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The Fragile States Debate

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**Considering ways and means
to achieve stronger statehood**

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Seeking out the State: Fragile States and International Governance

Keith KRAUSE / Oliver JÜTERSONKE¹

The concept of fragile or failing states has become an integral part of the vocabulary of liberal internationalism. Incorporating both the institutional dimension of state collapse and the functional dimension of state failure, the narrative of fragility places the accent on the social and political realities of the state-building process. The language of fragile states highlights the dynamic nature of governance, and the challenges posed to the international community in promoting peace and security. Of interest are the role of external actors and spoilers within the context of fragile states, as well as attempts to devise ways of assessing the risk that a particular state will 'fail'.

Introduction

Although far from being a new phenomenon, the notion of state 'fragility,' 'failure' or 'collapse' has received increased attention in the past two decades. No longer supported by one (or both) of the superpowers, many former 'proxy allies' in the post-colonial world have found themselves cut off from economic and military support, often with the burden of having to deal with long-standing and unresolved grievances from suppressed parts of the population calling for self-determination or greater social and political recognition and economic justice.

The result has been the apparent inability of numerous regimes to maintain 'empirical' statehood and to function as viable state apparatuses. For many observers, the future for such states looked bleak; the pessimistic tone was well captured in an influential article published in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1994 by Robert Kaplan, entitled "The Coming Anarchy." In a dystopic twist on Karl Marx, Kaplan presented a vision of future chaos resulting from the withering away of the central governments of modern states, in favour of tribal domains, "city-states, shanty-states, [and] nebulous and anarchic regionalisms."² At the same time, Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner popularized

the concept of "failed states" in an article in *Foreign Policy*.³

The concept of fragile or failing states has subsequently become an integral part of the vocabulary of contemporary liberal internationalism. Beyond questions about state capacity, claims to 'sovereignty' or 'statehood' are no longer inherently given, but are increasingly based on meeting certain (seldom explicit) standards of performance. Statehood has to be continuously 'earned'. One prominent example of this is the emergence of the language of a "responsibility to protect:" states are deemed to have a duty to protect individuals on their territories against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.⁴ The normative judgement that a state is 'strong' is no longer exclusively tied to its military might or economic power, but to standards of good governance: a strong state is one that not only has control over the legitimate means of force,

1 Professor and Research Coordinator, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva

2 Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), digital edition: www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/anarchy.htm. 1-32.

3 Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, No. 89 (Winter, 1992-1993), 3-20. However, as John Rapley recently pointed out in an article entitled "The New Middle Ages", not all cases in which private actors assume some of the functions of the state involve failure or chaos – Jamaican communities controlled by gangs involved in drug-trafficking are among the safest in the country. John Rapley, "The New Middle Ages," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 3 (May/June 2006), 95-103.

4 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).

but also fulfils its internal obligations – and thus, in turn, also possesses the authority to judge, as part of the international community, the performance of other states.

The current discourse on ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states thus contains two (often implicit) definitions or benchmarks. The first concerns the ‘stateness’ against which any given state should be measured (the institutional dimension of state collapse), and the other concerns the normative and practical implications of such a failure (the functional dimension of state failure). In practice, state collapse is a rare phenomenon, but the failure of a state to fulfil its core functions, and its consequent political, social and/or economic fragility, are much more common.

Often, concern over the possibility of state failure has as much to do with dashed expectations about the achievement of modern statehood, or about the functions that states should fulfil, as it does with the empirically-observed decomposition or collapse of the institutions of governance. This is illustrated by the US National Security Strategy of September 2002, which argues that the United States is now less threatened by conquering states than it is by failing ones.⁵ Today, rules of engagement with non-state armed groups as well as guidelines for intervention for humanitarian purposes are intricately linked to the discourse on ‘failed states’.

For obvious reasons, the somewhat crude and normatively-laden terminology of state failure has led many experts, in particular those within the development community, to work for a more sophisticated understanding of states and the process of state-building. Not only is the notion of functional state ‘failure’ often misleading (one may think of the well-oiled genocidal machinery that kept functioning in Cambodia or Rwanda), but the negative connotation of ‘weak,’ ‘failing,’ ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states is also not conducive to the efforts of the international community in aiding states in transition or those recovering from conflict. USAID, DFID (UK), the OECD, the World Bank, and a host of other actors have thus adopted the notion of ‘fragile’ states, understood to encompass

a phenomenon that can take on a variety of forms and levels of intensity. Indeed, a number of attempts have recently been made to draw up indicators and indexes that measure states’ degrees of vulnerability, some of which will be discussed below.

