In the post-COVID19 global order, rising geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and East Asia reflect the boiling tensions States face on multiple fronts. Within this, the United States is on two fronts as a major player and supporter of its allies that are directly facing hostility. Since the start of 2020, China’s hard, military power maneuvering in the South China Sea, deteriorating political relations with Japan and Australia, and the Himalayan standoff against India have seemingly further substantiated the need for the formulation of The Quad, a proposed quadrilateral arrangement with a varying mandate of operations. The proposed structure would constitute India, Japan, Australia, and the United States. The grouping has repeatedly been touted as not as “anti-China.” However Chinese interpretation of the mutual intent has equated them to being an “Asian NATO.” Keeping this in mind, I draw upon Duncan Snidal and Felicity Vabulas’ works on Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and considers the inherent pitfalls that states may incur while negotiating through the contours of such a structure. Particularly in regards to strategic autonomy, asymmetry in resource contribution and control, and agreeing on a set of fundamental driving philosophies that are certain enough to tie the parties together for the foreseeable future. I focus on contemporary international relations theory, secondary research in the subject countries’ Indo-Pacific policies, and the more significant geopolitical trends of securitization in Asia.