

Forging a Proto-Third World? Latin America and the League Against Imperialism

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Introduction

Historians of Latin America often protest that their region is marginalized, or misunderstood, in the rising field of global history. The complaint has taken various forms: the best-known global historians do not devote sufficient attention to the region and, when they do, their treatment of it is superficial and prone to interpretive mistakes.¹ Leading journals of global and world history do not publish enough articles specifically dedicated to Latin America.² Or else, since Latin America had long been subjected to extra-continental influences, historiography of the region, too, has always been global in outlook, but English-language scholarship, owing to its linguistic narrow-mindedness, does not sufficiently recognize this.³ The consensus, however, if mainly among Latin Americanists themselves, seems to be that their region is not granted the attention that it deserves.

There are several problems with such complaints. In light of the difficulty of demarcating a field that through its defining adjective “global” announces its expansionist scholarly potential, it is rarely clear what exactly global history is. As a consequence, it is not quite clear either from what exactly Latin America is being sidelined. Given the burgeoning historical literatures about overseas empires, Atlantic revolutions, and trans-oceanic migrations, the precise boundaries of Latin America—that is, the object of supposed marginalization—are rather blurred, too. Most importantly, however, the plaintiffs rarely clarify the criteria according to which an acceptable amount of attention to Latin America in global history should be determined.⁴ Rather they seem to operate on an implicit assumption: that the history of Latin America is integral to those historiographical quarters that in recent decades have embraced the mantle of global history most enthusiastically, such as the histories of modern empires and imperialism, of slavery, of resistance to all these, and of the eventual rise of the idea of the “Third World” or, more recently, the “Global South.”

The assumption that Latin America should be seen as an essential part of these histories, of course, itself has a history. By exploring the role of Latin America in the Comintern-sponsored League Against Imperialism

(1927–1937), this chapter provides a case study for illuminating the history of that assumption. Habituated as we now are to viewing Latin America as an intrinsic part of the “developing world,” the “Global South,” or “The Third World,” it is all too easily forgotten that things were not always so straightforward. When French demographer Alfred Sauvy first coined the term in 1952, his “Third World” did not yet comprise Latin America, since for him the concept still related more closely to contemporaneously decolonizing countries.⁵ Nor did Latin Americans take part in the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung in 1955, which Sukarno, then president of Indonesia, famously cast as a successor to the League Against Imperialism’s 1927 conference in Brussels’ Egmont Palace.⁶ It was only the Cuban Revolution and its “tricontinental” engagement during the 1960s that firmly established Latin America as part of the “Third World,” aligning the concept more closely with economic “underdevelopment” and relating it to more variegated forms of imperialism than the formal colonial control that was being unwound in the years after the Second World War.⁷ Revealing both the possibilities and the limits of a tricontinental, anti-imperialist imagination that included Latin America by the late 1920s is the aim of this chapter.

Latin America’s role in the League Against Imperialism (LAI) is a suitable topic for this purpose, for two reasons. First, much like Sukarno, historians have often cast the LAI’s inaugural conference of 1927 as a precursor to Bandung and Third Worldism.⁸ Second, and more importantly, the foundation of the LAI in 1927 was one of the few historical moments prior to the 1960s in which a powerful organization, the Comintern, seriously attempted to formulate a global solidarity of “oppressed nations,” as the jargon of the time had it, which comprised Latin America. To be sure, the Latin American share among the approximately 175 delegates present in Brussels (roughly 8.5 per cent) was even less than the percentage of articles devoted to Latin America in the *Journal of Global History* between 2006 and 2016 (9 per cent).⁹ Yet, both on the Latin American side and among representatives from other world regions, the LAI’s initial years brought together prominent personalities who would later play important roles in the elaboration of a Third World imaginary. As a US delegate put it, the conference at Brussels’ Egmont Palace, which today ironically houses the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was a “star-studded affair.”¹⁰ It also offers a good touchstone for gauging both the prospects and the limits of a tricontinental Third Worldism *avant la lettre*.

Exploring such a proto-Third Worldism from the vantage point of Latin America implies engaging with two distinct strands of scholarship.

The first of these is the historiography of anti-imperialism and left-wing politics in Latin America, which has conventionally focused on ideological disputes within Marxism, the relationship between socialism and populism, and the prospects of social revolution in Latin America. Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of Moscow's comparatively weak interest in the region, communist parties and the Comintern have played a secondary role in this literature, which instead has for the most part focused on supposedly more interesting heterodox thinkers.¹¹ The standard history of the Comintern in Latin America, in turn, dealt mainly with the relationship between Soviet emissaries and local politics, mentioning the LAI only in passing.¹² Querying the role that the LAI played for Latin American anti-imperialists of the 1920s thus allows us not only to bring together several discrete strands of scholarship, but also to re-assess the importance of transnational and global imaginaries in the formation of left-wing politics within Latin America.

The second strand of scholarship concerns the LAI and interwar anti-imperialism globally. Recent attention to the LAI has largely been a product of the rise of transnational and global history, as well as post-colonial studies, all of which grew at a time when interest in the history of communism was in steep decline. Even though the Comintern was a global organization par excellence, the result of this disjuncture has been that recent historiography of the LAI—as opposed to the pre-1989 historiography produced in socialist countries, which was often well-researched but ideologically tinged—has tended to downplay the League's relationship with the Comintern.¹³ It has also had little to say about Latin American participation in the LAI, which is surprising considering that, because of the low proportion of committed communists among them, their participation in Brussels would have made for a particularly convincing case of the LAI's ideological heterogeneity, and alleged distance to communism, during its early years.¹⁴ Foregrounding the presence of these Latin Americans and the problems with which it presented the League sheds new light on interwar understandings of anti-imperialism, and their relationship with communism more broadly.

Two central questions, then, run through this chapter. First, what does the history of the LAI tell us about Latin American anti-imperialism in the 1920s? Second, what can Latin American participation in the LAI tell us about the League and, more broadly, about global anti-imperialism during the 1920s? Here, the chapter focuses on the multiple mismatches between anti-imperialism in world regions still subject to formal colonialism and

in Latin America, where nominal political independence had mostly been achieved a century prior to the foundation of the League.

The Comintern, Latin America, and Theories of Imperialism

Discussion of the importance of communism for the LAI has focused on the years before 1928, after which the Guomindang-communist split in China and the Comintern's abandonment of alliances with "bourgeois nationalists" rendered the League's communist orientation more obvious. Within these early years of ideological fluidity, assessments based on Comintern archives have unsurprisingly found greater communist involvement than those following some of its early players, such as Jawaharlal Nehru.¹⁵ With a view to Latin America, both perspectives matter: the League's character as a Comintern organization, though willfully disguised by its chief organizers in the first years, was the entry ticket to the LAI for the mostly non-communist Latin Americans to begin with. This communist character proved ironic, since it also provided the source of subsequent friction and, once Comintern policies towards non-communist allies became more implacable, the reason for the exit of the League's most prominent Latin American members.