Of course, one need only study the current situation in Afghanistan or Iraq to demonstrate that the move towards the vocabulary of ‘fragile states’ does not automatically resolve the key issues of state-building, neither conceptually nor practically. Yet, following Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand’s title “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better?,”⁶ a deeper and more sophisticated recognition of the challenges faced by states, and by the international community, seems a necessary first step in the process.

Legitimacy and the Core Functions of the State

In order to think constructively about the challenges of state-building and fragile states, it is useful to situate contemporary statehood in a broader perspective. The discourse of statehood, as it developed through the process of state formation in Western Europe, revolves around three intertwined narratives of the state that encapsulate its core functions of providing security from internal and external threats, promoting welfare and wealth, and representing the political aspirations and ideals of the populations residing on its territory.⁷ These three functions – security, welfare and representation – are all rooted in an understanding of a stable domestic order that emerges from some sort of social contract between states and their citizens.

⁵ President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.

⁶ Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, “Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict’ Change in Afghanistan,” in Jennifer Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 131-155. “Try again, fail better” is from Samuel Beckett’s *Worstward Ho* (London: Calder, 1983), 7.

⁷ For an elaboration see Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,” in Milliken (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*, 1-21; as well as the special section of *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 2005), edited by Oliver Jütersonke and Rolf Schwarz. Cf. also Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

They are also the central variables for testing a state's performance, and the foundation for a regime's legitimacy. Understanding how these functions are linked in a continuum of social action, and recognizing how state-building is about maximizing possibilities while coping with the tensions inherent in the fulfilment of these functions, is crucial to grappling with the phenomenon of fragile states.

An example of the intricate relationship between these core functions of the state is the evolving understanding of the link between security and development in the international community. Arguably these represented the two main pillars of multilateral action, but until the early 1990s ideas about development and security were pursued in parallel but disconnected institutional and political structures. The commonly held view in economic and development circles was that development was a precondition for security, and that increased economic development would almost automatically reduce the incidence of conflict within – and potentially even between – states. Increasingly, however, it has been recognized that in a situation of scarcity, development assistance and relief are precious commodities; if wrongly distributed, they may reinforce social cleavages and (paradoxically) sow the seeds of conflict and insecurity, rather than alleviate them.⁸ More importantly, the development–security link is also being reversed, through the acknowledgment that the provision of basic security is often a precondition for political, social and economic development and well-being. Some noteworthy examples of this shift in thinking include the concept of 'security first,' the idea of 'sustainable disarmament for sustainable development,' and the focus on security sector reform (SSR) by major aid donors and international financial institutions.

Attempts at coming to terms simultaneously with all three functions can also generate serious tensions, however. As Mohammed Ayoub has argued, given that democracy is

8 See James K. Boyce, *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality After Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 351 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Deborah Maresko, "Development, Relief Aid, and Creating Peace: Humanitarian Aid in Liberia's War," *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6 (2004), 94-120.

ultimately about the competition for power, a rapid attempt to increase political voice and representation when the institutional foundations of the state and its ability to deliver security and welfare remain weak, can have pernicious effects on the state-building process.⁹ A further tension may exist between economic liberalization and structural reform, and the ability of the state to develop robust policy and service-delivery apparatus – particularly in situations where the imperatives of traditional patterns of rule (patronage or neo-patrimonialism) run directly opposite to the needs of state consolidation and long-term reconstruction. In such cases, meeting the combined needs of security, welfare and representation may require a piecemeal approach that is willing to defer advances in one sector temporarily for the sake of long-term stability. This choice is not politically or ethnically neutral, however.

The notion of 'fragile' states helps to capture these scenarios. In cases of transition and post-conflict states, performing all functions adequately in the short and medium-term may not be possible – the state will continue to 'fail' to fulfil some, if not all, of its functions. Focusing on fragility, however, puts the accent on the social and political realities of the state-building process. It emphasizes that state fragility is not an accidental situation, like a flood or an earthquake, but a process, and the result of a constellation of social, political and economic forces and pressures. A particular state may become more or less fragile with time, it may collapse into conflict but then re-emerge, perhaps in a different form. The language of fragile states highlights the dynamic nature of governance, and the challenges posed to the international community in promoting peace and security around the globe.

