship.

Figure 6-12: Primary source of food (o077) according to the poverty level



## 6.8 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO REFUGEE STATUS

Refugees also rely more on relief assistance than non-refugees. As illustrated in Figure 6.13, below, 13% of refugees and only 4% of non-refugees rely on food assistance. The role that UNRWA plays in food distribution among refugees provides the main reason for the gap that exists between refugees and non-refugees in this regard.




Figure 6-13: Primary source of food (o077) according to refugee status

## 6.9 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO REGION

The concentration of refugees in the Gaza Strip seems to explain the higher reliance on food assistance there over the West Bank. The fact that 12% of Gaza Strip respondents said that they rely on food assistance, compared to only 6% in the West Bank




Figure 6-14: Primary source of food (o077) according to region



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

also points to the important role UNRWA plays in the provision of food assistance to refugees. On the other hand, a higher percentage of West Bankers than Gazans rely on support from the extended family for food.

### 6.10 PRIMARY SOURCE OF FOOD, ACCORDING TO THE WALL

When the information was gathered as to whether respondents were affected by the Wall or not, a significant observation was made relating to the increased role that families play in assisting their relatives who need food assistance. As illustrated in Figure 6.15, 18% of the respondents who reside in areas directly affected by the Wall identified their extended families as the main provider of food to their households, compared to only 6% of respondents residing in "non-wall" areas. This observation can be explained as a consequence of the tough realities that Palestinians residing in Wall-affected areas are facing - realities that force them to resort to asking their families for help.





Figure 6-15: Source of food (o077) according to the Wall

### 6.11 FOOD ASSISTANCE

There is a sharp decline in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they received assistance in recent months. Whereas 48% of all respondents said that they received some type of assistance in July 2003, that percentage dropped to 39% in February 2004, a decline of 9%.

Further examination of Figure 6.16 reveals that the decline of assistance was more marked regarding food assistance. In addition to the overall decline in assistance, the proportion of food assistance dropped from 79% in July 2003 to 76% in February 2004.

Figure 6-16: Proportion of food assistance compared to the overall assistance provided (o035, o036)



## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 6-17: Food distribution (o36) according to area and region of residence, July 2003 - February 2004

This decline, however, was distinctive in certain areas and regions. While, as illustrated in Figure 6.17, there was a significant drop in food assistance in villages (from 29% in July 2003 to 19% in February 2004) and in the West Bank (a drop from 50% in July 2003 to 44% in February 2004), the proportion of food assistance increased in refugee camps from 18% to 28% and in the Gaza Strip from 48% to 55% during the same period.

West Bank respondents living outside refugee camps received 37% of the overall food assistance provided, followed by Gaza Strip respondents living outside refugee camps who received 36% of the food assistance, Gaza Strip refugee camp residents received 21% of food assistance, with the last 5% distributed in the West Bank refugee camps, as illustrated.




Figure 6-18: Food distribution (o36) according to place of residence: first and second types of assistance

Figure 6.19 provides the proportion of food assistance delivered to the 16 districts and governorates of the OPT.




Figure 6-19: Food distribution (o36) according to district

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Despite the significant drop in food assistance during the six months prior to February 2004, it can be argued that the targeting has become more appropriate. As illustrated in Figure 6.20, the proportion of overall food assistance delivered to respondents classified as above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February 2004. Conversely, the proportion of food assistance to the hardship cases increased from 34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.




Figure 6-20: Food distribution (o036) according to poverty, July 2003 and February 2004

### 6.12 SOURCE OF FOOD ASSISTANCE

Two questions were raised in this survey regarding the providers of food assistance. One question allowed respondents to state what was the most important type of assistance they received and from whom; the other was specific and respondents were asked who provided food rations to their households.

When examining Figure 6.21 below, the answers to both questions appear to be consistent. UNRWA's share of food assistance is 50%, followed by the Palestinian Authority (15%) and other international organizations, such as the World Food Program (WFP)<sup>1</sup> and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which make up approximately 15%.

The following analysis will be made according to the question where respondents themselves identified food assistance and the source of that assistance. This question has been included in all previous surveys and, accordingly, results can be compared over time.

As discussed earlier, food assistance is increasingly targeting the neediest families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A quick glimpse at Figure 6.22 shows that while all of the food assistance providers are targeting those below the poverty line, trade


<sup>1</sup> WFP's objective in the OPT is to assist the most vulnerable segment of non-refugee Palestinians. Of its 530,000 beneficiaries, approximately 70% are from among the "new poor," 28% are from households regarded by the Ministry of Social Affairs as hardship cases, and the rest of their aid targets those suffering from malnutrition or living in institutions.

The total expenditure for the period July 15, 2003 to July 14, 2004 was approximately US\$ 31 million. It was disbursed with the assistance of a number of local and international partners including the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees and others. The food basket that is provided through WFP consists of cereals, pulses, vegetable oil, sugar, wheat, and high energy biscuits.



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 6-21: Providers of food assistance (o036)



unions and international organizations seem to adopt a good targeting system. None of the respondents receiving food assistance from trade unions and only 6% of those receiving food assistance from international organizations were among respondents classified as being above the poverty line. The Palestinian Authority also seems to adopt a good distribution policy as only 12% of their food recipients were from those above the poverty line. Only local NGOs and charities have distributed food assistance to a relatively large percentage of respondents classified as being above the poverty line, with only 71% of their recipients classified as poor.





Figure 6-22: Food distribution (o036) according to source and poverty

As previously discussed, the deteriorating economic conditions during the past three and a half years have impacted all sectors of Palestinian society, irrespective of their refugee status or where they live. While the neediest refugees have been catered to by UNRWA, the destitute among non-refugees did not receive much food assistance. With a mandate to help the refugees, UNRWA's food distribution efforts have been on the forefront with almost 50% of food assistance being provided by this UN agency. As illustrated in Figure 6.23, 88% of UNRWA's beneficiaries are Palestinian refugees.

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII


As the economic situation worsened for refugees and non-refugees alike, various organizations embarked on providing for the destitute among the non-refugee population. In addition to the Palestinian Authority, organizations like the WFP and the ICRC provided economically disadvantaged non-refugees with food assistance. As also illustrated in Figure 6-23, 74% of the PA's food assistance and 85% of the food assistance provided by various international organizations have targeted non-refugees.

Figure 6-23: Food distribution (o036) according to source and refugee status



The concentration of UNRWA food assistance is manifested in the proportion it distributes in the Gaza Strip. As can be discerned from Figure 6.24, 72% of UNRWA's food assistance is carried out in the Gaza Strip where the overwhelming majority of the residents are UNRWA-registered refugees. Also interesting to note is that all assistance provided by trade unions was distributed in the Gaza Strip, while all food assistance provided by international organizations was focused on the West Bank. In general, however, the Gaza Strip receives almost 56% of all food assistance compared to 43% of such assistance directed at the West Bank.

Figure 6-24: Food distribution (o036) according to source and region



The role of UNRWA and the share it has in overall food assistance obviously impacts the distribution of assistance to the various areas of the OPT, particularly in refugee camps. Although the camp population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is around 665,000,<sup>1</sup> (approximately 18% of the OPT), our results reveal that 27% of the overall food recipients are refugee camp


<sup>1</sup> <http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/camp-profiles.html>



## February 2004 Surveys


residents, as indicated in Figure 6.25, below. While almost all organizations provide food assistance in cities, food assistance to villages is primarily provided by the Palestinian Authority (35%) and international organizations (44%).

Figure 6-25: Food distribution (o036) according to source and area of residence



In addition to the poverty level and the refugee status of the respondents, the place of residence of respondents clearly determines the proportion of food assistance received from the various food assistance providers. While UNRWA naturally focuses on the needy among the refugee population in and outside refugee camps, concentrated primarily in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority and the various international organizations target their assistance to the non-refugee population, concentrated more in the West Bank, as indicated in Figure 6.26. Also noteworthy is that while local NGOs target the West Bank more than the Gaza Strip (respectively 65% and 35%); Islamic organizations are more focusing on the Gaza Strip (respectively 40% and 60%).

Figure 6-26: Food distribution (o036) according to source and place of residence



### 6.13 FREQUENCY OF FOOD ASSISTANCE

When respondents were asked about the frequency of food assistance, only 10% reported that food assistance is provided to them on a monthly basis, 15% reported that they received food assistance once every two months, 43% said that they received it once every three months and 34% stated that their households received food assistance only once in the past six months.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

When the results were examined according to the source of food assistance, international organizations proved to be the source providing food assistance to recipients on a monthly basis more than others, with the Palestinian Authority coming in second. Although only 7% of UNRWA food assistance recipients said that they received it monthly, 68% said that they received it either twice or three times in the past six months. Food assistance provided by local NGOs does not seem to be provided regularly, as 62% of the recipients of such assistance reported that they received it only once in the past six months.



Figure 6-27: Frequency of food distribution (o074)





Figure 6-28: Frequency of food distribution (o074) by source of food assistance

When examining the frequency of food distribution according to region of residence, the results in Figure 6.29, reveal that food distribution seems to occur more frequently in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas 74% of food recipients in the Gaza Strip said that they received food assistance more than twice in the past six months, only 57% of their counterparts in the West Bank said so.

One of the main explanations for the discrepancy in the frequency of food distribution between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the large concentration of refugees in the Gaza Strip. An

Figure 6-29: Frequency of food distribution (o074) according to region of residence



### February 2004 Surveys




Figure 6-30: Frequency of food distribution (o074) according to area of residence

examination of food distribution according to area of residence shows that food distribution is more frequent in refugee camps than in cities and villages. As illustrated in Figure 6.30, whereas 25% of food assistance recipients from refugee camps said that they received food assistance only once in the past six months, the percentage is respectively 48% in villages and 34% in cities.

### 6.14 ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOOD ASSISTANCE

As discussed earlier, a sizeable proportion of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip rely on food assistance as their primary source of food. In addition, the provision of food assistance enables households to use the money they would have spent on food to purchase other necessary items.




Figure 6-31: Main benefit from food assistance (o173)

The results from Figure 6.31, reveal that 52% of the food recipients said that food assistance enabled them to use the money they would have spent to buy other food items for the household, 38% said that they used the money to buy other household goods, and 10% said that it enabled them to keep some assets that would have been sold if no food assistance was provided.

Thus, food assistance has been instrumental in helping households manage the hardship confronting them, and this assistance is making a difference for these households. The attitudes respondents hold regarding food assistance is another indicator for assessing the value of food assistance and its impact on the Palestinian population.

To this end, food recipients were queried both about their perception of the organization that provided them with food and about their level of satisfaction with food assistance.



### 6.15 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION

In general, 62% of food recipients believe that food distribution was either very organized or somewhat organized. As indicated in Figure 6.31, only 38% said that food distribution was not organized.




Figure 6-32: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to region, area and place of residence

The attitudes of food recipients regarding the organization that distributes food vary according to region, area, and place of residence of those respondents. While 52% in the West Bank felt that food distribution was organized, the 71% of respondents felt this way in the Gaza Strip. The sense of satisfaction was even higher among recipients in Gaza Strip refugee camps, where 76% stated that food distribution was organized or somewhat organized compared to 48% in the West Bank refugee camps. Lastly, while 45% of food assistance recipients in villages considered food distribution to be organized, this was the case for 70% of the recipients in refugee camps.

When attitudes towards food assistance distributors were examined according to the poverty level, the poorer among




Figure 6-33: Attitudes towards the organization of food distribution (o075) according to poverty and source of food assistance

food assistance recipients were markedly more positive than those respondents receiving food assistance who are classified as being above the poverty line. Whereas 63% of the former said that food distribution was organized or somewhat organized, only 55% of the latter shared this opinion.

It is equally important to point out the difference in attitude with respect to food assistance providers. UNRWA and the other international organizations appear to be perceived as the most organized, with only 30% and 34% respectively saying that the food distribution by those organizations was not organized. The most negative perception towards food distribution was among those receiving food assistance from the Palestinian Authority, Islamic organizations, and trade unions, as shown, above, in Figure 6.33.

### 6.16 LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH FOOD ASSISTANCE

The level of satisfaction with food assistance provides another indication of the importance of food assistance. Clearly, as depicted in Figure 6.34, 67% of food recipients are either very satisfied or satisfied with the food their household received in the six months prior to February 2004. Only 33% said that they are not satisfied. When exploring the reasons behind their dissatisfaction, 54% of those dissatisfied with food assistance attributed their dissatisfaction to the infrequency of food distribution, 23% attributed their dissatisfaction to the quantity, and 20% were dissatisfied with the quality of food assistance to their households.




Figure 6-34: Level of satisfaction with food assistance

The level of satisfaction varies according to a number of variables such as the source of food assistance, refugee status, area of residence, and the poverty level of food assistance recipients.

Figure 6.35 outlines the differences in satisfaction with food assistance according to the source of food assistance. The assistance provided by international organizations seems to generate the highest level of satisfaction, with only 12% of its recipients not being satisfied. Local NGOs are rated more negatively, with 56% of their beneficiaries expressing their dissatisfaction with the food assistance provided by them.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Given the relatively higher targeting of food assistance to refugees, it is perhaps surprising that refugees are less positive than non-refugees about the food assistance received. As illustrated in Figure 6.36, 62% of refugees are satisfied with food assistance, while this is the case for 75% of non-refugees.

Even a higher percentage of food recipients in cities are satisfied with food assistance (75%) than are food recipients in refugee camps (62%).

One of the possible reasons for the higher dissatisfaction among refugees and refugee camp residents is the higher rate of poverty among refugees, particularly those living in refugee camps. Since the infrequent distribution of food assistance is the main reason for dissatisfaction with food assistance, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, it is not unusual to see that the dissatisfaction lies among those who are more economically disadvantaged. An examination of Figure 6.37 shows that the people who need food assistance most are those who are least satisfied. While 58% of respondents classified as hardship cases said that they were satisfied with food assistance, 65% among those above the poverty line reported being satisfied.




Figure 6-35: Level of satisfaction with food assistance, according to food assistance provider




Figure 6-36: Level of satisfaction with food assistance, according to refugee status and area of residence




Figure 6-37: Level of satisfaction with food assistance according to poverty level



## 6.17 VALUE OF ASSISTANCE

The value of food assistance will be discussed in this part on the basis of what the respondents have reported as the value of food assistance in New Israeli Shekels (NIS)73. In the following pages, two measures to evaluate the value of food assistance will be presented, the average value (mean) and the median (the 50th percentile). While it is often easier to understand the average value of assistance, the median might provide a better description of the real situation as the average value is often influenced by few extreme numbers or outliers. Accordingly, the analysis here will be based mainly on the median rather than the average.

The median value for food assistance is approximately NIS 150 (about US\$ 33).

As illustrated below in Figure 6.38, the highest value of assistance seems to be in the West Bank among those living outside refugee camps. Although, as discussed earlier, the Gaza Strip receives more food assistance than the West Bank,


the value of food assistance is higher in the West Bank than it is in the Gaza Strip (NIS 150 in the West Bank compared to NIS 120 in the Gaza Strip). Moreover, the value of the food is also higher outside refugee camps. Whereas, for example, the median value of food assistance in West Bank refugee camps is NIS 125, the median is NIS 196 in the West Bank outside the refugee camps. Similarly, whereas the median in the Gaza Strip outside the refugee camps is NIS 130, the median in Gaza Strip refugee camps is only NIS 100.

Also interesting to note is that the median value of food assistance in villages is much higher than in refugee camps. As depicted in Figure 6.38, above, while the median value in villages is NIS 150, the median value in refugee camps is only NIS 100, which is almost 33% less than the value distributed in villages.

An examination of Figure 6.39, below, reveals that the median value of food assistance is the same (NIS 150) for those food recipients who are below the poverty line and for those who are above the poverty line. However, the average value is higher for those below the poverty line. This could be explained by the possibility that a few hardship cases who are extremely poor might have received a high value of food assistance, thus increasing the average value.

Also important to note is the considerable difference in the value of food assistance between refugee and non-refugee recipients. Whereas the median value is NIS 120 for the former, the latter receives a median value of

Figure 6-38: Average value and median of food assistance according to place, region, and area of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

NIS 150. As will be discussed in the following section, the reason for this difference is due to the lower value of food assistance provided by UNRWA when compared to that provided by other organizations who distribute food assistance to non-refugees.

When examining the value of assistance according to source, the highest value is that provided by international organizations, with a median value of assistance reaching NIS 400. As indicated in Figure 6.40, the value of UNRWA's food assistance is reported to be much lower with a median of only NIS 100. This gap between the value of food assistance distributed by UNRWA and that distributed by other international organizations provides an explanation as to why villages and cities receive food assistance with a higher value than that received by refugee camp dwellers. This could explain why the value of food assistance in the West Bank is higher than that in the Gaza Strip, as international organizations focus their food assistance more on the West Bank than on the Gaza Strip, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

An examination of Palestinians' perceptions (among those who receive food assistance




Figure 6-39: Average and median value of food assistance, according to poverty and refugee status




Figure 6-40: Average value and median of food assistance, according to source of food assistance




Figure 6-41: Perceptions about the targeting of food assistance (o166)



## February 2004 Surveys

and those who do not) about the targeting of food assistance is, in general terms, positive, but needs to be qualified. As indicated in Figure 6.41, 26% of respondents maintain that food distribution is carried out indiscriminately, while a mere 16% of respondents specified that food assistance primarily targets needy households. It is therefore possible to conclude that, although the findings in this section clearly indicate that food assistance seems to target the needy, public perceptions about food targeting remain somewhat skeptical.

The main findings of this discussion of food and food assistance can be summarized as follows:

- The proportion of the overall food assistance delivered to respondents living above the poverty line declined from 25% in July 2003 to 15% in February 2004. Conversely, the proportion of food assistance reaching hardship cases increased from 34% in July 2003 to 42% by February 2004.
- There is a sharp decline of 9% in the proportion of Palestinians who said that they received assistance in recent months. More specifically, whereas 48% of the respondents said that they received some type of assistance in July 2003, the percentage dropped to 39% in February 2004.
- There has been a decline in the number of Palestinians who rely on food assistance as their primary source of food, and a parallel decrease in the number of households who rely on the extended family for food.
- There has been a relative improvement in the dietary intake of food.
- The food situation in areas that are directly affected by the Wall is deteriorating and might need extra targeting in the future.
- Food is the second most important priority for the household. The fact that only 10% of respondents said that food is the most important unmet need indicates the successful effort conducted by food assistance providers in distributing food assistance to the needy.



# 7 HEALTH & EDUCATION

In this part of the study, issues related to health and education will be overviewed. In subsequent sections, more specific questions concerning the respondents' attitudes about health and education will be dealt with according to the various relevant independent variables at hand.

## 7.1 HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN GENERAL

Before going into depth into issues related to health and education, it is important to briefly evaluate the importance of health and education both for the household and for the community.

When respondents were queried about the two most important needs of their household,<sup>1</sup> health but especially education lost importance since the September 2003 report. Whereas in September 2003, education was the household's most important need, it now only takes fifth place in order of importance. Health remains the third most important need of the household.

When taking into consideration only unmet needs,<sup>2</sup> the importance of education continues to be ranked in fifth place (11%), while health as an unmet need stands in fourth place (12%). These rankings might suggest that the needs of health and education are already quite well catered for.

When the question to interviewees concerned the two most important




Figure 7-1: The two most important needs of the household (o079)




Figure 7-2: The most important unmet need of the household (o180)

<sup>1</sup> This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 6 of the study.

<sup>2</sup> This question has been discussed in more detail in Part 6 of the study.

## February 2004 Surveys

needs of their community, health again is ranked in third place and education is ranked in fifth place. This survey indicates that education that has declined considerably in importance since the September 2003 report, where it was ranked in second place after employment.




Figure 7-3: The two most important needs of the community (o080)

As the construction of the Wall nowadays has become one of the major issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, interviewees were asked whether or not the Wall affected their household in various manners. For example, respondents were asked whether or not the construction of the Wall had made access to basic services such as education and health care more difficult. As detailed in Table 7.1, 25% of the respondents stated that the construction of the Wall had hampered their access to basic services such as education and health care.

Table 7-1: Effect of the construction of the Wall on access to basic services such as education or health (o164f)

Effect of the construction of the Wall on access to education or health care		
	Frequency	Valid Percent
Did not make access more difficult	1125	75%
Made access more difficult	374	25%
Total	1499	100%


## 7.2 HEALTH

This section will be divided into four main parts: (1) issues pertaining to the need for medical care, (2) restrictions on the delivery of medical care, (3) the level of satisfaction with health services and their providers, and (4) the provision and source of health coverage. Before entering into these specific discussions, however, it is useful to start off with more general health-related issues, such as the main reason for choosing a specific health facility.

In general, the main reason that respondents chose their health facility is because that facility is free or cheaper than others (42%). The second reason influencing the choice of the health facility is distance or because it is the only one available (23%), followed by trust in the quality of services (18%) and the availability of drugs (6%). The remaining reasons for choosing a health facility, such as the short waiting time (4%), the humanity of the caretakers (2%) or the gender of the physician (2%) do not seem to be such important factors in the decision for choosing one health facility over another.

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Table 7-4: The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168) in general and according to region and area of residence



As overviewed in Figure 7.4, the reasons behind Palestinians' choice of a particular health facility vary according to region and area of residence. Respondents in the West Bank (48%) and the Gaza Strip (40%) are much more concerned than their counterparts in Jerusalem (16%) about their health facility being free or cheaper than other ones. The same is the case for respondents in refugee camps (50%) and villages




Figure 7-5: The main reason for choosing the health facility (o168) according to poverty level, educational level and Wall

## February 2004 Surveys

(49%) in comparison with respondents in cities (35%). Also clear from the results is that the highest percentage of respondents to choose their health facility on the basis of trust in the quality (24%) and drug availability (10%) can be found in the Gaza Strip.

The reasons behind Palestinians' choice of a health facility also vary according to their level of poverty, level of education, and whether or not their area of residence is crossed by the Wall. As can be expected, a far higher percentage of respondents from households living in hardship (55%) and those with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line (47%) than those with a living standard above the poverty line (27%) attach importance to their health facility being free or cheaper than others. The opposite is true concerning choosing a health facility on the basis of distance or it being the only one available, and the trust in the quality provided by the institution. Furthermore, the higher educated (35%) are less concerned than the medium (45%) and lower educated (53%) about the cost of the health facility. Conversely, the former (28%) more than the latter consider the distance of the health facility an important factor in their choice. Lastly, a far higher percentage of respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall (61%) than those residing in other areas (39%) stated that the main reason for choosing their health facility was that it was free or cheaper than others. On the other hand, respondents residing in areas that are not crossed by the Wall (19%) significantly more often than respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall (10%) choose their health facility on the basis of the trust in the quality of services.




Figure 7-6: Drugs prescribed and provided for chronic or acute problems over the past six months in general (o169a1, o169a2, o169b1, o169b2)




Figure 7-7: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the past six months (o169a) according to area of residence, refugee status and Wall




Figure 7-8: Drugs prescribed for acute problems over the past six months (o169a) according to poverty level and age




One way to find out more about the health status of the population is to try and gauge the percentage of people who - in the past six months - needed drugs for acute or chronic problems. It is also important to find out in how often people who were prescribed drugs for acute or chronic problems also had access to the necessary drugs. In general, 19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute problems, while 29% of the interviewees were prescribed drugs for chronic problems. There is a disparity of a few percentage points between the number of respondents prescribed drugs for both acute and chronic problems and the actual frequency with which they were provided with drugs for these problems. Three percent fewer interviewees prescribed drugs for acute problems were actually provided with the drugs (16%) and 4% fewer who were prescribed drugs for chronic problems were actually provided with the drugs (25%).


As both the prescription and the provision of drugs for acute and chronic problems vary according to different independent variables, they are discussed separately and systematically below. First, concerning the prescription of drugs for acute problems over the past six months, the results in Figure 7.7 suggest that fewer drugs were prescribed in refugee camps (14%) as compared to cities (19%) and villages (23%). A lower percentage of refugees (16%) than non-refugees (22%) was prescribed drugs for acute problems. Lastly, the prescription of drugs for acute problems was more than twice as high in areas crossed by the Wall (36%) than in other areas (17%).

The results also indicate that the prescription of drugs for acute problems increases with higher levels of poverty and with age. More specifically, whereas 26% of the respondents in households living in hardship were prescribed drugs for acute problems, this was the case for a mere 13% of respondents in households with a living standard above the poverty line. Furthermore, whereas a mere 13% of the respondents between 18 and 24 years of age were prescribed drugs for

**Figure 7-9: Drugs provided for acute problems in the past six months (o169b) according to area of residence, Wall, poverty level and age**



**Figure 7-10: Drugs prescribed for chronic problems over the past six months (o169a) according to region of residence, poverty level and age**




acute problems, this was the case for 30% of the respondents who are 50 years or older.

As for the provision of drugs for acute problems, one observes by comparing figures 7.7 and 7.8, on the one hand, and figures 7.9 and 7.10, on the other hand, that the discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for acute problems never exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by the Wall. There, the discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs over the past six months reaches 8%.


Concerning the prescription of drugs for chronic problems, the results in Figure 7.10 clearly indicate that this occurs far less frequently in Jerusalem (18%) than in the West Bank (30%) and in the Gaza Strip (31%). Furthermore, a considerably lower percentage of respondents in households above the poverty line (23%) than those in households below the poverty line (31%) and those living in hardship (32%) were prescribed drugs for chronic problems. Finally, it is obvious from the results that the incidence of drug prescription for chronic problems is highest in the age group of 50 years and above.

Figure 7-11: Drugs provided for chronic problems over the past six months (o169b) according to poverty level and age



As for the provision of drugs for chronic diseases, it is clear from a comparative glimpse at figures 7.10 and 7.11 that the main discrepancy between the prescription and the provision of drugs occurs among respondents that live in hardship. Nine percent fewer respondents in this category who were prescribed drugs for chronic problems were actually provided with them.

Figure 7-12: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) in general, according to region of residence and Wall



The provision of drugs could come from various sources. As such, the interviewees were queried about the source of the drugs they needed. In general, 43% of the respondents stated that that the private pharmacy was their source of medication, 30% said that it was a Ministry of Health clinic, 23% responded that their drugs came from a United Nations Refugee Works



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

(UNRWA) clinic and 3% said that their drugs came from a non-governmental organization clinic. The remaining 2% of the respondents specified that although the drugs were available, they was too expensive for them to purchase.

The results on the source of respondents' prescribed drugs vary significantly according to most of the independent variables at our disposal. They are overviewed in figures 7.12, 7.13 and 7.14. First of all, when examining this issue according to region, it is clear that private pharmacies are least frequently used to obtain drugs in the Gaza Strip (33%). Even Ministry of Health clinics as providers of prescribed drugs are mentioned by a far lower percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (21%) than in the West Bank (35%) and Jerusalem (44%). As such, it seems that UNRWA clinics are the main providers of drugs in the Gaza Strip (41%).<sup>1</sup> A further look at Figure 7.12 also shows that 50% of the respondents who reside in areas that are crossed by the Wall specified that they acquired their drugs from Ministry of Health clinics.




Figure 7-13: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) according to area of residence, refugee status and place of residence




Figure 7-14: Source of required prescription drugs (o170) according to poverty level and educational level




Figure 7-15: Type of medical care needed in the past six months (o102)

<sup>1</sup> A potential explanation for the high reliance on UNRWA clinics in the Gaza Strip for needed drugs is that the majority of the Gaza population are refugees and are most likely to rely on UNRWA for such services.




When examining the question on the source of drugs according to area of residence, refugee status and place of residence, the reliance of refugees and - perhaps even more often - camp refugees on UNRWA clinics for their needed drugs is marked. As overviewed in Figure 7.13, 59% of the respondents in refugee camps compared to 21% in cities and a mere 5% in villages specified that UNRWA clinics provided them with the needed drugs. Moreover, whereas 46% of the refugee respondents stated that an UNRWA clinic was the source of most of their needed drugs, this was the case for merely 1% of the non-refugee respondents. Finally, 56% of West Bank camp respondents and 61% of Gaza camp respondents indicated reliance on an UNRWA clinic for most of their needed drugs.

The results in Figure 7.14, mainly indicate that reliance on a private pharmacy for most of the needed drugs is higher in households with a monthly income above the poverty line (51%) than in households that fall below the poverty line (39%) or that live in hardship (33%). Moreover, a lower percentage of low educated (36%) and medium educated (39%) respondents than high educated respondents (49%) stated that the source of most of their required medicine is a private pharmacy.

### 7.2.1 Need for medical care in the past six months

In an attempt to monitor Palestinian medical care needs, interviewees were asked to specify from a predetermined list what type of medical care they or any of their household members had been in need of in the past six months.<sup>1</sup> In general, and as overviewed in Figure 7.15, 79% of the respondents needed drugs, 74% were in need

Figure 7-16: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them (n=172) in general and according to region of residence



of medical care, and 55% needed hospitalization, while 26% were in need of an ambulance. Furthermore, 44% of the respondents stated that they needed vaccinations. While 25% of the respondents were in need of family planning, 36% needed prenatal care and 28% needed actual birth care. Slightly less than 30% of the respondents needed health care for a sick child. Lastly, 17% of the respondents

<sup>8</sup> It is worth pointing out that this question was also asked in the September 2003 report. However, in September 2003, the question encompassed the time since the beginning of the Intifada, while in the current report it concerns the past six months. Also, the current report's predetermined list includes many more types of needed medical care.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

specified that they or their household members had need of specialized care in the past six months, 8% needed physical rehabilitation and 21% needed follow-up for a chronic disease.

Another more specific type of medical care concerns mental health care. In an attempt to assess the need, availability and accessibility of such specialized care, interviewees were asked whether or not anybody in the household required mental health care, and if so, whether or not the necessary services exist in their area and whether or not they could be accessed in the past six months. In general, 65% of the respondents stated that nobody in their household was in need of mental health care, while an additional 11% of the respondents specified that nobody in their household wanted this care. Furthermore, 14% of the respondents said that mental health care services are not available in their area of residence, 1% said that these services could not be reached, while 3% stated that these services could not be reached most of the time. Finally, 3% of the respondents said that mental health care services could be reached most of the time, while 4% affirmed that these services could be reached all the time. When analyzing this question according to region of residence, the results show that the need for mental health care is the highest in the Gaza Strip and the lowest in Jerusalem. The results are overviewed in Figure 7.16.




Figure 7-17: Need for mental health care services and ability to reach them (n=172) according to refugee status and level of poverty

The results in Figure 7.17 indicate that the need for mental health care is higher among refugees than non-refugees. The need for mental health care is also higher among the poorer sections of society than among the households with a monthly income that is above the poverty line. Lastly, across all subgroups under examination, the percentage of respondents being able to reach mental health care services most of the time or all the time is higher than the percentage of those who could not reach these services most of the time or all of the time in the past six months.

**7.2.2 Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months**

In order to attain a better picture of the delivery of medical care, respondents were also asked to specify whether or not delivery of medical care was restricted in the past six months. Hereafter, each type of medical care, the need for such care and the restrictions faced in the reception of such care will be discussed separately according to the relevant variables that prove to be significant.

When examining the issue of prescription drug delivery over the past six months, in general, 51% of the respondents stated that they had not faced any restrictions, 21% were faced with a delay, while 7% of respondents reported that the delivery of drugs was denied. As illustrated in Figure 7.18, below, the need for drugs was higher in the Gaza Strip (10%) than in the West Bank (26%) and Jerusalem (37%). Denial of drugs was most frequent in the West Bank (10%), but delay in the delivery of drugs was most frequent in the Gaza Strip (28%). In comparison with Gazans (58%) and Jerusalemites (57%), West Bankers were most frequently restricted in their ability to attain prescription drugs. Furthermore, respondents with a household income level above the poverty line (25%) were less often in need of drugs than respondents with a household income below the poverty line (20%) or those living in hardship (12%). Moreover, the former less frequently experienced a delay or complete inability to attain drugs, and more frequently experienced no restrictions in their access to drugs.




Figure 7-18: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six months (o102h) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

The results detailed in Figure 7.19 show that respondents in refugee camps on the one hand were most in need of drugs (8%), while on the other hand, they received this care most frequently without any restrictions (64%). Denial of the provision of drugs was higher in villages (11%) and cities (6%) than in camps (4%), while a delay in the delivery of such care occurred more in refugee camps (24%) and cities (21%) than in villages (18%). Furthermore, the need for drugs was more than twice as high among respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall (11%) than among respondents residing in areas that are not crossed by the Wall (23%). In comparison with respondents from areas that are crossed by the Wall, respondents in other areas had their delivery of drugs less often denied (7% vs. 13%), less often delayed (19% vs. 33%) and less often restricted (52% vs. 44%).



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Of the total sample, only half of the respondents stated that their delivery of medical care had not been restricted in the past six months, while 7% said this delivery had been denied

and 17% specified that it had been delayed. When analyzing this question according to region of residence, the need for medical care in the past six months was far greater in the Gaza Strip (81%) than in the West Bank (70%) and Jerusalem (65%). However, in comparison to respondents in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, respondents in the West Bank faced the most restrictions, delays or denials of medical care. The effect of closures and occasional curfews could explain this phenomenon. According to poverty level, the percentage of hardship cases that were in need of medical care in the past six months, and saw the delivery of this care denied, delayed or restricted is higher than the percentage among respondents with living standards above the poverty line or even those with living standards below the poverty line.




Figure 7-19: Restrictions on the delivery of drugs in the past six months (o102h) according to area of residence and Wall




Figure 7-20: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months (o102g) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

The results in Figure 7.21, below, show in a detailed manner that, although the need for medical care was highest in refugee camps, it was less often denied or restricted in those areas than in cities or villages. Furthermore, in comparison with areas that are not crossed by the Wall, the need for medical care in areas that are crossed by the Wall is greater and the denials, delays and restrictions faced by respondents residing there are significantly greater.

In general, 45% of the respondents did not need hospitalization in the past six months. Of the 55% who did need hospitalization, 37% did not face any restrictions at all, 6% were denied hospitalization and 12% saw their hospi-

## February 2004 Surveys





Figure 7-21: Restrictions on the delivery of medical care in the past six months (o102g) according to area of residence and Wall

talization delayed. Although the need for hospitalization in the past six months has clearly been higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank or in Jerusalem, denial and restrictions of hospitalization occurred least in this region of residence. Once again, the need for hospitalization was clearly far higher among households living in hardship than among households with a living standard below the poverty line or households with a monthly income level above the poverty line. The results on restrictions on hospitalization in general, according to region of residence and poverty level are detailed in Figure 7.22.

Figure 7-22: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102b) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level



Although the need for hospitalization was lower in villages (51%) than in refugee camps (44%) and cities (43%), denials, delays and restrictions occurred more often in those areas. Furthermore, although the need for hospitalization in areas that are crossed by the Wall and other areas was quite similar in the past six months, the occurrence of denials, delays and restrictions was significantly higher in the former than in the latter.

In general, 74% of the interviewees were not in need of an ambulance in the past six months. Of the 26% of the respondents who were in need of an ambulance, 5% were denied the provision of an ambulance, 7% faced a delay, while the remaining 15% did not face any restrictions. Although a slightly higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (70%) than in the West Bank (73%) needed an ambulance in the past six months, restrictions,



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

delays and denials of such service occurred more frequently in the latter than in the former. As illustrated in Figure 7.24, a higher

percentage of respondents above the poverty line (79%) and below the poverty line (72%) than respondents living in hardship (67%) stated that in the past six months they had not been in need of an ambulance.




Figure 7-23: Restrictions on hospitalization in the past six months (o102b) according to area of residence and Wall




Figure 7-24: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102c) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

Although about the same percentage of respondents in cities (75%) and villages (75%) specified that they had not been in need of an ambulance in the past six months, villagers clearly more than city residents faced denial, delay or restrictions in the receipt of such care. When examined according to area of residence, the need for an ambulance was the highest in refugee camps. Furthermore, not only did a significantly lower percentage of respondents residing in




Figure 7-25: Restrictions on the provision of an ambulance in the past six months (o102c) according to area of residence and Wall

## February 2004 Surveys

areas crossed by the Wall than those in other areas state that they had not been in need of an ambulance in the past six months, the former also more than the latter experienced denial, delays or restrictions in their access an ambulance. The results according to area of residence and the effect of the Wall are overviewed in Figure 7.25.




Figure 7-26: Restrictions on the provision of vaccinations in the past six months (n=1490) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

Although not included in the figure, it is also worth mentioning that the need for an ambulance increases with age. More specifically, whereas 81% of the respondents between the age of 18-24 years old specified that they had not been in need for an ambulance in the past six months, this was the case for barely 70% of respondents who are 50 years or older.

Of the total sample, 56% of the interviewees did not need vaccinations in the past six months and 38% were not restricted in the provision of vaccinations. Two percent of respondents were denied provision of vaccinations, while 4% faced a delay. The need for vaccinations in Palestinian households was higher in the Gaza Strip (49%) than in the West Bank (58%) and Jerusalem (69%). Furthermore, the need for vaccinations seems to increase in parallel with the poverty of the respondents.

Despite that an equal percentage of respondents in villages (57%) and cities (57%) were in no need of vaccinations in the past six months, restrictions, delays and denials in obtaining such care was clearly higher in the former than in the latter. The results in Figure 7.27, also suggest that respondents residing in areas crossed by the Wall clearly faced more difficulties than their counterparts in other areas in obtaining the necessary vaccinations for their households.




Figure 7-27: Restrictions on the provision of vaccinations in the past six months (n=1490) according to area of residence and Wall

Of all the interviewees, 75% have not been in need of family planning-related medical services in the past six months. Of the 25% who were in need of family planning over this time, 19% did not face any restrictions, while 3% were denied the provision of such care and another 3% faced delays. The percentage of respondents who were not in need of family planning care was the highest in Jerusalem (96%), followed by the West Bank (74%) and the Gaza Strip (70%). Restrictions, delays and denials of family




## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 7-28: Restrictions on the provision of family planning in the past six months (o102f) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level



planning occurred most frequently in the West Bank. Furthermore, an equal percentage of respondents in households with a monthly income below the poverty line (66%) and those living in hardship (66%) specified that they had no need for family planning. The need for family planning was clearly the lowest in households with a living standard above the poverty line, with 82% of the respondents in that subgroup stating that they had not needed family planning in the past six months. Although not overviewed in Figure 7.28, it is notable that there is a statistically significant relationship between the need for family planning and the variable of age. The lowest percentage of respondents who reported needing family planning was found in age groups between 18-24 years (16%) and from 50 years and above (16%). In the age group between 25-34 years, 31% of the respondents were in need of family planning over the past six months, while this was the case for 29% of the respondents in the age group of 35-49 years.

Figure 7-29: Restrictions on the provision of family planning in the past six months (o102f) according to area of residence and Wall



The respondents who least often reported that nobody in their household had need of family planning over the past six months was found in refugee camps (69%). In fact, when examining the need for family planning according to refugee status, 28% of the refugee respondents were in need of family planning in the past six months compared to 22% of the non-refugees needing such care. Restrictions, delays and denials in the provision of family



## February 2004 Surveys

planning were the highest in villages. As detailed in Figure 7.29, not only were households in areas crossed by the Wall more in need of family planning than households in other areas, they also more frequently faced restrictions, delays and denials in their attempts to obtain such care.

In general, 64% of the total sample had no need for prenatal care over the past six months. Of the 36% of the households where prenatal care was needed, 29% faced no restrictions, 2% were denied access to prenatal care, while 5% were confronted with delays. Although the need for prenatal care was clearly higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank or Jerusalem, the occurrence of delays and denial of access to prenatal care was the highest in the West Bank. The results in Figure 7.30, below, also illustrate how

the need for prenatal care increases in parallel with increased levels of poverty. Finally, it is worth pointing out that the highest need for prenatal care according to the variable of age can be found in the age group between 25-34 years with 44% of the respondents stating that prenatal care had been needed in their household in the past six months.





Figure 7-30: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care in the past six months (o102e) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

The percentage of respondents specifying that there has been no need for prenatal care in their household in the past six months is about the same in refugee camps (62%) and villages (63%), and is slightly lower in cities (66%). However, restrictions, denials and delays in the provision of prenatal care have been highest in villages. Furthermore, the results in Figure 7.31 also show that not only the need for prenatal care in areas that are crossed by the Wall is higher than in other areas, but also that more difficulties were faced in obtaining such care by respondents in the former than by respondents in the latter.

Figure 7-31: Restrictions on the provision of prenatal care in the past six months (o102e) according to area of residence and Wall



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Concerning birth care, 72% of the total sample had no such need in the past six months. Of the 28% in need of such care, 3% were denied the delivery of birth care, 4% faced delays in the delivery of such care, while 21% faced no restrictions at all. As the need for prenatal care was highest in the Gaza Strip, it is not surprising that the need for birth care is also the highest in this region of residence. Once more, difficulties in the delivery of such care occurred most frequently in the West Bank. Again coherent with the findings about the need of prenatal care, the need for birth care increases with increased levels of poverty.