From a Latin American point of view, the organization's communist background was important not so much as a pole of ideological attraction in itself, but rather in that it furnished the materialist rationale for including Latin American countries as victims of imperialism in the first place. Latin American anti-imperialists, who of course existed prior to 1927, needed no further persuasion that theirs were indeed nations oppressed by imperialism.¹⁶ Yet, from a global angle, in order to include Latin America as a region subjected to imperialism, a theory of imperialism was required that went beyond the customary understanding of formal colonial political control, which after all had expired in most of Latin America around 1820. Lenin's 1917 treatise about imperialism provided such a theory. In wedding the concept of imperialism to the global expansion of finance capital, explicitly treating Argentina as an example of a "semi-colony," Lenin had officially sanctioned the treatment of Latin America as a victim of imperialism, which consequently necessitated being addressed under a single analytical and organizational roof.¹⁷ The point was not that the text necessarily converted Latin Americans to communism. Nor that Lenin's was the only available theory of imperialism that potentially made room for Latin America.¹⁸ Rather, given the Comintern's doctrinal adherence to Leninism, it furnished an incentive for an organizational practice that incorporated Latin America.



Fig. 18. Drawing by Diego Rivera on the Front Page of *El Libertador*, no. 18, June 1928, depicting Nicaragua as assassinated by the United States.

The minority of Latin American anti-imperialist groups that self-identified as communist unsurprisingly subscribed to Lenin's understanding of imperialism as an expression of finance capitalism. *El Libertador*, the organ of the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas (LADLA), a Comintern-affiliated group of intellectuals from various Latin American countries founded in Mexico City in 1925, clarified as much from its very first issue. In explicit opposition to earlier Latin American anti-imperialists who had a more culturalist view of imperialism, the paper defined the "yoke of imperialism" as "Yankee capital," so that "any strike on a plantation or in a mine ... is always a strike against the foreign master."¹⁹ In a similar vein, the cartoons that appeared on the pages of subsequent issues, some of them drawn by the famous Mexican artist Diego Rivera, characteristically included dollar signs and showed high rises representing Wall Street (see figure 1), while countless articles listed the land holdings, refineries, and mines owned by American companies.²⁰ Use of the words "dollar" and "dollar imperialism" was likewise the leitmotiv of the speech in Brussels of Charles Philip, who under the pseudonym Manuel Gómez represented the LADLA's US section.²¹ Its interpretation of imperialism dovetailing with that of the Comintern, the LADLA also became the Latin American association most closely linked to the LAI in the entire period from 1926 until 1930.

But highlighting the economics of imperialism was not an exclusive domain of communists, as the case of the most prominent Latin American participant at Egmont Palace, the former Mexican education minister José Vasconcelos, shows. Vasconcelos's Latin America-wide fame was largely

based on a book he had published in Paris in 1925 entitled *La raza cósmica*, which was a cultural celebration of *mestizaje* (racial mixing) rather than a materialist indictment of capitalism.²² In fact, Vasconcelos, who later flirted with fascism, had no Marxist, let alone Leninist, predilections, as he expressly underlined in his speech in Brussels. His harping on the dangers of American capital investment in Mexico in that same speech thus did not stem from his adherence to, or even familiarity with, Lenin's reading of imperialism, but rather from the fact that a focus on finance was simply the surest way to grant Latin America a seat at the global table of victims of imperialism.²³ Ideologically, then, the LAI's communism opened the door to the involvement of non-communist Latin American anti-imperialists.

This inroad matched the Comintern's policy before 1928, which recommended "united fronts" between communist cadres and "bourgeois nationalists." It also served the aims of the LAI's mastermind, the German communist Reichstag deputy and media baron, Willi Münzenberg, who conceived of the Brussels conference as a vehicle to lure "fellow travelers," as he called them, into the Comintern's orbit.²⁴ Whereas in formally colonial settings the recruitment of non-communist participants for the Egmont Palace meeting was left to the communist parties of imperial countries, in the case of Latin America the task fell to Münzenberg's Hungarian adjutant, Louis Gibarti (born László Dobos), who soon approached the LADLA in Mexico, the exiled Peruvian student leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre (who by then was in London), and his recently founded American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), as well as Latin American anti-imperialist students in Paris.²⁵ With the exception of LADLA members, such as the Cuban Julio Antonio Mella, the conference organizers thus expressly sought out non-communist participants with an anti-imperialist agenda—a category of people not difficult to find among Latin American exiles and intellectuals in cities such as Mexico City and Paris.

Haya de la Torre and his APRA were a case in point of how the global reach and boilerplate policies of the Comintern, through the Brussels Conference, indirectly promoted the emergence of a non-communist anti-imperialist leader and organization. The APRA's later importance for Peruvian national politics has overshadowed these transnational origins.²⁶ The decisive boost that Haya's career and the APRA received from the LAI has also been forgotten because shortly after (and partly owing to) the Brussels Conference Haya became known for his "populist" version of anti-imperialism, distancing himself from the official Comintern line toed by his compatriot José Carlos Mariátegui and by the Cuban Julio

Antonio Mella, a prominent LADLA member and another speaker in Brussels. The fault line in this dispute—a typical local product of the global schism arising in the wake of the Guomintang-communist split in China—seemingly mapped onto the standard ideological divide of the moment: whereas Haya stressed the role of the “national bourgeoisie” for anti-imperialist revolutions, Mariátegui and Mella championed a socialist revolution from the beginning, without bourgeois participation, as the most promising strategy—matching the Comintern line adopted in 1928.²⁷

But these realignments of 1928 obscured how, only one year earlier, Egmont Palace had been a stepping-stone for Haya and the APRA: although Haya later mythologized a 1924 meeting in Mexico City as APRA’s moment of foundation, the group really became known in the run-up to the LAI Conference. It was in anticipation of this event that APRA branches were opened in Paris and Buenos Aires. The conference permitted Haya to advertise his hitherto largely nominal group, for example in a piece he wrote for the British *Labour Monthly* of October 1926. Though Haya hedged his bets against a possible future Comintern takeover of his group by emphasizing that the APRA was “completely Latin American, without foreign interventions or influences,” the entire article was pitched to offer Haya’s services to the Comintern. It therefore stressed APRA’s nature as a “‘unique front’ anti-imperialist party,” which twisted the communist phrase of “united fronts,” but essentially corresponded to what Münzenberg was looking for when drafting speakers for Brussels. Underlining the link between capitalism and imperialism and entrusting the future revolution to workers and peasants, Haya’s programme as of late 1926 fitted Leninist ideas.²⁸ The LAI thus promoted the rise of a political organization designed to serve as a non-communist Comintern ally in Latin America.

