Financial crisis response (“FCR”) policies are governed by nested, parallel, partially overlapping, and non-hierarchical normative arrangements, which collectively form a regime complex. Due to its inherent susceptibility to “salience” and “accessibility” biases, this governance model undermines the visibility and adaptivity of FCR norms, leading to informationally imperfect decision-making, limited accountability, power politics and normative stagnation. The present thesis draws attention to the tangible, real-life impact FCR norms may have on the policies they govern by identifying concrete ways in which FCR norms may serve as guideposts, constraints, and externalities in relation to FCR policies, using the Icelandic, Eurozone and Argentine financial crises as case studies. By empirically demonstrating that the FCR complex is amenable to, and worthy of, systematic analysis, the thesis seeks to increase the level of executive and regulatory attention currently enjoyed by FCR norms, thereby helping to eliminate the biases against their salience and accessibility, close their visibility and adaptivity deficits and mitigate the risks of informationally imperfect decision-making, limited accountability, power politics and normative stagnation.