Figure 7-32: Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102i) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

The results in Figure 7.33, below, indicate that compared to respondents residing in refugee camps (76%), a lower percentage of respondents in cities (72%) and villages (70%) stated that nor they nor their household members needed birth care in the past six months. Moreover, villagers were confronted most frequently with denials and delays in the delivery of birth care. Furthermore, although there is only a slight difference in the percentage between respondents in areas crossed by the Wall and respondents in other areas stating that there had been a need for birth care in their households, restrictions, denials and delays in the delivery of such care has been significantly higher in the areas crossed by the Wall than in other areas under study.

Concerning the delivery of health care to a sick child, 71% of the total sample of interviewees did not have any need for health care for a sick child in the past six months. Of the 29% who did




Figure 7-33: Restrictions on the delivery of birth care in the past six months (o102i) according to area of residence and Wall

need such care, 21% did not face any restrictions, 3% had the delivery of health care to a sick child denied, while 6% were provided with health care for their sick child with a delay. Clearly from the results in Figure 7.34, households in the Gaza Strip were more frequently in need of health care for a sick child than households in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Furthermore, the poorer segments of society more frequently than the financially better-off seem to be in need of health care for a sick child. Indeed, whereas only 59% of the respondents living in hardship said that they did not have any need for health care

## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 7-34: Restrictions on the delivery of health care for a sick child in the past six months (o102j) in general, according to region of residence and poverty level

for a sick child in their household, this was the case for 65% of the respondents with a monthly household income below the poverty line and for 73% of the respondents in households above the poverty line.

The results in Figure 7.35, below, illustrate that whereas the need for health care for a sick child in households in refugee camps and villages is quite similar, it is higher in cities.




Figure 7-35: Restrictions on the delivery of health care for a sick child in the past six months (o102j) according to area of residence and Wall

Furthermore, while the need for health care for a sick child is about the same in areas that are crossed by the Wall and in areas that are not crossed by the Wall, the denial of delivery of such care and the delays in the provision of health care to a sick child occurred more frequently in the areas that are crossed by the Wall than in other areas.

Moving on to the delivery of specialized care, in general, 83% of the interviewees reported that neither they nor their household members were in need of such care in the past six months, 4% said that the delivery of such care had been denied, 6% specified that it had been delayed, while 7% stated that the delivery of specialized care had not been restricted at all. The need for specialized care is highest in the Gaza Strip, followed by the West Bank, and only then, Jerusalem. However, the results in Figure 7.36 indicate that it was most difficult for West Bankers to receive specialized care without restrictions, denial or delay. When examined according to poverty level, both the need for specialized care and the restrictions of any kind on the delivery of such care were the highest among households living in hardship.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII




Figure 7-36: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care in the past six months (o102k) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level

When studying the data according to area of residence, the need for specialized care and the restrictions, delays or denials of such care are the highest in villages. Similarly, when analyzing the results according to the effect of the Wall, the need for specialized care and the restrictions of any type on the delivery of such care are the highest in areas that are crossed by the Wall.



Figure 7-37: Restrictions on the delivery of specialized care over the past six months (o102k) according to area of residence and Wall

Concerning physical rehabilitation, the large majority of 92% of the sample stated that neither they nor any of their household members had need of such care in the past six months. Of the 8% percent that were in need of physical rehabilitation, 3% saw their need for such care denied, 2% faced a delay in the provision of such care, while the remaining 2% were provided with the needed physical rehabilitation without restrictions. As is obvious from the results detailed in Table 7.2, below, the number of respondents who affirmed that they were in need of physical rehabilitation is quite small. As such, the results on this question will not be

analyzed according to the various

independent variables at hand because it would be impossible to draw any significant and correct conclusions.

Table 7-2: Restrictions on the delivery of physical rehabilitation in the past six months (o1021)

Medical care needed: physical rehabilitation		
	Frequency	Valid percent
Not needed	1372	92%
Needed, but denied	43	3%
Needed, but delayed	34	2%
Needed and provided	46	3%
Total	1495	100%

## February 2004 Surveys

Finally, concerning the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six months, 78% of the total sample of interviewees had no need for such care. Of the 22% of households who did need follow-up for chronic diseases, 3% were denied the provision of such care, 6% saw a delay, while 13% were not confronted with any restrictions in the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases. When examining this question according to region of residence, the need for follow-up of chronic diseases is the highest in the Gaza Strip and the lowest in Jerusalem. Furthermore, there is a definite increase in the need for follow-up of chronic diseases in parallel with increased levels of poverty. Although not detailed in Figure 7.38, below, it is worth pointing out that according to age the need for follow-up of chronic diseases is - perhaps logically - the highest in the age group of 50 years and above, with 37% of the respondents stating that they or their household members were in need of such care in the past six months.




Figure 7-38: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six months (o 102m) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level

As portrayed in Figure 7.39, the need for follow-up of chronic diseases was the highest in refugee camps, but the villagers who needed the provision of such care seem to have had the hardest time in obtaining it. Furthermore, the need for follow-up of chronic diseases is slightly higher in areas that are crossed by the Wall than in other areas. In addition, restrictions, denial or delay in the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases occurred - once again - more frequently in the areas that are crossed by the Wall than in areas that are not crossed by the Wall.





Figure 7-39: Restrictions on the provision of follow-up for chronic diseases in the past six months (o 102m) according to area of residence and Wall




## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 7-41: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167) according to area of residence and Wall



The above overview demonstrated that frequently when Palestinian households were in need of some type of medical care they were confronted with difficulties in acquiring that care. As such, it is not surprising that quite a few households had to find an alternative health facility to provide them with the needed care. The analysis, below, overviews in which ways the need to find an alternative health facility negatively affected Palestinian households.

Figure 7-40: Problems related to finding an alternative health facility (o167) in general and according to region of residence



In general, 61% of the interviewees stated that they did not need to find an alternative health facility. Of the 39% who were forced to find an alternative health facility, 12% were most affected by additional costs, 7% were confronted with a delay of the needed care, while for another 7% it caused more suffering. In addition, 5% of the respondents who needed to search for an alternative health facility were most affected by the low quality of services in that health facility, for 4% it created more danger, while a final 2% complained about non-familiarity with the alternative health facility. When analyzing the need to find an alternative health facility according to the region of residence of the respondents, it is clear that such need was by far the greatest in the West Bank. Furthermore, while in the West Bank the additional costs and the



Figure 7-42: Percentage of Palestinians who benefited from the following services in the past six months (0126)




delays in the provision of care seem to be the main problems related to having to rely on an alternative health facility, Gaza Strip respondents were also affected by the additional costs, and even more so the increased suffering caused by having to choose an alternative health facility.

Far more respondents in refugee camps (72%) than in cities (65%) and villages (49%) said that there had been no need for their household to find an alternative health facility. In fact, when dealing with this issue according to refugee status, the need to find an alternative health facility was also far lower among refugees than among non-refugees, with 32% of the refugees reporting that they needed to search for an alternative health facility as compared to 45% of non-refugees who needed to do so. Furthermore, as portrayed in Figure 7.41, the need to search for an alternative health facility was far greater in areas crossed by the Wall than other areas. Once again, the additional costs created by the need to go to an alternative health facility seem to be the problem that affected the household most. Nevertheless, the delays, the increased suffering and the increased danger faced as a result of having to go to an alternative health facility are not to be underestimated.

### 1.2.3 Level of satisfaction with services and their providers in the past six months

As the title suggests, this section is mainly concerned with the level of satisfaction with health services, while also trying to gauge who the main providers of these services are. Before going into this analysis, however, it is important to overview the percentage of respondents who benefited in the past six months from different types of health services.

Figure 7-43: Providers of hospital services (n=126as) in the past six months, in general and according to place of residence



As summarized in Figure 7.42, 66% of the respondents stated that they or their household members have benefited from hospital services in the past six months, 74% used medication, 44% made use of primary health care services, 8% benefited from physical rehabilitation, 13% from specialized care, and 20% from ambulances.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Having established the percentage of respondents who benefited from various types of health care in the past six months, the level of satisfaction with each of these types and their providers will be discussed separately and sequentially below.

Starting off with the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of hospital services, the results in Table 7.3, below, indicate that 71% of the respondents were satisfied, while 29% were dissatisfied. It is worth noting that no statistically significant differences were found when cross-tabulating the issue of satisfaction with hospital services with any of the independent variables at hand.

As for the providers of hospital services, in general, 71% of the respondents stated that this service had been provided to them by the Palestinian

**Table 7-3: Level of satisfaction with hospital services (o126a) in the past six months**

Satisfaction with benefited from hospital services		
	Frequency	Valid percent
Satisfied	587	71%
Dissatisfied	244	29%
Total	831	100%

Authority (PA), 13% referred to UNRWA as their provider, while 6% specified that local NGOs were their providers of hospital services. An overview that includes the other providers of such services is provided in Figure 7.43, below. Although throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the PA is the main provider of hospital services, the extent of its predominance in this field varies considerably according to different variables. According to place of residence, for example, it is clear from the results in Figure 7.43 that UNRWA is a service provider more often in West Bank and Gaza refugee camps than elsewhere. Furthermore, in Jerusalem, Israeli health services are the main provider of hospital services (45%), followed by local NGOs (26%), and finally, the PA (11%).

Given the abundance of information and differences according to various independent variables concerning the providers of each type of health service, under each figure a short summary will be provided of the remaining main findings that are not described in the graphs. Concerning providers of hospital services, the main findings can be summarized as follows:

### *According to region*

The Palestinian Authority is mentioned as a source for hospital services by a higher percentage of Palestinians in the West Bank (77%) than in the Gaza Strip (72%). In Jerusalem, a mere 11% of respondents referred to the Palestinian Authority as the provider of their hospital services, while 45% of the Jerusalemites rely on Israeli health services.

A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (20%) than in the West Bank (9%) refer to UNRWA as the source of their hospital services, while local NGOs are most referred to in Jerusalem (26%), followed by the West Bank (6%) and the Gaza Strip (2%).

### *According to area*

The Palestinian Authority is most often cited as a provider of hospital services in villages (75%) and cities (72%) and less so in refugee camps (65%). In those camps, of course, UNRWA (30%) is mentioned by a higher percentage





of respondents than in cities (11%) or villages (5%). Local NGOs seem to provide more hospital services in cities (7%) and villages (7%) than in refugee camps (2%).

*According to refugee status*

Similar to the findings on providers of hospital services according to area of residence, it is clear that the Palestinian Authority is more prominent as a provider of hospital services to non-refugees (82%) than to refugees (60%), while UNRWA's provision of hospital services is mostly focused on the refugee population (25% refugees vs. 2% non-refugees).

*According to poverty level*

The data clearly reveal that the poorer sections of Palestinian society rely more on the Palestinian Authority as a provider of hospital services (hardship cases, 77%, and those below the poverty line, 75%) than Palestinians with living standards above the poverty line (63%). A higher percentage of Palestinians with a living standard above the poverty line (10%) mentioned local NGOs as providers of their hospital services than those with a family income that falls below the poverty line (5%) or those living in hardship (3%). The provision of UNRWA's hospital services seems to be quite evenly spread over all sectors according to poverty line, with 14% of the hardship cases and another 14% of respondents with a family income below the poverty line referring to UNRWA as their provider compared to 12% of those with a living standard above the poverty line.

The second type of health care respondents were queried about was provision of medication. As illustrated in Figure 7.44, below, in general 68% of the respondents who benefited from medication services in the past six months were satisfied, while 32% were dissatisfied. Satisfaction with medication is highest in Jerusalem (90%), followed by the West Bank (69%) and then the Gaza Strip (64%). Furthermore, the level of satisfaction with medication is lower in cities (64%) than in refugee camps (71%) and villages (75%). According to refugee status, the level of satisfaction with medication services in the past six months is 10% higher among refugees (73%) than among non-refugees (63%). Lastly, the level of satisfaction with medication services decreases with increased levels of poverty.




Figure 7-44: Level of satisfaction with medication services in the past six months (n=126b) in general and according to region and area of residence, refugee status and poverty level

Concerning the providers of medication, in general the Palestinian Authority is the main provider with 49%, while UNRWA comes second with 28%. When analyzing the provision of medication services according to place of resi-



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

dence, the Palestinian Authority only remains the main provider of such services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip outside camps (69% and 44% respectively). In the camps - whether in the West Bank (70%) or the Gaza Strip (62%) - UNRWA is by far the main provider. In Jerusalem, the PA (6%) has a relatively small role in the provision of medication, as there Israeli health institutions are the main providers (67%), followed at a far distance by local NGOs (15%).




Figure 7-45: Providers of medication services in the past six months (o126bs) in general and according to place of residence

Concerning providers of medication services, the main findings in addition to those described in Figure 7.45 can be summed up as follows:

### *According to region*

A higher percentage of West Bankers (64%) than Gazans (42%) and Jerusalemites (6%) identified the Palestinian Authority as their provider of medication services. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently mentioned source of medication (46%), while in Jerusalem, Israeli health services (67%) are the largest providers. Both local NGOs (15%) and international organizations (4%) were most frequently cited by Jerusalemites as their providers of medication.

### *According to area*

A larger percentage of villagers (62%) than camp dwellers (30%) or respondents residing in cities (49%) stated that the Palestinian Authority is their provider of medication. The same is the case for local NGOs, with 9% of villagers, 6% of respondents in cities and 2% in camps identifying them as their source of medication. UNRWA, of course, is the main provider of medication in the refugee camps (64%), but was also mentioned by 26% of respondents in cities and 5% of respondents in villages.

### *According to refugee status*

The Palestinian Authority is the provider of medication to 28% of refugees and 70% of non-refugees, while UNRWA is the source of medication for 54% of refugees and 2% of non-refugees. Interestingly, 9% of non-refugees mentioned private sources for their medication compared to a mere 2% of the refugees.



*According to poverty level*

A larger percentage of respondents living in poverty referred to the Palestinian Authority as their source of medication (hardship cases 58%, below poverty line 49%) than respondents with a family income above the poverty line (40%). The same is true for UNRWA with 32% of the hardship cases, 36% of those below the poverty line and 22% of those above the poverty line stating that UNRWA is their provider of medication. Local NGOs are more frequently mentioned by respondents with a family income above the poverty line (9% vs. 6% below the poverty line and 4% hardship cases). This is also the case concerning the use of private sources with 9% of respondents above the poverty line citing this source of medication compared to 3% of respondents below the poverty line and 1% of those living in hardship.

With regard to the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of primary health care services, in general, 78% of the respondents are satisfied, while the remaining 22% are dissatisfied.



Figure 7-46: Level of satisfaction with primary health care services (o126g) in the past six months (o126b) in general and according to region of residence, poverty level, and the Wall

When examining the level of satisfaction with primary health care services according to poverty level, a considerably higher percentage of respondents with a living standard above the poverty level (86%) than respondents with a monthly household income below the poverty line (74%) or those living in hardship (72%) are satisfied




Figure 7-47: Providers of primary health care services in the past six months (o126gs) in general and according to place of residence



with those services. The results in Figure 7.46 also show that satisfaction with primary health care services is significantly lower in areas that are crossed by the Wall (60%) than in areas that are not (77%).

With regard to the providers of primary health care in the past six months, in general, 49% of the respondents specified that the Palestinian Authority provided them with such services, while 38% of the respondents indicated that UNRWA had provided them with primary health care. As indicated by the results in figure 7.47, below, the PA is the largest provider of primary health care outside refugee camps both in the West Bank (74%) and the Gaza Strip (51%). The role of the PA inside camps both in the West Bank (16%) and the Gaza Strip (20%) in providing primary health care is far smaller and is largely taken over by UNRWA (respectively 78% and 76%). It is also worth pointing out that UNRWA's role in primary health care in the Gaza Strip outside camps is relatively large (45%). This could be explained by the large number of refugees in the Gaza Strip who no longer reside in camps, but still benefit from UNRWA services.

Regarding the providers of primary health care, the main findings, in addition to those described in Figure 7.47 can be summarized as follows:

### *According to region*

A far higher percentage of respondents in the West Bank (66%) than in the Gaza Strip (42%) and Jerusalem referred to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care. In Jerusalem, the main sources of primary health care are Israeli health institutions (40%) and local NGOs (33%), while in the Gaza Strip UNRWA (54%) is cited most frequently by respondents as service provider.

### *According to area*

A considerably higher percentage of villagers (70%) than respondents residing in cities (53%) or camp dwellers (19%) reported that the Palestinian Authority is their source of primary health care. Expectably, a far higher percentage of camp residents (76%) than those residing in cities (30%) and villages (17%) referred to UNRWA as their source of primary health care.

### *According to refugee status*

Predictably, the Palestinian Authority is clearly the main provider of primary health care for non-refugees (82% vs. 20% refugee) and, conversely, UNRWA is the main provider of primary health care for the refugee population (66% vs. 6% non-refugee).

### *According to poverty level*


When examining the source of primary health care according to poverty, it is clear that UNRWA provides care more frequently to those living in hardship (43%) and below the poverty line (47%) than to those with a family income above the poverty line (26%).

The provision of primary health care by the Palestinian Authority is more evenly spread over poverty status, with 52% of those living in hardship, 46% of those below the poverty line and 48% of those above the poverty line referring to the Palestinian Authority as their source of primary health care.

With regard to the level of satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services, the results in Figure 7.48 illustrate that in general a small majority of 51% of the respondents are satisfied, while the remaining 49% beneficiaries of such



care are dissatisfied. It is worth noting here, that there are no statistically significant relationships between the level of satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services and any of the independent variables at hand, as the number of beneficiaries of such care is too small (n=106).



n=106 Satisfied Dissatisfied

Figure 7-48: Level of satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services (o126h)

As for the providers of physical rehabilitation services, the only statistically significant relationship that could be established was according to refugee status. First, however, in general, 45% of physical rehabilitation services in the past six months have been provided by the Palestinian Authority. Unlike the types of health services discussed above, UNRWA (10%) is not the second main provider of physical rehabilitation services. In fact, the role both of local NGOs (21%) and international organizations (13%) in providing physical rehabilitation is greater than that of UNRWA. When analyzing the provision of physical rehabilitation services according to refugee status, it is clear that the PA mainly provides such services to non-refugees (63%), while UNRWA primarily provides such services to refugees (20%). The results in Figure 7.49, below, also indicate that international organizations provide physical rehabilitation services equally to refugees (12%) and non-refugees (12%), while local NGOs seem to concentrate their services more on the refugee population (26%) than on the non-refugees (18%). Lastly, it is notable that when Islamic organizations provide physical rehabilitation services, they seem to do so solely to the refugee population (10%).




Figure 7-49: Provision of physical rehabilitation services over the past six months (o126hs) in general and according to refugee status

Regarding the level of satisfaction with specialized care services, in general, 61% of the respondents are satisfied with the provision of those services, while 39% are dissatisfied. The results portrayed in Figure 7.50 also clearly indicate that satisfaction with physical rehabilitation services is far lower in the West Bank (51%) and the Gaza Strip (61%) than in Jerusalem (92%). Furthermore, about an equal percentage of beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services



below the poverty line (51%) and those living in hardship (52%) are satisfied with such services, while this is the case for a far higher percentage of respondents with a monthly household income above the poverty line (80%).



Figure 7-50: Level of satisfaction with specialized care services (o126i) in general, according to region and poverty level

Examination of the providers of specialized care over the past six months shows that, in general, the three main providers of such care are (1) the Palestinian Authority (37%), (2) UNRWA (22%), and (3) local NGOs (20%). It is worth pointing out that 8% of the respondents specified that the specialized care was provided to them by other




Figure 7-51: Providers of specialized care over the past six months (o126is) in general and according to place of residence

private sources. Moreover, those who received specialized care services from private sources solely reside in the West Bank outside camps (23%). It is also interesting to notice that - unlike with any of the types of health services discussed above - the PA is also the main provider of specialized care in West Bank refugee camps (60%). Lastly, in Jerusalem, twice as many respondents were provided with specialized care by local NGOs (62%) than by Israeli health services (31%). The results are detailed in Figure 7.51.

Concerning providers of specialized care, the main findings in addition to those described in Figure 7.51 can be summed up as follows:



## February 2004 Surveys

### *According to region*

A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (43%) than in the West Bank (35%) reported that the Palestinian Authority is their source of specialized care. The opposite is true concerning UNRWA, with more

than double the percentage in the Gaza Strip (30%) than in the West Bank (14%) reporting UNRWA as their provider of specialized care. In Jerusalem, the main providers of specialized care are local NGOs (62%), Israeli health services (31%) and international organizations (8%).



Figure 7-52: Level of satisfaction with ambulance services (o126j) in general and according to region of residence and poverty level

### *According to area of residence*

The provision of specialized care by the Palestinian Authority seems to be quite evenly spread over cities (38%), refugee camps (34%) and villages (35%). UNRWA is the main provider for specialized care in refugee camps (47%), but was also referred to as a source in cities (17%) and villages (13%). The main focus of international organizations and local NGOs with regard to specialized care seems to be cities.

### *According to refugee status*

When examining the source of specialized care according to refugee status, it is clear that a higher percentage of non-refugees (43%) than refugees (32%) report that the Palestinian Authority is their provider of specialized care. As for UNRWA, 33% of refugees specified it as their source of specialized care compared to 7% of non-refugees.

### *According to poverty level*

The Palestinian Authority as a provider of specialized care is mentioned by a considerably higher percentage of respondents with a family income above the poverty line (40%) and below the poverty line (44%) than by the respondents living in hardship (29%). UNRWA's focus for specialized care, however, seems to be more on hardship cases (35%) and Palestinians with a family income that falls below the poverty line (27%) than on those above the poverty line (10%).

Finally, beneficiaries of ambulance services over the past six months were asked about their satisfaction with those services. In general, 72% of the respondents were satisfied, while the remaining 28% were dissatisfied. More specifically, while the level of satisfaction in the Gaza Strip (63%) and Jerusalem (63%) is quite similar, it is considerably higher in the West Bank (81%). Furthermore, as specified in Figure 4.52, the level of satisfaction with ambulance services decreases in parallel with an increase in the level of poverty in households.

Finally, concerning the providers of ambulance services in the past six months, in general, the majority of such services have been provided by the Palestinian Authority (52%). Other main providers include international




## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

organizations (15%), UNRWA (14%), and local NGOs (13%). When analyzing this question according to place of residence, several interesting differences are apparent.

- While the PA is the main provider of ambulance services in the West Bank outside camps (47%) and in the Gaza Strip outside camps (47%), it does not provide such services at all in West Bank camps, while in Gaza Strip refugee camps it remains the main provider of ambulance services (46%).
- While UNRWA mainly provides ambulance services in West Bank camps (44%)<sup>1</sup> and Gaza Strip camps (39%), its share in the provision of ambulances is larger in the Gaza Strip outside camps (16%) than in the West Bank outside camps (1%).
- Local NGOs only provide ambulance services to the West Bank camps (33%) and non-camps (23%) and Jerusalem (25%), but do not seem to provide such services at all in the Gaza Strip, whether it is in camps or outside camps.
- Ambulance services provided by international organizations seem more concentrated in the West Bank and Jerusalem than in the Gaza Strip.
- The provision of ambulance services by Islamic organizations seems to be mostly concentrated outside camps, both in the West Bank (7%) and the Gaza Strip (5%).

Concerning providers of ambulance services, the main findings in addition to those described in Figure 7.53 can be summarized as follows:

Figure 7-53: Providers of ambulance services over the past six months. (n=276js) in general and according to place of residence



### According to region

A higher percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (66%) than in the West Bank (41%) stated that the Palestinian Authority was the source of their ambulance service. The same is valid for ambulance services provided by UNRWA (Gaza Strip 23% vs. West Bank 6%). Ambulance services by international organizations seem to have been more concentrated in the West Bank (20%) than in the Gaza Strip (9%).

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that UNRWA West Bank is endowed with only four ambulances.



*According to area of residence*

Ambulance services provided by the Palestinian Authority are more concentrated in villages (61%) and cities (56%) than in refugee camps (32%), while those provided by UNRWA are mainly reported in camps (40%), followed by cities (10%) and 1% in villages.

*According to refugee status*

Of the non-refugee population, 64% reported that the Palestinian Authority was their provider of ambulance services, while this is the case for 42% of the refugee population. Ambulance services provided by UNRWA were solely referred to by refugee respondents (27%), while ambulance services provided by international organizations seemed to be equally divided between the refugee (14%) and non-refugee (14%) population.

**1.2.4 Health coverage**

As health coverage<sup>1</sup> comprises an important aspect of health and the provision of its services, interviewees were asked whether or not they receive any assistance in covering their medical expenses. As indicated in Figure 7.54, below, 26% of the respondents still cover their medical expenses through their own sources. When the respondents do receive assistance in covering their medical expenses, the main providers are government health insurance (43%) and UNRWA (20%). Another 7% cover their medical bills through private health insurance and 2% have their health coverage

provided by charitable organizations. The remaining 2% of the respondents did not specify who provided them with health insurance, but did say that they delayed payment of the fees. In comparison with the results on the same

question in the previous report (September 2003), health coverage by government insurance increased by 10%, UNRWA's health coverage increased by 3%, private health insurance decreased by 4%, while coverage by charitable organizations decreased by 7%. The percentage of the respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket has decreased by 5% since the September 2003 report and by 9% since the December 2002 report.





Figure 7-54: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and according to area of residence (excluding Jerusalem respondents)

<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that in the analysis regarding health coverage, respondents in Jerusalem are excluded. Jerusalemites are entitled to Israeli government health coverage, and as such their inclusion into the analysis would provide inaccurate results about Palestinians covered by Palestinian government health insurance.



The results in Figure 7.54 also illustrate that the sources of health coverage vary considerably according to the respondents' area of residence. Government health insurance is the main provider of health coverage in villages (47%) and cities (46%), but is largely superceded by UNRWA in refugee camps, where the government only provides for 28% of the residents. Expectedly, UNRWA provides assistance through health insurance mostly in camps (55%) and not so often in cities (16%) and villages (1%). Respondents in villages seem to receive the least assistance in covering their medical expenses as - in comparison with respondents in cities (24%) and refugee camps (11%) - they far more frequently cover medical bills from their own sources (37%). Finally, coverage by private insurance is most frequent in cities (9%), followed by villages (6%) and then refugee camps (4%).

Figure 7-55: Sources of health coverage (o089) in general and according to region of residence and Wall (excluding Jerusalem respondents)



Sources of health coverage also significantly differ between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although the percentage of respondents stating that they are covered by government health insurance does not differ much between the West Bank (44%) and the Gaza Strip, the percentage of respondents specifying that their medical bills are covered by UNRWA<sup>1</sup> is far lower in the West Bank (13%) than in the Gaza Strip (30%).<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the percentage of respondents covering medical expenses from their own pocket is twice as high in the West Bank (32%) than in the Gaza Strip (16%). The results described in Figure 7.55 also indicate that the percentage of respondents in areas crossed by the Wall who are covered by government health insurance (63%) is considerable higher than the percentage of respondents saying so in other areas (40%). A similar percentage of respondents in areas crossed by the Wall (24%) with respondents in other areas (26%) stated that they cover their own medical bills.

### 1.2.5 Health coverage and income

The source of health coverage among Palestinians does not only vary depending on where they live in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it also differs according to the income level of the household. As the results in Table 7.4 indicate,

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noting that UNRWA does not offer its own health insurance scheme, although the Agency (partially) covers hospitalization costs and also some medication charges.

<sup>2</sup> The higher percentage of refugees among the total Gaza Strip population as compared to the West Bank population could explain this finding.



coverage by government health insurance seems to be quite randomly spread over the different income levels, while more low-income households than high-income households cover their medical bills by using UNRWA services. More specifically, whereas 31% of

households with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 cover their health expenses through UNRWA, none of the households with an income level over NIS 5,000 do so. Generally, households with a higher monthly income seem to be covered more frequently by private health insurance than households with a lower income level. Moreover, the former

also cover medical expenses from their own sources more often than the latter. Still, it is worth pointing out that 12% of households with a monthly income level of less than NIS 500 cover their medical bills through private health insurance.

	Household income in NIS						Total
	Over 5000	3000-5000	2000-3000	1800-2000	500-1800	Less than 500	
Government health insurance	15 47%	70 39%	113 45%	111 44%	190 44%	39 37%	538 43%
UNRWA		30 17%	42 17%	55 22%	89 21%	33 31%	249 20%
Private health insurance	6 19%	16 9%	25 10%	11 4%	26 6%	13 12%	97 8%
Charities	1 3%	2 1%	1 1%	4 2%	10 2%		18 1%
Cover own medical expenses	10 31%	61 34%	68 27%	70 28%	101 23%	15 14%	325 26%
Payment delayed		1 1%	3 1%	4 2%	18 4%	5 5%	31 3%
Total	32 100%	180 100%	252 100%	255 100%	434 100%	105 100%	1258 100%


Chi Square \*\*\*

Table 7-4: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to household income level (excluding Jerusalem respondents) (o057v3)

*Health coverage and poverty*

As was discussed earlier, the government (43%) and UNRWA (20%) are the main providers of health coverage. When examining the beneficiaries of health coverage according to the variable of poverty, one notices that both government insurance and UNRWA more frequently provide health coverage to Palestinians with a household income that falls below the poverty line (respectively 64% and 75%). However, two rather alarming findings stand out in Figure 7.56, below. First, a higher percentage of households below the poverty line (54%) than households above the poverty line

Figure 7-56: Sources of health coverage (o089) according to poverty level (excluding Jerusalem)



cover their medical expenses through private health insurance. Second, although the general results indicated that the percentage of households that cover their medical expenses from their own pocket has dropped by 5% in the past six months, the percentage of households below the poverty line that cover their own medical expenses has increased by 8% since the September 2003 report. Indeed, whereas in this report 54% of the respondents stated that they pay their own medical bills, this was the case for 46% of the respondents last September.




Figure 7-57: Sources of health coverage (o089) for hardship cases (excluding Jerusalem)

When examining the source of health coverage for respondents living in hardship, it is clear that government insurance is the main provider (43%), followed by UNRWA (26%). The percentage of hardship cases that are covered by private health insurance dropped from 14% in the September 2003 report to 8% in this report. More disturbing, however, is that in this report is that the percentage of respondents living in hardship who cover their medical expenses from their own sources has slightly increased from 15% in the last report to 17% now. Also, it is worth pointing out that for the first time some respondents mentioned that they delayed payment of their medical fees. More concretely, 5% of the respondents living in hardship seem to be in this situation.

### 7.3 EDUCATION

As in the section on health, it is valuable to first determine the general level of satisfaction with education services and schools in the past six months, and also to find out more concretely who were the main providers of such services.



Figure 7-58: Level of satisfaction with school services in the past six months (o126c) in general and according to region of residence

The results pointed out that 75% of the total sample of interviewees benefited from school services in the past six months. As overviewed in Figure 7.58, the large majority of 87% of the beneficiaries are satisfied with the schools. However, the level of satisfaction is considerably greater in the West Bank (92%) than in the Gaza Strip (83%). The level of satisfaction with schools is the lowest in Jerusalem (78%).



## February 2004 Surveys




Figure 7-59: Providers of schools in the past six months (o126cs) in general and according to place of residence

In general, the Palestinian Authority (61%) and UNRWA (31%) are the main providers of school services. The provision of schools by Islamic or international organizations, local NGOs, Arab governments or organizations, and private sources are minimal and do not exceed 3% respectively. When analyzing the provision of schools according to place of residence, one can very clearly notice that while the PA is the main provider outside refugee camps both in the West Bank (88%) and the Gaza Strip (51%), UNRWA is the main provider inside the camps both in the West Bank (71%) and the Gaza Strip (85%).<sup>13</sup> Local NGOs play a major role in the provision of education in Jerusalem (21%) and to a lesser extent in the West Bank camps (7%) and in the Gaza Strip outside camps (2%). The provision of private schools is mainly concentrated in Jerusalem (14%).

In addition to the information provided in Figure 7.59, there are more significant differences according to several other independent variables. They are briefly overviewed below.

### According to region

A far higher percentage of West Bankers (82%) than Gazans (40%) and Jerusalemites (59%) identified the Palestinian Authority as the provider of their school services. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA was the most frequently mentioned source of school services (58%), compared to 12% in the West Bank. Local NGOs (21%) and private sources (14%) were most frequently cited by Jerusalemites as their providers of school services, while these sources were barely mentioned by any respondent in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip.

<sup>1</sup> It is worth mentioning that there is an agreement in place between the PA and UNRWA, according to which UNRWA will enroll non-refugee students (preferably girls) in UNRWA schools if: (a) there is no PA school in the surrounding three km, or (b) they reside in a frontier village, or (c) they reside in Shu'fat camp and meet certain conditions.



*According to area*

A considerably higher percentage of villagers (86%) than respondents residing in cities (64%) or camp dwellers (14%) stated that the Palestinian Authority provides them with schools. UNRWA, of course, is the main provider of school services in refugee camps (82%), but was also mentioned by 28% of the respondents in cities and 5% of the respondents in villages.


*According to refugee status*

The Palestinian Authority provides school services to 90% of non-refugee respondents and 31% of refugee respondents, while UNRWA mainly provides these services to refugees (63%) and only 1% of the non-refugee respondents.

*According to poverty level*

The Palestinian Authority's school services seem to be quite equally provided to Palestinians across poverty levels, with 58% of the hardship cases, 60% of the respondents with a family income below the poverty line, and 62% of those above the poverty line having benefited from these services in the past six months. The poorer sections of society (38% hardship cases, 36% below the poverty line) more so than to those Palestinians with a household income above the poverty line (23%) seem to benefit from schooling provided by UNRWA. Those respondents with a family income above the poverty line rely more on private sources (4%) and on local NGOs (8%) for schooling than do their poorer counterparts.

Figure 7-60: Educational attainment (o056 and educ)




**1.3.1 The overall situation**

As illustrated in Figure 7.60, only 2% of the respondents said that they are illiterate, 8% stated that they only went to elementary school, and 16% specified that they only went to preparatory school. About 32% of the respondents finished secondary school, while a relatively high percentage either attained some level of college education (23%) or college and above (16%). For the purposes of analysis in this study, the various levels of education were categorized into three categories: low education (illiterate and elementary), medium education (preparatory and secondary), and high education (some college, and college and above). When the various levels of educational attainment are grouped in such manner, one can see that 10% of the total sample of interviewees are low educated, 51% are medium educated and 39% are highly educated.


When examining the educational attainment among Palestinians according to gender, one sees that a higher percentage of women than men are low (13% vs. 8%) or medium (53% vs. 48%) educated, while a higher percentage of men than women obtained high education (44% vs. 35%).

Figure 7-61: Educational attainment according to gender



As illustrated in Figure 7.62, below, the refugee population seems to be better

Figure 7-62: Educational attainment according to refugee status



educated than the non-refugee population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Indeed, whereas fewer refugees (6%) than non-refugees (15%) are low educated, more refugees than non-refugees are medium educated (53% vs. 49%) and high educated (42% vs. 37%).

### 1.3.2 Educational attainment, according to region and area of residence

Educational attainment also differs significantly according to region and area of residence of the interviewees. First, according to region of residence, it seems that the lowest level of education can be found in the West Bank, while the highest level of education is in the Gaza Strip. Indeed, whereas 14% of the respondents in the West Bank are low educated, this is the case for only 7% of the respondents respectively in the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Furthermore, a considerably higher percentage of




Figure 7-63: Educational attainment according to region and area of residence

interviewees in the Gaza Strip (45%) than in the West Bank (37%) and Jerusalem (34%) obtained high educational levels. Second, according to area of residence and consistent with the findings on educational attainment according to refugee status, the highest level of education seems to be located in refugee camps, while the lowest level of education seems to be in




villages. More concretely, whereas 15% of the respondents in villages are low educated, this is the case for 9% and 6% of the respondents respectively in cities and refugee camps.

### 1.3.3 Education and place of work

There seems to be a correlation between the level of educational attainment and the place of work of the respondents. As illustrated in Figure 7.64, below, a considerable higher percentage of low and medium educated respondents than high educated respondents rely on the Israeli labor market and, as such are employed in Israel proper or settlements. Conversely, the high educated more so than the medium and low educated seem to rely on the Palestinian labor market in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.

Figure 7-64: Educational attainment according to place of work (o011) of those who are employed and unemployed



### 1.3.4 Education and income

There is a clear statistical significance between level of education and income: a significantly higher percentage of respondents with a high level of education (56%) than respondents with medium (32%) or low (18%) levels of education enjoy a living standard above the poverty line. Logically this implies that an impressive 82% of the low educated respondents come from a household with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line, whereas this is the case for 'only' 44% of the high educated respondents. The overall results are overviewed in Table 7.5, below.

There is also a very strong correlation between the level of education

Table 7-5: Educational attainment according to poverty level

Poverty level	Poverty level		Total
	Above poverty line	Below poverty line	
Low	18%	82%	100%
Medium	32%	68%	100%
High	56%	44%	100%
Total	40%	60%	100%

of Palestinians and their ability to maintain jobs, or – in case of job loss – to change employment. The results in Table 7.6, indicate that a far higher percentage of high educated than low or medium educated managed to retain their employment. More specifically, in the past six months, 56% of the low educated remained in the same job, while 35% of this group lost their jobs and only 8% managed to change their employ-

Table 7-6: Educational attainment and change in the employment situation (o012)

Change in employment situation in the past six months	Change in employment situation in the past six months			
	No	Changed	Lost job	Total
Low	56%	8%	35%	100%
Medium	56%	12%	32%	100%
High	85%	7%	8%	100%
Total	70%	10%	21%	100%





## February 2004 Surveys

ment. In comparison, 85% of the respondents with high educational levels kept the same employment, only 8% lost their jobs, while 7% was able to find different employment.

In conclusion, the findings in this part of the study indicate that health, but especially education, have lost importance as needs both for the household and for the community since the September 2003 report. Compared to other types of unmet needs of the household, health and education are not high on the priority list, which might suggest that those needs are already quite well covered.

The main three factors influencing Palestinians' choice of a health facility are (1) the health facility being free or cheaper (42%), (2) the distance or availability of a health facility (23%), and (3) trust in the quality of services (18%). The results showed that the highest percentages of Palestinians choosing their health facility based on the first reason can be found in the West Bank, in refugee camps and villages, among the poorer segments of society, among the low educated, and among Palestinians residing in areas that are directly affected by the wall.

Concerning the need for drugs for acute and chronic diseases in the past six months, 19% of the total sample was prescribed drugs for acute diseases and 29% were prescribed drugs for chronic diseases. The results point to a gap of a few percent between the prescription of drugs for both acute and chronic diseases and the actual provision of the drugs for these problems. The prescription of drugs for acute diseases was the highest in villages, among non-refugees, among residents directly affected by the Wall, among the poorest in Palestinian society, and among respondents who are 50 years or older. As for the discrepancy between prescription and provision of drugs for acute problems, it never exceeds the 5% mark, except in areas that are crossed by the Wall. The prescription of drugs for chronic diseases was quite similar in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and was the highest among the poorer segments of society and among respondents who are 50 years or older. As for the provision of drugs for chronic problems, the main discrepancies between prescription and provision of such drugs are found among Palestinians living in hardship and among those who are 50 years or older.

The private pharmacy is the main source of medication, followed by the Ministry of Health clinic, the UNRWA clinic, and much less frequently, the NGO clinic. The UNRWA clinic is the main source of medication in the Gaza Strip, among refugees, and in both West Bank and Gaza Strip camps. The reliance on a private pharmacy for medication is highest in Jerusalem, in villages, among non-refugees, among the economically better-off in society, and among the high educated.

Concerning the need for any of the 12 types of medical care in the past six months under review in this part of the report, with the exception of the need for birth care, the need for health care for a sick child and the need for specialized care, the need for any type of care was consistently highest in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are directly affected by the Wall. Birth care and specialized care were most needed in villages, while health care for a sick child was most needed in cities. Furthermore, concerning restrictions, delays and denials for the provision of any of the 12 analyzed types of medical care, generally difficul-



ties occurred most often in the West Bank, in villages (often least frequently in refugee camps), among the poorer segments of society, and among residents in areas that are crossed by the Wall.

In general, 39% of the total sample of interviewees specified that they were forced to find an alternative health facility. However, the results showed that the need to find an alternative health facility was the highest in the West Bank, in villages, among non-refugees, and among residents in areas that are crossed by the Wall. The most frequently reported problems resulting from having to find an alternative health facility were additional costs, delay in the needed care, and more suffering.

Considering the level of satisfaction among beneficiaries of six different types of health services, 71% were satisfied with hospital services, 68% were satisfied with medication, and 78% were satisfied with primary health care. Furthermore, 51% of the beneficiaries of physical rehabilitation services were satisfied, while 61% were satisfied with specialized care and 72% were satisfied with ambulance services. Concerning the providers of these six different types of health services, in general, the results indicated that the PA and - to a lesser extent - UNRWA, are the main providers, except physical rehabilitation services where UNRWA's place is taken in by local NGOs, and with regard to ambulance services where a slightly higher percentage of beneficiaries reported using international organizations rather than UNRWA.