Haya’s strategy found an expression in his characterization of the APRA as the “Guomintang of Latin America,” a formula that he first employed in late 1926, in a series of interviews with Chinese journalists in Europe.²⁹ Since Haya occasionally met with Chinese activists in Europe in 1926, his appraisal of the Guomintang may well have been genuine.³⁰ Yet it also served two other purposes. First, the analogy with China, the country that furnished by far the largest single contingent of speakers at Egmont Palace, firmly placed Latin America within a global imaginary of colonial and “semi-colonial” countries. Second, the parallel with the Guomintang positioned the APRA as an ally for communists, so as to earn Haya a ticket to Brussels. Eudocio Ravines, who headed the Parisian APRA section

and also took part in the congress, later recalled that Haya's "cunning" worked well at Egmont Palace: the Italian-Argentine communist Vittorio Codovilla and other communist congress participants courted Haya and skirted his later adversary, the Cuban communist Mella. Haya in turn availed himself of the congress to demarcate his independence from the Comintern and thus raise the APRA's profile by ostentatiously signing the congress' resolution on Latin America only "with reservations"; a manoeuvre that led not only to a split between Haya and the communist Mella, but also to a fracture of the APRA itself, some of whose members (for instance, Ravines) preferred to follow the Comintern and Mella.³¹

As the history of these communist former *apristas* suggests, the dispute between the APRA and the communists cannot exclusively be attributed to a fundamental ideological incompatibility. In fact, the reason that Haya gave as a pretext for his "reservations" regarding the congress resolution was the exact opposite of the argument he subsequently made in his disputes with Mariátegui and Mella: good anti-imperialists should oppose an "unconditional front with the [national] bourgeoisies," he maintained in Brussels—the exact same point voiced one year later by Marxists such as Mariátegui and Mella, to which Haya then responded with a volte-face that celebrated the national bourgeoisie as the spearhead of anti-imperialism. Haya's manoeuvre in Brussels, in short, served solely the tactical purpose of touting the APRA's autonomous existence through staging a widely advertised break with the Comintern, which consequently switched its support to the more reliable Mella.³²

The LAI's communism, then, was a key vehicle for the inclusion of Latin Americans—including anti-communists—in an anti-imperialist international. Ideologically, Lenin's definition of imperialism provided a blueprint for the admittance of very different countries under the broad umbrella of "colonial and semi-colonial." Translated into an organizational practice that was based on such a wide purview and at the same time encouraged the participation of non-communists, the Brussels Congress became a stage for Latin American anti-imperialists, boosting some long political careers such as that of Haya de la Torre and his APRA. But the Latin American presence would also reveal the difficulties and limits of proto-Third Worldism.

The Global Geography of Imperialism

Ironically, whereas Lenin's broad definition of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism admitted Latin Americans to take a seat at the table of "oppressed nations," the LAI's chief organizers remained wedded to

another understanding of imperialism, which tended to narrow the term to formal colonial control. A reduction of imperialism to *de jure* colonialism inevitably made the inclusion of Latin America more questionable. As Münzenberg strove to include Indian anticolonialists in the course of 1926, the League's definition of imperialism increasingly shifted towards formal colonial control—so much so that the League's first official name was League against Colonial Oppression.³³ The importance of colonialism was also reflected in the League's eventual name in French and German after 1927 (Ligue contre l'impérialisme et l'oppression coloniale/Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrückung). The full English name after the Brussels Congress, in turn, contained a crucial addendum referring to the aim of national sovereignty ("League Against Imperialism *and for National Independence*" [my emphasis]); a point that, like colonialism, looked less relevant for the majority of formally independent countries of Latin America than it was for colonial domains. The name betrayed an ongoing insistence on the nation-state in the League's endeavours.

Nowhere was this focus clearer than in the inordinately conspicuous role awarded to Puerto Rico, the only formally colonial domain in Latin America, when it came to showcasing the region's subjection to imperialism. The outsized involvement of Puerto Rico at the Brussels Conference initially stemmed from the attempts of US communists to infiltrate the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico via a local branch of the LADLA, which had its headquarters in Mexico City.³⁴ But the matter took on a dynamic of its own, as the leaders of the Nationalist Party mistrusted the LADLA's advances and instead enlisted two prominent non-communist anti-imperialists to represent them in Brussels: the Mexican Vasconcelos and the Argentine Manuel Ugarte.³⁵ Even though the Nationalist Party—which later became known for its Catholicism, admiration of Spanish colonialism, and flirtation with fascism—was an unlikely ally for the Comintern, foregrounding Puerto Rico in Brussels had the benefit of harmonizing the case of Latin America with demands for national independence elsewhere, particularly by establishing a parallel between Puerto Rico and the Philippines.³⁶

The problem was not that Latin American anti-imperialists were, for any specific reason, disinclined to sympathize with Puerto Rican nationalism, but merely that it was low on their list of priorities. Vasconcelos' Brussels speech on behalf of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico failed even to mention the island.³⁷ Instead, by the time of the conference, Latin Americans campaigned primarily against the presence of American marines in Nicaragua, who ostensibly supported

the Nicaraguan government to fight a rebellion led by Augusto César Sandino. Promoted by LADLA in Mexico City as well as Latin American student groups in Paris around the Uruguayan activist Carlos Quijano, another speaker in Brussels, the pro-Sandino campaign developed into a global *cause célèbre* during 1927.³⁸ The focus on Puerto Rico in Brussels was thus rather unusual for mainstream anti-imperialist movements in Latin America at the time and can be seen as an attempt globally to align anti-imperialisms to the demand for national sovereignty.

The greater resonance of the Nicaraguan cause revealed, and reinforced, a crucial aspect of Latin Americans' notions of imperialism. It showed that they did not necessarily equate imperialism with the kind of *de jure* political control exerted by the United States in Puerto Rico or by European colonial empires elsewhere. Watchwords like "sovereignty" and *patria* were admittedly cornerstones of Sandino's rhetoric. But as Alan McPherson has argued, among the several countries best eligible for anti-imperialist campaigning in the 1920s—including the Dominican Republic and Haiti—Nicaragua was in fact the one in which national sovereignty was least obviously threatened or curtailed, as US Marines had arrived by fiat of the national government and operated more locally.³⁹

The reasons for Nicaragua's eminence were manifold, some of them mundane: Sandino's fighters possessed excellent transnational solidarity networks in the places that mattered most, such as Mexico City and San José, where the intellectual magazine *Repertorio Americano* helped to create a continent-wide anti-imperialist public sphere.⁴⁰ With Sandino the struggle also had a single heroic figure that the other movements of resistance to US occupation lacked. Other reasons, in turn, were indicative of the broader ideological forces that drove Latin American anti-imperialism in the 1920s: Sandino's framing of his rebellion as a defence of the "Indo-Hispanic race" against "Yankee invaders" echoed the *indigenista* elements of the anti-imperialist idiom of the time—evident, for instance, in Haya de la Torre's talk of *indoamericanismo*.⁴¹ Continental opposition to US meddling in Nicaragua could moreover build on the precedent of a hemispheric intellectual campaign against the filibuster invasion of the 1850s; a movement that had midwived the very term "Latin America."⁴² As a long-standing cornerstone of a Latin America under threat, Nicaragua was thus perceived as deserving of a continent-wide solidarity campaign in its defence.