External Actors and Fragile States

Although not always officially or legally sanctioned, external involvement in state-building processes has been omnipresent, at the beginning of, during and after the heyday of the colonial project. It is nonetheless worth pointing out that the nature of involvement

9 Mohammed Ayoub, *The Third World Security Predicament* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

in the state-building project has changed dramatically from the colonial period to today. Colonial and Cold War intervention was often military and political in nature, and undertaken in the service of geopolitical interests of the great powers. Of course, this has not entirely disappeared, and one could argue that the current global war on terror is in part based on the recognition that the inability of weak states to meet the basic needs of their people creates the conditions for predation, the emergence of non-state armed groups, transnational organised crime, and terrorism.

Today, however, broader engagement with fragile states is often undertaken more for humanitarian or development purposes, although it remains part of a larger liberal internationalist project of promoting peace, (human) security and sustainable development worldwide.¹⁰ Usually grouped under the heading of 'peace support' or 'post-conflict peacebuilding,' such operations have become in many ways the core business of the international humanitarian and development community. Although forceful and non-coercive interventions during the violent phases of conflicts occupy most headlines, the crucial subsequent work of disarming and demobilizing ex-combatants, (re)building civil society institutions, creating conditions for economic and social development, and establishing political institutions to resolve and manage societal conflicts has become the mainstay of a large array of development and humanitarian nongovernmental actors, international institutions and national bodies.

The less interest-based nature of (some) of these interventions should not mask the dilemmas and paradoxes involved. All external involvement in local affairs rest upon a problematic relationship between external and local actors, and in some cases reflect what Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore called "institutional pathologies of international organisations."¹¹ This issue is

especially important when dealing with fragile states, where existential questions of survival for individuals, families or communities may be at stake. Indeed, policies and programmes in these contexts often request people to take on faith what for them are matters of life and death.

In all fragile state contexts, it is essential to understand how and why people are forced to rely on self-help measures – at the basic individual, family, or community levels – to protect their own security and well-being. Furthermore, it is crucial to comprehend under what circumstances they may have enough trust to work with external actors to help build political institutions that can provide for their security and well-being.

Any type of intervention, however, even the humanitarian variety, paradoxically can also weaken the very states and actors that it intends to promote. Usually armed with a cookie-cutter programmatic blueprint based on the most recent prior post-conflict scenario, the international community often runs the risk of not realizing that peacebuilding is ultimately about the reallocation of power among local actors. A 'quick-fix' mentality, over-reliance on the NGO model to attract funding, and the generally competitive nature of interactions among UN agencies and the donor community all tend to lead to a rather authoritarian wielding of political and economic power on the part of the interveners. In the eyes of the local population, international actors are thus often perceived as a party to the conflict, rather than an objective intermediary, and those local actors who depend on the international community for support can find their own legitimacy and credibility undermined.

The key principle that has emerged to guide the engagement of the international community working on state-building and fragile states is the international version of the Hippocratic oath: 'do no harm.'¹² This in no

10 Roland Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the 'Mission Civilisatrice'," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2002), 637-656.

11 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations," *International Organization*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999), 699-732. For examples from different issue areas see James Fergusson, *The Anti-*

Politics Machine (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989-1998* (New York: St. Martins, 1998); Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2000), 27-39; David Reiff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

12 Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can*

way implies that the international community is powerless to act, or should not intervene in order to let the organic (and often violent and predatory) state-formation process run its course. Acknowledging the challenges of state-building should not lead one to slide back into historicist fatalism of immutable historical tendencies or culturalist accounts of inevitably violent places, nor should it lead into a politics of withdrawal. Given the increasingly global nature of the world economy, close links between diaspora groups, and cross-border and regional economic and social interactions of every sort, there is no way not to be involved. Instead, the crucial question concerns the suitable basis on which policies and programmes to further state-building may best be implemented.

Spoilers and State Fragility

Of particular relevance to our understanding of fragile states, in particular in post-conflict settings, is the phenomenon of 'spoilers.' Often the least well understood aspect of the peacebuilding process, spoilers are actors who seek to undermine or delay a particular peace process, or any process that endeavours to strengthen the state apparatus. Expressed differently, spoilers are individuals or groups who have often contributed to the erosion of state institutions in the first place, and who benefit from the existence or perpetuation of a fragile state.