Governmental health coverage and, to a lesser extent, UNRWA remain the main health insurance providers. Although, in general, the percentage of Palestinians covering their medical expenses from their own pocket has dropped by 5% (26%) since the September 2003 report, alarmingly, the percentage of households below the poverty line that cover their own medical bills has increased by 8% (54%) since last September. Finally, this analysis indicates that a higher percentage of households in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, and a higher percentage of households in villages than in cities and refugee camps cover medical expenses from their own resources.

Concerning education, a large majority (87%) of respondents are satisfied with their school services. The PA and UNRWA are the main providers of such services, with the PA focusing its attention mostly on the non-refugee population outside camps and UNRWA mainly targeting the refugee population whether inside or outside camps. Furthermore, the largest portion of Palestinians with high educational levels can be found among refugees, in refugee camps and in the Gaza Strip. The low and medium educated tend to rely more on the Israeli labor market, while the high educated rely more on the Palestinian labor market. Moreover, the low and medium educated are far less able to maintain their employment than the high educated. Finally, the low and - to a lesser extent - the medium educated are more likely than the high educated to belong to households with an income level that falls below the poverty line.





# 8 WOMEN & CHILDREN

Part 8 of our study focuses on issues pertaining to women and children, and, more specifically, on the impact of the Intifada on women and children.

In the first section on women, all issues where cross-tabulation with the independent variable of gender shows a statistically significant difference will be discussed. In addition and more concretely, the main focus in this section lies on the

employment situation of women and on the impact of employed women's financial contribution to the household. For the first time, this section will also deal with some issues that specifically concern housewives.

In the section pertaining to the impact of the Intifada on children, several main issues will be addressed, such as child labor and the types of such labor, children and education, behavioral changes in children as a result of the Intifada, the influence of the Intifada on the needs of children, and the ability of parents to care for and protect their children.

## 8.1 IMPACT OF THE INTIFADA ON WOMEN

### 8.1.1 In general

As has been the case in previous reports, specific issues discussed elsewhere in the report are not examined according to the independent variable of gender as, usually, opinions between male and female respondents do not differ in a significant manner. They will be overviewed in this section. However, important differences in opinion according to gender with regard to both employment and children will be discussed in the appropriate sections of this chapter. Furthermore, it is important to note that the results of the survey conducted for this report reveal even fewer significant differences in opinion along the lines of gender than was already the case in previous reports.

One of the differences in opinion between male and female respondents concerns their consideration of the option of emigration. As indicated in Table 8.1, below, a higher percentage of female respondents (83%) than male respondents (70%) do not consider emigration to be an option. Furthermore, a higher percentage of male respondents than female respondents affirmed that they consider emigration (9% vs. 5%) or that they would like to emigrate, but cannot and will perhaps do so later (20% vs. 12%). It is perhaps worth



## February 2004 Surveys

remembering that in Report 5 on Palestinian perceptions of their living conditions (December 2002) the same question was asked with similar results as this time, both in general and according to gender.

**Table 8-1: Do you think of emigrating? (o094a) according to gender**

Do you think of emigrating?	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Yes	9%	5%	7%
Yes, but I cannot/maybe later	20%	12%	16%
No	70%	83%	77%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Women seem to be less hampered than men in their attempts to reach their place of work, as 6% more female respondents

**Table 8-2: Ability to go to work in the past six months (o114) according to gender**

Ability to go to work in the past six months	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
Almost impossible	6%	4%	5%
Very difficult	12%	9%	11%
Difficult	32%	31%	31%
Not difficult	50%	56%	53%
Total	100%	100%	100%

(56%) than their male counterparts (50%) stated that it was not difficult to reach work in the past six months. A similar question was asked in Report 5 on Palestinian perceptions of their living conditions (December 2002), but then over a timeframe of 12 months. Then, too, women found it less difficult than men to get to work (it should be pointed out that, generally speaking, the ability to go to work has improved; at that time only 33% of female respondents declared that it was not difficult to reach work compared to 28% of the male respondents).

## 8.2 WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT

Although issues related to employment and the labor market have been discussed in detail in Part Two of the study, it is valuable to have a closer look at some of these issues from a gender perspective. This is the main aim of this section.

### 8.2.1 Number of women employed per household


In general, in the majority of Palestinian households no women are employed. Of the total sample of the survey conducted for this report, 74% of the respondents said that of the employed in the household none are women. In 22% of the surveyed households, one woman is employed, while in 4% of the households two or more women work.

Compared to the results on this question in the previous report (December 2003), a considerably lower number of households have women in the labor market. Indeed, in December 2003, 37% of the surveyed households had at least one women employed, which already was an increase of 3% of households with women in the labor market since the December 2002 report. The results in the survey conducted for the current report are similar to those in the November 2001 report. At that time and as is the case now, 26% of the households had at least one women employed.



The results in Figure 8.1, below, further detail that there is a significant relationship between the number of women employed in the household and the level of education of the interviewees. The number of households with employed

Figure 8-1: Number of women employed per household (o018b) in general and according to educational level



women seems to rise with advanced education. Indeed, whereas 88% of the households with a low level of education have no women in the labor market, this number decreases to 81% in households with medium education levels and to 60% in households with a high level of education.

The number of households that have women employed is also influenced by age. As the results in Table 8.3 indicate, the highest percent-

Table 8-3: Number of women employed per household (o018b) according to age

	Age categories				Total
	18-24	24-34	35-49	50+	
None	77%	66%	77%	76%	74%
One	18%	27%	21%	20%	22%
Two or more	6%	7%	2%	3%	4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

age of households with at least one woman employed (33%) can be found in the age category of 24 to 35 years, while in all the other age categories, the percentage of households with at least one women working stands at about 23% to 24%.

**2.2.2 Impact of women’s employment on household financial situation**

One might suppose that the financial situation of households with employed women is more comfortable than that of households with no employed women, as women are adding to the household income. As such, one would expect a larger number of women in the labor market in higher income households than in lower income households. The results in Figure 8.2, below, seem to support this hypothesis. For example, whereas 96% of the respondents with a monthly household income of less than NIS 500 and 82% of respondents with a monthly household income between NIS 500-1600 declared that no female household members were employed, this was the case for





Figure 8-2: Number of employed women per household (o018b) according to household income level (o057)

60% of the respondents with a monthly household income that is higher than NIS 5,000 and for only 55% of the respondents with a household income ranging between NIS 3,000 and NIS 5,000.

The extent of employed women's contribution to the household is further reinforced when examining


Figure 8-3: Poverty level according to whether or not female household members are employed (o018b)



the issue from the perspective of poverty level. As illustrated in Figure 8.3, 31% of households with a living standard above the poverty line have at least one woman in the labor market. This percentage decreases to 26% in households with a monthly income that falls below the poverty line and to 16% in households living in hardship.

As the employment of female household members so obviously impacts the household financial situation, it should also positively influence the ability of the household to financially cope in the future. Indeed, as the results in Figure 8.4, show, whereas 52% of the respondents where at least one woman in the household is employed stated that they would financially cope for "as long as it takes", only 30% of the respondents from households with no women employed

Figure 8-4: Ability of households to cope financially (o044) according to whether or not female household members are employed (o018b)



made such a statement. Similarly, whereas 18% of the respondents from households with no women working admitted that they do not even have enough to live on now, this was the case for only 5% of the respondents from households with at least one working woman.

### 8.2.3 Type of employment and place of work, according to gender

Generally, women are found more often in specific types of employment. As illustrated in Figure 8.5, in the Palestinian labor market, women are more often than men in the role of professionals (16% vs. 8%) and employees (65% vs. 33%). Men are more often employed as skilled (16% vs. 3%) or unskilled workers (19% vs. 1%) or technicians (7% vs. 0%) than their female counterparts. Also in this sample, a higher percentage of employed males than employed females are self-employed (18% vs. 13%).

Also, when examining type of employment from the perspective of the type of employer, there are clear differences according to gender. The government (37% women vs. 26% men), international agencies (9% women vs. 4%



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

men), international NGOs (7% women vs. 3% men) and local NGOs (8% women vs. 4% men) are more frequently the employers of female employees than male employees. The private sector (about 25%) and agricultural petty trade (4%) seem to provide about the same percentage of employment to male and female respondents, while manufacture petty trade provides employment to a higher percentage of men (7%) than women (2%). Furthermore, in this sample, a considerably higher percentage of males (28%) than females (10%) are self-employed.

When looking at the total sample, the employment situation also significantly differs according to gender. As the results in Figure 8.7 overview, a higher percentage of male respondents than female respondents are employed, whether it is full-time (36% vs. 17%), part-time (7% vs. 4%) or for a few hours a day (16% vs. 4%). Furthermore, a far higher percentage of female respondents than male respondents are not employed (75% vs.





Figure 8-5: Occupation (o009), according to gender

and agricultural petty trade (4%) seem to provide about the same percentage of employment to male and female respondents, while manufacture petty trade provides employment to a higher percentage of men (7%) than women (2%). Furthermore, in this sample, a considerably higher percentage of males (28%) than females (10%) are self-employed.

Figure 8-6: Type of employer (or last type) (o063), according to gender



75% vs. 41%).




Figure 8-7: Employment situation (o008), according to gender



## February 2004 Surveys

41%). Interestingly, among those respondents who are not employed, 21% of the males are actually unemployed compared to a mere 5% of the females. The females who are not employed seem to be mainly housewives (62%).




Figure 8-8: Salary regularity and amount (o099), according to gender

When examining the salary regularity and amount according to gender, employed women clearly have more reason to feel financially secure than their employed male counterparts. The results in Figure 8.8 illustrate that




Figure 8-9: Main place of work (or most recent place of work) (o011), according to gender

employed women (85%) far more than employed men (61%) receive their salaries regularly and fully. Furthermore, a higher percentage of male respondents (9%) than female respondents (3%) do not receive their salary regularly nor fully.

In comparison with their male counterparts, working women seem to have their place of work closer to where they reside. More concretely, while 25% of the male respondents have their place of work in the Gaza Strip, this is the case for 47% of the female respondents. However, males (20%) far more frequently than females (2%) are employed in Israel proper.

### 8.2.4 Loss of employment, according to gender

Loss of employment, and the manner or the effort Palestinians invest in trying to find another job, clearly varies according to gender. When interviewees were asked whether or not their employment situation had changed in the past six months, a higher percentage of female




Figure 8-10: Change in employment situation in the past six months (o012), according to gender



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

respondents than male respondents (85% vs. 65%) managed to maintain their job. Furthermore, as overviewed in Figure 8.10, below, a higher percentage of male respondents (24%) than female respondents (9%) has lost their job, but at the same time a higher percentage of male (11%) than female respondents (6%) changed their employment.

Figure 8-11: Attempts to find a job (o014) according to gender



Among the unemployed respondents, men clearly tried much harder to find different employment than their female counterparts. As illustrated in Figure 8.11, of the male unemployed, 75% tried hard to find another job, while only 14% did not try at all to seek alternative employment. In comparison, only 27% of the female unemployed tried hard to find work and 61% did not try at all to find employment.

As the results in Table 8.4 indicate, the reasons for not searching for alternative employment vary considerably according to gender. The main reasons for men not to search for another job include: studying (36%), sickness (16%), lack of job opportunities (14%) and old age (12%). The reasons for women not to look for another job are entirely different, with a majority of 61% of the female respondents arguing that they want to devote more time to home commitments and children. However, it is also worth pointing out that 7% of the female respondents stated that they did not search for employment because society and/or their husbands do not allow women to work.

Table 8-4: Reasons for not searching for another job (o140), according to gender

Reasons for not searching for another job	Gender		Total
	Male	Female	
1. Did not find the right job	6%	3%	4%
2. Devote time for studying	36%	5%	14%
3. Devote time for home commitments/kids	4%	61%	44%
4. Old age	12%	3%	5%
5. Roads	0%	1%	1%
6. 1+3+5	0%	1%	1%
7. Don't want to work	0%	4%	3%
8. Can't work	4%	3%	3%
9. Because of sickness	16%	4%	8%
10. Lack of job opportunities	14%	1%	5%
11. Society/husband does not allow women to work	0%	7%	5%
12. Despair	2%	0%	1%
13. Harassment at work because of my honesty	2%	0%	1%
14. Because of financial conditions	0%	3%	2%
15. I have no degree	0%	3%	2%
16. I don't need to work	0%	1%	1%
17. I am waiting to travel abroad to work	2%	0%	1%
18. Personal reasons	2%	0%	1%
19. No one helped me to get a job	0%	3%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%

From the analysis above, it became clear that although women seem to be more capable of maintaining their employment than men, once unemployed, men are more eager to find alternative employment. Interestingly, it seems that men are also more willing than women to compromise on their wages as long as this entails that they can keep their job or at least avoid total unemployment. Indeed, when respondents were asked to indicate their willingness to work, a higher percentage of male respondents than female respondents stated that they were willing to work if the wage is 10-25% lower (19% vs. 11%), or 25-50% less (12% vs. 3%), or even if the wage is 50% lower (8% vs. 3%). In addition, a considerably lower percentage of male respondents than female respondents stated that they would only be willing to work if the wage were the same as



before (23% vs. 38%). Conversely, a higher percentage of female respondents than male respondents said that they would be willing to work at any wage (45% vs. 38%). Here, it is perhaps also worth noting that the high percentage of respondents specifying that they would be willing to work at any rate could point to the dire circumstances of many Palestinians who are desperate enough to be willing to work at any rate in order to generate at least some income to sustain themselves and their families.

**8.2.5 Housewives**

For the first time in the history of this survey, two questions were directed specifically at the interviewed housewives in order to be able to obtain a clearer picture of housewives in Palestinian society and the place they might occupy in the informal labor market. As such, the interviewed housewives were first asked how many hours a day they work at home, and secondly, how many hours a day they spend on work not related to the house or the children, but perhaps helping out in the family shop or working in the field. The analysis, below, of the answers on those two questions, is based on the mean

or the average amount of hours per day spent by housewives either at home or for work not related to the home and the children.

In general, housewives seem to spend an average of about seven hours a day on work at home. However, and as detailed in Figure 8.13, the daily hours of work at home for housewives seems to increase with poverty. Furthermore, the housewives that fall into the categories of 25-34 years of age and 35-49 years of age seem to spend more

daily hours of work in the house than those that are between 18-24 years of age or older than 50 years. A plausible explanation for these differences in time per day spent working at home could be that the housewives in the former age categories are more likely to have children in the household, while the housewives that fall into the latter categories either do not have children yet or their children are grown up and/or have left the house.




Figure 8-12: Willingness to work (o115) according to gender




Figure 8-13: Hours per day of work at home for housewives (o159) in general, according to poverty level, and age






Figure 8-14: Number of hours spent for work not related to the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.) (o160) in general, according to poverty level (poverty3), and according to educational level (educ)

The average amount of time spent on work not related to the house or children among housewives who do actually utilize their time in other ways, is about three hours and 20 minutes a day. As was the case concerning households that have women in the labor market, it seems that also housewives in households with a monthly income above the poverty line spend more time on work not related to the house or the children than housewives in poorer households. Furthermore, the housewives who have a higher level of education seem to spend a higher average number of hours on work not related to the house or the children than housewives with medium or low educational levels.

The average number of hours spent on work not related to the house or children among housewives

who do spend time helping out beyond the typical housework also varies according to region and area of residence. As illustrated in Figure 8.15, the daily average number of hours of work spent in work unrelated to the house and the children, is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem, and is also higher in refugee camps than in cities or villages.




Figure 8-15: Number of hours spent for work not related to the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.) (o160), according to region of residence, and area of residence

### 8.3 IMPACT OF THE INTIFADA ON CHILDREN

#### 8.3.1 Children and employment

Given the long duration of the Intifada and the negative implications it has on Palestinians' livelihood, there has been a steady increase in child labor since the beginning of the second Intifada. It appears that an increasing number of Palestinian households have begun to rely on their children to provide additional income.



However, and despite the ongoing harsh conditions prevailing in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, in this report, the percentage of children below the age of 18 and below the age of 16 employed for more than four hours a day has declined significantly to the level of child labor as it stood in December 2001. More concretely, whereas in the last report (September 2003) still 23% of the respondents stated that at least one of their children below the age of 18 was working for more than four hours a day and 12% of the respondents admitted that at least one of their children below the age of 16 were doing so, these percentages in the current report dropped to respectively 11% and 4%. One factor that could explain this drop could be the timing of the surveys conducted for the reports. Whereas the survey for the last report was conducted in the middle of the summer school holidays and at a time where many youth were involved in temporary employment, the survey for the current report was conducted during the school year and at a time where many of the youth are not involved in temporary employment. As such, only after the next survey foreseen for the summer of 2004, might it be possible to draw more definite conclusions.

When examining the issue of children and employment according to the region of residence of the respondents (Figure 8.16), it is clear that fewer households in East Jerusalem seem to have children working, while a slightly higher percentage of households in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank have both children below the age of 18 and below the age of 16 working for more than four hours a day.

When studying the issue of children and employment from the perspective of households' economic status, it is evident that the decision to involve

children below the age of 18 and even below the age of 16 in the labor market is strongly affected by financial difficulties faced by households. As illustrated in Figure 8.17, 18% of the households living in hardship have at least one child below the age of 18 working for more than four hours a day, while this is the case for only 5% of the





Figure 8-16: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, in general and according to region of residence

Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, according to poverty level (poverty3)



households with a family income above the poverty line. Similarly, whereas 7% of the households that can be classified as hardship cases have at least one child below the age of 16 working, this is the case for 3% of the households with a living standard above the poverty line.

The interviewees were also asked about the various strategies that they use in order to cope with hardship. 14 In answering this question, respondents were given the opportunity to specify from a predetermined list which coping strategies they had used. In this list, there was one question asking the interviewees whether or not they had sent additional members below the age of 18 into the labor market.

In general, 10% of the respondents stated that they had sent more household members below the age of 18 into the labor market as a method of coping with the hardship. It is worth remembering that this percentage stood at 16% in the last report (September 2003). As such, there is a drop of 6% among respondents who sent household members below the age of 18 into the labor market. This, again, could be partially explained by the fact that the survey for the current report was conducted during the school year, while the survey for the last report was conducted during the summer holidays.

As illustrated in Figure 8.18, there are clear differences in the percentage of respondents that opted for sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a coping strategy according to region, poverty level and the effect of the Wall.

Once again, there is no great difference in the percentage of respondents in the West Bank (10%) and the Gaza Strip (11%) who sent children below the age of 18 into the labor market. This coping mechanism is used least frequently by respondents in East Jerusalem (3%). Furthermore, reliance on the strategy of sending children below the age of 18 to work increases as poverty increases. More concretely, whereas 7% of households with a family income above the poverty line sent children below the age of 18 into the labor market





Figure 8-17: Number of children below the age of 18 (o065a) and below the age of 16 (o065b) employed for more than 4 hours a day, according to poverty level


Figure 8-18: Children below the age of 18 in the labor market as a coping strategy (o131f) in general and according to region of residence, poverty level, and Wall



as a coping strategy, this percentage swells to 11% among households with a living standard below the poverty line and to 15% among households living in hardship. Finally, the strategy of sending children below the age of 18 into the labor market as a means of coping with hardship is far more often found in areas that are crossed by the Wall (18%) than in areas that are not crossed by the Wall (8%).

For the first time in our series of studies, interviewees who said that they have at least one child below the age of 18 working for more than four hours per day were asked about the type of work these employed children carry out.

Figure 8-19: Type of work of employed children below the age of 18 (o065o)




The answers were classified into four categories, which included (1) farming, (2) construction, (3) workers and (4) shop assistants. As indicated in Figure 8.19, the largest percentage of employed children below the age of 18 work as shop assistants (38%), followed by 27% who fall into the category of workers, 25% who are employed in farming and 10% who are involved in construction.

### 8.3.2 Children and education

In general, only 1% of the respondents stated that it was “almost impossible” for the household members to reach their place of education, 5% said that it was “very difficult”, and 23% considered it to be “difficult”. The majority of 71% of the respondents said that it was not difficult at all for their household members to attend school or university.

In comparison to the results on this question in the last report (September 2003), there is a considerable improvement in the ability of Palestinians to get to their

Figure 8-20: Ability to attend school or university in the past 6 months (o113a) in general and according to region of residence



place of education. Indeed, last September, less than half the respondents (46%) stated that it was “not difficult” to attend school or university, while the majority continued to face various levels of difficulties in getting to their place of education.

In comparison with the results of September 2003, there is still a significant - albeit diminished - difference in opinion concerning the ability to attend school or university depending on the region in which respondents reside. As indicated in Figure 8.20, fewer West Bankers (64%) than Jerusalemites



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

(76%) and Gazans (79%) stated that it was not difficult to reach school or university. In the report of September 2003, only 32% of West Bank respondents said so, but the differences according to region of residence which remain considerable, merely highlight the continuing restrictions of movement as a result of closures and occasional military actions that are felt more by Palestinians in the West Bank than by their compatriots in the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

Household members of respondents in villages clearly continue to have a harder time attending school or university than their peers in cities and refugee camps. Indeed, whereas 76% of city residents and 71% of camp dwellers said that their household members did not face any difficulty in getting to their place of education, only 62% of village respondents shared this opinion. Again, this trend can be explained by the prevailing conditions on the ground as villagers, in order to attend some schools and especially universities, must be able to enter cities, which remain closed or hard to reach as a result of the Israeli military checkpoints surrounding them.


Finally, the results in Figure 8.21 also illustrate that respondents residing in areas that are crossed by the Wall face far more difficulties in attending school or university than respondents in areas that are not crossed by the Wall. More con-

cretely, whereas half of the respondents that were affected by the Wall (50%) stated that it has not been difficult for their household members in the past six months to attend school or university, this was the case for a majority of 74% of the respondents that were not affected by the Wall.

Respondents with school-age children were also asked how often in the past six months their children had been unable to attend school or were late to school due to curfews or closures. Generally, the results very much correspond with the results from the previous question's analysis concerning the ability to attend school or university in the past six months. Whereas in general 71% of the respondents stated that it has "not been difficult" in the past six months to attend their place of education, another 71% of the respondents replied that in the past six months that their children had never or were almost never unable to attend school or arrived late to school as a result of closures or curfews. Of the remainder of the respondents, 26% said that their children were unable to go to school or arrived late fewer than ten times a month, while 3% stated that this happened ten times or more a month in the past six months.

As overviewed in Figure 8.22, below, the inability to attend school or late arrival at school due to curfews or closures varies considerably according to the respondents' region and area of residence. Concretely, a markedly higher

Figure 8.21 Ability to attend school or university in the past 6 months (o113a), according to area of residence and Wall





## February 2004 Surveys

percentage of respondents in the Gaza Strip (87%) and in Jerusalem (70%) than in the West Bank (59%) said that their children were never or were almost never unable to reach school or arrived late at school as a result of curfews or closures. Furthermore, a distinctly higher percentage of respondents in villages (73%) and cities (72%) than in refugee camps (62%) relayed that their children were never or almost never unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews or closures. In short, these results seem to indicate that the main trouble spots for attending school in the past six months are in the West Bank and in refugee camps.




Figure 8-22: Frequency in the past six months of the inability to attend school or of arriving late at school due to curfews/closures (o113b) in general and according to region of residence, and area of residence

When parents of school-going children were asked about the frequency in the past six months of their children not being taught by their regular teacher because that teacher was unable to come to school due to curfews or closures, the results seem to indicate that children were able to reach school easier than their teachers. In general, only 53% of the parents said that it never or almost never happened that their children were not taught by their regular teacher because he/she was unable to reach school as a result of curfews or closures. Of the remainder of the respondent parents, 39% said that their children were not taught by their regular teacher less than ten times per month, while 7% stated that this happened ten times or more per month in the past six months. As was the case concerning children's inability to attend school, the inability of teachers to get to school as a result of curfews or closures also varies considerably according to region and area of residence. As overviewed in Figure 8.23, below, children not being taught by their regular teacher because that teacher was unable to come to school due to closures or curfews occurred less frequently in the Gaza Strip (64%) and Jerusalem (52%) than in the West Bank (45%). Furthermore, a far higher percentage of parents in cities (58%) and villages (51%) than in refugee camps (39%) affirmed that it never or almost never happened that their children were not taught by their regular teacher in the past six months. In summary, it is again in the West Bank and in refugee camps that teachers seem to have the most trouble in getting to their classrooms.

In the survey conducted for this report, respondents for the first time were asked if they had moved from their original place of residence since the beginning of the Intifada. Hereby, they were also queried about their reasons



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII




Figure 8-23: Frequency in the past six months of children not being taught by their regular teacher because the teacher was unable to come due to curfews/closures (o113c) in general, according to region of residence, and area of residence

behind the move to another town, city or village. Although this question is discussed in more detail in Part One of this report, it is covered briefly here, because one of the possible reasons for moving was for children in the household to be able to continue their education. As indicated in Table 8.5, below, 94% of the respondents had not moved since the beginning of the second Intifada. However, slightly less than 1% of the respon-

dents moved so that their children could continue their education.

Although this percentage does not look impressive at all, when translated into reality, it implies

that more than 25,000 families in the OPT have moved to another town, city or village since the beginning of the Intifada in order to ensure the continuation of their children's education.

Table 8-5: Moved from original place of residence to another town, city or village since the beginning of the Intifada so that children can continue with their education (o161)

Moving since the beginning of the Intifada	Frequency	Valid percent
No, did not move	1370	94%
Moved to preserve my livelihood	7	0.4%
Moved to find another job	7	0.4%
Moved because life became unbearable	45	3%
Moved so children can continue education	8	0.6%
Other	29	2%
Total	1465	100%

### 8.4 CHILDREN AND THE INTIFADA

The harsh conditions of the Intifada have impacted many Palestinian children in different ways. In order to be able to create a more concrete picture of the effects of the Intifada, respondent parents were asked whether or not their children (below the age of 18) expressed signs of psychological problems such as aggressive behavior, poor school results, bedwetting and nightmares. In general, 36% of the parents detected aggressive behavior among their children, 31% noticed poor school results, 25% reported bedwetting, and 28% stated that their children suffered from nightmares. Although these



## February 2004 Surveys

results are depressing as they are, it is notable that they represent an improvement to answers to the same question in the August 2003 survey. At that time, still 46% of the parents

reported aggressive behavior, 38% poor school results, 27% bedwetting, and 39% nightmares. From this comparison, one could possibly deduce that Palestinian children are slowly but surely starting to bounce back over time from traumas experienced when the negative and direct effects of the Intifada, such as shooting, injury or death of a relative or friend, arrests and beatings, confinement at home as a result of curfews or Israeli military incursions, were widespread.

After having generally discussed the negative impact of the Intifada, it is important to explore whether or not children's behavioral problems differ according to the various independent variables at hand. As such, below, each of the listed effects of the Intifada on children below the age of 18 will be discussed separately.

Concerning children showing aggressive behavior since the beginning of the Intifada, there are significant differences when examining the answers according to region and area of residence,

refugee status, poverty level, and the effect of the Wall. As detailed in Figure 8.25, in comparison with children in the West Bank (29%) and East Jerusalem (30%), children in the Gaza Strip most frequently manifested aggressive behavior (48%). Furthermore, a lower percentage of children in villages (30%) than in cities (38%) and refugee camps (43%) suffer from aggressive behavior. A higher percentage of refugee children (41%) than non-refugee children (33%) seem to behave aggressively. The results in Figure 8.25 also indicate that aggressive behavior among children seems to augment with an increase in hardship. Finally, aggressive behavior among children seems to be more common among children residing in places that are crossed by the Wall (44%) than among those who have their home in places that are not crossed by the Wall (35%).

Figure 8-24: Impact of the second Intifada on children (o033a, b, c, d)





Figure 8-25: Aggressive behavior by children (o033a) according to region and, area of residence, refugee status, poverty level and Wall



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

The phenomenon of poor school results since the beginning of the Intifada is similar in the West Bank (26%) and East Jerusalem (26%) and is most evident in the Gaza Strip (42%). It is perhaps worth remembering here that the overall assessment of poor school results according to region of residence has changed noticeably since the September 2003 report. At that time, poor school results were most common among children in the West Bank and least witnessed in children residing in East Jerusalem. As such, in the past six months the problem of bad school results among West Bank children seems to have considerably diminished.

Furthermore, the results in Figure 8.26 clearly indicate that incidence of poor school results is far more pronounced in households that live in hardship (54%) than in households with a monthly income below the poverty line (39%) or above the poverty line (23%).





Figure 8-26: Bad school results by children (o033b) according to region of residence and poverty level

When analyzing the issue of bedwetting according to region of residence, it is again obvious that bedwetting is far more frequent in the Gaza Strip (37%) than in the West Bank (18%) and Jerusalem (15%). Again, results with regard to bedwetting were very different in the September 2003 report as at that time bedwetting was mostly a problem among West Bank children. A possible explanation for this change could be that in the past six months Israeli military incursions, attacks and targeted killings occurred more often in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, and, as such, it is now the Gazan children more than the children in the West Bank and East Jerusalem who increasingly experience traumatic events and as a result progressively manifest more signs of psychological distress such as bedwetting.

A significantly higher percentage of children residing in refugee camps (37%) than in cities (24%) and villages (19%) wet their beds. Furthermore, bedwetting occurs far more frequently

Figure 8-27: Bedwetting by children (o033c) according to region of residence, area of residence and poverty level



## February 2004 Surveys

amongst children in households living in hardship (44%) than among children in households with a monthly income above the poverty line (19%) and even than children in households with a monthly income below the poverty line (29%).





Figure 8-28: Have the children (below the age of 18) in your household suffered from nightmares since the beginning of the second Intifada? (o033d) according to region of residence, area of residence and poverty level

Consistent with the findings above, a higher percentage of children in the Gaza Strip (35%) than children in the West Bank (25%) and Jerusalem (20%) suffer from nightmares. Also similar to previous findings, nightmares are a more common phenomenon among children in refugee camps (36%) than among children residing in cities (27%) and villages (26%). Finally, once more poverty negatively impacts children's state of mind, as a far higher percentage of children in households living in hardship (44%) than children in households that are financially relatively better-off (27%) have nightmares.

Given the so obviously persisting manifestations of psychological distress among Palestinian children below the age of 18, it is important to assess to what

Figure 8-29: Care and protection needs of children (o171) in general and according to region and area of residence



extent parents feel that they are capable of fully meeting the needs of their children for care and protection. As could be expected given the continuing high percentages of children who express signs of psychological problems, in general, a majority of parents (53%) do not feel that they can fully care and protect of their children. Again not surprising given the trends detected above, a lower percentage of parents in the Gaza Strip (39%) than in Jerusalem (46%) and the West Bank (54%) feel that they can meet the needs of their children for care and protection. Similarly, a lower percentage of parents in refugee camps (42%) than in cities (44%) and villages (57%) report feeling able to meet these basic needs of their children.

The ability of parents to fully meet the needs of their children for care and protection also varies significantly according to refugee status and poverty level. As overviewed in Figure 8.30, a considerably lower percentage of refugee parents (43%) than non-refugee parents (51%) are able to meet these needs. Furthermore, an impressive 66% of parents in households living



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

in extreme poverty admitted that they were unable to meet the needs of their children for care and protection. This was “only” the case for 43% of parents in households with a living standard above the poverty line.

As usual, parents were asked to specify what in their opinion is the most important need of their children. In

general, 32% of parents considered their children’s regular attendance of school to be the most important need; 29% believed that it was most important that their children eat as before the Intifada; while 26% stated that it was most important for their children to have safe opportunities to play with friends. Less than 10% (9%) of the parents believed that the most important need of their children was to receive psychological support and only 5% considered unrestricted access to medical care to be the most important need for their children. The most striking differences in comparison with the September 2003 report is the decrease in the percentage of parents viewing psychological support for their children as the most important need (decline from 19% to 9%), and the increase in the percentage of parents stating that the most important need of their children is to eat as before the Intifada (increase from 20% to 29%).

These reported needs vary according to region and area of residence. For example, a far higher percentage of parents in the West Bank (41%) than in Jerusalem (26%) or the Gaza Strip (22%) asserted that the most important need of their children is to attend school regularly. The importance of school attendance is also significantly higher in villages (42%) than in cities (29%) and refugee camps (25%). Conversely, the need for children to eat as they did before the Intifada is considered to be more important by parents in the Gaza Strip (32%) and by parents in refugee camps (39%) than by parents in other regions and areas of residence.





Figure 8-30: Care and protection needs of children (o171) according to refugee status, and Wall

Figure 8-31: Most important need of children (o105) in general and according to region and area of residence



## February 2004 Surveys

Parents' perceptions about the most important need of their children vary according to the poverty level of the households. Indeed, the less poor are the respondent parents, the more importance they attach to the need of their children to have safe opportunities to play with their friends and to attend school regularly. In contrast, the need for children to eat as they did before the Intifada gains importance with increased levels of poverty. Moreover and as detailed in Figure 8.32, both the need of children to attend school regularly and to eat as they used to do before the Intifada are more important to parents that reside in areas that are crossed by the Wall than to parents in areas that are not crossed by the Wall.




Figure 8-32: Most important need of children (n=105) according to poverty level and Wall

In conclusion, when examining specific issues related to women and children, a number of interesting and sometimes worrying findings can be identified. These results are summarized in the bullets below.

- In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December 2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one woman employed (26%). In fact, the percentage dropped to the level it stood at in the December 2001 report. Interestingly, the percentage of households with at least one woman employed swells with an increased level of education and is also highest in the households that fall in the age category of 24 to 35 years.
- When women in the household are employed, it has a clear positive effect on the household's financial status, as these households tend to have a higher monthly income level and can more often position their financial status above the poverty line. Furthermore, those households seem to be in a better position to cope financially in the future.
- Women in the labor market less frequently lost their jobs than their male counterparts. However, those women who did lose their employment tried less hard than men to find alternative employment. Furthermore, although less women than men are employed full-time in the labor force, women more than men seem to be able to bring home a regular and full salary. Lastly, men more than women are willing to compromise on their wages as long as they can keep a job and avoid total unemployment.
- In general, housewives spend an average of seven hours a day on work at home. Housewives who also spend time on work not related to the house or children, on average do so for about three hours and 20 minutes a day.
- In comparison with results in previous reports (September 2003, December 2002), a lower percentage of Palestinian households have at least one child below the age of 18 employed (11%). In fact, the percentage has dropped to about the level of child labor as it stood in the December 2001 report. The decision to have children work is influenced by the financial situation of the household, as a far higher percentage of households living in



hardship or below the poverty line than households with a living standard above the poverty line have children employed. Children in the labor market are most often working as shop assistants, or are workers or involved in construction.

- Albeit that about 30% of the household members of respondents continue to face difficulties in getting to their place of education, there appears to be a considerable improvement in the ability of Palestinians to attend school or university since September 2003.

- About 71% of the respondents stated that their children in the past six months had never or almost never been unable to attend school or had arrive late, while 53% of the parents said that it never or almost never happened that their children were not taught by their regular teacher because he/she was unable to reach school due to curfews or closures. However, both child and teacher attendance of school were most problematic in the West Bank and in refugee camps.

- Since the beginning of the Intifada, 36% of parents reported aggressive behavior among their children, 31% noticed bad school results, 25% mentioned that their children are bedwetting, and 28% reported that their children have nightmares. Although the results are striking, they represent an improvement on the answers to the same question in the September 2003 report. All four types of behavioral problems are most explicit in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps and among the poorer segments of society.

- A majority of 53% of parents admit to being unable to fully meet the needs of their children for care and protection. Again, this phenomenon is most pronounced in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorer elements of society and among refugees.

- The need for children to attend school regularly is the priority for the majority of parents. In comparison to the September 2003 report, a declining percentage of parents stress the need for their children to receive psychological support, while an increasing percentage emphasize the need for their children to eat as they did before the outbreak of the Intifada. The importance attached to the need for children to eat as they did before the Intifada is most striking in the Gaza Strip, in refugee camps, among the poorest and in areas that are crossed by the Wall.







# 9 REFUGEES & UNRWA

Part 9 of the report investigates the living situation of the Palestinian refugees living in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT) and the impact of international aid on their livelihoods.

Refugees constitute 46% of the population sample, i.e. 674 out of 1,464 respondents.<sup>1</sup> As indicated in the following figure, most of refugee respondents reside in cities.

Twenty-six percent of the West Bank refugees included in our sample live in camps, which mirrors the statistics of the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA). Our refugee sample in Gaza somehow underrates camp residents: they make up 44% of our total sample, while UNRWA estimates they representation at 53% of the population.<sup>2</sup>

Conversely, refugee camps - which are usually perceived as the embodiment of refugee status - are mostly by not exclusively inhabited by refugees. On average, 95% of the camp residents we interviewed were refugees, with a high of 98% in the West Bank and a low of 94% in the Gaza Strip.

Part 9 is divided into two sections.

- The first section sets out to establish a basic socioeconomic profile for the refugees as perceived by the refugees themselves and by the OPT population as a whole.
- The second section focuses on the Palestinians' perceptions of the socioeconomic assistance programs undertaken on behalf of the refugees.

Our main explanatory variable is the "refugee status" independent variable. However, when relevant, we will also use the "camp refugee" variable, either vis-à-vis inhabitants of other areas of residence (i.e. villages and cities, including non-camp refugees) or other places of residence (i.e. non-camp dwellers, including non-camp





Figure 9-1: Distribution of refugees according to area of residence

<sup>1</sup> Previous reports have shown that nearly all refugees (above 95%) were registered with UNRWA.

<sup>2</sup> See UNRWA, *Figures as of 31 December 2003*, Public Information Office, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza), March 2004.

refugees). Variables related to age, gender, education are excluded from our analysis as they are dealt with in other parts of the report. Also generally excluded is East Jerusalem as a place of residence.

Figure 9-2 Refugee status according to place of residence



## 9.1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE REFUGEES

This section aims at sketching refugees’ socioeconomic characteristics, regardless of the sources of assistance they receive, as compared with non-refugees and the OPT population at large. Analysis is mainly based on data linked to three interrelated notions:

- Poverty status in terms of household income.<sup>1</sup>
- Causes of poverty such as mobility constraints, employment status and availability of alternative sources of income.
- Unmet needs at both the household and community levels.

### 9.1.1 Poverty status and refugees: reality and perceptions

#### 9.1.1.1 Poverty line and refugee status

##### *Current situation*

Overall, refugees are comparatively poorer than non-refugees. In terms of household income, this means that the percentage of refugees below the poverty line<sup>2</sup> (including the hardship cases, i.e. those who earn half or less than the level of income needed to be on the poverty line<sup>3</sup>) is higher. Sixty percent of the refugee sample was in this situation as compared with 53% of the non-refugee sample.

1 We refer here strictly to the monetary income-related definition of poverty. It is agreed that, overall, (transient) poverty is also related to gaps in education, health, housing and other human development criteria.

2 The determination of the poverty line and of the hardship cases category used in this report is discussed at length in the Introduction and Part II and Part III.

3 The notion of “hardship cases” used in this report is different from the notion of “Special Hardship cases” used by UNRWA. The latter is not restricted to income-related criteria as it also restricts eligibility to specific categories of the refugee population (families headed by widows, for instance). For a comprehensive definition of UNRWA’s “Special hardship cases” see below, footnote 18.



Refugee camps clearly emerged as a focal point of poverty, with proportionally more hardship cases (38%), than in cities and villages (22% and 15% respectively). Strictly speaking, hardship cases constitute the majority of the camp population, while in other areas the majority of the population is above the poverty line. However, our data shows that that this pattern in refugee camps is mainly due to conditions in the Gaza Strip, where nearly half of camp residents are hardship cases. Quite to the opposite, in the West Bank one finds more hardship cases outside the camps.





Figure 9-3: Poverty according to refugee status

*Evolution in the past six months*

The figures obtained in this survey indicate lower levels of poverty than the data obtained in our preceding survey (July 2003), when 66%, i.e. an additional six percent, were considered below the poverty line and hardship cases.<sup>1</sup> The non-refugee sample is slightly worse-off than in July 2003, as percentages of non-refugee hardship cases and those below the poverty line climbed from 51% to 53%. The relative improvement of the refugees' socioeconomic status between July 2003 and February 2004 can also be inferred from the family income figures. During this period, the percentage of refugees who earned low incomes (NIS 1,000 and less) decreased from 23% to 19%, whereas the same group among non-refugees increased from 18% to 22% (o057v3).

The refugees' better socioeconomic situation is due to the improvement in their employment conditions during the period under scrutiny. Between July 2003 and February 2004, the percentage of full-time employed among refugees increased by 6% (from 48% to 54%), while the

Figure 9-4: Poverty according to place of residence



<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 175.



## February 2004 Surveys

percentage of unemployed decreased by 5% (from 25% to 20%). Conversely, during the same period, the non-refugees experienced a decline in the full-time employed by 5% (from 48% to 43%), while the number of unemployed increased by 2% (25% to 27%) (o08)<sup>1</sup>.




Figure 9-5: Evolution of employment situation (o008) according to refugee status

Analyzing the evolution of conditions from a geographical perspective demonstrates the uneven nature of progress in refugees' socioeconomic status.