The ideal of Latin American unity, an essential part of anti-imperialism in Latin America long before the Brussels Conference, was equally central to the views of the Latin American participants in the LAI. The Parisian

student group of one speaker in Brussels, the Uruguayan Carlos Quijano, was a case in point: its roughly 250 members in 1927 hailed from virtually all Latin American countries, but characteristically excluded Brazil.⁴³ The group's activities rested, first, on opposition to US imperialism and, second, its official aim of "abolishing nationality" within Latin America, so that "everybody will be equally Latin American."⁴⁴ A Parisian demonstration that the group organized one month after the LAI conference thus "protest[ed] against the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua" and called the event "a demonstration of Latin solidarity."⁴⁵ Other European-based anti-imperialist organizations whose leaders were present in Brussels, such as the French cell of Haya de la Torre's APRA and Mella's Association of New Cuban Revolutionary Emigrants, were equally transnationally Latin American (excluding Brazil), both in their social composition and in their avowed political aims.⁴⁶

Latin American anti-imperialism thus rested on Spanish American transnational networks, which clustered in cities with a large number of Spanish American exiles and intellectuals from various countries—notably Mexico City, Paris, and Buenos Aires. The LAI and the Comintern, which were both increasingly comfortable with using the designation of "Latin America," further fomented such networks of exchange. At the Egmont Palace, the Uruguayan Quijano thus represented the Venezuelan Revolutionary Party, the Peruvian Haya de la Torre spoke for the Nicaraguan and Panamanian sections of the LADLA, while the Cuban Mella served as a delegate of the LADLA's Mexico headquarters as well as the Mexican National Peasants League. Since Puerto Ricans were hard to find anywhere near Brussels, the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico appeared on the official programme with four speakers of whom none was Puerto Rican.⁴⁷ Back in Puerto Rico, the Nationalist Party's weekly frantically eulogized its (Mexican, Peruvian, and Cuban-French) representatives in Brussels as "our noble and knightly brothers of race and most beloved fellows in the holy struggle for the independence of Puerto Rico."⁴⁸ Possibly a spin-off of the conference, the paper reported more on other Latin American countries than usual in the weeks surrounding the event. The LAI conference, in short, reinforced Latin American regionalism on the basis of a shared anti-imperialism.

In the long run, this *latinoamericanismo* became a linchpin in Latin America's incorporation into visions of the Third World. It allowed for perceiving individual instances of resistance to imperialism as part of a wider regionalism or pan-nationalism of equally oppressed "brother peoples." No less important, the reciprocity between what in Spanish

America became known as *patria chica* and *patria grande* (i.e. Latin America) was a general parallel to many anti-imperial nationalisms in Asia and Africa that cast their nations as part of a larger pan-African or pan-Arab whole.⁴⁹ Later Third World nationalisms, whether in Latin America or elsewhere, were partly construed on the back of these pan-visions.

The Limits of Worldwide Solidarity

In the shorter term, however, while *latinoamericanismo* clearly fuelled Latin American anti-imperialism, the underlying connotation of *latinité* simultaneously marked imaginary boundaries between Latin Americans and anti-imperial activists from Asia and Africa—especially of a racial kind. These boundaries interacted with two other issues that undercut a tricontinental imagination comprising Latin America: first, the fact that Latin Americans had in mind a different imperial power (the United States) compared to Asians and Africans; second, the limited clout of communism in Latin America, which crippled Latin American participation in the LAI once the Comintern adopted more rigid policies in 1928. In other words, the very features that for a brief moment in 1927 enabled a proto-Third Worldism including Latin America—a strong regional identity expressed in *latinoamericanismo*, shared opposition to the expansion of US imperial interests, and communism—also undermined such an imagination.

The role of race becomes clearer if we bear in mind that Latin America was not categorically distinct from all the other “oppressed nations” represented in Brussels on a variety of counts. Like most Latin American countries, China, the country from which the largest single contingent of delegates in Brussels hailed, was also formally independent; albeit no less “semi-colonial” than Argentina, in Lenin’s dictum. China’s long history of independence never imperilled its central importance within the LAI. In fact, the League’s origins harked back to Münzenberg’s 1925 contacts with Chinese students in Berlin (see Petersson in this volume).⁵⁰ The breadth of the portfolio of imperial powers to which LAI members—including Japan, for instance—objected moreover made the Latin Americans’ focus on the US look less unusual from a global perspective.

Race, by contrast, was more of a dividing line. As Michel Gobat has argued, *latinoamericanismo* was not only baked into opposition to US meddling in Nicaragua during the 1850s, but the very concept of Latin America, in seeking to distinguish one (“Latin”) from another (“Anglo-Saxon”) America, inherently laid claim to whiteness and to a sort of brotherhood with “Latin” Europe.⁵¹ The socio-demographic and racial composition of early-twentieth-century Latin American anti-imperialists

may have reinforced their affinities with the notion of *latinité*. The majority of the student activists and intellectuals who populated the ranks of the LAI, the LADLA, the APRA, and Quijano's Parisian student group, were urban, white, and wealthy.⁵² Hailing from formally independent nation-states, they moreover had partial access to lavishly funded diplomatic apparatuses in Paris and Geneva, which in the Mexican case helped to finance their activities as well as the LAI itself.⁵³

The association of Latin America with whiteness, to be sure, was blurred and incomplete. As Sandino's evocations of the "Indo-Hispanic race" and Haya's watchword of *indoamericanismo* implied, the interwar years saw an increasing appreciation of Latin America's indigenous heritage. Though clouded in assimilationist ideals, Vasconcelos's 1925 book *La raza cósmica* was one of the most famous expressions of this tendency.⁵⁴ Nor did critics of imperialism from Asia and Africa necessarily see Latin Americans as exclusively white. Regarding the racial classification of groups, Nehru's report of the Brussels conference noted that the event's Latin American participants were "dark as the Northern Indian."⁵⁵ The influential Indian Comintern thinker, M.N. Roy, who had spent two formative years in revolutionary Mexico from 1917 to 1919, drew racial analogies between India and indigenous Latin Americans on the basis of the etymology of the Spanish word *indio*.⁵⁶

Although the region's African heritage remained comparatively more marginal to Latin American identity constructions, it was nonetheless incorporated to a greater degree than prior to the First World War. Young Cuban writers and artists in 1920s Paris, where they frequented the entertainment venues of the so-called *vogue noir*, revalorized their country's African traditions and embraced them as an integral part of *cubanidad*.⁵⁷ Whereas in 1912 another Paris resident, the conservative Peruvian anti-imperialist Francisco García Calderón, had still disparaged Haiti's history as evidence of "the political incapacity of that race," which he maligned as "primitive, impetuous ... idle, and servile,"⁵⁸ by the time of the Brussels Congress Haiti was coopted into the Latin American family of nations on account of being yet another independent American state whose sovereignty was militarily threatened by the United States. In line with treating Haiti as a Latin American republic, the Brussels speaker on behalf of the Haitian Union Patriotique, a loose association opposing the US occupation of 1915–1934, was a Paris-based Uruguayan journalist and ally of Quijano, Carlos Deambrosis Martins.⁵⁹ Quijano and his AGELA thereafter kept indignation over the US occupation of Haiti alive among

Latin American students in Europe, who in late 1929 protested against the “measures taken by the invader against the Latin culture [of Haiti].”⁶⁰