Perhaps the most influential work on spoilers to date, by Stephen John Stedman, has sought to make sense of the phenomenon of spoilers by elaborating on a typology in terms of their position (inside or outside an agreement), the number of spoilers, the type of spoiler (limited, greedy, or total), and locus of the spoiler problem (leader or followers, or both).¹³ By thus focusing on the elites involved in the negotiation and implementation of peace processes, the spoiler type becomes the independent variable in a causal mechanism determining success or failure of the process. Recently, Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major have argued that it may actually be the

other way round, namely that spoiler type does not determine the kinds of outcomes possible, but that the possible outcomes determine the type of spoiler that may emerge.¹⁴

In terms of policy recommendations, Greenhill and Major's approach suggests that the critical step in a peacemaking process should not be to define the type of spoiler one is confronted with, but rather to change "the decision calculus of active or potential spoilers by identifying (dis)incentives that can be put into place to discourage or forestall their emergence and the steps that can be taken to change the potential payoffs associated with cooperation versus confrontation."¹⁵

The debate concerning 'spoilers' highlights some of the difficult issues faced by those dealing with state-building in post-conflict settings, namely that fragility is created by someone (or some set of forces), and serves particular interests. It is the presence of spoilers (of all sorts) that makes state structures potentially fragile, but it is also this fragility that fosters spoilers. Any account of state fragility must therefore not only include the "devious objectives"¹⁶ of those parties who are in disagreement with the 'liberal' peace proposed, but also examine the whole range of actors who profit from the state's inability to fulfil its core functions of providing security, welfare and representation. In such situations, "unusual predatory economic opportunities abound: a market for protection services, illicit and destabilizing commerce, and aid manipulation."¹⁷ Moreover, certain actors such as warlords find their political base precisely in the insecurity and fear created by ineffective state organs. Rather than having

14 Kelly M. Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter 2006/07), 7-40.

15 *Ibid.*, 8.

16 Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, "Introduction. Obstacles to peace processes: Understanding spoiling", in Newman and Richmond (eds.), *Challenges to peacebuilding: Managing spoilers during conflict resolution* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006), 1-19, at 2.

17 Thomas G. Weiss and Peter J. Hoffman, "Making humanitarianism work," in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Making states work: State failure and the crisis of governance* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2005), 296-317, at 299.

Support Peace – or War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

13 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), 5-53, at 8.

a dispute with another party on a particular territory, these actors benefit from the power vacuum, and have no interest in a greater degree of formal governance structures. Another case would be organized criminal groups, such as drug cartels in Columbia, which are able to flourish precisely because the authorities are unable or unwilling to venture into the areas these groups effectively control.

In addition to the general lack of knowledge or insight into the motivations and strength of spoilers, the international community faces a commitment problem. The current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan amply illustrate that as long as local actors can resort to violence to increase the costs of the outside intervener, it is difficult to sustain a long-term commitment to reconstructing and strengthening state institutions. A real dilemma exists here: if an external commitment is linked to a fixed timeframe for exit, the victor will be the most patient party, willing to sit out the attempts by external actors to reshape the distribution of power and wealth. If, on the other hand, no exit timetables are set, one risks creating a dynamic of dependence, in which weak and vulnerable social actors depend for their security and well-being on external parties, more powerful parties manipulate and profit from the international presence, and the external parties become targets for disaffection and violence.

State Fragility and Early Warning

As the above discussion illustrates, there are potentially numerous paths to state fragility, and various forms this fragility can take on. It is this complexity that has led a number of think tanks, especially those close to donor governments, to attempt to devise ways of assessing the risk that a particular state will 'fail.' Yet it is also this same complexity that makes such efforts potentially controversial, both analytically and as a basis for sound policy-making.

Two such attempts at ranking state fragility have been launched by the Fund for Peace (in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and by the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The Fund

for Peace ranks countries "about to go over the brink" according to 12 "indicators of instability:" demographic pressures, refugees and displaced persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalised elites, and external intervention.¹⁸ In 2005, the Ivory Coast came out first with a total of 106 points. The CIFP's state fragility index is somewhat more sophisticated, in that it employs relative assessments based on a state's levels of authority, legitimacy and capacity, together with cluster-based summaries in the areas of governance, economics, security and crime, human development, demography, and environment. There is also a cross-cutting gender dimension. Burundi tops its list, with a fragility index of 8.25 (out of 10).¹⁹

A comparison of the two lists already reveals some of the problems with such attempts at creating indexes of fragile states. For a start, the two methods bring very different results. In the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index, for instance, North Korea ranks 13th and Venezuela 21st; both of these states are missing from the top forty fragile states in the CIFP index. But even along the same indicators, the scores were far from similar. Zimbabwe and Myanmar/Burma scored highly in the Failed States Index in terms of demographic pressures, for instance, whereas in the CIFP index, their demography scores were among the lowest.