In terms of place of residence, the overall socioeconomic status improvement observed among refugees reflected the improvement of conditions for West Bank camp dwellers (98% of them being refugees), who appear to have benefited more from the relative relaxing of Israel's closure policy.<sup>2</sup> The percentage of hardship cases in this group declined by 12% (from 28% to 16%), while the percentage of people above the poverty line increased by 10% (from 35% to 45%). In contrast, conditions for Gaza camp dwellers (94% of them being refugees) deteriorated dramatically, with the percentage of hardship cases among Gaza refugee camp residents rising from 36% to 46% and the proportion of those above the poverty line dropping from 31% to 23% (o08).<sup>3</sup>

Highlighting the different conditions between refugee camps in the West Bank and those in the Gaza Strip, the percentage of (very) low income earners (below NIS 1,000) increased in the Gaza refugee camps from 27% to 35%, but sharply decreased in the West Bank refugee camps from 33% to 9% (o057v3).

### 9.1.1.2 General perceptions of income and of living conditions

The refugees' perceptions of their purchasing power do not significantly reflect their overall improved socioeconomic status for the period surveyed. Hence, the percentage of refugees who perceived their income as lower than needed was significantly higher than average: 71% of them believed their income to be much less (41%) or slightly less (30%) than needed. Non-refugees were less dissatisfied about their income (o040).

<sup>1</sup> The o08 variable does not consider retired people, housewives and students unemployed.

<sup>2</sup> The percentage of hardship cases and above-the-poverty-line respondents (refugees and non-refugees) among the non-camp dwellers remained stable at 19% and 46% respectively.

<sup>3</sup> In comparison, the percentage of non-camp resident hardship cases decreased from 34% to 29%, while the percentage of non-camp residents above the poverty line increased from 25% to 34%.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

These perceptions are nevertheless more positive than those of July 2003, however the perception of improved conditions is slightly more prevalent among non-refugees.

Between July 2003

and February 2004, the percentage of respondents who considered their income less than needed decreased by 6% among non-refugees and by 5% among refugees.

Over the same period, the percentage of respondents who considered their income higher than needed increased by 7% among non-refugees and by only one percent among refugees.





Figure 9-6: Perceptions of income's conformity to needs (o041) by refugee status

The non-refugees confirmed their comparatively more favorable socioeconomic status by reporting more optimistic financial forecasts. Forty percent of them believed that they would be able to keep up financially "as long as it would take", and 51% that they could "barely manage" or were in a serious situation, versus 32% and 56% respectively of the refugee respondents. Six months earlier, one third of each category believed they "could manage" and 55% that they could barely get by (o044).

In a nutshell, between July 2003 and February 2004, refugee prospects for improved income remained less optimistic, whatever the refugees' area of residence, whereas those prospects were somewhat improved for non-refugees. During this time period the political prospects of the Roadmap failed, and along with it hoped-for positive short- and long-term socioeconomic impacts (such as the re-opening of the Israeli job market and possible proposed compensation/repatriation schemes). It is possible that the pessimism of refugees reflects their added economic and political stake in these developments.

Figure 9-7: Perceptions of the refugees' living conditions (o144) by refugee status




## February 2004 Surveys

The refugees' overall less-enviable socioeconomic status is reflected in the OPT population at large. About two-thirds of our total sample believes that the refugees are much or slightly worse-off than non-refugees. That percentage is less, however, among non-refugees themselves. More strikingly, 12% of non-refugees believe that refugees are slightly or much better-off than others, as compared with 3% of refugee respondents who believe that refugees are slightly or much better-off (o0144xo02).

Interestingly enough, in terms of area of residence, camp residents tend to consider the refugees' living conditions in a more balanced way than residents of cities and villages. They are more likely to believe that there is no real difference between refugees and non-refugees in this respect, and less likely to consider refugees worse off. Paradoxically, more residents of cities (9%) and villages (7%) also see refugees as being better off than non-refugees, versus 2% of the refugees (o0144xo060).

Figure 9-8: Perceptions of the refugees' living conditions (o144) by area of residence



### 9.1.2. Causes of poverty

The comparatively underprivileged status of refugees is generally ascribed to the latter's lack of access to capital, land and alternative sources of income, to greater expenses due to persistent unmet needs or to a decrease in the socioeconomic assistance provided, rather than conjectural factors linked to mobility problems or to types of employment available.<sup>1</sup>

#### 9.1.2.1 Mobility constraints


Regarding mobility, the statement still holds true. The closure policy imposed by Israel in the OPT affected refugees less than non-refugees. In general, 66% of the latter experienced a lot of mobility problems versus 51% of the former (o031). And while relatively similar percentages of both categories

<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, *Report VI*: 174-176.



encountered difficulties in getting access to places of work (o114), fewer refugees suffered from business losses due to curfew (28% versus 40% of non-refugees) (o0140e). Also, the construction of the Wall prevented more non-refugees (36%) from getting to their place of work than refugees (21%) (o0164c).

Figure 9-9: Various impacts of mobility restrictions (o031, o114, 0140e, 0164c) by refugee status



When examining area of residence, camp residents (88%) (and resident of cities) are in general less exposed to mobility restrictions than villagers (95%), with regards to reaching place of work (47% versus 62%, respectively) (o0130e), or to suffering business losses because of curfews (21% versus 45%, respectively) (o0140e). In addition, the camp residents' comparative advantage vis-à-vis residents of villages is all the more obvious when it comes to Wall-related access to work problems: 18% of camp residents were affected in this respect, versus 22% of city residents and 47% of village residents (o0164c).

9.1.2.2. Employment status and alternative income sources

As highlighted in our preceding survey, there is no significant difference between refugees and non-refugees regarding type of employment, employment situation and unemployment status per se.<sup>1</sup> Refugees are represented, like the general population, among full-time workers (26%) and housewives (32%) (o008). Students (11%) and retired people (2%) excluded, 13% of refugees are not employed. In addition, around half of the main breadwinners (54%) have gone through various periods of unemployment since the beginning of the Intifada, most of those periods extending from 7 to 24 months (26%).

When employed, however, refugees tend to receive their salaries more regularly and fully than non-refugees (75% versus 61%) (o009), perhaps because they are employed in more sustainable job sectors, such as the public sector (where 32% of refugees are employed versus 27% of non-refugees) or in international agencies (where 12% of refugees are employed versus 6% of non-refugees). Conversely, many more non-refugees are self-employed (36% versus 30% of refugees), or are employed by the private sector (30% versus 18% of non-refugees) (o063).

Conversely, refugees seem to be more vulnerable to variations in the local job market. These variations have had a comparatively larger impact on their level of income, as they enjoy fewer alternative sources of income, such as work in Israel or in another country (14% versus 16% of non-refugees)

<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, Report VI: 174.






## February 2004 Surveys

(o011), independent income (27% versus 40% of non-refugees) or property renting (10% versus 14% of non-refugees) (o0163b). Likewise, they are less in a position to sustain the hardship by selling property (5% versus 8% of non-refugees) or by cultivating land (10% versus 31%) (o0131c and d).<sup>1</sup> Financial help from international organizations somehow helps allay difficulties: 21% of refugees benefit from this kind of assistance versus 11% of non-refugees (o0163b) (see Section 9.2) but, as we will see below, international aid is not stable. Ultimately, one finds refugees more likely to resort to short-term measures in order to sustain the hardship, such as reducing expenses (79% versus 74% of non-refugees) or not paying water and electricity bills (45% versus 39% of non-refugees) (o0131h, g).

Fewer opportunities for alternative sources of income result in higher percentages of refugees ascribing a drop in income to job losses: 34% of refugees versus 25% of non-refugees reported themselves in that situation. Among other causes of income decline, our survey underscored working hour losses (27% versus 24% of non-refugees) and business/cultivable land damaged (9% versus 10% of non-refugees) (o0109).

Figure 9-10: Job losses as main cause of income decrease (o109)  
by place of residence



Job loss was also the major cause of income decline in refugee camps (48%) and in villages (29%), ahead of working hour loss (23% for refugee camp residents and 22% for villagers). The impact of job losses was more marked in Gaza refugee camps, where the percentage of camp residents naming job loss as the reason for their drop in income was over twice as great as among those residing outside camps.

### 9.1.3. Unmet needs

Employment and financial assistance were considered by 52% of our overall population sample as the main important unmet needs (29% for employment and 23% for financial assistance), well ahead of housing (15%), health (12%), education (11%) and food (10%) (o0180).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is especially the case of camp refugees where, due to lack of land property, less than 2% of residents in either Gaza or the West Bank can cultivate land or sell property to sustain hardship (o0163 c and d).

<sup>2</sup> The pre-eminence of employment as a need is also positively asserted by 45% of refugees and 40% of non-refugees as their households' first most important need, well ahead of food and financial assistance for refugees (14% and 13% respectively), and food and health for non-refugees (17% and 15% respectively) (o079av3). Employment is also referred to by the overall sample as the main first important community assistance (62%), ahead of financial assistance (11%) and food (10%) (o0180av3).



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Given the higher impact jobs losses have had on refugee income, it is no surprise that employment is more often cited as an unmet need by refugees than non-refugees. Actually, as indicated in Figure 9.11, refugees appear to be more in need of basic services than non-refugees, except for education and health (and food for some of the special hardship cases)<sup>1</sup> which are provided to them on a regular basis by UNRWA.

It is worth noting that while food is more frequently referred to as an important unmet need among refugees in general (as

can be seen in the above figure), it is underrated as such by refugee camp residents. Our survey finds that only 6% of camp residents consider food an unmet need versus 11% of city residents and 29% of village residents (o0180x0060). The discrepancy between camp and non-camp residents is wider in the West Bank, where 2% of the former considered food as an important unmet need versus 12% of the latter, than in Gaza where the percentages were at 8% and 12%, respectively (o0180xplace). These findings may be explained by an emphasis on food assistance in UNRWA-recognized camps which, as we saw above (see Figure 9.4), are the OPT's main pockets of poverty. Conversely, refugees living outside the camps may be insufficiently supported in this respect.

When it come to the services most in demand in refugee camps and informal refugee areas,<sup>2</sup> most respondents from our total sample believe that income-generation services are most desirable, ahead of infrastructural rehabilitation, relief and regular basic services such as education and health.

This hierarchy of priorities in services corresponds to the





Figure 9-11: Most important needs (o180) according to refugee status

Figure 9-12: Most desired service in refugee camps and refugee areas (o146)



<sup>1</sup> See footnote 18.

<sup>2</sup> Informal refugee areas (or informal refugee gatherings) are also called "unrecognized camps".

## February 2004 Surveys

hierarchy established by the refugee and non-refugee respondents. However, when one takes as an independent variable the area or place of residence, it is clear that camp residents (at 19%), whether in Gaza or the West Bank, are more likely to opt for relief over infrastructure rehabilitation than city (17%) or village residents (15%).

The comparative importance of infrastructure rehabilitation and relief services (which here includes shelter rehabilitation) when set alongside other basic services may stem from an urgent need to address the direct hardships incurred by the community in the overall destruction of shelters, communal buildings and physical infrastructure due to Israeli military incursions. More generally, and regardless of the Intifada per se, UNRWA has long complained that lack of resources, minimal space for improvement and expansion, and great population density contribute to an overall deterioration in shelter and physical infrastructure conditions in its five fields of operation.<sup>1</sup>




Figure 9-13: Access to infrastructure (o174a, o174b, o174c) by area of residence

However, in terms of availability of services, our survey shows that with regard to the main infrastructural services, such as water, sewage disposal and electricity networks, camp residents emerge on average better off than, or equal to, residents of other areas.<sup>2</sup>

## 9.2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND REFUGEE STATUS

This section aims at determining the refugees' perceptions of the socioeconomic assistance provided by local and international assistance institutions operating in the OPT. In this respect, Palestinian refugees constitute a specific category. Most of them have since May 1950 been provided basic services in the fields of education, primary

<sup>16</sup> See for instance the report presented at the Workshop II of the Conference organized by UNRWA in Geneva on 7-8 June 2004: "Community Development and Refugees: Infrastructure, Environment, Housing and Social Development" (available on UNRWA's website [www.unrwa.org](http://www.unrwa.org)).

<sup>17</sup> Camp residents are worse off than city residents and sometimes villagers when it comes to connection to less basic services, such as satellite TV (66% versus 72% and 65% respectively), internet (4% versus 18% and 11% respectively), fixed phone (45%, versus 68% and 58% respectively) and mobile phone (52% versus 61% and 62% respectively) (o0174 h, g, e, fx0060).



health care, housing, and relief/social services by UNRWA, the only UN agency that has worked for such a long time in the exclusive service of one particular category of refugees.<sup>1</sup>

In the OPT, over 1.5 million refugees are registered with the Agency, accounting for more than 40% of the total population of these areas. All refugee children registered with UNRWA in the OPT are eligible for nine years free schooling, and as part of its regular program of assistance, the Agency runs 269 elementary and preparatory schools for 250,000 pupils. Primary health care is also provided and the Agency operates 51 health centers across the territories. Whilst UNRWA has no role in administering the 27 recognized refugee camps in which 650,000 refugees in the OPT live, it does have some responsibility for developing and maintaining infrastructure. Refugee families unable to meet their own basic needs are eligible for additional care, under the Agency's Special Hardship Case program (SHC). In the OPT 110,000 persons are registered as SHCs and receive direct material and financial assistance, including regular food parcels (see below for SHC criteria), funded from the Agency's regular program budget. UNRWA runs a number of other poverty alleviation and income-generating projects, including a small loans scheme.

Following the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, UNRWA launched a program of emergency activities in the OPT, aimed at responding to the immediate and longer-term needs of the refugee population. The main pillars of the Agency's response include an emergency employment creation scheme - which by the end of 2003 had created over 45,000 short term jobs - and a large-scale food assistance program, under which refugees who have lost their livelihoods are provided with food baskets covering around 60% of their daily needs. UNRWA is currently feeding approximately 1,000,000 persons as part of this program. Other interventions include a program of emergency shelter repair and reconstruction, selective cash assistance and a number of health and education activities, including psychosocial counseling.

Unfortunately however, donor contributions requested to respond adequately to the crisis did not keep pace with mounting needs during 2003-2004, resulting in the gradual curtailing of most, and the suspension of other, emergency activities and obliging UNRWA to strictly prioritize its interventions.<sup>2</sup> In particular, shortfalls in funding have seen food distributions almost halved in the Gaza Strip and the volume of food reduced in the West Bank; drastic cuts in the Agency's emergency re-housing program and the suspension of its shelter repair program in the West Bank; the suspension of repairs to water and sewage lines severely affected by Israeli military activity; the cancellation of in-kind assistance in the form of shoes and basic school supplies for children, and the suspension of emergency education measures such as

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<sup>1</sup> UNRWA's latest definition of the "Palestine refugee" (1993) stipulates that "Palestine refugee shall mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." Refugees within this definition and their direct descendants are eligible for Agency regular services (source: Consolidated Registration Instructions (Effective January 1993). Emergency services are granted not only on the basis of refugee status but also economic conditions.

<sup>2</sup> UNRWA, *UNRWA emergency appeal 2004*, UNRWA Headquarters (Gaza: December 2003).



## February 2004 Surveys

the distribution of self-standing learning material, education kits and after school activities, etc.<sup>20</sup> The outcome of these austerity measures pervade the sub-sections that follow.

This section is divided in two subsections:

- Current socioeconomic assistance according to refugee status: coverage, content and sources.
- The future of socioeconomic assistance, based on levels of satisfaction vis-à-vis current assistance received and the future of UNRWA per se.

### 9.2.1. Current socioeconomic assistance

#### 9.2.1.1. Coverage

##### Actual trends

As highlighted in preceding surveys, refugees emerged as the main recipients of assistance during the period under scrutiny. Over half of them received assistance of some sort

compared with one-third of non-refugees (o035). However, the figures produced in this survey were, for refugees especially, significantly lower (minus 14% for refugees and 5% for non-refugees) than those obtained in the July 2003 survey, or more generally since the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.




Figure 9-14: Assistance received (o035, o035b) according to refugee status, 2001-2004

generally since the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000.




Figure 9-15: Assistance received (o035) by place of residence

In terms of area of residence, refugee camp residents remained the main targets of socioeconomic assistance (66%), ahead of city (39%) and village residents (24%). This was more the case in Gaza, where 72% of refugee camp residents received assistance versus 54% of those living outside the camps, than in the West Bank where

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 4.



48% of camp residents received assistance versus 29% of those living outside the camps (o035).

Tracing the decline of assistance during the six past months per place of residence, one clearly sees that West Bankers, be they camp residents or not, were those most affected. The percentage of beneficiaries among Gaza refugee camp residents, the main recipient category altogether, even increased slightly from 71% to 72% (o035).

As we will see below, this evolution is surely due to lack of adequate funding of UNRWA. It may also result from a need to focus on the Gaza camps, which were both the main poverty pockets in the OPT (see above 9.1.1.1.) and the most affected by Israel's military measures during the time of this survey.

### *Perceptions of coverage*

To what extent do refugees perceive that the assistance they received adequately covered their needs? Our survey shows that refugees feel on average comparatively more covered by assistance. Among those who needed assistance and did not receive it, one finds significantly fewer refugees (20%) than among non-refugees (34%) (o038r). The refugees' comparative advantage may be due to the resilient and sustainable character of UNRWA's services as compared to the services of the Palestinian Authority, of local NGOs and of international bodies.

Confirming a focus of institutionalized assistance in the Gaza refugee camp communities, only 8% of Gaza refugee camp residents reported they had not received needed assistance. The percentage of Gazans living outside the camps who reported thus was twice as high; the percentage of West Bank refugee camp residents who reported thus was three times as high (25%); and the percentage of West Bankers residing outside camps who did not receive needed assistance was over four times as high (33%).

The comparative advantage of refugees in terms of assistance received was acknowledged by the OPT population at large. Fifty-three percent of our total sample believed that refugees received comparatively more assistance, versus 39% who saw no significant difference, and 9% who stated that non-refugees received comparatively more assistance (o0145). However, both refugee and non-refugee




Figure 9-16: Perceptions of levels of received assistance (0145) by refugee status

respondents tended to portray themselves as more needy, or the other as more privileged, regarding assistance received. While 55% of non-refugees considered the refugees worse off (see Section 9.1.1.3), nearly two-thirds of non-refugees believed that refugees received more assistance. Conversely, most refugees said that their refugee status was not a determining factor in the receipt of aid, thereby suggesting that received assistance was insufficient, since they also believed that more 70% of refugees were worse off than non-refugees (see 9.1.1.3). Lastly, the percentage of refugees who reported that non-refugees received more assistance than they was twice as large as the percentage of non-refugees who thought that non-refugees received more aid.

The more obvious discrepancy with regard to perceived levels of received assistance lies between West Banker non-camp residents and West Bank camp residents. While the former category's assessment is somewhat in line with non-refugees' assessment (see above), West Bank camp residents were more inclined to believe that non-refugees received more assistance (25%) than the other way around (24%). This phenomenon may be interpreted as West Bank camp residents' response to the dramatic decline in assistance (from 71% to 48% reporting assistance) they received over the past six months, (see Figure 9.13).<sup>1</sup> In contrast, camp residents and non-camp residents in Gaza had similar perceptions as to the distribution of received assistance per refugee status.

### *9.2.1.2 Content of assistance received over the six past months*

Three main types of assistance will be analyzed: food, financial aid, and job and employment assistance.

#### *Food*

Our survey confirmed that food was the most important first and second assistance item received by the OPT population. Food assistance was referred to as the first most important type of assistance received by a majority of 76% of refugees and non-refugees alike.<sup>2</sup> It was also mentioned as the second most important type of assistance received by 68% of refugees and 54% of non-refugees (o036a1). When compared with the July 2003 survey, the significance of food aid has nevertheless decreased in combined importance (by 13% for refugees and 3% for non-refugees) (o036foo). Residents of all areas were less likely to report food as the first or second most important assistance received by a minimum of 6% (West Bank camp residents) and a maximum of 12% (West Bankers residing outside camps). This was not true for Gaza camp residents, where 62% of respondents rated food as the first or second most important item, up from 54% in July 2003 (o036fooxplace).

Our survey found that the percentage of refugees depending on food assistance was threefold the percentage of non-refugees (13% versus 4%, respectively). This is due, as recalled above (see Part 6), to the major role UNRWA plays in delivering food on a

<sup>1</sup> This decline however may be seen as service providers' response to the improvement of conditions for refugee camp residents in the West Bank during the July 2003 - February 2004 period.

<sup>2</sup> Refugee status is not a valid independent variable in this case ( $\chi^2 > 0.05$ ).



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

regular basis to its hardship cases<sup>1</sup> and, more broadly, within its emergency program. Conversely, while both categories were consistent in their use of extended family support (8% and 7%, respectively), refugees appeared less able to rely on their own income for food (80% versus 89%, respectively) (o077). These findings testify to the shift in the institutional set-up of household food supply that has occurred from July 2003 to February 2004 among refugees and non-refugees, as indicated in the following figure:





Figure 9-17: Main source of food in refugee households (o077), July 2003-February 2004

### Financial aid

After food, refugees considered financial aid the most important assistance item received, with 11% of them declaring financial aid as either the first or the second most important item received (o036fin). When considering place of residence, most groups were less likely than in our previous survey to select financial aid as one of the most important types of aid, except for West Bankers residing outside refugee camps.

Figure 9-18: Received financial assistance (o036fin) by area of residence, July 2003-February 2004



<sup>1</sup> As part of its regular program of assistance, UNRWA provides relief aid to 28,500 refugee families (115,000 persons) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are registered with the Agency as Special Hardship Cases (SHCs). The UNRWA concept of special hardship incorporates several eligibility criteria. The total regular monthly income of the family should not exceed a determined threshold and the family should not include a male adult who is able to work. Consequently, eligible families are those e.g. headed by a widow, divorcee or abandoned woman; an orphan; or a refugee male over 60 years of age. In addition, SHC status can also be granted to families headed by or including a male adult who is following a full-time course of study; is serving a term of compulsory military service; or is suffering from a medical condition which renders him incapable of earning a living (Source: UNRWA).



## February 2004 Surveys

### Job and employment assistance

The percentage of refugee households benefiting from job assistance (32%) was over twice as high as the percentage of non-refugees benefiting from job assistance (14%) (o023). Strikingly, these figures are much lower than those obtained in our July 2003 survey by a margin of 12% for both refugees and non-refugees. More short-time jobs (11% of refugees and 5% of non-refugees) than long-term jobs (4% of refugees and 1% of non-refugees) were offered.

Other employment-related assistance included, aside from provision of job opportunities, unemployment funds (17% of refugees versus 4% of non-refugees).

Looking at the issue from a geographical perspective, the only places of residence that were not affected by the decline in job aid were the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, where the percentage of beneficiaries grew from 37% to 45%. This appears to reflect concern among main employment providers about the serious deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions affecting Gaza camp residents during the period under survey (see Section 9.1.1.1).

Probably on account of the short-term nature of the job assistance schemes, respondents considered employment assistance a low-importance item, despite the dominant refugee perception of employment assistance as a major unmet need (see Section 9.1.2.3). The percentage of refugee respondents that considered employment assistance one of the two most




Figure 9-19: Job assistance received in the past six months, by place of residence, July 2003 - February 2004 (o023)




Figure 9-20: Source of first most important assistance received (o036c1) according to refugee status

important assistance received remained at 5% between July 2003 and February 2004, while increasing among non-refugee respondents from 1% to 2% during the same period of time (o036emp).

9.2.1.3. Sources of assistance


General trends

The survey confirmed the refugees' material dependency on UNRWA's services, as 62% of them reported that the Agency was the source of their first most important assistance item received (o036c1), ahead of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and trade unions (10% each). The PA and international organizations (other than UNRWA) emerged as the main providers of assistance for non-refugees, but non-refugees' sources of socioeconomic assistance were, as could be expected, much more diverse.

In comparison with the July 2003 survey, while the percentage of people considering UNRWA the most important provider of first important services declined for refugees (minus 6%), it increased for non-refugees (plus 8%). The latter may have benefited comparatively more from emergency measures that targeted the overall population such as food assistance to people living under siege or to those whose homes were demolished by the Israeli army. In the same context, the PA saw its role as a main provider of first most important services to refugees increase twofold, from 5% to 10%.<sup>1</sup>

More specifically, UNRWA remained the main provider of first most important received assistance in the refugee camps, with 60% in the West Bank camps and 62% in Gaza camps (o036c1) reporting UNRWA as the source of crucial aid, but to a lesser extent

Figure 9-21: Main sources of regular services (o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es, o126fs) for refugees



<sup>1</sup> Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, *Report VI*: 182.

<sup>2</sup> In July 2003, the Islamist organizations and the local NGOs were each considered by 27% of the Jerusalemite respondents as the main providers of first most important services. In January, this percentage reached 0% for the former and 4% for the latter. Conversely, UNRWA's percentages in Jerusalem climbed from 9% to 57% during the same period of time.

## February 2004 Surveys

than in July 2003, when the same query produced proportions of 69% and 68%, respectively. Further, UNRWA lost its preeminence among West Bank beneficiaries (refugees and non-refugees) residing outside the camps (23% versus 29% in July 2003), where the PA has taken the lead as the main provider (25% versus 12% in July 2003). The main reason for that change, besides the Agency's budgetary problems outlined early in this section, may be UNRWA's shifting focus from the West Bank to East Jerusalem to make up for the dramatic decline in Islamist charitable organizations there.<sup>2</sup>

### Source of assistance per type of services

UNRWA retained its place as the refugees' main provider of the most important assistance in the form of food (34% versus 4% for the PA), in-kind aid (52% versus 14% for Islamic institutions) and coupons (53% versus 18% for the PA). It is in distributing those same items that UNRWA also takes precedent within the refugee camps. However, comparing these results with those of the precedent survey shows a decline in UNRWA's role as a provider of emergency food rations (54% in July 2003, i.e. minus 20% in February 2004),<sup>1</sup> and of in-kind aid (80% in July 2003, i.e. minus 28% in February 2004).

In the same respect, UNRWA slipped from the first to second provider of medication (26% versus 32% for the PA) and stabilized its position as second to the PA regarding employment services (41% versus 44%), and third to trade unions and the PA in the provision of financial assistance (12% versus 34% and 23%, respectively) to the refugees (o036).

Our survey confirmed that UNRWA is the main provider to refugees of services made available on a regular basis (without reference to importance) such as schooling, medication, primary health care and food rations. No dramatic change occurred from that perspective during the July 2003 -




Figure 9-22: UNRWA as the source of regular services (o126bs, o126cs, o126ds, o126es, o126fs, o126gs) by area of residence

<sup>1</sup> According to UNRWA, its rations seek to cover 50-60% of daily calorific needs, and are to be considered a supplement to household income (NIS 155 in the West Bank and NIS 189 in Jerusalem, for instance). Since 2003, UNRWA has been forced to further reduce its coverage of daily calorific requirements.

<sup>2</sup> We highlighted in our precedent survey the phenomenon whereby more refugees above the poverty line than non-refugees in the same situation got assistance (Bocco, Brunner, Daneels, Husseini, Lapeyre and Rabah, *Report VI*: 180).



February 2004 period, except that the PA became the first provider of regular employment schemes for refugees. This resulted more from the latter's enhanced role in this sector (moving from 32% to 43% between July 2003 and February 2004) than from UNRWA's demise (as it decline from 36% to 39% during the same period of time).

UNRWA's pervasiveness has also to do with the broad targeting of its regular education and health services for which registered refugees are eligible, regardless of their socioeconomic condition.<sup>2</sup> This being said UNRWA's activities are mainly focused on the camps, which are among the main poverty pockets in the OPT.

The following sub-section aims at providing information relevant to how refugees contemplate the future of the assistance programs undertaken by international and local assistance institutions. After gauging the refugees' level of satisfaction with the services received, the report will determine their attitude vis-à-vis the future of UNRWA.

### **9.2.2. The future of socioeconomic assistance**

This sub-section aims at providing information about the refugees' perceptions of the future of assistance programs carried out on their behalf. Two perspectives will be considered. The first perspective is operational, pertaining to the refugees' degree of satisfaction and reliance regarding the assistance programs carried out on their behalf. The second perspective, of a more political nature, has to do with the refugees' opinion regarding the sustainability of UNRWA's mandate.

#### **9.2.2.1 Satisfaction with assistance received**

In line with the overall sample, 61% of refugee respondents expressed general satisfaction (52%) or much satisfaction (9%) with the assistance received (o037). This result is close to the result obtained in our precedent survey (July 2003: 59% of respondents were satisfied).

Among the 39% that were unsatisfied, the great majority of refugees and non-refugees alike ascribed their dissatisfaction to unsatisfactory frequency (60%) of services, ahead of inadequate quantity (21%), or the quality of services (17%) (o0123). Unsatisfactory frequency was prevalent in every place of residence, but especially in Gaza, where 67% of refugees inside the refugee camps and 70% of refugees outside the refugee camps were dissatisfied.<sup>1</sup>

Regarding levels of satisfaction related to the first most important assistance received in the six past months, refugee status is not a conclusive independent, explanatory variable. As we saw above, emergency programs - including UNRWA's programs - sometimes cover both refugees and non-refugees. In general, the level of satisfaction rose, especially in the field of employment assistance where the level of satisfaction increased from 51% in July 2003 to 74% in February 2004 (o036empt).

In the same context, refugee status was significant in only two cases. Regarding medical assistance, refugees proved to be more satisfied (at 89%) than non-refugees (at 75%) (o036). Refugees were comparatively less satisfied with food assistance, 35% of them reporting dissatisfaction (a rise of 4%

<sup>1</sup> In the West Bank, the results were different as camp refugees were more dissatisfied by the frequency of assistance (60%) than those living outside the camps (53%).



## February 2004 Surveys

since July 2003) versus 24% of the non-refugees (a rise of one percent since July 2003). In line with this finding - and maybe explaining it - is the larger percentage of dissatisfied camp residents (40% versus 26% of city residents and 38% of villagers) vis-à-vis food assistance. Camp residents also were less satisfied with found food distribution than non-camp residents (23% versus 19% respectively), especially in the Gaza Strip (o0166xplace). As stated earlier in the report (See Part 6 on *Food*), one may ascribe the wider dissatisfaction among camp refugees, despite that they are more targeted than non-refugees, to higher poverty levels. It may also reflect the camp refugees' dismay at the decrease in regularity of UNRWA's food distribution due to under-funding.




Figure 9-23: Percentage of the total population who received and were satisfied with regular services (o126b, c, d, e, f, g) by refugee status

Still, refugees' diminished satisfaction regarding food as the first most important received item must be qualified. As seen above (Section 9.1.2.3), food is considered on average by refugees as one of their least significant unmet needs.

When it comes to services received regularly (o0126), refugees status becomes a valid independent variable. This is due to UNRWA's operations as a major regular supplier of services exclusively to refugee communities. However, the survey shows that whereas the refugees benefited comparatively more from regular services, both refugee respondents and non-refugee respondents are in agreement in their satisfaction with these regular services.

As in the preceding survey, it appears that refugees were satisfied with the assistance received, whatever the source of assistance, except for those two areas they reported as primary unmet needs: employment and financial aid (see Section 9.1.2.3). For non-refugees, the situation was similar, with the exclusion of financial aid, where satisfied respondents prevailed by a brief margin of one percent.




Figure 9-24: Future of UNRWA (o147) according to refugee status



To sum up, although refugees (and non-refugees) remain critical of certain aspects of the assistance they receive, either as most important or regular items, they were in general satisfied and did not appear to have major complaints with the assistance system established on their behalf.

### 9.2.2.2. *The future of UNRWA's mandate*

Refugees' satisfaction with international assistance inevitably reflects upon UNRWA. The austerity measures the Agency was bound to adopt as a result of budget restrictions, and the persistence of gaps in the levels of employment and financial aid delivered, do not seem to have altered the overall favorable opinion refugees have towards the Agency. This attitude may stem from the safety net constituted by its various emergency and regular programs. It may also be due to the political significance of the its mandate, which is widely interpreted by the OPT population as the embodiment of the refugees' political rights as enshrined in paragraph 11 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). Whatever words refugees have used to portray the Agency, from our father to the contemptuous stepmother,<sup>1</sup> UNRWA has over the years become part of the OPT social fabric.

The only question remaining to be discussed here relates to how the refugees see the future of UNRWA within the context of the peace process. A significant proportion of refugees and non-refugees stated that UNRWA should be preserved until the refugee issue is solved. On average, respondents suggesting that the advent of a Palestinian state trigger the dismantlement of UNRWA services were three times fewer and those advocating the immediate dismantlement of UNRWA were fourteen times fewer than those who advocated its continuation. Refugee status here is relevant in the sense that non-refugees were more ready to opt for a dismantling of UNRWA once a Palestinian state is established or as soon as possible.

- The survey indicates that the socioeconomic status of refugees improved between July 2003 and February 2004, with hardship cases in decline and a higher percentage of refugees reporting themselves above the poverty line. The situation of non-refugees deteriorated slightly during the same period. This positive evolution among refugees is due to an improvement in the employment situation of the refugees, the percentage of full-time employees among them increasing by 7% and the percentage of unemployed decreasing by 3%.
- These findings hide important spatial differences. In terms of place of residence, only West Bank camps (98% of their residents being refugees) were affected by the improvement in socioeconomic conditions, perhaps able to benefit from the slight relaxing of Israel's closure policy during the period under scrutiny. For instance, the percentage of hardship cases in the West Bank refugee camps decreased by 12%, while increasing by 10% in the Gaza Strip refugee camps.
- In absolute terms, however, refugees remained poorer than non-refugees. Our survey found that the main reason for increased poverty among refugees lies in their lack of alternative sources of income (availability of land and capital). Fewer

<sup>1</sup> Report - International Mission to Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan and Lebanon, April 10-19, 1994. *Refugee Working Group VI* (Cairo: May 10-12, 1994) 5-6; Fawaz Turki. *The Desinherited* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972) 58.



## February 2004 Surveys

opportunities to rent, sell or cultivate land, for instance, make them more sensitive to a tightening of the job market. Improved employment during the period under scrutiny did not make up for lack of capital, even more so because rewarding job opportunities (mainly in Israel) are limited due the external closure policy imposed on the OPT population.

- Employment and financial aid are among the main unmet needs aired by the refugee respondents. Refugees are in general more “service-demanding” than non-refugees, except in sectors where UNRWA distributes free services, such as education and health, to the entire refugee population.
- Refugees have remained the main targets of socioeconomic assistance. The percentage of refugee recipients was twofold the percentage of non-refugee recipients. However, responding to the favorable evolution of the refugees’ socioeconomic situation, the percentage of refugees assisted dwindled by 14% in the July 2003-2004 period, while decreasing by 5% for non-refugees. The only places of residence not affected by decline in assistance were the Gaza refugee camps where, contrary to conditions in the rest of the OPT, hardships were on the rise.
- Regarding emergency assistance, refugees considered food the most important item received. Employment was considered as a relatively marginal assistance item mainly because it was composed mostly of short-term job schemes.
- UNRWA remained by far the main source of assistance of emergency and regular assistance items for refugees. However, likely due to budgetary restrictions, its importance declined in the July 2003 - February 2004 period from 66% to 60%. Conversely, the PA saw its share of emergency assistance provision among refugees increase from 5% to 10%. It notably became more influential in the field of employment schemes, whether in the form of emergency assistance or regular service.
- Despite the decrease in assistance and UNRWA’s declining role, a majority (about 60%) of refugees (and non-refugees) were generally satisfied with the emergency assistance they received in the past six months. Regarding regular services, the refugees’ level of satisfaction overtook that of non-refugees.
- Our respondents, refugees and non-refugees alike, underscored the operational and political salience of UNRWA’s mandate by stating that it should be preserved until the settlement of the refugee issue, rather than the advent of a Palestinian state.



# 10 POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The purpose of this report is to examine Palestinian perceptions towards a number of issues pertaining to internal Palestinian politics. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not examined here because the intention is to identify various issues that might prove to be helpful to better understand the prospects of political development in the future Palestinian state. Obviously,

the future political settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis will have a major impact on the political structure and the political economy of Palestine. Will Palestine be economically viable? Will it have control over its borders? What is the future of Israeli settlements? To what extent will Palestine have control over its natural resources, particularly water? What is the future of Palestinian refugees? Will Palestine be geographically contiguous? What will be the stake in Jerusalem?

Unquestionably, the outcome of these questions will either provide the Palestinian leadership and Palestinian institutions with legitimacy, or illegitimacy as they govern the future Palestine. It is rather inconceivable for the Palestinian public to accept anything less than what was outlined in the various international documents pertaining to the Palestine issue, particularly UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Any Palestinian leadership that reaches an agreement that undermines the minimum requirements envisaged in - or the spirit of - the above mentioned UNSC documents will render that leadership illegitimate and, as such, render the relationship between the citizens of the future Palestinian state and its leadership one of distrust and non-recognition. Consequently, the prospects for good governance and mutual respect between the government and the public will be doubtful. In fact, any attempt by any leader, including Yasser Arafat, to stifle the political demands of the Palestinian people will bring chaos and bloodshed.

Arafat neither purposively unleashed the uprising (as Thomas Friedman and others suggest) nor did he have great incentive to try to crush it. The al-Aqsa Intifada is the predictable expression of anger by a people for whom negotiations to end a military occupation and restore legitimate rights failed. Had Arafat tried to crack down on the Intifada, it likely would have led to a Palestinian civil war<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Robinson, Glenn, *Palestinian leadership in Transition?*  
<http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/20010315ib.html>





While the above conditions are necessary for the establishment of a good relationship between the government and the governed, there are other internal issues that are also important in the development of the future Palestinian political system and political institutions. Among these conditions are the creation of credible and viable political institutions that are governed by laws, rules and regulations in which the public has a role, through its elected representatives, in forming.

This public participation is essential in any type of political development. Throughout the long history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian public has accumulated a substantial amount of understanding and recognition of the importance of participatory politics and freedom of expression. This was evident through a number of configurations, such as the diversity of the Palestinian political institutions that were part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the importance of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and the multiplicity of its members, and also the mixed political backgrounds and affiliations of the members of the Executive Committee of the PLO.

The pre-existing political groupings both within the PLO and outside of it constitute a degree of political pluralization unequalled in the Arab world. Rather than the Monarch/Dictator/one party state model, full panoply of political factions exists ranging from Islamic fundamentalists to communists. The existence of the government in exile, the PNC, and its various constituencies is a level of democracy that could serve as the nucleus for democratization in Palestine.<sup>1</sup>

This phenomenon has also manifested itself in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) even prior to the signing of the Oslo Protocol in 1991. While under occupation, the Palestinians have exhibited signs of political maturity. The free and regular elections for student councils, trade unions, and other professional organizations were unique to this region. Also unique was the establishment of a strong civil society movement that was composed of a large number of organizations whose political affiliations were diverse and whose services were targeting the general public and not the constituency of the respective NGOs.

Another characteristic of the Palestinian political history and experience is the multiplicity and freedom of the Palestinian press, even after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Numerous publications, radio and TV stations, and other media were established with diverse political agendas. Moreover, public opinion polls were conducted regularly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the results were published regularly even when these results presented negative attitudes towards the Palestinian Authority, or its leadership, or its institutions.

This is not to say that Palestinian political institutions are totally democratic and accountable. There are major misgivings voiced about the performance of the Palestinian Authority as well as other political institutions and organizations. Transparency is not optimal, corruption continues to be a problem, and the role of the Palestinian leadership is highly debated.

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<sup>1</sup> Wing, Adrien Katherine, *Democracy, Constitutionalism and the Future State of Palestine With a Case Study of Women's Rights*, PASSIA, Jerusalem, [http://www.passia.org/publications/research\\_studies/K\\_Wing\\_Democracy/Part2.htm](http://www.passia.org/publications/research_studies/K_Wing_Democracy/Part2.htm)



However, the fact that these negative tendencies are debated amongst the Palestinians themselves, in the Palestinian Legislative Council, in the Palestinian media, and as part of the various activities that are carried out regularly in the various parts of the OPT is another indication of the political maturity of the Palestinian body politic.

The following pages will examine some of the questions related to Palestinian political life, particularly those related to the Palestinian perception of a number of political issues. Through this exercise, some indicators may provide a picture of the prospects for political development in the future Palestinian state.

### 10.1 TRUST IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL FACTIONS

The question raised in this survey regarding which political or religious organization Palestinians trust most was an open-ended question where respondents were given the opportunity to name the organization they trust most. Interviewers were instructed to write the name of any organization stated by the interviewees and they were also instructed not to mention the option of “no trust in any organization” unless the respondent specifically stated that. A follow-up question was also asked to those who said that they do not trust any political and religious organization in order to probe their general preference. In the follow-up question, the main Palestinian political and religious organizations were read to the interviewees.