As this very formulation suggests, however, the embrace of Haiti was itself premised on the imputation of the country’s “Latinity”—the same move that in 1930 allowed the far-right Action Française to praise the nationalist Haitian government of Sténio Vincent, a one-time activist of the very same Union Patriotique, and to decry American “imperialist abuses.”⁶¹ Haitian anti-imperialists in search of Latin American allies in the late 1920s had to contend with their potential interlocutors’ widespread racism, which more broadly undermined the emergence of a continent-wide campaign in support of Haiti, even as the country’s sovereignty was in fact much more thoroughly and overtly curtailed than Nicaragua’s.⁶² It did not help the matter that denial of that racism became something of a distinctive hallmark of Latin American anti-imperialism, which in the hands of writers like Vasconcelos was in good part construed upon a contrast between the racist US and a supposedly racially tolerant Latin America. As a consequence either of Latin American lobbying or of black activists’ romanticized view of the region, the Brussels Conference’s “Joint Resolution on the Negro Question” flat out asserted that “in Latin America, the Negroes do not have to lament any race prejudice,” given “the political equality and the cordial relations that reign between the various races of these countries.” The same resolution treated the US occupation of Haiti, alongside those of Cuba and Santo Domingo, purely as a matter of state sovereignty, distinguishable from “the Caribbean colonies [in which] the Negroes are plagued by the various forms of imperialism.”⁶³

The official verdict that the so-called “Negro question” did not apply to Latin America in some ways confirmed how the Comintern handled matters of race organizationally. In 1922 the Comintern had created a “Negro Bureau” aimed at the United States—later extended to include Africa and the Caribbean—in a tacit recognition that independent statehood might not be the magical solution to all forms of imperial or colonial oppression, even as Moscow continued to tout precisely that solution even for African Americans. In spite of Latin America’s large African-descended population, as well as efforts by the Trinidadian pan-Africanist and Comintern organizer George Padmore to cooperate with the “Latin-American and South American” sections of the Profintern around 1930, such integration never truly bore fruit.⁶⁴ In Brussels, too, representatives of “the Negro struggle for freedom,” though including the Uruguayan Deambrosis Martins, were corralled into a separate session with little organizational or rhetorical overlap with Latin America. On the

basis of precisely this separation, Quijano, who represented his Parisian group of Latin American students, berated an earlier speaker of the “Negro race” (probably the Guadeloupean Max Clainville-Bloncourt) for having failed to mention that the “Yankee troops of occupation in Santo Domingo and Haiti ... massacred more than 3,500 Negro inhabitants of these areas;”⁶⁵ in other words, for failing to view US imperialism as the most serious problem.

If race subtly demarcated Latin America, other identity markers, such as language, further diminished the communicability of Latin American anti-imperialism. In his speech in Brussels, Vasconcelos complained that he had been encouraged to deliver his speech in English (in which he was fluent because he had spent part of his youth in Texas), professing that he was “one of those ardent defenders of the Spanish language as the main link of our race.”⁶⁶ The Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, for which Vasconcelos spoke officially on this occasion, promoted a Catholic *hispanista* version of the island’s identity and past, full of praise for the “civilizational” mission accomplished by Spanish colonialism.⁶⁷ Quijano’s more left-leaning Parisian student group (AGELA) was equally illustrative of the affinities that Latin American anti-imperialism entertained with Hispanism. A 1925 meeting to protest at the heavy-handed rhetoric by the American Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, towards Mexico—“the Great Anti-Imperialist Manifestation,” as it was called—brought together not only some of the main Latin American speakers who re-met in Brussels, but also the leading Spanish intellectuals Eduardo Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno, who hailed Latin Americans and Spaniards as “brothers ... because language is the blood of the spirit,” united against the “colossus of the North.”⁶⁸

Brazil’s marginality further revealed the importance of language as a unifying, yet also exclusivist, identity marker. Tellingly, neither AGELA nor the Mexico City-based LADLA had any Brazilian members worth mentioning. In well over 200 pages’ worth of published speeches, resolutions, and declarations emanating from the Brussels Conference, Brazil was mentioned a single time as one of four regions of Latin America; followed by the offhand dismissal that in contrast to the other three “it shows very particular economic, political, and social conditions,” which apparently made it unworthy of further treatment.⁶⁹ The sidelining of Brazil not only reduced Latin America’s cultural diversity and its potential connectivity to the so-called “Negro question,” but also confirmed more broadly historian Leslie Bethell’s argument that prior to the Second World War Brazil was barely imagined as a part of Latin America at all, owing to

linguistic fault lines affecting intellectual exchange, but also owing to the relatively low intensity of anti-imperialist feelings among Brazilian elites.⁷⁰ The same double exclusion affected the Caribbean: if Haiti, a conceivably “Latin” country threatened by US imperialism, could be construed as part of Latin America, the English-speaking Caribbean clearly could not.

The more important point is that *latinoamericanismo* and anti-imperialism (directed against the United States) were intimately linked and reinforced each other. That one was not possible without the other lent Latin American anti-imperialism a distinctly culturalist dimension, which it had characteristically acquired well before the Russian Revolution. One of its most lasting imprints came from an essay entitled *Ariel*, written by the Uruguayan author José Enrique Rodó as a reaction to the Spanish-American War of 1898, which contrasted “Latin” spirituality with “Anglo-Saxon” materialism and utilitarianism.⁷¹ The text inspired a whole generation of so-called *arielistas*, including people like Quijano and Haya de la Torre, who frequently reread *Ariel* and exchanged their views about the book.⁷²

In addition to their implicit, and sometimes explicit, claims to whiteness, appraisals of *latinité* not only paved the way for a new-found appreciation of the Spanish colonial legacy, but also entailed esteem for an important colonial power by the early twentieth century, France—a predilection that the French state had assiduously cultivated since the 1860s. At the 1925 anti-imperialist meeting in Paris, according to a police report, the attendants championed “an intimate union of all the peoples of Latin America so as to fight victoriously against the despotism of the United States,” but also “vibrantly eulogize[d] France and Paris.”⁷³ A 1929 poster by another Paris-based anti-imperialist student group, which protested against the assassination of the Cuban communist Mella in Mexico City, addressed “the French people” and declared that “the Latin Americans are your brothers. From their birth, they have heard the great voice of your revolution, they have enriched it with their echoes.”⁷⁴ Haya de la Torre’s APRA even adopted the *Marseillaise* as its party anthem.⁷⁵ The Nice-based Argentine anti-imperialist, Manuel Ugarte, who alongside Vasconcelos was scheduled to represent the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico at Egmont Palace, even received the French Légion d’Honneur in early 1927, which may explain why he cancelled his trip to the LAI conference at the last minute.⁷⁶ Inasmuch as “Latinity” was an integral part of Latin American anti-imperialism, it also diminished the appeal of that anti-imperialism beyond Latin America.

If this was not enough to undermine the emergence of a stable tricontinentalism in the 1920s, two seemingly more mundane factors further weakened it. The first of these was Latin Americans' exclusive focus on the United States as an imperialist power. Although the Brussels Conference addressed a variety of imperial powers, the Latin American speakers appeared to be uniquely compelled to persuade others of the United States' imperialist nature—in a way that Indian or Senegalese delegates did not feel was necessary when it came to describing their colonial powers. Vasconcelos thus complained about fellow delegates at the conference who failed to realize that the United States was “the most terrible empire ... that history has ever known.”⁷⁷ The assumption that anticolonialists from the British and French Empires required special persuasion on this point was probably not mistaken, since only eight years prior to the LAI conference they had pinned their hopes on American president Woodrow Wilson's promise of self-determination.⁷⁸ Although by 1927 their belief in the United States as an anticolonial power had been bitterly shattered, they were not for that reason ready to see the US as a colonial power analogous to Britain or France.