The lack of convergence among these two indexes is troubling, even if by itself this does not call into question the overall utility of such an exercise. Much more work needs to be done in order to be sure that such indexes are capturing adequately capture the mechanisms and actors involved in the active process of making states fragile. Moreover, even if such indexes manage to give a reasonable picture of a state's fragility, they do so only by providing a retrospective (and often blurry) snapshot of a particular point in time. They do

18 Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, "The Failed States Index," *Foreign Policy*, Issue 149 (July/August 2005), 56-65.

19 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, *Failed and Fragile States 2006: A Briefing Note for the Canadian Government* (August 2006), available at <http://www.carleton.ca/cifp>

not yet help policy-makers determine whether a state is becoming more or less fragile, nor do they help identify key intervention points for policy-making. Policy and programming will require both a series of comparable measurements over time (the Fund for Peace has already published two lists, one in 2005, a second in 2006²⁰), and a more qualitative and contextual analysis of the key elements of state fragility at a given point in time.

A Difficult Set of Policy Choices

The idea that fragile states need to be strengthened goes to the heart of the social contract between states and their citizens that is the basis of the modern state. The discourse of statehood revolves around three core functions of providing security, welfare, and representation. Which one to prioritize in policy and programmatic terms, however, is not clear, and there is no consensus on “where to start.” Arguably, in post-conflict contexts, providing security is the primary duty that a state needs to fulfil for its citizens. It is the basic bargain evoked by Max Weber in his definition of the state as an organization that has the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence force. Yet when one asks people in Southern Sudan whether they are more or less secure today, their answer – yes – turns out to mean that they and their families are not starving, and that they enjoy greater “food security.” So the local understanding of what their basic needs are, and what they should expect from state institutions, is not always self-evident.

When we look closely at contemporary peace and security operations in places such as East Timor, Haiti, or Southern Sudan, and their two to four-year timeframes, we must also recognize that the international community is trying to telescope a process that took decades – in some cases even centuries – in more established states. Moreover, the process of creating domestic order and security was not completed without a great deal of violent struggle against predatory elites, the medieval equivalent of contemporary warlords, repressive and authoritarian rulers, and so forth. Similarly, the struggle to create

the conditions of the modern market economy – security of contract, respect for property rights, fair exchange – was not automatic or self-evident, and certainly involved a great deal of institutional innovation to guide the so-called “invisible hand” of the market. By attempting to break existing patterns of politics and forcing a reconstruction of social, economic and political relationships into a non-violent or non-coercive mode, the magnitude of the task that the international community is attempting in places such as Liberia, Afghanistan, and Kosovo is consequently enormous.

The menu of policy options that the international community possesses is vast, and includes such things as:

- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes (DDR)
- security sector reforms (SSR)
- truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and transitional justice arrangements
- democracy promotion efforts
- direct budget support to government departments
- NGO service delivery arrangements
- economic and structural adjustment reforms
- trade and investment liberalization agreements
- punitive and sanctions regimes

Most of these measures reach deep into the internal sovereignty and governance capacities of states, and attempt to reshape the relationship between states and their citizens.

As policies that the international community should promote to reverse state fragility, they also only make sense if one accepts that an externally-driven ‘social (re)engineering’ project can accelerate or substitute for a more ‘organic’ historical process of state-building that would otherwise be driven by local actors, instrumentally using external alliances and resources to consolidate their power or achieve their goals.²¹ In other words, the policy

20 Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, Issue 154 (May/June 2006), 50-54.

21 This vision leans heavily on Charles Tilly’s account of state formation; see Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.),

challenge for the international community is to unpack the historical process by which contemporary states were built, determine how a stable and secure domestic order was created, and apply the 'recipe' – with appropriate adaptation to local circumstance – to difficult environments in which political,

social and economic institutions are at their most fragile. The goal is ambitious, the tools (and knowledge) available to the international community is limited, and our expectations should be modest.

Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191; and Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990). For a more contemporary version, see Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 2002), 81-102.