Figure 10-1: Trust in political and religious factions

It is important to include here a note on the wording used in this report to refer to the various Palestinian political tendencies. After much discussion, we have decided to provide broad reference to Fateh, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian People’s Party and other groups founded on leftist ideology as “secularist” factions. While Fateh, historically the strongest faction represented in the Palestine Liberation Organization, includes religious and secular tendencies, its core ideology has developed out of nationalist, rather than, Islamist roots. Similarly, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and smaller Islamist factions are referred to here as “religious” factions, despite that their platforms are a mix of Islamist, religious and nationalist aims. This broad division should neither dismiss the role of the minority

## February 2004 Surveys

Christian population, nor obscure the very complex interplay between religious, secular and nationalist objectives and rhetoric in Palestinian political discourse.

### *According to the general public*

As illustrated in Figure 10.1, 45% of respondents said that they do not trust any political or religious organization, 24% trust Fateh, 18% trust Hamas, 5% selected Islamic Jihad, 2% selected the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), while the remaining respondents trust other secular and religious institutions. Interestingly, the results show a slight drop in support for most of factions in comparison with the results of July 2003. This decline in trust in specific organizations is also reflected in the increase in the percentage of those who said that they do not trust any organization. While in July 2003, 42% of the respondents said that they do not trust any organization, this percentage increased to 45% in February 2004.

The results in Figure 10.1, above, also indicate that when those respondents who specified that they do not trust any organization were probed to state their preference, Hamas came in the highest with 19% choosing this faction, 15% mentioned Fateh, 7% saying Islamic Jihad, and 54% maintaining their opinion of not trusting any organization.

### *According to region*

When examining trust in political and religious factions according to region (West Bank vs. East Jerusalem vs. the Gaza Strip), the results point to significantly stronger support for specific factions in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. More specifically, and as indicated in Figure 10.2, below, whereas 48% of the respondents in the West Bank said that they do not trust any organization, the percentage in the Gaza Strip is only 37%.

The difference between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in terms of factional trust is also reflected in the relative strength of trust for Fateh and Hamas in the Gaza Strip as compared to the West Bank. While Fateh and Hamas, respectively, enjoy the trust of 28% and 23% of respondents in the Gaza Strip, these percentages drop to 24% and 16%, respectively, in the West Bank.




Figure 10-2: Most trusted factions, according to region

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Also evident from Figure 10.2 is the relatively stronger support for religious factions in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Whereas the overall trust in religious factions in the Gaza Strip amounts to almost the same as that in secularist groups (respectively 31% and 32%), overall, West Bank respondents place their trust in secularist factions (30%) and religious groups (22%).

Jerusalemites responses concerning their most trusted faction is quite different. Although the number of respondents in the Jerusalem area is too small to draw any scientific conclusions, generally, the results convey a strong feeling of factional distrust amongst Jerusalem residents, with 59% of the respondents saying that they do not trust any faction. However, it is interesting to note that trust in Fateh among East Jerusalem respondents is very low (9%) when compared to trust in non-secularist organizations, including Hamas (27%).

### *According to area*

Further examination of trust in political factions according to area of residence reveals that Fateh enjoys the strongest support among refugee camp residents (30%), while its strength is the lowest is among respondents residing in cities (21%). On the other hand, trust in Hamas is relatively consistent both in cities and in refugee camps, 18% and 20% respectively. Interestingly, Hamas enjoys the lowest amount of trust among village residents,

with only 16% specifying that Hamas is the organization they trust most, compared to 25% who trust Fateh the most. These results are overviewed in Figure 10.3.

It is also important to point out the relatively strong showing of the secularist groups such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), and FIDA in villages. While respondents' trust in these organizations is only 2% in cities and 1% in refugee camps, the percentage of trust is 5% amongst village respondents, as also indicated in Figure 10.4, below.




Figure 10-3: Most trusted factions, according to area of residence

### *According to place*

Figure 10.5, below, shows the differences in the level of factional trust according to place of residence. Clearly, the differences in the level of factional trust between West Bank and Gaza Strip non-camp residents are not as sharp as they are between West Bank and Gaza Strip refugee camp residents. The lack of trust in any political or religious faction in the West Bank refugee camps is

## February 2004 Surveys

very evident (61%) and nearly twice as high when compared to the lack of factional trust evident in Gaza Strip refugee camps (31%). Moreover, trust in Hamas is much lower among West Bank refugee camp




Figure 10-4: Most trusted faction, according to place of residence

respondents than among Gaza Strip refugee camp respondents. More specifically, whereas only 7% of the former mentioned Hamas as the organization they trust most, 25% of the latter named Hamas as the most trusted faction.


### According to refugee status

Although no statistical significance exists when analyzing refugee status and trust in political factions, it is noteworthy that Palestinian refugees are likely to be more politically polarized than Palestinian non-refugees. As illustrated below in Figure 10-6, a higher percentage of Palestinian refugees than Palestinian non-refugees trust Fateh and Hamas.

### According to poverty level

A strong correlation exists between trust in Palestinian political factions and the poverty level of respondents. Ironically, respondents that are classified as being above the poverty line are more likely to distrust any political or religious factions than those who are below the poverty line. As indicated in Figure 10.6, below, over half the respondents who are above the poverty line said that they do not trust any political or religious faction compared to 40% for those who are below the poverty line.

Figure 10-5: Trust in factions, according to refugee status



Moreover, trust in the main factions among the respondents above the poverty line is significantly lower than among those who are below the poverty line, including those who are classified as hardship cases. Concretely, whereas respectively 20% and 15% of the respondents above the poverty line trust Fateh and Hamas, these percentages are 29% and 19% respectively among respondents below the poverty line and 26% and 20% among respondents in hardship.





Figure 10-6: Trust in factions, according to poverty level

Although trust in the main political factions is lower among respondents above the poverty line, it is worth noting that the trust these respondents place in other secularist organizations is slightly higher than the trust these factions enjoy among respondents who are economically less advantaged. Indeed, whereas 8% of the former trust the PFLP and the other secularist organizations, the percentage is 4% among the below-poverty line respondents, and 3% among the hardship cases.

*According to employment*

There are clear indications that employment status impacts where respondents place their trust. As detailed in Figure 10.7, 54% of respondents who trust Fateh are fully employed, while 44% of respondents who trust Hamas are fully employed. Moreover, 29% of respondents who trust Hamas are unemployed, compared to 22% among Fateh supporters that are unemployed. In general, the results indicate that the proportion of respondents trusting secularist factions is stronger among those who are fully employed, while this is not so obviously the case among the religious factions, as a

Figure 10-7: Trust in factions, according to employment status



## February 2004 Surveys


significant percentage of respondents who place their trust in religious factions are not employed or partially employed.

### According to gender

There is also a significant relationship between factional trust and gender. Females are more likely than males to distrust any political or religious faction. Whereas only 44% of males do not trust any political or religious factions, this percentage is 56% among female respondents. Moreover, while trust in Hamas is divided equally across the gender line, the situation is

slightly different with respect to Fateh and the other secularist factions, where males are more likely than females to trust these groups.

Figure 10-8: Factional support, according to gender



### According to education

Trust in political and religious factions is also statistically significant according to education. Trust in the PFLP, for example, is particularly high among respondents with some college education or above. Indeed, 55% of those trusting the PFLP are highly educated. Hamas also enjoys a high level of trust among the higher-educated, with 46% of those placing their trust in Hamas being classified as being highly educated.




Figure 10-9: Factional trust, according to educational attainment

### According to model country


When respondents were asked the model country they would like the future Palestine to emulate, it was worthy of note that a relatively large percentage of respondents chose Western European countries as their preferred model. Even amongst those who trust religious factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, a significant percentage wants Palestine to follow a Western system of government. As illustrated in Figure 10.10, 17% of those trusting Hamas and 24% of those trusting Islamic Jihad want Palestine to be modeled after one of the Western states. While this might seem astonishing, a sizeable percentage of Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters would like Palestine to emulate an Islamic state.



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

The apparent appreciation for Western-style system of government is more often echoed by respondents who said they trust secularist political groups and, even more so by respondents who said that they do not trust any political or religious factions.

Figure 10-10: Factional trust, according to the model country for the future Palestine



While very few respondents trusting Fateh said that they would like to see a system of government that is modeled after countries like Iran or Pakistan (5%) or to adopt the caliphate system of government (2%), 34% said they want Palestine to be modeled after a western, particularly one of the European states.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the majority still favor an Arab-style system of government. This is particularly true for those trusting Fateh, of which 54% want Palestine to emulate other Arab states, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

### According to most trusted source of information

Also important to examine is the relationship between trust in the factions and the source of information Palestinians trust most. This is particularly important given the known impact of state-controlled media in shaping political opinions and viewpoints and stifling political participation and development.

When examining the sources of information Palestinians trust most, it is clear that state-owned media such as the Palestinian Authority radio and TV are comparatively weak in influence. Perhaps the relative flexibility of the Palestinian Press Law, which freely provides for access to multiple sources of information, enabled Palestinians to seek, and consequently rely on other sources of information. As demonstrated in Table 1, only 15% of Fateh supporters rely on Palestinian TV for their news, while 5% rely on Palestinian radio. Respondents trusting Fateh, as well as those trusting other factions rely heavily on Al-Jazeera. In fact, 37% of the respondents said that they trust Al-Jazeera, followed by 16% who trust Al-Manar TV.<sup>1</sup> However, further examination of which respondents rely on Al-Manar TV station as their most trustworthy source of information shows that respondents who trust religious factions form the core of its Palestinian viewer base.

<sup>1</sup> Al-Manar TV station broadcasts from Lebanon and is affiliated with the Lebanese party Hizb-Allah.



10.2 TRUST IN PALESTINIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Just after the survey was conducted in February 2004, two senior Hamas leaders, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Dr. Abdul Aziz Al-Rantisi, were assassinated by Israel. Other Palestinian leaders previously assassinated included Abu Ali Mustapha, Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Table 10-1: Most important source of information, according to trust in faction

	O133 Most Trusted Faction							Total
	Fateh	Hamas	Islamic Jihad	PFLP	Other Islamic factions	Other Secularist factions	Do not trust anyone	
Palestinian radio	6%	7%	5%		11%	6%	5%	5%
Palestinian TV	15%	6%	8%	0%	6%	3%	7%	9%
Al-Quds newspaper	4%	5%	6%		15%	3%	8%	6%
Al-Ayyam	2%	0%	5%	3%	2%	22%	0%	2%
Al-Hayat	2%	0%		3%	2%	3%	1%	1%
Mosque/religious leaders		5%	8%		2%		1%	2%
Faction I trust most	1%	4%	6%	9%		3%		2%
Friends and relatives	2%	1%		6%			4%	3%
Al-Jazeera	34%	37%	27%	36%	38%	31%	39%	37%
Al-Arabyiyah	12%	5%	2%	15%	4%	3%	7%	7%
Abu Dhabi	10%	5%	5%	12%	6%	11%	6%	7%
Al-Manar	11%	21%	23%	9%	13%	11%	17%	16%
Al-Hura						3%	1%	0%
Other	2%	2%	5%	6%	0%	3%	4%	3%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Sig. = .000, N = 1341

In addition to those who have been assassinated, a number of Palestinian leaders are in detention in Israeli prisons. Such leaders include Abdul-Rahim Mallouh, a senior leader in the PFLP, Marwan Barghouti, a senior Fateh leader and a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and also Husam Khader, another Fateh leader and a member of the PLC. These examples and the near-house arrest of President Yaser Arafat is indicative of the crisis underway in the collective Palestinian leadership.

The policy of assassination and imprisonment of Palestinian leaders has obviously been adopted by the present Israeli government to undermine not only the current Palestinian leadership but also any leadership that it views as unwilling to accept its terms. The following pages will examine the attitudes of Palestinians towards their leadership according to a number of independent variables. The question used in the survey was also an open-ended question where respondents were given the opportunity to name the leader they trust most.

*According to the general public*

Two of the three most trusted Palestinian leaders according to our survey were assassinated by Israel just after the fieldwork for this study was completed. The third, President Arafat, is repeatedly threatened by Israel with deportation or death and is therefore unable to leave his offices. The



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

forth most trusted leader, Marwan Barghouti, is in Israeli prison. Another leader from the list in Figure 10.11, namely Secretary General of the PFLP Ahmad Saadat, is in a Palestinian prison, after pressure from the Israeli government. Other leaders who are on the list, Abdullah Al-Shami, an Islamic Jihad leader, and Dr. Mahmoud Al-Zahhar, a prominent Hamas leader, are presumed to be on the list of Israeli assassination targets. The only two popular Palestinian leaders who remain relatively free to work and lead are Ahmad Qurei (Abu-‘Alaa), the current Palestinian prime minister and Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi, a prominent leader from the Gaza Strip who headed the Palestinian delegation to 1991 talks in Washington prior to the Oslo Agreement.

In such conditions, one wonders about the prospects for the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership. While it is true that 49% of the respondents do not trust any leader, that percentage is not unique when compared with other parts of the world, including in stable democratic states. Moreover, further examinations of what kinds of Palestinians say they do not trust any leader shows little difference comparatively with the kinds of Palestinians who named a leader they trust most. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that this group of undecided Palestinians is a potential support base for a leader acceptable to the Israeli government.

Figure 10-11: Trust in leadership



In any case, Yaser Arafat remains the only Palestinian leader to command the bulk of the trust of the Palestinian public, especially after the assassination of the two most prominent Hamas leaders. While new Hamas leaders will undoubtedly emerge, it is not yet clear as to the extent those leaders will be able to rally public support, hence public trust, particularly after Hamas made the decision to maintain the anonymity of its top political echelon.

### According to region and area


A close look at the trust in leadership according to region and area of residence reveal that Yaser Arafat enjoys a relatively consistent level of trust in all the parts of the OPT.

As shown in Figure 10.12, Arafat enjoys the highest level of trust among refugee camp residents (26%) and the lowest in East Jerusalem, where only 9% named Arafat as the leader they trust most.



## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 10-12: Trust in leadership, according to region and area of residence



### According to refugee status

The trust in Arafat amongst refugee camp residents is also reflected in the level of trust he enjoys amongst Palestinians who are refugees or descendents of a refugee family. As indicated in Figure 10.13, 24% of refugees trust Arafat, while only 18% of non-refugees say the same. In general, non-refugees appear to be more distrustful of any Palestinian leader than refugees, as also illustrated in Figure 10.13.





Figure 10-13: Palestinian trust in political and religious leaders, according to refugee status



According to poverty

The poor also seem to trust Arafat more than those who are economically better-off. Whereas 18% of those classified as being above the poverty line trust Arafat, the percentage is respectively 22% among hardship cases, and 24% among respondents who are classified as being below the poverty line, but not extremely poor, as illustrated in Figure 10.14.

Figure 10-14: Trust in leadership, according to poverty



The lower trust in Arafat among those Palestinians above the poverty line is by no means indicative of the presence of another personality that enjoys more trust amongst this sector of the Palestinian public. Another look at Figure 10.14 shows the extent of distrust in any leader amongst the economically advantaged as compared with that amongst the economically disadvantaged. Whereas 54% of the former do not trust any political or religious leader, 42% and 43% of the latter report not trusting in any political or religious leader.




Figure 10-15: Trust in leadership, according to education, gender, and age

*According to education, gender, and age*

Trust in Arafat seems to be consistent according to education, gender, and age except where trust in him dwindles to 11% among the oldest generation of Palestinians. This generation also shows a high level of distrust in leadership in general, but also has a higher trust in secularist leaders than other age groups.

10.3 ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORMING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

*According to the general public*

The large majority (72%) of Palestinians stated that reform of the Palestinian Authority is an urgent matter, and only 24% saying that reform of the Palestinian Authority should be dealt with only after independence. As indicated in Figure 10.16, only 4% said that there is no need for reforming the Palestinian Authority.

Clearly, the reform of the Palestinian Authority is primarily related to issues pertaining to mismanagement and corruption, with only a minority of respondents saying that what concerns them most about the Palestinian Authority is security issue or issues related to democratization or human rights. As can be discerned from Figure 10.17, 55% of the respondents said that the most issues that they are concerned about with respect to the Palestinian Authority are the issues of corruption, nepotism, and lack of transparency and accountability. Only 6% were primarily concerned about human rights and democracy, and 19% were concerned about the inability of the Palestinian Authority to deal with security matters.




Figure 10-16: Attitudes towards the urgency of reform of the Palestinian Authority




Figure 10-17: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

The seriousness Palestinians display with respect to corruption and nepotism is widespread even amongst respondents with the least education. Like the medium and higher educated respondents, the least-educated recognize corrup-

tion as the main problem confronting the Palestinian Authority. They are even more specific about corruption than the respondents who have attained higher education. In fact, 26% of this sector of society identified nepotism as the main problem.

Differences according to region of residence are mainly related to transparency and human rights, with slight differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While 10% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip said lack of transparency as the main issue they are concerned about, only 5% of the West Bankers said so. West Bankers are more concerned about the lack of human rights, with 5% of West Bank respondents identifying it as the main problem as compared to 3% of Gaza Strip respondents. Table 10.3 summarizes the differences between West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip respondents with regard to the various problems facing the Palestinian Authority.

Concern about human

Table 10-2: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to education

	Educational level		
	Low	Medium	High
None	8%	2%	1%
Lack of financial means	11%	8%	8%
Nepotism	26%	18%	19%
Inefficiency and mismanagement	6%	10%	12%
Inability to deal with international security problems	9%	11%	10%
Inability to maintain public order	3%	7%	7%
Lack of democracy	1%	2%	2%
Lack of transparency/accountability	4%	6%	8%
Lack of human rights	11%	4%	2%
Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	2%	1%	2%
Corruption in general	19%	30%	30%

Sig. = .000 N = 1433

Table 10-3: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to region

	Region of residence		
	West Bank	Jerusalem	Gaza Strip
None	3%	3%	1%
Lack of financial means	7%	7%	11%
Nepotism	20%	18%	19%
Inefficiency and mismanagement	11%	14%	9%
Inability to deal with international security problems	10%	13%	10%
Inability to maintain public order	7%	7%	6%
Lack of democracy	1%	2%	2%
Lack of transparency/accountability	5%	3%	10%
Lack of human rights	5%	2%	3%
Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	1%		3%
Corruption in general	30%	32%	25%

Sig. = .000  
N = 1443

Table 10.3 summarizes the differences between West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip respondents with regard to the various problems facing the Palestinian Authority.

Table 10-4: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority according to area of residence

	Area of residence		
	City	Refugee camp	Village
None	2%	2%	3%
Lack of financial means	8%	9%	8%
Nepotism	19%	19%	20%
Inefficiency and mismanagement	12%	12%	7%
Inability to deal with international security problems	9%	11%	12%
Inability to maintain public order	8%	4%	6%
Lack of democracy	2%	1%	2%
Lack of transparency/accountability	7%	8%	5%
Lack of human rights	2%	2%	9%
Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	2%	2%	1%
Corruption in general	29%	29%	28%

Sig. = .000  
N = 1443

## February 2004 Surveys

rights in the West Bank is largely due to the concern village respondents express about this issue, where 9% identify the lack of human rights as the most serious problem compared to only 2% of city and refugee camp respondents.

**Table 10-5: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to the poverty level**

	Poverty level		
	Hardship cases	Below poverty line	Above poverty line
None	2%	3%	2%
Lack of financial means	12%	10%	6%
Nepotism	18%	19%	22%
Inefficiency and mismanagement	10%	10%	11%
Inability to deal with international security problems	12%	9%	10%
Inability to maintain public order	7%	8%	6%
Lack of democracy	0%	1%	3%
Lack of transparency/accountability	9%	6%	5%
Lack of human rights	8%	4%	2%
Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	2%	0%	1%
Corruption in general	21%	29%	32%

*Sig. = .000, N = 1203*

When examining the above-mentioned concerns according to the economic status of the respondents (Table 5), the most outstanding difference seem to be higher concern about corruption among respondents classified as being above the poverty line. In fact, when compared to the less economically-advantaged respondents, respondents with a higher income are less concerned about human rights and only 2% of them identified this as the issue they are more concerned about.

Finally, an examination of the issue of most concern according to political trust reveals that concern about corruption is just as strong among those trusting Fateh, the faction that constitutes the backbone of the Palestinian Authority. Also, Fateh 'supporters' are more inclined to be concerned about lack of democracy than are Hamas or Islamic Jihad supporters. Moreover, while the discussion about unauthorized weapons is often related to Hamas and Islamic Jihad members, the respondents trusting Hamas and Jihad were more concerned about the inability of the Palestinian Authority to deal with unauthorized weapons than were the respondents trusting Fateh.

**Table 10-6: The issue that concerns Palestinians most with respect to the Palestinian Authority, according to the most trusted political or religious faction**

	Factional trust							
	Fateh	Hamas	Islamic Jihad	PLP	Other Islamic	Other Secularist	None	Total
None	3%	2%			2%	0%	2%	2%
Lack of financial means	12%	8%	5%	12%	22%	3%	6%	9%
Nepotism	20%	17%	15%	27%	4%	24%	20%	19%
Inefficiency and mismanagement	10%	12%	13%	21%	17%	14%	9%	11%
Inability to deal with international security problems	11%	12%	15%	0%	7%	3%	10%	10%
Inability to maintain public order	6%	6%	8%	12%	13%	14%	7%	7%
Lack of democracy	4%	0%	2%			3%	2%	2%
Lack of transparency/accountability	7%	8%	8%	9%	7%	11%	5%	7%
Lack of human rights	3%	4%	5%	3%		8%	4%	4%
Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons	1%	4%	3%			8%	1%	2%
Corruption in general	24%	26%	27%	15%	28%	14%	33%	29%

*Sig. = .000, N = 1329*


*According to region*



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

It could be deduced from the above analysis that when Palestinians talk about reforming the Palestinian Authority, they are in fact thinking about corruption and nepotism more so than about other issues like human rights or security. This concern about corruption is widespread irrespective of whether the respondents come from the West Bank, Jerusalem, or the Gaza Strip. However, as shown in Figure 10.18, this concern seems to be stronger in the Gaza Strip than it is in the West Bank as 77% of the respondents there said reform should be a priority, as compared to 67% in the West Bank.


Figure 10-18: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to region



### *According to area*

Concern about immediate reform of the Palestinian Authority is weakest in villages where 29% of the respondents believe that reform should be dealt with only after the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared to only 18% among refugee camp respondents and 23% among respondents residing in the main cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Figure 10-19: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to area



### *According to place of residence*


It is surprising to note that while attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority are similar between Gaza Strip camp and non-camp residents, attitudes vary rather significantly when comparing camp and non-camp respondents in the West Bank. Whereas 81% of West Bank respondents believe that reforming the Palestinian Authority should be a priority and should not wait until after independence, 66% of non-camp respondents in the West Bank said that this should be a priority. Moreover, a sizeable proportion of West Bank non-camp respondents (28%) stated that they would like to see reform carried out only after Palestinian independence, compared to only 11% in the West Bank refugee camps, as illustrated in Figure 10.20.





## February 2004 Surveys


Figure 10-20: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to area of residence



### According to poverty

It is also worth noting that the urgency of reforming the Palestinian Authority is almost the same irrespective of respondents' economic status. As can be discerned from Figure 10.21, the poor as well as those who are economically better-off share the same views about the need to reform the Palestinian Authority, with almost no difference between them.


Figure 10-21: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to poverty



### According to age

As is the case with other independent variables, all respondents from the various age brackets agree on the need for reforming the Palestinian Authority. However, it seems that more respondents falling in the middle-age and the older-age brackets want to see reform of the Palestinian Authority than the younger generation. Whereas 68-69% of respondents below the age of 34 want to see reform even before independence, that number rises to 73-76% among respondents who are over 49 years of age, as illustrated in Figure 10.22.

Figure 10-22 Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to age



### According to education


While Palestinians with varying levels of education have similar attitudes towards the urgency of reforming the Palestinian Authority, it is evident that more respondents with higher education would like to see reform in the Palestinian Authority now rather than later, than do respondents with less



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

education. Whereas 66% and 70%, respectively, of low- and medium-educated respondents want reform now, the percentage is 75% among respondents with the highest level of education, as illustrated in Figure 10.23.


Figure 10-23: Attitudes towards reforming the Palestinian Authority, according to educational attainment



### According to trust in political factions

Not surprisingly, those trusting Hamas (the largest opposition faction) are more likely than those trusting other factions to call for immediate reform. Seventy-eight percent of Hamas supporters are demanding reform now, compared to the 67% of Fateh supporters who say that reform should have priority (as discussed earlier, Fateh supporters are just as concerned about corruption and nepotism as respondents placing their trust in other political or religious factions).


Figure 10-24a: Attitudes towards the reform of the Palestinian Authority, according to trust in political factions



According to the system of government Palestinians want Palestine to be modeled after As might be expected, a large proportion of Palestinians who would like Palestine to be modeled after a Western country (75%), believe that reforming the Palestinian Authority is a priority, compared to only 65% among those preferring an Arab-style system of government in Palestine. Seventy-eight percent of those preferring a revival of the Islamic caliphate system in Palestine also say that reforming the Palestinian Authority should be a priority. As illustrated in Figure 10.25, below, reform is very important among those who would like to see a system of government similar to that in Iran and Pakistan (Islamic, non-Arab states), where 84% said that reform of the Palestinian Authority should be a priority.

## February 2004 Surveys

Figure 10-24b: Attitudes towards reform of the Palestinian Authority, according to the most preferred model for Palestine



### 10.4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS PALESTINIAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In the following pages an attempt will be made to assess the perceptions of the Palestinian public vis-a-vis a set of questions related to the functioning of the municipal councils, village councils, and refugee camp committees that are responsible for basic services that have an effect on the lives of all citizens.

Nine questions were asked pertaining to local government. These questions centered around three main themes:

- Knowledge of the activities of the local councils;
- Attitudes towards the efficiency of the local councils; and
- Perceptions about the independence of the local councils.

#### 10.4.1 Attitudes towards the local councils


In general, the Palestinian public seems to have sufficient information about their local councils. About 52% said that they have sufficient information about the activities of their local councils. The fact that 66% of the respondents said that the local media does not cover the activities of the local councils efficiently may explain the relatively large number (48%) of respondents who said that they do not know about the activities of their municipal or village councils. As indicated in Figure 10-26, only 33% of respondents think that the Palestinian media covers the activities of the local authorities sufficiently.

Another possible explanation for the relative lack of knowledge about the activities of the local authorities is the feeling among a large number of Palestinians that they are unable to express their views and opinions about matters related to their local authorities. Only 34% of the respondents said that they can express their views to their respective local councils.



As for the performance of the local councils in general, three questions were asked: the first measured the respondents' perception of local councils' performance, the second measured the extent to which respondents feel local councils represent their interests to the Palestinian Authority, and the third question measured the public's perception of the allocation of municipal funds.

Figure 10-25: Attitudes about municipal and local councils



The respondents expressed mixed feelings about their local councils' performance. While a little over half (52%) said that their local councils perform well in serving their communities they are entrusted to serve, only 40% said that the councils represent them well to the Palestinian Authority and only 38% said that local funds are appropriately allocated for the delivery of social services.

Another three questions were included in this study to gauge public perceptions about the independence of local councils. The respondents express mixed feelings about the relationship between the local authorities and the Palestinian Authority. Slightly less than 50% of the respondents (47%) think that the PA allows their local councils ample freedom to carry out their activities, and only 43% think that the PA consults with local authorities about local affairs. On the other hand, 51% of the respondents believe that their local authorities represent their interests more than the interests of the Palestinian Authority.

The following will examine these three issues with respect to a number of independent variables.

### *Knowledge about the work of the local councils*

The analysis reveals that poverty and place of residence are the only independent variables that have a significant relationship to the three questions on the work of the councils. A quick look at Figure 10.26, shows that respondents outside and inside West Bank refugee camps have more information about the activities of the local councils than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. While 56% and 59% of respondents living outside and inside West



## February 2004 Surveys

Bank refugee camps respectively stated that they have enough information about the local councils, a relatively lower 47% in the Gaza Strip both outside and inside refugee camps.

The ability to express opinions about the work of the local councils is also perceived more positively in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, particularly in West Bank non-camp areas where 38% of the respondents there stated that the local councils provide them with the opportunity to express their opinions. In the Gaza Strip outside camps, the percentage is only 28%.

Respondents in the Gaza Strip were more positive than their counterparts in the West Bank concerning media coverage of the activities of the local councils. This may be explained by Palestinian Authority-funded TV coverage, which broadcasts local events from Gaza more than it covers West Bank local news. Movement restrictions, discussed elsewhere in this report, are also comparatively worse in the West Bank, which inhibits local journalists' access.

Respondents above and below the poverty line also have differing perceptions of the adequacy of information that they receive about the activities of local councils. Whereas 58% of those above the poverty line state that they have sufficient information about their municipal council, the percentage is respectively 48% among the respondents who are below the poverty line and 47% among those who are classified as hardship cases, as illustrated in Figure 10.27.

On the other hand, differences in respondents' stated ability to express opinions about the activities of the local council are not as pronounced when examined by poverty. The proportion of respondents above the poverty line




Figure 10-26: Knowledge about the activities of the local council, according to place of residence




Figure 10-27: Knowledge about local council activities, according to poverty



who said that they can express their views does not exceed 37%, as compared to 30% among respondents below the poverty line and 36% among hardship cases.

Also, a minor difference was found in

respondents of varying economic levels with respect to their perception of media coverage of local activities. Respondents above the poverty line are more likely to believe that the local media sufficiently covers local activities (at 38%) than respondents falling under the poverty line (at 26%) and hardship cases (33%).

When refugees and non-refugees are queried concerning their knowledge of local council activities, 57% of non-refugee compared to 49% of refugee respondents feel that they have sufficient information about local council activities. The difference between the two is also significant concerning their perceptions about the ability to express their opinions to the local council. As can be observed from Figure 10.28, 39% of non-refugee respondents believe that they can express their opinion about the activities of the local council, compared to a mere 29% among refugee respondents.

Respondents from the West Bank were also more positive about the role of their municipal councils than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. A brief examination of




Figure 10-28: Knowledge about local council activities, according to refugee status

Figure 10-29: Knowledge about local council activities, according to region




Figure 10.29, shows that 56% of West Bank respondents said that they had enough information about the local council activities, while 47% of Gaza Strip respondents said the same. In addition to saying they were well-informed, West Bank residents were more positive than respondents in the Gaza Strip about their ability to express concerns to the local authorities. Whereas 37% of West Bank respondents answered affirmatively when queried as to whether they can express their views to local councils, that same group in the Gaza Strip was only 28%. Further analysis of the data shows that place of residence, whether city, refugee camp, or village, does not seem to influence peoples' perceptions about their ability to voice their opinion to the local councils. Accordingly, the relationship between the local council and constituents appears to be worse in the Gaza Strip than the West Bank, and this problem is not related to the fact that more refugee camp residents reside in the Gaza Strip.



## February 2004 Surveys

Almost half the population, respondents who said that they do not trust any political faction and those trusting Hamas are the least to know about the activities of the local councils. By

examining Table 10.7, it is clear that almost all respondents stating a preference for one of the factions are more likely to feel that they have enough information about the local councils than those who say they do not trust any organization. This convergence is particularly marked among Fateh “supporters” where 58% said that they have enough information about the work and activities of the local authorities.

It is interesting to note that those trusting Hamas are the least positive about their ability to express their concerns and views to the local councils. As can be shown in Table 10.8, only 25% of respondents

trusting Hamas said that they can voice their views to their respective local councils. The same also applies to those trusting the PFLP, where only 26% of them said that they are able to express their opinion to the local councils compared to 38% of respondents trusting Fateh, and 39% of those trusting other secularist organizations.

When analyzing our data for the variables of gender and education, only the extent to which respondents report having information about local council activities was statistically significant. Differences were insignificant between males and females or according to level of education on the ability to express opinions to the local council. Figure 10.30 shows that males know more about local council activities than do females.

	I have enough information about the activities of my municipal council				Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
Fateh	10%	48%	32%	11%	100%
Hamas	11%	39%	35%	15%	100%
Islamic Jihad	12%	53%	29%	5%	100%
PFLP	7%	57%	27%	10%	100%
Other Islamic factions		43%	43%	14%	100%
Other secularist factions	21%	29%	39%	11%	100%
Do not trust anyone	6%	43%	40%	11%	100%
<b>TOTAL</b>	9%	44%	36%	12%	100%

Table 10-7: Knowledge about local council activities, according to trust in political factions

Table 10-8: The ability of residents to express their opinions regarding local council activities, according to trust in political factions

	My local council allows the citizens to express their opinions				Total
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
Fateh	8%	30%	49%	14%	100%
Hamas	3%	22%	53%	21%	100%
Islamic Jihad	3%	40%	40%	17%	100%
PFLP	4%	26%	63%	11%	100%
Other Islamic factions	4%	29%	54%	13%	100%
Other Secularist factions	11%	28%	39%	22%	100%
Do not trust anyone	3%	27%	52%	18%	100%
<b>TOTAL</b>	4%	28%	51%	17%	100%




Figure 10-30: Knowledge about local council activities, according to gender and education

Not surprisingly, respondents with more education were more likely to say that they were informed about the activities of the local councils. Whereas 58% of highly educated respondents said they were well-informed, 49% of respondents with medium education and 52% of respondents with low education said that they were well-informed about local council activities.

### 10.4.2 Perceptions about the performance of local councils

The questions we asked respondents concerning the performance of local councils were related to three concerns:

- Local councils' performance in serving the community;
- Local councils' representation of respondents interests with the PA; and
- Appropriate allocation of municipal funds for social services.

Generally speaking, the data shows that West Bank respondents, whether they reside in camps or outside camps, perceive the performance of their local councils more positively than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. As indicated in Figure 10.31, 60% and 61% of respondents outside and inside West Bank refugee camps, respectively, stated that their local councils perform well in serving the community (45% of Gaza Strip respondents living outside camps and 50% of Gaza Strip respondents living inside refugee camps said that they were satisfied with the local council's performance).

This comparatively positive attitude in the West Bank towards the performance of local councils is also reflected in West Bankers' perceptions about the extent to which their local councils represent community interests with the Palestinian Authority. Forty-five percent of West Bank respondents believe that their local councils represent the community's interests well with the Palestinian Authority, while only 33% of Gaza Strip respondents outside refugee camps and 37% of Gaza Strip respondents inside the camps said the same.




Figure 10-31: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to place of residence

There were few marked differences according to place of residence concerning local councils' allocation of funds except among West Bank refugee camp respondents where 49% said that funds were appropriately allocated, compared to only 38% among West Bank non-refugee camp respondents, 33% among Gaza Strip non-refugee camp respondents, and 36% among Gaza Strip refugee camp respondents.





## February 2004 Surveys

The three performance indicators utilized here in this study also varied according to respondents' refugee status. As indicated in Figure 10.32, below, refugees are more positive than non-refugees about the performance of the local councils, with 49% of them stating that the local councils' performance is good, as compared to 38% among non-refugee respondents.

While refugees perceive the general performance of local councils more positively than do non-refugees, results of the two other questions concerning representation and fund allocation show just the opposite. When asked if local councils represent the communities' interests well with the Palestinian Authority, 45% of non-refugees answered affirmatively compared to 36% among refugee respondents. Similarly, when queried about the appropriate allocation of local council funds, non-refugees were again more positive than refugee respondents. While 41% of the former said that funds were allocated appropriately, the percentage among refugee respondents declined to 34%.

These differences of opinion between refugees and non-refugees may be explained by differences in opinion between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where more refugees live. As illustrated below in Figure 10.33, 56% of

West Bank respondents approve of the performance of the local councils compared to 50% in the Gaza Strip. While no difference can be seen between the two regions with respect to perspectives on councils' allocation of funds, West Bank respondents more often believe that their local councils represent their interests with the Palestinian Authority than do respondents residing in the Gaza Strip. While 45% of West Bank respondents think that the local councils represent them well with the Palestinian Authority, the proportion amongst Gaza Strip respondents is 34%.

Positive attitudes towards the performance of the local councils are evidenced more often among Palestinians above the poverty line than among those below the poverty line. As illustrated in Figure

10.34, 59% of non-poor respondents think that the performance of the local councils is good, and 48% of them think that their local councils represent their communities' interests well with the Palestinian Authority. This is a stark





Figure 10-32: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to refugee status

Figure 10-33: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to region of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

comparison with poor respondents (not including hardship cases) of whom 49% positively evaluate the performance of the local councils, and only 35% think that their councils represent their interests well with the Palestinian Authority.





Figure 10-34: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to poverty

While no marked differences were observed between residents of different areas and their attitudes towards performance of the local councils, but village residents

Figure 10-35: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to area of residence



appeared generally more positive about the manner that their council represents them to the Palestinian Authority than respondents residing in cities and refugee camps. As shown in Figure 10.35, 46% of village residents think that their village council represents them well to the Palestinian Authority, compared to only 37% among city respondents and 39% among refugee camp respondents.

Although there is a relationship between attitudes towards local council performance and factional trust, Figure 10.36, below, shows that when it comes to attitudes towards local authorities'




Figure 10-36: Perceptions about the performance of local councils, according to trust in political factions

performance, Fateh "supporters" are more positive about the local councils than other respondents, but otherwise, there are few variances. The same also applies to respondents' perceptions about the extent to which local councils represent their interests with the Palestinian Authority. Whereas 49% of Fateh



supporters were pleased with the local councils' representation of their interests with the PA, only 33% of Hamas "supporters", 32% of Islamic Jihad "supporters", 33% of PFLP "supporters" and 30% of those who place their trust in other secular organizations like the People's Party, FIDA, and the DFLP were similarly positive.

### 10.4.3 Independence of local councils


Three questions were asked to measure perceptions about the independence of the local councils:

- The extent to which the Palestinian Authority provides local councils with freedom to conduct their activities;
- The extent to which the Palestinian Authority consults with local councils about local affairs;
- The extent to which local councils represent the Palestinian Authority more than the communities they serve.

Generally speaking, village respondents are more positive about the independence of their local councils than are city and refugee camp respondents. As indicated in Figure 10.37, below, approximately half of respondents in villages think that the Palestinian Authority provides their village councils with the freedom to conduct their affairs freely and also that the Palestinian Authority consults with their councils on local matters. Among city and refugee camp residents, however, perceptions are slightly more negative.

The most negative perceptions about the independence of local councils are expressed primarily by city residents, particularly, concerning the extent to which their local councils put residents' interests before that of the Palestinian Authority. As also illustrated in Figure 10.37, 56% of respondents living in cities believe that their local councils place the interests of the Palestinian Authority first, compared to only 42% of respondents from villages, and 40% of refugee camp respondents.

Figure 10-37: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to area of residence



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Differences in perceptions regarding the independence of local councils are also manifested according to respondents' place of residence. Figure 10.38 shows that respondents living outside West Bank refugee camps believe that their local councils are more independent than their counterparts in the Gaza Strip. However, whereas 54% of West Bank non-camp residents said that the Palestinian Authority provides local councils with the freedom to conduct their activities, this percentage is only 38% among West Bank refugee camp residents.

The same phenomenon is reflected in the issue regarding whether the Palestinian Authority consults with local councils. Although 51% of non-camp dwellers said the PA consults with local authorities, only 37% of West Bank refugee camp residents said the same.

Regarding whether the local councils put the interests of the Palestinian Authority before the interests of their constituencies, it is interesting to note that non-camp respondents in both the West Bank

and Gaza Strip are more likely than their counterparts in the refugee camps to believe that the local authorities put the interests of the Palestinian Authority before the interest of their citizens. Whereas 50% of West Bank non-refugee camp residents and 51% of Gaza Strip non-refugee camp respondents think that the local councils are more interested in accommodating the Palestinian Authority than their respective communities, the same opinion is expressed by 32% of refugee camp respondents in the West Bank and 42% of refugee camps respondents in the Gaza Strip.

From the above it is possible to argue that West Bankers are general more positive than Gazans regarding the independence of the local councils. As indicated in Figure 10.39, below, West Bank respondents seem to have a more positive perception of local authorities' independence from the Palestinian Authority and about the role the

Figure 10-38: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to place of residence





Figure 10-39: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to region



PA plays in consulting with the local council on local matters. No difference, however, exists between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with respect to whether local councils better represent the interests of their communities or the interests of the Palestinian Authority.

Respondents above the poverty line are more prone to believe that the Palestinian Authority does not provide the local councils with the freedom to conduct activities than, for example, respondents who are hardship cases. As indicated in Figure 10.40, below, 45% of the respondents above the poverty line think that the PA enables local councils to carry out their activities freely, as compared with 52% of respondents who are hardship cases.

While the percentage of those who strongly agree and agree that local authorities are independent is almost the same among the various economic sectors, according to our survey, it is noteworthy that 20% of hardship cases intensely believe that their local authorities put the interests of the Palestinian Authority before the interests of the communities they serve, as compared to only 6% of respondents who are above the poverty line.




Figure 10-40: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to poverty level

When examining refugee and non-refugee attitudes on the local authorities' independence from the Palestinian Authority, it appears that, as illustrated in Figure 10.41, non-refugees are more likely than refugees to believe that local councils are independent. Similarly, non-refugees (47%) more often than refugees (39%) believe that the PA consults with local councils on local matters.