Quijano's speech in Brussels tellingly summed up both the promise and the limits of tricontinental solidarity of the moment. Trying to argue for cross-continental communality, he opened by saying, “We are aware ... that our action is only part of the international action against international imperialism. The struggles of the Chinese, the Indians, the Egyptians, are also our struggles.” But soon enough he arrived at the differences: “our struggle is primarily directed against American imperialism.” He then devoted the bulk of his speech to an attempt to convince the audience that, contrary to earlier African and Asian enthusiasm for Wilson's rhetoric, the United States was indeed an empire. His reminder that “Yankee troops ... in Santo Domingo and Haiti ... massacred more than 3,500 Negro inhabitants of these areas” was followed up by the specification that this had happened precisely “at the moment when president Wilson won over Europe [to embrace the principle of self-determination].”⁷⁹ Just like the relationship between Latin America and the LAI on the whole, Quijano's Brussels speech thus moved from the promise of a global tricontinental solidarity to demarcating the differences between Latin America and its putative brothers in arms.

The second, and final, factor unravelling Latin America's role within the LAI was communism. Although a Leninist definition of imperialism as wedded to capitalist exploitation, rather than formal political control alone, had initially been a vehicle for the inclusion of Latin America, the

LAI's growing communist rigidity from 1928 onwards harmed Latin American participation. When the Guomindang-communist alliance split up two months after the Brussels Conference, heralding the Chinese Civil War, and the Comintern abandoned its policy of "united fronts" with "bourgeois nationalists" in 1928, the LAI was laid bare as a communist organization. Even though these changes may have entailed greater discipline and tighter organization, they naturally alienated the League's many non-communist members, who in 1927 had been among the most prominent.⁸⁰

These problems were not specifically Latin American, but they affected the participation of Latin Americans more negatively than that of others. In Latin America, anti-imperialism preceded both the First World War and the Russian Revolution, which both left less of an indelible mark than they did in other world regions. Communists were never more than a small minority among Latin American anti-imperialists, even at the LAI Congress of 1927. With the exception of Mella, the prominent attendants at Egmont Palace were all non-communists: Haya used the conference only to stage a break with the Comintern. Quijano had briefly sympathized with the French Communist Party in the mid-1920s, but his association was superficial and ephemeral.⁸¹ Vasconcelos, meanwhile, stressed his dislike of communism both in his Egmont Palace speech and in a subsequent letter to Ugarte summarizing his experience in Brussels.⁸² Viewed from Moscow, Latin America at any rate appeared far away, geo-strategically unimportant, and, because of all of the above, distinctly unpromising. As a result, the LAI's closer oversight by Moscow from 1928 onwards tended to reduce the organization's attention to Latin America. By the time of the League's second conference, held in Frankfurt in 1929, the only significant remaining Latin American organization affiliated with the LAI was the LADLA, itself a crumbling organization by then.⁸³ All told, between 1927 and 1929 the "star-studded affair" of Brussels was reduced to the appearance of the Mexican artist Diego Rivera on the Frankfurt programme, although not at the event itself. Shortly thereafter, Rivera, too, fell out with the LAI.⁸⁴

Conclusion

If there was an effort to imagine Latin America as a part of a Third World *avant la lettre* prior to revolutionary Cuba's official tricontinentalism of the 1960s, surely it was at the LAI's inaugural conference in February 1927. With a Latin American contingent numbering just below 10 per cent of the total of delegates, the region was not exactly over-represented at

the event, but contrary to the more famous Bandung Conference of 1955 it did have a discernible presence. Latin America's involvement with global anti-imperialism in the interwar period, however, is best understood as a short-lived moment, which may have provided a precedent that future generations could draw upon, but which also died down after the flourishing of 1925–1928. What, then, explains the arrival of this moment and its subsequent closure?

Ironically, communism both opened and closed the door to Latin America's inclusion. To view the region as subjected to imperialism required a capacious understanding of that term (like Lenin's) and a powerful organization with global aspirations to act upon it (the Comintern). Moscow's openness to non-communist anti-imperialists prior to 1928 also favoured Latin American participation. But the LAI's increasing subordination to the Comintern reduced this participation once Moscow began categorically to oppose all collaboration with non-communists during the so-called Third Period, beginning in 1928.

The LAI thus failed to overcome a number of structural obstacles to tricontinental solidarity in the 1920s. Latin American anti-imperialists, contrary to many other attendants of the Brussels Congress, were not colonial subjects. Racial or religious discrimination at home, or consequent demands for civil rights, were not their primary concerns. Mostly white, wealthy, and from independent nation-states, their grievances concerned strong states bullying weaker ones, whether militarily, politically, or in relation to foreign investment. Often couching their resentment in a culturalist idiom of *latinité*, some of them embraced Spanish colonialism in opposition to all things "Anglo-Saxon"; a framing of the problem of imperialism that further distanced them from their African and Asian peers.

The most fundamental difference lay in Latin America's divergent histories of colonialism and decolonization, followed by informal imperialism from the mid-nineteenth century. With the exception of Puerto Rico, US meddling in Latin America for the most part undermined existing, and formally recognized, national sovereignties without expressly threatening their basic legitimacy; a role that was distinct from that of European colonial powers in Africa and Asia explicitly denying the right to national independence of subject peoples. The LAI's official full name—League Against Imperialism and for National Independence—reflected the Comintern's boilerplate demand of statehood for all nations outside the Soviet Union, but it also made it instantly plain that the entire enterprise was in fact ill-suited to the grievances of the spokesmen of

nations that for the most part had achieved independence a full century earlier. Foregrounding Puerto Rico in Brussels failed to paper over this difference.

The question of the limits to imagining Latin America as a part of the Third World can also be turned on its head: what had to change to make room for the rise of a tricontinentalism with global resonance? As Jason Parker has argued, the Cold War as well as discourses regarding poverty and “underdevelopment” were important cornerstones of a tricontinental Third Worldism.⁸⁵ Yet at the same time, in some ways Africa and Asia, now consisting chiefly of formally independent countries, came to occupy geopolitical roles that were more similar to Latin America’s. It might be possible to say that Latin America became a part of the Third World once Ho Chi Minh ceased to see France, but rather the United States, as his nemesis and the world’s main imperialist power. In other words, two conditions had to be fulfilled: first, the former colonies in Africa and Asia had to become independent nation-states, which shifted discussions of imperialism from the narrow terrain of *de jure* colonialism to the wider field of unequal international relations. Second, the Cold War had to globalize the United States’ role as a superpower. Both these changes made Vietnam in the 1960s look a little bit more akin to Cuba than would have been the case in the 1920s. Post-Second World War decolonization and the Cold War were thus the unsurprising conditions for Che Guevara’s famous demand to create “two, three, or many Vietnams” in his 1967 message to the Tricontinental.⁸⁶

Notes

- 1 See esp. Matthew Brown, “The Global History of Latin America,” *Journal of Global History* 10:3 (2015), 365–386.
- 2 Carlos Riojas López, “América Latina entre narrativas influyentes y tiempos de historia global,” *América Latina en la Historia Económica* 25:3 (2018), 7–39.
- 3 Rafael Marquese and João Paulo Pimenta, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Traditions of Global History,” in Sven Beckert and Dominic Sachsenmaier (eds.), *Global History, Globally: Research and Practice Around the World* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 67–82.
- 4 Riojas López, “América Latina,” for instance, calculates the percentage of articles devoted to Latin America in the *Journal of Global History* and the *Journal of World History*, but does not quite explain according to what benchmarks this constitutes an under-representation.