Figure 10-41: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to refugee status

While non-refugees are more often positive about the independence of local authorities, their responses concerning the interests that are prioritized by the local council show that non-refugees and refugees are of much the same opinion.


When examining views on local councils' independence according to the educational level of respondents, results show that despite that more respondents with low education think that the Palestinian Authority provides the local councils freedom to conduct their activities, their response to whether



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

the local councils represent the PA's interests more than their own was more pronounced. Seventeen percent said that they strongly agree with this statement, while 20% strongly disagreed, as indicated in Figure 10.42.

Figure 10-42: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to level of education



Not surprisingly, those trusting Fateh are more positive about the independence of local authorities. This positive attitude, however, is not indicative of strong disagreement with respondents who place their trust in other factions. Results pertaining to the




Figure 10-43: Perceptions about the independence of local authorities, according to trust in political factions

ability of local councils to conduct their duties freely were the same irrespective of which faction the respondents trust. What Fateh "supporters" express more often (47%) is the belief that the PA does consult with local authorities.



## 10.5 ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE

It has been reported through various surveys that the Palestinian public prefers to have an Islamic-style state in Palestine. However, references to an “Islamic state” are rather vague. Some may interpret “Islamic state” to be one modeled after Iran, others may reference Saudi Arabia, and still others may think of an Islamic state as one following the principles of Islam where corruption does not exist, justice is universal, and tolerance is a main concern.

In this survey, we believed that gauging Palestinians’ preference as to what system of government they would like the future Palestinian state to adopt would be best measured by asking which country in the world they would like Palestine to emulate. The question was an open-ended question and the respondents were able to choose any country they preferred the future Palestine to emulate. This question will also be examined according to the same set of independent variables used previously in this study.

### 10.5.1 According to the general public

As shown in Table 10.9, respondents referred to 58 different countries and entities in answering this question. Egypt and Saudi Arabia were those most cited, at 9% each, followed by France (8%), the USA (7%), Jordan (7%), Iran (7%), and the Islamic caliphate system (7%). Interestingly, 6% of respondents said they would like Palestine to be modeled after Israel.

The above list of countries was classified into six different categories in order to allow for practical analysis:

- Arab states
- Western states
- Israel
- Islamic caliphate
- Islamic non-Arab states
- Communist countries
- Others


Table 10-9: Preferred country for Palestine to be modeled after

Country	Frequency	Valid Percent	Country	Frequency	Valid Percent
Egypt	90	9%	Palestine	42	4%
Jordan	67	7%	Morocco	3	0%
Saudi Arabia	88	9%	Holland	5	0%
Britain	21	2%	United Arab Emirates	11	1%
Gulf states	1	0%	Spain	4	0%
Afghanistan	5	1%	Russia	1	0%
Syria	41	4%	China	5	0%
Iraq (under Saddam)	10	1%	Denmark	3	0%
Sudan	21	2%	Australia	4	0%
Libya	5	0%	Romania	1	0%
Algeria	2	0%	Belgium	1	0%
Lebanon	28	3%	Kuwait	3	0%
Israel	64	6%	North Korea	4	0%
USA	67	7%	Qatar	1	0%
Abu Dhabi	6	1%	Hizbollah	5	0%
Italy	4	0%	Venezuela	1	0%
Canada	12	1%	None of the states	34	3%
Sweden	29	3%	Brazil	1	0%
Switzerland	15	1%	Islamic State	67	7%
Tunisia	8	1%	Democratic State	11	1%
France	84	8%	Secular	1	0%
Germany	23	2%	Bahrain	3	0%
Europe countries	1	0%	Indonesia	1	0%
Iran	76	7%	The Soviet Union	5	0%
Pakistan	7	1%	Tanzania	2	0%
Austria	3	0%	Malaysia	3	0%
Japan	3	0%	Yugoslavia	1	0%
Dubai	4	0%	Monaco	1	0%
Norway	5	0%	Total	1021	100%
Cuba	6	1%	DK/NA	478	
	1499				



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Figure 10-44: System of government for Palestine to be modeled after



After the countries were categorized into the above mentioned classifications, we found that 44% of the respondents said that they would like Palestine to be modeled after an Arab government, 31% said they would like Palestine to emulate a “Western” system of government, 10% cited Islamic non-Arab states, 7% preferred a system based on the Islamic caliphate, and 2% preferred communist countries.

It is noteworthy that the countries that have immediate proximity to Palestine (Jordan, Egypt, and Israel), or that are often visited by Palestinians (like Saudi Arabia which is visited for pilgrimage and for work) are cited frequently by respondents. In-depth analysis of the data showed, for example, that 76% of those who selected Jordan were from the West Bank which borders Jordan and 60% of those who chose Egypt were from the Gaza Strip bordering Egypt. As for those who preferred Saudi Arabia, 57% were from the Gaza Strip, compared to 41% from among West Bank respondents.

### According to region and place of residence

No significant difference is evident between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with respect to whether the future Palestine should emulate Arab states or western states. The main difference of note seems to be in East Jerusalem, where more Jerusalem respondents chose western states as their model, as indicated in Figure 10.45.

When the data was examined according to place of residence, Gaza Strip refugee camp residents were less likely to prefer a Western-style model for Palestine.

While 22% of respondents there cited a western government,




Figure 10-45: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to region and place of residence



## February 2004 Surveys

the percentage of respondents who cited western governments in West Bank refugee camps was 32%.

### According to poverty and employment

It is rather striking to see the differences in chosen model for Palestine between the various economic strata. As illustrated in Figure 10.46, those above the poverty line most often

preferred the model of the western-style government. Whereas 40% of respondents above the poverty line said they would like Palestine to imitate a western system of government, 32% of respondents above the poverty line preferred an Arab state model. Conversely, the proportion of those below the poverty line (23%) and hardship cases (22%) who preferred a western system was dramatically lower.




Figure 10-46: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to poverty and employment

When the data was analyzed according to respondents' employment situation, it was also interesting to note that more fully employed Palestinians prefer western over Arab systems of government for Palestine. While 41% of the fully-employed prefer a western-style system for Palestine, 36% of the fully-employed prefer an Arab system. Those not fully employed are more likely to prefer an Arab system.

### According to age and education

The type of system Palestinians prefer for Palestine also varies by age, and more so by respondents' educational level. As illustrated in Figure 10.47, the preference for an Arab-style system of government is higher among the older generation than among younger respondents. Whereas, for example, 49% of respondents above 50-years-old said that they would like Palestine to be modeled after an Arab government, 38% of respondents 18 to 24-years-old preferred the Arab state model.

Whereas, for example, 49% of respondents above 50-years-old said that they would like Palestine to be modeled after an Arab government, 38% of respondents 18 to 24-years-old preferred the Arab state model.




Figure 10-47: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to age and education



When respondents' preferences for the state which Palestine should emulate are analyzed by their level of education, the differences are rather striking. While only 17% of the respondents with the lowest education said that they prefer a western-style state in Palestine, the percentage of those who have the highest level of education and said the same was 38%. Respondents with medium levels of education are in between these two poles, as illustrated below. Thus, one can argue that respondents with more education are more likely to prefer that Palestine adopt a western-style system of government.

### *According to leadership and factional trust*

When preference towards a system of government was cross-checked with trust in specific factions, the results showed that often those who prefer an Islamic system of government also trust religious factions. As shown in Figure 10.48, below, respondents who would like the caliphate system to be adopted in Palestine were mainly respondents who also said they trust Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Even respondents who cite non-Arab

Islamic states such as Iran as their model were also from among those who stated that they trust religious factions most. Having said that, it is interesting to note is that a significant proportion of respondents trusting Hamas and Islamic Jihad mentioned a western

system as their model for Palestine. Almost one-quarter of respondent trusting Islamic Jihad, for example, said that they would like Palestine to follow a system of government modeled after Western states.

Very few respondents trusting Fateh, on the other hand, mentioned non-Arab Islamic states or an Islamic system of government based on the Islamic caliphate. The majority of Fateh "supporters" (54%) cited one of the Arab governments as the model they would like Palestine to follow.



The type of government Palestinians would like to see implemented also correlates with the leader they trust most. When examining model preference according to those trusting Arafat compared to, for example, those trusting Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, it is evident that the preference for a Western-style system is significantly higher among those trusting Arafat than among those




Figure 10-48: Model country for Palestine to emulate, according to most trusted leader and faction

trusting Yassin. Whereas 34% of those trusting Arafat said they would like Palestine to be modeled after one of the Western countries, the proportion among respondents trusting Yassin was exactly half that number.

## 10.6 TRUST IN MEDIA

Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been exposed to various sources of information before and after the Oslo process. Although the Palestinian media was restricted by the Israeli military censor prior to (and in some cases after Oslo), the strong and diverse Palestinian NGO community was active in disseminating information, along with the various Palestinian political and religious factions.


In the aftermath of Oslo, however, the OPT witnessed an influx of various other sources of information. Some were due to the relative flexibility of the new Palestinian Press Law which, on the one hand allowed for the establishment of private TV and radio stations and, on the other hand, did not have any clauses concerning the need to send material to a censor, as was the case when Israel was in total control of all of the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

In addition to the internet, the establishment of a number of Arab satellite channels also proved to be a new source of information that challenged the formal Arab TV stations widely watched in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These satellite channels focused on various issues that were unique not only to the Arab world in general, but also to the OPT. Some were news-oriented, others were entertainment-based, and some had a religious orientation.

In the following pages the Palestinian perception towards the various sources of information available to them will be examined. The information available in this section is based on a question addressed to the respondents concerning their most trustworthy source of information. The analysis will also make use of the independent variables discussed earlier.

### 10.6.1 According to the general public

Al-Jazeera satellite channel is the single most trusted source of information among the Palestinian public, with almost 37% citing the Qatar-based network. As illustrated in Figure 10.49, below, 24% of Palestinians cited Palestinian media (Palestinian radio and television and the three Palestinian newspapers). Trust in political factions or religious



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

institutions as a source of information is only cited by 4% of the respondents, and only 3% named their relatives and friends as the most trusted source for information.

The Hezbollah-run satellite television station Al-Manar is trusted by 17% of respondents, the newly-established Al-Arabyiah is trusted by 7%, while Abu Dhabi satellite channel is cited by 6%. Al-Hurra, the television station that was established by the United States to “foster democracy,” is barely mentioned by respondents.

### *According to region*

Palestinian public radio and TV stations are more widely trusted in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. As indicated in Table 10-10, 21% of Gaza respondents trust Palestinian radio and TV compared to 13% in the West Bank. On the other hand, West Bank respondents are more likely to trust the Palestinian print press than do Gazans. While 12% of West Bankers trust the three main daily newspapers: Al-Quds, Al-Ayyam, and Al-Hayat, this percentage is only 4% in the Gaza Strip.

**Table 10-10: Most important source of information according to area of residence**

REGION	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Mosque/religious leaders	Faction I trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabyyah	Abu Dhabi	Al-Manar	Al-Hura	Other
West Bank	5%	8%	8%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	30%	4%	6%	18%	1%	3%
Jerusalem	2%		11%	1%		2%	1%	3%	44%	13%	3%	19%		1%
Gaza Strip	8%	13%	3%	1%	0%	2%	3%	4%	32%	9%	8%	15%		3%
<b>WBGS</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>3%</b>

Sig. = .000, N = 1464

These apparent differences could be attributed to the fact that, while the three main daily newspapers in the OPT are published in the West Bank and Jerusalem, Palestinian television broadcasts from the Gaza Strip.

Al-Jazeera satellite channel remains the single most-trusted source of information in the three main areas of the OPT - the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip - although the channel is significantly strong in East Jerusalem, where 44% of respondents selected it as the most trustworthy.

### **10.6.2 Most important source of information**

#### *According to area of residence*

Refugee camp respondents seem to trust Palestinian radio and TV more than city or village residents. As shown in Table 11, 20% of refugee camp residents chose radio and television as their most important source, as compared to 13% of respondents in cities and 14% of respondents in villages. Again, Al-Jazeera remains the single most important source of information irrespective of the area of residence.

#### *According to place of residence*

Although Palestinian radio and TV seem to be more important among refugee camp residents, further analysis reveals that trust in Palestinian public radio and TV in refugee camps is primarily seen in the Gaza Strip (24% of respondents) as compared to only 9% in West Bank refugee camps. What is interesting to note, however, is that 53% of West Bank refugee camp respondents said that they trust Al-Jazeera, compared to only 29% of Gaza Strip refugee camp residents. While one may argue that this could be due to the availabil-



## February 2004 Surveys

ity of satellite dishes in the households, the data shows that, in fact, more Gaza refugee camp residents have satellite access in their households than do respondents in the West Bank refugee camps. Whereas 67% of the former said that their households have satellite dishes, the percentage is 63% in the latter.

Table 10-11: Most important source of information according to place of residence

Place	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Masqatiyouna hebdar	Factional trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabiya	Abu Dhabi	Al-Banar	al-Hurra	Other
WB outside camps	5%	8%	8%	2%	2%	2%	1%	2%	37%	4%	6%	18%	1%	3%
WB Refugee Camps		9%	2%				2%		53%	6%	5%	17%		6%
Jerusalem	2%		11%	1%			2%	1%	3%	44%	13%	3%	19%	1%
GS outside camps	6%	12%	2%	1%	6%	2%	3%	5%	34%	9%	8%	14%		4%
GS Refugee Camps	11%	13%	6%	1%		1%	2%	2%	28%	11%	8%	16%		
WBGS	6%	9%	6%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	37%	7%	6%	17%	6%	3%

Fig. 2.000, Nr1468

### According to poverty

Trust in Palestinian radio and TV is very low among respondents above the poverty line than among respondents that are economically disadvantaged. As indicated in Table 10.12, only 8% of the respondents that are above the poverty line said that they trust Palestinian TV and radio, compared to 17% of respondents below the poverty line and 22% of respondents that are hardship cases.

Table 10-12: Most important source of information according to poverty

Poverty	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Masqatiyouna hebdar	Factional trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabiya	Abu Dhabi	Al-Banar	al-Hurra	Other
Hardship cases	9%	13%	7%	2%	1%	2%	2%	5%	31%	5%	5%	15%	8%	4%
Below poverty line	7%	16%	5%	1%	1%	2%	1%	3%	35%	9%	7%	16%	8%	2%
Above poverty line	3%	5%	8%	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%	42%	7%	6%	18%		3%
WBGS	6%	9%	7%	2%	1%	2%	1%	3%	37%	7%	6%	17%	6%	3%

Fig. 2.002, Nr1222

Although the lower availability of satellite dishes in households of hardship cases might explain this tendency, it is not clear why this is the case for households that fall below the poverty line given the fact that 67% of those households have satellite dishes.

### According to age

Age does not seem to influence which sources of information are most important to respondents. An examination of Table 10.13 shows only minor differences according to age. Interestingly, however, is that the tiny percentage of respondents who named Al-Hurra as the television station that they trust most were among those above the age of 50.

Age	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Masqatiyouna hebdar	Factional trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabiya	Abu Dhabi	Al-Banar	al-Hurra	Other
18-24 yrs	2%	7%	6%	1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	36%	11%	7%	18%	0%	2%
25-34 yrs	8%	9%	8%	2%	1%	1%	1%	3%	39%	6%	5%	17%	0%	3%
35-49 yrs	6%	10%	6%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	38%	6%	6%	18%		2%
50+ yrs	7%	9%	6%	2%	1%	2%	2%	5%	32%	6%	9%	13%	2%	5%
WBGS	6%	9%	6%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	37%	7%	6%	17%	6%	3%

Fig. 2.027, Nr1463

Table 10-13: Most important source of information according to age



## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

### According to education

The level of education of respondents seems to correlate more than age with the various important sources of information. Only 9% of respondents with the highest level of education get their information from Palestinian TV and radio stations as compared to 30% among respondents with low levels of education. In contrast, 40% of respondents with high levels of education trust Al-Jazeera as compared to 33% of respondents with low levels of education.

Table 10-14: Most important source of information, according to trust in political factions

Education	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Mosque religious leaders	Faction trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabyyah	Abu Dhabi	Al-Manar	Al-Hura	Other
Low	13%	17%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	5%	33%	4%	3%	18%	2%	6%
Medium	6%	9%	6%	2%	1%	2%	1%	4%	35%	6%	7%	18%	0%	3%
High	3%	6%	8%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	40%	9%	7%	15%	1%	2%
WBGS	6%	9%	7%	2%	6%	1%	2%	1%	37%	7%	6%	17%	0%	3%

Sig. < .001, N=1438

### According to trust in political factions

Al-Jazeera is the most important source of information for respondents trusting all of the various political factions. Having said that, however, Al-Manar satellite station is also important for respondents who trust Hamas and Islamic Jihad. As indicated in Table 10.15, 23% of respondents trusting Islamic Jihad and 21% of respondents trusting Hamas report that Al-Manar is their most important source. Only 11% of respondents placing their trust in Fateh cited Al-Manar as their most important source of information.

Table 15: Most important source of information, according to levels of education

Most trusted political faction	Most important source of information													
	Palestinian radio	Palestinian TV	Al-Quds newspaper	Al-Ayyam	Al-Hayat	Mosque religious leaders	Faction trust most	Friends and relatives	Al-Jazeera	Al-Arabyyah	Abu Dhabi	Al-Manar	Al-Hura	Other
Fateh	4%	15%	4%	2%	2%	1%	2%	2%	34%	12%	10%	11%	2%	2%
Hamas	7%	6%	5%	0%	0%	5%	4%	1%	27%	5%	5%	21%	2%	2%
Islamic Jihad	5%	8%	6%	5%	5%	8%	6%	1%	27%	2%	8%	23%	8%	5%
PFLP				3%	3%		3%	6%	36%	18%	12%	9%		6%
Other Islamic	11%	6%	15%	2%	2%	2%			38%	4%	6%	10%		
Do not trust anyone	4%	3%	3%	22%	3%		3%		21%	3%	11%	11%	3%	3%
Secularist	5%	7%	8%	0%	1%	1%		4%	28%	7%	6%	17%	1%	4%
WBGS	5%	9%	6%	2%	1%	2%	2%	3%	37%	7%	7%	16%	0%	3%


Sig. < .001, N=1341

In one final question concerning media, respondents were asked if the US-run Al-Hurra satellite channel is intended to foster democracy in the Arab world. Interestingly, the majority of respondents reported that they had not

heard of the channel. Of those who had, 42% said that the

station was not intended to foster democracy, as compared with a mere 6% who said that yes, the station was intended to foster democracy. Clearly the channel has not made much of an impact among Palestinians surveyed.

Figure 10-50: Attitudes towards Al-Hurra TV



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## Annexes

## TABLES OF VARIABLES

Question	Variable	Label	Category
Q 001	o118	Feeling of security	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q 002	o002	Refugee Status	Main Independent Variables
Q 003	o008v2	Employment Situation	Labour Market
Q 004	o009o1	Occupation (or last occupation for the unemployed)	Labour Market
Q 004_o	o009o2v2	Occupation (or last occupation for the unemployed)	Labour Market
Q 005	o063v2	Type of employer (or last type)	Labour Market
Q 006	o089	Salary, Regularity and Amount	Labour Market
Q 007	o015v2	Willing to work only if...	Labour Market
Q 008	o011v2	Place of work (or last place...)?	Labour Market
Q 009	o012v2	Change in employment situation (past 6 months)	Labour Market
Q 010	o013v3	Was this change a consequence of the current situation	Labour Market
Q 010_o	o013v3o	Was this change a consequence of the current situation (others)	Labour Market
Q 011_o	o014	If unemployed, did you try to find a job?	Labour Market
Q 012	o014o	Reasons for not trying to find a job	Labour Market
Q 013	o100v3	Unemployment duration of main breadwinner	Labour Market
Q 014_a	o155a	Women in household	Other Independent Variables
Q 014_b	o155b	Men in household	Other Independent Variables
Q 014_c	o141a	Number of children (<18) in household	Women and Children
Q 015_a	o018a	No. of employed men	Labour Market
Q 015_b	o018b	No. Of employed women	Labour Market
Q 016_a	o065a	Number of children (<18) working	Labour Market
Q 016_b	o065b	Number of children (<16) working	Labour Market
Q 017	o065o	Type of work of employed children	Labour Market
Q 018	o019	Household members lost their jobs in the past 3-4 months	Labour Market
Q 019_a1	o024a	Personal emp. assist. Long term job	Assistance
Q 019_a2	o0262a	HH emp. Assist. (only): Long term job	Assistance
Q 019_b1	o024b	Personal emp. assist. Short term job	Assistance
Q 019_b2	o0262b	HH emp. Assist. (only): Short term job	Assistance
Q 019_c1	o024c	Personal emp. assist. Unemp. Funds	Assistance
Q 019_c2	o0262c	HH emp. Assist. (only): Unemp. Funds	Assistance
Q 019_d1	o024d	Personal emp. assist. Self-employed res.	Assistance
Q 019_d2	o0262d	HH emp. Assist. (only): Self-employed res.	Assistance
Q 020	o024s	Personal emp. assist. Source	Assistance
Q 021	o026s	HH emp. assist. Source	Assistance
Q 022	o025	Evaluation job assistance last 6 months	Impact of Assistance
Q 023	o025d	Reason for dissatisfaction with employment assistance	Impact of Assistance
Q 023_o	o025do	Other reason for dissatisfaction with employment assistance	Impact of Assistance
Q 024	o162	Business investment since Intifada	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 025	o108v2	Household income evolution (past 6 months)	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 026_a	o163a	Household income composition: Salaries from long-term jobs	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 026_b	o163b	Household income composition: Salaries from short-term jobs	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 026_c	o163c	Household income composition: Independent income	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 026_d	o163d	Household income composition: Property renting	Socio-Economic Conditions

Question	Variable	Label	Category
Q.026. e	o163e	Household income composition: Help from Palestine family	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.026. f	o163f	Household income composition: Help from family abroad	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.026. g	o163g	Household income composition: Dividends	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.026. h	o163h	Household income composition: Fin. help P.A./int. local org.	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.027	o031	Mobility problems	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. a	o164a	Separation Wall: separation from relatives	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. b	o164b	Separation Wall: separation from land	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. c	o164c	Separation Wall: prevent job access	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. d	o164d	Separation Wall: cut land from water	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. e	o164e	Separation Wall: forced move	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. f	o164f	Separation Wall: access basic services difficult	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. g	o164g	Separation Wall: diff. market for agriculture	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. h	o164h	Separation Wall: agriculture difficult/impossible	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.028. i	o164i	Separation Wall: prices for material/transport	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.029	o165	Concern for Separation Wall	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. a	o140a	Business suffered due to inability to market products to areas	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. b	o140b	Business suffered due to difficulties to buy raw materials or products	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. c	o140c	Business suffered due to problems to reach the place of work	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. d	o140d	Business suffered due to inability to pay bank loans	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. e	o034e	Business suffered: bankrupt past 6 months	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. f	o140e	Business suffered due to inability to work because of curfew	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.030. g	o140f	Business suffered due to damage to agriculture lands	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.031. a	o102hv2	Medical care needed: drugs	Health and Education
Q.031. b	o102hv2	Medical care needed: medical care	Health and Education
Q.031. c	o102bv2	Medical care needed: hospitalization	Health and Education
Q.031. d	o102rv2	Medical care needed: ambulance	Health and Education
Q.031. e	o102dv2	Medical care needed: vaccination/immunization	Health and Education
Q.031. f	o102hv2	Medical care needed: family planning	Health and Education
Q.031. g	o102rv2	Medical care needed: prenatal care	Health and Education
Q.031. h	o102v2	Medical care needed: birth care	Health and Education
Q.031. i	o102iv2	Medical care needed: sick child	Health and Education
Q.031. j	o102rv2	Medical care needed: specialized care	Health and Education
Q.031. k	o102v2	Medical care needed: physical rehabilitation	Health and Education
Q.031. l	o102mv2	Medical care needed: chronic disease follow-up	Health and Education
Q.032	o167	Problems related to alternative health facility	Health and Education
Q.033	o168	Main reason for choosing health facility (other reason)	Health and Education
Q.033. o	o168o	Main reason for choosing health facility	Health and Education
Q.034. a1	o169a2	Drugs for chronic diseases: Prescribed during the past 6 months	Health and Education
Q.034. a2	o169b1	Drugs for chronic diseases: Provided during the past 6 months	Health and Education
Q.034. b1	o169a1	Drugs for acute diseases: Prescribed during the past 6 months	Health and Education
Q.034. b2	o169b2	Drugs for acute diseases: Provided during the past 6 months	Health and Education
Q.035	o170	Most important drug source	Health and Education
Q.036	o105v2	What children need most	Women and Children
Q.037. a	o033a	Children's behavior: Aggressive	Women and Children

Q.037_b	o033b	Children's behavior: Bad school results	Women and Children
Q.037_c	o033c	Children's behavior: Bed wetting	Women and Children
Q.037_d	o033d	Children's behavior: Nightmares	Women and Children
Q.038	o171	Ability to fully meet the needs of children for care and protection	Women and Children
Q.039	o172	Need and existence of mental health care services	Health and Education
Q.040	o035b	Received assistance since beginning of Intifada	Assistance
Q.041	o035	Received assistance during the past 6 months	Assistance
Q.042_aa	o036a1	1st assistance received: Nature	Assistance
Q.042_ab	o036b1	1st assistance received: Value	Assistance
Q.042_ac	o036c1	1st assistance received: Source	Assistance
Q.042_ad	o036d1	1st assistance received: Satisfaction	Impact of Assistance
Q.042_ba	o036a2	2nd assistance received: Nature	Assistance
Q.042_bb	o036b2	2nd assistance received: Value	Assistance
Q.042_bc	o036c2	2nd assistance received: Source	Assistance
Q.042_bd	o036d2	2nd assistance received: Satisfaction	Impact of Assistance
Q.043	o037	General satisfaction with assistance received	Impact of Assistance
Q.044	o123	Reason for dissatisfaction with assistance in general	Impact of Assistance
Q.044_o	o123o	Reason for dissatisfaction with assistance in general	Impact of Assistance
Q.045	o074v2	Frequency of food assistance received	Food
Q.046	o075	Effectiveness of food distribution	Food
Q.047	o173	Main benefit from food assistance	Food
Q.048	o166	Targeting of food assistance	Food
Q.049	o038	Assistance needed by those who didn't receive it	Impact of Assistance
Q.050_a	o079av3	Household assistance: 1st most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.050_b	o079bv3	Household assistance: 2nd most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.051	o180	Most important unmet needs	Assistance
Q.052_a	o080av3	Community assistance: 1st most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.052_b	o080bv3	Community assistance: 2nd most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.053	o077	Main source of food in household	Food
Q.054_a	o107a	Your opinion: 1st most needed food item	Food
Q.054_b	o107b	Your opinion: 2nd most needed food item	Food
Q.055_a	o124av2	Infrastructure assistance: 1st most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.055_b	o124bv2	Infrastructure assistance: 2nd most important	Impact of Assistance
Q.056	o040	Money needed every month	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.057	o041	Income close to what's needed	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.058	o109o1	If income decreased, main cause	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.058_o	o109o2	Reason for household income decrease	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.059	o044	Ability to keep up financially during the coming period	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_a	o131k	Assistance from family and friends living abroad	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_b	o131l	Getting assistance from family and friends living in Palestine or Israel	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_c	o131b	Using past earnings to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_d	o131c	Selling estate property to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_e	o131d	Cultivating land to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.060_f	o131e	More adults going into the labor market to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions

Question	Variable	Label	Category
Q 060 q	o131f	More children going into the labor market to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 060 h	o131q	Not paying the bills (water, electricity, etc.) to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 060 j	o131h	Reducing expenses to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 060 l	o131i	Selling jewelry/gold to sustain the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 060 k	o131j	Buying on credit	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 061	o177	Available means to relieve the hardship	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 062 a	o081a	Food consumption: dairy products	Food
Q 062 b	o081b	Food consumption: meat	Food
Q 062 c	o081c	Food consumption: carbohydrates	Food
Q 062 d	o081d	Food consumption: Bread	Food
Q 062 e	o081e	Food consumption: Fruits and vegetables	Food
Q 063	o181	Number of meals per day	Food
Q 064 a01	o126aa	Source of hospital	Health and Education
Q 064 a02	o126ab	Source of medication	Assistance
Q 064 a03	o126ac	Source of primary health care	Assistance
Q 064 a04	o126ad	Source of physical rehabilitation assistance	Assistance
Q 064 a05	o126ae	Source of specialized care	Assistance
Q 064 a06	o126af	Source of ambulances	Assistance
Q 064 a07	o126ag	Source of school	Health and Education
Q 064 a08	o126ah	Source of food rations	Assistance
Q 064 a09	o126ai	WFP is source of food rations	Assistance
Q 064 a09	o126aj	Source of job assistance	Assistance
Q 064 a10	o126ak	Source of financial assistance	Assistance
Q 064 b01	o126al	Satisfaction with hospital	Health and Education
Q 064 b02	o126am	Satisfaction with medication	Assistance
Q 064 b03	o126an	Satisfaction with primary health care	Assistance
Q 064 b04	o126ao	Satisfaction with physical rehabilitation	Assistance
Q 064 b05	o126ap	Satisfaction with specialized care	Assistance
Q 064 b06	o126aq	Satisfaction with ambulances	Assistance
Q 064 b07	o126ar	Satisfaction with school	Health and Education
Q 064 b08	o126as	Satisfaction with food rations	Assistance
Q 064 b09	o126at	Satisfaction with employment assistance	Assistance
Q 064 b10	o126au	Satisfaction with financial assistance	Assistance
Q 065	o089v2	Assistance for covering medical expenses	Assistance
Q 066 a	o174a	Connected to services: Water network	Health and Education
Q 066 b	o174b	Connected to services: Electricity network	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 c	o174c	Connected to services: Sewage disposal network	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 d	o174d	Connected to services: Solid waste disposal service	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 e	o174e	Connected to services: Fixed phone network	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 f	o174f	Connected to services: Mobile phone network	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 g	o174g	Connected to services: Internet (permanent)	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 066 h	o174h	Connected to services: Satellite TV	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q 067 a	o175a	Not connected to water: Total water consumption / day (liters)	Health and Education
Q 067 b	o175b	Not connected to water: Drinking water consumption / day (liters)	Health and Education

Q.068	o113av2	Possibility to go to school or university last 6 months	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.069	o113b	Children late or missed classes due to closures last 6 months	Women and Children
Q.070	o113c	Children not taught due to closures last 6 months	Women and Children
Q.071	o114v2	Possibility to go to work last 6 months	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.072	o115v2	Possibility to cultivate land during the 6 last month	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.073	o176	Reform of the PA	Media and Politics
Q.074	o178	Biggest concern about the PA	Media and Politics
Q.075_1	o179a	Local government: know enough about activities	Media and Politics
Q.075_2	o179b	Local government: sufficient freedom from PA	Media and Politics
Q.075_3	o179c	Local government: good job for community	Media and Politics
Q.075_4	o179d	Local government: residents can voice opinions	Media and Politics
Q.075_5	o179e	Local government: is consulted by the PA	Media and Politics
Q.075_6	o179f	Local government: represents my interests with PA	Media and Politics
Q.075_7	o179g	Local government: represents PA more than local interests	Media and Politics
Q.075_8	o179h	Local government: activities enough covered by media	Media and Politics
Q.075_9	o179i	Local government: uses funds properly	Media and Politics
Q.076	o133	Faction you trust most	Media and Politics
Q.077	o134	Leader you trust most	Media and Politics
Q.078	o182	More trustworthy faction (for those who don't trust any)	Media and Politics
Q.079	o135	Model country to choose a government	Media and Politics
Q.080	o136v2	Most important source of information	Media and Politics
Q.080_o	o136v2o	Most important source of information (other)	Media and Politics
Q.081	o183	Objective of Al Hurra TV: Strengthen democracy in Arab World	Media and Politics
Q.082	o144	Refugees' living conditions comparison within Intifada	Refugees and UNRWA
Q.083	o145	Refugees and non-refugees level of assistance within Intifada	Refugees and UNRWA
Q.084	o146	First service wanted in refugee camps and refugee areas	Refugees and UNRWA
Q.085	o147	Future of UNRWA	Refugees and UNRWA
Q.086_1	o148a	Opinion of UNRWA	World Bank
Q.086_2	o148b	Opinion of UNDP	World Bank
Q.086_3	o148c	Opinion of IMF	World Bank
Q.086_4	o148d	Opinion of EU	World Bank
Q.086_5	o148e	Opinion of World Bank	World Bank
Q.086_6	o148f	Opinion of Islamic Development Bank	World Bank
Q.087	o149	Description of World Bank	World Bank
Q.088	o150	Most useful role for World Bank in West Bank & Gaza	World Bank
Q.088_o	o150o	Most useful role for World Bank in West Bank & Gaza (other)	World Bank
Q.089	o151	Most problematic sectors/issues	World Bank
Q.089_o	o151o	Most problematic sectors/issues (other)	World Bank
Q.090_a	o152a	Most important problematic sectors/issues (choice 1/2)	World Bank
Q.090_ao	o152ao	Most important problematic sectors/issues (choice 1/2) other	World Bank
Q.090_b	o152b	Most important problematic sectors/issues (choice 2/2)	World Bank
Q.090_bo	o152bo	Most important problematic sectors/issues (choice 2/2) other	World Bank
Q.091	o153	Frequency of hearing/reading about World Bank	World Bank
Q.092	o154	Main source of information about WB	World Bank

Question	Variable	Label	Category
Q.092_o	o184o	Main source of information about WB (other)	World Bank
Q.093_1	o184a	World Bank independence from the PNA	World Bank
Q.093_2	o184b	World Bank independence from the United States	World Bank
Q.093_3	o184c	World Bank independence from Israel	World Bank
Q.093_4	o184d	World Bank independence from the IMF	World Bank
Q.093_5	o184e	World Bank independence from the EU	World Bank
Q.093_6	o184f	World Bank independence from the NGOs	World Bank
Q.094_1	o185a	Best performing donor (choice 1/2)	World Bank
Q.094_2	o185b	Best performing donor (choice 2/2)	World Bank
Q.095	o061	Gender	Main Independent Variables
Q.096	o055	Age	Other Independent Variables
Q.097	o060	Area of residence	Main Independent Variables
Q.098	o059	Region of residence	Main Independent Variables
Q.098	o127	Region of residence	Main Independent Variables
Q.099	o093a	Recent immigration of your immediate family	Other Independent Variables
Q.099_b	o093b	Country of recent immigration of your immediate family	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.100	o094a	Do you yourself think of emigrating?	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.100_b	o094b	Country of personal emigration	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.101	o056	Educational level	Health and Education
Q.102	o095	Subjective poverty	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.103	o087r3	Family income	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.104	o058	Marital status	Other Independent Variables
Q.105	o156	Do you or your family own or rent land?	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.106	o157	Respondent's position regarding household income	Socio-Economic Conditions
Q.107	o158	Number of people working for the PNA	Labour Market
Q.108	o159	Housewife: Hours per day of work at home	Labour Market
Q.109	o160	Housewife: Hours per day of work not related to house or children	Women and Children
Q.110	o161	Moved since the beginning of the Second Intifada	Mobility and Security Conditions
Q.110_o	o161o	Moved since the beginning of the Second Intifada (other reason)	Mobility and Security Conditions



ENGLISH QUESTIONNAIRE

**Q.1 In general, do you feel secure?**

- 1.. I feel secure
- 2.. I do not feel secure
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.2 Are you a refugee or descendant of a refugee family?**

- 1.. Yes, I am a refugee or a descendant of a refugee family
- 2.. No, I have never been displaced from my place of origin
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.3 Are you currently employed or not?**

- 1.. I am employed full-time
- 2.. I am employed part-time
- 3.. I am employed for few hours/day
- 4.. I am not employed
- 5.. I am occasionally employed
- 6.. I am a housewife
- 7.. I am a student
- 8.. I am retired
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.4 Employment category (or previous one for the unemployed)?**

- 1.. Professional (physician, engineer, etc...)
- 2.. Skilled worker
- 3.. Unskilled worker
- 4.. Technician
- 5.. Employee
- 6.. Self-employed
- 7.. Other.....Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 88 Not applicable
- 99 DK/NA

**Q.5 Type of employment (or last type for the unemployed)**

- 1.. Government employee
- 2.. Employed by an international agency
- 3.. Employed by an international NGO
- 4.. Employed by a local NGO
- 5.. Employed by the private sector
- 6.. Self-employed in petty trade of agricultural products
- 7.. Self-employed in petty trade of manufactured products
- 8 ... Other self-employed
- 88... Not applicable
- 99 ...DK/NA

**Q.6 If regularly employed, how do you get your agreed upon salary?**

- 1... I get it regularly and fully.
- 2... I get it regularly, but less than the agreed upon amount.
- 3... I do not get it regularly, but when I do it is the agreed upon amount.
- 4... I do not get it regularly, even when I do it is less than the agreed upon amount.
- 8... Not applicable
- 9... DK/NA

**Q.7 Would you be willing to work:**

- 1.. Only if the wage is about the same as before
- 2.. Even if the wage is 10% to 25% lower than before
- 3.. Even if the wage is 25% to 50% lower than before
- 4.. Even if the wage is more than 50% lower than before
- 5.. I am willing to work at any wage.
- 8.. Not applicable

- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.8 Main place of work (or last place for the unemployed)?**

- 1.. Jerusalem
- 2.. West Bank
- 3.. Gaza Strip
- 4.. Settlement
- 5.. Israel proper
- 6.. In another country
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.9 Did your employment situation change in the past six months?**

- 1.. No, it remained the same (go to Q. 11)
- 2.. Yes, I had to search for a different job
- 3.. Yes, I lost my job
- 8.. Not applicable (go to Q. 11)
- 9.. DK/NA (go to Q. 11)

**Q.10 Was this change a consequence of:**

- 1.. Inability to reach the place of work
- 2.. Employer can no longer afford to pay my salary
- 3 I had to close my/family business because of losses
- 4 Other.....Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.11 If you are unemployed, did you try to find a job?**

- 1.. Yes, a lot (go to Q. 13)
- 2.. I tried, but not very hard (go to Q. 12)
- 3.. I did not try at all (go to Q. 12)
- 8.. Not applicable (go to Q. 13)
- 9.. DK/NA (go to Q. 13)

**Q.12 If you did not try to find a job or did not try very hard, please tell us your main reason?**

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q.13 Looking back to the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, for how long in total has the main breadwinner of your household been unemployed?**

- 1.. Never
- 2.. Less than two months
- 3... Between 2 to 6 months
- 4.. Between 7 to 12 months
- 5... Between 13 to 24 months
- 6.. Between 24 to 36 months
- 7.. The whole period (41 months)
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.14 How many women (18 years old or more), men (18 years old or more) and children (less than 18 years old) live in this household?**

- |                         |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| (a) _____ women         | (b) _____ men           | (c) _____ children      |
| 88 ..... Not applicable | 88 ..... Not applicable | 88 ..... Not applicable |
| 99 ..... DK/NA          | 99 ..... DK/NA          | 99 ..... DK/NA          |

**Q.15 How many female and male adults (18 years old or more) in this household are employed?**

- |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| (a) _____ men           | (b) _____ women         |
| 88 ..... Not applicable | 88 ..... Not applicable |
| 99 ..... DK/NA          | 99 ..... DK/NA          |

## February 2004 Surveys

**Q.16** How many children (below the age of 18) work for more than 4 hours a day either at home or outside?

(a) \_\_\_\_\_ children (below 18), of which : (b) \_\_\_\_\_ are (is) 15 years and below

88 ..... Not applicable

88 Not applicable

99 ..... DK/NA

99 DK/NA

**Q.17** If children (below the age of 18) work in your household, for what type of work are they employed?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q.18** How many adults of your household members have lost their jobs in the past six months?

\_\_\_\_\_ adults

88 ..... Not applicable

99 ..... DK/NA

**Q.19** Did you personally or another member of your household receive employment assistance of the following types in the past six months? (*MULTIPLE ANSWERS*)

	Me	Other household members	
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> a	2 <input type="checkbox"/> a	Long-term job
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> b	2 <input type="checkbox"/> b	Short-term job
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> c	2 <input type="checkbox"/> c	Unemployment funds
	1 <input type="checkbox"/> d	2 <input type="checkbox"/> d	Resources to sustain your activity as a self-employed

**Q.20** If you personally received such assistance, what was its source?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q.21** If other household members received such assistance, what was its source?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Q.22** In general, how do you evaluate this employment assistance received by you personally and/or by other household members?

- 1.. Very satisfied (*go to Q.24*)
- 2.. Satisfied (*go to Q.24*)
- 3.. Dissatisfied
- 4.. Very dissatisfied
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.23** If you are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this employment assistance, could you please give your main reasons of dissatisfaction? (*ONE ANSWER ONLY*)

- 1... The amount of assistance is too little
- 2... The period of employment is very short
- 3... Other ..... Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 8... Not applicable
- 9... DK/NA

**Q.24** Did you invest money in a business since the Intifada started?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.25** In the past six months, did your household income increase, decrease, or remain the same?

- 1.. It increased
- 2.. It remained the same
- 3.. It decreased
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.26 Of the following items, which constitute the income of the household?**

(MULTIPLE ANSWERS)

- a.. Salaries from long-term jobs
- b.. Salaries from short-term jobs
- c.. Income from independent activity or petty trade
- d.. Renting of property
- e.. Financial help from family members living in Palestine
- f... Financial help from family members living abroad
- g.. Dividends
- h.. Financial help from the PA, from local or international organizations

**Q.27 To what extent would you say that restrictions on your mobility were a problem for you and your family in the past six months?**

- 1.. A lot
- 2.. A little
- 3.. Not at all
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.28 Did the construction of the separation wall affect you and your household?**

(MULTIPLE ANSWERS)

- a.. It separated us from relatives
- b.. It separated us from our land
- c.. It prevented family members from reaching their place of work
- d.. It cut our land from water
- e.. It forced members of our household to move to another place
- f... It made access to basic services such as education or health more difficult
- g.. It made it difficult/impossible to market agricultural produce
- h.. It made it difficult/impossible to prepare, plough, plant, harvest the land
- i... It greatly increased the price of inputs and transportation costs

**Q.29 In general, how concerned are you about the separation wall?**

- 1.. Concerned
- 2.. Rather concerned
- 3.. Not concerned
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.30 How did your business or that of your family suffer in the past six months?**

(MULTIPLE ANSWERS)

- a.. Inability to market products to areas
- b.. Difficulties in buying raw materials or products
- c.. Problems pertaining to reaching the place of work
- d.. Inability to pay bank loans
- e.. My business went bankrupt in the past six months
- f... Inability to work because of curfew
- g.. Damage to agricultural lands

**Q.31 What kind of medical care did you or any of your household members need and receive in the past six months?**

*For each type of medical care, you may answer one of the following:*

0... It was not needed

1... It was needed, but denied

2... It was needed, but there was a delay

3... It was needed and provided without delay or restriction

	0	1	2	3	
a..... Drugs			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b..... Medical care			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c..... Hospitalization			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d..... Ambulance			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e..... Vaccination			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f..... Family planning			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g..... Prenatal care			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h..... Birth care			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i..... Health care for a sick child			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j..... Specialized care			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
k..... Physical rehabilitation			<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
l..... Follow-up for chronic disease	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

## February 2004 Surveys

- Q.32** If your usual health facility was not available and you had to find an alternative facility, how did this choice affect you and your household the most? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)
- 1.. Delay in reaching health services
  - 2.. Exposure to more danger
  - 3.. Additional cost for transportation and for other expenses
  - 4.. More suffering for the sick person
  - 5.. Low quality of health services
  - 6.. Inconvenience due to non-familiarity with the new health professionals
  - 7.. We did not need an alternative health facility
  - 9.. DK/NA
- Q.33** What was your main reason for choosing your health facility? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)
- 1.. Because it was free of charge or cheaper than others
  - 2.. Because of distance and time or because it is the only one available in the area
  - 3.. Because of short waiting time
  - 4.. Because of confidence in the quality of care
  - 5.. Because of the availability of drugs
  - 6.. Because of the humanity of care
  - 7.. Because of the physician's gender
  - 9.. Other ..... Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
  - 88. Not applicable
  - 99 DK/NA
- Q.34** In the past six months, were you or any other member of your family prescribed drugs for chronic or acute problems and did the pharmacy of your health facility provide them?
- |                              |                              |                                   |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| (a) prescribed               | (b) provided                 |                                   |
| 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | Drugs for <u>chronic</u> diseases |
| 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | Drugs for <u>acute</u> problems   |
- Q.35** From what source did you receive most of the drugs you needed? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)
- 1.. Private pharmacy
  - 2.. Ministry of Health clinic
  - 3.. NGO clinic
  - 4.. UNRWA clinic
  - 5.. Drug was not available at all
  - 6.. Drug was available, but I could not buy it for financial reasons
  - 8.. Not applicable
  - 9.. DK/NA
- Q.36** What do you think the children of your household need most? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)
- 1.. Attend school regularly
  - 2.. Safe opportunities to play with friends
  - 3.. Get psychological support
  - 4.. Unrestricted access to medical services
  - 5.. Eat as before the Intifada
  - 8.. Not applicable (I have no children - go to Q.39)
  - 9.. DK/NA
- Q.37** Do the children (below the age of 18) in your household suffer from the following since the beginning of the second Intifada? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS)
- a.. Aggressive behavior
  - b.. Bad school results
  - c.. Bedwetting
  - d.. Nightmares
- Q.38** Do you feel that you can fully meet the needs of your children for care and protection?
- 1.. Yes
  - 2.. No
  - 9.. DK/NA

**Q.39** If anybody of your household requires mental health care, do the necessary services exist in your area and could they be accessed in the past six months?

(ONLY ONE ANSWER)

- 1... Nobody needs mental health care in our household
- 2... Even though some need it, nobody wants mental health care
- 3... Yes, some need it, but we could not find any services in our area
- 4... Yes, some need it and services exist, but they could never be reached
- 5... Yes, some need it and services exist, but they could not be reached most of time
- 6... Yes, some need it and services exist and they could be reached most of the time
- 7... Yes, some need it and services exist and they could be reached all the time
- 9... DK/NA

**Q.40** Looking back since the Intifada started, did you, or any of your household members receive any type of assistance? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, financial assistance, educational assistance etc.)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No, we did not receive any assistance, financial or non-financial. (go to Q. 48)
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.41** Have you or your family received any assistance from any party in the past six months? (Assistance such as food, medicine, job, financial assistance, education assistance etc.)

- 1. Yes
- 2. No, we did not receive any assistance, financial or non-financial. (go to Q. 48)
- 9. DK/NA (GO TO Q49)

**Q.42** If you received assistance in the past six months (yes to Q.41), what are the two most important types of assistance that you or your family received in the past six months? What was their value and source and were you satisfied with it?

**A. First type of assistance**

Type: (aa) \_\_\_\_\_

Value: (ab) \_\_\_\_\_ NIS

- 0 No Value
- 1 No material value
- 9 DK/NA

Source: (ac) \_\_\_\_\_

Satisfaction: (ad)

- 1 Very satisfied
- 2 Satisfied
- 3 Dissatisfied
- 4 Very dissatisfied
- 8 Not applicable
- 9 DK/NA

**B. Second type of assistance**

Type: (ba) \_\_\_\_\_

Value:(bb) \_\_\_\_\_ NIS

- 0 No Value
- 1 No material value
- 9 DK/NA

Source:(bc) \_\_\_\_\_

Satisfaction: (bd)

- 1 Very satisfied
- 2 Satisfied
- 3 Dissatisfied
- 4 Very dissatisfied
- 8 Not applicable
- 9 DK/NA

**Q.43** In general, how do you evaluate the assistance provided to you and to your family in the past six months by various organizations?

- 1.. Very satisfied (go to Q.45)
- 2.. Satisfied (go to Q.45)
- 3.. Dissatisfied
- 4.. Very dissatisfied
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.44** If dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, what is your main reason? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)

- 1...Because of the quantity
- 2...Because of the quality
- 3...Because of the frequency
- 4...Other .....Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 88... Not applicable
- 99...DK/NA

**Q.45** How about food assistance, was this assistance provided:

- 1.. Every month
- 2.. Three times in the past six months
- 3.. Twice in the past six months
- 4.. Once in the past six months
- 8... Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

## February 2004 Surveys

**Q.46 How about the effectiveness of the distribution of food, was it:**

- 1.. Organized
- 2.. Somewhat organized
- 3.. Badly organized
- 8... Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.47 If your household received food assistance, did the food assistance you have received allow you to:**

- 1.. Save money to buy other food commodities
- 2.. Save money to buy other necessary items
- 3.. Keep assets that you would have sold otherwise
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.48 What is your opinion about the targeting of food assistance in your community? To what extent would you say that food assistance is targeted to the needy?**

- 1.. Food assistance is primarily targeted to the needy
- 2.. Food assistance targets the needy, but often others who do not need such assistance also receive it
- 3.. In general, food assistance is distributed without any distinction between the needy and those who do not need it
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.49 Coming back to assistance in general, if neither you nor your family received any assistance, would you say that you need assistance?**

- 1.. Yes
- 2.. No
- 3.. Not sure
- 8.. I did receive assistance
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.50 Which of the following, in your opinion, are the two most important needs of your household?**

- | 1 <sup>st</sup>             | 2 <sup>nd</sup>             | most important need    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> a1 | <input type="checkbox"/> b1 | Employment             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a2 | <input type="checkbox"/> b2 | Food                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a3 | <input type="checkbox"/> b3 | Health                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a4 | <input type="checkbox"/> b4 | Financial assistance   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a5 | <input type="checkbox"/> b5 | Housing and re-housing |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a6 | <input type="checkbox"/> b6 | Education              |

**Q.51 Taking into consideration the unmet needs only, which of the following, in your opinion, is the most important need of your household? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)**

- 1 Employment
- 2 Food
- 3 Health
- 4 Financial assistance
- 5 Housing and re-housing
- 6 Education

**Q.52 What about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important needs?**

- | 1 <sup>st</sup>             | 2 <sup>nd</sup>             | most important need    |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> a1 | <input type="checkbox"/> b1 | Employment             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a2 | <input type="checkbox"/> b2 | Food                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a3 | <input type="checkbox"/> b3 | Health                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a4 | <input type="checkbox"/> b4 | Financial assistance   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a5 | <input type="checkbox"/> b5 | Housing and re-housing |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a6 | <input type="checkbox"/> b6 | Education              |

**Q.53 What is the main source of food in your household?**

- 1.. Household relies primarily on relief assistance
- 2.. House relies primarily on support from its extended family
- 3.. House relies primarily on own income for food
- 9.. DK/NA

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

**Q.54 Concerning food what are the two most needed food items in your household?**

- | 1 <sup>st</sup>             | 2 <sup>nd</sup>             | most important need   |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> a1 | <input type="checkbox"/> b1 | Baby food   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a2 | <input type="checkbox"/> b2 | Basic commodities such as flour, sugar, lentils, beans, rice, oil |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a3 | <input type="checkbox"/> b3 | Milk and other dairy products                                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a4 | <input type="checkbox"/> b4 | Canned food   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a5 | <input type="checkbox"/> b5 | Fruits and vegetables   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a6 | <input type="checkbox"/> b6 | Meat and poultry  |

**Q.55 Still about your community, which of the following would you say are the two most important facilities needed?**

- | 1 <sup>st</sup>             | 2 <sup>nd</sup>             | most important facility        |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> a1 | <input type="checkbox"/> b1 | Water network                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a2 | <input type="checkbox"/> b2 | Electricity network            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a3 | <input type="checkbox"/> b3 | Sewage disposal network        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a4 | <input type="checkbox"/> b4 | Solid waste disposal service   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a5 | <input type="checkbox"/> b5 | Fixed phone line network       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a6 | <input type="checkbox"/> b6 | Mobile phone network           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a7 | <input type="checkbox"/> b7 | Internet (permanent connexion) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> a8 | <input type="checkbox"/> b8 | Satellite TV                   |

**Q.56 How much money would you say your household needs monthly to be able to meet basic life necessities?**

Amount needed: \_\_\_\_\_ Shekel. (9 = DK/NA)

**Q.57 To what extent would you say your household income is close to this number nowadays?**

- 1.. Much higher than this
- 2.. Slightly higher than this
- 3.. About the same
- 4.. Slightly less than this
- 5.. Much less than this
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.58 If your household income decreased in the past six months, what was the most important cause for this change in the household income? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

- 1.. Job loss
- 2.. Working hour loss
- 3.. Business/land for cultivation damaged
- 4.. Member of household in detention
- 5.. Health problems
- 6.. Increase in the prices of inputs and transportation
- 7.. Other .....Please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- 8.. Household income did not decrease
- 99. DK/NA

**Q.59 How long would you say you could keep up financially in the future?**

- 1.. For as long as it takes
- 2.. For about one year
- 3.. For only few months
- 4.. We can barely manage now
- 5.. Our situation is serious and we do not have enough to live.
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.60 Does your household do the following to be able to relieve the hardship? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS)**

- a.. We are getting assistance from family and friends living abroad
- b.. We are getting assistance from family and friends living in Palestine or Israel
- c.. We are using past savings
- d.. We are selling estate property
- e.. We are cultivating land
- f.. More household members over the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market
- g.. More household members below the age of 18 yrs went into the labor market
- h.. We do not pay the bills (water, electricity, etc.)
- i.. We are reducing expenses
- j.. We are selling jewelry/gold
- k.. We are buying on credit



## February 2004 Surveys

**Q.61** Of the above strategies utilized to relieve the hardship, would you say that those means are still available to your household, will be exhausted soon, are already exhausted, or were not available from the beginning?

- 1.. Those coping strategies are still available
- 2.. Those coping strategies will soon be exhausted
- 3.. Those coping strategies are already exhausted
- 4.. None of the above coping strategies were available from the beginning
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.62** Of the following commodities, would you say that your household consumption in the past year has increased, decreased, or remained the same?


	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same	DK/NA
a) Dairy products	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>		3 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/>	
b) Meat	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>		3 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/>	
c) Carbohydrates (such as potatoes, rice...)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
d) Bread	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>		3 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/>	
e) Fruits and vegetables	1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/>		3 <input type="checkbox"/> 9 <input type="checkbox"/>	

**Q.63** How many meals do you take each day?

[ ] meals per day (9 = DK/NA)

**Q.64** In case anyone in your household benefited from the following services in the past six months, please tell me whether you were satisfied or dissatisfied with that service and the organization that provided it?

Service	(a) Service provider	(b) Satisfaction				
		Very satisfied	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	DK/NA
1. Hospital		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Medication		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Primary health care		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Physical rehabilitation		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Specialized care		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Ambulances		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
7. School		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
8. Food rations		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
9. Employment assistance		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Financial assistance		1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>



1. PNA institution
2. Islamic organization
3. Local NGO
4. Arab government
5. Arab organization
6. UNRWA
7. ICRC
8. WFP - World Food Program
9. Other international organization
10. Other
99. DK/NA

**Q.65** Do you get any assistance for covering medical expenses? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)

- 1.. Yes, through government health insurance
- 2.. Yes, through UNRWA
- 3.. Yes, through private health insurance
- 4.. Yes, through charitable organizations
- 5.. No, we cover our medical expenses from our own sources
- 6.. No, we had to delay paying for medical expenses for financial reasons
- 9.. DK/NA

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

**Q.66** Is your house connected to or receives the following services? (MULTIPLE ANSWERS)

- a.. Water network
- b.. Electricity network
- c.. Sewage disposal network
- d.. Solid waste disposal service
- e.. Fixed phone line network
- f.. Mobile phone network
- g.. Internet (permanent connection)
- h.. Satellite TV

**Q.67** If you are not connected to a water network, how many liters of water do you bring everyday for the household?

- (a) [\_\_\_\_] liters per day, of which (b) [\_\_\_\_] liters of drinking water  
(-1 = Connected to water network)

**Q.68** In the past 6 months, was it possible to go to school or university for you or your family members?

- 1.. Almost impossible
- 2.. Very difficult
- 3.. Difficult
- 4.. Not difficult
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.69** In the past 6 months, how often, on average, were your children unable to attend school or arrived late due to curfews/closures?

- 1.. Never or almost never
- 2.. Less than 10 times per month
- 3.. 10 times or more per month
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.70** In the past 6 months, how often, on average, were your children not taught by their regular teacher because the teacher was unable to come due to curfews/closures?

- 1.. Never or almost never
- 2.. Less than 10 times per month
- 3.. 10 times or more per month
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.71** In the past 6 months, was it possible to go to work for you or your family members?

- 1.. Almost impossible
- 2.. Very difficult
- 3.. Difficult
- 4.. Not difficult
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.72** In the past 6 months, was it possible to cultivate land for you or your family members?

- 1.. Almost impossible
- 2.. Very difficult
- 3.. Difficult
- 4.. Not difficult
- 8.. Not applicable
- 9.. DK/NA

**Q.73** Some say that the reform of the Palestinian Authority should be the most important priority; others say that the reform of the Palestinian Authority should be dealt with after the independence. What is your opinion on that?

- 1. Reform of the PA should be a priority
- 2. Reform of the PA should be dealt with after independence
- 3. There is no need for reforming the Palestinian Authority
- 9. DK/NA

## February 2004 Surveys

**Q.74 Looking at the PA, what is the issue you are most concerned about? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

- 1. None
- 2. Lack of financial means
- 3. Nepotism / Clientelism (assisting the relatives of PA employees)
- 4. Inefficiency and mismanagement
- 5. Inability to deal with internal security problems
- 6. Inability to maintain public order
- 7. Lack of democracy
- 8. Lack of transparency/accountability
- 9. Lack of human rights
- 10. Inability to deal with unauthorized weapons
- 11. Corruption in general
- 99. DK/NA

**Q.75 Please let me know whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:**

		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK/NA
1	I know sufficiently about the activities of my municipal or village or refugee council	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
2	The Palestinian Authority provides the local councils with sufficient freedom to conduct their functions and activities	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
3	In general, my municipal council is doing a good job in serving the community it is responsible for	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
4	In general, my local council provides the residents with the opportunity to voice their opinions	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
5	The Palestinian Authority consults with my local council on local issues	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
6	My council represents my interests with the Palestinian Authority	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
7	My municipal council represents the interests of the Palestinian Authority more than the interest of the residents under its jurisdiction	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
8	The Palestinian media covers municipal activities adequately	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
9	In general, municipal funds that are allocated for social services in my city/village/refugee camp are properly used	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

**Q.76 Which political or religious faction do you trust most? (DO NOT READ NAMES)**

Name of the faction \_\_\_\_\_ (88= Do not trust anyone / 99= DK/NA)

**Q.77 Which political or religious leader do you trust most? (DO NOT READ NAMES)**

Name of the leader \_\_\_\_\_ (88= Do not trust anyone / 99= DK/NA)

**Q.78 If you do not trust any faction, could you please tell me which of the following factions is at least slightly more trustworthy than the others? (ONE ANSWER ONLY)**

- 1 ... Fatah
- 2 ... Hamas
- 3 ... Islamic Jihad
- 4 ... PFLP
- 5 ... DFLP
- 6 ... Fida
- 7 ... People's Party
- 9 ... DK/NA

**Q.79 If you were given the opportunity to choose the system of government you like to see in Palestine, which country in the world do you think is the closest to that choice?**

Name of country \_\_\_\_\_ (99= DK/NA)

**Q.80 What is the source of information that you trust most?**

- 1. Palestinian Radio
- 2. Palestinian TV
- 3. Al-Quds newspaper
- 4. Al-Ayyam
- 5. Al-Hayat Al-Jadidah
- 6. The mosque/ the religious leaders
- 7. The political/religious faction I trust most
- 8. Friends and relatives
- 9. Al-Jazeera
- 10. Al-Arabyyah
- 11. Abu Dhabi
- 12. Al-Manar
- 13. Other (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 99. DK/NA

**Q.81 Do you think that the objective of Al-Hurra TV station is to strengthen democracy in the Arab World?**

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. I did not watch it/I did not hear about it
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.82 How would you compare the refugees' and non-refugees' living conditions within the context of the Intifada?**

- 1. The refugees are much worse-off
- 2. The refugees are slightly worse-off
- 3. There is no real (or significant) difference
- 4. The refugees are slightly better-off
- 5. The refugees are far better-off
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.83 How would you compare the level of assistance received by refugees and non-refugees within the context of the Intifada?**

- 1. The refugees receive comparatively more assistance
- 2. There is no real (significant) difference
- 3. The non-refugees receive comparatively more assistance
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.84 What kind of service should the camps or refugee-inhabited areas (unrecognized camps) receive first? (ONLY ONE ANSWER)**

- 1. Relief services
- 2. Infrastructural rehabilitation services
- 3. Income generation (or job creation) services
- 4. Educational services
- 5. Health services
- 6. The camp refugees do not need more assistance
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.85 How do you see the future of UNRWA?**

- 1.. UNRWA should be preserved until a Palestinian state is declared
- 2.. UNRWA should be preserved until the refugee issue is solved.
- 3.. UNRWA should be dismantled and its budget turned over to the host authorities/PA.
- 9... DK/NA

**Q.86 If you are familiar with one or more of these organizations, how would you qualify your opinion of them?**

- |  | Favorable | Somewhat favorable | Neutral |
|--|-----------|--------------------|---------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.. UNRWA                           |           |                    |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.. UNDP                            |           |                    |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.. The International Monetary Fund |           |                    |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.. The European Union              |           |                    |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.. The World Bank                  |           |                    |         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.. The Islamic Development Bank    |           |                    |         |

## February 2004 Surveys

**Q.87 The following questions will focus more specifically on the World Bank which has been active in the Palestinian territories for ten years. In your opinion, which phrase best describes the World Bank? (tick one answer only)**

- 1.. A political institution with a role in promoting international law and good relations between countries
- 2.. A financial institution lending money to the Palestinian private sector
- 3.. An institution providing financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority
- 4.. A non-governmental organization financed by foreign governments
- 5.. A provider of social services to the Palestinians

**Q.88 Which, in your opinion, is the most useful role the World Bank could play in its West Bank & Gaza programme?**

- 1.. A public source for reliable information on the economic situation in the Palestinian territories
- 2.. To help develop sound Palestinian economic strategies, policies and institutions
- 3.. A source of technical and financial assistance for the delivery of basic services to those most in need
- 4.. A mediator between Palestinian and Israeli economic interest groups
- 5.. A source for the development of physical infrastructure in the West Bank & Gaza
- 6.. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**Q.89 What, in your opinion, is the sector/issue presenting most problems to the Palestinians today? (one answer only)**

- 1.. economic problems
- 2.. poverty
- 3.. education
- 4.. health
- 5.. government and governance
- 6.. infrastructure
- 7.. environment
- 8.. restrictions on movement
- 9.. lack of peace with Israel
- 10.. Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 99.. no answer

**Q.90 What, in your opinion, are the two most important sectors/issues presenting most problems to the Palestinians today?**

- | <b>First issue</b>  | <b>Second issue</b>   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.. economic growth                              | <input type="checkbox"/> 1.. economic growth                              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.. job creation                                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.. job creation                                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.. attracting investment for the private sector | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.. attracting investment for the private sector |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.. strengthening the agricultural sector        | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.. strengthening the agricultural sector        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.. strengthening the financial sector           | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.. strengthening the financial sector           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.. poverty reduction                            | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.. poverty reduction                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.. improving education                          | <input type="checkbox"/> 7.. improving education                          |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8.. reducing corruption and improving governance | <input type="checkbox"/> 8.. reducing corruption and improving governance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9.. infrastructure development                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 9.. infrastructure development                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10.. strengthening civil society                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 10.. strengthening civil society                 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11.. environmental protection                    | <input type="checkbox"/> 11.. environmental protection                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 12.. health                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> 12.. health                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13.. Other (Specify) _____                       | <input type="checkbox"/> 13.. Other (Specify) _____                       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 99.. DK/NA                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> 99.. DK/NA                                       |

**Q.91 How frequently, if at all, do you see, read or hear anything specifically about the World Bank**

- .. at least once a week
- 2.. at least once a month
- 3.. at least once every few months
- 4.. at least once a year
- 5.. at least once over the last five years
- 6.. never

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

**Q.92** If you have heard of or seen/read something about the World Bank in the past year – what is your main source of information about the World Bank?

- 1.. newspapers
- 2.. television
- 3.. internet
- 4.. World Bank publications
- 5.. World Bank web-site
- 6.. non-governmental organizations
- 7.. the Palestinian Authority
- 8.. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- 9.. DK/NA

**3** In carrying out its activities in the West Bank & Gaza, to what extent do you believe the independence of the World Bank is subject to pressure from any of the following:

- |   | Strong positive pressure   | Somewhat positive pressure | No pressure at all         | Somewhat negative pressure | Strong negative pressure   |
|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. The Palestinian Authority       | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. The United States               | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. Israel                          | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. The International Monetary Fund | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. The European Union              | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. non-governmental organisations  | <input type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |

**4** In your opinion, which are the best performing two of the following donor countries/organizations?

- 1.. UNRWA
- 2.. UNICEF
- 3.. UNDP
- 4.. World Food Programme
- 5.. World Health Organisation
- 6.. World Bank
- 7.. USAID
- 8.. The European Commission (EUROPEAID)

First: \_\_\_\_\_

Second: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q.95** Gender:  1 Male  2 Female

**Q.96** Your age: [ ] years (999 = DK/NA)

**Q.97** Place of residence:  1 City  2 Village  3 Refugee camp

- Q.98** Governorate
- 1. Jenin District
  - 2. Toubas District
  - 3. Nablus District
  - 4. Salfit District
  - 5. Qalqilia District
  - 6. Tulkarem District
  - 7. Ramallah District
  - 8. Jerusalem District
  - 9. Jericho District
  - 10. Bethlehem District
  - 11. Hebron District
  - 12. North Gaza District
  - 13. Gaza City
  - 14. Rafah District
  - 15. Deir Al-Balah District
  - 16. Khan Younis District

**Q.99** Has any one of your immediate family emigrated recently, if yes to which country?

- 1... Yes (b) in which country? \_\_\_\_\_
- 2... No
- 9... DK/NA

## February 2004 Surveys

### Q.100 Do you yourself think of emigrating?

- 1... Yes (b) in which country? \_\_\_\_\_
- 2... Yes but I cannot (b) in which country? \_\_\_\_\_
- 3... Maybe later
- 4... I do not think of emigrating at all
- 9... DK/NA

### Q.101 Educational level

- 1.. Never went to school
- 2.. Until elementary
- 3.. Until preparatory
- 4.. Until secondary
- 5.. Some college
- 6.. College & above
- 9.. DK/NA

### Q.102 How do you financially consider yourself and your household?

- 1.. Better-off than the people in my community
- 2.. About the same as the people in my community
- 3.. Worse-off than the people in my community
- 9.. DK/NA

### Q.103 How much is your family income?

- 1.. NIS 5000 and over
- 2.. Between NIS 4500-4999
- 3.. Between NIS 4000-4499
- 4.. Between NIS 3500-3999
- 5.. Between NIS 3000-3499
- 6.. Between NIS 2500-2999
- 7.. Between NIS 2000-2499
- 8.. Between NIS 1500-1999
- 9.. Between NIS 1000-1499
- 10.. Between NIS 500-999
- 11.. Less than NIS 500
- 99.. DK/NA

### Q.104 Marital status

- 1.. Single
- 2.. Married
- 3.. Divorced
- 4.. Widower
- 9.. NA

### Q.105 Do you own or rent land?

- 1.. Yes, our family owns land since more than 10 years
- 2.. Yes, our family bought land in the past 10 years
- 3.. We rent land
- 4.. We do not own or rent land
- 9.. DK/NA

### Q.106 Are you:

- 1.. The main breadwinner of your household
- 2.. Not the main breadwinner, but I bring income to the household
- 3.. I do not bring income to the household
- 9.. NA

### Q.107 How many people in your household work for the Palestinian Authority?

[ \_\_\_\_\_ ] persons (88= Not applicable / 99= DK/NA)

### Q.108 FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY: How many hours do you work every day at home?

\_\_\_\_\_ hours

### Q.109 FOR HOUSEWIVES ONLY: Of those, how many hours are spent for work not related to the house or children (work in the field, helping at shop, etc.)

\_\_\_\_\_ hours

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

**Q.110** Since the beginning of the Intifada, did you move from your original place of residence to another town, city, or village?

- 1. No, I did not move
- 2. I moved to preserve my livelihood
- 3. I moved to find another job
- 4. I moved because life, in general, became unbearable in my old place of residence
- 5. I moved so that my children can continue with their education
- 6. Other \_\_\_\_\_(specify)\_\_\_\_\_
- 9. DK/NA

**Q.111** Name of place of residence of the interviewee \_\_\_\_\_

**Q.112** Time the interview ended Minute(T3)      Hour (T4)

Remarks of the interviewee:

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ARABIC QUESTIONNAIRE

JMCC Public Opinion Polling Unit  
POB 25047, East Jerusalem  
Tel. 02-5819777

March 2004

(لاستعمال المكتب) رقم الاستمارة	الرجاء تعبئتها من قبل الباحث/ة رقم المنطقة	رقم الباحث/ة
C3:-----	C2:-----	C1:-----
D3: _____	D2: _____	D1: _____
السنة	الشهر	اليوم
تاريخ المقابلة؟		

المعلومات اذناه تعباً من قبل الباحث/ة:

اسم الباحث/ة: \_\_\_\_\_

جنس الباحث/ة:

1. ذكر	2. أنثى
C4:-----	

القرية/المدينة/المكيم: \_\_\_\_\_

اسم الشارع المختار: \_\_\_\_\_

عنوان المنزل المختار: \_\_\_\_\_

متى بدأت المقابلة:

الدقيقة	الساعة
T1:	T2:

ملاحظات للمركز (لاستعمال المكتب فقط)

	اسم المتابع الميداني:
	اسم واضح الرموز:
	اسم مراجع الرموز:

إمضاء الباحث: \_\_\_\_\_

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

### تعليمات لاختيار المنزل

1. لاهب/ي إلى المدرسة الثانوية للذكور (إن لم توجد فللإناث، فإن لم توجد فالمدرسة الإعدادية) التي يحددها/تمدها هي المسقّبة إذا كان ذلك في القرية.
2. أما في المدينة، فيجب الالتزام بالمنطقة التي يحددها هي مسؤول المنطقة.
3. خذ/ي ثالث شارع على يمين المدرسة (إذا كان هناك أقل من ثلاث شوارع، خذ/ي الشارع الثاني الخ...).
4. عند تحديد الشارع، اختار/ي المنزل الرابع على يمين الشارع.
5. إذا كانت البداية أكثر من طابق، اختار/ي الطابق الأول.
6. عند الانتهاء من المقابلة الأولى في هذا المنزل، انتقل/ي إلى الجهة الثانية من الشارع واختار/ي المنزل الثالث على يسار الشارع، إذا كان المنزل أكثر من طابق، اختار/ي الطابق الثاني.
7. إذا انتهى الشارع، ابتداءً بالشارع الأقرب على يمين.
8. المحلات أو المصانع التجارية يجب أن لا تشمل في هذا البحث.

### تعليمات لاختيار الشخص في المنزل

إذا كان عدد سكان المنزل البالغين 3، اثنين منهم من النساء فيجب أن تقابل/ي المرأة الأكبر سناً كما هو موضح في الجدول أدناه. إذا لم يكن الشخص موجود في المنزل، الرجاء عدم مقابلة أي شخص آخر، إنتقل/ي إلى المنزل التالي، إلا إذا كان هناك فرصة لتحديد موعد مع الشخص المختار في وقت لاحق على الأبعدى ذلك اليوم التالي من إجراء المقابلة.

#### عدد البالغين في البيت

0	بالغ 1	بالغ 2	بالغ 3	4 فما فوق
نساء	بالغ	أكبر سناً	متوسط العمر	ثاني أكبر رجل
1	2	4	7	10
نساء	بالغة	امرأة أو رجل	اصغر سناً	متوسط العمر
2		امرأة اصغر سناً	امرأة أكبر سناً	أكبر اصغر رجل
نساء				
3				
نساء				
4				
نساء				

عدد النساء

مرحباً... أنا من مركز القدس للإعلام والاتصال ونحن نقوم ببحث حول آراء الفلسطينيين بخصوص بعض القضايا المتعلقة بالوضع الفلسطيني بشكل عام لقد تم اختيارك بطريقة عشوائية. ستوضع إجاباتك مع العديد من إجابات أشخاص آخرين وبالتالي لن يتم التعرف عليك بأي شكل من الأشكال، وتؤكد مرة أخرى على أن كل ما يرد من معلومات في هذه الاستمارة سيحافظ على سرية المطلقة.

كم عدد الأشخاص الذين عرهم من 18 عام فما فوق؟

كم من هؤلاء إناث؟

## February 2004 Surveys

عدد البالغين في البيت

		4 فما فوق	بالغ 3	بالغ 2	بالغ 1		
		ثاني اكبر رجل	متوسط العمر	اكبر سنا	بالغ		
10	نساء		6	3	1		
11	نساء	متوسط العمر	اصغر سنا	امراة او رجل	بالغة		
			7	4	2		
12	نساء	اكبر اصغر رجل	امراة اكبر سنا	امراة اصغر سنا			
			8	5			
13	نساء	امراة متوسطة العمر	متوسطة العمر				عدد النساء
			9				
14	نساء	ثاني امراة اصغر سنا					

يرجى من الباحث/ة تعبئة الاستمارة بنفسه/ها وعدم اعطاءها للمستفيدين.

Code	الجواب	السؤال
Q1:	1. اشعر بأمان 2. لا اشعر بأمان 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	1. بشكل عام، هل تشعر بأمان؟
Q2:	1. نعم، أنا لاجيء أو منحد من عائلة لاجئة 2. لا، لم أزرع من موطني 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	2. هل أنت لاجيء أو منحد من عائلة لاجئة؟
Q3:	1. اعمل بوظيفة بدوام كامل 2. اعمل بوظيفة بدوام جزئي 3. اعمل لثمن ساعات في اليوم 4. لا اعمل 5. أنا ربة منزل 6. أنا طالب 7. أنا متقاعد 8. موظف في بعض الأحيان ( اعمل بشكل متقطع) 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	3. هل تعمل حالياً أم لا؟
Q4:	1. مهني (طبيب، مهندس، ...) 2. عامل ماهر (صاحب صناعة، بلوطه، طريش ...) 3. عامل (بطون، حجر ...) 4. فني (كهربائي، ميكانيكي ...) 5. موظف 6. أعمال حرة 7. غيرها (حدد) _____ 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	4. تصنيف العمل (أو العمل الأخير الذي لا يعمل):
Q5:	1. موظف حكومي 2. موظف لدى مؤسسة دولية 3. موظف لدى منظمة غير حكومية دولية 4. موظف لدى منظمة غير حكومية محلية 5. موظف لدى القطاع الخاص 6. أعمال حرة في تجارة المنتجات الزراعية 7. أعمال حرة في تجارة المنتجات المصنعة 8. أعمال حرة أخرى 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	5. نوع العمل (أو العمل الأخير الذي لا يعمل أو العاطل عن العمل):
Q6:	1. احصل عليه كاملاً وبالمنظم 2. احصل عليه بانتظام لكن أقل من المبلغ المتوقع عليه 3. لا احصل عليه بانتظام لكن عندما احصل عليه يكون المبلغ المتوقع عليه 4. احصل عليه بانتظام 5. لا احصل عليه بانتظام وعندما احصل عليه يكون أقل من المتوقع عليه 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	6. في حال كنت تعمل بشكل منظم، كيف تحصل على الراتب أو الأجر المتوقع عليه؟

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

<p><b>Q7:</b></p>	<p>1. إذا كان الأجر تقريبا مساوي للأجر السابق 2. أنا مستعد أن أصغر حتى ولو كان الأجر أقل بنسبة بين 10% إلى 25% من الأجر السابق 3. أنا مستعد أن أصغر حتى لو كان الأجر أقل بنسبة بين 25% إلى 50% من الأجر السابق 4. أنا مستعد أن أصغر حتى لو كان الأجر أقل بنسبة 50% من الأجر السابق 5. أنا مستعد أن أصغر لقاء أي أجر 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>7. هل أنت مستعد أن تعمل فقط في حالة:</p>
<p><b>Q8:</b></p>	<p>1. القدس 2. الضفة الغربية 3. قطاع غزة 4. المستوطنات 5. في إسرائيل 6. في دولة أخرى 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>8. مكان العمل الأساسي (أو العمل الأخير للذين لا يعملون):</p>
<p><b>Q9:</b></p>	<p>1. لا. في الوضع كما هو (انتقل إلى سؤال 13) 2. اضطررت أن أبحث عن وظيفة أخرى 3. فقتت عملي 8. لا ينطبق (انتقل إلى سؤال 11) 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب (انتقل إلى سؤال 11)</p>	<p>9. هل حصل تغيير على وضعك الوظيفي خلال السنة <u>أشهر الماضية</u>؟</p>
<p><b>Q10:</b></p>	<p>1. عدم القدرة على الوصول إلى مكان العمل 2. لا يستطيع صاحب العمل أن يتحمل نفق اجري 3. اضطررت أن اعلق عملي أو عمل عائلي تجاري بسبب الفسارة 4. غيرها (حدد) _____ 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>10. هل كان التغيير نتيجة:</p>
<p><b>Q11:</b></p>	<p>1. نعم كثيرا (انتقل إلى سؤال 13) 2. حاولت لكن لم أحاول كثيرا ( انتقل إلى سؤال 12) 3. لم أحاول إطلاقا ( انتقل إلى سؤال 12) 4. لا ينطبق (انتقل إلى سؤال 13) 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب (انتقل إلى سؤال 13)</p>	<p>11. إذا كنت عاطل عن العمل، هل حاولت أن تبحث عن عمل؟</p>
<p><b>Q12:</b></p>	<p>_____</p>	<p>12. إذا لم تحاول أن تبحث عن عمل أو لم تبحث بشكل جدي، الرجاء أن تذكر السبب الرئيسي؟</p>
<p><b>Q13:</b></p>	<p>1. لم يكن عاطلا عن العمل طوال هذه الفترة 2. لأقل من شهرين 3. بين شهرين و 6 أشهر 4. بين 7 أشهر و 12 شهر 5. بين 13 إلى 24 شهر 6. بين 24 و 36 شهر 7. الفترة كاملة (41) شهر 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>13. عند النظر إلى الوراء إلى بداية الانتفاضة الثانية في أيلول 2000، ما هي السدة الكلية التي كان فيها المعلن الرئيسي في عائلك عاطل عن العمل:</p>
<p><b>Q14a:</b></p>	<p>1. _____ إناث (88) لا ينطبق (99) لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>14. ما هو عدد النساء (من الثامنة عشرة فما فوق) الذين يعيشون في هذه الأسرة؟</p>
<p><b>Q14b:</b></p>	<p>2. _____ ذكور (88) لا ينطبق (99) لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>14-1. ما هو عدد الرجال (من الثامنة عشرة فما فوق) الذين يعيشون في هذه الأسرة؟</p>
<p><b>Q14c:</b></p>	<p>3. _____ طفل (88) لا ينطبق (99) لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>14-2 ما هو عدد الأطفال (ما دون سن الثامنة عشر) الذين يعيشون في هذه الأسرة؟</p>
<p><b>Q15a:</b></p>	<p>1. _____ ذكور (88) لا ينطبق (99) لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>15. ما هو عدد الذكور (ما فوق 18 سنة) الذين يعملون في هذه الأسرة؟</p>
<p><b>Q15b:</b></p>	<p>2. _____ إناث (88) لا ينطبق (99) لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>15-1. ما هو عدد الإناث (ما فوق 18 سنة) الذين يعملون في هذه الأسرة؟</p>

## February 2004 Surveys

Q16a:	1. كم عدد الأطفال (ما دون الثامنة عشرة) الذين يعملون لأكثر من 4 ساعات يوميا في البيت أو خارج البيت؟ (88 لا ينطبق (انتقل إلى سؤال 18) (99 لا أعرف/ لا جواب	1. _____ أطفال (تحت الـ 18)
Q16b:	1-16 كم عدد الأطفال (15 فما دون) الذين يعملون لأكثر من 4 ساعات يوميا في البيت أو خارج البيت؟	2. من بينهم _____ أطفال (15 فما دون) (88 لا ينطبق (انتقل إلى سؤال 18) (99 لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q17:	17. في حال يعمل الأطفال في الأسرة، ما هو نوع العمل الذين يعملون؟	-----
Q18:	18. ما هو عدد أفراد العائلة البالغين الذين فقدوا اتصالهم في السنة أشهر الماضية؟	بالع (88 لا ينطبق (99 لا أعرف/ لا جواب

19. هل تسلمت شخصيا أو تسلم أحد أفراد عائلتك مساعدة تشغيل (المحصل على عمل) من الأتواج التالية في السنة أشهر الماضية؟  
19-أ. أفت:

Q19a1:	1. وظيفة طويلة الأمد	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19a2:	2. وظيفة قصيرة الأمد	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19a3:	3. مخصصات بطالة	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19a4:	4. موارد لمساعدتك في نشاطك كعامل مستقل	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب

19-ب. أحد أفراد عائلتك:

Q19b1:	1. وظيفة طويلة الأمد	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19b2:	2. وظيفة قصيرة الأمد	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19b3:	3. مخصصات بطالة	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q19b4:	4. موارد لمساعدتك في نشاطك كعامل مستقل	1. استلمت	2. لم استلم	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب

Q20:	20. إذا ما تسلمت شخصيا هذا النوع من المساعدة، ما هو المصدر؟ 88. لا ينطبق
Q21:	21. إذا ما تسلم أحد أفراد العائلة هذا النوع من المساعدة، ما هو المصدر؟ 88. لا ينطبق