- 5 Alfred Sauvy, "Trois mondes, une planète," *L'Observateur* 118, 14 August 1952, 14.
- 6 George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, 1955* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 39–40.
- 7 Jason C. Parker, "'An Assembly of Peoples in Struggle': How the Cold War Made Latin America Part of the 'Third World,'" in Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro (eds.), *Internationalism, Imperialism, and the Formation of the Contemporary World: The Pasts of the Present* (New York: Palgrave, 2018), 307–326; Mark T. Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny, and the Fate of Third Worldism," *Third World Quarterly* 25:1 (2004), 9–39; Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 158–206; Christoph Kalter, *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, c. 1950–1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), esp. 266–271.
- 8 Among these, Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: New Press, 2007), 16–30, is least afraid of teleology. In more hedged terms: Christopher J. Lee, "Between a Moment and an Era: The Origins and Afterlives of Bandung," in Christopher Lee (ed.), *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010), 1–43; Fredrik Petersson, "Anti-Imperialism and Nostalgia: A Re-Assessment of the History and Historiography of the League against Imperialism," in Holger Weiss (ed.), *International Communism and Transnational Solidarity* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 191–255.
- 9 Riojas López, "América Latina," 18, for the journal percentage. The LAI figure is calculated on the basis of the list of participants in *Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont* (Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1927), 229–240. However, this list includes people who were invited but never came, and probably excludes others who did come. The same is true of most police sources, which were usually elaborated on the basis of material distributed at the conference itself, thus reproducing the same mistakes.
- 10 Charles Shipman, *It Had to Be Revolution: Memoirs of an American Radical* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 162. Charles Shipman was a pseudonym of Charles Philips, who in Brussels spoke under yet another pseudonym (Manuel Gómez).
- 11 E.g. José Aricó (ed.), *Mariátegui y los orígenes del marxismo latinoamericano* (Mexico City: Pasado y Presente, 1980) and Michael Löwy (ed.), *Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanity Books, 1992).

- 12 Manuel Caballero, *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
- 13 This is true of Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 16–30, and to a lesser extent of Daniel Brückenhaus, *Policing Transnational Protest: Liberal Imperialism and the Surveillance of Anticolonialists in Europe, 1905–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 139–168. A good example of the pre-1989 historiography is the GDR-produced volume edited by Hans Piazza: Hans Piazza (ed.), *Die Liga gegen Imperialismus und für nationale Unabhängigkeit* (Leipzig: Karl Marx Universität, 1987).
- 14 E.g. Prashad, *The Darker Nations*, 16–30, Brückenhaus, *Policing Transnational Protest*, 139–168.
- 15 Petersson, *Willi Münzenberg*, is an example of the former; Michele Louro, *Comrades against Imperialism: Nehru, India, and Interwar Internationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)
- 16 For useful short overviews of the intellectual history of early-twentieth-century anti-imperialism in Latin America, see Nicola Miller, *In the Shadow of the State: Intellectuals and Quest for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Spanish America* (London: Verso, 1999), 174–209, and Greg Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-Americanism in the Americas,” *The American Historical Review* 111:4 (2006), 1042–1066.
- 17 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (London: Penguin, 2015 [1916]), 98.
- 18 As is well known, Lenin borrowed heavily from J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York, 2005 [1902]), whose interest in Latin America, however, was mostly limited to France’s ill-fated imperialism in Mexico in the 1860s.
- 19 “El peligro, las posibilidades, el propósito,” *El Libertador*, no. 1, March 1925, 2. Generally on the LADLA, see Daniel Kerssfield, “La Liga Antiimperialista de las Américas: una construcción política entre el marxismo y el latinoamericanismo,” in Elvira Concheiro, Massimo Modonesi, and Horacio Crespo (eds.), *El comunismo: otras miradas desde América Latina* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2007), 151–168, and Ricardo Melgar Bao, “The Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas Between the East and Latin America,” *Latin American Perspectives* 35:2 (2008), 9–24.
- 20 E.g. *El Libertador*, no. 18, June 1928, 1.
- 21 Liga gegen Imperialismus, *Das Flammenzeichen*, 70–76.
- 22 José Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica* (Paris, 1925).
- 23 International Institute of Social History (IISH), League Against Imperialism Archive (LAIA), File 39: “Speech of Vasconcelias [sic], Congress-Meeting of February 10th 1927.”

- 24 Sean McMeekin, *The Red Millionaire: A Political Biography of Willi Münzenberg* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 194–203.
- 25 Traces of these recruitment processes in: Archives Départementales de Seine-St.-Denis, 3MI6/25, sequence 172: Minutes of the meetings of the colonial commission of the French Communist Party, 4 September 1926; Archivo General de la Nación, Argentina [AGNA], Fondo Ugarte, vol. 5 bundle 2219, sheets 75–7: Louis Gibarti to Federico Acosta Velarde, 5 July 1926; Max Zeuske, “Haya de la Torre, die APRA und der Brüsseler Weltkongreß der Antiimperialistischen Liga,” in *Die Liga gegen Imperialismus*, 151–7; Michael Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis: Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 201–2.
- 26 Standard histories include Robert Alexander (ed.), *Aprismo: The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre* (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1973) and Carol Graham, *Peru’s APRA: Parties, Politics, and the Elusive Quest for Democracy* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
- 27 E.g. Aricó, *Mariátegui*, 1–51; Löwy, *Marxism in Latin America*, xix–xx.
- 28 “What is the A.P.R.A.?” *The Labour Monthly* 8:12 (December 1926), 756–759.
- 29 Later reproduced as: “Declaraciones de Haya de la Torre a la Tribuna de Cantón,” *Repertorio Americano*, 14:22, 11 June 1927, 344.
- 30 Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 207–208.
- 31 Eudocio Ravines, *La gran estafa* (Mexico City: Libros y Revistas SA, 1952), 103–105.
- 32 A similar interpretation can be found in Daniel Kersffeld, “Latinoamericanos en el Congreso Antiimperialista de 1927: Afinidades, disensos y rupturas,” *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 16:2 (2010), 151–163, and Zeuske, “Haya de la Torre.”
- 33 Brückenhaus, *Policing Transnational Protest*, 139–147, and Louro, *Comrades Against Imperialism*, 31–32.
- 34 Sandra Pujals, “¡Embarcados! James Sager, la Sección Puertorriqueña de la Liga Anti-Imperialista de las Américas y el Partido Nacionalista de Puerto Rico, 1925–1927,” *Revista del Centro de Investigaciones Históricas de la Universidad de Puerto Rico* 22 (2013), 105–139. Unfortunately, I failed to read this article prior to writing Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 204, which would have prevented my earlier misinterpretation.
- 35 AGNA, Fondo Ugarte, vol. 4, bundle 2219: Resolution of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, 27 September 1926, 97–98.
- 36 IISH, LAIA, File 41: “Erklärung der Delegation aller amerikanischer Länder...”.
- 37 IISH, LAIA, File 39: “Speech of Vasconcelias [sic].”

- 38 Generally, Barry Carr, "Pioneering Transnational Solidarity in the Americas: The Movement in Support of Augusto C. Sandino, 1927–1934," *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research* 20:2 (2014), 141–152. On Paris: "Latin Americans Protest in Paris," *The New York Times*, January 14, 1927, 2; and the APRA flyer of January 1927 and unnamed report, January 14, 1927, both in the Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), F7/13435.
- 39 Alan McPherson, *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- 40 McPherson, *The Invaded*, 213–237.
- 41 Michael J. Schroeder, "The Sandino Rebellion Revisited: Civil War, Imperialism, Popular Nationalism, and State Formation Muddled Up Together in the Segovias of Nicaragua, 1926–1934," in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore (eds.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), 208–268, here 228–229.
- 42 Michel Gobat, "The Invention of Latin America: A Transnational History of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Race," *The American Historical Review* 118:5 (2013), 1345–1375.
- 43 Archives de la Préfecture de Police de Paris [henceforth APPP], BA 2143 (57850): Renseignements Généraux to police prefect, 26 June 1929; and Renseignements Généraux to police prefect, 20 June 1932. See generally on this group (called General Association of Latin American Students, or AGELA): Michael Goebel, "Una sucursal francesa de la Reforma Universitaria: jóvenes latinoamericanos y antiimperialismo en la París de entreguerras," in Martín Bergel (ed.), *Los viajes latinoamericanos de la Reforma Universitaria* (Rosario: hay Ediciones, 2018), 177–199.
- 44 Miguel Angel Asturias, *París 1924–1933: periodismo y creación literaria* (Nanterre: Centre de Recherches Latino-Américaines, 1988), 526.
- 45 Archivo General de la Nación, Uruguay [AGNU], Fondo Quijano, Folder 11 Box 1: "Grande Conférence Publique."
- 46 Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 133–135 and 268.
- 47 *Das Flammenzeichen*, 236–237. Vasconcelos was Mexican, Ugarte (who did not come to Brussels) Argentine, César Falcón Peruvian, and Luis Casabona French-Cuban.
- 48 "Al margen del congreso anti-imperialista de Bruselas," *El Nacionalista*, 5 February 1927, 5.
- 49 See generally Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, 261–269.
- 50 See Hans Piazza, "The Anti-Imperialist League and the Chinese Revolution," in Mechthild Leutner et al. (eds.), *The Chinese Revolution in the 1920s: Between Triumph and Disaster* (London: Routledge, 2002), 166–176.

- 51 Gobat, "The Invention."
- 52 For a comparative social profile, based on Paris, see Goebel, *Anti-Imperial Metropolis*, esp. 21–55, and Jens Streckert, *Die Hauptstadt Lateinamerikas* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2013).
- 53 Münzenberg's widow Babette Gross thus remembers the Mexican minister in Berlin, Ramón de Negri, as "one of the league's most eager sponsors" in her *Willi Münzenberg: Eine politische Biographie* (Stuttgart, 1967), 203.
- 54 Vasconcelos, *La raza cósmica*.
- 55 Jawaharlal Nehru, "Report on the Brussels Congress," *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, S. Gopal (ed.), (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), Vol. 2, 277–295, here 280.
- 56 See Michael Goebel, "Geopolitics, Transnational Solidarity, or Diaspora Nationalism? The Global Career of M.N. Roy, 1915–1930," *European Review of History* 21:4 (2015), 486–499.
- 57 Jason Weiss, *The Lights of Home: A Century of Latin American Writers in Paris* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 23–5.
- 58 Francisco García Calderón, *Las democracias latinas de América: la creación de un continente* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1979), 196–197.
- 59 *Das Flammenzeichen*, 119–123. Because of his speech for the Union Patriotique, Deambrosis Martins is often misidentified as Haitian in the literature.
- 60 AGNU, Fondo Quijano, folder 11, box 1: José Chelala Aguilera, secretary general of AGELA, n.d.
- 61 "L'indépendance d'Haïti," *L'Action Française*, March 14, 1930.
- 62 Alan McPherson, "Joseph Jolibois Fils and the Flaws of Haitian Resistance to U.S. Occupation," *The Journal of Haitian Studies* 16:2 (2010), 120–147. For the broader comparison, see McPherson, *The Invaded*.
- 63 Liga gegen Imperialismus, *Das Flammenzeichen*, 129. The phrasing of the French version is remarkably different. See ISH, LAIA, File 54: "Résolutions communes sur la question nègre."
- 64 Holger Weiss, *Framing a Radical African Atlantic: African American Agency, West African Intellectuals and the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 314–318.
- 65 *Das Flammenzeichen*, 68.
- 66 IISH, LAIA, File 39: "Speech of Vasconcelias [sic]."
- 67 César J. Ayala and Rafael Bernabe, *Puerto Rico in the American Century: A History Since 1898* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 95–135.
- 68 Armando Maribona, "La gran manifestación antiimperialista de Latinoamérica celebrada en París," *El Imparcial*, 26 September 1925.
- 69 *Das Flammenzeichen*, 78.

- 70 Leslie Bethell, "Brazil and 'Latin America,'" *Journal of Latin American Studies* 42:3 (2010), 457–485.
- 71 For a good overview of Rodó's ideas see Nicola Miller, *Reinventing Modernity in Latin America: Intellectuals Imagine the Future, 1900–1930* (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 23–70.
- 72 AGNU, Fondo Quijano, Folder 5 Box 24: Haya de la Torre (Lima) to Quijano (Montevideo), 30 August 1922.
- 73 AN, F7/13435: Unnamed report, 7 January 1926.
- 74 APPP, BA 2143 (57850): "Groupe Libre d'Intellectuels Latino-Américains," 1929.
- 75 Sánchez, *Apuntes*, vol. 1, 193.
- 76 He officially cited health reasons. Manuel Ugarte to Federico Acosta Velarde, 11 February 1927, *El Nacionalista*, 12 March 1927, 1.
- 77 IISH, LAIA, File 39: "Speech of Vasconcelias [sic]."
- 78 Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
- 79 *Das Flammenzeichen*, 68.
- 80 For an excellent account of the conflict between Nehru and the LAI (and the league's weakening in India), see Louro, *Comrades Against Imperialism*, 140–178.
- 81 Gerardo Caetano and José Pedro Rilla, *El joven Quijano 1900–1933: izquierda nacional y conciencia crítica* (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1986).
- 82 IISH, LAIA, File 39: "Speech of Vasconcelias [sic];" AGNA, Fondo Ugarte, vol. 4, bundle 2219: Vasconcelos to Ugarte, February 23, 1927, 147.
- 83 IISH, LAIA, File 67: "List of affiliated, associated and sympathising organisations," 1929.
- 84 Fredrik Petersson, "Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The League against Imperialism and Berlin, 1927–1933," *Interventions* 16:1 (2014), 49–71: 59–60.
- 85 Parker, "An Assembly."
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