Q22:	22. بشكل عام، كيف تقيم هذه المساعدة لإيجاد عمل التي تسلمتها انت شخصيا أو / و تسلمها أحد أفراد العائلة؟ 1. راض جدا (انتقل إلى سؤال 24) 2. راض (انتقل إلى سؤال 24) 3. غير راض 4. غير راض مطلقا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q23:	23. إذا كنت غير راض أو غير راض بتاتا عن المساعدة لإيجاد عمل، هل يمكنك ذكر السبب الرئيسي لعدم رضائك؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط) 1. قيمة المساعدة قليلة جدا 2. مدة العمل قصيرة جدا 3. أخرى حدد _____ 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q24:	24. هل استثمرت أموالا في مشروع تجاري منذ بدأت الالتقاؤهم؟ 1. نعم 2. لا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q25:	25. هل ازداد دخل أسرتك في السنة أشهر الماضية، نقص أو بقي كما هو؟ 1. ازداد 2. بقي كما هو 3. نقص 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب

26. من بين التالية، ما الذي يشكل دخل العائلة؟

Q26a:	1. رواتب من وظائف طويلة الأمد	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26b:	2. رواتب من وظائف قصيرة الأمد	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26c:	3. دخل من نشاط مستقل أو عمل تجاري بسيط	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26d:	4. تأجير عقار	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26e:	5. مساعدة مالية من أعضاء الأسرة الذين يعيشون في فلسطين	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26f:	6. مساعدة مالية من أعضاء الأسرة الذين يعيشون في الخارج	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26g:	7. مخصصات (أرباح، أسهم، سندات... الخ)	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q26h:	8. مساعدة مالية من السلطة الفلسطينية، من منظمات محلية أو دولية	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

				27. لأي مدى يمكنك القول أن القيود على حركتك شكلت مشكلة لك ولعائلتك في السنة أشهر الماضية؟ 1. كثيرا 2. قليلا 3. لم تؤثر إطلاقا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
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28. هل أثر جدار الفصل عليك وعلى أسرته؟

Q28a:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	1. فصلنا عن أقرابنا
Q28b:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	2. فصلنا عن أرضنا
Q28c:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	3. منع أعضاء الأسرة من الوصول إلى مكان عملهم
Q28d:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	4. منع وصول الماء إلى أرضنا
Q28e:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	5. أجبر أعضاء من الأسرة إلى الانتقال إلى مكان آخر
Q28f:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	6. شكلت صعوبات أكبر أمام الوصول إلى الخدمات الأساسية مثل التعليم والصحة
Q28g:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	7. جعل عملية تسويق المنتجات الزراعية مستحيلة/ صعبة
Q28h:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	8. جعل عملية حوث وزراعة وحصد الأرض مستحيلة/ صعبة
Q28i:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	9. فرض زيادة كبيرة على تكلفة وأسعار المدخلات والموصلات

				29. بشكل عام، ما مدى قلقك من جدار الفصل؟ 1. قلق 2. قلق إلى حد ما 3. لست قلقا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
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30. هل عاني عملك التجاري أو عمل أحد أقاربك التجاري خلال السنة أشهر الماضية من الأمور التالية:

Q30a:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	1. عدم القدرة على تسويق المنتج إلى المناطق
Q30b:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	2. صعوبات في شراء مواد الخام أو المنتجات
Q30c:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	3. صعوبات ومشاكل مرتبطة بالوصول إلى مكان العمل
Q30d:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	4. عدم القدرة على دفع فروض البنك
Q30e:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	5. الفلاح مشروعي التجاري في آخر سنة أشهر
Q30f:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	6. عدم القدرة على العمل بسبب منع التحول
Q30g:	1. نعم	2. لا	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	7. تدمير المنتجات الزراعية

31. ما هو نوع الرعاية الصحية التي استلقت منها شخصا أو استفاد منها أحد أفراد أسرته منذ بداية الانقراض الثانية؟

Q31a:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	1. أنوية
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	2. علاج طبي
Q31b:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	3. مستشفى
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	4. إسعاف
Q31c:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	5. تطعيم
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	6. تنظيم الأسرة
Q31d:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	7. العناية بالحوامل
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	8. رعاية الأطفال حديثي الولادة
Q31e:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	9. الرعاية الصحية للأطفال المرضى
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	10. رعاية متخصصة
Q31f:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
Q31g:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
Q31h:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
Q31i:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
Q31j:	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	
	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	2. كان هناك حاجة لها ولم يتم السماح بوصولها	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	

## February 2004 Surveys

Q31k:	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	2. كان هناك السماح بوصولها	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	11. إعادة تأهيل جسدي
Q31L:	4. كان هناك حاجة لها وتم توفيرها بدون اعاقه	3. كان هناك حاجة لها لكن كان هناك تأخير	2. كان هناك السماح بوصولها	1. لم يكن هناك حاجة لها	12. متابعة للأمراض المزمنة

Q32:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. تأخير الوصول إلى الخدمات الصحية</li> <li>2. التعرض لمخاطر أكبر</li> <li>3. تكاليف إضافية للمواصلات وغيرها من التكاليف</li> <li>4. معاناة أكثر للمريض</li> <li>5. نوعية متدنية للخدمات الصحية</li> <li>6. عدم الارتياح بسبب عدم التأقلم مع المهنيين الجدد العاملين في قطاع الصحة</li> <li>7. لم نحتاج أي مرفق صحي بديل</li> <li>9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>32. إذا كان المرفق الصحي الاعتيادي (المستخدم دائما) غير متوفر واضطرت ان تبحث عن مرفق بديل، كيف أثر ذلك عليك وعلى أسرته أكثر شيء ؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q33:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. لأنه كان مجاني و اخص من غيره</li> <li>2. بسبب المسافة الوقت او بسبب عدم وجود بديل آخر</li> <li>3. بسبب قصر فترة الانتظار</li> <li>4. بسبب الثقة في نوعية الرعاية</li> <li>5. بسبب توفر النواء</li> <li>6. بسبب التعامل الانساني المقدم</li> <li>7. بسبب جلس الطبيب</li> <li>8. غير ذلك حدد _____</li> <li>88. لا يطبق</li> <li>99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>33. ما السبب الرئيسي لاختيارك هذا المرفق الصحي؟ (اجابة واحدة الأهم فقط)</p>

34. في السنة أشهر الماضية، هل تم وصف أي نواء لمرض مزمن أو مرض شديد لك شخصيا أو لأحد أفراد أسرتك وهل وفرت هذه الخدمة هذا النواء؟

Q34a1:	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم	1. هل تم وصف (إعطاء النواء)
Q34a2:	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم	2. هل توفر النواء
Q34b1:	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم	أ. أمراض شديدة
Q34b2:	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم	1. هل تم وصف (إعطاء النواء)
				2. هل توفر النواء

Q35:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. صيدلية خاصة</li> <li>2. عيادة تابعة لوزارة الصحة</li> <li>3. عيادة تابعة لمنظمة غير حكومية</li> <li>4. عيادة تابعة للأونروا</li> <li>5. لم يكن النواء متوفر إطلاقا</li> <li>6. كان النواء متوفرا لكن لم استطع شراؤه لأسباب مادية</li> <li>8. لا يطبق</li> <li>9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>35. من أي مصدر تشتت أكثر نواء احتجت له؟ ( اجابة واحدة فقط)</p>
Q36:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. الانتظام في المدرسة</li> <li>2. فرص أمله للعب مع الأصدقاء</li> <li>3. تلقي دعم نفسي</li> <li>4. حرية الوصول إلى الخدمات الطبية</li> <li>5. التغذية/ الأكل بشكل طبيعي مثلما كان قبل الانتفاضة</li> <li>8. لا يطبق ليس عندي أطفال (انتقل إلى سؤال 39)</li> <li>9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>36. باعتبارك ما الاحتياجات الأكثر إلحاحا للأطفال في عائلتك؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)</p>

37. هل يعاني الأطفال في عائلتك (ما دون سن 18) من أي من التالية منذ بداية الانتفاضة الثانية؟

Q37a:	2. لا يعاني	1. يعاني	1. التصرف العنواني
Q37b:	2. لا يعاني	1. يعاني	2. نتائج مدرسية سيئة
Q37c:	2. لا يعاني	1. يعاني	3. التبول الليلي
Q37d:	2. لا يعاني	1. يعاني	4. كوابيس

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Q38:	<p>38. هل تشعر أنك توفر لأطفالك العناية والحماية بشكل كامل؟</p> <p>1. نعم 2. لا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>39. إذا ما احتاج أحد أفراد أسرته لرعاية نفسية، هل تتوفر الخدمات الأساسية في منطقتك وهل يمكن الوصول إليها في السنة أشهر الماضية؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)</p> <p>1. لا يوجد أي فرد من أسرتي بحاجة إلى رعاية نفسية 2. بالرغم من أن البعض بحاجة لذلك، لا يوجد أحد يريد هذه الرعاية 3. نعم البعض يحتاج إليه لكننا لم نجد أية خدمة في منطقتنا 4. نعم البعض يحتاج إليه وتتوفر الخدمة لكن لا يوجد وسيلة للوصول إليها بناتنا 5. نعم البعض يحتاج إليه وتتوفر الخدمة لكن لا يوجد وسيلة للوصول إليها في معظم الأوقات 6. نعم البعض يحتاج إليه وتتوفر الخدمة ويمكن الوصول إليها في معظم الأوقات 7. نعم البعض يحتاج إليه وتتوفر الخدمة ويمكن الوصول إليها في أي وقت 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>
Q39:	<p>40. بالنظر الى الوراء منذ بداية الانتفاضة، هل تسلمت أو تسلم أحد أفراد اسرتك أي نوع من المساعدة (مساعدة مثل الغذاء، التواء، العمل، المساعدة المالية، المساعدة التعليمية)؟</p> <p>1. نعم 2. لا، لم تسلم أية مساعدة مالية أو غير مالية (انتقل إلى سؤال 48) 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</p>	<p>41. هل تسلمت أنت شخصيا أو أي من أفراد عائلتك أية مساعدة من أية جهة في السنة أشهر الماضية (مساعدة مثل طعام، ثواء، فرص عمل، مساعدة مالية، مساعدة تعليم، الخ ...)</p> <p>1. نعم 2. لا، لم تسلم أية مساعدة مالية أو غير مالية (انتقل إلى سؤال 48) 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب (انتقل إلى سؤال 49)</p>

42. إذا ما تسلمت مساعدة في خلال السنة أشهر الماضية، ما هو أهم نوعين من المساعدة التي تسلمتها أنت أو تسلمها أحد أفراد اسرتك خلال السنة أشهر الماضية، وما هي قيمة المساعدة والمصدر وهل كنت راض عنها؟  
المساعدة الأولى:

نوع المساعدة	القيمة	مقدم المساعدة (المصدر)	مدى الرضى
المساعدة الأولى:	_____	_____	1. راض جدا 2. راض 3. غير راض 4. غير راض مطلقا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا اعرف/ لا جواب
88. لا ينطبق 99. لا اعرف/ لا جواب	0. ليس لها قيمة 1. قيمة غير مالية 2. لا اعرف/ لا جواب 8. لا ينطبق	88. لا ينطبق 99. لا اعرف/ لا جواب	
Q42aa:	Q42ab:	Q42ac:	Q42ad:

### المساعدة الثانية:

نوع المساعدة	القيمة	مقدم المساعدة (المصدر)	مدى الرضى
المساعدة الثانية:	_____	_____	1. راض جدا 2. راض 3. غير راض 4. غير راض مطلقا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا اعرف/ لا جواب
88. لا ينطبق 99. لا اعرف/ لا جواب	0. ليس لها قيمة 1. قيمة غير مالية 2. لا اعرف/ لا جواب 8. لا ينطبق	88. لا ينطبق 99. لا اعرف/ لا جواب	
Q42ba:	Q42bb:	Q42bc:	Q42bd:

Q43:	<p>43. بشكل عام، كيف تقيم المساعدة التي توفرت لك وعائلتك في السنة أشهر الماضية من قبل مختلف المنظمات والهيئات؟</p> <p>1. راض جدا (انتقل إلى سؤال 45) 2. راض (انتقل إلى سؤال 45) 3. غير راض 4. مطلقا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	<p>44. إذا ما كنت غير راض أو مطلقا ما هو السبب الرئيسي لعدم رضاك؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط الأهم)</p> <p>1. بسبب الكمية 2. بسبب النوعية 3. عدد المرات التي تم فيها تقديم هذه المساعدة 4. غيرها حدد 88. لا ينطبق 99. لا اعرف/ لا جواب</p>
Q44:	<p>45. ماذا عن المساعدات الغذائية، هل تم توفرها؟</p> <p>1. كل شهر 2. ثلاث مرات في خلال السنة أشهر الماضية 3. مرتين في خلال السنة أشهر الماضية 4. مرة واحدة في خلال السنة أشهر الماضية 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا اعرف/ لا جواب</p>	
Q45:		



## February 2004 Surveys

Q46:	<p>1. منظمة 2. منظمة الى حد ما 3. تطبيقها سيئ 8. لا يطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	46. ماذا بالنسبة لتعالية توزيع الغذاء، هل كانت:
Q47:	<p>1. في توفير بعض القود لشراء سلع غذائية اخرى 2. في توفير المال لشراء مواد اساسية اخرى 3. توفير بعض المقتنيات التي كان من الممكن ان يتبعها في حالة عدم استلام هذه المساعدة الغذائية 8. لا يطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	47. إذا ما تسلمت اسرتك مساعدة غذائية، هل ساهمت واساعدت هذه المساعدة:
Q48:	<p>1. تصل هذه المساعدات أساساً للمحتاجين 2. تصل هذه المساعدات أساساً للمحتاجين لكن بعض الناس غير المحتاجين يتسلمونها ايضاً 3. بشكل عام يتم توزيع المساعدات الغذائية بدون تفرقة بين المحتاج وغير المحتاج 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	48. ما هو رأيك في نقة اورجاعة استهداف القطاعات المحتاجة من ناحية المساعدات الغذائية في مجتمعك المحلي؟ لأي مدى يمكنك القول انها تصل للقطاعات المحتاجة:
Q49:	<p>1. نعم 2. لا 3. لست متأكدًا 4. لقد استلمت مساعدات 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	49. عند النظر للمساعدة بشكل عام، اذا لم تسلم انت وعائلتك أية مساعدة، هل يمكنك القول انك بحاجة الى مساعدة؟

50. من بين الاحتياجات التالية، ما هي برأيك اهم احتياجات لعائلتك:

الاحتياج الاول	الاحتياج الثاني
<p>1. التشغيل 2. الغذاء 3. الصحة 4. المساعدة المالية 5. الاسكان وإعادة الاسكان 6. التعليم</p>	<p>1. التشغيل 2. الغذاء 3. الصحة 4. المساعدة المالية 5. الاسكان وإعادة الاسكان 6. التعليم</p>
Q50a:	Q50b:

Q51:	<p>1. التشغيل 2. الغذاء 3. الصحة 4. المساعدة المالية 5. الاسكان وإعادة الاسكان 6. التعليم</p>	51. أختين بعين الاعتبار الاحتياجات التي لم تلبي قط (الاحتياجات لم تصلك من خلال المساعدات) ، ما هي برأيك اهم هذه الاحتياجات لأسرتك:
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52. ماذا بالنسبة للمجتمع المحلي الذي تعيش فيه انكر الاحتياجات الرئيسية الاكثر اهمية؟

الاحتياج الاول	الاحتياج الثاني
<p>1. التشغيل 2. الغذاء 3. الصحة 4. المساعدة المالية 5. الاسكان وإعادة الاسكان 6. التعليم</p>	<p>1. التشغيل 2. الغذاء 3. الصحة 4. المساعدة المالية 5. الاسكان وإعادة الاسكان 6. التعليم</p>
Q52a:	Q52b:

Q53:	<p>1. تعتمد الأسرة بشكل أساسي على مساعدات الإغاثة 2. تعتمد الأسرة بشكل أساسي على الدعم من العائلة الممتدة 3. تعتمد الأسرة بشكل أساسي على دخلها الذاتي من أجل الغذاء 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>	53. ما هو المصدر الرئيسي للغذاء لأسرتك؟
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54. بالنسبة للغذاء، ما هي أكثر مادتين غذائيتين يحتاجهما منزلك أكثر؟

المادة الغذائية الاولى	المادة الغذائية الثانية
<p>1. غذاء الأطفال 2. السلع الرئيسية، الطحين، السكر، عسل، بازلاء، أرز، زيت 3. الحليب ومشتقاته 4. المعليات 5. الفاكهة والخضار 6. اللحم والدجاج</p>	<p>1. غذاء الأطفال 2. السلع الرئيسية، الطحين، السكر، عسل، بازلاء، أرز، زيت 3. الحليب ومشتقاته 4. المعليات 5. الفاكهة والخضار 6. اللحم والدجاج</p>
Q54a:	Q54b:

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

55. في إطار مجتمعك المحلي، ما هما أمرين برأيكم ضروريان لمجتمعك المحلي ؟

المرفق الثاني	المرفق الأول
1. شبكة المياه 2. شبكة الكهرباء 3. نظام التخلص من المياه العادمة 4. خدمة تصريف النفايات الصلبة 5. شبكة خطة الهاتف الأرضي 6. شبكة الهاتف الثابتة 7. الإنترنت (ربط دائم) 8. محطة التلفاز الفضائية (ساتلايت)	1. شبكة المياه 2. شبكة الكهرباء 3. نظام التخلص من المياه العادمة 4. خدمة تصريف النفايات الصلبة 5. شبكة خطة الهاتف الأرضي 6. شبكة الهاتف الثابتة 7. الإنترنت (ربط دائم) 8. محطة التلفاز الفضائية (ساتلايت)
<b>Q55b:</b>	<b>Q55a:</b>

<b>Q56:</b>	1. المبلغ _____ شاق 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	56. كم من المال تشعر ان عائلتك تحتاج كل شهر من أجل ان تستطيع تلبية الاحتياجات الأساسية؟
<b>Q57:</b>	1. أعلى بكثير من هذا الرقم 2. أعلى بقليل من هذا الرقم 3. تقريبا نفس الشيء 4. أقل بقليل من هذا الرقم 5. أقل بكثير من هذا الرقم 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	57. لأي مدى يمكنك القول أن دخل أسرته قريب من هذا الرقم اليوم؟

<b>Q58:</b>	1. فقدان الوظيفة 2. فقدان ساعات عمل 3. الحاق الإذى بالمشروع التجاري، الأرض الزراعية 4. اعتقال أحد أفراد الأسرة 5. مشاكل صحية 6. زيادة أسعار المدخلات والمواصلات 7. غير ذلك حدد _____ 8. لم يتناقص دخل الأسرة 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	58. إذا ما حصل تناقص في دخل أسرته في السنة شهر الماضية ما هي أهم سبب لهذا التغيير في دخل الأسرة؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط الأهم)
<b>Q59:</b>	1. أستطيع الصمود بغض النظر عن طول المدة 2. لحوالي عام واحد 3. لعدة أشهر 4. بالكاد نستطيع تدبير أمورنا 5. نحن نعاني من وضع خطير ولا نعرف كيف نعالج 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	59. ما هي المدة الزمنية التي تعتقد أنك تستطيع الصمود فيها ماديا في المستقبل؟

60. هل تقوم أسرته بأي من الأمور التالية من أجل الصمود في وجه المصنة؟

<b>Q60a:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60b:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60c:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60d:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60e:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60f:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60g:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60h:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60i:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60j:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				
<b>Q60k:</b>	9. لا أعرف/لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم				

<b>Q61:</b>	1. استراتيجيات وامكانيات التأقلم (تخفيف المعاناة) ما زالت متوفرة 2. استراتيجيات التأقلم (تخفيف المعاناة) سيتم استغلالها قريباً 3. تم استغلال هذه الاستراتيجيات 4. لم تتوفر أي من هذه الاستراتيجيات منذ البداية 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	61. من بين الاستراتيجيات (الطرق والامكانيات) المذكورة أعلاه لتخفيف المعاناة على العائلة، هل يمكنك القول أن هذه الاستراتيجيات ما تزال تتبع (تستخدم) من قبل أسرته، أم سيتم استغلالها قريباً، أم تم استغلالها، أم انها لم تكن متوفرة أصلاً ؟
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## February 2004 Surveys

62. من بين السلع التالية هل لزداد الاستهلاك، أم نقص أم بقي كما هو خلال السنة الماضية؟

Q62a:	1. ازداد	2. نقص	3. بقي كما هو	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q62b:	1. ازداد	2. نقص	3. بقي كما هو	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q62c:	1. ازداد	2. نقص	3. بقي كما هو	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q62d:	1. ازداد	2. نقص	3. بقي كما هو	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
Q62e:	1. ازداد	2. نقص	3. بقي كما هو	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب

Q63:	63. على كم وجبة غذائية تحصل عليها يومياً؟ _____ وجبة في اليوم الواحد	9) لا أعرف / لا جواب
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64. في حال استفاد أحد أفراد أسرته من الخدمات التالية خلال السنة أشهر الماضية، الرجاء أن تذكر إذا ما كنت راضٍ أو غير راضٍ عن الخدمة ومن هي الجهة التي وفرت هذه الخدمة؟  
أ. المستشفى

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راضٍ
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راضٍ
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64ab:	Q64aa:

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راضٍ
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راضٍ
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64bb:	Q64ba:

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راضٍ
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راضٍ
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64cb:	Q64ca:

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

### د. إعادة تأهيل جسدية

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد)	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
<b>Q64db:</b>	<b>Q64da:</b>

### هـ. الرعاية المخصصة

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد)	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
<b>Q64eb:</b>	<b>Q64ea:</b>

### و. سيارة الإسعاف

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد)	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
<b>Q64fb:</b>	<b>Q64fa:</b>

### ز. المدرسة

اسم موفر الخدمة:	مدى الرضى
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد)	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
<b>Q64jb:</b>	<b>Q64ja:</b>

## February 2004 Surveys

Q64jb:	Q64ja:
<b>اسم موافق الخدمة:</b>	<b>ح. حصص الغذاء</b>
<b>مدى الرضى</b>	<b>مدى الرضى</b>
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64kb:	Q64ka:
<b>اسم موافق الخدمة:</b>	<b>ط. مساعدة تشغيل</b>
<b>مدى الرضى</b>	<b>مدى الرضى</b>
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64Lb:	Q64La:
<b>اسم موافق الخدمة:</b>	<b>ي. مساعدة مالية</b>
<b>مدى الرضى</b>	<b>مدى الرضى</b>
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
Q64mb:	Q64ma:
<b>اسم موافق الخدمة:</b>	<b>مدى الرضى</b>
1. مؤسسة من مؤسسات السلطة الوطنية الفلسطينية	1. راض
2. منظمة إسلامية	2. غير راض
3. منظمة غير حكومية محلية	8. لم يستفيد
4. حكومة عربية	9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
5. منظمة عربية	
6. الأورو	
7. اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر	
8. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	
9. منظمة دولية أخرى	
10. أخرى (حدد) _____	
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	
<b>Q65:</b>	<p>65. هل حصلت على أية مساعدة لتغطية النفقات الطبية؟ (جابه واحدة فقط)</p> <p>1. نعم، من خلال نظام التأمين الصحي الحكومي</p> <p>2. نعم، من خلال الأورو</p> <p>3. نعم، من خلال تأمين صحي خاص</p> <p>4. نعم، من خلال مطاعم خيرية</p> <p>5. لا، نغطي نفقاتنا الطبية من مواردها</p> <p>6. لا، تأمرنا بدفع النفقات الطبية لأسباب مادية</p> <p>9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</p>
<b>Q66a:</b>	66. هل يتلقى بنك الخدمات التالية:
<b>Q66b:</b>	1. شبكة مياه
<b>Q66c:</b>	2. شبكة كهرباء
<b>Q66d:</b>	3. نظام التخلص من المياه العادمة
<b>Q66e:</b>	4. خدمة تصريف الفضلات الصلبة
<b>Q66f:</b>	5. شبكة خط هاتف أرضي
<b>Q66g:</b>	6. شبكة الهاتف النقالة
<b>Q66h:</b>	7. الإنترنت (ربط دائم)
<b>Q66i:</b>	8. محطة التناز الكهروضوئية (مستأثرت)

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

66. هل يتلقى بنك الخدمات التالية:			
Q66a:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66b:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66c:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66d:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66e:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66f:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66g:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
Q66h:	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	2. لا	1. نعم
67. هل أنت مربوط بشبكة مياه			
Q67:	1. نعم (انتقل إلى سؤال 68) 2. لا		
Q67a:	_____ لتر في اليوم	67-1 إذا لم تكن مربوط في شبكة مياه، كم لتر مياه تجلب (تحمض) للعائلة في اليوم؟	
Q67b:	متى _____ لتر كمياه للشرب	67-2 كم لتر تجلب (تحمض) للعائلة في اليوم كمياه للشرب؟	
Q68:	1. تقريبا مستحيل 2. صعب جدا 3. صعب 4. ليس صعبا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	68. خلال السنة الشهر الماضية هل كان باستطاعتك أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك الذهاب إلى المدرسة أو الجامعة؟	
Q69:	1. ولا مرة أو تقريبا ولا مرة 2. أقل من 10 مرات في الشهر 3. عشر مرات أو أكثر في الشهر 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	69. خلال السنة أشهر الماضية بالمعدل ما عدد المرات التي لم يتمكن أو لادك من الوصول إلى المدارس أو وصلوا إلى المدرسة متأخرين، بسبب نظام منع التجول أو الإغلاق؟	
Q70:	1. ولا مرة أو تقريبا ولا مرة 2. أقل من 10 مرات في الشهر 3. عشر مرات أو أكثر في الشهر 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	70. خلال السنة أشهر الماضية بالمعدل ما عدد المرات التي لم يتمكن المدرس المعتمد من تدريس أطفالك في المدرسة بسبب عدم وصوله إلى المدرسة بسبب نظام منع التجول أو الإغلاق؟	
Q71:	1. تقريبا مستحيل 2. صعب جدا 3. صعب 4. ليس صعبا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	71. خلال السنة أشهر الماضية هل كان باستطاعتك أنت أو أفراد أسرتك الذهاب إلى العمل؟	
Q72:	1. تقريبا مستحيل 2. صعب جدا 3. صعب 4. ليس صعبا 8. لا ينطبق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	72. خلال السنة أشهر الماضية هل تمكنت أنت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك من فلاحه الأرض؟	
Q73:	1. لا يوجد 2. إصلاح السلطة الفلسطينية يجب أن يكون الأولوية 3. إصلاح السلطة الفلسطينية يجب التعامل معه بعد الاستقلال 4. لا يوجد حاجة لإصلاح السلطة الفلسطينية 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	73. البعض يقولون أن إصلاح السلطة الفلسطينية يجب أن يكون الأولوية القصوى، والبعض الآخر يقول أنه يجب التعامل مع إصلاح السلطة الفلسطينية بعد الاستقلال ؟ ما رأيك؟	
Q74:	1. لا يوجد 2. قلة الموارد المالية 3. الأربابنة - معاناة الأثريين (مساعدة الأثريين موطفي السلطة) 4. عدم الفعالية وسوء الإدارة 5. عدم القدرة على التعامل مع المشاكل الأمنية الداخلية 6. عدم القدرة على المحافظة على النظام العام 7. عدم وجود ديمقراطية 8. عدم وجود شفافية ومسائلة 9. عدم وجود حقوق إنسان 10. عدم القدرة على التعامل مع الأسلحة غير المرخصة 11. الفساد بشكل عام 99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	74. عند النظر إلى السلطة الفلسطينية، ما هو الموضوع الذي يفتكك أكثر: (اجابة واحدة فقط الامم)	

## February 2004 Surveys

75. الرجاء أن تذكر هل توافق أم تعارض مع المقولات التالية:					
Q75a:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75b:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75c:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75d:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75e:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75f:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75g:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75h:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q75i:	1. أوافق بشدة	2. أوافق	3. أعارض	4. أعارض بشدة	9. لا جواب
Q76:	88. لا أتق بأحد 99. لا أعرف / لا جواب				76. ما هو التنظيم السياسي أو الديني الذي تتق به أكثر؟ (لا تقرأ أية أسماء)
Q77:	88. لا أتق بأحد (النقل إلى سؤال 78) 99. لا أعرف / لا جواب (النقل إلى سؤال 78)				77. من هي الشخصية السياسية أو الدينية التي تتق بها أكثر؟ (لا تقرأ أية أسماء)
Q78:	1. فتح 2. حماس 3. الجهاد الإسلامي 4. الجبهة الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين 5. الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين 6. فدا 7. حزب الشعب 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب				78. إذا كنت لا تتق بأي فصيل سياسي أو ديني، هل يمكنك أن تذكر أي فصيل من الفصائل التالية تتق بها أكثر من بقية الفصائل؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)
Q79:	اسم التولدة 99. لا أعرف / لا جواب				79. في حالة أعطيت الفرصة لاختيار نظام الحكم الذي تود أن تراه في فلسطين، أي دولة في العالم تراه أقرب إلى اختيارك؟
Q80:	1. راديو فلسطين 2. تلفزيون فلسطين 3. جريدة القدس 4. جريدة الأيام 5. جريدة الحياة الجديدة 6. الجامع/القناة الثمينين 7. الفصيل السياسي/الديني الذي أتق به أكثر 8. الأصدقاء والأقارب 9. قناة الجزيرة 10. العربية 11. أبو ظبي 12. المنار 13. الحرة 14. أخرى حدد 99. لا أعرف / لا جواب				80. ما هو أهم مصدر للمعلومات تتق به أكثر؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)
Q81:	1. نعم 2. لا 3. لا شاهدها/ لم اسمع بها 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب				81. هل تعتقد أن تلفزيون الحرة هدفه إرساخ الديمقراطية في العالم العربي؟
Q82:	1. أوضاع اللاجئين أصعب للغاية 2. أوضاع اللاجئين أصعب بقليل 3. لا يوجد فرق حقيقي 4. أوضاع اللاجئين أفضل قليلا 5. أوضاع اللاجئين أفضل كثيرا 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب				82. كيف يمكنك أن تقارن بين الأوضاع المعيشية للاجئين وغير اللاجئين في إطار الانتفاضة؟
Q83:	1. يتسلم اللاجئون مساعدات أكثر 2. لا يوجد فرق حقيقي 3. يتسلم غير اللاجئين مساعدات أكثر 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب				83. كيف يمكنك أن تقارن بين المساعدات التي يتسلمها اللاجئ وغير اللاجئ في إطار الانتفاضة؟

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Q84:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. خدمات إغاثة</li> <li>2. خدمات إعادة تأهيل للبيئة التحتية</li> <li>3. خدمات توليد دخل أو خلق فرص عمل</li> <li>4. خدمات تعليمية</li> <li>5. خدمات صحية</li> <li>6. لا تحتاج مخيمات اللاجئين إلى خدمات إضافية</li> <li>9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</li> </ol>	84. ما هو نوع الخدمات الإضافية التي يجب أن تتسلمها (ولا المخيمات أو المناطق التي يسكنها لاجئين)؟				
Q85:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. يجب المحافظة على الأوتروا لغاية إعلان الدولة الفلسطينية</li> <li>2. يجب المحافظة على الأوتروا لغاية حل مشكلة اللاجئين</li> <li>3. يجب تفكيك الأوتروا و تحويل موارثها المالية الى الدول المضيفة أو السلطة الفلسطينية</li> <li>9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب</li> </ol>	85. كيف ترى مستقبل الأوتروا؟				
86. إذا ما كنت مطلعاً على هذه المنظمات، ما هو تقييمك لكل منها؟						
Q86a:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	1. الأوتروا - وكالة العوت
Q86b:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	2. برنامج الأمم المتحدة الاغاثي
Q86c:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	3. صندوق النقد الدولي
Q86d:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	4. الاتحاد الأوروبي
Q86e:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	5. البنك الدولي
Q86f:	5. غير راض	4. غير راض نوعاً ما	3. محايد	2. راض نوعاً ما	1. راض	6. البنك الاسلامي للتنمية
Q87:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. مؤسسة سياسية ذات دور في الترويج للقانون الدولي والعلاقات الجيدة بين الدول.</li> <li>2. مؤسسة مالية تقرر المال للطعام الخاص الفلسطيني</li> <li>3. مؤسسة توفر المساعدة المالية والفنية إلى السلطة الفلسطينية</li> <li>4. منظمة غير حكومية ممولة من قبل الحكومات الأجنبية</li> <li>5. مزود للخدمات الاجتماعية إلى الفلسطينيين</li> <li>9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>					87. تركز الأسئلة التالية تحديداً على البنك الدولي الذي كان نشطاً في المناطق الفلسطينية لمدة عشر أعوام. برأيك، أي من الجمل التالية تصف البنك الدولي بشكل أكثر دقة: (اجابة واحدة فقط)
Q88:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. مصدر عام للمعلومات الموثوقة حول الوضع الاقتصادي في المناطق الفلسطينية</li> <li>2. المساعدة في تطوير استراتيجيات وسياسات ومؤسسات اقتصادية فلسطينية سليمة</li> <li>3. مصدر للمساعدة الفنية والمالية لتوفير الخدمات الأساسية للطوائف الأكثر احتياجاً.</li> <li>4. وسيط بين مجموعات المصالح الاقتصادية الفلسطينية والإسرائيلية</li> <li>5. مصدر لتطوير البنية التحتية المادية في الضفة الغربية وعزة</li> <li>6. غير هاء الرجاء إن تحدد _____</li> <li>9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>					88. ما هو، برأيك، الدور الأكثر إفادة الذي يمكن أن يلعبه البنك الدولي في برنامج في الضفة الغربية وعزة؟ (اجابة واحدة فقط)
Q89:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. المشاكل الاقتصادية</li> <li>2. الفقر</li> <li>3. التعليم</li> <li>4. الصحة</li> <li>5. الحكومة والحكم</li> <li>6. البنية التحتية</li> <li>7. البيئة</li> <li>8. قيود على الحركة</li> <li>9. لنص السلام مع إسرائيل</li> <li>10. غير هاء الرجاء أن تحدد _____</li> <li>99. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>					89. ما هو، برأيك، القطاع الضعيف التي تشكل معظم المشاكل بالنسبة للفلسطينيين هذه الأيام: (اجابة واحدة فقط)



## February 2004 Surveys

90. الرجاء ان تختار من الثلاثة أهم قضيتين من ناحية الأولوية التنموية التي تواجه الشعب الفلسطيني اليوم:

القضية الثانية	القضية الأولى
1. النمو الاقتصادي	1. النمو الاقتصادي
2. خلق فرص عمل	2. خلق فرص عمل
3. جذب الاستثمار للقطاع الخاص	3. جذب الاستثمار للقطاع الخاص
4. تعزيز القطاع الزراعي	4. تعزيز القطاع الزراعي
5. تعزيز القطاع المالي	5. تعزيز القطاع المالي
6. تخفيف الفقر	6. تخفيف الفقر
7. تحسين التعليم	7. تحسين التعليم
8. تخفيف الفساد وتحسين الحكم	8. تخفيف الفساد وتحسين الحكم
9. تنمية البنية التحتية	9. تنمية البنية التحتية
10. تعزيز المجتمع المدني	10. تعزيز المجتمع المدني
11. حماية البيئة	11. حماية البيئة
12. الصحة	12. الصحة
13. غيرها	13. غيرها
99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب
<b>Q90b:</b>	<b>Q90a:</b>

<p>Q91:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. على الأقل مرة واحدة في الأسبوع</li> <li>2. على الأقل مرة واحدة في الشهر</li> <li>3. على الأقل مرة واحدة خلال بضعة أشهر</li> <li>4. على الأقل مرة واحدة في السنة</li> <li>5. على الأقل مرة واحدة في آخر خمس أعوام</li> <li>6. بناتنا لم نشاهد أو نسمع أو نقرأ عن البنك الدولي</li> <li>9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>91. كم مرة تشاهد أو تسمع أو تقرأ تحديثاً عن البنك الدولي؟</p>
<p>Q92:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. الصحف</li> <li>2. التلفزيون</li> <li>3. الإنترنت</li> <li>4. إصدارات البنك الدولي</li> <li>5. صفحة البنك الدولي على الإنترنت</li> <li>6. منظمات غير حكومية</li> <li>7. السلطة الفلسطينية</li> <li>8. غيرها حدد</li> <li>9. لا أعرف / لا جواب</li> </ol>	<p>92. إذا ما سمعت أو قرأت شيئاً عن البنك الدولي في العام الماضي - ما هو مصدر معلوماتك حول البنك الدولي؟ <b>(إجابة واحدة فقط)</b></p>

93. عند القيام بنشاطاتها في الضفة الغربية وعزقة إلى أي مدى تعتقد أن استقلالية البنك الدولي معرضة للضغط من أي من التالية:

	1. السلطة الفلسطينية	1. ضغط جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي جدا	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93a:</b>	2. الولايات المتحدة	1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93b:</b>	3. إسرائيل	1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93c:</b>	4. صندوق النقد الدولي	1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93d:</b>	5. الاتحاد الأوروبي	1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93e:</b>	6. المنظمات غير الحكومية	1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب
<b>Q93f:</b>		1. ضغط ايجابي جدا	2. ضغط ايجابي	3. لا يوجد	4. ضغط سلبي نوعاً ما	5. ضغط سلبي جدا	9. لا أعرف / لا جواب

94. برأيك، ما هي الفضل منظمين من ناحية الأداء من مجموع هذه المنظمات والجهات المانحة:

أول الفضل أداء	ثاني الفضل أداء
1. الأونروا - وكالة الغوث	1. الأونروا - وكالة الغوث
2. اليونيسف	2. اليونيسف
3. برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإغاثي	3. برنامج الأمم المتحدة الإغاثي
4. برنامج الغذاء العالمي	4. برنامج الغذاء العالمي
5. منظمة الصحة العالمية	5. منظمة الصحة العالمية
6. البنك الدولي	6. البنك الدولي
7. الوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية الدولية	7. الوكالة الأمريكية للتنمية الدولية
8. المفوضية الأوروبية	8. المفوضية الأوروبية
<b>Q94a:</b>	<b>Q94b:</b>

## Palestinian Public Perceptions - Report VII

Q95:	1. ذكر 2. أنثى	95. الجنس:
Q96:	سنة 888. لا جواب	96. العمر:
Q97:	1. مدينة 2. قرية 3. مخيم لاجئين	97. هل تسكن في:
Q98:	1. جنين 2. طوبا 3. نابلس 4. سلفيت	98. مكان الإقامة (المحافظة):
	5. فقهية 6. طوك 7. رام الله 8. القدس	
	9. اربعا 10. رم 11. الخليل 12. شمال غزة	
	13. مدينة غزة 14. رفح 15. دير البلح 16. خان يونس	
Q99:	1. نعم 2. لا 9. لا أعرف / لا جواب	99. هل هاجر مؤخراً أي من أفراد عائلتك المقربين (سكان منزلك) إذا كان الجواب نعم، إلى أين كانت الهجرة؟
Q100:	1. نعم (انتقل إلى سؤال 1-100) 2. نعم لكن لا أستطيع (انتقل إلى سؤال 1-100) 3. ربما لاحقاً 4. لا أفكر في الهجرة مطلقاً 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	100. هل تفكر شخصياً في الهجرة؟
Q100a:	اسم البلد _____	1-100. اسم البلد؟
Q101:	1. أمي 2. حتى الابتدائي 3. حتى الإعدادي 4. حتى الثانوي 5. بعض جامعي 6. جامعي فما فوق 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	101. المستوى التعليمي:
Q102:	1. أحسن حالا من الناس في مجتمعي 2. مثل الناس في مجتمعي 3. أسوأ من الناس في مجتمعي 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	102. من ناحية مادية كيف تعتبر نفسك وأسررتك؟
Q103:	1. 5000 شاقق فما فوق 2. بين 4500 - 4999 3. بين 4000 - 4499 4. بين 3500 - 3999 5. بين 3000 - 3499 6. بين 2500 - 2999 7. بين 2000 - 2499 8. بين 1500 - 1999 9. بين 1000 - 1499 10. بين 500 - 999 11. أقل من 500 شاقق 99. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	103. ما هو دخل أسرتك الشهري؟
Q104:	1. أعزب 2. متزوج 3. مطلق 4. أرمل 9. لا جواب	104. الحالة الاجتماعية:
Q105:	1. نعم تمتلك عائتي أرض منذ أكثر من 10 سنوات 2. نعم اشترت عائتي أرض خلال 10 سنوات الماضية 3. نستأجر أرض 4. لا تمتلك أو نستأجر أرض 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	105. هل تمتلك أو تستأجر أرض؟
Q106:	1. المعيل الرئيسي للأسرة 2. لست المعيل الرئيسي لكنني أحبب دخل إلى الأسرة 3. لا أحبب دخل إلى الأسرة 9. لا أعرف/ لا جواب	106. هل أنت:



