

**Meat in the Heat: A History of Tel Aviv under the British Mandate
for Palestine (1920s-1940s)**

THESIS

submitted at the Graduate Institute
in fulfilment of the requirements of the
PhD degree in International History

by

Efrat GILAD

Thesis N° 1376

Geneva

2021

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INSTITUT DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT
GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

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Sur le préavis de M. Davide RODOGNO, professeur à l'Institut et directeur de thèse, de M. Cyrus SCHAYEGH, professeur à l'Institut et membre interne du jury, et de Ms Lisa HAUSHOFER, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Biomedical Ethics and History of Medicine, University of Zurich et expert extérieur, la directrice de l'Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement autorise l'impression de la présente thèse sans exprimer par là d'opinion sur son contenu.

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RESUME / ABSTRACT
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Titre de la thèse / Title of thesis : **Meat in the Heat: A History of Tel Aviv under the British Mandate for Palestine (1920s-1940s)**

Résumé en français: Sous le mandat britannique pour la Palestine, les experts sionistes (économistes, agronomes et nutritionnistes) ont dissuadé les Juifs de consommer de la viande ; toutefois, la viande est restée un aliment important dans le régime alimentaire des Juifs européens surtout dans les villes de Palestine. En se concentrant sur la capitale carnivore du pays, Tel-Aviv, cette thèse explore d'abord la raison pour laquelle les experts sionistes se sont opposés à la consommation de viande et comment les colons juifs urbains ont ignoré ce conseil. Ensuite, cette étude souligne la manière dont les colons urbains ont créé des systèmes pour accéder à davantage de viande dans un pays où l'offre était limitée et retrace les tensions qui ont émergé au sein de ces systèmes. Enfin, cette thèse démontre comment l'industrie de la viande de Tel-Aviv était liée à l'expansion et au développement de la ville, lui permettant de gagner plus de terrain, de revenus et d'autonomie. En tant que tel, ce travail montre comment l'accès grandissant des Juifs à la viande en Palestine était peut-être contre l'avis des experts, mais a finalement servi l'objectif national : la colonisation de la Palestine.

English Summary: Under the British Mandate for Palestine, Zionist experts – economists, agronomists, nutritionists – discouraged Jews from consuming meat, yet meat remained an important part of European-Jewish diets especially in Palestine's cities. By focusing on the country's carnivorous capital – Tel Aviv – this dissertation first explores why Zionist experts objected to meat consumption and how urban Jewish settlers ignored this advice. It then highlights how urban settlers created systems to allow themselves more access to meat in a country of limited supply and traces the tensions that arose within those systems. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates how Tel Aviv's meat industry was tied to the expansion and development of the city, allowing it to gain more land, revenue, and autonomy. As such, this study shows how increasing Jews' access to meat in Palestine was perhaps against experts' advice, but ultimately served the national goal: the colonization of Palestine.

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Meat in the Heat: A History of Tel Aviv under the British Mandate for Palestine (1920s-1940s)

Abstract

Under the British Mandate for Palestine, Zionist experts discouraged Jews from consuming meat. Yet not all Jews adhered to Zionist guidelines, and meat remained an important part of European-Jewish diets especially in Palestine's cities. By focusing on the country's carnivorous capital – Tel Aviv – this dissertation first explores why Zionist experts objected to meat consumption and how urban Jewish settlers ignored this advice. Then this dissertation traces the systems urban settlers created to allow them more access to meat in a country of limited supply. It also traces the tensions that arose within those systems, before demonstrating how Tel Aviv's meat industry was tied to the expansion and development of the city, allowing it to gain more land, revenue, and autonomy. As such, this dissertation shows how increasing Jews' access to meat in Palestine was perhaps against experts' advice, but ultimately served the national goal: the colonization of Palestine.

Introduction

In 2019, according to OECD statistics, the world's leading consumers of beef were Argentina, the United States, and Brazil. Argentina prevailed with an annual 38 kilograms per capita, followed by the United States and Brazil with 26.3 and 25.2 kilograms per capita respectively. In 4th place, almost tied with Brazil, was a more curious contender: Israel, with 25.1 kilograms.¹ With beef consumption almost on par with global heavyweights more commonly associated with their love of meat, the proverbial “falafel nation” might be more accurately described as a carnivore’s capital.²

Aside from Israel, countries that tend to hold top positions in these lists are countries known for their love of *grilling* meat. This practice is rooted in the historical, geographical, and cultural development of these settler-colonies come nation-states where European settlers used their cattle to colonize. In Australia, the United States, Brazil, and elsewhere, cowboys or gauchos wandered across vast green fields with their massive herds of livestock, dominating space and grabbing land. Grilling meat out in nature on an open fire symbolized the settlers’ connection to the land, and eating that meat was – and still is, according to scholars – a celebration of masculinity, power, and domination.³

Anthropologist Nir Avieli shows how in Israel too, meat grilling is linked to nationalism and more broadly, to power.⁴ Building on theoretical frameworks that tie the settler-cowboy

¹ “Agricultural Output - Meat Consumption - OECD Data” *OECD Data*, 2019, <https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm>. [last accessed 20 November 2020]

² Yael Raviv, *Falafel Nation : Cuisine and the Making of National Identity in Israel* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015).

³ Nir Avieli, “Grilled Nationalism: Power, Masculinity and Space in Israeli Barbeques,” *Food, Culture & Society* 16, no. 2 (2013): 301–20. Marshall Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976): 170–179; Barbara E. Willard, “The American Story of Meat: Discursive Influences on Cultural Eating Practice,” *The Journal of Popular Culture* 36, no. 1 (2002): 105–18; Luciano Bornholdt, “What Is a Gaucho?: Intersections between State, Identities and Domination in Southern Brazil”, *Textos* 4 (2010): 23–41.

experience to the nation-state, Avieli suggests that the ultimate Israeli barbeque – the Independence Day *al ha'esh* – is a symbolic celebration of Jewish nationalism. Of the meat consumed at these feasts, Avieli concludes: “the roasted cuts of meat are portions of processed and refined Israeliness that the Jewish citizens of the state absorb into their bodies in a day that symbolizes more than any other their connection to the nation-state”.⁵

In his analysis, Avieli incorporates a theoretical framework based on the historical development of other settler-colonies with an observation of contemporary Israel. But in Israel, the link between the history of meat and contemporary consumption patterns is not quite straightforward. While colonization is part of Israel’s past and present, Jewish settlers did not wander with herds of animals across vast green fields to dominate Palestine’s landscape. There were no Jewish cowboys in Palestine.⁶ This does not mean there is no historical link between meat and colonization in Israel, but that the historical trajectory that led Israelis to consume as much beef as Brazilians was different, and thus requires further investigation. This dissertation is the first comprehensive history of meat in Israel grounded in extensive archival research.⁷

In this dissertation, I focus on Palestine under the British Mandate (1920-1948), and especially on the interwar period. This is when, I argue, Jewish settlers laid the foundations for a state with meat-eating habits on par with those of the beef producers of the world. Doing so, I contribute both to the historiography of the *Yishuv* (the pre-state Jewish settlement in Palestine) as well as to the historiography that links meat and settler-colonialism. On the most basic level, this dissertation is one of few to explore the history of a

⁴ Avieli, “Grilled Nationalism”.

⁵ My translation from Avieli’s Hebrew article on the topic. Nir Avieli, “Al Haesh: Meat, Power, Space and Nationalism in Israeli Independence Day Barbeques”, *Sociologia Israelit* 14 (2012): 83-109 [Hebrew].

⁶ There might have been one exception to this in Kibbutz Shamir, established in 1944 in the Upper Galilee region. I will explore this further in my Postdoctoral project.

⁷ Currently only few articles or book chapters have been dedicated to the issue of meat in Israeli history. See “Sources” section below for an annotated list.

meat-eating nation without a cowboy ethos. More intricately, it explores how urban Jewish settlers created the foundations for a meat-eating nation in their efforts to make Palestine not only habitable to them but palatable as well. Then this dissertation illuminates how in their seemingly mundane actions, driven by the desire for meat, urban settlers directly contributed to the colonization of Palestine. By focusing on Tel Aviv, which was both a major center of Jewish life in Palestine and its biggest meat market, I contribute to both historiographies of meat and Zionism by shifting the focus from cowboy-frontiers and pioneers to cities and urban settlers.

I. Research Questions

Without a cowboy ethos and boundless pastures for livestock to graze, Palestine was not an ideal location for settlers desiring meat. In other settler-colonies, a pull factor was the potential to improve one's diet by gaining more access to meat. Australia, for example, was promoted to immigrants as a land where one eats meat three times a day.⁸ In the United States, Jewish immigrants experienced similar culinary changes: instead of weekly, they ate meat daily. As historian Hasia Diner writes, "Their once meager cabbage or beet *borschts* now glistened with fat pieces of meat".⁹ As Palestine was a country of limited animal husbandry, it never offered European settlers a similar promise of more meat.¹⁰ On the contrary, during the Mandate period, newspapers show that demand for meat was always higher than supply.¹¹

⁸ Michael Symons, *One Continuous Picnic: A Gastronomic History of Australia* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2007): 38. Also relevant is: Peter J. Guarnaccia et al., "'We Eat Meat Every Day': Ecology and Economy of Dietary Change among Oaxacan Migrants from Mexico to New Jersey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 35 (2012): 104–119. ■

⁹ Hasia Diner, *Hungering for America: Italian, Irish, and Jewish Foodways in the Age of Migration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003): 179-180.

¹⁰ Roza El-Eini, *Mandated landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine, 1929-1948* (New York: Routledge, 2006): 121. Let alone meat, even Palestine's promotion as a land where *Milk and Honey* flow was quickly debunked upon immigrants' arrival: Anita Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992): 42.

¹¹ Not only Jewish settlers demanded more meat during this period, but also Palestinians. See below.

Compared with other settler-colonies, access to meat was limited, and attitudes to meat differed as well. While the demand for meat shows that Jewish consumers were interested in meat, Zionist experts did not share their enthusiasm. Zionist institutions (such as the Hadassah Medical Organization and the Jewish Agency's Nutrition Committee) and the experts linked to them (including economists, agronomists, public health experts, nutritionists, and educators) promoted a low-meat or no-meat diet. Throughout the interwar period, Zionist experts continued to try to convince Jews in Palestine to consume (and desire) less meat.¹² Cooking instructors promoted vegetarian recipes, newspaper articles described the harm in consuming meat in Palestine's heat, nutritionists highlighted meat-alternatives, and agronomists promoted locally produced vegetables and dairy in place of meat.¹³

While scholars claim that barbecuing meat in other settler-colonies was a celebration of settlers' connection to land and nature, that connotation was missing in Zionist imagery. Rather than nature, fields, and cowboys, Zionist experts associated meat consumption with Jewish city dwellers. This was a negative connotation especially as the prominent Labor Zionist ideology promoted rural-living and many experts adhered to that ideology.¹⁴ In other words, beef was a habit reminiscent of Europe's "old Jew" as opposed to Palestine's "new Jew". In 1938 a Jewish physician in Palestine wrote:

In the Diaspora too, Jews were excessive consumers of meat... but somehow they never liked fruits and especially vegetables... The concentration of the Jews in cities and their distance from nature in the Diaspora led to their distance from natural foods . . . and now we must make big changes in our diet.¹⁵

¹² Anat Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat: Climate and Culture in 1920s and 1930s Tel Aviv," *Journal of Israeli History* 22, no. 1 (March 2003): 71–90.

¹³ See Chapter 1.

¹⁴ Erik Cohen, *The City in the Zionist Ideology* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970); Hizky Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv: Purim and the Celebration of Urban Zionism* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014).

¹⁵ Quoted in: Dafna Hirsch, "'We Are Here to Bring the West, Not Only to Ourselves': Zionist Occidentalism and the Discourse of Hygiene in Mandate Palestine," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41 (2009): 582-583.

Replacing beef with dairy and vegetables was emblematic of the re-education that Zionist experts demanded from Jewish settlers. To adapt to Palestine, experts asked settlers to forget meat. When Erna Meyer promoted vegetarian recipes in her famous cookbook *How to Cook in Palestine* published in 1937, she insisted that housewives could cook vegetables instead of meat because “one can always learn new things”.¹⁶ Then, to learn to enjoy eating vegetables instead of meat, the prominent nutritionist Sarah Broomberg added in 1938: “the new immigrant must not only learn, he must also forget”.¹⁷

The idea that Jews needed to learn and forget to adapt to Palestine begins to explain why and how Zionist experts rejected beef. It also further highlights the discrepancies between the history of meat in Palestine and the historiography of meat. One of the most prominent arguments in the historiography on meat is that consuming the flesh of other highly evolved mammals represents humans’ domination over animals and the environment. In other words, the consumption of meat is the ultimate triumph of man over nature.¹⁸ Conquering nature is also a dominant factor in the historiography of Zionism in Palestine. For the Zionist project to succeed, scholars claim, Jews had to overcome Palestine’s environment.¹⁹ Zionists drained swamps, planted trees, toiled lands, introduced species, eliminated species, irrigated, plowed, sowed, cropped, bred, fed, and hiked.²⁰ Therefore, I present the first question that this

¹⁶ Erna Meyer and Milka Saphir, *How to Cook in Palestine* (Tel Aviv: Women’s International Zionist Organization, 1936): 29.

¹⁷ The idea of learning and forgetting is especially prominent in the historiography on food in Israel. See for example: Claudia Roden, “Jewish Food in the Middle East”, in Sami Zubaida (ed.) *A Taste of Thyme Culinary Cultures of the Middle East* (London; New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2011): 153-158. Ofra Tene, “The New Immigrant Must Not Only Learn, He Must Also Forget’: The Making of Eretz Israeli Ashkenazi Cuisine,” in Anat Helman (ed.) *Jews and Their Foodways*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 46-64; Joachim Schlör, “How to Cook in Palestine: Kurfürstendamm Meets Rehov Ben Jehuda,” in Nils Roemer (ed.) *Longing, Belonging, and the Making of Jewish Consumer Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 2010): 163–181.

¹⁸ Nick Fiddes, *Meat: A Natural Symbol* (London; New York: Routledge, 1991).

¹⁹ Sandra Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920-1947* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007).

²⁰ For example: Sufian, *Healing the Land*; Oz Almog, *The Sabra : The Creation of the New Jew* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 2000); Alon Tal, *Pollution in a Promised Land : An Environmental History of Israel* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 2002); Dan Tamir, “Motives for Introducing Species:

dissertation seeks to answer: if conquering Palestine's natural environment was essential to the colonization of the country, *and* the consumption of meat was the ultimate act of dominating nature, why did Zionist experts object to it? Why not meat?

The short answer is that there was no Jewish beef industry in Palestine, and so consumption of beef had no value to the Zionist project. On the contrary, Zionist experts feared that it was detrimental to it.²¹ Cattle for beef came from Arab breeders in Palestine and the region, and later from Europe.²² Any Jewish contributions towards the beef market were generated from cows and calves no longer useful for the Zionist dairy industry. Efforts towards a national meat industry waited until well after the 1950s when Israel's political and economic situation began to stabilize.²³ Then, it could only expand once Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967.²⁴ Even today, Israeli beef is mainly a byproduct of the dairy industry and the majority of beef consumed in Israel is imported.²⁵ While neither a dairy nor a beef industry fit Palestine's climate or environment, Zionist planners decided to invest heavily in the former.²⁶ Subsequently, Jewish settlers were asked to forgo "foreign meat" and consume "Hebrew milk" instead.

Palestine's Carp as a Case Study," *Environment and History* 16, no. 1 (2010): 73–95; Tamar Novick, *Milk and Honey: Technologies of Plenty in the Making of a Holy Land, 1880-1960* (PhD Dissertation University of Pennsylvania, 2014); Netta Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science in Palestine, 1897-1948* (PhD Dissertation University of Oxford, 2019).

²¹ Akiva Ettinger, "What are the Products that our Agriculture Makes Available for the Woman", Everything for the Women, date unknown, probably between 1938 to 1940. CZA/A111/25

²² See chapter 2.

²³ See for example: Moshe Pfeffer, *Raising Calves for Meat* (Ministry of Agriculture and Development: Animal Department, State of Israel 1952) [Hebrew]; D. Levy and R. Volkani, *Survey of the Problems and Directions of Development of the Cattle for Beef Industry in Israel* (Volkani Institute for Agriculture Research, Rehovot, 1964) [Hebrew].

²⁴ The agricultural properties of the Golan's soil and climate have made it a central location for Israeli food production including, according to one source, approximately 40 percent of Israeli beef as well as many other agricultural produce. See a report from the American University in Cairo: Sara El Abd, "Economic Stakes in the Golan Heights: Constraining the Peace Process?", *The Chronicles* (2009): 44.

²⁵ Elizabeth Wachs and Alon Tal, "Herd No More: Livestock Husbandry Policies and the Environment in Israel," *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 22, no. 5 (2009): 401–22.

²⁶ Yaacov Shavit and Dan Giladi were the first to note that dairy was a peculiar choice as the pillar of Jewish agricultural settlements, and Tamar Novick further showed this by discussing the strenuous efforts involved in creating the Zionist dairy industry. See: Yaacov Shavit and Dan Giladi, "The Role of the Dairy Farm in the Development of Jewish Settlement during the Mandatory Period," *Cathedra* 18 (1981): 178–92. [Hebrew]; Novick, *Milk and Honey*.

Already in the 1930s, it was clear that Zionist efforts to promote milk-instead-of-meat gained limited success. Consumption of meat in the *Yishuv* only rose with new waves of settlers from central-European countries and better socioeconomic backgrounds.²⁷ Even in the 1940s, when the British government recommended a (wartime) daily allowance of 25 grams of meat per day in Palestine, according to the press Jews consumed on average “60 or more grams per day”.²⁸ This was especially the case in Tel Aviv. As expressed by historian Anat Helman: “European meat-eating habits reigned in Tel Aviv”.²⁹ With animals imported live and slaughtered locally, during the interwar period 50 percent of all imported meat was consumed in the city.³⁰

How is it that these urban settlers ignored the advice of experts? The ideologies of Labor Zionism seeped through experts’ advice, but only a minority of Jewish settlers actually saw themselves as pioneers who manifested Zionism in their every action.³¹ While familiar with the ideals of Zionism, these “ordinary” immigrants also carried over to Palestine habits rooted in their countries of origin.³² Scholar Yael Raviv claims that consuming the produce of Jewish agriculture, such as “Hebrew milk”, was a “political statement, a deliberate performance” while eating other agricultural produce was “an everyday, unmarked act”.³³ I argue, however, that resisting the advice of experts by consuming meat was deliberate and equally political. Thus, the second question this dissertation deals with illustrates what happened when urban settlers ignored experts’ advice. I ask in particular how did settlers in Tel Aviv gain access to meat in a country of limited supply? What were the systems they

²⁷ Helman, “European Jews in the Levant Heat”.

²⁸ “What are the Butchers Striking about?” *Ha'boker* 28 January 1947; “Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?” *Ha'boker* 26 August 1947.

²⁹ Helman, “European Jews in the Levant Heat”: 75

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Gur Alroey, *An Unpromising Land Jewish Migration to Palestine in the Early Twentieth Century*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

³² Anat Helman, *Young Tel Aviv: A Tale of Two Cities* (London: Brandeis University Press, 2010).

³³ Raviv, *Falafel Nation*: 55.

created to make Tel Aviv into Palestine's carnivorous capital? And how was this, indeed, political?

This dissertation shows how beyond the disagreement over meat – should it or should it not be eaten in Palestine – access to meat was also a highly contentious matter *within* Tel Aviv. Writing about “dietary utopias” in Egypt and Cuba, Eman Morsi writes: “The history of access to meat becomes a story of the shaping of desires and expectations”.³⁴ In Tel Aviv, desires and expectations revolved around the idea of consuming meat but also of procuring, producing, and selling meat. Questions of access to meat in Tel Aviv caused consumers to complain, importers to profiteer, butchers to strike, and the municipality to quarrel with representatives of the Mandate government, among other internal and external disputes. Tracing the place of meat in Tel Aviv highlights the internal contradictions, conflicting attitudes, and varying practices concerning meat consumption among Jews in Palestine. In this way, instead of focusing solely on the ideals of Labor Zionism, this dissertation highlights alternative ideas about eating, living, and making a living in Palestine.

The last question this dissertation presents has to do with retrieving the role of meat in the colonization of Palestine. Specifically, I ask how did urban Jewish settlers take over and/or bypass a livestock economy based on regional ties between Arab breeders and merchants. In addition, how was the procurement of meat for the population of Tel Aviv linked to the city's expansion? How did the city use the “meat cause” to gain more land, taxes, and authority? By looking into these questions with a focus on Tel Aviv's slaughterhouse and its meat-strikes, I show how even though experts disregarded urban settlers' meat habit, ultimately, the systems created to maintain it were not detrimental to the Zionist cause but promoted it.

³⁴ Eman Morsi, “Let Them Eat Meat: The Literary Afterlives of Castro's and Nasser's Dietary Utopias”, in: Chen Jian, Martin Klimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, Joanna Waley-Cohen (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation-Building* (New York: Routledge, 2018): 565.

II. Historiography

MEAT

Cattle Colonialism

Beginning with Alfred Crosby's definition of "ecological imperialism", historians have shown how animals were instrumental in assisting Europeans to take over land and establish colonies overseas.³⁵ As an extension of "ecological imperialism", John Ryan Fischer discusses "cattle colonialism" as the process in which Europeans introduced domesticated livestock to new territories, and the animals became a forerunner for colonialism. As they reproduced, multiplied, and wandered, cattle conquered frontiers and trailblazed the way for settlers, turning open fields into farmlands and transforming grass into meat.³⁶ In addition, as Virginia Dejohn Anderson argues, because livestock-based agriculture was widespread in Europe, European settlers considered animal husbandry necessary for agricultural development in the territories they took over. Within the imperial design, "progress" and "development" was the process in which European models of agriculture were adopted and performed by indigenous peoples.³⁷

Recent contributions to this historiography also emphasize how in addition to ecological shifts, "cattle colonialism" changed how both settlers and indigenous people lived and earned a living.³⁸ At the meeting point of environment and labor, scholars show how the imagery of the cowboy was culturally celebrated but historically sidelined to make way for industrial ranching and meatpacking.³⁹ In the 19th and 20th centuries, this resulted in reduced prices for

³⁵ Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986).

³⁶ John Ryan Fischer, *Cattle Colonialism: An Environmental History of the Conquest of California and Hawai'i* (University Of North Carolina Press, 2015).

³⁷ Virginia Dejohn Anderson, *Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

³⁸ Fischer, *Cattle Colonialism*.

beef to the enjoyment of growing urban middle classes, who, in turn, came to expect beef at affordable prices. Supplying cheap beef meant continuous dispossession of lands to produce cattle and the exploitation of workers to produce meat, feeding into the cyclical “cattle-beef-complex” as defined by Joshua Specht.⁴⁰ In the 21st century, Alex Blanchette shows how the industrial ranch has evolved into the “factory-farm”: a type of corporate town where everything is planned and practiced in accordance with the production of meat-animals. Because meat-animals are capital, and producing them is so vital for these towns' livelihoods, human life there is reorganized around the lives and deaths of animals.⁴¹

Blanchette's contribution is significant. As stated in the previous section, a prominent argument in the historiography of meat has to do with humans' domination over animals (and essentially nature). Historian Christopher Otter has made the most compelling recent contribution to this argument by showing how human interventions have – in effect – created an artificial bovine. This animal not only lives in an entirely artificial ecology, outside of which it could not exist, but even its body has been reconfigured to meet human meat demands. For example, through experiments in feeding and slaughter, humans achieved the desired “marble effect”: no longer does fat and muscle develop separately in bovine bodies but simultaneously and intermingled. According to Otter, this “artificialization” is designed to capitalize cattle to the maximum, which demonstrates the power of humans over the entire existence and bodily evolution of other species.⁴² Blanchette rejects – in his words – human

³⁹ This argument is central in: Joshua Specht, *Red Meat Republic: A Hoof-to-Table History of How Beef Changed America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020). Related arguments were made in earlier works. Notably, Bornholdt illustrates the gap between the imagery of gauchos (used by the state) and the realities of their livelihood struggles, in: Bornholdt, “What Is a Gaucho?”. Pilcher shows the imperialism of American meatpacking as the practice was exported and enforced in Mexico, depriving traditional Mexican butchers and methods. In: Jeffrey M Pilcher, *The Sausage Rebellion: Public Health, Private Enterprise, and Meat in Mexico City: 1890-1917* (Albuquerque: University Of New Mexico Press, 2006).

⁴⁰ Specht, *Red Meat Republic*.

⁴¹ Alex Blanchette, *Porkopolis: American Animality, Standardized Life, and the Factory Farm* (London: Duke University Press, 2020).

⁴² Christopher Otter, “Planet of Meat: A Biological History,” in Tony Bennett (ed.) *Challenging (the) Humanities* (Canberra: The Australian Academy of the Humanities, 2013).

domination as an analytical framework. Instead, the anthropologist claims that through the “factory-farm” human and animal lives are subjected to “industrial capital animality”.⁴³ Yet the two are not mutually exclusive. If we consider Otter and Blanchette’s works together, what we can see that power lies in the production of cattle as capital. The drive for capital dominates over humans and animal lives together.

Another important factor of the power paradigm inherent to the history of meat has to do with the history of the science of nutrition, especially as it relates to imperialism. Meat, nutrition, and imperialism seem to be intertwined since the mid-19th century. Following the discovery of the protein in 1838, an enduring taste for meat was validated by science as physiologically essential. As Mark Finlay illustrates, some pseudo-scientific theories followed. In Britain, the United States, Germany, and elsewhere, chemists, physicians, cookbook authors, and statesmen theorized that if meat builds muscle, it also builds political power because a nation’s strength depended on the vitality of its men. Was it a coincidence, they asked, that the most powerful nations of their period were meat-eaters? How else could one explain the domination of the “beef-eating nations” over the “rice-eating peoples”?⁴⁴ Rather than casual annotations on local diets and global dynamics of power, these comments became embedded in nutritional thinking.

In the imperial encounter of nutrition, the diets of indigenous peoples were used both to explain their perceived inferiority and to perpetuate it. British nutritionist John Boyd Orr was especially influential in his examination of diets in Kenya in the 1920s. The study highlighted

⁴³ Some scholars think that *Porkopolis*, published this year, marks the beginning of a historiographical turn. Gabriel Rosenberg from Duke University described *Porkopolis* as a “field-defining work”. Quoted from Duke University Press website: <https://www.dukeupress.edu/porkopolis> For more, see Rosenberg’s conversation with Blanchette: “Working Pigs and Humans in the Age of Covid-19,” *The Abusable Past: Radical History Review* (September 4, 2020), <https://www.radicalhistoryreview.org/abusablepast/working-pigs-and-humans-in-the-age-of-covid-19/> [Last accessed 20 December 2020].

⁴⁴ Mark R Finlay, “Early Marketing of the Theory of Nutrition: The Science and Culture of Liebig’s Extract of Meat”, in: Kamminga and Cunningham (eds.) *The Science and Culture of Nutrition 1840-1940* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995): 48–49.

that the meat-rich Maasai diet was nutritionally superior to Kikuyu vegetarian diets.⁴⁵ Similarly, and during the same period, in India colonial nutritionists highlighted the dairy-rich diets of northern “martial races” such as the Sikhs, versus the “poor rice diets” of the “non-martial” southerners such as the Bengalis.⁴⁶ Yet as historians of medicine have since shown, the deficiencies in indigenous diets that were “discovered” by colonial nutritionists, were often directly caused by colonial policies on food, agriculture, and taxation.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, nutrition studies in the colonies served both to design colonial policies there, as well as inform the metropole.

As Otter shows, the British “nutrition transition”, which highlighted the nutritional value of meat, evolved in tandem with the growing accessibility of meat in Britain.⁴⁸ Accessible meat was first a matter of military provisions, as the nutrition (and morale) of soldiers was deemed nationally vital. Thus, while one British colonel concluded that “nothing will conduce to the health and strength of the fighting man as fresh bread and fresh meat”, limited availability made fresh-meat-alternatives more practical options.⁴⁹ To nourish soldiers, sailors, and settlers, scientists first invented tinned meats and beef extracts (believed to provide the nutrients of meat, though the latter contained mainly its aromas).⁵⁰ These made their way back to the metropole, but advancements in freezing technologies were even more revolutionary for working-class diets. Frozen meat was almost “as good as fresh” and immensely more affordable and portable. Deeming access to beef almost a human right, by 1914 the British

⁴⁵ Cynthia Brantley, “Kikuyu-Maasai Nutrition and Colonial Science: the Orr and Gilks Study in Late 1920s Kenya Revisited”, *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 30, no. 1 (1997): 59-60.

⁴⁶ David Arnold, “British India and the ‘Beriberi Problem’, 1798–1942,” *Medical History* 54, no. 3 (2010): 295–314.

⁴⁷ Michael Worboys, “The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition between the Wars,” in David Arnold (ed.) *Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988): 208–25; Marilyn Little, “Imperialism, Colonialism and the New Science of Nutrition: The Tanganyika Experience, 1925–1945,” *Social Science & Medicine* 32, no. 1 (1991): 11–14.

⁴⁸ Chris Otter, “The British Nutrition Transition and Its Histories,” *History Compass* 10, no. 11 (2012): 812–25.

⁴⁹ Rachel Duffett, *The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2012): 37-38.

⁵⁰ Finlay, “Early Marketing of the Theory of Nutrition”: 48-53.

Empire promised British citizens a growing stream of frozen meat from Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and South Africa.⁵¹

What enabled this “democratization” according to Otter, was the British food system which first introduced livestock *from* Britain to settler-colonies; only then did settlers breed those species and sent them back *to* the metropole.⁵² As such, Otter argues, Britain’s imperial meat industry was an extension of Crosby’s “ecological imperialism”.⁵³ A parallel process occurred which we can define here as “nutritional imperialism”. Just as the British Empire played a major role in spreading livestock and meat around the world, so it did with the language of nutrition. The canonical publications of British nutritionist Orr as well as other influential figures such as Wallace Aykroyd, were then made international as they were adopted and promoted by the League of Nations.⁵⁴

Nutrition studies were also connected to tropical medicine, a field embedded in the power structures of imperialism.⁵⁵ With Europeans moving mainly to climates considered tropical, and tropical medicine especially concerned with the acclimatization of Europeans to new territories, climate science, and nutrition became intertwined. What, how much, or how little to eat in hot weather became an issue worthy of study, especially when it came to meat and fat. As Sherene Seikaly notes, Western allowances of approximately 100 grams of animal protein and 100 grams of fat were reduced for India (roughly by half) and Palestine (roughly by a third) due to their climates. According to the nutritional survey of Palestine conducted by W.J. Vickers, based on and inspired by Orr and Aykroyd’s studies, even these reduced

⁵¹ Duffett, *The Stomach for Fighting*: 37-38, 41-51, 114-116; Finlay, “Early Marketing of the Theory of Nutrition”: 54-58. Frozen meat became so significant by this stage that as early as 1912 a history of the frozen meat trade was published. See: James Troubridge Critchell and Joseph Raymond, *A History of the Frozen Meat Trade* (London: Constable and Company, 1912)

⁵² For this process, see especially: Rebecca J H Woods, *The Herds Shot Round the World: Native Breeds and the British Empire, 1800-1900* (Chapel Hill: The University Of North Carolina Press, 2017).

⁵³ Otter, “The British Nutrition Transition”.

⁵⁴ For example: Etienne Burnet and W R Aykroyd, *Nutrition and Public Health, Quarterly Bulletin of the Health Organization*, vol. IV (2) (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935).

⁵⁵ Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science*.

amounts were incompatible with habits in the Middle East where people were “vegetarian in mind”.⁵⁶

The issue of climate, diet, meat, and fat in Palestine will be discussed in Chapter 1. For now, suffice it to state that Vickers’ assumption was inaccurate at best. Middle-Easterners were not inherently vegetarian.⁵⁷ On Barak demonstrates that in the Middle East as well, the “democratization of meat” was parallel to the “nutrition transition”. Just as medical and popular journals communicated the nutritious value of meat to American and European audiences, Arabic journals did the same in the Middle East.⁵⁸ Historically, Ottoman officials and wealthy Arabs consumed plenty of meat.⁵⁹ Gradually, the discourse of nutrition conveyed to Arab middle-classes that they should do so too.⁶⁰ Barak also demonstrates that, as in Britain, the “democratization of meat” was linked to frozen meat. For Britain, freezing was a technology of expansion, both in terms of what it did for meat’s shelf-life as well as how it enabled the British empire to expand. Shipping frozen meat to the Middle East, Barak claims, connected the technology of artificial cold and the language of nutrition, making eating meat into an arena of imperial encounter.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Sherene Seikaly, *Men of Capital Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Stanford, Calif. Stanford Univ. Press, 2016): 92, 96, 213 n. 152.

⁵⁷ I think that this point has not been emphasized enough in the historiography of Palestine. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, meat consumption was linked to urbanization. As shown by Sarah Graham Brown, in Palestine, in the late 19th century, a process of rapid urbanization followed developments in industry and export. As a result, Seikaly shows, between landowner elites and rural peasants grew an Arab Palestinian urban middle class. Thus, in addition to elites (and Bedouins who engaged in much of the livestock production), I suspect that these middle classes were the main Arab consumers of meat in Palestine. My impression from searching through Arabic Palestinian press is that many news articles discuss the price and availability of meat. This implies that it was not only Jews who were preoccupied with access to meat in Palestine, but Palestinian Arabs were as well. For urbanization and the formation of the middle-class see: Sarah Graham Brown, “Political Economy of Jabal Nablus, 1920-1948,” in *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982): 90-92; Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 8. For an example of articles on access to meat in the Palestinian press, see for example: “The Fall in Meat Prices and the Arrival of Sheep”, *Al-Difa*, 6 March 1940; “The High Price of Meat and the Lack of Sheep”, *Al-Difa*, 26 December 1939; “Thirty Days without Meat”, *Mirat al-Sharq*, 20 October 1931.

⁵⁸ On Barak, *Powering Empire: How Coal Made the Middle East and Sparked Global Carbonization* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2020): 70-71.

⁵⁹ Julia Hauser, “A Frugal Crescent: Perceptions of Foodways in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in Nineteenth-Century Vegetarian Discourse,” in Julia Hauser and Bilal Orfali (eds.) *Insatiable Appetite: Food as Cultural Signifier in the Middle East and Beyond* (Leiden: Brill, 2019): 292–316.

⁶⁰ Barak, *Powering Empire*: 70-71.

To summarize, “cattle colonialism” brought animals to colonies, and technologies of preservation – tinning, dehydrating, and especially freezing – brought them back to the metropole, supported by the discourse of nutrition. The idea that meat was vital to build strong nations was not only adopted in countries with a long-standing meat-habit but notably also in countries asking to resemble them, as Wilson Warren shows in China and Japan.⁶² One might expect a similar process in Palestine. Zionism was a settler-colonial movement, enabled by the British imperial system. As scholars have well-demonstrated, within this system European Jewish settlers functioned as “agents of development”, eager to introduce scientific methods and modern technology into various fields including medicine, infrastructure, and environmental management.⁶³ Political power, capital, European models of agriculture, and a “nutrition transition” were all part of the Zionist colonization of Palestine, and yet, as we will see below, Zionist “cattle colonialism” worked differently.

Cattle Colonialism in Palestine

As Tamar Novick has shown, in Palestine as elsewhere, Europeans – missionaries, German Templars, then Jews – brought cattle to Palestine. However, she writes “while the raising of cows for meat has been enormously important in global imperialism, and the British Empire in particular... Jewish settlers put very little emphasis on cow meat”.⁶⁴ In Palestine, Zionist “cattle colonialism” focused on milk, not meat. In addition, the way Zionists employed the animals was different: herds of cattle were not set free to roam and

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Wilson J Warren, *Meat Makes People Powerful: A Global History of the Modern Era* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2018).

⁶³ The term “agents of development” is from Norris’ *Land of Progress*, illustrating European Jews’ role as middlemen driving colonial development. As examples for the above-mentioned see especially: Jacob Norris, *Land of Progress : Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development, 1905-1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Sandra Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation : Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920-1947* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2007); Fredrik Meiton, *Electrical Palestine : Capital and Technology from Empire to Nation* (Oakland, California University Of California Press, 2019).

⁶⁴ Novick, *Milk and Honey*: 67 n. 156.

land-grab. On the contrary, dairy cows were highly monitored. The architects and operators of the Zionist dairy industry kept cattle closely under watch in demarcated areas of Jewish agricultural settlements. Observing, calculating, and experimenting, planners of the Zionist dairy industry were determined to find the optimal conditions for high yields of milk.⁶⁵

Though they focused on milk instead of meat, Zionists designed an agricultural settlement based on the European model of the mixed farm system. Popular in Britain, Germany, and perfected in Denmark, the model incorporated animal husbandry and various crops.⁶⁶ When settlement planners designed collective settlements (*kvutzot* or *kibbutzim*), dairies were their pillar. The Zionist dairy industry invested heavily in the importation of European cattle to Palestine, cross-breeding with local bovine species, and experimenting in feeding. These strenuous efforts paid off. Dairy became the second most profitable produce in the *Yishuv* after citrus. As citrus was mostly produced by private capital, this meant that dairy was the flagship project of Labor Zionism's collective farming ideology. Its success was economically and ideologically vital if the movement was to determine the character of the future Jewish state.⁶⁷

Thus milk, and not meat, became the nutritional star of the Zionist "nutrition transition".⁶⁸ When Zionist nutrition experts promoted milk, they were not in defiance of international nutrition science, but well-within its scope. Orr's experiments in Scotland and Aykrod's in India both highlighted the importance of milk in diets, especially for children.⁶⁹ Moreover,

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Markus Lampe and Paul Sharp, *A Land of Milk and Butter: How Elites Created the Modern Danish Dairy Industry* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018); Hezi Amiur, *Mixed Farm and Smallholding in Zionist Settlement Thought* (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2016) [Hebrew].

⁶⁷ Shavit and Giladi, "The Role of the Dairy Farm"; Nahum Karlinsky, *California Dreaming: Ideology, Society, and Technology in the Citrus Industry of Palestine, 1890-1939* (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 2005); Novick, *Milk and Honey*; Amiur, *Mixed Farm*.

⁶⁸ I demonstrate this in Chapter 1.

⁶⁹ Kenneth J. Carpenter, "The Work of Wallace Aykroyd: International Nutritionist and Author," *The Journal of Nutrition* 137, no. 4 (2007): 873–78; Andrea S. Wiley, "Cow's Milk as Children's Food: Insights from India and

milk gained superfood status when it became understood as vital both for human development and agricultural (read: economic) development. International nutritionists connected through the League of Nations promoted milk as a product that not only quenched thirst and relieved hunger but also made children spring in height, protected vulnerable bodies from deficiency and infectious diseases, and rejuvenated national economies.⁷⁰ As such, encouraged by the League of Nations, various countries combined feeding programs with agricultural reforms that focused on dairy. A corresponding trend followed: agriculture served the science of nutrition and nutritionists promoted national agricultural industries.⁷¹ |

The alignment of nutritionists with national agricultural industries will be further demonstrated in this dissertation. However, I am less convinced by the assertion in much of the Zionist historiography that efforts in the field of agriculture were solely ideologically – rather than economically – driven. Prominent economic historian Jacob Metzger explains that “the Zionist objective throughout the interwar period was to promote agriculture as the key national industry”, but not due to its financial potential.⁷² Rather, the promotion of agriculture was an ideological choice, because agriculture embodied two invaluable ideals for Zionist ideologues: land and labor.⁷³ Historians followed Metzger’s lead and explained the various and deep ways in which farming became entangled in Zionist ideals as an antidote to Jewish otherness. Suffice it to state that for the dominant Zionist labor movement, agriculture was an

the United States”, In: Jakob A. Klein James L. Watson (eds.) *The Handbook of Food and Anthropology* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016): 227-248.

⁷⁰ Josep L. Barona, “Nutrition and Health. The International Context During the Inter-War Crisis,” *Social History of Medicine* 21, no. 1 (2008): 87–105; Josep L. Barona, *The Problem of Nutrition: Experimental Science, Public Health and Economy in Europe, 1914-1945* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010).

⁷¹ Barona, “Nutrition and Health”: 95-97; E. Melanie Dupuis, *Nature’s Perfect Food: How Milk Became America’s Drink* (New York: New York University Press, 2002):114; Michael Bresalier, “From Healthy Cows to Healthy Humans: Integrated Approaches to World Hunger, c. 1930–1965,” in Woods Abigail et al (eds.) *Animals and the Shaping of Modern Medicine* (Cham: Springer International, 2018): 119–60.

⁷² Jacob Metzger, “Economic Structure and National Goals—The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine,” *The Journal of Economic History* 38, no. 1 (1978): 106. For a detailed critique on Metzger’s publications, see: Seikaly, *Men of Capital* .

⁷³ See for example: Boaz Neumann, *Land and Desire in Early Zionism* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2011).

instrument to transform Jews from a nation of wanderers to a “nation among nations”, a legitimate political entity with an intimate relationship to the land of Palestine.⁷⁴ The purpose of agriculture, as so many studies reiterate, was never profit. Rather, the role of agriculture was to create a self-reliant settlement that produced its own food and strengthened Jews’ connection to the land through consuming the produce of “their own soil”.⁷⁵

In contrast, I argue that profitability, as a long-term goal, was an important consideration for Jewish agriculture, even if not its immediate outcome. Here, I draw on new research on profitability in private-capital driven fields as well as in fields associated with Labor Zionism. As Fredrik Meiton has recently recognized: “Zionism’s territorial claim was based, to a far greater extent than is recognized in the existing scholarship, on the promise of organizing an economically viable territory in the context of global trade”.⁷⁶ And this promise appealed to British imperial trade structures.⁷⁷ Zionist efforts in agriculture – like in industry and manufacturing, as Meiton argues – had to do with aspirations to position Palestine within the global flow of production and consumption.⁷⁸

Historian Netta Cohen shows how Jewish agronomists, botanists, economists, and engineers chose which crops to invest in based on cultural inclinations as well as economic motivations. Not all food crops were created equal, and those chosen were, very often, not native to Palestine but acclimatized to it. Mangos, avocados, and guavas were all foreign species of tropical fruits successfully acclimatized to Palestine. Technologies such as intensive irrigation, imported to Palestine from other settler colonies in sub-tropical climates, were key in the successful introduction of another tropical fruit: the Cavendish banana.⁷⁹ Within

⁷⁴ Metzger, “Economic Structure and National Goals”; Almog, *The Sabra*; Neumann, *Land and Desire*; Shavit and Giladi, “The Role of the Dairy Farm”.

⁷⁵ See for example: Tene, “The New Immigrant”: 55.

⁷⁶ Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*: 9.

⁷⁷ A similar argument was made by Norris: Norris, *Land of Progress*.

⁷⁸ Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*: 9.

Palestine, the Union for the Land's Produce (*Totzeret Ha'aretz*) promoted this newcomer as "The Hebrew Banana", yet its more important market was, like Palestine's citrus, the international market. Taking advantage of Palestine's climate and central global location in terms of trade routes, exporting "Hebrew Bananas" to "countries of the temperate zone" was a calculated decision based on profitability.⁸⁰

Before explaining how profitability affected Zionist attitudes to meat, other animal-proteins serve as informative examples. Historian Dan Tamir shows how the introduction of the Carp to Palestine in the 1930s, a fish species historically enjoyed by Jews in Europe, had devastating long-lasting environmental effects on the biodiversity of the country's freshwater bodies. European Jews brought carps to Palestine because – even in their new coastal Mediterranean environment – they were accustomed to it. Tamir understands the introduction of the carp as part of Zionists' efforts to transform Palestine's natural environment. Economically, it also had a clear goal. Raising carp in Palestine allowed the *Yishuv* to import less fish from neighboring Arab countries and frozen fish from Europe, and it also held the profitable potential to enter the international fish trade. Indeed, within a decade, Palestine became a Carp exporter. Ranked today as one of the world's top 100 invasive species, in the 1930s carp was a lucrative business.⁸¹

Much more than fish, or any animal for that matter, introducing European cattle to Palestine had the largest economic and cultural impact on Jewish food-ways. The most celebrated Jewish agricultural achievement in Palestine was the dairy industry.⁸² Dairy became the epitome of labor Zionism's accomplishments by reintroducing milk into "the land of milk and honey". In terms of profitability, "Hebrew milk", unlike the "Hebrew banana", was

⁷⁹ Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science in Palestine*: 154-157.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Tamir, "Motives for Introducing Species": 73-95.

⁸² Novick, *Milk and Honey*.

marketed mainly to Jewish consumers within Palestine, and very little was exported internationally. “Hebrew Cows”, however, quickly gained the attention of international experts and international markets. By cross-breeding European and local bovine species, Zionist experts in Palestine artificially created cows that were not only world-champions in milk yields but were also acclimatized to sub-tropical climates and more immunized to local diseases.⁸³

This was no small achievement. The British government followed developments in Zionist experimentations in breeding and feeding and took notice of their successes.⁸⁴ British officials considered it the only “modern scientific” form of agriculture in the entire “backward” Middle East.⁸⁵ Others were watching as well. In 1939, the Director of farms for the Maharaja of the Indian Emirate of Mysore visited Palestine to purchase “Hebrew Cows”. The bovine species native to his region, like species indigenous to the Middle East, did not provide much milk. Importing European cows to India was unsuccessful, as European breeds could not bear the climate. Experiments in Palestine caught the Director’s attention. Palestine, he figured, was an ideal “transfer station” for India. Like in the case of exporting bananas, Palestine’s climate and location “between cold Europe and very hot India” made it ideal as an export market.⁸⁶ Within the same logic, as Tamar Novick shows, in the 1960s “Hebrew Cows” were exported to Iran, and today, Israeli start-ups offer in-vitro “Hebrew Cow” embryos shipped anywhere in the world.⁸⁷

No such efforts were made in the field of beef. Palestine imported the majority of its livestock, and Zionist experts saw no way to control the production of cattle-for-beef.⁸⁸ It was

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ For example, see various records kept by the Colonial Office under the title: “Zionist Organisation, Palestine: Cattle feeding experiments second programme” between 1926-1931 such as BNA, CO 758/65/1.

⁸⁵ I. A. Gillespie, “*Livestock Survey of Palestine and Transjordan*” 1944, BNA, FO 922/72.

⁸⁶ “Is Palestine the Center for Raising Cows?”, *Haqiqat al-Amr*, 12 July 1939.

⁸⁷ Novick, *Milk and Honey*: 205-206.

more sustainably profitable to use cows for milk and dairy. Yet, even when focused on milk rather than meat, Zionist “cattle colonialism” still linked the dissemination of European agricultural methods and the science of nutrition within the empire. With milk’s vitamin *and* protein content somewhat overshadowing meat in the interwar period, and with its production engrained in European agricultural methods (“development”), Zionist experts could promote milk using its international recognition. And the discourse on milk, just like meat, was seconded by theories on race and power. For example, in efforts to promote the distribution of milk among Jewish schoolchildren, one official stated: “Nutrition experts say that milk builds muscle... The League of Nations says that handsome physique(s) and improved health are found among the races where milk takes up an important place in diet”.⁸⁹ Within the League of Nation’s Mandates system, where nations needed to prove their readiness for self-governance to inherit territories from colonial rule, Zionists experts were “agents of development”. Even without a cowboy ethos, and with an emphasis on milk instead of meat, the agricultural models Zionist experts adopted and the diet they chose to promote, show that “cattle colonialism” was key in the colonization of Palestine.

The next section explores how *urban* settlement was also a central aspect of the colonization of Palestine. With regards to urban settlement, during the Mandate period, Tel Aviv was unmatched. It drew in settlers, hosted the majority of Jewish economic and cultural activity, and in the everyday dealings of its institutions and inhabitants, it delivered an under-examined but omnipresent practice: urban Zionism. Below I discuss Tel Aviv’s position within Jaffa, and how it grew out of it. I begin with urban Zionism and continue by situating Jaffa and Tel Aviv in a historiographical debate – the “dual society” versus “the relational approach” – highlighting three issues in particular, the question of separation, the

⁸⁸ Ettinger, “What are the Products”.

⁸⁹ P. Meltzer, “Speech at the Milk Party in Jerusalem” in *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem* (Jewish National Council in Palestine, 1938): 16.

interconnectedness of the cities and their inhabitants, and urban infrastructure. Finally, I engage with the limited historiography on meat in Tel Aviv and the *Yishuv*.

TEL AVIV

Tel Aviv: Urban Zionism

The Jewish settlement in Palestine, or the *Yishuv*, emerged at the intersection of various currents. Among them, the creation of the LON mandates system which gave Britain a legal framework for colonial rule in Palestine starting from 1920;⁹⁰ a transnational migration of European settlers in search of refuge, new opportunities, or both;⁹¹ and shifts in the World Zionist Organization (WZO) which redirected efforts to resettle Jews in Palestine primarily, embodied by the creation of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JA) in 1929, which collaborated with The Jewish National Council (JNC) in Palestine established already in 1920.⁹²

As a settler-colonial movement within a broader imperial (mandates) system, Jewish European settlers joined a small minority of Sephardi and Yemenite Jews in Palestine. Between the 1920s and 1940s, among the country's Muslim and Christian populations, the Jewish population in Palestine grew demographically and organized politically. The *Yishuv* was a diverse community with respect to their land of origin, language, gender, vocation, creed, and political orientation. Their public affairs, however, were run by a small group of technical experts who were European, male, and highly educated, members of, or chosen by,

⁹⁰ For Palestine and the Jewish settlement within this framework, see: Cyrus Schayegh and Andrew Arsan, *The Routledge Handbook of the History of the Middle East Mandates* (London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2015).

⁹¹ For example, Gur Alroey contextualizes Jewish migration to Palestine by discussing its relation to the great wave of Eastern European migration to the United States. He shows for example that Palestine was often only a second choice when New York was not an option. See: Alroey, *An Unpromising Land*: 116. For the *Yishuv* as a settler-colonial movement see discussion below.

⁹² See for example: Derek Jonathan Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870-1918* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

the WZO, JA, or JNC. They were also, for the most part, invested in the ideals of the Labor Zionist movement, which became dominant during those years and in their aftermath.⁹³

Labor Zionist ideology glorified rural-living in cooperative agricultural settlements, but in reality, most Jews settled in Palestine's towns and cities, even before the Mandate period.⁹⁴ Immigration to Jerusalem, for example, was rooted in Jewish tradition, but another city, Jaffa, was equally attractive due to the opportunities it offered. Jaffa was a central port city and gateway to international trade.⁹⁵ Under the late Ottoman government, the ancient city grew due to migration and urbanization. Ottoman modernization schemes expanded the city's living quarters and public spaces.⁹⁶ Jaffa became a cultural and financial focal point, a hub of Palestinian nationalism, as well as home to growing Jewish neighborhoods such as Neve Tzedek (a center for Jewish intellectuals) and the rapidly growing Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv was established in 1906 and named "Tel Aviv" in 1909. Only later, its administrators achieved official "township" status (1921) and "municipal" status (1934). Yet its appeal to settlers was never limited to its official classification. Already in 1914 Jews in Palestine referred to the neighborhood as a city.⁹⁷ And already in 1914, Zionist operators understood Tel Aviv's pulling powers as both an asset and an obstacle. Historian Gur Alroey quotes an employee of the immigration offices of the Jewish Agency at Jaffa. In 1914 the employee wrote:

Tel Aviv plays an important part in the growth of the *Yishuv*: it attracts new people. It makes the change of place, the move from Europe to

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ S. Ilan Troen, *Imagining Zion: Dreams, Designs, and Realities in a Century of Jewish Settlement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011): 112.

⁹⁵ Daniel Monterescu, *Jaffa Shared and Shattered: Contrived Coexistence in Israel/Palestine* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015): 8.

⁹⁶ Mark LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880-1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

⁹⁷ Nahum Karlinsky, "Jaffa and Tel Aviv before 1948: The Underground Story", in Maoz Azaryahu and S Ilan Troen (eds.) *Tel-Aviv, the First Century: Visions, Designs, Actualities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012): 145.

Asia, easier for them. It makes the country attractive to them... but there is a catch. Many people... choose to settle here rather than to go up to a colony...⁹⁸

In other words, Tel Aviv worked in favor of the Zionists' goals by luring in settlers, but the "catch" was that Tel Aviv was more appealing than the Zionist settlements. Indeed, between 1905 and the eve of World War I, the number of Jews in Jaffa rose from 5,000 to approximately 15,000.⁹⁹ As it grew and established first under the Ottomans and then especially under the British Mandate, Tel Aviv's pull factors for Jewish settlers were unmatched in Palestine. The Mandate period is when Tel Aviv gained its municipal status, and when, according to historian Anat Helman, Tel Aviv's consumer culture sharply clashed with Zionism's pioneering ideals.¹⁰⁰ Between the 1920s and 1940s, the period I focus on in this dissertation, forty percent of Jewish immigrants settled in Tel Aviv. The population of Tel Aviv grew tenfold to some 160 thousand settlers.¹⁰¹ At that point, Jews in Tel Aviv and Jaffa counted for at least one-third of all Jews in Palestine, making it a major Jewish center in the country.¹⁰² By 1948, almost half of the Jews in the newly established state of Israel resided in Tel Aviv.¹⁰³

As Tel Aviv grew, so did the gap between the *Yishuv's* Labor Zionist administration and the majority of Jews in Palestine. During the 1930s, the origins and socioeconomic background of Jewish settlers further diversified. Following the rise of the Nazi party in Germany and the implementation of antisemitic policies in various European countries, the official annual figure of Jews immigrating to Palestine more than tripled. From approximately 9,500 Jewish

⁹⁸ Alroey, *An Unpromising Land*: 179.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* 179.

¹⁰⁰ Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*: 91-92.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰² S. Ilan Troen, "Introduction: Tel-Aviv Imagined and Realized", in Azaryahu and Troen (eds.), *Tel-Aviv, the First Century*: xi.

¹⁰³ Orit Rozin, "Craving Meat during Israel's Austerity Period 1947-1953," in Anat Helman (ed.) *Jews and Their Foodways* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015): 70.

immigrants in 1932, that number jumped to approximately 30 thousand in 1933, then 42 thousand in 1934, 61,500 in 1935, and 29 thousand in 1936.¹⁰⁴ This period also saw the beginning of organized Jewish illegal immigration to Palestine so the numbers of Jews arriving at the country's shores was higher. The British government classified Jewish immigrants by occupation and financial means. In the 1930s we see a substantial increase in the number of so-called "capitalists" immigrants fitting "category A (i)", meaning "persons in possession of at least P.1,000". In 1932 some 700 Jewish immigrants were categorized as "capitalists". In 1933 this number rose to over 3 thousand, and in 1934 over 5 thousand. In other words, within two years this category of immigrants – grew sevenfold.¹⁰⁵ The Sephardi and Yemenite Jewish communities, which were joined by Eastern-European Jews in the 1910s and 1920s, were in the 1930s joined by some immigrants from Middle Eastern countries, but more conspicuously by Central-Europeans of better means, often lumped together as "Germans" or "German-speakers".¹⁰⁶ Certainly, some German-Jews were invested in the ideals of Labor Zionism,¹⁰⁷ yet as a group, this wave was dubbed the "bourgeois *aliyah*", implying that both in their status and their habits they challenged Zionist ideals.¹⁰⁸ |

Historian Hizky Shoham illustrates how Zionism and "bourgeois culture" did not necessarily contradict. Before discussing Shoham's contribution, we should first note the historiographical context of his work. As a subject of academic study, Tel Aviv gained attention only around the 2000s. This attention is linked to other historiographical shifts such as the "spatial turn" which shifted some focus from the state to urban spaces, and Post-

¹⁰⁴ Neil Caplan, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 29.

¹⁰⁵ "Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the year 1934" (Government of Palestine, 1934) available here: <https://cutt.ly/DhVRbh5> [Last accessed 20 December 2020]

¹⁰⁶ Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 72. See also: Tatjana Eichert, *Yekkes and Arabs: Encounters between German-Speaking Jews and Arab Palestinians in British Mandate Palestine, 1920-1948* (PhD Dissertation, The Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies, 2020).

¹⁰⁷ Such as the omnipresent Arthur Ruppin, which we will meet here in Chapter 1. A significant distinction is that Ruppin began his Zionist activism and career already around 1900 and settled in Palestine shortly after.

¹⁰⁸ Yaacov Shavit, "In Search of the Israeli Bourgeoisie" *Cathedra* 95 (2000): 159-164 [Hebrew].

Zionism which began to question Zionism's founding myths – both in historiography and in the everyday lives of Israelis. In addition, scholars began to reflect on Tel Aviv's history towards its centennial in 2009.¹⁰⁹ For Israeli scholars studying spaces other than the state or the glorified *kibbutzim*, Tel Aviv was a natural choice. Nicknamed the “First Hebrew City”, Tel Aviv was the first city designed and constructed with the idea to inhabit Jews, be governed by Jews, and where, as early as 1921, the official language was Hebrew.¹¹⁰ Further illustrating its centrality in the *Yishuv*'s history, years prior to its historiographical recognition, the Hebrew city was also informally known as “the city that begat the state”.¹¹¹

Thus, the concept that Shoham puts forth – urban Zionism – might seem obvious, but historiographically this was not the case. As Shoham notes, “urban Zionism was far from the margins, but its ideology had no ideologues”.¹¹² That is not to say that no one believed in or practiced an urban-capitalist form of Zionism (focused on building cities, manufacturing, industry, finance, etc.), but that while many ideologues articulated an anti-urban Zionist ethos, very few (such as Tel Aviv's iconic mayor Meir Dizengoff) expressed pro-urban Zionism explicitly in writing.¹¹³ The anti-urban anti-capitalist discourse was so prominent that it was even adopted by industrialists and entrepreneurs who encouraged private entrepreneurship.¹¹⁴ As a result, historians, have treated doctrinal texts of Zionist ideologues

¹⁰⁹ Barbara Mann, “Tel Aviv after 100: Notes toward a New Cultural History,” *Jewish Social Studies* 16, no. 2 (2010): 93–110; Uri Ram, “Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the Bifurcation of Israel,” *International Journal of Politics Culture and Society* 19, no. 1 (2005): 21–33; Maoz Azaryahu and S. Ilan Troen, *Tel-Aviv, the First Century: Visions, Designs, Actualities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).

¹¹⁰ Liora R. Halperin, “Hebrew Under English Rule the Language Politics of Mandate Palestine,” in Schayegh and Arsan (eds.) *The Routledge Handbook*: 336–48.

¹¹¹ Montereescu, *Jaffa Shared and Shattered*.

¹¹² Hizky Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv: Purim and the Celebration of Urban Zionism* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2014): XVI.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ For example, Pinhas Rutenberg, one of the most prominent Jewish capitalist entrepreneurs in Palestine and director of the Palestine Electrical Company, is quoted in saying that: “Zionism, its one and only purpose, is saving lives, not making profits”. My translation, as quoted in: Michal Frenkel, Hannah Hertzog, and Yehuda Shenhav, “National Capitalism,” *Theory and Criticism* 9 (1996): 15 [Hebrew]. See also: Gershon Shafir, “Capitalist Binationalism in Mandatory Palestine,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 4 (2011): 611–33.

as the only way to understand Zionism, regardless of how Zionism manifested in reality.¹¹⁵

Instead of rethinking the ideology and how it manifested, Zionist leaders and scholars alike defined the gap between a rural image and an urban reality as a failure of the original grand plan for Palestine.¹¹⁶ Yet arguably, Tel Aviv was one of Zionism's greatest achievements. More than driving "a return to the land", Zionism, as Shoham states, seems like it was a "massive industrialization and urbanization project".¹¹⁷ Indeed, soon enough, Tel Aviv was not only an economic and cultural center for industry, manufacturing, finance, import/export, etc., but also a political center, housing the offices of most Jewish political parties, and a focal point for colonization by housing major Zionist agencies, immigration offices, and national celebrations.¹¹⁸ Tel Aviv was also where David Ben Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister, declared the establishment of the state on the 14th of May 1948. By then, Israel was not only the result of a massive industrial and urban project, as Shoham implies, but as Meiton argues, "was arguably infrastructural before it was anything else".¹¹⁹

With Shoham and Meiton's arguments about the importance of urbanization, industry, and infrastructure in the Zionist project, we can move on to explore how those fields materialized in Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Through industry, infrastructure, and everyday activities, Tel Aviv's leaders and settlers created the Jewish capital of Mandate Palestine. This was not done in a vacuum, and as mentioned earlier, Tel Aviv was first a small Jewish district in Jaffa, and later

¹¹⁵ Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*: 184.

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 172. It seems that Erik Cohen was the first to critically assess this in: Erik Cohen, *The City in the Zionist Ideology* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970).

¹¹⁷ Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*: 183-184. Interestingly, it was precisely the stereotypical image of Jews in Europe as tied to industrialization and urbanization that was at the root of the anti-urban Zionist ethos. Anti-urban attitudes were a form of internalized antisemitism. Hillel Kieval analyzed the discourse of modern antisemitism of the 1870s and 1880s, and its link to anti-urban rhetoric. Within that rhetoric, Kieval claimed, "the Jew" and "the urban" were interchangeable. "The Jew" was depicted both as a victim of modernization as well as the most obvious personification of its corruption by linking the abnormality of "the Jew's body" with the realities of city life. See: Hillel J. Kieval, "Antisemitism and the City: A Beginner's Guide", in Ezra Mendelsohn (ed.) *People of the City: Jews and the Urban Challenge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999): 4-5.

¹¹⁸ Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*.

¹¹⁹ Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*: 6.

its interwoven neighbor. The next section explores some of the infrastructural changes in Jaffa and Tel Aviv during the Mandate period, and how they connected to the conflict between the cities through the prism of one historiographical debate: the “dual society” versus the “relational approach”.

Jaffa and Tel Aviv

In 2013 and 2019 (respectively) two scholars, sociologist Ronen Shamir and the above-mentioned historian Meiton, published books on the same topic: the electrification of Palestine.¹²⁰ Besides the same topic, both studies deal with the same period, largely the same location, many of the protagonists are the same, and both read electrification as an early and crucial component in Zionist state-building and the conflict between Jews and Palestinians in Palestine. I will return to these manuscripts later, but for now, the main difference between the two can be summed up thusly: the first follows a “dual society” approach and the second a “relational approach”.

Shamir highlights “the flow” as a Zionist-led state-building powerhouse (with the actual powerhouse located in Jaffa) unmatched and unanswered by snippets of Palestinian resistance. Shamir claims that the electrical grid itself had agency, and that agency enacted the separation between Jews and Arab Palestinians in Palestine. In Meiton’s critique of Shamir, he notes that it is odd that Shamir is willing to acknowledge the agency of the electrical grid while denying Palestinian agency in its application.¹²¹ Meiton, then, revisits the story of the laying of the electrical grid, with the idea that the technology itself was never neutral, rather inherently political and colonial. Both societies evolved in conversation with it, and in their resistance, Palestinians also *shaped* Palestine’s grid.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ronen Shamir, *Current Flow the Electrification of Palestine* (Stanford, Calif. Stanford University Press, 2013); Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*.

¹²¹ Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*: 10-11.

The two books serve as an example of a debate that initiated in the late 1970s and still shapes the historiography on Palestinians and Jews in Palestine (even when the authors do not explicitly situate their work within the debate). In 1978, Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak put forward the “dual society” theory. They wanted to show how one territory could inhabit two entirely separate ethnonational communities, with separate economies and most prominent in their account – separate institutions.¹²³ In their analysis, Palestine was one land with two separate societies, hence, the “dual society” approach. Economic Historian Jacob Metzger avouched the approach and extended it to his influential “dual economy” idea.¹²⁴ According to Metzger, the Jewish economy in Palestine was a diversified capitalist economy with a high proportion of industry and manufacturing, against the backdrop of a backward Palestinian economy based on “traditional” agriculture (i.e., as opposed to agriculture in Zionist settlements that followed European models and technologies). Scholars have since continued to argue that during the Mandate period the Jewish society successfully built the foundations of the future Jewish state through modern institutions and a sustainable economic model, while Palestine’s Arab majority did neither.

Already in the 1980s scholars published studies on Palestinian economic activity and agency, yet the “dual society” and especially the “dual economy” idea is still persistent.¹²⁵ Perhaps its power lies in its simplicity, self-explanatory qualities, and retrospective “wisdom”: supposedly, Zionists inherited the land from colonial rule because they were more suited to do so. They had the vision, the vigor, and the human capital to build the foundations of their future state. Yet the first problem of the “dual society” approach is that it measured

¹²² Ibid. 6,8,11.

¹²³ Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine Under the Mandate* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

¹²⁴ Jacob Metzger, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

¹²⁵ Roger Owen (ed.), *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1982)

Palestinian capital and capitalist activities using the same tools that were part of a system that oppressed and dispossessed Palestinians in the first place. Another problem with the “dual society” approach is that it compares and contrasts the Zionist and Palestinian national movements as if both were equal and had an even chance at realizing nation-building schemes. Finally, the approach ignores both Palestinian agency as well as the various meeting points of Jews and Palestinians in Palestine.¹²⁶

The first scholars who began to question the “dual society” approach were also the first to historicize the Zionist movement within the global phenomena of settler colonialism.¹²⁷ They were followed by historian Zachary Lockman who articulated an alternative approach to the “dual society”, coining the term the “relational approach”. In his *Comrades and Enemies*, Lockman essentially highlights the points of contact between Palestinian and Jewish workers in Palestine, showcasing that the two societies never existed in a vacuum. Even when their encounters were not positive, they, and their respective national movements, still developed and formed in *relation* to one another.¹²⁸

Deborah Bernstein’s *Constructing Boundaries* followed Lockman in using the “relational approach” as well as a labor-history approach to examine Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine during the Mandate period.¹²⁹ Bernstein is especially relevant here, as she explicitly brings the “relational approach” to Tel Aviv’s history.¹³⁰ As she challenges separatism in her work on other spaces, when studying the frontier zones connecting Jaffa and Tel Aviv, she shows

¹²⁶ For more see Seikaly’s introduction: Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 1-22.

¹²⁷ Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: the Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

¹²⁸ Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies : Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906-1948* (Berkeley ; Los Angeles ; London: University Of California Press, 1996).

¹²⁹ Deborah S Bernstein, *Constructing Boundaries: Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory Palestine* (Albany: State University Of New York Press, 2000).

¹³⁰ Deborah Bernstein, “Contested Contact: Proximity and Social Control in Pre-1948 Jaffa and Tel-Aviv,” in Daniel Monterescu and Dan Rabinowitz (eds.) *Mixed Towns, Trapped Communities* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007): 215–42. I would argue that Mark LeVine is the first to use a “relational approach” to the history of Jaffa and Tel Aviv. See below.

evidence of some trade and interpersonal relations between the communities. Moreover, she claims, even if Jews and Palestinians did not meet personally or often, they “were in one another’s immediate orbit”.¹³¹ By their sheer proximity, the inhabitants of Jaffa and Tel Aviv were connected.¹³² By occupying the same spaces, Jaffa and Tel Aviv’s inhabitants were not “dual” in the sense that they existed in isolation of each other. In the cities’ juxtaposition, the nation-building that took place within Jaffa and Tel Aviv formed in a dialectical fashion.¹³³

As two connected spaces that were also focal points of rival national movements (one settler and one indigenous, one backed by an imperial structure and one occupied by it), scholars apply both the “dual” and the “relational” approaches to the history of Tel Aviv. Those following a “dual society” approach, even if they do not express it specifically, highlight Tel Aviv’s inherent difference from Jaffa emphasizing it as a modern city, based on European standards of sanitation, urban planning, and consumer culture, disregarding or ignoring Jaffa altogether. Others, who follow a “relational approach”, highlight how Jaffa and Tel Aviv were parts of the same city, with daily meeting points, commercial ties, enabling social relationships that ranged from collaboration to competition, from romantic affairs to violent altercations.¹³⁴

One question that reflects the “relational approach” in Jaffa and Tel Aviv is the question of separation, which will also be discussed in this dissertation in Chapter 3. When the British government established its civil administration in Palestine in 1920 (after its military occupation of Palestine in late 1917) it acknowledged Jaffa’s central role by declaring it a

¹³¹ Deborah Bernstein, “South of Tel-Aviv and North of Jaffa—The Frontier Zone of “In Between”” in Azaryahu and Troen, *Tel-Aviv, the First Century*: 122. See also: Or Aleksandrowicz, “Paper Boundaries: The Erased History of The Neighborhood of Neve Shalom,” *Theory and Criticism* 41 (2013): 165–97.

¹³² Bernstein, “South of Tel-Aviv and North of Jaffa”: 122.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 134.

¹³⁴ Within one volume, we can compare for example between the chapters of Shavit and Azaryahu with the chapters of Shoham, Bernstein, Karlinsky, and Nitzan-Shiftan. See: Azaryahu and Troen, *Tel-Aviv, the First Century*: 3-12, 13-33, 34-59, 115-137, 373-405.

municipality under the Jerusalem-Jaffa district. The following year, the government declared Tel Aviv a township under Jaffa's jurisdiction.¹³⁵ While Jaffa had a mayor, Tel Aviv only had a President of Township and a town council. Tel Aviv's residents paid taxes in Jaffa, held business in Jaffa, and voted in local elections.¹³⁶ Scholars agree that Tel Aviv's aspirations for urban autonomy were largely met by an enabling British government as the city's administrators and the government's commissioners shared a vision of an accelerated modernization and development of Palestine.¹³⁷ In practical terms, however, this was a gradual process.

Instead of glossing over this period as if separation from Jaffa was inevitable, scholars using a "relational approach", delve into that period. For example, Nahum Karlinsky shows that not everyone in Tel Aviv pushed for separation from Jaffa. In 1921, when Tel Aviv became a township, it annexed some Jewish neighborhoods, but the more established neighborhoods (such as Neve Tzedek) expressed a firm desire to stay within Jaffa's jurisdiction to the extent of bringing the issue to court.¹³⁸ Some of Tel Aviv's officials and councilmen were also against the separation from Jaffa. Besides Jaffa's economic significance for export (especially citrus) and import, the city was a gateway for Jewish immigration to Palestine. This was not only a key economic factor but a vital demographic facilitator for the Zionist colonization of Palestine. Thus, as Tamir Goren discusses, separation from Jaffa meant that Tel Aviv's citizens no longer voted in Jaffa's elections, losing some influence in the city's administration and in protecting Zionist interests there.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Internally however, "municipality" or "city" was already used. Karlinsky claims that while initially referred to as a neighborhood, already in 1914 the term "city" came into use. Karlinsky, "The Underground Story": 145. In addition, in the TAMA files I consulted, while English correspondence with the British use "Township" and "President of Township" regarding Tel Aviv, Hebrew correspondence use "Municipality" and "Mayor" at least 10 years before officially recognized as such by the British.

¹³⁶ In the 1920s, for example, the Jaffa municipal council reflected the diversity of its inhabitants with six Muslim councilmen, three Christians (including the deputy mayor), and three Jews. Tamir Goren, "Tel Aviv and the Question of Separation from Jaffa 1921–1936," *Middle Eastern Studies* 52, no. 3 (2016): 473–475, 480.

¹³⁷ For example: Karlinsky, "The Underground Story"; Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*, Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*.

¹³⁸ Karlinsky, "The Underground Story": 146.

One thing that did propel separation were cycles of violence.¹⁴⁰ The 1921 disturbances pushed half of Jaffa's Jews towards Tel Aviv to settle in the zone in-between the cities.¹⁴¹ Similarly, the violent outbreak of 1929, a watershed moment in the history of Palestine, pushed the separation of the cities forward.¹⁴² Eventually, in 1934, the British government granted Tel Aviv separate municipal status, but just as separation was not predetermined, it was also not absolute. Jews continued to live in or visit Jaffa (and Palestinians in Tel Aviv) especially in the undefined areas of in-between such as the Manshieh quarter.¹⁴³ Moreover, as first shown by Mark LeVine and later by Goren, before and after cycles of violence, cooperation between the municipalities of Jaffa and Tel Aviv was common whether if it was considered natural, vital, or simply practical.¹⁴⁴

Karlinsky demonstrates LeVine's point with a somewhat lowly example: the cities' interconnected sewage system. Karlinsky shows that Tel Aviv's town council continually pushed to separate, often supported by the British administration, but found that cooperation with Jaffa was inevitable and indeed worthwhile for laying the sewage infrastructure under the neighborhoods comprising Jaffa and Tel Aviv.¹⁴⁵ In another example, Goren illustrates that even while the administrators of Tel Aviv lobbied the government to allow the construction of a harbor there, essentially to compete with Jaffa's port, they also lobbied for the development of Jaffa's port when the latter was competing over funds and development

¹³⁹ Goren "Tel Aviv and the Question of Separation": 473-487.

¹⁴⁰ As Julia Phillips Cohen discusses, cycles of violence and cooperation depended on broader historical and political contexts of alliances, identity formation, and civil status. See especially Chapter 3: Battling Neighbors in: Julia Phillips Cohen, *Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁴¹ Bernstein, "South of Tel-Aviv and North of Jaffa".

¹⁴² The 1929 events are known as the known as the Palestinian Revolt (or the "Great Arab Revolt") the Buraq Uprising (Arabic: Thawrat al-Buraq) and the Occurrences of Tarpat (Hebrew: Meora'ot Tarpat). Hillel Cohen, *Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1929* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2015).

¹⁴³ Bernstein, "South of Tel-Aviv and North of Jaffa"; Aleksandrowicz, "Paper Boundaries".

¹⁴⁴ LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*.

¹⁴⁵ Karlinsky, "The Underground Story".

schemes with Haifa's port. Thus, both scholars confirm the intricacies of independence and codependence, of urban-national goals and everyday considerations.¹⁴⁶

LeVine was also the first to illustrate how European-Jews or British governors were not the sole messengers of modern technology, infrastructure, or taste. As LeVine writes, "modernity did not have to penetrate Jaffa", rather, the Jaffa's inhabitants actively adopted various forms of modern architecture, fashion, and knowledge.¹⁴⁷ Even though LeVine shows that Tel Aviv administrators' view of modernity was exclusivist, part of an inherently colonial discourse of backwardness versus progress, and European-Jew versus Arab, his approach is relational as his narrative still highlights "interaction, interdependence, and mutual influence" between Jaffa and Tel Aviv.¹⁴⁸

Returning to Shamir and Meiton, we can now tie the histories of Jaffa and Tel Aviv with infrastructure and the "relational approach" more concretely. One difference that ties Shamir and Meiton to the "relational" approach is reflected in the sources they employ. For example, Shamir did not consult Arabic sources, and so his understanding of Palestinian agency is limited. In addition, Meiton approaches the history of electrification more like LeVine does the history of Jaffa, and more apparently like Jacob Norris approaches other developmental projects in Palestine: mineral extraction at the Dead Sea and the construction of the Haifa Port (beginning in 1922).¹⁴⁹ As Norris and Meiton demonstrate, part of the historiographical tendency to associate Jews with "progress" and the institutional, industrial, infrastructural, and agricultural development of Palestine, has to do with the fact that more often than not, British administrators chose Jewish entrepreneurs to lead projects in these fields. This was not because there were no eligible Palestinian entrepreneurs. It was due, as the scholars

¹⁴⁶ Goren, *Rise and Fall*: 115-117.

¹⁴⁷ LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 3.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 13.

¹⁴⁹ Norris, *Land of Progress*.

illustrate, to a bias among the British administration in Palestine towards Jewish entrepreneurs, engineers, experts, etc. This is exactly what Norris suggests in his definition of “agents of development”; Jews were not the sole promoters of modernization schemes for Palestine (sewage, electricity, natural-resource extraction) but were seen by the imperial power as the most qualified force to bring them about.¹⁵⁰

Norris’ and Meitons’ arguments and analyses are convincing and each serves as a noteworthy contribution to the literature. Their work has informed how I read the events this dissertation focuses on. The idea of “agents of development” helps to understand Jewish efforts in nutrition and the support they received from the government to do so. More directly, I build on Norris’ and Meitons’ work on the role of developmental infrastructure, as linked to state-building, in my analysis of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse (1931) and the attempts to expand the capacities of the city’s port (circa 1937-1939). However, because my prism is different, so are the actors I focus on and their motivations. I explain this below.

In this dissertation, after shedding light on the origins of the dispute between Zionist experts and urban consumers (Chapter 1) and discussing meat ecologies and economies (Chapter 2), I move on to explore how Tel Aviv’s administrators worked to establish a separate slaughterhouse years before Tel Aviv officially separated from Jaffa (Chapter 3). I do so within two overlapping processes. The first can be described as infrastructural Zionist state-building, i.e., the creation of infrastructures to help build a nation-state. The second process has to do with the township’s activism in promoting this goal, especially as it linked with the question of separation from Jaffa. Tel Aviv’s administrators saw themselves as part of the national project, or in fact, essential to it. This especially applies to Dizengoff and his successor Israel Rokach, but as I show in the chapter, this extended to the town’s principal

¹⁵⁰ Norris, *Land of Progress*; Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*.

economist, chief veterinarian, and even its butchers. Through the infrastructure/facility of the slaughterhouse, we see how Tel Aviv's leaders and ordinary settlers promoted urban Zionism and separation as a state-building strategy.¹⁵¹

Like in the accounts of Norris and Meiton, here too, Jews were not the only ones who desired and designed modern infrastructures. Jaffa's municipality, led by Mayor Assem El Said, planned, approved, and erected a modern slaughterhouse in 1926, while Tel Aviv only managed to do so in 1931 (still some three years before its municipal status).¹⁵² This illustrates LeVine's point: it was not Tel Aviv that modernized Jaffa.¹⁵³ At least in the case of the slaughterhouse, the Jews of Tel Aviv were the ones lagging behind. The slaughterhouse issue also demonstrates that separation from Jaffa was a *clearly defined* goal of Zionist state-building only since and because of the events of 1929.

Where this dissertation deviates from Norris and Meiton has to do with the topic I explore. Changing the focus highlights different actors and thusly different sympathies. Using meat as my lens, the most important British actors, and those most referred to in the sources studied here, were in charge of food provisions, rations, import, health, and nutrition. Coincidentally, the most dominant figure in Palestine in all these fields was Colonel George Wykeham Heron. Heron was a trained surgeon and the Director of Medical Services in Palestine in 1920-1946. In 1939 High Commissioner of Palestine Harold MacMichael, the highest-ranking British authority in Palestine, appointed Heron as the country's Controller of Supplies. This made Heron the most influential figure when it came to health, welfare, hygiene, food, imports, who also had a say in matters of agriculture, husbandry, and veterinary. As described succinctly by Historian Sherene Seikaly, in Palestine, Heron was

¹⁵¹ Shafir, "Capitalist Binationalism": 611.

¹⁵² I use the transliteration "El Said" instead of other variations as that is how the Mayor is referred to in TAMA sources.

¹⁵³ LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 13

“the engineer of import and consumption control”.¹⁵⁴ Jefferey Walsh, the wartime Food Controller, was Heron’s deputy. Oddly enough, scholars mention Walsh much more often than Heron.¹⁵⁵

To add nuance to British favoritism (as described by Norris and Meiton) Heron exemplifies how different British officials had different sentiments towards Jews and Palestinians in Palestine and their respective national causes. For one, Heron served under both Arthur Grenfell Wauchope, High Commissioner between 1931-1938, remembered as the most sympathetic and supportive of the Zionist settlement in Palestine, as well as under MacMichael who served between 1938-1944, considered the most hostile to the *Yishuv*.¹⁵⁶ Second, as the focus of this dissertation is nutrition, consumption, import, and slaughter, Heron is the most prominent British official to appear in the sources. Coincidentally, sources describe Heron as either anti-Zionist, antisemitic, or both.¹⁵⁷ Some scholars have also mentioned, in passing, Herons’ disputes with Zionist institutions in the field of public health.¹⁵⁸ This is especially interesting considering that scholars widely agree that the field of

¹⁵⁴ Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 130.

¹⁵⁵ Chris Wilson, in his PhD dissertation, mentions that for such an omnipresent character it is surprising that Heron is only ever mentioned in passing and has never been examined in depth in academic literature. See: Chris Wilson, *Mental Illness and the British Mandate in Palestine* (PhD dissertation, University of Cambridge): 43.

¹⁵⁶ This was also the case for lower-ranking officials. Historian Efrat Ben-Ze'ev's uses oral histories of Palestine Police officers to show how vastly their views on the conflict varied. See: Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, *Remembering Palestine in 1948: Beyond National Narratives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

¹⁵⁷ One New York-based newspapers described Heron as “antisemitic” in the article: “British Military Officer Reveals New Facts About Anti-Semitism of British Palestine Officials”, *Jewish Daily Bulletin*, 13 December 1929. In addition, it is interesting to note here that Heron also explicitly blamed the Jews in Palestine for raising price of milk, eggs, and other produce during World War II in: “Notes to the Superintendent of General Supplies, Colonel Heron's Speech at the Nutrition Conference” *Al-Difa*, 21 December 1941.

¹⁵⁸ None of the prominent scholars in the field have done so, but Marcella Simoni compares how Heron referred to Zionist spending in the field of welfare as “extravagant”, while the British treasury based in London referred to those same efforts by stating that “one cannot but feel considerable sympathy for the Jewish organizations which have done such excellent work in Palestine and now find themselves financially strained”. Simoni accredits this discrepancy to differences between local administration in Palestine and British Government in London. In addition, Wilson, in his PhD dissertation, also quotes Colonel Frederick Hermann Kisch, a decorated officer in the British Army (who we will encounter again in Chapter 3), saying that Kisch was unable to “recollect one single occasion in which Colonel Heron has shown a sympathetic attitude towards Jewish medical needs, or to our representations to the health department”. See: Simoni, Marcella. “A Dangerous

public health and welfare especially illustrates the like-mindedness of Zionists and British administrators, often at the expense of Palestinians.¹⁵⁹ A better examination of this contradiction awaits, but in Chapters 3 and 4 I add more nuance to British favoritism, by showing Heron through the eyes of Dizengoff, Rokach, and the Jewish press, notwithstanding the inherently uneven story of the colonization of Palestine under the British Mandate.

To conclude, in this dissertation I aimed to follow the “relational approach” but the resulting manuscript is more of a compromise.¹⁶⁰ The majority of my sources were produced by European Jews, and I focus primarily on European Jews. As such, this is a disservice to Palestine’s majority of Muslims and Christians, as well as to Sephardi and Yemenite Jews (and additional religious minorities). However, this focus is related to using meat as a prism. The settlers of the 1920s and 1930s especially highlight a moment of continuity and change for Palestine’s livestock and meat ecologies, economies, and cultures. To deal with some of this unevenness, whenever possible, I tried to incorporate at least some broader Palestinian issues, and, importantly, Palestinian sources (see “Sources” section). Finally, the dissertation shows how European Jews did indeed see themselves as separate from Palestinians, but they were always in interaction with Palestinians. Jewish and Palestinian mayors corresponded, Jewish and Palestinian cattle merchants competed, and Jewish and Palestinian butchers met at slaughterhouses. |

In the next section, I focus specifically on meat in Tel Aviv. The relevant literature is limited to a handful of articles. Thus, I do not present it within historiographical debates or turns, rather, I explain how they shaped the early stages of my research. I focus on what I found

Legacy: Welfare in British Palestine, 1930-1939”. *Jewish History* 13, no. 2 (1999): 84-85; Wilson, *Mental Illness and the British Mandate*: 43.

¹⁵⁹ Sufian, *Healing the Land*; Seikaly, *Men of Capital* .

¹⁶⁰ I borrow the idea of a compromise between the two approaches from Yoni Furas: Yoni Furas, *Educating Palestine : Teaching and Learning History under the Mandate* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2020): 11.

particularly useful in the literature and which questions were left unanswered by it. Later, I demonstrate how these questions directed me towards certain archives and sources.

Meat in Tel Aviv

A growing Jewish population of means, increasingly of central European origin, redesigned consumption habits and consumerism in Tel Aviv. Between 1932-1936, alongside small family-operated retail stalls and stores, new settlers established larger department stores, selling products that would have been considered a luxury before. Food stores became the largest part of Tel Aviv's retail business; almost fifty percent of shops sold food, and food businesses, including shops, kiosks, and eateries, employed almost forty percent of workers in the city. The turnover for food stores stood at almost thirty percent. These factors made it the biggest and most successful business sector in Tel Aviv during that period. Eateries constituted fifteen percent of all business in Tel Aviv, yet most of them were small, simple and their profits were mostly meager.¹⁶¹ In 1936 the Palestinian revolt caused a recession, yet food retail was booming. This was due to high demand, as often is the case during crises, but also related to the migration of Jews and Jewish business from Jaffa to Tel Aviv following clashes in Jaffa.¹⁶²

Tel Aviv's settlers established more food businesses as well as created a specific market to cater to their tastes. Imports soared in 1934. During the second half of 1934, imports amounted to some 8 million Palestine Pounds, a 2 million increase compared to the same period the previous year.¹⁶³ Delicatessens sold various imported products: canned foods,

¹⁶¹ Yaakov Shavit and Gideon Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume I: The Birth of a Town 1909-1936* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2001): 262-269 [Hebrew]. Shavit and Bigger published a four-volume series dedicated to the history of Tel Aviv. It is highly informative, like an encyclopedia of the city, divided by periods. It is critical in as much as it focuses on the realities of the city as well as its image, yet it is highly uncritical when it comes to Jaffa for example, which mostly appears as a backdrop to Tel Aviv.

¹⁶² Yaakov Shavit and Gideon Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume II: From a City-State to a City in a State 1936-1952* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2007): 202 [Hebrew].

butter, cheese, salted or smoked fish, and sausages. Gradually, Jews in Tel Aviv also consumed butter, sour milk, and sour cream produced by Jewish industries, and local eggs were added to growing quantities of imported eggs. The majority of fruits and vegetables consumed in the city were either imported or produced by Palestinians, but some were also produced by Jewish farmers. Other products sold in Tel Aviv's stores included flour, rice, pasta, tea, cocoa, coffee, sugar, potatoes, apples, tomatoes, onions, peas, lentils, and oil. Bread was sold in bakeries and remained the most basic food, generally eaten at every meal, though new varieties appeared on the market during the 1930s.¹⁶⁴ As opposed to bread, consumption of dairy, eggs, and meat depended on income.¹⁶⁵

Regarding meat, new settlers also changed the urban landscape. Between 1931 and 1936 the number of butcher shops doubled. Over 70 new butcher shops opened in the city during those five years, bringing their number in 1936 to 150. By end of the decade, there was one butcher shop for every 897 citizens, and this figure includes only the registered meat vendors.¹⁶⁶ In comparison, there were only 44 bakeries, even though bread was the city's staple starch and meat – a luxury.¹⁶⁷ Butchers in Tel Aviv sold at least half of the beef produced from imported cattle. While Palestinians consumed mostly sheep and goats, Jews consumed mainly beef and poultry. Spinneys' – the British retailer with stores in Tel Aviv, Haifa and elsewhere – sold pork products to restaurants and private consumers, as did some local butcher shops.¹⁶⁸

Although meat businesses grew, examining a list of professional associations in Tel Aviv from 1937 reveals that among 19 associations, meat workers were the smallest group.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ "1.5 Million Palestine Pounds for Imports a Month", *Davar*, 3 May 1935.

¹⁶⁴ Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 75-78; "More Food Imports", *The Palestine Post*, 1 December 1939; "Growth of Poultry Farming", *The Palestine Post*, 31 October 1939. Seikaly mentions how as part of food rationing schemes during World War II, the British imposed a strict one shape and two sizes plan after complaining that over 30 varieties of bread and all shapes and sizes were baked in Palestine. Seikaly, 91.

¹⁶⁵ Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 78.

¹⁶⁶ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume II*: 202.

¹⁶⁷ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume I*: 268, 276-277.

¹⁶⁸ Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 75-76.

Workers' associations in Tel Aviv also serve as a reminder that Labor Zionist ideologies were not absent in Tel Aviv. In the 1920s, 30 percent of Tel Aviv's population were members of the *Histadrut* the general workers union and the mainstay of the Labor Zionist movement. This dramatically dropped in the 1930s but still stood at 14 percent.¹⁷⁰ Owners of vegetarian restaurants in Tel Aviv promoted them as healthy alternatives to the meat-centered menus of other establishments. Similarly, fishmongers in Tel Aviv advertised in Hebrew and German that fresh fish, as opposed to meat, salted, and smoked fish, were healthier in Tel Aviv's hot and humid climate.¹⁷¹ These examples imply that the messages of the *Yishuv*'s nutritionists made their way to the city. Yet, as Helman shows, even the *Histadrut*'s cooperative restaurant in Tel Aviv shifted towards meat between the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1930s, when the standard of living was raised in Tel Aviv, the eatery added meat to its previously inexpensive vegetarian meals. As Helman notes, this indicates that “carnivorous desires had not been overcome or altered, only denied temporarily, out of necessity”.¹⁷²

Helman is the first scholar to write about meat in the *Yishuv*. She shortly explores these carnivorous desires in her article on climate and everyday life in Tel Aviv by focusing more broadly on leisure and consumerism. The article's 6-page subsection titled “too much meat and fat” was especially formative for my research, pointing me towards a gap between experts' advice on consumption and climate, and consumers' meat-eating habits. For Helman, that gap was due to a clash between Zionist asceticism and Tel Aviv's hedonism, as well as an example of how immigrants slowly adjust to new environments especially when it comes to food.¹⁷³ Yet, as both experts and urban middle-classes were immigrants and were

¹⁶⁹ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume II*: 306. The Butchers Association, which I present in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, was not mentioned in the list.

¹⁷⁰ Helman, “European Jews in the Levant Heat”: 78.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 80.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 78-79.

¹⁷³ Helman, “European Jews in the Levant Heat”: 75.

often from the same countries of origin (or even the same cities) and their socioeconomic background was similar, I was eager to make more sense of the gap, and the roots of experts' aversion to meat.

Following Helman, historian Orit Rozin explored the desire for (“too much”) meat in an article about meat shortages during Israel’s austerity period. The austerity period is defined as 1948-1953, but its policies were in fact a continuum of British wartime rationing in Palestine which extended into the first years of Israeli independence. As Rozin shows, meat was the most sought after and debated foodstuff during the period. She uses the concept of “meat hunger” to describe a sense of deprivation caused specifically by the lack of meat.¹⁷⁴ This appetite for meat also resurfaced in a study on Palestinian food in Israel. There, in a passing comment, sociologist Liora Gvion mentions how austerity, remembered by Israeli Jews for its “meat hunger”, was not experienced similarly by Palestinian communities. A man from Jaffa, who Gvion interviewed, claimed that his family’s diet did not change much due to the austerity period. They had so little need for their meat-rations stamps that they preferred to sell them to Jews or exchange them in favor of other goods.¹⁷⁵

Why did Palestinians, who remained in Jaffa after 1948, experience austerity differently than Jews in neighboring Tel Aviv? Thinking of “meat hunger” during austerity, and the fact that austerity policies were rooted in the 1940s, Jews in Palestine seem to have experienced – to paraphrase Seikaly’s “meatless days” – a meatless decade.¹⁷⁶ If so, what made Jews not only desire meat but also expect it? Instead of thinking of meat solely as an imported habit and simply accepting that meat was mostly imported, as implied by Helman and Rozin, these questions led me to explore the meat-possibilities that existed in Palestine before and upon

¹⁷⁴ Rozin, “Craving Meat during Israel’s Austerity Period”.

¹⁷⁵ Liora Gvion, *Beyond Hummus and Falafel: Social and Political Aspects of Palestinian Food in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012): 152–153.

¹⁷⁶ “Meatless days” is the title of Seikaly’s PhD dissertation that was then published as “*Men of Capital*”.

settlers' arrival. Before conducting my own research into the political ecologies and economies of livestock in Palestine, the works of Amos Nadan and Roza El-Eini on Palestinian animal husbandry were informative.¹⁷⁷ Yet while both scholars mention Palestine's limited abilities in cattle-breeding, and thusly the growing numbers of animals imported to the country, nothing in the academic literature suggested that any scholar prior to this dissertation seriously considered *who* imported these animals, and from *where*.

One very recent addition to the historiography adds slightly more information. In an article on British efforts to prevent cruelty to animals in Palestine, historian Alma Igra shortly discusses Jewish slaughter (*schita*) and the economy of kosher meat. Igra illustrates the importance of importing live animals (instead of meat) to be slaughtered locally.¹⁷⁸ Igra also connects the history of meat with the British imperial system in Palestine (like, if you will, Norris and Meiton do in their fields). Related to this, Igra also published a chapter in an edited volume where she discusses a dispute over kosher meat at a cooperative eatery in Tel Aviv.¹⁷⁹ There, Igra claims that “import and slaughter were interwoven within the British control systems and Jewish autonomy”.¹⁸⁰ To this, the historian adds that the animals “were produced across the empire and slaughtered in Tel Aviv”.¹⁸¹

My research shows, however, that most cattle slaughtered in Tel Aviv were not produced within the British Empire.¹⁸² Thus, notwithstanding Igra's contribution, the extent to which meat in Palestine was a clear imperial story and the actual degree of the “Jewish autonomy”

¹⁷⁷ Amos Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy under the Mandate* (Cambridge: Harvard Center For Middle Eastern Studies, 2006); El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*.

¹⁷⁸ Alma Igra, “Mandate of Compassion: Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in Palestine, 1919–1939”, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (2019).

¹⁷⁹ Alma Igra, “Kosher Life: The Kosher Meat Controversy and The Socialist Cooperative Restaurant in Tel Aviv, 1934-1940,” in Dafna Hirsch (ed.) *Encounters: History and Anthropology of the Israeli-Palestinian Space* (Jerusalem: Van Leer Institute Press, 2019): 115–46 [Hebrew].

¹⁸⁰ My Translation. *Ibid.*, 121.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 141.

¹⁸² More on this in the Sources and Structure sub-section below.

she mentions, is where we seem to have come up with different conclusions. In addition, also relating import, Igra notes that separation between the Arab and the Jewish economies was made only through the interconnectedness of Tel Aviv's port with those of the empire.¹⁸³ This is a fascinating idea, but here again, my research shows otherwise. While Tel Aviv's administrators sought to connect it directly to various international ports, including imperial ones, this goal never materialized at least when it came to landing cattle there. I return to this below, in the next section.

To conclude, the limited historiography devoted to meat in the *Yishuv* puts forth engaging arguments and analyses but is limited in its scope as well as the information it provides. The literature leaves many unanswered questions. What was the root of the dispute between experts and consumers? Where did local meat come from? Who bred livestock and delt it? If the majority of meat was imported – who imported it and where from? Was it indeed a straightforward imperial story or were their other actors involved? And equally important, what does the history of meat in Tel Aviv teach us about the city? This dissertation intervenes in the literature by seeking to answer these questions and more. It is the first study of substantial length and breadth to explore the history of meat in the *Yishuv* grounded in extensive archival research and a variety of sources. In this dissertation, meat is also a means to an end. I use it as a prism into the history of Tel Aviv, informed by the idea of urban Zionism and enlightened by the “relational approach”. Below I detail how the above-questions directed my choice of archives and sources, and how they shaped each chapter and its arguments.

III. Sources and Structure

¹⁸³ Igra, “Kosher Life”: 141

In this dissertation, I draw from a wide variety of sources from archives in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, New York, London, Oxford, Geneva, and online. These include personal, municipal, national, and colonial archives, and I primarily make use of correspondences, memorandums, minutes, speeches, publications, scientific and popular journals, cookbooks, recipes, newsletters, and newspaper articles. Except for newspapers, that were used throughout the dissertation to illuminate and tie between other sources, each chapter comprises its own corpus of sources. This dictated each chapters' focus, level of analysis, key actors, and arguments. Thus, here I describe the structure of the dissertation, chapter by chapter, as well as the core sources that designed each chapter.

In *Chapter 1: How to Eat in Palestine*, I delve deeper into the gap between experts and everyday consumers.¹⁸⁴ To do so, I first explore how food became a matter of scientific expertise in the *Yishuv* and the contexts in which experts attempted to educate the *Yishuv* on matters of consumption. Hadassah, The Women's Zionist Organization of America, was the first to introduce nutrition and home-economics to Jews in Palestine through its Hadassah Medical Organization (HMO).¹⁸⁵ After HMO laid the foundations for food programs and nutrition-education as nation-building apparatuses, additional experts, associated with the JA and JNC, became involved in them as well.

To examine the motivations behind experts' advice, I visited the Hadassah Archives in New York, the National Library of Israel (NLI), and the Central Zionist Archives (CZA) in Jerusalem. These archives hold the papers and publication of national experts. Initially, I

¹⁸⁴ Throughout the dissertation I use "Zionist experts" to succinctly describe experts from various fields (such as nutrition, agronomy, and economy) who weighed in on matters of consumption in Palestine. I refer to them as "Zionist" to emphasize the difference between "Jewish" and "Zionist", indicating their ideological affiliation and how their work promoted ideals linked with the dominant stream of Labor Zionism. In contrast to "Zionist experts" I use "Jewish settlers". Their Jewishness does not refer to religiosity but to identify them as a group.

¹⁸⁵ The American heritage in Zionist nation-building seems to have been obscured in the historiography. Looking through the prism of nutrition, however, American influence seems very present. See for example: Baruch Rosen and Yonel Rosenthal, "American Influences on the Development of the Pasteurized Dairy Industry in Israel", *Cathedra* 71 (1994): 35-60 [Hebrew].

searched for experts' writings on the nutritional value of meat, but I found none. What I did find were countless mentions, reports, and publications dedicated to milk. Nutrition journals devoted entire sections to milk, dairy reports described production issues and marketing problems, nutritional surveys paid special attention to dairy, and school-feeding programs seemed fixated on distributing "Hebrew" milk to children.¹⁸⁶ If meat was ever mentioned, it was mostly in negation to milk. Asking why milk and not meat, I was able to begin to trace the role of nutrition in the *Yishuv*.

Together, HMO, JNC, and JA promoted the acclimatization of Jews to Palestine through "rational consumption": a way of eating based on economizing, supporting national industries, and building healthy bodies based on the science of nutrition. This meant that not only nutritionists and home-economists (many of them female) distributed nutritional knowledge, but so did prominent public health experts, economists, and agronomists (all of them male). By employing nutritional advice, Zionist experts attempted to steer consumption in a way that would fit Jewish food-production. In this way, HMO and JNC/JA efforts complemented each other. Hadassah invested funds and energy to create ideal Jewish citizens through food programs, and Jewish semi-governmental agencies used nutrition to strengthen the foundations of the Jewish settlement. And the latter especially highlighted agricultural industries in which meat-production was marginal at best.

HMO, JA, and JNC communicated their ideas and directed their programs towards the Jewish public alone. While the chapter focuses on European-Jews, I also shortly introduce two

¹⁸⁶ For example, NLI and CZA hold booklets and publication such as a Journal *Ha'mazon* ("the Food") published by the national Nutrition Committee in 1938, and various booklets such *Milk as Food for the People* (Tel Aviv: The Nutrition Committee, 1937). Also kept at these archives, are JNC initiatives published as: *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem* (Jewish National Council in Palestine, 1938) and agricultural and economic reports concerning milk-production in the Jewish agricultural settlements. Hadassah's Archives are on long-term deposit at the American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS) kept at the Center for Jewish History in New York. Though many Hadassah sources are also available at CZA (for example Sarah Broomborg's Personal Papers, or correspondences between JNC and HMO), generally, the New York collections are more detailed, organized, and categorized in a way which makes them easier to access. They also contain an inordinate amount of information on HMO's school-lunch program. For this and more, see: Chapter 1.

significant efforts in Arab-Palestinian nutritional programs/education.¹⁸⁷ The first was by domestic-reformer Salwa Said, mentioned previously by scholars. The second was the understudied Palestinian school-lunch program which began to operate some twenty years after the HMO's program for Jewish children, and only following the 1943 British Nutrition Survey of Palestine "discovered" malnutrition among Palestine's poor.¹⁸⁸ For both programs, I relied on Palestinian Arabic Press.¹⁸⁹ I only begin to scratch the surface of the potential – and historical significance – of analyzing the Palestinian lunch program, but it was nevertheless important to introduce here for a more well-rounded depiction of nutritional efforts under the British Mandate.

While the level of analysis of Chapter 1 is national, *Chapter 2: Meat-Animals in Palestine* shifts mostly between the local and the regional. The perspective is more fluid, following livestock tracks across territories in the Middle East towards Palestine's markets, the import of animals from abroad by sea, and meat-controversies related to the breeding, sale, and consumption of non-kosher meats in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The purpose of this is to provide a wide view of meat production in Palestine: where meat came from, which animals were eaten, who bred, dealt, and handled them, and how was the politics of meat-related to the political ecologies and economies of livestock in Palestine. |

¹⁸⁷ I do not do justice here to the Palestinian efforts in the field, and I hope to do so in the future. One significant difference I would like to point out already is that while Palestinian nutritional efforts were mostly decentralized, relying on grass-roots initiatives and until the 1940s mostly charity, efforts in the Jewish sector during the Mandate period became highly centralized. I think this is part of the reason Palestinian efforts have received less historiographical attention. See Chapter 1.

¹⁸⁸ W. J. Vickers, *A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine, 1942-1943* (Jerusalem: Palestine Department of Health, 1944). Vickers was a senior medical officer, a deputy to formally mentioned Colonel Heron. The original document is kept at Rhodes House in Oxford as well as the NLI. The survey was conducted as the basis for wartime ration schemes in Palestine and "discovered" the nutritional discrepancies between Jews and Palestinians. It seems that Kligler, although not mentioned in the survey, contributed to it. Implied here: "Jewish Population Here Well Nourished", *The Palestine Post*, 13 November 1939.

¹⁸⁹ I used various Palestinian newspapers but tried to rely more on *Filastin* and *Al-Difa* - the most popular newspapers in Palestine. The papers were also published in Jaffa which makes them even more relevant here. For more see: Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 55.

As mentioned above, for local animal husbandry, I relied on Nadan and El-Eini mostly. Yet for a broader view of livestock ecologies and economies, not only in Palestine but in the region, I turned to the British National Archives (BNA), especially to records of the Foreign Office (FO) and Colonial Office (CO). The most extensive and useful primary source I use here is The FO's Livestock Survey of Palestine and Transjordan, and the adjacent communications and annotation existing in the file. The survey was conducted by an officer of the Middle East Supply Center, an agency established in 1941 to control supplies under the British Ministry of War. Granted the exploitive nature of an imperial power collecting data to inform wartime provision policies, the strength of the source for my purposes was not only in its wealth of data but its broad view of the ecologies and economies of meat in the region.¹⁹⁰

To track where cattle were imported from, and by whom, Tel Aviv Municipal Archives (TAMA) provided vital information.¹⁹¹ The chief economist of the Tel Aviv municipality was Nathan Ben-Nathan, who studied the meat trade. I relied on much of his correspondences and on reports he conducted on "the meat problem", as well as on a similar report found in the Lavon Institute for Labour Research (Lavon).¹⁹² TAMA was also useful due to additional officials' correspondences with cattle importers as well as the municipality's internal memos and minutes on the topic of import. As opposed to my experience looking for information on meat at CZA and NLI, when searching through the online archives of Palestine's Jewish

¹⁹⁰ I. A. Gillespie, "Livestock Survey of Palestine and Transjordan" 1944, BNA, FO 922/72 [hereafter: *Livestock Survey*]. I also relied especially on the "Livestock Survey Summary of Reports Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine" in the same folder [hereafter: *Livestock Summary*].

¹⁹¹ Due to its urban focus, TAMA was the most important archive for this dissertation as a whole. Though TAMA is well-known and centrally located in Tel Aviv, scholars working on Israeli history or even the Yishuv's history, do not pay it as much attention in comparison to CZA and ISA. I was mostly influenced to visit TAMA following Helman's vivid descriptions of everyday life in historic Tel Aviv based on TAMA sources (See for example: Anat Helman, "Taking the Bus in 1920s and 1930s Tel Aviv," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 4 (2006): 625–40). Upon arrival I was struck by the amount of collections relating to meat in the city with relation to kashrut, slaughter, prices, taxes, license, etc.

¹⁹² Nathan Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question in Tel Aviv" in *Yedioth Iriath Tel Aviv* (Tel Aviv Municipality News) 16 September 1937 [hereafter: "The Meat Question"]; Nathan Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Problem in Tel Aviv and the Entire Country" in *Yedioth Iriath Tel Aviv*, January 1939 [hereafter: "The Meat Problem"]; Y. Greenfeld, "To the Meat Question in Tel Aviv (Memorandum) 1937-1938", The Economic Committee and the Subcommittee to *Tozeret Ha'aretz*, Lavon, Tel Aviv Workers' Council, 4-250-72-1-1195.

press (in Hebrew and English), I found countless references to meat, especially on its availability, prices, and indeed – its importers. I incorporated these into Chapter 2 and all chapters here.¹⁹³

Based on this research, I show in Chapter 2 that import was conducted within an imperial system, as Igra discusses, but for the most part, animals slaughtered in Tel Aviv were not bred within the empire. Cattle, sheep, and goats slaughtered in Palestine came from over twenty countries in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Europe. For cattle, the Balkans, and Romania in particular, were especially prominent in the sources. The Balkans were not part of the empire and animal husbandry there was not linked to the imperial system. Thus, instead of pointing to the empire, in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I highlight the agency of Jewish settlers who imported cattle. Broadly, import was conducted with an imperial system, but the story of cattle imports, I argue, is more directly a story of settler-colonialism, and a variation of the “cattle-colonialism” paradigm. By highlighting Jewish cattle importers in Palestine, I also contribute to the historiography of Jewish cattle dealers, which normally ends with the *shoa*.¹⁹⁴ I show how cattle-dealing, historically associated with Jews in Central and Eastern-

¹⁹³ “The Jewish press” refers to newspapers owned by Jews, generally addressing Jewish readers and issues of interest to the Jewish community in Palestine. All newspapers used here are in Hebrew, except for *The Palestine Post* (known before 1932 as the Palestine Bulletin and since 1950 the Jerusalem Post). *The Palestine Post* is a particularly useful source because it was designed to appeal to English-readers such as British officials in the country. As such, it takes care in explaining local Jewish issues to those less familiar with them, thus providing scholars today more comprehensive details on various events. I would also like to note that Jewish newspapers in Palestine, as elsewhere, were affiliated with a political party, an ideology, or a certain style. Most relevant and used here are: *Davar*, the mouthpiece of the *Histadrut* which promoted Labor Zionist agendas, *Ha'boker* and *Ha'aretz* two papers associated with the middle-class, *Doar Ha'yom* (literally: The Daily Mail) which aimed at a wide audience through its popular topics and tendency towards sensationalism, *Ha'tzofe*, associated with the religious-national movement, and finally *Ha'mashkif* (and *Ha'yarden*) who belonged to the hawkish “Revisionist” movement. These papers present a wide spectrum of political views in the Yishuv. While I do not discuss party-affiliation in the dissertation, it is important to note the “identities” of these newspapers that I quote, and the fact that all were equally interested in the “meat question”. Finally, access to all these papers and many more was made possible through NLI’s amazing digitization project of historical Jewish press in multiple languages from multiple countries and a vast timeframe (and more recently, though not as extensive, Palestinian Arabic Press from the late Ottoman and Mandate periods.). See: “Historical Jewish Press,” www.nli.org.il, <https://www.nli.org.il/en/discover/newspapers/jpress>; “Newspapers | The National Library of Israel,” www.nli.org.il, <https://jrayed.org/en/newspapers/home>. [last accessed 15 December 2020]

¹⁹⁴ See Chapter 2, sub-section II “Importing Cattle: Balkan Beef”, as well as discussion on *schita*, protection of animals, and antisemitism in Chapter 4.

Europe, continued in Palestine. While it was a far smaller phenomenon, I trace how Jewish settlers formally involved in the European meat trade made use of their old ties to create a transcontinental network of cattle dealers, supplying Balkan beef to Tel Aviv's consumers.

Finally, Chapter 2 tracks controversies surrounding the breeding, slaughter, and consumption of other, non-kosher, animals: pigs and camels. For this, the Israel State Archives (ISA) proved valuable for the personal papers they hold (such as Jewish politician David-Zvi Pinkas who was vocal on kosher matters). More importantly as ISA, the national archive, "inherited" archives from the Mandate government, it holds some rare Palestinian official sources, much of which were destroyed or displaced during the war of 1948. From ISA folders titled "Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous (1943-1944)"¹⁹⁵ and "Veterinary Service: Movement of Meat (1941-1947)", I was able to retrieve complaints and requests written by Christian and Muslim breeders and butchers in Palestine, such as the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine who protested against British policies and a Muslim camel-butcher with Jewish customers. Thinking with the "relational approach", these documents express Arab perceptions of Jews as both clients and competitors, as I show in the chapter. Also regarding pig-breeding, I relied on two additional Palestinian sources: a memoir and an oral history interview.¹⁹⁶ Thus, while Chapter 2 focuses on Jews in Palestine, I try to illustrate a diversity of concerns regarding meat between local and regional ecologies, economies, and encounters.

After the national perspective of Chapter 1 and the regional/local perspective of Chapter 2, *Chapter 3: The Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse* and *Chapter 4: The Tel Aviv Meat Strikes* zoom in to

¹⁹⁵ Registered under "abandoned documents", an archival euphemism that pertains to documents collected during or following the 1948 war.

¹⁹⁶ Mahmud Zaydan, "Interview with Marie Shammās", *Al Nakba Collection, Palestine Oral History Archive* <https://cutt.ly/xhVRE8J> [last accessed 15 December 2020]; Wasif Jawhariyah, Salim Tamari, Issam Nassar, Nada Elzeer, and Rachel Beckles Willson, *The storyteller of Jerusalem the life and times of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, 1904-1948* (Northampton: Olive Branch Press, 2013).

provide an explicit urban perspective. As such, TAMA was the key archive for these chapters. In these chapters, I included reports, minutes, statistics, internal memos, and other communications kept in folders on the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse and an informative collection of folders titled “the war on the high price of meat” starting in 1937 and continuing well-into Israeli independence. Especially illuminating were correspondences kept in these folders. Key interlocutors include Mayor Meir Dizengoff, who led Tel Aviv’s town council (and later municipality) between 1911-1936, his deputy David Bloch, and Dizengoff’s successor Israel Rokach who served as mayor until 1953. Also important were the correspondences, reports, and internal memos of the above-mentioned Ben-Nathan, Chief veterinarian Moshe Caspi (and later Arie Levit), and others. These men communicated with each other as well as with other stakeholders who played various roles in the city’s meat trade.

Chapter 3 focuses on the years leading up to the establishment of two separate slaughterhouses for essentially one city – Jaffa and its Tel Aviv. Some important sources are correspondences with Mayor of Jaffa Assem El Said. This is not solely because of El Said’s rank and the informative substance of the letters, but also, because Jaffa’s municipal archives have “disappeared”.¹⁹⁷ The Tel Aviv slaughterhouse was a matter of debate between Jaffa’s municipality and Tel Aviv’s town council in the 1920s, and thinking with the “relational approach” one could also point out that Dizengoff, Tel Aviv’s iconic mayor, was in fact, for the majority of his career subordinate to Jaffa’s El Said.¹⁹⁸

Also in Chapter 3, Like Karlinsky and Goren, I engage with the question of separation and cooperation. While Tel Aviv was only granted separate Municipal status in 1934, the city’s administrators were already making plans for a separate slaughterhouse as early as 1925. Nevertheless, as I show, the events of 1929 were the point where these efforts exacerbated on

¹⁹⁷ Karlinsky, “The Underground Story”: 152. This also relates to the 1948 war.

¹⁹⁸ Tamir Goren, “Relations between Tel Aviv and Jaffa 1921–1936: A Reassessment, *Journal of Israeli History*,” *Journal of Israeli History* 36, no. 1 (2017): 1–21.

all levels. On the lowest level, Jewish butchers protested against working in Jaffa in life-threatening conditions. As for the city's leaders, the township and the religious authorities saw an opportunity to permanently move slaughter to Tel Aviv, and thusly gain more control over it and income from it. Finally, Heron, the head of the British Medical Services, was not enthusiastic about the idea but was forced to approve a separate slaughterhouse after the 1929 butchers' strike. This reveals some of the assumptions of contemporaries: that meat was a legitimate need and a major concern for a growing town, and that violent cycles between Jews and Palestinians were both unpredictable (i.e., could ignite at any given time) and perpetual (and thus, separation was the only solution).

In its inauguration in 1931, the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse became the first municipal infrastructure/institution Tel Aviv operated independently from Jaffa. In LeVine's words, Tel Aviv pushed for separation from Jaffa through a "discourse of development".¹⁹⁹ Indeed, Chapter 3 shows how Dizengoff and other lobbyists speaking to the government on his behalf reiterated how gaining a slaughterhouse was essential for Tel Aviv's urban development. While the fight in Chapter 3 over the right to slaughter ended successfully for Tel Aviv, Chapter 4 shows that the municipality never achieved another major goal it fought for: the right to import cattle directly to its port instead of to the Haifa port and from there to Tel Aviv. Read together, Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate how Jewish autonomy in Tel Aviv was only a semi-autonomy, constantly challenged and negotiated over. In addition, adding the issue of Haifa highlights how Tel Aviv's separatism was not only, or even primarily, about separating from "Arabs". It was also about becoming Palestine's most advanced city. Haifa was the British capital in which the government invested most. Tel Aviv was the capital of urban Zionism. A sense of urgency to become the most developed city in Palestine was equally about Tel Aviv's position in the *Yishuv*, in Palestine, or even its role in the world. As

¹⁹⁹ LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 16.

stated by Shoham, because Tel Aviv was often discussed as the only “Jewish sphere” in the world, the city was a spectacle of the potential of Jewish sovereignty.²⁰⁰

Creating a Jewish sphere of Jewish sovereignty was not only the desire of the Tel Aviv Municipality. Jewish butchers in Tel Aviv, who played a very active role in the city gaining a slaughterhouse, imagined a separate slaughterhouse in Tel Aviv as a place where they would reign and prosper. The Hebrew Butchers of Tel Aviv and Jaffa who came together in 1936, began to publish a newsletter in 1937, and some editions are kept at NLI.²⁰¹ In Chapter 4 I relied on the newsletter for a unique look into a group – butchers – not often associated with literary output. The newsletter is a primary source here that illustrates both disputes between Jews and Palestinians in the meat trade, but also among Jewish settlers themselves. The chapter ends on a “relational” note. Some butchers eventually became disillusioned with Tel Aviv’s slaughterhouse. Disappointed by their marginalization in the city’s meat-trade, they returned to work at the Jaffa slaughterhouse – a place they swore never to return to.

To summarize, Chapter 1 illustrates a discourse on meat, highlighting conflicting attitudes to it through nutritional advice and those who ignored it. It also takes care to show how Zionist experts’ advice and educational programs on food linked, in their minds, the success of the Zionist project to what Jews in Palestine consumed. Chapter 2 aims attention at the source of meat in Palestine. Instead of simply reiterating that “meat was imported”, I ask from where and by whom. I also inquire why meat was imported, what was available locally, and, in times of scarcity, which meats quickly ran out and which were used in their place. The hierarchies of meat were tied to their origins, as were anxieties over meats. Chapter 3 focuses on the context in which Tel Aviv established its slaughterhouse and interprets the events that

²⁰⁰ Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*: XVIII.

²⁰¹ The Hebrew Butchers of Tel Aviv and Jaffa Newsletter. Used here are issues from January 1937 (82 pages); March 1939 (121 pages); January 1940 (8 pages); February 1940 (8 pages); April 1940 (8 pages); May 1940 (8 pages); June-July 1940 (12 pages); August-September (8 pages); January-February 1941 (8 pages).

led to it within a discussion on urban development and the question of separation. I show how both leaders such as Dizengoff, as well as workers such as the butchers, saw this achievement as an urban-national triumph. Chapter 4 does not end with a similar triumph. Though they rejoiced at its inauguration, the first decade of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse did not bring butchers the professional success they hoped for. Problems with municipal authorities, internal struggles, and the Palestinian Revolt (1936-1939) followed by a world-war created volatility in the meat-trade. For the municipality, the slaughterhouse was lucrative (as long as they could ensure a stream of cattle towards it). But its appetite for gaining more power over procuring the city's meat without detours in other, more developed, urban ports (Haifa) became heightened due to the events of the period. Chapter 4 ends at the height of World War II meat shortages in 1940s Palestine. Though the end of that decade saw an absolute transition of power from the British administration to the Jewish one, it would take at least another decade for Tel Aviv's administration to secure meat for its citizens.

Archives Consulted²⁰²

Israel State Archives (ISA)

Central Zionist Archives (CZA)

National Library of Israel (NLI)

Tel Aviv Municipal Archives (TAMA)

The Pinchas Lavon Institute for Labour Movement Research (Lavon)

Hadassah Archives at The American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS)

British National Archives (BNA)

League of Nations Archives (LONA)

Historical Jewish Press, NLI

Arabic Newspaper Archive of Ottoman and Mandatory Palestine, NLI

²⁰² Complete list of archival collections and sources listed in the bibliography.

Chapter 1: How to Eat in Palestine

In 1931 a bacteriologist, physician, nutritionist, and statistician collaborated in publishing the first nutrition study in Palestine.²⁰³ This group of experts represented organizations working on different levels: The Department of Hygiene at the Hebrew University, the Hadassah Medical Organization (HMO), and the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JA). The study, funded by Hadassah and WIZO and published by a Tel Aviv-based economic journal, collected data on diets in Palestine.²⁰⁴ This, according to the experts and institutions involved, was the first step in promoting “the proper adjustment of an immigrant population to [a] new social and physical environment” with the ultimate purpose of “developing a rational Palestinian diet”.²⁰⁵

A rational diet in Palestine, as this chapter illustrates, was defined by Jewish settlers for Jewish settlers. According to the experts – especially nutritionists, economists, and agronomists – three main factors determined how Jews should eat in Palestine: the science of nutrition, the climate of Palestine, and the Yishuv’s economy. This chapter explores how all three were articulated to the Jewish public through food programs, publications, newspaper articles, radio broadcastings, and cookbooks. It does so while highlighting the political economy of nutrition and its value for the promotion of Jewish national goals and the colonization of Palestine.

During the interwar period, various organizations became interested in nutrition and invested in its promotion. Yet the first and most important institution to study, teach, and promote nutrition was Hadassah’s HMO. The first section in this chapter shows how the organization

²⁰³ Israel Kligler, Alexander Geiger, Sarah Broombeg, and David Gurevitch, *An Inquiry into the Diets of Various Sections of the Urban and Rural Population of Palestine* vol. 5(3) (Tel Aviv: Palestine Economic Society, 1931).

²⁰⁴ WIZO is the common name the Women’s International Zionist Organization. It often collaborated with Hadassah on various programs, but I do not discuss the organization here. See more on WIZO in: Raviv, *Falafel Nation*.

²⁰⁵ Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 10.

laid the foundations for the transfer of nutritional knowledge from experts to the public. It funded feeding programs, educational curricula, nutritional studies, exhibitions, and cooking classes directed at children and housewives in particular. By teaching settlers how and what to eat in Palestine the HMO promoted Jews' acclimatization to Palestine and to one another, thus linking food with nation-building.

Acclimatization to Palestine also included an encounter with Palestinians. Jewish experts in Palestine promoted nation-building using the science of nutrition, but how they understood nutrition was rooted in colonial medicine. Trained in the United States and Europe, Jewish experts in Palestine linked nutrition, geography, and climate, as did colonial experts. As part of the settler-colonial project, European-Jews first studied the diets of Palestinian-Arabs to design their own nutritional advice. The second section explores Jewish experts' ambiguous attitudes to Palestinian diets and begins to explore Arab-Palestinian efforts to promote nutrition within the Arab-Palestinian population as well. Through discussing what Jewish experts considered most harmful in Palestine's climate (fat and meat) and what was ideal (fruits, vegetables, and dairy), this section also shows how another encounter in Palestine – the one between Ashkenazi experts and Sephardi diets – became especially informative in the creation of a Jewish national diet.

Finally, the science of nutrition and the climate of Palestine were important factors in determining a rational national diet. Most importantly, however, was promoting the prosperity of Jewish agriculture, industry, and manufacturing (sections which will be discussed bundled up as “the Jewish economy”).²⁰⁶ I will demonstrate this with two tangible examples: the promotion of milk and the denunciation of meat. The political economy of nutrition in the *Yishuv* meant that collective economic considerations, with an emphasis on

²⁰⁶ I reject the idea that there were two separate economies in Palestine – one traditional (Palestinian) and one modern (Jewish). When I use “Jewish economy” in this dissertation I refer to the above fields and the way they are discussed in primary sources as key in the promotion of the Zionist colonization of Palestine.

the prosperity of the agricultural industries, took precedence when developing and promoting rational consumption among Jews in Palestine. The “politics of nutrition”, as it was defined by experts at the time, determined how experts’ understood, employed, and communicated the science of nutrition to the Jewish public.²⁰⁷

I. How to Eat: Nutritional Expertise and Rational Consumption

Until the turn of the 20th-century, food programs in Palestine had one goal: to feed the hungry. In Jerusalem, aside from the *imaret*, the long-standing Ottoman soup kitchen, Jewish philanthropists funded the distribution of food among the Jewish poor through the Straus soup kitchen. Before turning his efforts to Palestine, Nathan Straus, a German-born Jewish American philanthropist, invested his time and fortune promoting the pasteurization of milk in the United States and its distribution to impoverished urban children.²⁰⁸ During World War I, the Joint Distribution Committee supplied through the Straus soup kitchen four thousand daily portions of bread, soup, and flour.²⁰⁹ Running these benevolent operations was a Jewish figure that later revolutionized food programs in Palestine: Henrietta Szold. In the interwar period, by shifting food away from charity and into the realm of education, Szold transformed the role of food in the Yishuv.

After her earlier involvement in Jewish charities, Szold founded Hadassah and the HMO. Invested in the ideologies of the American Progressive Era, Szold became a staunch

²⁰⁷ Israel Kligler, “Our Goal”, *Ha'mazon* (April 1938): 1; Akiva Ettinger, “The Nutrition Committee at this Hour”, *Ha'mazon* (November 1938): 1.

²⁰⁸ Julie Miller, “To Stop the Slaughter of the Babies: Nathan Straus and the Drive for Pasteurized Milk, 1893-1920,” *New York History* 74, no. 2 (1993): n.p.

²⁰⁹ John Gal and Mimi Ajsenstadt, “The Long Path from a Soup Kitchen to a Welfare State in Israel”, *Journal of Policy History* 25 (2013): 247-248; Margalit Shilo, *Girls of Liberty: The Struggle for Suffrage in Mandatory Palestine* (New England, Brandies University, 2016): 8; Felix M Warburg, A Lucas, and American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, *Reports Received by the Joint Distribution Committee of Funds for Jewish War Sufferers* (New York: Press of C. S. Nathan, 1916): 137.

supporter of professionalizing social welfare programs, which entailed efficient and tightly run operations that emphasized personal responsibility in self-improvement.²¹⁰ Thus, when Szold designed Hadassah's social programs, she based them on these new values of philanthropy.²¹¹ The HMO built hospitals, maternal and infant care stations, and provided various forms of medical assistance in Palestine. In the field of nutrition, HMO's flagship operation was the Hadassah School Luncheon Project, the first program of its kind in Palestine.²¹²

In 1923 Szold established the lunch program in a girl's school in Jerusalem's old town. To adhere to HMO standards, the program had to move beyond feeding or relief-work. It was designed as "relief that teaches",²¹³ a project invested in "training rather than mere feeding".²¹⁴ The cost of meals was borne by Hadassah (by contributions made to the organization) and the JNC. Jewish children under the program received food free-of-charge, but meals were not free of expectations. As put by Historian James Vernon, "there was... no such thing as a free lunch". "If society was now to provide hungry children with school meals", Vernon writes, "those meals had to teach them about the nature of that society and the appropriate... forms of behavior it now demanded".²¹⁵ For Hadassah, the nature of Palestine's Jewish society was an immigrant society. While many food programs during this period had middle-class values bestowed upon lower-class children in exchange for nourishment, the HMO emphasized the

²¹⁰ Gal and Ajsenstadt, "The Long Path from a Soup Kitchen": 249-250.

²¹¹ School meals were not limited to American Progressivism, and they reflected the new values of philanthropy elsewhere as well. As a modern way to manage hunger school meals emerged in Germany, France, Britain, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States first designed by philanthropists, funded by them or subsidized by the state, provided at cost, or entirely free of charge. See for example: James Vernon, "The Ethics of Hunger and the Assembly of Society: The Techno Politics of the School Meal in Modern Britain," *The American Historical Review* 110, no. 3 (2005): 693-694.

²¹² Before the program, some school teachers led small grassroots initiatives to provide simple meals for Jewish children to help them get through the day.

²¹³ "Trends of Modern Education: Relief that Teaches", article reprinted from the New York Times, no date, probably 1930s. Hadassah Archives at the American Jewish Historical Society (hereafter: HA/AJHS), RG 5 box 17 folder 10.

²¹⁴ "School Luncheon Fund", letter from Batia Zeldis to Mrs. Berkson, Miss Szold, Mrs. Mohl and Mrs. Moschenson, 27 May 1930, HA/AJHS, RG 5 box 16 folder 5.

²¹⁵ Vernon, "The Ethics of Hunger": 710-711.

experience of resettlement and the need for acclimatization. In a promotional pamphlet, HMO explained the school lunch program to American audiences:

...children fleeing humiliation and persecution have found refuge in Palestine. But refuge alone is not enough... They must be fed – fed with the kind of nourishment imperative for their physical rehabilitation and fed with knowledge as to how to maintain their health in this new country... they must be provided with social training which will enable them to live happily in their new world with its different language, customs, people, climate... The only single agency in Palestine able to provide the answer to all these pressing needs is the School Luncheons project”.²¹⁶

Hadassah’s self-assurance and self-promotion was successful. In the 1930s the program spread to include roughly 80 educational institutions, feeding approximately 7,000 children in Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, Haifa and smaller cities.²¹⁷ By the early 1940s the program also included schools in Tel Aviv and the *moshavot* (Jewish settlements) of Pardess Hana, Herzliya, and Rehovot reaching approximately 20,000 students.²¹⁸ By swapping the soup kitchen for the school kitchen, Szold found an ideal site for instilling Hadassah’s values in children. The New York-based Chairwoman of the Hadassah School Luncheon Committee claimed that students applied their social training at home. This was of particular importance to the HMO as “in most cases the parents are immigrants... and both parents work”. Through the transfer of knowledge from the program to the child, and from the child to the home, on the most immediate level children were expected to assist their parents with the tedious realities of housework, and more broadly, to influence parents’ own acclimatization to Palestine. As such, HMO operatives imagined the program served entire Jewish immigrant families, not only their children.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ “Feed a Child for a Year”, 1 May 1934, HA/AJHS, RG-5 box 14 folder 15

²¹⁷ “Menus, Marks and Mothers: Learning to Cook”, *The Palestine Review*, 1937, found at: HA/AJHS RG-5 box 14 folder 16.

²¹⁸ Miriam Granovsky (Chairman School Luncheons of Hadassah) to Julia Dushkin (Co-chairman Child Welfare Committee of Hadassah New York), 17 April 1941, HA/AJHS RG-5 box 15 folder 16. See also list of 74 schools, probably from 1940 in: HA/AJHS RG-5 box 15 folder 8.

As the program launched in the 1920s, when HMO officials focused on “immigrants” they referred to Eastern European Jews who recently settled in Palestine. In addition, HMO operatives were adamant to educate Sephardic and Yemenite Jews, native to Palestine since the Ottoman era. Hadassah’s operatives in Palestine repeatedly wrote back to their American colleagues describing their difficulties in encountering the diverse community. One HMO agent asked how could she be expected to educate children in “a country whose inhabitants are Eastern Jews of many communities, Sephardim, Persians, etc.” where there was no “standardized book of etiquette”.²²⁰ In the mid-1930s, once central-European Jews were added into the mix in increasing numbers, another HMO operative complained that “the multiplicity of backgrounds and beliefs in Palestine complicates everything, from the smallest to the largest project”.²²¹ It is interesting to note how American professionals – educated in a country where immigration was its ethos – were so disturbed by the diversity of the Jewish Yishuv.²²²

Teaching etiquette to children, and *through* children, the HMO emphasized three values especially: “rational consumption”, the value of work, and the civilizing aspect of the communal meal. Children learned “rational consumption” through learning to plan and produce meals that were economically and nutritionally conscientious. They studied the fundamentals of nutrition, the categorization of foods by their nutritional value, and how to prepare and cook various dishes. Regarding the value of work, children were assigned to “kitchen duty” by rotation. During which they not only helped prepare food but also served

²¹⁹ Mrs. Alexander Lamport, “Story of the Palestine School Luncheons”, 20 November 1930, HA/AJHS RG-5 box 17 folder 8.

²²⁰ Baldwin to “members of Hadassah”. Educating Parents through their children was a theme in the Lunch Program. It also collaborated with other partners in setting up food exhibitions and night classes for adults, often using the facilities and kitchens constructed in schools.

²²¹ Dorothy Kahn, “for Hadassah”, 31 January 1940, HA/AJHS, RG 5 box 17 folder 8

²²² Quite possibly, HMO’s fixation on fixing Jewish diets to fit their host country also stems from internal debates at the time among American-Jews about Americanizing Jewish diets. See for example: “Should Jewish Cuisine be Entirely Americanized”, פֶּאָרווערטס (Forverts / The Forward), 12 January 1930.

meals to classmates and cleaned up after them. Inexplicitly, “civilizing” was achieved by all the above. More explicitly, the civilizing aspect of the program was ingrained in students by introducing order into eating, such as having meals at a set time each day and eating a meal by three courses, as well as the rules of hygiene, table manners, the use of cutlery and individual (as opposed to communal) plates.²²³

HMO’s field workers – cooking instructors, nurses, teachers – believed that “civilizing” was an integral part of their mission. One journalist reporting on the program visited a school in Jerusalem during lunch preparations. The Hadassah instructor who guided him through the visit, pointed his attention to a girl arranging slices of bread on a platter using a fork instead of her fingers. “There you have both hygiene and aesthetics”, asserted the instructor to the journalist. She continued: “this girl will certainly not allow her mother to serve a meal on dirty plates, and she will see to it that her little brothers and sisters do not touch the food they are eating with their hands...”.²²⁴ During another tour, Hadassah officials paid a visit to a small town where an HMO clinic, school kitchen, and dining room were newly established. To get there, the group had to cross a sand dune, a trek that left quite an impression on them. Once they arrived, they were equally struck by the poor conditions of the community there. Dumbfounded, one HMO official declared: “We are the one reminder of civilization in this desert”. The group went on to meet an HMO nurse stationed in the town. Reflecting on the lunch program she told them: “when the Hadassah teacher came, [the children] didn’t even know how to sit down to a table and eat with forks and spoons. She has really been a civilizing force in this settlement”.²²⁵

²²³ “A Child in Palestine” HA/AJHS RG-5 box 14 folder 15; Eva H. Baldwin to “members of Hadassah” 1 February 1932, HA/AJHS RG-5 box 17 folder 8; C.Z. Kloetzel, “A Man Looks at Hadassah” 18 February 1934, HA/AJHS RG-5 box 17 folder 10. Kloetzel is described in an attached note as “a very well-known German journalist who... knows the Orient very well”. His on the school lunch was issued by Hadassah’s New York headquarters.

²²⁴ Kloetzel, “A Man Looks at Hadassah”.

²²⁵ Kahn, “for Hadassah”.

Although Hadassah was supplying food, the women running the program were not as interested in feeding as they were in civilizing, as they understood it. A disagreement between the HMO and one school principal is a telling example. The lunch program funded the meals as well as the salaries of instructors. Schools, however, had to provide a kitchen and a dining room that met “American standards of efficiency and sanitation”.²²⁶ In one case this meant that an HMO representative toured a school, and chose the most sunlit room to serve as the future kitchen and dining room.²²⁷ The principal of the school refused. The room happened to be his favorite room, where he kept geography maps. The HMO representative and the principal began debating the future of the room. When the discussion took a heated turn, the principal suggested the Hadassah women “just cook”. The HMO representative did not think twice before responding: “no proper conditions; no meals”.²²⁸ Recounting this dispute to her colleagues in the New York, the HMO agent described the principal as not only interfering with the lunch program but, she insisted, he was “impeding the wheels of progress”. To this, she added: “the principal is bewildered. He sees that the Hadassah women are charmingly docile. They are mild feminine creatures who never raise their voices. But they are stubborn as the donkeys who bray outside his school...”.²²⁹ Stubbornness paid off. Negotiations ended with the principal agreeing to all of Hadassah’s terms.

Additional male principals found themselves bewildered when facing women who were generally working in a woman’s’ field – feeding – but did not feel compelled to feed above all else. Even when schools already took part in the lunch program, negotiations over its implementation occurred. Some principals and teachers complained about the number of hours dedicated to nutrition and home-economics classes, and especially over the length of

²²⁶ Kahn, “for Hadassah”. Kahn wrote the article following a visit to several school lunch locations accompanied by Sarah Broomberg and other local colleagues.

²²⁷ For more on the importance of a bright kitchen see Salwa Sa’id’s views as discussed in Seikaly: *Men of Capital*, 65-66.

²²⁸ Kahn, “for Hadassah”.

²²⁹ Ibid.

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that if a solution for his school would not be found, Hadassah officials would share the

Figure 1. Young students on “kitchen duty” carrying bread, dishes, and cutlery to set dining tables. Unknown school, Jerusalem, 1929. Hadassah Archives, AJHS, I-578/RG 18 Box 48 m,

but rather its strongest negotiation tool.



²³⁰ Tzipora Shchori Rubin, “The ‘Cafeteria’: Hadassah’s Feeding Program in Hebrew Schools”, *Cathedra* 92 (1999): 121-122. Other schools also disputed the length of the “kitchen duty” and the topic was the subject of debates throughout 1934. Eventually, the kitchen duty was shortened to one week.

Feeding was not the sole purpose of the school lunch program, but the HMO carefully chose



through various dishes and varied menus. It aimed to deliver a substantial amount of children's daily requirements of vitamins, especially vitamin A, B, C, Iron, and Calcium, as possible.²³³ Alongside the menu, the booklet included three courses of fruits, and were always



Figure 3. School project by student Hannah Bernstein: a handmade booklet presenting a three-course meal and its nutritional value. Hannah's menu includes a first course of fish cooked in cream with root vegetables, a second course of vegetable salad, and a fruit salad for dessert. The last page of the booklet describes the micro and macronutrients provided by this meal. *Ruhama Girls' School* (probably in Jerusalem), no date. Hadassah Archives, AJHS RG2 HMO box 165 folder 15.

booklet below).

²³¹ Elmer Verner MacCollum, *The Newer Knowledge of Nutrition* (New York: Macmillan 1992)

²³² Raviv, *Falafel Nation*, 97-98.

²³³ Shchori Rubin, "The 'Cafeteria'": 126-127.

²³⁴ Lampert, "Story of the Palestine School Luncheons".

Outside school hours, HMO instructors also used school kitchens to teach adults directly. Mothers were especially encouraged to come and learn about “vitamins, calories, and raw salads” at the very same kitchens where their children completed the “kitchen duty”. In addition, Hadassah, and partners such as WIZO, organized monthly food exhibitions with an emphasis on economical cooking. Women and men visited these exhibitions, held at some 40 schools in various locations in Palestine. Exhibition displays changed according to the season, and every two years a larger exhibition presented various advice on nutrition as well as developments in the Jewish food industry.²³⁵ WIZO distributed simple recipe brochures divided by topic.²³⁶ Hadassah estimated attendance at 100 to 200 visitors at each exhibition, which meant, by their calculation, an outreach of 4000 to 8000 families who benefited monthly from their educational activities.²³⁷




Figure 4. Menu for 10 girls. First-course: vegetable salad with eggs, second-course: potato, egg and cheese bake, dessert: caramel pudding made from milk and sugar. *Ruhama Girls' School* (probably in Jerusalem), 1920s. Hadassah Archives, AJHS, I-578/RG 18 Box 48.

²³⁶ Raviv, *Falafel Nation*, 99-100.

²³⁷ D. Kahn Bar Adon, “Wartime Menus”, 12 March 1942, HA/AJHS RG-5 box 15 folder 6.

Promoting scientific approaches to diets beyond the school, HMO also invested in nutrition surveys. In 1927, Etta Sadow, the Head of the HMO Dietetic Department conducted the first study of eating habits in Palestine.²³⁸ In the United States, Sadow trained as a nutritionist, embracing, according to historian Hassia Dinner, “American nutrition culture”.²³⁹ Supervising food operations at Boston’s Federated Jewish Charities, Sadow worked closely with Eastern European Jewish immigrants, defining their diets as “a problem to be solved”.²⁴⁰ In Palestine Sadow felt the same way. Her study aimed to gain “an adequate picture” of how different strands of the country’s “complex population” ate and what they knew about the fundamentals of nutrition science.²⁴¹

Sarah Broomberg (Hebraized: Bavly), an institutional figure in Israeli history, succeeded Sadow.²⁴² By the 1930s, Broomberg promoted nutrition to Jews in Palestine through three main channels: Hadassah’s Dietetic Department, the School Lunch Program, and the Nutrition Department at the Straus Health Center.²⁴³ The Straus Health Center absorbed the old Strauss soup kitchen alongside modern facilities: a Prenatal and Infant Welfare Department, School Hygiene Department, a Dental Clinic, Department of Corrective Gymnastics, a Nutrition Department, and even a state of the art, one of a kind in Palestine, Milk Pasteurization Plant. The center’s director, public health expert Israel Kligler, believed

²³⁸ Sadow’s study, although the first of its kind in Palestine has been obscured by the later study conducted by Kligler. Scholars usually refer to the latter as the first in Palestine. See: Yecheil Guggenheim et al, “The Genesis of Research on Nutrition and Food in the Land of Israel”, *Cathedra* 59 (1990): 144-160. Historian Ofra Tene mentions Sadow’s study in: Tene, “The New Immigrant”: 61.

²³⁹ Hasia Dinner, *Hungering for America*: 214

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ S. Etta Sadow, “Summary Report of Dietetic Survey made in Palestine Jan. 1927 – May 1927”, HA/AJHS, RG-2 HMO box 170 folder 11.

²⁴² Broomberg became synonyms with nutrition in Israel. In 1946 she returned to Columbia to obtain a PhD in nutrition. In the 1950s she supervised food services in Israel’s transit camps for new immigrants as well as for its military, and in 1953, with the assistance and support of the international Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Broomberg established Israel’s College of Nutrition and Home Economics. For more: Ronit Endevelt, “Sarah Bavly”, *Jewish Women: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia*, 27 February 2009, Jewish Women’s Archive, <https://jwa.org/encyclopedia/article/bavly-sarah> [last accessed 24 September 2020].

²⁴³ Meyer, “Homemaking Education in Palestine”.

these departments were key in promoting public health by focusing on, in Kligler's words: "the body and the home".²⁴⁴

In 1930, Kligler and Broomberg collaborated on a new nutrition study. Broomberg was of Dutch origin and completed her Master of Science degree in Amsterdam in 1925. She joined Hadassah first as a dietitian at the Hadassah hospital in Tel Aviv. Gaining the attention of Hadassah directors, Broomberg was sent to a year in the United States to prepare for her future role as Head Dietician. She studied at Columbia University's Teachers' College and interned at hospitals and clinics in New York and Boston.²⁴⁵ Kligler immigrated to the United States as a child. He studied Bacteriology at Columbia University and worked at the Department of Public Health at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. Between 1916-1920 Kligler was employed at the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. In 1917 the Rockefeller Institute published Kligler's *Sanitary Survey of Palestine*²⁴⁶ and in 1919 sent Kligler to Mexico and Peru as a member of the Yellow Fever Commission.²⁴⁷ Drawing on personal ties to Szold as well as his professional credentials, in 1921 Kligler arrived in Palestine to direct the laboratories of the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem. In 1922 Kligler also began directing the Malaria Research Unit in Haifa which was incorporated into the colonial government's Health Department. As malnutrition was a factor in contracting and suffering from infectious diseases, Kligler delved into nutrition research in addition to his other public health interests.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁴ Israel Kligler on behalf of Hadassah Medical Organization, *The Nathan and Lina Straus Health Center Jerusalem: First Annual Report October 1930 – September 1931* (Jerusalem, 1932): 9.

²⁴⁵ Broomberg's further duties at Hadassah were vast, including directing the Strauss Health Center's Nutrition Department, the supervision of nutrition in five Hadassah hospitals, instructing nurses on nutrition and cooking, establishing local clinics and more. See: Sarah Bavly, "Outline of Projected Work as Supervising Dietician of the Hadassah Medical Organization in Palestine" (Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in the Faculty of Practical Science, Teacher's College, Columbia University), HA/AJHS, RG-2 HMO, box 44, folder 4; Sarah Bavly, "Nutrition Teaching Guide with Recipes", 1933, HA/AJHS, RG-2 HMO, box 170, folder 11; Sarah Broomberg to HMO headquarters, 8 December 1931, CZA J113/83.

²⁴⁶ Sufian, *Healing the Land*, 35.

²⁴⁷ Zalman Greenberg and Anton Alexander, "Israel Jacob Kligler: The Story of 'a Little Big Man' A Giant in the Field of Public Health in Palestine", *Korot* 21 (2011–2012): 176.

Funded by Hadassah, Kligler and Broomberg's study was published in 1931 under the title: *An Inquiry into the Diets of Various Sections of the Urban and Rural Population of Palestine*. This was a more systematic study compared to Sadow's review, but it was also limited in its scope.²⁴⁹ The importance of the study here is to show how the topic of nutrition attracted a scientist of Kligler's caliber, whose efforts in the field of public health were instrumental for the Jewish colonization of Palestine.²⁵⁰ Kligler had ties both to the colonial government and to Jewish national institutions such as the JNC, JA, and the Hebrew University where he established and directed the bacteriology department. As the next sections will demonstrate, Kligler and his colleagues at the JNC and the JA adopted Hadassah's vision on the importance of nutrition and incorporated it into their own initiatives, adapted to their own agendas. As nutritional expertise expanded and leading Zionist institutions in addition to HMO incorporated it into their programs, funds dedicated to nutrition grew. By the 1940s, HMO's Nutrition Department alone ran on a budget of 200,000 pounds, a sum fitting for an entire colonial governmental department in Palestine but spent almost entirely on the Jewish section alone.²⁵¹

As Jewish efforts towards improving the nutrition of the community centralized, Arab-Palestinians efforts remained decentralized and limited in scope. Palestinians never received similar institutional and financial support for food programs, nutrition education, or any welfare initiative for that matter.²⁵² Arab Palestinian feeding programs relied solely on charity until the 1940s. This was not because Palestinian professionals were not familiar with

²⁴⁸ See for example Kligler's nutrition experiments on rats in: Israel Kligler, "The Influence of Climate on Infection", *Ha'refua Medical Journal* 12 (1) (1937): 8-15.

²⁴⁹ Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, 211 n. 125.

²⁵⁰ In the past 10-15 years scholars have revisited Kligler's work. See references to Kligler in: Sufian, *Healing the Land*; Novick, *Milk and Honey*, Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science*.

²⁵¹ The wartime British Food Controller's department for example managed a budget of 250,000 Pounds. See: Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, 90, 105.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

advancements in the science of nutrition or the importance of welfare. Both academic journals and the daily press introduced the science of nutrition in Palestine and Arabic-speaking countries since the turn of the 20th century.²⁵³ The disparities are rooted in the colonial structure in which Palestine's government allowed, even encouraged, welfare schemes funded by external donors as long as it was not obliged to participate in spending. As Jews established *their own* institutions, backed by international donors, and run by local administrators powered by a sense of national urgency, Jewish efforts in the field of food were unmatched.

During the 1940s, two shifts occurred in Palestinian feeding and food education which are particularly relevant here. The first was Salwa Sa'id's radio series "The New Arab Home" broadcasted by the Palestine Broadcasting Service (PBS) between 1941-1942. The second was the school lunch program for Palestinian children that emerged in 1942 due to wartime malnutrition among the urban poor especially.²⁵⁴ Both initiatives spoke to different Palestinian audiences but still illustrate how for Palestinians too, nutrition, hygiene, feeding, and home-making became part of national discourse.

Sa'id studied at the American University in Beirut and moved to Palestine following her marriage.²⁵⁵ Historian Sherene Seikaly defines Sa'id as a domestic-reformer known best for her series of 12 radio lectures, "The New Arab Home". Sa'id's audience was, like her, of upper-middle-class background. In her lectures, she addressed Palestinian housewives and discussed a range of topics such as the importance of a hygienic kitchen, nutritious foods, reforming cooking practices to save time and energy, and a housewife's relationship with her maid.²⁵⁶ The home was the housewife's domain, and importantly, it was where she raised the

²⁵³ For academic journals see: On Barak, *Powering Empire*: 70-71. As for the daily press in Palestine, see for example: "Information on Ideal Nutrition", *Al-Difa* 4 October 1939; "Ideal Nutrition What You Should Eat as Food", *Al-Difa* 5 October 1939.

²⁵⁴ Vickers, *A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine*.

²⁵⁵ Andrea L. Stanton, *"This Is Jerusalem Calling": State Radio in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013): 143.

next generation of Palestinian children for “good manners, proper education, and strong bodies”.²⁵⁷

By urging housewives to revolutionize Palestinian homes, Sa’id promoted Palestinian citizenship. As shown by Seikaly, Sa’id was part of a Palestinian upper-middle-class who promoted a “model middle” to serve as the core of Palestinian nationalism. Many of the topics Sa’id discussed were similar to those promoted by Hadassah, which preceded her talks by almost 20 years, yet Sa’id never referred to Zionist efforts in her lectures. This is likely because, as stated by Seikaly, Palestinian reforms “did not understand themselves only, or even primarily, through their confrontation with Zionism”.²⁵⁸ Illustrating how nutrition and homemaking were incorporated into Palestinian nationalism, Sa’id’s lectures were reprinted on the cover page of leading Palestinian newspapers *Filastin* and *Al-Difa*. Sa’id was the only expert – male or female – to have her radio lectures reprinted in the press, which indicates both an endorsement of Sa’id’s messages as well as the desire of the papers’ editors to transmit it to a broader audience than those who could afford a radio.²⁵⁹

The second important development of the 1940s was the school lunch program for Palestinian-Arab children. While Sa’id did not compare or refer to Jewish efforts in her talks, those involved in promoting a Palestinian school feeding program often did. In wartime Palestine, urban poverty was rampant and dire. In Jaffa, for example, the majority of the city’s residents lived in crowded and blighted dwellings.²⁶⁰ Faced with vast malnutrition among children, confirmed by the first comprehensive study on nutrition conducted by the colonial government, the government was finally forced to invest in welfare programs for

²⁵⁶ Caroline Kahlenberg, “New Arab Maids: Female Domestic Work, ‘New Arab Women,’ and National Memory in British Mandate Palestine,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 52, no. 3 (June 29, 2020): 449–67.

²⁵⁷ “The New Arab Home”, *Al-Difa*, 12 December 1940.

²⁵⁸ Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 15.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 143-147.

²⁶⁰ Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 54.

Palestinian-Arab children.²⁶¹ Nearly 20 years after Szold established the Jewish lunch program, in late 1942 local Palestinian initiatives received governmental financial support.²⁶² Government officials explained this allocation of funds by acknowledging that similar Jewish projects were already active for years.²⁶³ This disparity was also made clear in the Palestinian press.²⁶⁴

The municipality of Jaffa collaborated with local volunteers and ran the first and most organized program. Next, programs spread to Jerusalem and Haifa, followed by initiatives in Acre, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza, Nazareth, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Lod. Different from the Jewish program, the Jaffa program also attempted to reach homeless children, not only schoolchildren.²⁶⁵ Nutritionally, it is hard to evaluate the menus of the program as they were designed at the height of inflated wartime prices and shortages. In General, it seems that the programs tried to follow international guidelines. Newspapers reported efforts to provide vegetables, fruits, grains, and legumes, as well as milk at least twice a week. *Filastin* also reported that facilities were clean and orderly, dishes were prepared daily, meals were nicely presented and tasty.²⁶⁶ Making a point to mention esthetics, hygiene, and palatability shows how even an urgent wartime feeding program for impoverished children needed to fit “model middle” standards, and thusly, national goals.

The values taught through lunch programs, both the Jewish and Palestinian, illustrate the evolution of, and departure from, the old soup kitchen. A more thorough examination of the

²⁶¹ Ibid, 95.

²⁶² “25 Thousand Students in the Nutrition Project”, *Al-Difa*, 25 December 1942; “18 Thousand Pounds for the Nutrition Project”, *Al-Difa*, 28 December, 1942; “The Government contributes 20 Thousand Pounds to the Nutrition Project”, *Al-Difa*, 14 January, 1943; “Tea Party to Encourage the Nutrition Project” *Al-Difa*, 4 April 1943.

²⁶³ “Social Affairs: Nutrition Projects for Arabs and Jews”, *Al-Difa*, 5 July 1943.

²⁶⁴ “20 Thousand Pounds for the Nutrition Project – The Finances of the Similar Project for the Jews”, *Al-Difa*, 14 January 1943.

²⁶⁵ “Meeting of the Executive Committee for Social Affairs to Expand the Nutrition Program and Establish New Centers”, *Al-Difa*, 11 March 1943.

²⁶⁶ “His Visit to the Camp of Displaced Families from the Affected Neighborhoods”, *Filastin*, 26 January 1943.

Palestinian program is in need, but as for the HMO, it is clear that the organization distributed food and knowledge for free, while recipients were expected to produce and consume meals that promoted certain ideals.²⁶⁷ Doing so, the HMO laid the foundations for nutritional knowledge to be incorporated into the national project. By exploring how the HMO and other Zionist institutions promoted not only *how* to eat in Palestine but *what* to eat there too, the next sections show how nutrition merged with national goals, first, through linking nutrition and acclimatization to Palestine's climate, and then by supporting Jewish economic efforts in the country.

II. What to Eat: Nutrition, Geography, and Climate

A national diet, Kligler wrote in his nutrition study, "is an expression of the accumulated experience of the race inhabiting a given territory". As such, ideal diets had to be appropriate climatically and "derived chiefly, if not wholly, from the products available within the territory".²⁶⁸ As Historian Ofra Tene has claimed, nutrition experts like Kligler and Broomberg believed that in order to create a national diet, Jews had to "immerse their bodies...metaphorically and concretely in the land".²⁶⁹ This meant that when determining *what* Jews should eat in Palestine, Jewish experts took note of Arab Palestinian diets. However, locality was not more important than science, and the "higher culture" European Jewish experts believed they brought to Palestine.²⁷⁰ As HMO's Brachiyahu wrote, "Arab cuisine deserves our attention" because it is "natural to the land's climate". Yet, it was "inconceivable", he insisted, to simply adopt Palestinian diets. First, he wrote, those "must be

²⁶⁷ To the best of my knowledge the program has not yet been examined in length. It was discussed by Tibawi in the 1950s and only shortly mentioned by Seikaly. See: A. L. Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine. A Study of Three Decades of British Administration* (London: Luzac, 1956); Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, 95.

²⁶⁸ Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 11.

²⁶⁹ Tene, "The New Immigrant".

²⁷⁰ Hirsch, "We Are Here to Bring the West".

corrected in a civilized manner”.²⁷¹ The need to both immerse and correct led to ambiguous attitudes towards Palestinian diets.

In Sadow’s original study, she expressed the desire to provide recommendations to Jews as well as Palestinians. Thus, she evaluated the diets of “Oriental or Sephardic Jews”, “the Yemenites”, “the new immigrant Jews” (i.e., Eastern European Jews) as well as the “country Arab” and the “city Arab”.²⁷² Sadow’s main conclusions were that Arab Palestinians needed to modify their use of oil, namely less frying, as well as improve “regularity, hygiene and sanitation” of meals. Eastern European diets, on the other hand, were entirely inappropriate in Palestine. Those included inadequate quantities of milk and vegetables and an excess of meat and salted fish.²⁷³ Sadow concluded that Palestinian diets needed some modifications, but “the immigrant Jew... needs to learn many, many things”.²⁷⁴

Similar to Sadow, Kligler and Broomberg divided the Jewish community in Palestine into “Ashkenazi”, “Sephardi”, “Yemenite” and “Oriental”, and also examined fractions of Palestinian society by studying “Fellah and Bedouin” diets. Unlike Sadow, Kligler and Broomberg did not express an intention to educate Palestinians on their diets but included them in the study as they were “indigenous to the soil for generations” which made their diets informative for Jewish newcomers still adapting to the country.²⁷⁵ Creating a Jewish national diet in Palestine was especially difficult according to Kligler, as many Jewish immigrants were ignorant regarding “the food traditions of the country”.²⁷⁶

What were the food traditions in Palestine? British and Zionist studies were the first to systematically evaluate diets in Palestine²⁷⁷, but attention to Palestinian diets did not start with

²⁷¹ Tene, “The New Immigrant”.

²⁷² Sadow, “Dietetic Survey”.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 11.

²⁷⁶ Ibid.

foreign gazes. Tawfiq Canaan, a Palestinian physician and ethnographer, discussed aspects of Palestinian lives, including diet, in his publications.²⁷⁸ In 1914, Canaan described the diets of Palestinian *fellahin* (peasants) to German-reading audiences. “Throughout the year”, Canaan wrote, “the land gives its farmers a wide variety of vegetables and healthy fruits”. Thus, Canaan claimed, *Fellahin* diets, were easily digestible and very nutritious. *Fellahin* ate what was available and seasonal, including a variety of lentils, beans, wheat, and rice. *Fellahin* cooked in olive oil or sesame oil, they prepared and consumed their own sour milk, butter, and sour cream. They ate very little meat, and their bodies were strong and productive.²⁷⁹

When Jewish experts promoted Palestinian diets to Jewish settlers, this ideal *fellah* diet was exactly what they had in mind. For example, in 1939 Lilian Cornfeld, an iconic Israeli cookbook author who grew up in Canada and studied nutrition at Columbia University, published an article titled: “We Learn from Our Neighbors”. By “we”, Cornfeld referred to Ashkenazi Jews in Palestine, and by “our neighbors” she referred not only Palestinian Arabs but “Sephardic and Yemenite communities” as well. In her column, she explained: “We have to go to the poor of every land to find out which are the cheapest and most nourishing foods”.²⁸⁰ “The principle of mixing legumes with cereals, for instance... rice and lentils, is entirely sound”, wrote Cornfeld. This combination supplemented protein in diets compromising of “so little animal protein” while also being inexpensive.²⁸¹ Likewise, Cornfeld claimed, consumption of greens, citrus, and sesame paste compensated for the lack of dairy in “oriental diets” with a variety of vitamins and minerals economically-achieved.²⁸²

²⁷⁷ Seikaly, *Men of Capital*, 92, 211 n. 125.

²⁷⁸ Tawfiq Canaan, *Superstition and Folk Medicine in the Land of the Bible* [German] (Hamburg, L. Friedrichsen & Co., 1914). I would like to thank Netta Cohen for bringing this study to my attention and Mona Bieling for translating excerpts for me.

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

²⁸⁰ Lilian Cornfeld, “We Learn from our Neighbors”, *The Palestine Post*, 12 November 1939.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

This diet might have been economically ideal and nutritionally sufficient, but it was also rare in 1939. The effects of World War I, the economic turmoil of the 1930s following the Palestinian Revolt, and the wartime 1940s, left many *fellahin* impoverished and malnourished. Even during peacetime, farmers rarely indulged in produce that was headed towards an international market such as citrus. During wartime, as prices for all fruits and vegetables skyrocketed, farmers preferred to sell them rather than consume them.²⁸³ Thus, consumed in adequate amounts, Kligler claimed, Palestinian diets were ideal, but in reality, the diets of poor *fellahin* left them vulnerable to contracting infectious diseases and suffering most from them.²⁸⁴ In his nutrition study, Kligler discredited “Fellah and Bedouin” diets as unusually low in protein and high in fat intake.²⁸⁵ In his report to the Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire, he noted the correlation between Bedouin and *fellahin* undernourishment and infant mortality rates.²⁸⁶

For these reasons, Kligler and Broomberg’s nutrition study did not suggest that Jewish settlers adopt the diets of local Palestinians even though those diets were an expression of centuries of accumulated experience and based on the produce of the land. Scholars claim the initial fascination with Palestinians as “natives” was stronger during the 1920s, but as tensions rose between Jews and Palestinians during the 1930s, this negatively affected Jewish attitudes towards anything Palestinian, including food.²⁸⁷ Yet Brachiyahu stated the above negative observation in 1928 while Cornfeld expressed the idea of learning from Palestinian “neighbors” well into the intensification of intercommunal violence in 1939.²⁸⁸ Thus, after

²⁸² Ibid. Cornfeld was the most lenient of food experts studied here in her willing to fathom that dairy could have an alternative in healthy diets. Why this was an unpopular opinion will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

²⁸³ Vickers, *A nutritional economic survey of wartime Palestine*.

²⁸⁴ Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science*, 171. Based on Jacob Israel Kligler, *The Epidemiology and Control of Malaria in Palestine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930): 15.

²⁸⁵ Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 66-67.

²⁸⁶ “Jewish Population Here Well Nourished”, *The Palestine Post*, 13 November 1939.

²⁸⁷ Helman, “European Jews”: 79; Dafna Hirsch and Ofra Tene, “Hummus: The Making of an Israeli Culinary Cult,” *Journal of Consumer Culture* 13, no. 1 (2013): 25–45; Novick, *Milk and Honey*: 90-91.

examining many primary sources on nutritional advice, I argue that rather than a linear shift, continuous ambiguity is a more accurate representation of Jewish attitudes towards Palestinian food and diets.

My conclusion is that the Jewish public was encouraged to adopt *some* Palestinian dietary habits, and most importantly, those habits had to come from the rural sector of Palestinian society. Jewish experts entirely overlooked urban Palestinian diets, because those supposedly suffered from the same issues urban Jews suffered from: their diets were “too rich”.²⁸⁹ If Jews were to learn something from Palestinians – it had to be from *fellahin*, those most intimately connected to the land. Yet the ideal Jewish diet was based on an *imaginary fellah* whose diet was both “simple and complete”.²⁹⁰ This ideal *fellah* was somehow close enough to the land to base his diet on it, had the means and knowledge to supplement his diet with ample quantities of pasteurized dairy as well as the leisure to consume it all in an orderly, hygienic, regular, and timely manner.²⁹¹ Most likely, few Palestinians or Jews ate like this.

Ambiguity also resonates with European-Jewish experts’ ideas about Sephardi diets. Anthropologist Claudia Roden points to a conundrum in modern Israeli cuisine. She notes: “while the culture of Sephardi Jews is belittled in Israel, their cooking predominates”.²⁹² Roden attempted to explain this discrepancy by describing how Ashkenazi cuisine often developed in poverty and in an environment of persecution – realities Jews wished to forget once they settled in Palestine – while Sephardi cuisine generally evolved in warm climates and neighborly environments.²⁹³ A more grounded reason for this is that Ashkenazi experts often used Sephardi cuisine as a bridge between European Jews and local Palestinian habits.

²⁸⁸ Cornfeld even expressed these views during the 1948 war, and Hadassah on the radio show in 1944

²⁸⁹ “Nutrition Cycles: The Arab Food”, PBS, 5 December 1944. This was a radio series sponsored by the Food Controller, produced in conjunction with the Nutrition Department of Hadassah, Jerusalem. Transcripts are held at AJHS RG-5 box 16 folder 9 [hereafter: “Nutrition Cycles”].

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Roden, “Jewish Food in the Middle East”: 153.

²⁹³ Ibid., 153-155.

Thus, the gravitation towards Sephardi cuisine was at least somewhat by-design and was linked, again, to ideas that tie between geography, climate, and nutrition. This, I show below, was also established via Hadassah's, and other experts', efforts.

In 1944 Hadassah's Nutrition Department, in conjunction with Palestine's wartime Food Controller, produced a radio show titled Nutrition Cycles. The first episode, "How to Eat in Palestine", discussed the fundamental factor determining the correct way to eat: climate. The host explained to listeners that the world is divided between north and south. In the north, Eskimos eat copious amounts of fat because fat produces heat in the body which protects them against the cold. In the south, humans depend on fruit and vegetables because the liquid content in plants counteracts perspiration. According to the host, this was not a casual observation but a scientific rule: "the stomach of the southerner would not be able to digest the same amount of fat as that of a northerner". "This is where the upsetting factor comes in", the speaker announced, "the northerner who has come to Palestine will go on eating much fat and suffer from the heat".²⁹⁴

The idea that a high fat intake was unsuitable for Palestine's climate was a prevailing belief among nutritionists in Palestine throughout the 1920s to the 1940s.²⁹⁵ This idea was strongly rooted in colonial medicine, specifically tropical medicine. When British nutritionist W.J. Vickers and medical expert Colonel Heron designed wartime rations in Palestine, they claimed that "western" intake of fat and protein allowances of animal origins were "far too high for Palestine" due to its climate. Sufficient allowances, they figured, should match those they prescribed for another hot territory: India.²⁹⁶ In Palestine, the idea that a high intake of fat was harmful in sub-tropical climates was adopted mostly as a critique of Jewish-European

²⁹⁴ "Nutrition Cycles: How to Eat in Palestine", PBS, 10 October 1944.

²⁹⁵ Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 75-80.

²⁹⁶ Vickers and Heron based these claims on the authoritative studies of Orr and Aykrod the British Internationally recognized nutrition experts. Vickers's survey was forwarded by Heron. See: *A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine*: 14.

diets. Kligler performed his own experiment on rats, mentioned in the nutrition survey, to show that a high fat intake “similar to that prevailing in Europe” was harmful at high temperatures.²⁹⁷

The radio show suggested that diets in Palestine’s sub-tropical climate should keep the use of fat to a minimum and should avoid excessive consumption of meat as both habits produce heat in the body in an already hot country. In place of meat, fish could be consumed as it was considered easier to digest, but milk, cheese, and eggs “should be the main food eaten to build our body”.²⁹⁸ The speaker concluded:

“Let us put things that way: a) our body adjusts itself of its own to the climate of Palestine. b) The climate supplies the necessary foodstuffs. But between our gift of adjustment and, say, nature, stand tradition and our habits. And it is very hard for nature to overcome our human shortcomings”.²⁹⁹

Nutritionists and cooking experts in Palestine took it upon themselves to push European Jewish settlers to overcome their human shortcomings. Namely, they adopted the idea that nutrition had to be adjusted to climate, and saw it their duty to shift Jewish taste preferences and eating habits. In 1934 Erna Meyer, a German Jewish expert in home-economics reflected on food habits in Palestine as “an intricate mixture of customs imported from all over the world, many of them not at all adapted to a hot climate, and therefore harmful to health”.³⁰⁰ In 1936 she published *How to Cook in Palestine*, where she clearly stated: “the preparation of meat and fish... will not be dealt with here at all”.³⁰¹ This was an intentional choice made by Meyer to encourage *hausfraus* to adopt a suitable diet for Palestine’s climate. Like other food experts in the Yishuv, Meyer insisted that “cooking, suitable to the climate, must place vegetables, salads, and fruits in the foreground...”.³⁰²

²⁹⁷ Kligler mentions his rat experiments in: Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 65-66.

²⁹⁸ “Nutrition Cycles: How to Eat in Palestine”.

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

³⁰⁰ Meyer, “Homemaking Education in Palestine”.

³⁰¹ Meyer, *How to Cook*: 8.

Considered the first Israeli cookbook, this collection of vegetarian recipes was printed in Hebrew, English, and German, reflecting both the author's background as well as its target audience. By then, "the new immigrants" that occupied the minds of experts were no longer Eastern Europeans, but notably central-European German-speaking Jews. This wave presented a problem for experts not due to a lack of knowledge or resources, but due to habits inconsistent with technocrats' advice. On the other hand, this wave also brought an influx of technical experts and highly educated professionals like Meyer, who were committed to promoting national goals.

Meyer promoted the idea that the consumption of fat was harmful in hot climates and she insisted the same was true for meat.³⁰³ "A newcomer, puzzled as to why so much meat is consumed in such a hot country is generally told that 'vegetables here are very watery and not very tasty, so we prefer meat'".³⁰⁴ An expert in home-economics, Meyer blamed housewives' cooking abilities for the unappetizing vegetables they served, not the variety or quality of produce available. Encouraging housewives to adapt their tastebuds and cooking skills, she added: "one can always learn new things".³⁰⁵ A similar message was expressed elsewhere by Broomberg. Regarding immigrants' tendency to prefer meat and their aversion from local vegetables like zucchinis and eggplants, Broomberg asserted: "the new immigrant must not only learn, he must also forget".³⁰⁶

³⁰² Ibid., 7-8.

³⁰³ Ibid., 63.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 29.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Sarah Broomberg, "Questions in Purposeful Nutrition in the Land of Israel", *Ha'mazon* (April 1938): 2-3.



Figure 5. A caricature mocking meat and milk substitutes titled: “We’ve been informed of the invention of “synthetic meat” in our land, produced from mushrooms and eggplants...” On the cow’s udders: “powdered milk”. The stamp on the cow’s rear: “for all”. The conversation between two housewives (written below): “What type of animal is this?”, answered by: “Behold, it’s a synthetic cow!”. Published in: Ma’ariv, 11 November 1949 (not 1944)

Even children, educated in the school lunch program, were enlisted in helping their mothers forget meat. The program rarely featured meat in children’s menus, and HMO instructors boasted their achievements in promoting meat-alternatives. As one story goes:

The girls are proud of each new dish they are taught and bring the menus home to their mothers. We were amused to learn that we had even been instrumental in making “shalom bait”. One of the fathers had longed for years for a nice vegetable salad (his wife was rather an expert in meat dishes but understood little about preparing salads). And here little Chaya came home one day, with shining eyes and proudly taught her mother to make the salad her father likes.³⁰⁷

Other experts promoted salads as simply safer in Palestine's weather. Handling meat in Palestine's heat presented potential problems for immigrants from temperate climates. Immigrants met articles in the press with headlines such as "Food News: Bad Meat", which described how "during the hot and humid weather one is bound to hear of a certain number of cases of a food poisoning due to spoiled meat".³⁰⁸ Reading or hearing of food poisoning was not as bad as suffering from it, and immigration agencies attempted to address this issue even before immigrants set sail to Palestine. Meyer reported: "as new immigrants come ashore, they are handed leaflets of the "ten commandments" of health and nutrition in Palestine".³⁰⁹ There is no record as to what exactly those commandments entailed, but a reference to the same leaflet in a Straus Center annual report provides more information:

Since many of the recent immigrants, particularly those from Germany, contracted various intestinal troubles, either digestive or infectious, due to lack of familiarity with local climate requirements and risks, a concise leaflet was issued in Hebrew and German containing "Ten Commandments" on the foods to be used, manner of disinfection, etc. These were distributed at the port of entry and also through the Palestine Office at the port of embarkation.³¹⁰

Even the experts who were more lenient when it came to meat consumption, warned against the risks of meat in Palestine's heat. Cornfeld wrote that "seeing all the meat consumed in Palestine one is apt to sympathize with the vegetarian." Yet Cornfeld, as opposed to other experts, was more nuanced in her advice. Not all meat was categorically harmful, she claimed. For those suffering from digestive problems, or those who overeat meat, meat could

³⁰⁷ Granovsky to Dushkin. In "Shalom-Bait" (correct form is "shlom-bait") Granovsky means "domestic peace", a Jewish value that refers especially to a harmonious relationship between the husband and wife.

³⁰⁸ "Food News: Bad Meat", *The Palestine Post*, 31 July 1935.

³⁰⁹ Meyer, "Homemaking Education in Palestine".

³¹⁰ Israel Kligler on behalf of Hadassah Medical Organization, *The Nathan and Lina Straus Health Center Jerusalem: Third Annual Report October 1932 – September 1933* (Jerusalem, 1934): 36. The leaflets were distributed through the following agencies: Immigration Bureau at Trieste (3000 leaflets), Kuppot Holim (550), German Immigrants Association in Haifa (500), Committee for Settlement of German Jews (500), and Strauss Health Center in Tel Aviv (100).

be harmful. But “in the normal case, an average amount of meat is very good food with well utilized protein and iron”.³¹¹ Cornfeld’s advice was to consume meat cooked thoroughly to kill all existing bacteria, and to avoid purchasing minced meat which contained the largest number of bacteria. “In this climate,” she wrote, “I would strongly advise against buying this”.³¹²

If meaty European diets were inappropriate in Palestine’s climate, what did experts suggest Jews eat in Palestine? Discussing labor, Historian Netta Cohen demonstrates, Zionist leaders considered Sephardi Jews to have greater potential to work well under Palestine’s climatic conditions.³¹³ This was because they derived from Arab countries, or at least lived in them for generations, making them, in theory, already adapted to the regions’ climate. This logic was applied to diet as well. Thus, while Jewish experts sometimes found Palestinian diets – as a concept – hard to stomach, Sephardi diets were more easily promoted by nutrition experts as appropriate for Jews in Palestine. With their Jewishness bridging the gap between European Jews and Palestine’s climate, Sephardi diets were incorporated into the Zionist mission.³¹⁴

Nutrition Cycles, the radio series that earlier explained to listeners “How to Eat in Palestine” by tying climate and nutrition together, went on to describe various diets prevalent in Palestine, their advantages, and disadvantages. Sephardi diets were examined first. Because Sephardim were most deeply rooted in Palestine, the speaker presented their diets as close to ideal: menus were rich and varied, the housewife devoted time and energy to preparing food and to its esthetic appearance, and her use of fresh fruit and vegetables in every season was exemplary. Sephardi cuisine was also noted for using meat sparingly, as a seasoning rather

³¹¹ Lilian Cornfeld, “Food News: A Few Facts about Meat”, *The Palestine Post*, 1 November 1935.

³¹² Ibid. Food Hygiene was highlighted during this period in cooking advice in general, not only when it came to meat. For example, one of Hadassah’s recipes for a “favorite Sephardic dish” opens with the line: “hold the cauliflower over fire so as to kill any worms that may be on it”. In: “Nutrition Cycles: How to Eat in Palestine”.

³¹³ Cohen, *Jews and Climate Science*, 193.

³¹⁴ A similar argument relates to the idea that falafel became mainstream in Israel through Yemenite Jews who already in the 1930s operated falafel stands. See: Raviv, *Falafel Nation*.

than the main dish.³¹⁵ The only failure of the Sephardi diet was that it did not include enough milk. By simply adding liquid milk and dairy products to this diet, the Sephardi diet would become the model Jewish diet in Palestine, the speaker claimed. For the rest of that episode, the speaker read out recipes such as a “favorite Sephardic dish” based on cauliflower. The speaker also invited Sephardi women to write in and share their recipes, as long as they could provide exact measurements.³¹⁶

Other Jewish communities did not fare as well as the Sephardim on Hadassah’s radio series. For example, the only advantages of the Yemenite “monotonously poor and highly seasoned” diet, was that women kept kitchens clean and tidy. Kurds were described as “strong, healthy, hardworking” but also “not too highly cultured”. The latter attribute was perhaps why Kurdish females were not described as housewives but as women who “do not apply much energy and effort” to make food appetizing. In addition, or as a result, Kurdish diets “were too heavy and full of fat”. The only advantage Kurdish cooks had, according to the show’s host, was their knowledge and use of various nutritious wild herbs, herbs that Ashkenazim would never even consider eating.³¹⁷ “Ashkenazim”, the host stated, “if they ever ate a plant”, first robbed it of all its nutrients by overcooking it. “Carrots, for instance, the only vegetable that most people from Poland eat willingly, is eaten only after it has entirely lost its original shape and form”. And in addition, Ashkenazim, like the entire population of Palestine it seems, did not consume enough milk, and to make matters worse, they also consumed far too much meat.³¹⁸

Meat, especially, beef was considered nutritionally superfluous in Palestine, due to its fat content. Yet interestingly, not all fat was bad. Most Zionist experts argued against the

³¹⁵ “Nutrition Cycles: The Food of the Sephardim”, 16 October 1944.

³¹⁶ “Nutrition Cycles: How to Eat in Palestine”.

³¹⁷ “Nutrition Cycles: Yemenite and Kurdish Food”, 24 October 1944.

³¹⁸ “Nutrition Cycles: The Food of the Ashkenazim”, 14 November 1944.

consumption of some forms of fat but not others: *schmaltz* was “bad”, yet butter was ideal. One unnamed author, however, defyingly published an article in the daily press suggesting a different approach. In what seems like a protest s/he wrote: “People in hot climates have as much fat hunger as those in moderate and cold ones”. Citing medical missionaries and explorers linked to Charles Darwin, “who lived in the hottest parts of Africa and South America” found that “animal food” was as necessary in an “exhausting climate” as it was in the North of Europe.³¹⁹ The author continued:

“When a precept of the dietitians – like the one against fat in warm weather – is in conflict with the tastes and practices of many people in many countries through many centuries then it is likely the dietitians themselves will eventually learn... that the opposite of their precept is true... within not too many years... dietitians will announce what was right for Palestine: liking meat and liking it fat.³²⁰

In Palestine, however, the vilification of meat was not only a matter of climate, it was also a matter of economy. “Liking meat and liking it fat” was already a problem for Jewish experts in the 1920s and became more of a problem during the mid-1930s when European Jewish settlers injected more capital into Palestine than other waves. These middle-class immigrants were an economic force and their consumption habits accentuated the link between food consumption and the national economy of the Yishuv. The next section illustrates that by supporting the theory that meat was climatically inappropriate for consumption in Palestine, nutrition and cooking experts joined economic experts in their efforts to sway the public away from meat and towards locally grown and manufactured produce. In addition, by incorporating nutrition into its efforts, the JA further infused scientific advice with political agendas.

III. Where to Source: Nutrition and Political Economy

³¹⁹ “Should Palestinians Eat Fat? ‘Yes’ Says Arctic Explorer”, *The Palestine Post*, 24 August 1945

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

“Jewish economy is taking a look at the national menu, and the menu in turn must adapt itself not to accustomed tastes, but to the produce of the country”.³²¹

When Kligler and colleagues urged immigrants to adopt “a rational Palestinian diet”, what they envisioned was a national diet accustomed to the climate of Palestine as much as to the ideal Jewish economy. Throughout the mandate period, technocrats invested in technologically advanced agricultural development using systems of mixed farming, cultivation, and irrigation to strengthen the connection between Jewish consumers and the produce of “their” soil, but most importantly to develop an independent and separate Jewish economy.³²² While experts might have communicated ambivalent recommendations with regards to Palestinian dietary habits, one instruction was clear: the fruits, vegetables, and dairy prescribed by Zionist nutritionists had to come solely from Jewish farms, not Palestinian ones. This was a difficult demand, as Arab farmers supplied the majority of produce to all of Palestine’s consumers. The Jewish farming sector never supplied all of the Jewish consumers’ needs, and even its main distributor, *Tnuva*, a cooperative of farms that vehemently promoted only “Hebrew” produce, would sometimes buy from Palestinian farmers.³²³

The mid-1930s cemented the link between Jewish nutrition, Jewish agriculture, and the Jewish economy in Palestine. In 1935 the JA established the Economic Research Institute, led by famed political economist Arthur Ruppin.³²⁴ Ruppin and his colleagues were tasked with developing the Jewish section of Palestine’s economy, namely its agricultural sector. Within

³²¹ “Better Nutrition on Local Products”, *The Palestine Post*, 26 June 1939.

³²² Tene, “The New Immigrant”: 55.

³²³ *Tnuva* claimed to purchase produce only from Jewish farms, and highlighted this in its advertising. However, Nadan shows that at times the cooperative would also purchase produce from Arab Palestinian producers. See: Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant*: 22-23; Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 132-133.

³²⁴ “Studying the Palestinian Economy and its Problems: Press Conference at the Economic Research Institute”, *Davar*, 5 November 1936. It should be noted that the Palestinian Revolt also caused some to support the idea of binationalism rather than separation. See: Shafir, “Capitalist Binationalism”.

months, due to the outbreak of the Great Palestinian Revolt in 1936, this cause became urgent.³²⁵ The revolt limited the Yishuv's access to Arab Palestinian produce (due to boycotts) as well as internationally imported goods (due to port strikes). This further convinced Ruppin and his colleagues that the *Yishuv* had to become economically independent and self-sufficient as soon as possible. Ruppin pressed for increased Jewish agricultural production, and essentially, greater segregation of the Palestinian economies. A newspaper article titled "Strengthening our Stance" explained Ruppin's efforts to the public. The writer was Nahum Verlinsky, the Director of *Tnuva*. Verlinsky called on Jewish consumers to make sure they purchase only Jewish-grown produce – fruits, vegetables, eggs, and dairy – when shopping for their homes or dining out. He acknowledged that it might be difficult for Jewish consumers to focus on this seemingly mundane issue during times of violence and turmoil, but, he stressed, by buying "Hebrew produce" the urban consumer strengthened the agricultural sector, which was fundamental for expanding the settlement, reinforcing its economic stance, and liberating the *Yishuv* from dependency on others.³²⁶

To strengthen the agricultural sector and educate consumers about the significance of "Hebrew produce", Ruppin recruited another instrument: nutrition. In 1936, the Economic Research Institute created a subdivision: The Nutrition Committee, with Kligler as its Chair. Other committee members included two additional professors, several physicians, and three female nutritionists: Sarah Broomberg, Lilian Corenfeld, and Milka Saphir (who co-authored Erna Meyer's *How to Cook in Palestine*).³²⁷ As such, the Nutrition Committee did not function as part of the HMO, the Straus Center, or any other institution dedicated to public health. Rather, it was the brainchild of a national economic institute whose goal was

³²⁵ Chapter 4 will show how these events affected the meat trade more specifically.

³²⁶ Ruppin, "In our ability today", *Davar* 28 July 1937; Nahum Verlinsky, "Strengthening our Stance", *Davar*, 30 November 1936.

³²⁷ Both Saphir and Cornfeld became well-known cookbook authors in Israel's early years.

promoting Jewish agriculture and industry.³²⁸ With this, nutrition was incorporated into the national economic agenda of the JA.

As scientists, the members of the Nutrition Committee studied the composition of foods to prescribe those most nutritious. Yet as Zionist technocrats, these men and women were equally concerned with national goals when inventing a national diet. Simply educating the Jewish public on matters of nutrition, as the name of the committee suggests, was never its primary purpose. The committee's job was to influence the public, as consumers, to adapt their diet to the agriculture and political economy of the Yishuv. "The politics of nutrition", as described by experts, was aimed at achieving harmony between personal consumption and national goals. As a subdivision of the Economic Research Institute, it was political science, rather than strictly laboratory science, that dictated what foods were most nutritious for Jews in Palestine.³²⁹

Simultaneously, also in 1936, the JA established the Union for the Land's Produce (*Totzeret Ha'aretz*), an initiative that promoted Jewish produce to the *Yishuv* in advertisements, newspapers, posters, and other educational materials. Consumerism, according to these campaigns, was a political statement. Memorable advertisements include those for the "Hebrew watermelon" and the "Hebrew banana", which Jews were expected to purchase as a matter of national duty.³³⁰

By 1936, the Union for the Land's Produce and the Nutrition Committee joined the Economic Research Institute in promoting Jewish agriculture, industry, and manufacturing to the Jewish population of Palestine. As these experts provided the *Yishuv* with instructions on what to eat using their scientific authority, Helman is right to point out that it must have been

³²⁸ Indeed, even the 1931 study was not published by a medical organization but the Palestine Economic Society.

³²⁹ Kligler, "Our Goal"; Ettinger, "The Nutrition Committee at this Hour".

³³⁰ See especially: Raviv, *Falafel Nation*, 52-56.

difficult for Jews in Palestine to differentiate between scientific and economic arguments in favor of one food over another.³³¹ The promotion of national consumption merged both science and economy and nowhere was this more evident than in the discourse on meat and milk, discussed below.

In the experts' case against meat, the climatic-nutritional argument was always tied to an economic argument. The need to import meat made it detrimental to Zionist economic efforts. Even in the introduction to Kligler and Broomberg's nutrition study from 1930, Kligler explained that the ignorance of Jewish immigrants as to what to eat in Palestine was damaging both to their health as well as to the country's economy. It was harmful to their health because "the diet of temperate countries is not necessarily suitable to our sub-tropical climate" and harmful to the economy "because it may call for unnecessary importation of foodstuff".³³² Moreover, Kligler claimed, the natural way in which national diets developed was disturbed when "countries formerly depending on the products of their own soil learn to supplement and even to replace local with imported foods".³³³ When Kligler, who was a public health expert, not an economist, joined the Economic Research Institute, he joined Jewish agronomists and economists in warning against the dangers of importation.

In 1938 the Economic Research Institute published a technical report titled "Limiting Imports". Agronomist Akiva Ettinger explained the findings of the report to the public. Ettinger explained that the main goods imported into Palestine were meat, butter, grains, fish, fruit, vegetables, and eggs. The cost of all imported products that could have been substituted by local *Yishuv* products added up to 2 million PP annually.³³⁴ While still reliant on imports, the *Yishuv* gradually managed to increase its production of fruits, vegetables, dairy, poultry,

³³¹ Helman, "European Jews": 79.

³³² Kligler et al., *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 5

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Akiva Ettinger, "Nutrition Policy", *Davar*, 25 October 1938.

and eggs, and experts were adamant that Jews should buy more of them.³³⁵ There was no local Jewish alternative, however, for beef. Cattle imported for beef were in high demand and were expensive. For the Yishuv's agronomists and economists, this meant that huge sums of precious Jewish capital were leaving the *Yishuv* instead of being invested in it.³³⁶

To fix this, the Economic Research Institute recommended that the Jewish settlers in Palestine substitute meat with vegetables and dairy produced by Jewish farmers. By simply omitting beef, Ettinger explained, the *Yishuv* would save 1 million PP of the 2 million PP it spent on unnecessary imports annually. Furthermore, according to Ettinger, swapping meat for dairy was also nutritionally sound advice, approved by the national Nutrition Committee (which, again, was a subdivision of the producers of the report) as well as the League of Nations Nutrition Committee. While it was true that international nutrition experts did enthusiastically promote the consumption of dairy, many still considered beef an integral part of a healthy diet.³³⁷ The selective adoption of international nutritional knowledge and its adaptation to Zionist goals suggests that the climatic-nutritional case against meat was significant but equally important, or perhaps even more so, was the political economy of the Yishuv.

Ettinger was aware that omitting meat completely was not the type of advice readers would find appealing. He acknowledged that "it is impossible... to quickly and fundamentally convert consumers' habits", so he proposed a compromise. Ettinger explained that a healthy diet meant limiting the consumption of meat in "our country's climate", but with regards to the national economy, it would first be sufficient to cut beef imports by half.³³⁸ To do so, the

³³⁵ Dairy will be discussed below. For poultry and eggs see for example: "More Food Imports", *The Palestine Post*, 1 December 1939; "Growth of Poultry Farming", *The Palestine Post*, 31 October 1939.

³³⁶ Ettinger, "Nutrition Policy".

³³⁷ *Nutrition and The Public Health: Medicine, Agriculture, Industry, Education Proceedings of a National Conference on the Wider Aspects of Nutrition, April 27-28-29 1939* (London, British Medical Association): 21-22.

³³⁸ Ettinger, "Nutrition Policy".

agronomist turned to housewives in particular. It was up to the housewives, Ettinger claimed, to train their households to consume meat 3 to 4 times a week instead of every day. Ettinger appealed to housewives' sense of patriotism and economic thinking, insisting that "our farms" were unable to supply more than a small percentage of the Yishuv's consumption of beef, *now or in the future*, and the import of cattle for beef caused great damage "to our general annual balance".³³⁹ The problem with beef was not only that Jewish agriculture could not supply it then, but the idea that it would never be a profitable self-sufficient Jewish industry.³⁴⁰

The Nutrition Committee complied. It promoted the idea that locally-grown Jewish produce was healthier than imported alternatives. In 1939 the committee held a week-long food exhibition presented simultaneously at the Straus Health Centers in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa based on the idea that the foods grown in a particular country were those best suited to the well-being of its inhabitants. The exhibitions promoted "dairy products, vegetables, and fruits" over "tinned goods, meat, and imported fruits". The exhibition advertised "novel and interesting dairy dishes will be featured each day".³⁴¹ Even though the Zionist dairy industry was not native to Palestine, by 1939 it produced plenty of milk which nutrition experts marketed to the Jewish public. Thus, experts encouraged: "less imported fruit and meats and more dairy... on our table could cause a useful revolution in our individual and national finances".³⁴² Advertisements for the exhibitions concluded: "if the housewife will cooperate in this program, she can be a most important factor in the Palestine economy".³⁴³

It is hard to say how housewives answered the call. At least in Tel Aviv, the biggest consumer of beef in Palestine, the demand for meat and the growing meat industry did not

³³⁹ Ettinger, "What are the Products that our Agriculture Makes Available for the Woman".

³⁴⁰ See profitability argument in introduction.

³⁴¹ "Better Nutrition on Local Products", *The Palestine Post*, 26 June 1939.

³⁴² "Food Habit", *The Palestine Post*, 13 November 1939.

³⁴³ "Better Nutrition on Local Products".

slow down unless forced to by external factors such as shortages or rationing.³⁴⁴ Moreover, the constant appeals of experts seem to imply that consumers still chose to stick to their imported habits. We do have one available response to the omitting of meat from Meyer's *How to Cook in Palestine*. A woman named Frida Chomsky wrote a review of the cookbook in the women's section of *Davar*. "No one can deny the importance of vegetables and fruits in nourishment", Chomsky wrote, "but it was a mistake on the part of the author to remove the meat and fish from the book". While Chomsky agreed that excess consumption of meat was harmful, she insisted that meat was an affordable and convenient product to cook with. Thus, Chomsky claimed that Meyer could have supplied healthier alternatives to meat-heavy dishes such as meat or fish cooked with vegetables or in a soup.³⁴⁵ Chomsky's critique does not refer to a preference of taste, but rather makes a practical argument with housewives in mind.

Contrary to meat, as far as Jewish experts were concerned, the increasing production of milk in the *Yishuv* made it an ideal source of nutrients for the Jewish public. From the mid-1920s dairy farms began to spread across the *Yishuv*'s agricultural settlements and between the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s the production of milk in Jewish farms doubled.³⁴⁶ This surplus needed a market and experts were eager to market it.³⁴⁷ Already in 1931, Kligler's study used

³⁴⁴ See Chapters 3 and 4.

³⁴⁵ Frida Chomsky, "In the Women's Meshek: How to Cook in Palestine", *Davar*, 12 July 1936: 31.

³⁴⁶ Shavit and Giladi, "The Role of the Dairy Farm": 186-187. Although it has never received historiographical attention, the urban sector and the private sector were also producing milk. In Tel Aviv for example men and women were granted licenses for installing cowsheds, usually only occupied by one cow. If they also owned a dairy for producing dairy products, their produce had to pass the examination of the town's Chief Veterinarian and Inspector, Arieh Levit. Levit also served as Chief Veterinarian at the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, as will be discussed in chapter 3. License to sell milk and dairy products depended on these inspections and was renewable. Yet due to the national ethos, only the rural cooperative Zionist dairy industry, and *Tnuva*, were monitored on a national level. See numerous references to dairies, "milk factories", inspections of milk, and cowsheds registered to home addresses in Tel Aviv (under both men and women). See: ISA: Trades & Industries Tel-Aviv 1937-1945, 693/1-M. Similarly, in the northern settlement of Nahariya established by German Jews in 1935 (based on private-capital), families produced and sold dairy products on a small scale. These families include the now famous Strauss family (of the Strauss Group, which competes with *Tnuva* today in the dairy market), and even the Soglowek family, who is synonymous in Israel today with kosher charcuterie. Interview with Ami Soglowek at Soglowek Factory and Offices, Nahariya, 25 March 2018.

the consumption of milk and dairy as an indicator of living standards and nutrition levels of the Jewish population in Palestine. The study also promoted milk and butter as “ideal foods”.³⁴⁸ Yet Kligler acknowledged that even though Jewish farms were producing record amounts of milk and dairy products – pasteurized under his supervision at the Straus Center and distributed by *Tnuva* – their high cost was “beyond the means of the masses of the population”.³⁴⁹

This was disadvantageous to Jewish producers, especially as a variety of dairy products were available in Palestine from various origins and at competitive prices. Native Palestinians supplied goats’ milk to urban consumers, among them many Jews who were accustomed to purchasing fresh milk directly from Palestinian producers. Cow’s milk was a later addition to the Palestinian market, supplied by Protestant German settlers since the turn of the century, and later by Jewish settlements. The Palestinian market was also saturated with imported dairy products from British colonies as well as from European and Middle Eastern countries.³⁵⁰ Jewish-produced milk and dairy carried a higher price-tag than all of these alternatives and were also relatively new and unfamiliar. Imported butter, for example, a staple of Jewish diets in Palestine, was almost half the price of local Jewish butter.³⁵¹ In 1935, butter produced in Jewish farms and distributed by *Tnuva* sold at 280 mils per kilo, while imported butter sold for 150 mils per the same amount.³⁵²

Because butter was a diet staple for those who could afford it, it serves as an illustrative example here. It was impossible to argue that *Tnuva* butter, i.e., Jewish butter, was the more

³⁴⁷ See for example the Nutrition Committee’s journal *Ha’mazon*. All issues included articles on milk and dairy, but its 2nd issue was dedicated entirely to milk. See: *Ha’mazon*: Popular Journal on Nutrition May 1938 (Tel Aviv: The Nutrition Committee, 1938). See Also: Ettinger, “What are the Products that our Agriculture Makes Available for the Woman”; *Milk as Food for the People*.

³⁴⁸ Kligler, *An Inquiry into the Diets*: 190.

³⁴⁹ *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem* (Jewish National Council in Palestine, 1938): 10-11.

³⁵⁰ For Palestine as market for European and British goods, see for example: Norris, *Land of Progress*: 28.

³⁵¹ Due to costs of production and labor, imported products were often significantly cheaper than those locally produced in the Yishuv.

³⁵² Shavit and Giladi, “The Role of the Dairy Farm”: 190 note 40.

economical choice, so experts promoted it using a different approach. Kligler and colleagues conducted a study, the results of which were published in bold letters in the press: “high quality of *Tnuva* butter”. The study showed that *Tnuva* butter had two to four times the amount of vitamin A as did imported brands. However, in smaller print, the article added some reservations: among all the kinds of butter produced in Palestine only *Tnuva*’s was examined; Australian imported butter had only slightly less vitamin A than *Tnuva* butter; and levels of vitamin A in other imported butter had possibly deteriorated due to storage, not product inferiority.³⁵³ Similarly, in Meyer’s *How to Cook in Palestine*, we find instructions that illustrate how “nutritious” was a flexible adjective that depended more on consumer-politics than on science. She wrote: “The Palestinian housewife, whose duty it is to support home industries, naturally buys ‘Tnuva’ butter”. Meyer continued: “But if for reasons of economy she cannot do so, why should the only alternative be to buy foreign butter... when there are such excellent vegetable fats produced locally?”³⁵⁴

Meyer’s alternative to butter, a product extracted from milk and considered nutritious due to its milk-derived vitamin content, were vegetable oils – products of different micronutrient content. What made “local”, i.e., Jewish, vegetable oils superior was the fact that they were produced by Jewish manufacturers *Shemen* and *Meged*.³⁵⁵ *Meged* was also the sponsor of the cookbook in which she wrote these words. Meyer’s assertion explicitly defines the duties of Jewish housewives not only to their family but also to the nation. In second place after “Hebrew butter” was not imported butter, but “Hebrew oil”. As a cooking-expert within a national project, Meyer’s role was not only to educate housewives but also to sway them in favor of *Tnuva* and other “home industries”. Chomsky, in her review of *How to Cook in Palestine*, agreed that it was important to offer alternatives for wealthier newcomers “who

³⁵³ “Palestine Farm Products: a Study of their Nutritional Value”, *The Palestine Post*, 6 May 1940.

³⁵⁴ Meyer, *How to Cook in Palestine*, 25.

³⁵⁵ Meyer, *How to Cook in Palestine*, 25.

were accustomed to cooking everything in butter, margarine, or beef fat”, but, she claimed, for most in the *Yishuv* butter was not used for cooking but as a simple spread. “Bread in butter and tea is the most common breakfast in the country, and butter is usually foreign because it is cheaper”.³⁵⁶

Besides cookbooks, the Nutrition Committee promoted the Zionist dairy industry in the press, through exhibitions, and by the late 1930s through one more channel: a journal titled *Ha'mazon* (“the food”, or “the nourishment”). The journal was a “scientific-popular quarterly on nutrition and Home Economics”. It encouraged its readers to consume rationally and nationally, through articles on the advantages of pasteurized milk, the importance of mixed farming and fruit production in the Yishuv, practical advice for housewives on the proper way to conduct household chores from a physical perspective, as well as model menus for daily and holiday meals.³⁵⁷ While every issue of *Ha'mazon* included at least several references to milk and dairy, the second issue of the publication was dedicated entirely to the Jewish dairy industry.³⁵⁸ The journal suffered from financial difficulties and it seems as it never reached its target audience of housewives.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, *Ha'mazon* alongside smaller booklets published by the committee, such as *Milk as Food for the People* (*ha'chalav kemazon la'am*) illustrates its heightened focus on dairy.³⁶⁰

One such booklet was devoted entirely to dairy, and specifically, to the 1938 milk-in-school-program.³⁶¹ At the same time that the Nutrition Committee was trying to convince housewives to feed “Hebrew milk” to their children, Kligler and Verlinksy came up with a way to serve it to children directly. Verlinksy designed a milk-in-school program based on the British model

³⁵⁶ Chomsky, “In the Women’s Meshek”.

³⁵⁷ *Ha'mazon*, May 1938.

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁹ Kligler’s correspondences regarding the discontinuing of *Ha'mazon*, CZA S90/1112

³⁶⁰ *Milk as Food for the People*.

³⁶¹ On the milk program see my forthcoming article: Efrat Gilad, “The Child Needs Milk and Milk Needs a Market”: The Politics of Nutrition in the interwar Yishuv”, *Gastronomica* 21 no.1 (2021).

of “a glass of milk a day”. In Britain, this program was cemented by the 1934 British Milk Act. In Palestine, Zionist technocrats voiced national aspirations for the milk program, but with limited political authority under the British government, they could not enforce it by law. Nevertheless, the program was adopted by the highest body that governed over Jewish issues in Palestine, the JNC, which formed a special “milk committee” of technocrats from the JA’s Department of Health and Department of Education to oversee the program. The program was launched in Jerusalem, on May 2, 1938. It provided Jewish schoolchildren with one glass of cow’s milk, produced by Jewish farmers, pasteurized at the Straus Health Center, and distributed by *Tnuva*.³⁶²

The milk program included all Jewish schools in Jerusalem, but expanding to include additional cities was fundamental to its success. Out of approximately 70,000 Jewish students at the time,³⁶³ the program initially included 11 schools of 4,000 students. A month later, it grew to include 29 schools and 8,000 students. The following year, the program extended to the city of Haifa, incorporating 11 additional Jewish schools there. By 1943 the program included some 15,000 students in a few cities, but it never expanded into Tel Aviv or most cities in Palestine.³⁶⁴ Efforts to expand the milk program meant that local municipalities and parents needed to be persuaded of its importance because – as opposed to the HMO lunch program – they had to fund it. Thus, “the milk committee” promoted the milk program vigorously.

Like HMO’s lunch program, the milk program was directed at children but designed to reach their parents as well.³⁶⁵ In letters and conversations, members of the “milk committee” and

³⁶² See especially speeches by Kligler, Verlinsky, and Brachiyahu as well as “Excerpts from British Ministry of Health” all in: *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem*.

³⁶³ The number of Jewish students in Palestine is based on: Palestine Blue Book 1938 (Government of Palestine 1938): 451. For more: Furas, *Educating Palestine*.

³⁶⁴ Speech by Katznelson in: *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem*: 5; “How Do the People of Israel Drink Milk?”, *Davar*, 15 November 1938; “A Glass of Milk for Schoolchildren”, *Ha’aretz*, 22 January 1939.

other Zionist experts explained to parents that the project had two equally important objectives: promoting children's health and supporting the economy of the Yishuv. The milk committee explained that if the milk program expanded to include all Jewish settlements it would solve both children's malnutrition and the overproduction of milk in Jewish agricultural cooperatives.³⁶⁶ The initiators of the milk program claimed: "our child does not drink enough milk and our farms (*meshek*) do not sell enough milk. Their conclusion was simple: "milk for schools".³⁶⁷ "What marks our milk project from any other project" the committee claimed, was "the complete union of the two factors... the child and the *meshek*... The child needs milk and the *meshek* needs a market....".³⁶⁸

Educationally, a specific milk program was redundant, as Hadassah's school lunch program was still running and it already highlighted the importance of milk in children's diets. Milk and dairy featured in most school meals and their nutritional value was never simply implied but drilled into students. Schoolchildren, for example, were asked to reenact a play titled "Queen Dairy". In the play, children fought off "bad foods" who captured "Queen Dairy" and held her in prison.³⁶⁹ This redundancy highlights how the milk school program had little to do with nutrition and nutrition education, rather, it was more about marketing milk. This was less evident in letters to parents but was made clear when Zionist experts discussed the program among themselves.

³⁶⁵ *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem: 5-6.*

³⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 4. "Meshek" is a complex term, difficult to translate directly. While it differs according to context, it carries a certain meaning which links agriculture and economy. *Meshek* can refer to economy, such as *meshek otarki* – autarkic economy but may also refer to a specific agricultural settlement, like a kibbutz or a cooperative moshav, or to the entire farming sector within the Yishuv, which includes all agricultural settlements. *Meshek* could be used as "industry", i.e. the dairy industry, but it does not convey an "industrial" imagery as does the English term.

³⁶⁹ Children performed the play in 1941 and 1946 in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv. It is mentioned both at the Hadassah Archives in New York as well as in Sarah Broomborg's papers at CZA. Papers of Sarah Bavly, CZA A5207.

In front of an audience composed of technocrats who were involved in the milk project, Ruppin stated: “all of you know how much we have toiled and struggled to establish a state-of-the-art dairy.” However, Ruppin added, “while we were able to advance production, we were unable to solve the problem of marketing our increasingly growing product”.³⁷⁰ The root of the problem according to Ruppin were the habits of the community, which he discussed in terms of the average annual consumption of milk per capita. Ruppin compared milk consumption in the *Yishuv* in 1937 (49 liters per capita) with the following countries: Britain (95 liters), Germany (107 liters), The United States (146 liters), The Netherland (136 liters), and Denmark (164 liters). Showing the *Yishuv* as lagging behind “advanced nations”, was a tactic used by many nutritionists, economists, or agronomists. Ettinger for example used the same list but added the real global heavyweight in milk consumption – Switzerland (225 liters).³⁷¹ According to Ruppin, “progressive projects” such as the milk-in-school program were a way to promote the consumption of the *Yishuv*’s most important agricultural produce – milk.³⁷²

When Ruppin and his colleagues compared the *Yishuv* to other countries in terms of milk consumption they conveniently discussed gaps in consumers’ habits, not in prices. Like in the case of butter, the price of milk and dairy products produced by Jewish farmers were significantly higher in Palestine than in the above-mentioned countries. According to a Dairy Report from 1936, because the cost of production in the *Yishuv* was “much higher than that of any European country” the retail price for milk and dairy was “among the highest in the world”. The report explained that the price of milk was both objectively higher than in most countries, as well as “high with respect to the income of the consumer”.³⁷³ In 1935 for

³⁷⁰ Speech by Katznelson in: *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem*: 6.

³⁷¹ Akiva Ettinger’s personal papers, CZA/A111/25. See also: “Better Nutrition on Local Produce”.

³⁷² *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem*: 7-8.

³⁷³ L. Samuel, “Summary of the Dairy Report 1936”: 3-4, CZA/S90/361. For more information on the cost of living: The General Federation of Hebrew Laborers in Eretz Israel, Department of Statistics and Information,

example, one liter of milk in the *Yishuv* was sold for 13.5 mils, while in Denmark 5 mils, The Netherlands 8 mils, Australia 4 mils, Britain 9 mils, and Germany 8 mils.³⁷⁴

The high cost of Jewish-produced dairy in Palestine had to do with production costs which were double those of developed dairy industries elsewhere. In addition, demand for milk was never the driving force behind the Zionist industry. As explained in the Dairy Report, colonization called for “an increase of supply (which) may disturb the equilibrium of the market...” because in a “colonizing country... the needs of colonization have to be satisfied”.³⁷⁵ The needs of colonization also meant that promoting consumption by lowering prices would only be possible “in the distant future”.³⁷⁶ Instead of adapting the product to the market, Zionist technocrats created a market for their product. Cities were a market. School was a market. Thus, Ruppin concluded his speech by calling: “no urban child without milk!”³⁷⁷

Experts’ need to market milk was more important than parents’ desire to provide milk for their children. In the dichotomy between a productive farming sector and a consuming urban sector, even educators took it upon themselves to remind urban mothers that their duties extended beyond their private household. As a member of the Department of Education explained to one mother, the least urban consumers could do was to buy the products that the real heroes – the farmers – were producing. As the representative of farms and farmers, *Tnuva*’s Verlinsky further established the link between consuming milk and national goals: “The Hebrew *meshek* is fighting for its existence... Anyone who assists in the realization of the milk project in schools provides actual support to establishing the settlement and its

“The Cost of Living in Eretz Israel based on the Budget of the Working Family 1926-1939”, *Statistic Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Tel Aviv, 1940).

³⁷⁴ Shavit and Giladi, “The Role of the Dairy Farm”: 192. 1000 mils equaled one Palestine Pound under the British Mandate.

³⁷⁵ Samuel, “Summary of the Dairy Report”: 7-8.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

expansion”.³⁷⁸ Promoting milk by claiming there was a correlation between the needs of the child and the needs of Jewish agriculture, reflects the role of nutrition in the *Yishuv* within the ultimate goal of the colonization of Palestine.

The agricultural sector was planned by experts, funded by collective Jewish funds, and idealized for years to come, yet it was the spontaneous growth of Palestine’s cities, due to an influx of immigration from Europe especially during the 1930s, that was the saving grace of the mixed farming economy.³⁷⁹ As put by historians Shavit and Giladi, “failing to stop the expansion of the city was an ideological and political defeat”. Economically, however, it was a success.³⁸⁰ Zionist experts asked farmers to increase the supply of food so that the *Yishuv* could become self-sufficient, but it was urban immigrants who were called to sustain an otherwise unsustainable farming sector. In this process, the apparatus mobilized by experts to connect the two was nutrition. What made milk more nutritious than meat was grounded in the science of nutrition but anchored foremost to Zionist political goals.

IV. Conclusions

Nutritionists and other experts who weighed in on the field of nutrition never understood this field in isolation. This chapter demonstrated the political and economic considerations inherent in the application of nutrition in Palestine. Beginning with Hadassah, food programs and nutritional advice was no longer about feeding the hungry but serving the (future) state. If the school-lunch program educated children about “rational consumption”, the later addition to Jewish food programs, the milk-in-school project, fortified the idea of national consumption. Incoincidentally, the Mandate period was both when the foundations of nutrition education were established in the *Yishuv*, as well as when the foundations of the future

³⁷⁸ *The Milk Project in Schools Jerusalem*: 8-9.

³⁷⁹ On the development of cities in the *Yishuv* despite anti-urban Zionist ideologies: Troen, *Imagining Zion*; Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*; Alroey, *An Unpromising Land*; Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*; Shavit, “Telling the story of a Hebrew City”, in: Azaryahu and Troen, *Tel Aviv: the First Century*; Cohen, “The City in Zionist Ideology”.

³⁸⁰ Shavit and Giladi, “The Role of the Dairy Farm”: 190.

Jewish state were laid. Many of the experts who weighed in on nutrition were also key actors in other aspects of colonization including Szold, Ruppin, Kligler, and Ettinger. The needs of colonization seeped into nutrition, and nutrition was ingrained into the Zionist project.

At the same time that experts adopted a top-down approach to the acclimatization of European Jews to Palestine, they lacked the political power to coerce consumption habits. Their tone was stern and urgent because it was their main tool to persuade settlers to consume “rationally”. Across mediums and platforms, Zionist experts continuously insisted that meat did not fit Zionist goals. Regardless, with new waves of settlers, the consumption of meat in the *Yishuv* only grew. “Despite the tropical climate”, newspapers boasted, “Jews consume plenty of meat in Palestine”.³⁸¹ Even when a committee gathered to discuss solutions for meat shortages during the 1940s, it first noted that consuming high quantities of meat was “completely incoherent” in Palestine’s “climatic situation”. Experts associated this incoherence with immigrants from central European countries, considered especially persistent in maintaining old eating habits, consuming twice or three times as much meat as recommended in tropical climates.³⁸²

Whether it was due to ignorance, preference, or defiance, many consumers ignored expert advice. The few reactions to cooking advice, presented in this chapter, also provide a glimpse into individualist approaches within a dogmatic national movement, or to alternative ideas about eating and being in Palestine. Such for example, in a newspaper article titled “Zionism in the Kitchen” the author acknowledged that consuming “Hebrew produce” would support Jewish industries, and as a result, the Zionist cause. She concluded, however, that to strictly adhere to “Hebrew” consumption would have made housekeeping in Palestine “a complicated type of religion”.³⁸³ This continued to be the case for housewives who were

³⁸¹ “What are the Butchers Striking about?” *Ha'boker* 28 January 1947; “Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?” *Ha'boker* 26 August 1947.

³⁸² “Memorandum of the Subcommittee to Clarify the Meat Problem 1944”, TAMA, 58/1058

troubled by cooking advice during the early 1950s. As one housewife claimed: “it used to be simple... you cooked meat... now you have to be an artist to prepare a meal”.³⁸⁴

The next chapters explore what happened when consumers ignored experts’ advice, continued to cook and consume meat, and supported an entire meat economy. To the dismay of national experts, the consumption habits of Jewish settlers tied them economically to Arab Palestinian husbandry, to regional Arab breeders and merchants, and to a growing import economy.

³⁸³ Shulamit Schwartz, “Zionism in the Kitchen”, quoted in: Raviv, *Falafel Nation*: 52-53.

³⁸⁴ As quoted in: Raviv, *Falafel Nation*: 70.

Chapter 2: Meat-Animals in Palestine

The previous chapter illustrated how Jewish settlers in Palestine continued to consume meat despite the advice of Zionist experts. As the experts' goal was to promote a settler economy independent from Palestinian agriculture and foreign imports, meat had little place in ideal Zionist diets. Yet not all Jews adhered to Zionist ideals, and for those who could afford it, meat remained an important part of Jewish diets. Thus, this chapter asks a set of simple questions: if Jews insisted on consuming meat in a country of limited supply, where did that meat come from? Which animals did they consume? Who was responsible for those animals? And how were the origins of the animals – and their handlers – linked to the meanings assigned to their meat? Answering these questions elucidates this chapter's main argument: the politics of meat starts with live animals.

The first section in this chapter focuses on sheep, goats, and cattle. While sheep and goats were the most important milk and meat animals for the majority of Palestinians, European Jewish settlers preferred milk and beef from cattle.³⁸⁵ Breeding these animals contributed to the Palestinian economy, but to a lesser extent in comparison with neighboring countries. While over half of the Arab Palestinian population made a living off of agriculture, the majority cultivated cereals, and less than 3 percent engaged in animal husbandry.³⁸⁶ This choice was logical: Palestine's rural economy fit the country's climatic and environmental conditions. As stated by Fernand Braudel in his classic *Civilization and Capitalism*: "if the choices of an economy are determined solely by adding up calories, agriculture on a given surface area will always have the advantage over stock-raising". To which the historian

³⁸⁵ Other important livestock in Palestine include poultry, horses, donkeys, mules, and to a lesser extent, buffalos.

³⁸⁶ El-Eini provides the figure of three percent for farmers engaged in husbandry and forestry together. See: El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 121.

added, cereals have always fed “ten to twenty times as many people” as meat did.³⁸⁷ In the interwar period, however, British colonial approaches to agriculture valued large-scale intensive animal farming based on technological advancements and scientific measurements. I. A. Gillespie, a British surveyor of the Middle East Supply Center claimed that husbandry in Palestine suffered from the same “hardship and backwardness” he witnessed in other Middle Eastern countries. The only exception he claimed to have found was in the Jewish sector. The development of a Jewish dairy industry on cooperative settlements “along modern scientific lines” was in sharp contrast to the “primitive methods of indigenous farming” found elsewhere in the region. To the surveyor’s dismay, Arab farmers were “more interested in their sheep and goat flocks” than in making any progress in dairying.³⁸⁸

While the achievements of the Zionist dairy industry were celebrated by British and Jews alike, no such efforts were made to engineer a Zionist beef industry in Palestine under the Mandate. For meat, Jews relied first on local and regional cattle, raised in or led to Palestine by Arab handlers, and gradually and increasingly on a stream of imported cattle by sea. Any contributions from the Jewish sector to the Palestine meat trade were from cows that were no longer of use to the dairy industry. Thus, Palestine is understandably missing from the academic literature on meat and colonialism, where European settlers are often described as attracted to territories that offered more meat than the countries they left. In the United States, Hasia Diner writes, one of the most significant changes in the diets of Eastern European Jews was the opportunity to eat meat every day.³⁸⁹ This chapter is the first to show how Jewish efforts in the field of meat were inherently linked to a settler-colonial project as well, yet rather than a meat-producing giant attracting newcomers, in Palestine newcomers arrived and created systems to fit their meat needs.

³⁸⁷ Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th Century* (New York: Perennial Library, 1985): 104.

³⁸⁸ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*.

³⁸⁹ Diner, *Hungering for America*: 179-180.

This is not to say that meat was not consumed in Palestine before the wave of Jewish settlers in the interwar period. While some colonial medical experts linked meat-eating with “the west” and vegetarianism with “the east” as an almost self-explanatory theory of the division of power between these areas, not all Arabs or Arab Palestinians were mainly vegetarian. Historically, it would be more accurate to associate levels of meat consumption with socioeconomic status rather than geography.³⁹⁰ Even in the hottest climates of the Middle East, wealthier people ate meat.³⁹¹ In Palestine too, the daily Arabic press shows much preoccupation with the availability and price of meat indicating that access to meat was important.³⁹² This chapter will demonstrate how the consumption of meat in Palestine depended on the changing landscapes of its livestock economy within environmental and ecological limitations, as well as economic considerations.

Economic consideration and additional limitations also led Jews and Arabs in Palestine to consume animals that were not their first choice. Thus, in addition to cattle, sheep, and goats, the final section of this chapter will discuss the breeding and eating of pigs and camels. While pork meat has a long history of causing controversy among Jews and between Jews and their neighbors in Europe, in Israel there is only one study on this in particular.³⁹³ In addition, the controversies concerning camel meat in Palestine have not yet been told. The meat anxieties Jewish settlers possessed, as a group, were also linked to the settler-colonial project as a whole. These anxieties – expressed with regards to the purposeful or misguided consumption

³⁹⁰ Julia Hauser, “A Frugal Crescent”; Margareta Aslan, “Turkish Flavours in the Transylvanian Cuisine (17th–19th Centuries)”, in Violeta, Barbu, Angela Jianu, Zoran Milutinović, and Alex Drace-Francis (eds.) *Earthly Delights: Economies and Cultures of Food in Ottoman and Danubian Europe c. 1500-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2018): 112.

³⁹¹ Barak, *Powering Empire*, 59.

³⁹² For example: “The Fall in Meat Prices and the Arrival of Sheep”, *Al-Difa*, 6 March 1940; “The High Price of Meat and the Lack of Sheep”, *Al-Difa*, 26 December 1939; “Thirty Days without Meat”, *Mirat al-Sharq*, 20 October 1931.

³⁹³ Daphne Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs: Law, Religion, and Culture in Israel* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007). See also: Anna Shternshis, “Salo on Challah: Soviet Jews’ Experience of Food in the 1920s–1950s”. In Anat Helman (ed.) *Jews and Their Foodways* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 10-27.

of pork and camel – were symbolic of Jewish settler’s alienation from their new land and its offerings. This, I argue, goes beyond an aversion to non-kosher meats (as some Jews did not observe kosher laws at all) and represents general angst against meats symbolically distinctly “Arab” or alien.

I. Political Ecologies: Cattle, Sheep, Goats

In Palestine and its hinterlands, sedentary farmers (*fellahin*) and semi-nomadic Bedouins raised livestock in quantities that depended on their financial abilities. For farmers, livestock was both capital and workforce. For Bedouins, breeding animals was an important source of income, and collective identity was often defined not only by the territories they inhabited but also by the species of animal they bred.³⁹⁴ In Palestine, Bedouins were the main breeders and traders of sheep. They also owned camels, goats, and other animals, but rarely any cattle. Sedentary farmers bred the majority of cattle in the country, primarily in the districts of Galilee, Samaria, Haifa, Jerusalem, Lydda, and Gaza. *Fellahin* also owned goats, some sheep, and other animals.³⁹⁵ Urban dwellers also owned various animals but usually to a far lesser extent.³⁹⁶ Native Palestinian cattle were referred to as *Baladi* (“local”), but farmers of means also owned *Bayruti* cattle (from Beirut) as they were considered a better breed, and more resilient to various diseases.³⁹⁷ The British Livestock Survey labeled the standard of Palestinian cattle as especially low, without explaining what constitutes this ranking.³⁹⁸ We can learn more from a German doctoral student who examined Palestinian cattle in the 1920s, who wrote that these animals were raised for work, beef, and milk, but excelled at none of the above.³⁹⁹ Perhaps projecting his own shortcomings in handling these animals, the student also

³⁹⁴ “Bedouin”, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 21 October 2019 <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Bedouin> [last accessed 25 September 2020]

³⁹⁵ Such as poultry, mules, horses and others. Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*, 107.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 106.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 104-105.

³⁹⁸ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*.

noted that Palestinian cattle were “rather temperamental, quarrelsome, hard to manage, and particularly wary of people in European dress”.⁴⁰⁰

Regardless of their grade, in a livestock economy, females were especially significant.⁴⁰¹ Farmers and breeders generally preferred to sell as few young females as possible, because both male and female livestock provided adequate force required for labor, but only females offered offspring and the precious provisions they naturally produced. Palestine had goats in abundance and does were the most important milk-producing animal. Does were common and sturdy and unlike cows and ewes produced milk year-round. For farmers and breeders to keep maximum amounts of animal provisions for human consumption, all kids were weaned as early as possible and the majority of male kids were slaughtered at an early age. As noted in the Livestock Survey, “in the conflict of interest” between humans and young livestock, animals took second place.⁴⁰² Besides does, cows were kept for work and milk as well.⁴⁰³ Oxen were widely used for plowing throughout the Middle East, and only once they lost their ability to work, they were slaughtered or sold off for their meat.⁴⁰⁴ At times, the dearth of fodder crops rendered feeding oxen completely unprofitable. Instead, owning a female cow for her milk as well as her strength to draw a plow obviated the need to keep oxen altogether. And cows, just like oxen, could eventually be eaten.⁴⁰⁵

The greatest meat-eaters in the region were not farmers. Urban dwellers in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon possessed the highest wealth per capita in the region, and subsequently, their

³⁹⁹ Salo Jonas, “Cattle Raising in Palestine,” *Agricultural History* 26, 3 (1952): 101.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁴⁰¹ I use the collective terms cattle, sheep, goats to define the animal species regardless of their biological sex. When referring to females specifically, I use cow, ewe, and doe. For young cows – calves, and young goats – kids.

⁴⁰² Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 2-3.

⁴⁰³ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*; Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 2.

⁴⁰⁴ In some places other animals were used for ploughing. In Beersheba Sub-District and the Sinai camels were used for ploughing. El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 554.

⁴⁰⁵ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 2.

meat consumption was the greatest.⁴⁰⁶ The British Livestock Survey accredited these towns with absorbing all the meat animals in their immediate hinterlands as well as requiring additional animals from Iraq, Turkey, Arabia, and even the Balkan countries.⁴⁰⁷ But slaughtering increasing numbers of working-animals to supply growing urban meat demands, as practiced since the 1920s and perhaps before, caused shortages in these animals. This raised prices, putting an additional burden on farmers who depended on livestock labor.⁴⁰⁸ This is one way in which the consumption of meat demonstrated the imparities between rural producers and urban consumers.

Whether from a city's immediate hinterlands or arriving from afar, resilience was an important trait for animals in the region. Keeping animals fed and hydrated year-round was a challenge for farmers and nomads alike. Limited rainfall, dry hot seasonal winds, periods of drought, and limited fodder crops were life-threatening conditions for domesticated animals. Goats were the sturdiest of livestock who could thrive where other animals would not survive. Cattle, on the other hand, demanded higher quality vegetation and overall more temperate conditions. *Fellahin* were limited in their ability to feed their cattle as they did not travel with their animals to the extent that Bedouins did. They also preferred to cultivate grains for human consumption rather than fodder crops, and purchasing imported fodder was too expensive for the majority of *fellahin*. These circumstances meant that sufficient green grazing was available to cattle only in winter after adequate amounts of rainfall. During the summer, cattle simply had to endure their hunger and thirst, losing substantial weight. In

⁴⁰⁶ The rise of wealth per capita in Palestine did not begin with Jewish immigration. With the rise of the export of agricultural produce to Europe in the 1890s, Palestine experienced a long period of urbanization. See: Sarah Graham Brown, "Political Economy of Jabal Nablus, 1920-1948" in: Roger Owen (ed.) *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (The Southern Illinois University Press, 1982): 90-2.

⁴⁰⁷ Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 1.

⁴⁰⁸ Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*: 100.

extreme conditions, cattle and other livestock would die of starvation, rendering nomadism, or semi-nomadism, more necessity than choice.⁴⁰⁹

For much of the journey from hinterlands to town centers, animals traveled “on the hoof”. Networks of cattle trails and grazing pastures connected the territories of the Middle East, with seasonality playing a major role in dictating the movement of animals and their handlers. Summer drove seasonal movement in search for water and natural pasture along cultivated lands, around wells, riverbanks, and wastelands. During the winter, handlers in southern Iraq and Transjordan drove cattle and sheep westwards into Palestine.⁴¹⁰ In Palestine’s dry summers, Bedouins of the southern area left the desert with their flocks, traveling north and west towards cultivated valleys. The region’s sheep and goats were not finicky animals. They grazed on waste areas on hill slopes and on stubble left in fields after crops were harvested. The bodies of livestock were designed to endure some periods of scarcity and various seasonal conditions. Camels, for example, store fat in their humps, and sheep store fat in their tails.⁴¹¹

The movement of herds across the region, practiced for generations, both challenged and was challenged by imperial and state borders. What some British officials referred to as “meat smuggling” between Iraq and Syria, for example, was often simply herds and herdsmen following familiar historical tracks.⁴¹² Yet for authorities who wanted to safeguard boundaries, controlling the movement of livestock had both medical and financial importance.⁴¹³ As noted by historian Joshua Specht, “if the ecology of cattle trailing was a set of relationships that allowed cattle to move, the spatial politics of cattle quarantines shaped

⁴⁰⁹ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*; Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*: 107, 187. For figures on the enumeration of animals see El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 399. For more on British attempts to control grazing and their failed grazing policies, see: *Ibid.*, 222-228.

⁴¹⁰ Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 3.

⁴¹¹ Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 1-2.

⁴¹² Economic Advisor in Syria and Lebanon, “Meat on the Hoof ex Iraq”, 8 February 1944, BNA, FO 922/199.

⁴¹³ Igra, “Mandate of Compassion”: 3.

where and how the animals traveled”.⁴¹⁴ Palestine’s colonial government instituted quarantine stations alongside the country’s borders, but borders were crossable by foot, thus quarantine stations did not necessarily stop the movement of livestock across them.⁴¹⁵

The existing literature does not highlight however that even though the purpose of quarantine stations was to stop or slow down the traffic of animals long enough to count them, inspect them, and charge for their passage, quarantine stations did not impede meat trade, but became an integral part of it. For example, Samakh, located at the bottom of the sea of Galilee and known in Israel today as *Tzemach*, was initially the last stop of the Jezreel Railway (an extension of the Hijaz Railway) before the Syrian border.⁴¹⁶ The introduction of the railway to the area was followed by increased economic activity and development. The open-air animal quarantine there, erected and operated by Palestine’s Veterinary Services and equipped with dipping-tanks and a veterinary care facility, supplied a stream of healthy animals to the lively Samakh livestock market.⁴¹⁷ Thus, I suggest, we can also see quarantine stations as intrinsic to the period’s meat-trade.

In the region, Aleppo was the main focal point for the livestock trade.⁴¹⁸ In Palestine, in addition to Samakh, local merchants held weekly livestock markets in large towns and villages, such as Haifa, Nazareth, Tulkarem, Ramla, Lod, and Gaza, where Arab (and some Jewish) butchers, or their representatives, came to purchase cattle.⁴¹⁹ Cattle would usually come on the market around the age of 2 or 3, but oxen used for plowing would be put on the

⁴¹⁴ Specht, *Red Meat Republic*: 146.

⁴¹⁵ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 148-150.

⁴¹⁶ After World War I it became a border station for British authorities in Palestine and French Government of Syria.

⁴¹⁷ British Economic Section in Damascus, “Quarantine Station – building plans”, 9 August 1944. BNA, FO 922/199. For a list of animals and figures imported to Palestine through quarantine stations, see: Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 11.

⁴¹⁸ This was true for legal trade as well as illegal crossings. In the early 1940s, for example, Turkish cattle crossed over to Aleppo and from there to the Palestinian market unregulated. Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 3-4.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

market at an older age. The livestock trade was mostly monopolized by a handful of large merchants, who led their animals to the markets or employed others to do so. In distant desert areas, itinerant traders traveled between tribes and dealt in livestock on the go. Alongside authorized markets, illicit trade always existed. A black market for livestock and meat was rampant throughout the Mandate years and especially during acute shortages such as those throughout World War II.⁴²⁰

One Jewish butcher described Palestine's livestock markets. In a letter to his brother, he wrote that attending livestock markets was an unpleasant experience for a newcomer, where haggling over cattle with Arab merchants could get violent. "Negotiating with [an] Arab is wild", the butcher wrote, "he never tells you how much the animal is worth, but rather you have to offer the price, and sometimes, if you don't offer a fair price, he shoves you away with his scrawny hands". "Among us", the butcher continued referring to Ashkenazi Jewish butchers who visited the markets, "there are Sephardi and Yemenite Jews who are used to this... but for us it is difficult". As a result, the butcher claimed, he tried to avoid dealing with Arab merchants and started buying cattle directly from *fellahin*.⁴²¹

The Arabs and Jews of the meat business also encountered elsewhere. Instead of meeting at a meat market, sometimes an Arab merchant would bring animals directly to the slaughter location where he met butchers. In Tel Aviv in the 1920s this was simply on the seashore, out in the open, under the scolding sun or pouring rain. There, Jewish butchers usually in pairs or small groups, would buy an ox from a merchant and divide its meat between them to sell on to their respective customers. The merchant would arrive with the animal, the latter would be slaughtered on the sand, skinned by Arab skinners on the spot, and finally, if completed legally, examined by a veterinarian. The carcass was then lifted on to the back of a mule and

⁴²⁰ During the war, the price of livestock, like all commodities and provisions, increased dramatically, but the price of cattle skyrocketed more than tenfold. Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 6.

⁴²¹ Moshe Nehoshti, "Letters to Brother", *The Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 18-19.

weighed by the merchant, who would inform the butchers what they owed him according to that weight. The fee was due at the end of the week on a Friday.⁴²² Whether at the market or a meeting spot on the seashore, the aforementioned Jewish butcher claimed that Jews were the main consumers of beef in Palestine, but the entire trade was “in the hands of the Arabs”.⁴²³

With rising Jewish demands for beef, various Jewish actors made efforts to move the meat trade and its profits from Arab agents to Jewish ones. This, I will show in the next chapters, was inherently tied to the settler-colonial project as a whole and Tel Aviv’s urban development. Tel Aviv successfully established its own slaughterhouse in 1931, but a Tel Aviv cattle market never materialized.⁴²⁴ In the mid-1930s Arieh Levit, the Chief Veterinarian of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, suggested to Tel Aviv’s mayor that the city would benefit from hosting its own cattle market, in proximity to the slaughterhouse. This way, Levit added, the city’s butchers would also not have to travel far to purchase animals. However, Kligler, the prominent bacteriologist introduced in Chapter 1, on a visit he made to view the slaughterhouse facility, insisted that a livestock market adjacent to a slaughterhouse was a bad idea. A livestock market created a lot of grime, waste, and pollution, whereas a modern slaughterhouse had to be immaculately clean.⁴²⁵

Besides Arab and Jewish encounters in the meat trade, what is noteworthy in the butcher’s story is that a Jewish slaughterer – a *shochet* – was not mentioned as part of the process, which would render the meat non-kosher. This is interesting because increasingly under the Mandate period, *schita* (Jewish slaughter) in Jaffa and Tel Aviv came under the control of the Tel Aviv Rabbinate. If we understand the laws of *kashrut* as “iron-hard categories”, as

⁴²² Ibid.

⁴²³ Ibid.

⁴²⁴ Levit’s idea can be understood as an attempt to centralize the meat market in Tel Aviv. Alma Igra, email correspondence, 5 May 2020.

⁴²⁵ “The Visit of Dr. Kligler (to the slaughterhouse building site) 26 January 1930”, TAMA, 4/1552/4755. I would like to thank Alma Igra for sending me some documents from this TAMA folder.

defined in Mary Douglas' seminal work *Purity and Danger*, then it makes sense that slaughter would be controlled by the chief Jewish authority in the land.⁴²⁶ In reality, however, in Palestine, various separate forms of *schita* were practiced. Sephardic, Ashkenazi, and Yemenite communities traditionally slaughtered separately, and even within these groups, the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox also slaughtered separately to other Ashkenazim. Various Jewish sects had their own slaughter-supervisor (*mashgiach*) and their own sites for slaughter. They often quarreled with each other, denounced each other's practices, and boycotted the other groups' meat.⁴²⁷ It was in fact the British Government in Palestine that invented the Jewish Rabbinate when it sought to replace the previous decentralized Ottoman system and impose *one* rabbinical authority to reign over all religious Jewish matters. During the Mandate years, the Rabbinate worked to impose one form of kosher slaughter and criminalized all others. This was not only due to safeguarding Jewish ritual, it was also economically vital for the institution; it relied on slaughter taxes and payment for the services it provided. Colonial rule, as well as the centralizing of slaughter in one location – the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse – allowed one religious authority to dominate and prevail above the others.⁴²⁸

This was not the case for Muslim slaughter (*dhabihah*) in Palestine. Although the British government consolidated Islamic religious issues under The Supreme Muslim Council, similar to what it had done for Jews in Palestine, and although *dhabihah* was regulated, at least theoretically, by comparable “iron-hard” sets of religious rules, the Islamic institution did not deal with or earn from slaughter in the same manner as did the Rabbinate. Therefore, as stated by Alma Igra, Jewish and Muslim institutions generated different meat economies.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁶ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London & New York: Routledge, 1984 [1966]).

⁴²⁷ Greenfeld, “To the Meat Question in Tel Aviv”.

⁴²⁸ This was not left unchallenged during the Mandate period as evidenced by the municipal battle against “separate slaughter” of Jews in Jaffa and in Southern Tel Aviv in areas such as Kerem Ha'temanin (the “Yemenite Quarter”). See for example: “The Municipal Veterinary Services, January-December 1939”, *Yedioth Tel Aviv*, 15 December 1939, 15.

Here too, it should be mentioned, religious rules rarely stayed fixed over time and space. Rather, as noted by scholars Febe Armanios and Ergebe Bogac “Islamic law is a set of living and breathing traditions”.⁴³⁰ While in the Jewish communities this manifested, in practice, into separate slaughter, Roy Bar Sadeh shows how within Muslim communities, especially those living as minorities within a larger non-Muslim society, this manifested in a rich theological debate among Muslim scholars on the challenges of Halal meat and Muslim slaughter throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.⁴³¹

Returning to the butcher’s testimony, what we can also learn from it is that in addition to all the markets, there were various other places and manners in which cattle were sold for slaughter, legally and illegally, through agents or directly. This explains why when trying to answer a seemingly simple question about the size of the cattle population in Palestine there is no certain answer. One estimate claims that between the 1930s and 1940s the number of cattle in Palestine varied between 20 to 30 thousand heads.⁴³² Yet the number of cattle in the country is only estimated, and estimations differ because counting cattle varies between historical accounts, reports, surveys, censuses, and in later calculations by economic historians such as Amos Nadan and Roza El-Eini. These inconsistencies exist not only *between* Ottoman, British and Zionist sources, but also within these categories because, as mentioned by Tamar Novick, some surveys differentiated between cows and oxen, between dairy cows and other cattle, or between animals owned by different religious groups.⁴³³

⁴²⁹ Igra “Mandate of Compassion”, 14.

⁴³⁰ Febe Armanios and Ergebe Bogac, *Halal Food: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020): 169.

⁴³¹ Roy Bar Sadeh’s shows this in his chapter “‘Meat Together’: The Aligarh Movement and the Politics of Halal Meat, 1857-1894”. This chapter is part of his forthcoming PhD dissertation, to be submitted to the History Department at Colombia University.

⁴³² Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 2; Ben-Nathan, “The Meat Problem”; Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*: 101-102, 311-312.

⁴³³ Novick, *Milk and Honey*: 69.

The cattle population in Palestine diminished due to slaughter but also due to disease. Various contagious diseases, especially during the 1910s and the decade between 1926-1936 caused further losses for Palestinian farmers.⁴³⁴ The Veterinary Service, a division of the Palestine Government's Agricultural Department, was tasked with thwarting these losses. It was entrusted with upgrading animal stock in Palestine by encouraging husbandry, controlling epidemics threatening local animals, and preventing the introduction of new diseases into the country. The Veterinary Service also worked to improve animal welfare and hygiene, instruct sanitary practices for slaughter, and ensure that only wholesome meat was sold throughout the country.⁴³⁵ This government agency conducted inspections and investigations on farms, in stables, and slaughterhouses.⁴³⁶ The detection of illness in animals, or a reported outbreak of contagious diseases, required immediate intervention. Yet intervention did not entail curing animals but rather culling any animal suspected to have been exposed to a contagious disease. Preemptive medicine was the only treatment for such diseases, which included quarantining incoming animals and vaccinating local healthy animals.⁴³⁷ In addition, the veterinary services assisted in the breeding of livestock. For cattle, some scholars calculate 60 percent population-growth yet others show decline and recovery of cattle population between 1926 and 1937 rather than growth.⁴³⁸

While it remains unclear how big (or small) the cattle-for-meat population in Palestine was, we know that it did not suffice to supply the demand for beef. The urban meat consumers of Palestine and the Levant were joined by growing numbers of Jewish urban meat consumers. Jewish experts estimated that Palestinian production could supply between 2 and 10 percent

⁴³⁴ Kenneth W. Stein, "Palestine's rural Economy, 1917-1939", *Studies in Zionism: Politics, Society, Culture* 8:1 (1987): 37-38.

⁴³⁵ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 121, 145.

⁴³⁶ Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*: 311-312.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 101-102, 311-312.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

of Jewish demand.⁴³⁹ Besides quantity, local cattle were insufficient in terms of quality. In Palestine, beef was a seasonal product, depending on the availability of fodder and weight gain of cattle, as well as on price fluctuations. Palestinian meat merchants for example, who could afford the price of fodder for a while, would purchase livestock but delay slaughtering until prices increased.⁴⁴⁰ In terms of quality, the 1930s wave of Jewish settlers demanded not only more meat than Palestinians and previous Jewish settlers but also better-quality meat. And better-quality meat meant fatter cattle. Local cattle, whether *Baladi* or *Bayruti*, were meager compared to European breeds. Foreign cattle weighed on average three times as much as local cattle did. This allowed slaughtering fewer animals for more beef.⁴⁴¹ For Jewish consumers, besides preferences of taste, slaughtering larger animals was also an economic consideration as some parts of the ox, even if slaughtered according to Jewish ritual, were systematically disqualified as non-kosher (*trefa*) and thusly prohibited. Nevertheless, animal body parts did not go to waste. Non-kosher cuts were sold to neighboring Arabs.⁴⁴² Even slaughterhouse waste was used in various industries, one example being bone-meal, which was used in agriculture as a natural fertilizer.⁴⁴³ Thus, During the 1920s-1940s, we find a correlation between rising Jewish immigration from Europe and the rising quantities of imported cattle for slaughter.⁴⁴⁴ The next section explores the origins of those cattle and the mechanisms that brought them to Palestine.

⁴³⁹ This range probably includes both Jewish and Palestinian agriculture. I refer here to estimations made by one expert in agronomy, Ettinger, and another expert in the import of cattle, Jacob Governik. The range between these figures depended on the biases of the estimator and the context in which the estimation was made. Jacob Governik to District Officer Tel Aviv, 22 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089A; Ettinger, “What are the Products that our Agriculture Makes Available for the Woman”.

⁴⁴⁰ Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy*: 178.

⁴⁴¹ “Veterinary”, *Yedioth Tel Aviv* 39, 16 June 1935.

⁴⁴² It was common for Jewish butchers to sell off non-kosher cuts to neighboring non-Jews in Europe as well. At times, Christian butcher’s guilds resented Jewish butchers for selling these cuts inexpensively. See: Monica Richarz, “Emancipation and Continuity: German Jews in the Rural Economy”: in: W. E. Mosse, et al. (eds.) *Revolution and Evolution: 1848 in German-Jewish History* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1981): 111-112; Stefanie Fischer, “Clashing Gears: Jewish Cattle Traders, Farmers, and Nazis in Conflict, 1926–35”, *Holocaust Studies* 16 (2010): 22.

⁴⁴³ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 400.

⁴⁴⁴ Ben-Nathan, “The Meat Question in Tel Aviv”; Greenfeld, “To the Meat Question”; Ettinger, Personal Papers, CZA.

II. Importing Cattle: Balkan Beef

Palestine's climatic, environmental, and seasonal conditions were not compatible with the intensive farming required to cheaply produce large amounts of livestock for slaughter. Jewish consumers who insisted on devouring large quantities of beef were not willing to reconcile with the natural conditions of their new surroundings, nor with the ethos of the national movement that brought them there. Their meat habit challenged the political economy that Zionist leaders envisioned for the *Yishuv*: an autarkic economy. Creating an entire market that depended on imports, was in stark contradiction to these aspirations.⁴⁴⁵ In addition, the price of imported cattle was on average four times as much as local cattle. It was also vulnerable to international fluctuations which affected the cost of beef for all Palestinian consumers. All of these factors cumulated into a questionable, controversial, and volatile meat market, centered in and around Tel Aviv.⁴⁴⁶

By the mid to late 1930s, 50 percent of all imported meat was consumed in Tel Aviv. In 1931 there were 77 butcher shops and by 1933 there were 104.⁴⁴⁷ In 1934, a major year in terms of Jewish migration to Palestine, imports of oxen, cows, sheep, and lambs more than doubled in comparison to the previous year. This flow amounted to 299,975 Palestine Pounds (PP) in 1934 versus 137,190 in 1933. Even goats were imported for slaughter, though one would assume Palestine had enough goats judging by British administrators and Jewish settlers' complaints about the nuisance and destruction caused by these roaming animals who munched on any greenery they came across.⁴⁴⁸ The data available on the import of sheep and

⁴⁴⁵ See for examples: "Memorandum of the Subcommittee on Clarifying the Meat Problem 1944", TAMA, 58/1058; "Excessive Consumption of Meat is Harmful in Hot Climate", *Davar*, 8 April 1954.

⁴⁴⁶ The Palestine Cold Storage & Supply Co. Ltd. to the Chief Rabbinate, 26 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁴⁴⁷ Shavit and Gideon Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume I*: 268, 276-277.

⁴⁴⁸ "Meat Imports Doubled: Not Enough Goats to Go Around", *The Palestine Post*, 23 April 1935. On goats as nuisance see: Novick, *Milk and Honey*, especially Chapter 4; David Schorr also writes how changing the climate of Palestine into a more temperate one through forestation would have allowed raising cattle and sheep according to the British model "instead of the destructive goats of the Mediterranean basin". David Schorr,

goats is significant to mention here, as it implies that not just Jews, but Arab Palestinians also consumed more meat, and more imported animals, during the 1930s.⁴⁴⁹ Regarding cattle, the majority of imported cattle were consumed in Tel Aviv. Between 1934-1935 10,568 animals passed through the Tel Aviv quarantine adjacent to the slaughterhouse. A new cowshed was built during that year to allow more cattle to await slaughter, yet even this new structure quickly became insufficient to accommodate the traffic. Expanding the cowsheds and renovating parts of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse that was built only a couple of years earlier, were discussed within the municipality as urgent measures to address a growing population and its growing meat demands. Employment opportunities also grew as a result of meat demands. In 1935 Approximately 200 personnel held a permanent permit to enter the slaughterhouse premises.⁴⁵⁰

Scholars, such as Nadan, El-Eini, and more recently Igra, have acknowledged the growing meat imports to Mandate Palestine. Yet, the authors have not considered who was importing and from where. Examining numerous sources shows that in the 1920s the majority of cattle slaughtered for consumption was imported from Syria and Iraq. By the mid-to-end of the decade, imports from overseas grew, namely from Cyprus, Turkey and then Romania.⁴⁵¹ By the mid-1930s Palestine's cattle dealers imported legally from 21 countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Luxemburg, the USSR, Denmark, Great Britain, Irish Free State, USA, Austria, Greece, Lithuania, Cyprus, and for limited periods – Sudan.⁴⁵² In general, it seems as the importers of livestock from the region were Arabs, and the importers of cattle from Europe

"Forest Law in Mandate Palestine," in Frank Uekotter and Uwe Luebken (eds.) *Managing the Unknown: Essays on Environmental Ignorance* (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2014): 75. I would like to thank Netta Cohen for referring me to this article.

⁴⁴⁹ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question".

⁴⁵⁰ "Veterinary", *Yedioth Tel Aviv* 39, 16 June 1935; "Meat Imports Doubled".

⁴⁵¹ *Davar* 5 December 1927; *Palestine Bulletin* 9 August 1926; *Davar* 6 September 1926.

⁴⁵² District Officer of Tel Aviv to Mayor of Tel Aviv, 14 December 1937, TAMA 04-3089A.

were Jewish.⁴⁵³ The biggest Jewish importers focused their business on importing cattle from the Balkan states, especially Romania, which supplied at times up to 90 of the *Yishuv*'s beef. Between 1935-1939 this amounted to 15 to 20 thousand cattle annually. Half of which was consumed in the cities.⁴⁵⁴

	Romania	Bulgaria	Yugoslavia	Iraq
1935	20,960	1,650	4,050	
1936	15,630	6,150	500	
1937	16,200	1,900	3,800	1,600
1938	13,750	1,425	--	11,400
1939	4,050	--	--	21,500

Table reproduced and adjusted from: “Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?”
Ha'boker 26 August 1947, page 3.⁴⁵⁵

These figures raise some questions. How did Romania become a primary exporter to Palestine? How did Jewish importers enter Palestine's beef business? The answer, I argue, is related to the history of Jews in the meat trade, and their creation of transnational networks of cattle dealers.

From the middle ages to the 1930s, throughout Germany, Switzerland, Alsace, Poland, Ukraine, and Romania, Jewish merchants played a major role in the cattle trade.⁴⁵⁶ As put by Yuri Slezkine: “there was nothing particularly unusual about the social and economic position of Jews in medieval and early modern Europe”. Jews, like other groups of travelers or permanent strangers, “performed tasks that the natives were unable or unwilling to perform”. Cattle-dealing and butchering were some of these tasks.⁴⁵⁷ Jews in the area that is

⁴⁵³ This will be discussed in chapter 4. One of the biggest Arab livestock importers in Palestine, was Jaffa's Naim Shehadeh. The most successful and most notorious Jewish cattle dealer in Palestine was Tel Aviv's Jacob Gubernik.

⁴⁵⁴ “What are the Butchers Striking about?” *Ha'boker* 28 January 1947, 3.

⁴⁵⁵ Iraq did not appear in the original table; it is my addition based on information from the same article.

⁴⁵⁶ Neil G. Jacobs, *Yiddish: A Linguistic Introduction* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005): 284.

now Ukraine exported grains and cattle to areas which are now in Poland, and Polish Jewish merchants either settled in Moldavia and Walachia (in or around today's Romania) or came there temporarily to purchase cattle. From there, they led their stocks to markets and trade fairs in Germany.⁴⁵⁸ Jewish merchants were essential to the success of these markets.⁴⁵⁹ For generations, cattle dealers journeyed across farmlands to purchase cattle, before moving on to sell the animals in towns. As such, they acquired the role of middleman both between producer and consumer as well as between country and city. The more successful the trader, the more urban comforts and customs he could espouse, while for the most part still residing, unassimilated, in the countryside.⁴⁶⁰

In Germany, by the 19th century, the majority of Jewish agrarian traders dealt in cattle. This means that Jews, who are often associated with the urban, functioned as an essential part of rural economies as well. According to Monika Richarz, more Jews were employed in the cattle business than any other vocation in the country, and in some parts of Germany Jews held a monopoly over the trade.⁴⁶¹ During the 19th century, the economic conditions and opportunities of the cattle trade improved considerably. Experimentation in cattle breeding and feeding resulted in substantially increasing the weight of cattle, which in turn, more than tripled meat production during the century. This coincided with growing urban populations, the rise of the industrial-scale slaughterhouse, and increasing demand for meat and dairy.

⁴⁵⁷ Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): 14-15.

⁴⁵⁸ Lucian-Zeev Herscovici, "Moldavia", in: *The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe* <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Moldavia>; Jonathan Dekel-Chen, "Agriculture" in: *The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe* <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Agriculture>; "Kowel", in *Encyclopedia of the Ghettos, The International Institute for Holocaust Research at Yad va'Shem* https://www.yadvashem.org/yv/he/research/ghettos_encyclopedia/ghetto_details.asp?cid=877; Lucian-Zeev Herscovici, "Walachia", in: *The YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe* <https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Walachia> [all last accessed 7 April 2020]

⁴⁵⁹ Richarz, "Emancipation and Continuity": 97, 112.

⁴⁶⁰ Richarz, "Emancipation and Continuity": 97-98; Fischer "Clashing Gears": 18-20.

⁴⁶¹ Richarz, "Emancipation and Continuity": 106, 113. An example of one of the successful Jewish cattle dealing firms is Bermann and Oppenheimer in Bavaria. Berman then relocated to the United States. See: Fischer "Clashing Gears", 29-30; Daphna Berman, "Inheritance", *Tablet Magazine*, 7 June 2011, <https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/community/articles/inheritance-2> [last accessed 9 April 2020].

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It seems clear that Jews were rooted in the meat trade of central and eastern Europe. Yet what



made the Balkans, and especially Romania, the primary providers of cattle to Palestine?
According to scholar Katherine Verdery, cattle-rearing and exporting was a 20th-century
Romanian niche, an outcome of the country's long history of feudalism.⁴⁶³ From a European
perspective, the Balkans were a high-yielding hinterland, producing and exporting grains,

⁴⁶² Richarz, "Emancipation and Continuity": 112; Fischer "Clashing Gears": 18-19. Railways had a similar affect in the United States as well. See: William Cronon, *Nature's metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).

⁴⁶³ Katherine Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political Economic and Ethnic Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983): 315.

timber, and livestock, as well as other raw materials. The Ottoman Porte was also a great consumer of Balkan produce. The Porte consumed vast amounts of cattle from Romania, but even greater amounts of sheep.⁴⁶⁴ Moldavia and Walachia exported so much livestock and foodstuffs to the Porte that these regions became known as “the Porte’s pantry”.⁴⁶⁵ Essentially, it seems as Romanian farmers produced cattle for international markets rather than domestic ones. In fact, scholar Margareta Aslan claims that the extent to which Turks devoured cattle and sheep steered Romanians domestic consumption towards pork.⁴⁶⁶ In the early 20th century Romanian livestock were still geared toward the international market. Local ceiling prices on meat, set by the government to keep it affordable for workers, meant that some cattle were sold locally for meat and meat products, but the best animals were shipped off to be sold on the international market. And that trade, claims Verdery, was almost exclusively the in the hands of Jewish merchants.⁴⁶⁷

How exactly were Jewish traders in Romania and Jewish importers in Palestine connected has never been examined before this dissertation and is still not entirely clear here either. As a whole, Palestine’s economic relations with Romania is an entirety untold story. Chapter 4 will attempt to trace some of those links and their influence on Tel Aviv’s meat market. What seems clear is that importing from Romania became convenient due to the proximity, convenience, and relatively inexpensive maritime route that connected Romania’s Constanta port and the Haifa port.⁴⁶⁸ What also seems possible is that timber imports paved the way for cattle imports, as timber was the principal raw material imported from Romania during the Mandate period, and was essential for Palestine’s own most important export: oranges.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁴ In Cairo however, Alan Mikhail writes, Ottoman governors ate plenty of veal. See: Alan Mikhail, *The Animal in Ottoman Egypt* (New York : Oxford University Press, 2017): 78.

⁴⁶⁵ Aslan, *Earthly Delights*: 112.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers*: 195, 245, 316-317.

⁴⁶⁸ Ben-Nathan, “The Meat Question”.

As part of a barter agreement between the countries, timber that started its life in Romania, traveled to Palestine, was processed and reassembled into crates, filled with oranges, and sent back to Romania. The idea to swap oranges for timber, and the savviness required to secure that deal, was the work of Tzadok Chelouche of the renowned Sephardi family from Jaffa and later Neve Tzedek. In 1933, Chelouche collaborated with 25 industrialist, citrus exporters, and businessmen – Arab and Jewish – to establish the Palestine-Romania Chamber of Commerce.⁴⁷⁰ This was not an official chamber of Palestine’s colonial government, but it dealt directly with Romanian officials and its deals were upheld by the Romania government. Chelouche was driven by his desire to expand his business into timber imports. The Romanian government desired to recover its economy, following the world economic crisis, when prices of grains and livestock plummeted, and European countries restricted cattle imports to protect domestic industries. Jewish cattle exporters, who relied on the international market, were hit hard during this period.⁴⁷¹ The economic downturn pushed Balkan states to subsidize exports of livestock to countries with a trade deficit such as Italy, Greece, and Palestine.⁴⁷² This also created convenient conditions and prices for Palestine to increase its imports from the Balkans.⁴⁷³ Thus, the international economic conditions of the period, together with Chelouche’s initiative, secured additional essential goods beyond timber, such as petroleum, kerosene, grains, fruit, vegetables, and indeed, cattle.⁴⁷⁴ The success of the semi-official trade deal between Romania and Palestine, renewed throughout the 1930s, was

⁴⁶⁹ Romanian timber was used to fuel the construction booms that followed waves of settlers. In addition, Romanian timber was assembled into orange crates to allow oranges to be shipped long distances. See: Y. Adler, “Wood Consumption and Import to Eretz Israel”, *Ha’yarden* 02 November 1934; El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 205.

⁴⁷⁰ Aviezer Chelouche, *Who was that Apelboim?* (Ginot Shomron: Rachel Publishing, 1999): 282-289 [Hebrew].

⁴⁷¹ Robert Bideleux, Ian Jeffries, *A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change* (London and New York: Routledge 1988): 439.

⁴⁷² Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers*: 284.

⁴⁷³ Ben-Nathan, “The Meat Question”.

⁴⁷⁴ In 1938 the import of foods from Romania amounted to 320,000 PP, from an overall import value of over 1,253,000 PP. Tzadok Chelouche, “Increasing Our Economic Relations with Romania”, *Ha’aretz*, 9 February 1940.

not only welcomed by the Romanian government but even the British one, as briefly implied in the 1937 Peel Commission Report.⁴⁷⁵

Chelouche's initiative is noteworthy not only because it opened an avenue for the international cattle trade between Romania and Palestine, but also because it is emblematic of Palestine's "vacuum economy".⁴⁷⁶ Palestine had a colonial government with only limited interest in the country, and a flow of settlers with consumer demands unplanned, unanswered, and unregulated by the state. This left a vacuum in the form of various business opportunities open to savvy individuals to pursue using their skills, capital, and networks. This was evident in the enterprises of Palestine's Jewish cattle importers which will be explored in chapter 4, where a handful of cattle dealers, of European origin, dominated import. What made this possible was the cooperation between Jewish cattle dealers in Romania and Jewish cattle dealers in Palestine.⁴⁷⁷ With transnational ties between merchants in Romania and Palestine, a global economic situation that created a buyers' market, and convenient maritime routes between Constanta and Haifa, conditions were perfect for Palestine to import cattle from Romania.⁴⁷⁸

If Jewish preferences of taste dictated that Romanian cattle had to be shipped over fat, Jewish ritual dictated that cattle had to be shipped over alive. As opposed to many countries, notably Britain, which grew dependent on the frozen meat trade, Jewish religious authorities in

⁴⁷⁵ Chelouche also became an unofficial ambassador for the Yishuv in its dealings with Romanian officials, when lobbying, successfully, for the release of Jewish monies confiscated in the beginning of WWII. However, his trade arrangements with Romania ended with the advancement of the war and never resumed, despite Chelouche's post-war efforts. Chelouche, *Who was that Apelboim?*: 282-289.

⁴⁷⁶ Ya'akov Shavit expressed a similar idea when he referred to the "opportunity market" that enabled entrepreneurs, even those lacking initial capital, "to become bourgeois" during this period. Shavit, "In Search of the Israeli Bourgeoisie": 159.

⁴⁷⁷ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question".

⁴⁷⁸ For example, the "Mount Zion" ship began sailing regularly between Haifa and Constanta, sometimes through Cyprus or Turkey. The ship, according to the testimony of its Captain Hirschfeld, would carry mail, goods, and passengers. He described a typical ride on "Mount Zion" which included arriving at Constanta and loading twenty freights of timber, 200 live cattle, 1,000 chickens, and 135 passengers. The team included 54 people. The kitchen on ship was kosher. As quoted in: Danny Zimrin, "Seamanship in Israel before 1948", *The Same Sea: Israeli Seamanship Blog*. <https://cutt.ly/iHVRJav> [last accessed 2 October 2020].

Palestine managed to safeguard their territory – slaughter – by severally restricting the possibility of importing frozen kosher meat (this will be discussed in chapter 4). In addition to being alive, government regulations dictated that cattle had to enter the country healthy as well. These conditions – alive and unequivocally healthy – created great difficulties throughout the 1930s. As described above regarding import by land, the Veterinary Services were tasked with preventing the introduction of diseases from imported livestock to local animals. For imports by sea, The Animal (Export and Import) Ordinance of 1920 was reinforced by the Animal Disease Ordinance of 1926 and The Animal Quarantine Rules of 1931. This allowed the British Government, for example, to ban the import of Polish Cattle in 1934 due to a contagious pleuro-pneumonia infecting cattle there.⁴⁷⁹ Additional bans and emergency amendments were added throughout the 1930s.⁴⁸⁰ Even when cattle were imported from countries not suspected to carry contagious diseases, animals imported by sea were put in quarantine at or around ports or slaughterhouses, which by the 1940s amounted to approximately twenty on the outskirts of Palestine's towns.⁴⁸¹

Quarantine had economic ramifications both on importers and exporters, as the Palestinian government demanded from certain exporting countries periods of quarantine both before the animals set sale and at their arrival at Haifa. One major consideration was the need to feed cattle while in quarantine because any loss of weight meant a loss in potential profit. Such was the case in 1937 when a Yugoslavian Minister wrote to the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs and asked if the British government would be willing to consider the sea voyage as part of 14 days of quarantine required in Yugoslavia before sailing towards Palestine. The cost of quarantine and fodder at Yugoslavian ports, claimed the Minister, were too heavy for

⁴⁷⁹ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 148-150.

⁴⁸⁰ See for example: "Animal Quarantine (Importation of slaughter cattle from infected countries) Emergency (amendment) Rules, 1939 from 1/9/1939 until 31/10/1940". ISA - 29/ 16

⁴⁸¹ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 148-150.

the exporters. As the Minister was aware that quarantine requirements were not a uniform policy, rather they depended on the country the animals departed from, the Minister asked that Yugoslavia receive similar treatment to other, more favored countries (implying perhaps to Romania). Palestine's British government refused, claiming to favor veterinary considerations over financial ones. The condensed conditions in which animals traveled by sea, the government's response added, made it impossible to notice early signs of disease.⁴⁸²

Similarly, in 1938, Hungary asked to export 15,000 heads of cattle into mainland Britain. The request was rejected due to the Diseases of Animals Act owing to the prevalence of the foot-and-mouth disease among Hungary's livestock. Following which, an unofficial inquiry was made between two high-ranking acquaintances, one Hungarian the other British, who met in London. The two discussed the possibility of sending those 15,000 heads of cattle, deemed unfit for British consumers, to Palestine instead. Internal British correspondences on the matter noted the European geopolitics of the late 1930s, in which it was in Britain's favor to assist the countries and economies of the "Danubian Basin". Yet a Foreign Officer who eventually received the request had to explain to his superiors that Hungarian cattle were already admitted to Palestine, but that the entire country consumes 30,000 heads of cattle annually, and so the Hungarian request would be "difficult to accommodate".⁴⁸³ Within a few months import from Hungary to Palestine halted. The appearance of contagious diseases in Europe restricted imports to Palestine, and the advent of the World War eventually brought all cattle imports to a halt.

During World War II a dramatic increase in the price of livestock meant that cattle were ten-times more expensive than they were before the war. On the black market, this could have been even higher. Before the war, an ox sold for somewhere between PP 4 – PP 6, whereas

⁴⁸² Correspondences between 19 and 25 October 1937, "Commercial Relations with Foreign Countries: Palestine. Importation of Cattle into", BNA, CO 852/120/3.

⁴⁸³ Correspondences from 25 May 1938, 21 June 1938, 4 July 1938, "Commercial Relations with Foreign Countries: Palestine. Importation of Cattle into", BNA, CO 852/174/9. More from Hungary: CO 852/232/10.

around 1943-1944 its price was anywhere between PP 15 – PP 45.⁴⁸⁴ Shortages in beef and mutton created larger markets for cheaper meats. The table below, which presents data obtained from official slaughterhouses in Palestine (and thusly does not include illegal slaughter or slaughter by breeders done privately) shows how consumption of pork and camel increased with the advent of war. The year 1942 was especially dramatic. The slaughter of cattle, sheep, and goats almost halved, while the slaughter of camels raised remarkably: from less than 4 thousand camels in 1941 to over 11 thousand in 1942.⁴⁸⁵ This year is also noteworthy as the year when, as part of wartime rationing schemes, the government imposed three meatless days per week in Palestine.⁴⁸⁶

Slaughtered in Palestine (official slaughterhouse records)

Year	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Camels	Pigs
1933	51,837	157,206	89,278	962	904
1934	56,166	197,756	101,827	921	689
1935	51,507	212,674	94,569	882	678
1936	44,306	136,218	48,159	322	878
1937	53,590	219,929	100,338	461	862
1938	55,044	184,425	67,251	424	612
1939	65,497	196,410	89,780	1,262	767
1940	76,533	241,356	125,402	1,717	1,042
1941	102,436	256,659	110,687	3,731	2,117
1942	65,036	141,505	54,664	11,167	3,518

Table from: I. A. Gillespie, “Livestock Survey of Palestine and Transjordan” 1944, page 8, FO 922/72, BNA

What is remarkable is not only the sheer volume and increase in the slaughter of camels, and to a lesser extent pigs as well, but the fact that neither animal is kosher, and only camel is Halal. Nevertheless, neither the Muslim majority nor the Jewish minority in Palestine had the political authority to ban the sale of pork or any other meats as such. Under the British

⁴⁸⁴ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 6.

⁴⁸⁵ A dramatic increase in camel meat also occurred in Syria, and the scarcity of meat animals is accredited among other reasons to military requisitions. The majority of camels slaughtered in Palestine in 1942 came from Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 8; Gillespie, *Livestock Summary*: 4.

⁴⁸⁶ The policy was put in place in May 1942. In July, the government also restricted the baking of bread to one shape and two sizes. Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 91.

Mandate for Palestine, both pork and camel were legitimate meats. Pork, for example, was not only a British dietary staple but prohibiting its consumption would not have complied with the government's obligation to the League of Nations to avoid discrimination against any religious group in Palestine.⁴⁸⁷ Thus, the slaughter of pigs and camels abided by the same rules as any other meat animal. That included regulation on breeding or importing, inspections before and after slaughter, slaughter, dismembering, transfer to shops or meat processing factories, and sale.⁴⁸⁸ In addition, if we consider Jews to be a main meat consumer in Palestine, we must also assume that they were responsible for consuming at least some of these non-kosher meats. Thus, the next section will elucidate the contexts in which camels and pigs were raised, sold, and consumed in Palestine.

III. Camel Controversies and Pig Politics

Historically in the region, camels were highly prized livestock, especially among nomadic tribes. She-camels, like cows, provided both labor and milk for peasants and breeders which made their economic value greater than other animals. In Egypt, camel milk was considered even more nutritious than cow's milk and was integrated into peasants' diets in the form of liquid milk and camel dairy products. Among these peasants, it was rare to kill camels, or any other productive animal, solely for their meat. Slaughtering animals for meat was a luxury, reserved only for the rich. The rest enjoyed meat on special occasions.⁴⁸⁹ In Palestine, in the Mandate era, various sources imply that slaughtering camels for meat became more customary, but still, within the hierarchy of meats, camel was probably not the first choice for most Palestinians.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁷ Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 46.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 46, 192 n. 7-10.

⁴⁸⁹ Mikhail, *The Animal in Ottoman Egypt*: 77-78, 122.

⁴⁹⁰ Sources written by or about Arab camel butchers seem to be more prevalent in archives during the years of the war. See: "Slaughtered in Palestine", *Livestock Survey*, BNA, FO 922/72 , 8; "Veterinary Service: Movement of Meat", 1789/21-2, Israel State Archives (ISA).

In some rural areas of the Middle East peasants counted on camels as draught-animals instead of oxen. More commonly, travelers, traders, soldiers, and others used camels as pack animals, or transport animals, because they could carry heavy loads across long waterless distances with more resilience than other livestock.⁴⁹¹ Even urban dwellers counted on camels as beasts of burden.⁴⁹² In Jaffa, camels carried orange crates from groves to the city's port. On their way back from the port to the city, the animals transported goods, tourists, and settlers to their new quarters.⁴⁹³ Camel's capacity to carry commodities and people made their role and their economic value important within a household or tribal economy. This fact was not lost on British Mandate officials. In a correspondence, two British bureaucrats discussed the Bedouin practice of leading stock, in the Spring, from Palestine's southern Beersheba area up to Jericho for grazing. Regarding how to impose restrictions on this seasonal movement, one British official cautioned his counterpart against treating this issue with "a lack of sympathy". He warned: "an Arab will go a long way actually and metaphysically to save the life of his camel".⁴⁹⁴ The value of camels required special attention to the animals, their owners, and the interspecies bond between the two.

Special attention, however, did not change British policies which promoted the gradual repossessing and removing of camels (and Bedouins) from Palestine's ecosystem. Yet they too used camels for transport, in conflict, and their descriptions of "the East".⁴⁹⁵ Scholar Penny Johnson describes British fascination with camels as "camel orientalism".⁴⁹⁶ Within

⁴⁹¹ Gillespie, "The Baggage Camel", BNA, FO 922/72.

⁴⁹² "Beasts of burden" is a term used by Alan Mikhail through his book. See: Mikhail, *The Animal in Ottoman Egypt*.

⁴⁹³ Penny Johnson, "Take my Camel: The Disappearing Camels of Jerusalem and Jaffa", *Jerusalem Quarterly* 53 (2013): 35-39.

⁴⁹⁴ As quoted in: El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 225.

⁴⁹⁵ Already in World War I, the Imperial Camel Corps employed camel-mounted brigadiers who fought battles in the Egyptian deserts. This brigade was made famous by T.E. Lawrence. As for World War II, camels were mostly retired from battle. A Camel Corps was active in the Protectorate of Aden, but it was too expensive to operate as fodder had to be imported there. See: Robert Irwin, *Camel* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010): 172; Johnson, "Take my Camel": 30.

this discourse, camels were an emblem of the Middle East, its alleged slow-pace, and its links with antiquity. For example, Johnson notes one British architect's affinity to incorporate images of Arabs riding camels in his sketches to convey an "oriental atmosphere" to them, and historian On Barak quotes a British tourist who grieved the idea that trains would replace camels as a tool for transportation, putting an end to "the excitement and wonder of a journey in the desert".⁴⁹⁷ Within British "camel orientalism", camels were not only reliable work and transport animals but also sensitive animals that embodied the spirit and charm of the east.⁴⁹⁸

Jewish settlers in Palestine employed their own form of "camel orientalism", embodied by the image of the "Flying Camel". In 1932 Tel Aviv's Trade and Industry Company initiated the Levant Fair.⁴⁹⁹ The fair displayed the *Yishuv's* economic development, with emphasis on advancements in industry, agriculture, trade, transport, and finance.⁵⁰⁰ It also celebrated Jewish achievements in sports, leisure, and food production.⁵⁰¹ The fair's architect, Arieh Elhanai, created a special commercial figurine to personify the event and advertise it. He

⁴⁹⁶ The camel's slow pace was often presented in juxtaposition with more technologically advanced ways of travel such as the motor and especially the train. Within "camel orientalism", camels were presented as a relic of the past clashing with an advancing society, or an animal at the intersection of tradition and modernity. Yet, as Johnson shows, more often than not, both camels and cars existed side by side, and the choice between them depended on economic resources, availability, and terrain. Regarding the rail, On Barak's discussion on camels and trains shows how rather than being opposites, not only did the use of camel transportation increase rather than decrease after the establishment of Egypt's railways, but, Barak argues, "Egyptian trains could not move without camels". See: Johnson, "Take my Camel": 38; On Barak, *On time: technology and temporality in modern Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013): 34-39.

⁴⁹⁷ Johnson, "Take my Camel": 38-39; As quoted in Barak, *On time*: 35.

⁴⁹⁸ For example, even though the British Middle East Supply Center's report described the resilience of camels, it also insisted that camels needed acclimatization and were sensitive to even small changes in location, workload, climate, and feeding. The writer of the report insisted that camels should always be allowed essential rest, water, and grazing after a long mission across the dessert or hefty work. T.E. Lawrence was also said to be concerned for the animals of the Imperial Camel Corps, blaming the Corps for overloading their camels. For the first see: Gillespie, "The Baggage Camel", BNA, FO 922/72, for the latter see: Johnson, "Take my Camel": 31.

⁴⁹⁹ The Levant fair was an international exhibition and gathering in the spirit of the World Fairs of London, Paris, Chicago, and New York. Its purpose was to present and promote "the new Palestine", and especially Tel Aviv, as a progressive, technologically advanced center for commerce and industry. Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*: 51-55.

⁵⁰⁰ "The Flying Camel: The Value of the Levant Exhibition and Fair", *Palestine Bulletin*, 25 March 1932.

⁵⁰¹ As part of the fair's events, in 1934 for example, a football team from Beirut played against the Palestine-based Jewish team "Maccabee Tel Aviv", followed by another match between a team from Egypt and the Jewish "Hashmonai Jerusalem". The winner received the "Flying Camel Trophy". See: "International Football", *The Palestine Post*, 3 May 1934.

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If British “camel orientalism” emphasized the charm of the East, Jewish “camel colonialism” was embodied by the “flying camel”. The image demonstrates, as described by Dizengoff, that Tel Aviv’s economic activities pushed Palestine towards “wider horizons”, and that “resurrecting” the East was achieved not only by rural pioneers but also urban industrialists. The Jewish press enthusiastically adopted the “Flying Camel” as a catchy headline for articles on the fair and as a metaphor for Palestine, flying into the future due to the dynamism Figure 8. Left: “The Flying Camel” erected in Plumer Square at the main entrance to the Levant Fair. Source: Wikipedia: *Yarid Ha’ mizrach* (The Levant Fair). Right: “The Flying Camel” stamp. Source: Eliasaf Robinson Tel Aviv Collection, Stanford University.

The first image is available here: *Yarid Ha’ mizrach* (The Levant Fair) <https://cutt.ly/OhVRA3I> [last accessed 16 December 2020]. The stamp used to be available here: <https://lib.stanford.edu/eliasaf-robinson-tel-aviv-collection/city-work-and-prosperity-levant-fair> [last accessed in 5 April 2016]

of Jewish settlers.⁵⁰³ The image instantly became iconic, resonating with urban and rural Jews alike.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰² Meir Dizengoff, “The Flying Camel”, *The Sentinel*, 30 April 1936.

⁵⁰³ Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*: 51-55; Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Volume I*: 254.

⁵⁰⁴ Following its success, the “Flying Camel” image was borrowed for various commercial uses. The image or name “The Flying Camel” was used for galas, trophies, stamps, a song and a film. See: Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Volume I*: 254; “The Flying Camel – Film Star”, *The Palestine Post*, 3 June 1934; “The Levant Fair Plan”, *The Palestine Post*, 24 July 1933. Even today, an Israeli designer currently offers a replica of the camel for over NIS 430 (roughly CHF 120). See: <https://www.pieceofhistory.co.il/product-page/FlyingCamel> [last accessed 15 December 2020].

While Jews in Palestine might have celebrated a mythical camel, consuming camels was controversial. Camel meat was more common during the shortages of World War II, but it also appeared in Tel Aviv before.⁵⁰⁵ The only reference to Jewish consumption of camel meat in academic literature is mentioned by Orit Rozin with regards to clandestine slaughter during Israel's austerity period. As a result of "meat hunger", as defined by Rozin, she notes how "non-kosher animals such as rabbits and *even camels* were butchered illegally and without any oversight".⁵⁰⁶ This short sentence implies that either for Rozin or her readers, the idea of consuming camels was more unusual than eating rabbits even though both animals are prohibited according to kosher laws. More so than the European rabbit habit, consuming camels, a habit associated with Arabs, was an odd idea. This highlights European Jewish settlers' alienation from their new surroundings: the land of Palestine and the meats it had to offer. The rabbit example illustrates that controversies over consuming camel meat were not only about transgressing religious boundaries, but also about crossing national lines. This is because, in practical terms, consuming camels legally in Palestine depended only on Palestinian Arab butchers and slaughterhouses in Arab or mixed towns.⁵⁰⁷ And symbolically, with camels an emblem of the Arab East, eating camels meant metaphorically ingesting an alien animal into the Jewish body and body politic.

Even if the idea of consuming camel was illegitimate in the eyes of Jewish authorities then, and surprising to Israeli readers today, at least some Jews in Palestine enjoyed camel meat legally. For example, licensed camel butcher and retailer Husni Radwan Mahmoud Hamdan of Wadi Hunein of the Ramle District slaughtered camels at the Lydda Slaughterhouse and supplied their meat to Jewish costumers in Kibbutzim in the area, as well as restaurants in the

⁵⁰⁵ See for example: "Are Tel Aviv Citizens Fed Camel Meat?" *Doar Ha'yom*, 07 January 1930; "Veterinary", *Yedioth Tel Aviv* 39, 16 June 1935.

⁵⁰⁶ My emphasis. Rozin, "Craving Meat during Israel's Austerity Period": 71.

⁵⁰⁷ "The Municipal Veterinary Services, January-December 1939", *Yedioth Tel Aviv*, 15 December 1939: 15.

Jewish settlements of Rishon-le-Zion and Rehovot.⁵⁰⁸ The Palestinian butcher had no issues finding Jewish clientele for his meat. The only predicament he faced was vis-à-vis British district officials, regarding laws on the transferring of meat to this clientele, some of which lived beyond the Lydda “slaughterhouse area”. Under British veterinary regulations, each district was assigned a certain slaughterhouse, and meat was never to cross between districts. We can learn that Hamdan’s relationship with his Jewish clientele was significant enough to generate special requests to transfer meat to them as well as further correspondences between him and British officials on the matter.⁵⁰⁹

How many Jews chose to consume camel meat remains unclear, but it is unlikely that the majority of Jews in Palestine did so knowingly.⁵¹⁰ The Jewish press frequently mentioned camel meat when it ran stories on the “mistaken identity” of some meats available on the market. In such articles, the press incited anxieties around the possibility of being deceived by vendors into purchasing and eating non-kosher animals or unwholesome meats. The possibility to disguise camel as another type of meat was probably because camel meat, more so than pork, for example, was similar in cut, color, and taste to beef.⁵¹¹ Vendors’ incentive to do so was most probably economic: beef sold for twice as much as camel meat did. The origin of a pre-cut piece of meat was especially worrisome for some Jews as, if theoretically,

⁵⁰⁸ I have found no evidence that Jews raised and slaughtered camels for their own consumption, while some kibbutzim did raise pigs for that purpose. Dafna Barak-Erez discusses the issue of raising pigs in kibbutzim on lands purchased by collective Jewish funds. While issues like observing the Sabbath and employing only Jewish laborers were early clauses included when such lands were leased to Jewish agriculturalists, the issue of raising pigs on those lands only emerged as a clear legal issue after the creation of the state of Israel, when some kibbutzim were still raising pigs. See: Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 50-52.

⁵⁰⁹ Correspondences between Husni Radwan Mahmoud Hamdan; Assistant District Commissioner of Settlements Veterinary Officers; Assistant District Commissioner Rural Davison Ramle and District Officer of Settlements Tel Aviv between 19 November 1945 and 7 December 1945. In: “Veterinary Service: Movement of Meat”, ISA, 1789/21-2.

⁵¹⁰ When complaints about meat shortages were met by the British Food Controller’s suggestion that Palestinians should consume more camels, this suggestion was ridiculed in the religious Jewish press, reminding the official that camels were not kosher. See: “The Food Controller Suggests to Eat Plenty of Camel Meat”, *Ha’mashkif*, 5 October 1943.

⁵¹¹ One peculiar and unresolved case described a large piece of meat confiscated from a restaurant in Tel Aviv under the conviction that it was camel meat instead of beef. However, the possible mismanagement of the meat between confiscation, veterinary inspection, and its appearance in court, meant that no one could eventually verify what animal that meat came from. See: “Camel Meat or Beef?”, *Ha’aretz*, 1 August 1941.

a butcher sold mutton to a customer under the guise that it was beef, that would indeed be a crime, but one of over-charging: sheep was less expensive than beef, but it was still a kosher animal. Selling camel meat disguised as beef, however, meant deceiving someone into breaking a religious taboo.

Such scenarios were implied in the Jewish press when it reported on Tel Aviv's "meat trials". At these trials, individuals who were caught selling various illegal or unwholesome meats faced varying sentences, yet retailers who deceived customers by concealing the true origins of the meat were considered a particular menace to Jewish society. In 1939 Tel Aviv's Judge Rosenzweig made clear that "in Tel Aviv meat means beef...and beef does not include camel meat". The Judge added: "a customer who simply asks for meat means beef and should receive beef". The Judge insisted that anyone selling something else would be tried by the court for the highly punishable crime of fraud.⁵¹² This might explain the differences in sentences Jewish judges gave after a long day of "meat trials" in a Tel Aviv court. Sa'adia Shar'abi, a Yemenite Jew, was caught with a piece of goat meat without a Tel Aviv slaughterhouse stamp. Judge Shitrit sentenced him to a week in Jail. In comparison, another man, named Leshenski, who was caught in possession of two pieces of camel meat was sentenced to a month in Jail. Likewise, Edith Feinberg, a German-Jewess⁵¹³, who sold 18 pieces of camel meat to customers, was sentenced to 3 weeks in jail,⁵¹⁴ and Leib Duker, who sold camel meat at his butcher shop was sentenced to two months in jail with no bail.⁵¹⁵ The

⁵¹² "On the Sale of Camel Meat", *Davar*, 26 November 1939.

⁵¹³ It is interesting that while the Jewish butcher association of Tel Aviv and Jaffa included men only, and only men were mentioned in the majority of sources on meat and butchering in Tel Aviv and the Yishuv, yet newspaper reports on meat trials mention women offenders almost as much as they do men. This indicates that women did sell meat, even if they (probably) did not take part in slaughter, dismembering, and other tasks completed at the slaughterhouse. As for participating in production, women were involved in sausage making. As for selling, it seems women either worked for a retailer, or sold meat in restaurants and pensions they owned or ran. See for example the list of women and men on trial, from whom officers confiscated over 100 kilograms of meat, in: "Tel Aviv is Gorged on Camel and 'Abomination' Meat Again", *Ha'tzofe*, 29 January 1941.

⁵¹⁴ "The War on the Sale of 'Abomination' Meat (basar pigul)", *Ha'mashkif*, 19 November 1939.

⁵¹⁵ "Exemplary Punishment", *Ha'boker*, 29 November 1939.

names and addresses of the vendors were clearly published in the press to shame them and warn clients.

Both Jewish and Arab retailers stood trial for meat offenses in Tel Aviv, and the press would especially emphasize when Jews and Arabs worked together to deceive Jewish customers.⁵¹⁶ Jewish butchers who held non-kosher butcher shops, and Arab butchers in the areas of in-between Tel Aviv and Jaffa such as the Manshieh neighborhood, were often singled out for slaughtering camels at the Jaffa slaughterhouse and selling that meat to Tel Aviv's citizens.⁵¹⁷ Yet, only Palestinian Arabs were described engaging in the most licentious camel-meat trade, such as knowingly slaughtering sick camels, or butchering dead camels they happened to stumble upon, before transferring the meat to the Jews of Tel Aviv.⁵¹⁸ The seedy details were described in the press, which served to heighten anxieties regarding purchasing camel meat, or any meat for that matter, from Arab butchers. For example, during the trials of the Jaffa butchers and reoccurring offenders Haj Mohamad and Abed Hamid Nazim, the Jewish veterinarian Gosarsky detailed the "horrible things occurring in the Tel Aviv meat trade". He claimed to know the defendants well, as they and "a few other Arab butchers routinely buy ill animals to be slaughtered in the fields around the *Yarkon* river".⁵¹⁹ Like Jaffa, the Palestinian village Sumail, once neighboring Tel Aviv and today completely devoured by it, was a constant source of illegal smuggling of meats into Tel Aviv. This included camel and other perilous meats.⁵²⁰ Not only in Palestine, but in the region as well, sick camels were described as a threat. The same newspaper reported how in neighboring Arab countries hundreds of people were poisoned by bad camel meat, tens of which died as a result.⁵²¹ Details such as

⁵¹⁶ "The Municipal Veterinary Services, January-December 1939", *Yedioth Tel Aviv*, 15 December 1939: 15.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid.

⁵¹⁸ See for example: "A Trial on Camel Meat", *Davar*, 26 December 1934; "What are the Citizens of Tel Aviv Fed?", *Doar Ha'yom*, 24 September 1935; "These are Your Food Vendors, Israel", *Doar Ha'yom*, 28 October 1932.

⁵¹⁹ "Camel Meat for the Citizens of Tel Aviv", *Doar Ha'yom*, 27 December 1934. Also see: Ibid.

⁵²⁰ See for example: "Robbery, Unlicensed Radio, and Camel Meat", *The Palestine Post*, 24 September 1935; "On the Meat that We Eat".

these led one Judge to conclude his “meat trials” by stating: “anyone who hears the details of these trials cannot taste meat for months”.⁵²²

The fear of camel flesh penetrating Tel Aviv’s meat system demonstrates the sense of alienation the city’s settler society felt towards neighboring Arab cities and villages. In Jewish newspapers associated with the religious sector, meat trials concerning pork and camel were often mentioned together, boasting headlines such as “Pig Meat and Camel Meat in Restaurants”.⁵²³ Both types of meat presented dangers to the Jewish settler society, but not of the same nature. Jewish consumption of Pork did not provoke the same anxieties about encounters with Christian Palestinians as did camel meat with Muslim Palestinians.⁵²⁴ This is interesting because, in Europe, consumption of pork was, historically, a deeply dividing factor between Jews and the Christian societies within which they lived.⁵²⁵ Jewish consumption of pork in Palestine was feared more for its potential national corrupting qualities. Rather than an external other, highlighted by the case of camel meat, the pork problem illuminates the *internal* struggle within the Jewish settler society – a dispute over different visions of the future state as a secular state or one abiding by Jewish traditions.

The Tel Aviv municipality sided with the latter. In Tel Aviv, much effort was made to limit the sale of both pork and camel meat in the city. This was directed by the municipality and the religious authorities and executed by their subordinates: the Chief Veterinarian, the

⁵²¹ This report possibly refers to Hermel in Lebanon. Phillip Kiperdomph, “Harding and Vegetarianism”, *Doar Ha’yom*, 3 August 1924.

⁵²² “On the Meat that We Eat”. A general impression from newspapers sources is that religious newspapers boasted more sensationalist headlines and were concerned with the consumption of non-kosher meats especially pork and camel. Newspapers like *Davar* however, the organ of the secular labor movement, emphasized issues of hygiene and food safety associated with illegal meat trade.

⁵²³ For example: “[Caught] In Possession of Camel Meat and Pig Meat”, *Ha’mashkif*, 16 October 1941; “[Caught] In Possession of Camel Meat and Pig Meat”, *Ha’mashkif*, 26 August 1942; “Pig Meat and Camel Meat in Restaurants”, *Ha’tzofe*, 7 August 1945; “[Caught] In Possession of Pig Meat and Camel Meat”, *Ha’mashkif*, 30 July 1946.

⁵²⁴ As I later demonstrate however, Christian Palestinians did view Jewish settlers as an economic competitor with regards to the Jewish dairy industry over depleting resources during World War II in Palestine.

⁵²⁵ See for example: Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986): Chapter 1: “The Fair, The Pig, Authorship”.

sanitary inspectors, and even the municipal police force. A legal loophole enabled these actors to criminalize pork and camel meat in Tel Aviv. As pigs and camels were not slaughtered in the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse and British law prohibited moving meat between cities and “slaughterhouse areas”, this meant that technically all pork and camel meat found in the city was brought in from outside and was thusly illegal. This was the main way Tel Aviv Chief Veterinarian at the time, Arieh Levit, the highest authority at the slaughterhouse, could bring retailers to stand trial at the municipal court and testify against them. Culprits would be charged either with the illegal movement of meat, or, with regards to the sale of camel meat in particular, with fraud, because consumers would sometimes claim that they were unaware of the true origins of the piece of red meat they purchased.⁵²⁶ The declaration that in Tel Aviv “meat is beef”, and the ways which the municipality found to prohibit meats that were legal anywhere else in Palestine reinforces the idea that Tel Aviv, through its meat trade, was able to continuously carve out more autonomy for its self and its own urban-national goals.

More so than camel meat, sources imply that Jews in Palestine consumed pork knowingly, and not necessarily covertly. In Tel Aviv, some Jewish-owned restaurants and shops openly sold pork products, and even at the aforementioned Levant Fair, a quintessential Jewish-national celebration, ham and eggs appeared on a cafeteria menu.⁵²⁷ Very few Jews or Muslims seem to have been involved in pig breeding but at least a few were, and even did so in partnership.⁵²⁸ Some Jewish businessmen were also rumored to be involved in pig imports to Palestine.⁵²⁹ Yet the vast majority of pig breeders in the country, as in the region, were

⁵²⁶ See for example: “Meat Trials”, *Ha'tzofe*, 23 December 1943.

⁵²⁷ Helman, *Young Tel Aviv*: 55.

⁵²⁸ In Tel Aviv, at least one Jewish man raised or wanted to raise pigs probably for consumption. In Haifa, a network of Jewish men were involved in the pork meat-trade, which they raised on a piece of land in Pardes Hannah owned by a Muslim counterpart. Letter from Pinkas to Mayor Rokach dated 24 January 1944, Personal Papers of David Tzvi Pinkas, “Kosher Issues”, ISA, 3073/15-5; “Who Raises Pigs in the Land [of Israel]?”, *Ha'tzofe*, 2 July 1941.

local Christian Arabs, in addition to Christian settlers and missionaries.⁵³⁰ Palestinian Christians bred pigs for meat in Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahour, Beit Safafa, Ein Karem, and Ramallah. In the north, pigs were also bred in Bassa, Acre, and Haifa, and in the south – in Gaza.⁵³¹ According to the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine, their customers included “a great section of the Christian and Jewish communities in this country” to whom they supplied fresh pork, ham, bacon, and sausage. During World War II, their clientele expanded to include the allied armies and European refugees in the country.⁵³²

In the places mentioned above, and probably elsewhere, pig breeding was common before World War II, but the greatest increase in it occurred during the war. The economic crisis of the war pushed many to search for new avenues of income, at the same time that the price of livestock soared, and shortages in other meats meant that demand for pork was unusually high.⁵³³ For one, a growing presence of British and other foreign personnel in Palestine, for whom pork was a dietary staple, increased demand.⁵³⁴ Yet the British Government also played an active role in creating a booming pig market. The Director of Agriculture Production and the Food Controller called on local farmers to increase the production of all goods, especially local livestock and foods in a country that was heavily reliant on imports. To encourage production, they distributed local bran to farmers as pig fodder and left imported bran uncontrolled to allow farmers to purchase more of it. This is when, according to the

⁵²⁹ The rumors involve the famous Zionist businessman Moshe Ichilov, pigs imported from Cyprus, and the “Carlton” restaurant in Tel Aviv. Ichilov denied any connection to the import of pigs to Palestine. Correspondence between Pinkas and Ichilov, Personal Papers of David Tzvi Pinkas, “Kosher Issues”, ISA, 3073/15-ג.

⁵³⁰ Letter from Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine to the High Commissioner for Palestine, 9 Feb 1944, “Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944” ISA, 344/9-ג.

⁵³¹ Probably also elsewhere. These locations are according to the testimony of Wasif Jawhariyyeh as mentioned in: Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 50, 196 n.40; Letter from Isa Nakhleh (Barrister on behalf of the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Jerusalem Sub-District) to Chairman of War Economic Advisory Council, Jerusalem, “Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944”, ISA, 344/9-ג.

⁵³² Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine to The Food Controller, 21 December 1943, “Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944”, ISA, 344/9-ג.

⁵³³ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 4.

⁵³⁴ Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 50.

testimony of Wasif Jawhariyyeh, a Christian musician and chronicler from Jerusalem, Palestine became “the land of pigs”.⁵³⁵

Initially, the British government encouraged pig-breeding to the extent that it distributed pig fodder for free for farmers and anyone interested in becoming a pig farmer. The records of the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Jerusalem and Palestine, an association of Christian Arab Palestinians, indicate, as did Jawhariyyeh, that “very many” new pig farms were created to answer the government’s call.⁵³⁶ According to Jawhariyyeh, when the policy came into place, it created a frenzy. There was not a farm, a stable, or even an empty basement in or around Jerusalem “that did not breed pigs of some kind”. In line with the logic of livestock economies, here too, female pigs were especially valued for their ability to provide offspring.⁵³⁷ According to Jawhariyyeh, “the price of a she-pig exceeded one thousand Palestinian Pounds”, a sum, which according to him was “obviously a fortune that could buy a house”.⁵³⁸ The frenzy was not limited to the Jerusalem area, and not limited to live pigs, as the price of pork meat soared across the country as well. In Bassa in Northern Palestine, resident Marie Shammam recalled:

“not many civil jobs [were] available at the time. But having stalls in the market for meat was a big thing... Even pigs. I will never forget the rows of pig that would sell for 100 Palestinian pounds! If you had pig you could make hundreds of Lira and the Lira back then was like the sterling pound...”⁵³⁹

Palestine’s lucrative market for pig meat did not last long. What might have been regarded by the British government as economic development in the form of targeted support for the local pig industry quickly turned out to be – in the words of Jawhariyyeh – a farce.⁵⁴⁰ In July 1943

⁵³⁵ Jawhariyyeh et al., *The storyteller of Jerusalem*: 234-235.

⁵³⁶ Letter from Isa Nakhleh.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

⁵³⁸ Jawhariyyeh, *The storyteller of Jerusalem*: 235.

⁵³⁹ Lira is the Arabic and Hebrew term for the Palestine Pound. Zaydan, “Interview with Marie Shammam”.

⁵⁴⁰ Jawhariyyeh, *The storyteller of Jerusalem*: 235.

after a few months of the policy, not only did British agents stop supplying bran to pig breeders, but a firm “no bran for pigs” policy came into effect instead. The policy restricted the allocation of local bran, and imported bran came under strict government control as well. The Food Controller decided to allocate all bran to cattle instead of pigs, even though historically bran was used primarily as pig fodder, not cow feed. The Executive Committee of Pig Breeders described this move as “a hard and fatal blow” and one that was executed far too suddenly. Instead of bran, the government insisted that pig breeders could sustain their pigs on swill – a mixture of liquids and kitchen scraps.⁵⁴¹

Raising pigs on swill was perhaps a British custom, but in Palestine, during the war, it was a ludicrous demand. The Executive Committee of Pig Breeders claimed no household in Jerusalem produced enough food waste to feed pigs. The government replied that if that is the case, they should not have raised pigs in the first place.⁵⁴² This disregard infuriated Palestinian leaders such as Jamal Al-Husayni who wrote in a note that the Food Controller was ignorant: “what Arab household in Palestine has swill to feed pigs on? When it has barely sufficient food to feed itself!”⁵⁴³ Al-Husayni and the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders were not speaking figuratively. As a result of British policy, hundreds of pigs were dying daily, and thousands of people who invested in pig-breeding lost their life savings. Palestine’s 25-30 thousand pig population was in danger of starving, being abandoned by their owners, or slaughtered prematurely. As things became “darker and worse” for the breeders they tried to remind the government that the pig industry was essential in Palestine as it had the power to relieve some of the demand for beef and mutton. They demanded the government return to supply fodder or allow its import from Egypt. Alternatively, they suggested the government buy all existing pigs from their owners or repeal all laws and regulations controlling fodder

⁵⁴¹ Letter from Isa Nakhleh.

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ “Note by SH Jamal”, n.d. “Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944”, ISA, 344/9-5 .

and livestock.⁵⁴⁴ Rather than economic opportunity, pig breeding quickly became associated with desperation. As Jawhariyyeh wrote in his memoir: “pig farming and trading became a trend... a contagious disease that hit hundreds of well-known families. Some of them made some profit initially... but in the end they were bankrupt...”⁵⁴⁵

Allegedly, the Food Controller’s change in policy was motivated by the idea that the country needed more cow’s milk than pork meat. With virtually all dairy farming in the hands of the Jewish sector, this raised suspicions among members of the Executive Committee of Pig Breeders as to the government’s alliances. In their petition dated 9 February 1944, The Executive Committee wrote to the High Commissioner of Palestine, claiming they were being severely prejudiced against. There was no justification, they claimed, to discriminate between cattle and swine by supplying all fodder to the former leaving nothing for the latter. As virtually all of the swine breeders in the country were Christian Arabs, they claimed, discriminating between cattle and swine was equal to discriminating between Arab and Jew. They also argued that British discrimination was a result of favoritism, due to the influence of a Jewish technical “meat expert” in the Food Controllers department who managed to sway decisions in favor of Jewish-Zionist businesses such as *Tnuva*.⁵⁴⁶ Al-Husayni also implied that Jewish dairy farmers did not need all the bran they received, and were leaking their surplus bran to the black market where they sold it for fantastic prices.⁵⁴⁷

Just one day after pig-breeders sent in their petition, the government served them with another crushing blow by lifting the ban on importation of swine from Syria and Lebanon.

⁵⁴⁴ Letter from Isa Nakhleh; Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine to The Food Controller 21 December 1943; The Food Controller 30 December 1943; Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine to The Food Controller 9 February 1944 “Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944”, ISA, 344/9- 5.

⁵⁴⁵ Jawhariyyah, *The storyteller of Jerusalem*: 235.

⁵⁴⁶ Unfortunately, I could not find out the identity of this Jewish meat expert suspected of influencing British policies. Executive Committee of Pig Breeders in Palestine to the High Commissioner for Palestine, 9 Feb 1944, Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous 1943-1944”, ISA, 344/9-5.

⁵⁴⁷ “Note by SH Jamal”.

An unknown author wrote to the Food Controller on 16 February, “it is amazing that the government should import swine from outside Palestine when at the same time it is ruining thousands of its own citizens”. The writer could not understand why the government did not simply import fodder from Syria instead of pigs, as pigs take double the space to transfer than bran.⁵⁴⁸ The Food Controller department replied that the ban on Syrian and Lebanese pigs had nothing to do with the Palestinian industry, it was always about the presence of Swine Fever in those territories. With Syria and Lebanon cured of Swine Fever, Palestinian pig breeders faced competition from them, in addition to their local competition over fodder with the Jewish dairy industry. They also could not rely on British personnel as clientele, as the army had other resources. The army imported various quantities of frozen meat, ham, bacon, and other pork products from the British Empire.⁵⁴⁹ It even “grew its own bacon” in Palestine by raising pigs in army camps, hospitals, and veterinary hospitals, where pigs had to be guarded by dogs due to their value.⁵⁵⁰ And any leftover swill comprised of army rations was never transferred to Arab pig breeders but contracted to British freelancers, most notably – the food retailer Spinney’s.⁵⁵¹ With stores in Haifa, Acre, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Tel Aviv, Spinney’s sold various pork products not only to British personnel but to Palestinian civilians as well.⁵⁵² Palestine’s pig breeders faced economic ruin.

⁵⁴⁸ Unknown author to the Food Controller on 16 February 1944 Arab Chamber of Commerce: Meat Miscellaneous” 1943-1944, ISA, 344/9-2.

⁵⁴⁹ Gillespie, *Livestock Survey*: 12.

⁵⁵⁰ El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 177, 400.

⁵⁵¹ “Note by SH Jamal”. Spinney’s purchased its fresh pork either from Arab Christian breeders or German Templers who bred pigs in the Galilee area – or both.

⁵⁵² “Spinneys Group Limited” is today a vast supermarket chain with locations throughout the Middle East. Rawdon Arthur Spinney was a British officer who served in the Provisions Department in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria during World War I. During World War II, he was based in Haifa and was later the Director of Agra Fisheries. Once retired, Spinney stayed in Palestine, and used his military connections to embark on new ventures. He provided provisions for British troops and the Railroad Company before branching out to offer various imported goods to customers throughout the country. While chairing Spinney’s Ltd., Spinney also served the British Government in Palestine through various official roles. Eventually, Spinney’s headquarters moved to Bagdad, and Spinney himself retired in Cyprus. See: “Social and Personal”, *The Palestine Post*, 18 April 1940; “Spinney (Arthur) Rawdon”, in Philip Jones, *Britain and Palestine 1918-1948* (Oxford University Press, 1979).

In Tel Aviv, Spinney's sale of pork often agitated the religious Jewish press.⁵⁵³ Yet much more controversial than a British retailer selling pork products in Palestine were Jewish retailers who did so. Palestine's Chief Rabbinate, and its supporters among the press and the public, were adamant that Jews selling pork in the land of Israel was outrageous. Even beyond a religious issue, it was an urban-national one. Similar to camel meat, there were no legal grounds to punish those who sold pork under British law. All the authorities could do was to persecute Tel Aviv's pork vendors for selling meat that was slaughtered outside the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, and even these attempts were not always successful.⁵⁵⁴ Thus, alongside the legal route, the city's authorities pursued additional measures to support their cause: public shaming, picketing, and boycotting.

The rabbinate published lists of pork vendors – butcher shops, restaurants, food stores, pensions – and called to boycott these vendors and any business they owned. The rabbinate and its supporters also organized protests outside these establishments and regularly recruited individuals to picket outside pork vendors' shops.⁵⁵⁵ These methods were somewhat effective, bringing several retailers to negotiate with the Rabbinate, including Spinney's. Yet throughout the 1930s, one Jewish retailer repeatedly refused to stop selling pork despite the Rabbinate's constant badgering, and a petition signed against him by various organizations in the city who claimed the sale of pork in Tel Aviv was immoral and hurtful.⁵⁵⁶ This retailer, a German-Jew named Max Cohen, or a firm under that name, was targeted by the Rabbinate and its supporters in particular.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵³ Spinney defended his company as well as the work of the Food Controller in face of Jewish critics. See: Rawdon Spinney, "Readers' Letters: The Public's Fault", *The Palestine Post*, 7 December 1941. For issues regarding the sale of pork at Spinney's see for example: "Protest Against Pork Vendors in Tel Aviv", *Doar Ha'yom*, 10 February 1936; "Spinney's Discontinues the Sale of Pork in Tel Aviv", *Ha'tzofe*, 3 December 1944.

⁵⁵⁴ Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 48-49.

⁵⁵⁵ See for example: "Tel Aviv's Protests", *Doar Ha'yom*, 26 March 1936.

⁵⁵⁶ "Protest Against Pork Vendors in Tel Aviv", *Doar Ha'yom*, 10 February 1936; "Public Opinion", *Ha'tzofe*, 30 December 1937.

Cohen's German origin was often emphasized in protests against him, as it was for other German-Jews who sold pork and German-produced goods in Palestine.⁵⁵⁸ Those who took offense at the idea of German products sold by German-Jewish retailers, often associated these Jews – at least verbally – with Nazi Germany. Signs posted outside the Max Cohen establishment in Allenby street warned the Jewish public that the store sells German products.⁵⁵⁹ A crowd gathered to protest there called out: “Boo Hitler!”, “Boo Max Cohen!”, “Pig!”.⁵⁶⁰ German-Jewish consumers were targeted as well. When two German-Jewish women left the non-kosher “Rivoli” shop, protestors yelled at the women “Onwards to Germany!”. The frightened women took shelter in a nearby café, and the owner of the store called the police to disperse the crowd.⁵⁶¹ Finally, not only protestors singled out German-Jews. One Jewish judge was puzzled by the idea that a Jewish restaurateur, standing trial in Tel Aviv, insisted on serving pork dishes to his customers despite his day in court. This propelled the judge to ask the restaurateur a rhetorical question: “[did] you come here from Germany [just] to sell pork?”.⁵⁶²

For Jewish institutions with some political power in Palestine, such as the municipality and the rabbinate, being Jewish and consuming pork were mutually exclusive. Yet not all Jewish settlers agreed. One sausage manufacturer that produced his products from pork, published an ad in the press wishing his customers a “Happy Kosher Year” ahead of the Jewish new year. The sausage maker did not detect the irony in mentioning both “pork” and

⁵⁵⁷ See for example: “Protest”, *Ha'tzofe*, 11 January 1938. Max Cohen remains a relatively unknown figure yet his prominence in the source has led both Barak-Erez and Alma Igra to specifically mention him in their work as well.

⁵⁵⁸ “Tel Aviv's Protests”, *Doar Ha'yom*, 26 March 1936; “Public Opinion”, *Ha'tzofe*, 30 December 1937.

⁵⁵⁹ For more on the controversy of selling German products in the Yishuv, as well as the limited success of this boycott, see: Ayala Plesental, “The Milky Way: The Israeli dairy market in the 1930s as a mirror of German-Jewish relations”, in: Moshe Zimmerman (ed.): *Germany and Eretz Israel: A Cultural Encounter* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 2004): 133-142.

⁵⁶⁰ “Tel Aviv: Protest”, *Doar Ha'yom*, 5 September 1935.

⁵⁶¹ “Tel Aviv's Protests”, *Doar Ha'yom*, 26 March 1936.

⁵⁶² Barak-Erez, *Outlawed Pigs*: 49, 195 n. 30.

“kosher” in his well-intended address to the public. In addition, Jewish pork vendors claimed that they sold pork because that was what their customers demanded.⁵⁶³ This was also illustrated in the press with a humoristic anecdote. Two men walked past protesters outside a store when one man turned to the other saying that thanks to the picketers he now knows where to get pork from.⁵⁶⁴ Others took the pork protests in Tel Aviv less lightly. One commentator, possibly a German-Jew himself, wrote a long article published in the press. Targeting Jewish business and calling for their boycott was all too similar, he claimed, to what he had experienced just recently before leaving Europe. The fact that in Palestine, which was for him a place of refuge, Jews incited against Jews was a true tragedy.⁵⁶⁵

IV. Conclusions

This chapter illustrated how Jewish settlers in Palestine not only ignored the advice of Zionist experts by continuing to consume beef – and other meats – but also supported an entire economic sector devoted to it. The desire for meat was part of urban settlers’ ideas about life in Palestine. In their choices and habits, “everyday settlers”, the non-experts who settled in Palestine’s cities and towns, articulated a competing vision for the future state. Even though Zionist technocrats had substantial sway over the Jewish community in Palestine, the market for meat illustrates the power of everyday immigrant-consumers. To the dismay of experts, Jewish settlers relied first on Arab and Arab Palestinian breeders and merchants, and increasingly on imported animals from overseas, all to fulfill their meat needs.

By increasing overseas imports, Jewish settlers gradually gained more control over a section of Palestine’s livestock economy. Both cattle dealers and economists explained the need to import cattle as a matter of quantity and quality: Palestine did not have enough cattle, and the

⁵⁶³ “Two Questions”, *Ha'tzofe*, 22 August 1938.

⁵⁶⁴ “On ‘The Signs’”, *Doar Ha'yom*, 23 February 1936.

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

cattle it did were too meager to produce tasty meat according to European-Jewish preferences. Yet in addition, as this chapter illustrated, expanding imports was also a way to gradually bypass Arab Palestinian suppliers. At the same time that the colonial government encouraged international trade with its allies, European Jewish cattle dealers relied on their old connections in the European market to establish an international cattle trade especially between Palestine and the Balkans. This was one of the first ways to challenge the fact that the meat trade, as expressed above by a Tel Aviv butcher, was “all in the hands of Arabs”.

Jews were a diverse group in Palestine. The majority most likely adhered to kosher law, but many did not. Yet as part of a group, the “Arab” origins of camel meat highlighted their alienation from the land, its inhabitants, and the meats it had to offer. Importing cattle-for-beef, and from familiar sources, was a way to familiarize a livestock economy based on other species. Controversies revolving around pork emphasized the internal disparities with the Jewish settler community. Not only experts and laypeople held competing visions for the future Jewish state, but so did various groups within the public. Nevertheless, as expressed by a judge during “meat trials”, “in Tel Aviv meat means beef”. The next chapter will illustrate the role of beef in the development of Tel Aviv through the establishment of its slaughterhouse.

Chapter 3: The Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse

In the 1920s, Tel Aviv's town council lobbied the government for the right to slaughter. Although Tel Aviv was simply a township under Jaffa's municipality, and Jaffa was in the process of establishing a new modern slaughterhouse at the time, Tel Aviv inaugurated its own slaughterhouse in 1931. The slaughterhouse was designed to supply Jewish settlers with a steady supply of meat, "the main food for the masses", as well as a steady stream of income for the township in the form of slaughter taxes, charged from butchers.⁵⁶⁶ More broadly, however, in allowing Tel Aviv to establish its own slaughterhouse, in effect, the government supported Tel Aviv's goal to separate from Jaffa. The slaughterhouse was Tel Aviv's first separate infrastructure from Jaffa, gradually setting the stage for Tel Aviv's own municipal status. This chapter illustrates how gaining a slaughterhouse was vital for Tel Aviv's expansion geographically and municipally in accordance to its self-image as Palestine's Jewish capital.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, a modern slaughterhouse was a marker of a developed city. Examples from Berlin, Paris, Mexico City, Delhi, and Moscow emphasize the relationship between a city and its slaughterhouse. Scholars have examined how public health reforms also reformed citizens' meat standards. This, in turn, sponsored urban and industrial development as well as the demarcation of the city's periphery through designated areas for slaughter – out of sight and scent.⁵⁶⁷ This chapter builds on that literature by linking Tel Aviv's urban development with its slaughterhouse. It also adds to the literature by examining

⁵⁶⁶ Tel Aviv Council letter to District Commissioner Southern District, 18 July 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁵⁶⁷ Paula Young Lee (ed.), *Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse* (Durham: University Press Of New England, 2008); Jeffrey M. Pilcher, *The Sausage Rebellion: Public Health, Private Enterprise, and Meat in Mexico City 1890-1917* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006); Awadhendra Sharan, *In the City, out of Place: Nuisance, Pollution, and Dwelling in Delhi c.1850-2000* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

a different perspective: a city that did not push slaughter to its outskirts but rather embraced it into its boundaries, expanding the city towards the slaughterhouse.

Expanding Tel Aviv was always at the expense of Jaffa and the Palestinian villages in their vicinity. While this period in Jaffa and Tel Aviv's history is considered a decade of cooperation, as historian Mark Levine has argued, Tel Aviv's tangled relationship with Jaffa included "much cooperation, confusion, and conflict".⁵⁶⁸ This chapter weighs in on this relationship through the municipalities' correspondences, their plans, and actions. Especially, it will pause on the violent events of 1929 as a watershed moment. Tel Aviv's administrators' plans for a separate slaughterhouse preceded 1929, but it was this week of intense intercommunal violence that gave the Tel Aviv council the boost it needed to convince the British administration to separate slaughter.

The first section of this chapter explores the link between Tel Aviv's expansion, urban development, and the slaughterhouse. Picking the slaughterhouse location, the town council gained more than real estate, it gained a cursor pointing to the direction in which the city needed to expand: northwards. The second section illustrates how revenue from slaughter was so important for the town council, that even before the city was granted official permission to slaughter separately, its administrators went to great lengths to enable it. The city council ordered the setting up of illegal and haphazard slaughter locations, allowed questionable sanitary conditions, and paid little regard to public health and the well-being of workers and neighbors. Finally, the third section shows how the violent outbreaks of 1929 and the butchers' strike that followed were the catalyst for the construction of a separate modern slaughterhouse for Tel Aviv.

I. Land, Location and the Development of Tel Aviv

⁵⁶⁸ Levine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 108.

In 1923, the British District Governor of the Jerusalem-Jaffa District, the municipality of Jaffa, and the township of Tel Aviv were all in agreement that Jaffa and Tel Aviv would build a new slaughterhouse to serve both towns. According to the agreement, Tel Aviv and Jaffa would share the costs of acquiring a plot of land in Jaffa as well as the planning and construction on site. Profits would be divided at the rate of 60 percent for Jaffa and 40 percent for Tel Aviv. Jaffa's Mayor Assem El Said and the Deputy District Governor agreed that equating Tel Aviv's profits with Jaffa's would be reexamined at a later period when Tel Aviv's share in the slaughter grew.⁵⁶⁹ Within a few months, problems had surfaced.⁵⁷⁰ From the beginning, the Tel Aviv township had concerns over the location of the plot.⁵⁷¹ Yet this dispute aggravated when the township realized that the plot finally purchased, a site on the sea-shore in the Manshieh Quarter, was registered in the *Tabu* under Jaffa alone, even though Tel Aviv shared the cost of acquisition.⁵⁷² According to Tel Aviv officials, joint ownership of the land was a precondition agreed upon by Jaffa. As claimed by David Bloch, the Deputy President of the Township, in his letters to the Deputy District Governor, broken agreements at such an early stage do not bode well for the Tel Aviv-Jaffa partnership.⁵⁷³

In face of Tel Aviv's expectations of joint ownership, it should be kept in mind that in the 1920s the town was still under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Jaffa. Tel Aviv's citizens paid taxes in Jaffa and depended on Jaffa's public services. Yet, some of these

⁵⁶⁹ Letter by Deputy District Governor of Jaffa-Jerusalem to President Township of Tel Aviv enclosing the letter from Mayor of Jaffa, 13 November 1923, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁷⁰ Minutes of the Meeting Concerning the Building of a Joint Slaughterhouse for Jaffa and Tel Aviv, 29 April 1924. TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid; Letter from Tel Aviv Township to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, no date, possibly August 1924. TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁷² The Ottoman *Tapu*, or *Tabu* as pronounced in Palestine and still in Israel today, is a permanent lease of land from the state.

⁵⁷³ Letter by David Bloch to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 29 June 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from David Bloch to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 18 August 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553. See also: Letter by Dizengoff to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 17 November 1924. TAMA, 3/11a/553. We also do not have records of Jaffa's reaction to the accusation. However, a closer examination of the earlier 1923 correspondence between Jaffa and the Governor's office shows specific comments on the share of costs and the distribution of revenues between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, but do not mention a joint ownership of land.

citizens, those most invested in the meat trade such as Jewish butchers as well as religious authorities who depended on slaughter tax for revenue, advocated for a separate slaughterhouse in Tel Aviv. A Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, they imagined, would allow them better working conditions and modern facilities within their town. In addition, the economic considerations of keeping all or most revenue from slaughter with the township were immensely appealing, and these aspirations were further encouraged by rumors about the precarious state of the partnership agreement between Jaffa and Tel Aviv.⁵⁷⁴

One significant individual who weighed in on the matter was Jewish veterinarian Moshe Caspi, who was employed by the Jaffa municipality as Chief Inspector of the slaughterhouse since 1919.⁵⁷⁵ Despite the 60-40 agreement, Caspi claimed that Tel Aviv was responsible for the majority of slaughtered animals at the Jaffa abattoir. Each year, Caspi claimed, the number of animals slaughtered in Jaffa grew by 5,000 to 7,000. In 1919 approximately 11,000 heads of cattle, sheep, and goats were slaughtered; in 1920 16,000; in 1921 22,000; in 1922 28,000; in 1923 35,000; and in 1924 he estimated that the number would rise to 43,000 or 44,000 before the end of the year. For “Hebrew slaughter”, *Vaad Ha'kehila* received a tax for each animal slaughtered under its religious supervision, referred to by its Arabic name *Jabla*.⁵⁷⁶ The main cause for this rise was obvious according to Caspi: Jewish immigration was increasing daily. With the surge of immigration and the development of urban life in Tel

⁵⁷⁴ Letter signed by several butchers (including Jacob Gobernik and Leib Ducker) addressed to the Town Council of Tel Aviv, 27 October 1924; Letter from *Vaad Ha'kehila* (signed by Chairman Bezalel Yaffe and Secretary Rabbi Uzieli) addressed to the Township of Tel Aviv, 28 October 1924; Letter from Bloch to the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse Committee (composed of Bugrashov, Tabersky and Rokach): 27 October 1924; Letter signed by “a group of butchers” to the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse Committee, 14 November 1924. All letters found in TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁷⁵ Caspi was of Ukrainian origin. In 1918 the British government employed Caspi to assist in their efforts against Cattle Plague following World War I. That year he was also established the first private clinic in Jaffa for the treatment of workhorses, dairy cattle and dogs. For more on Caspi: A. Shimshoni, “The Pioneers: A Chapter in the History of Veterinary Medicine in Israel”, *Veterinary Medicine* 66 (2011): 12.

⁵⁷⁶ *Vaad Ha'kehila* was responsible for organizing Jewish affairs in Jaffa before the establishment of Tel Aviv, and it later operated in conjunction with the town council and municipality of Tel Aviv, as well as the Tel Aviv Rabbinate.

Aviv, he claimed, the township should be aware that 80 percent of all slaughtered animals are eaten by the Jews of Jaffa and Tel Aviv.⁵⁷⁷

Caspi's letter was forwarded to a Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse Committee. The Committee noted the economic factor but raised additional questions. What would two competing slaughterhouses mean? Would separation awaken the anger of "the Arabs"? What if "the Arabs" refused to buy the *trefah*? Would two slaughterhouses under the same municipality double the administrative expenses? Would the concentration of kosher slaughter in Tel Aviv cause a monopoly and raise prices? These questions were answered by at least one Tel Aviv official. "All points considered", he noted, "it would have been better to arrange things together".⁵⁷⁸ "Together", meaning a joint slaughterhouse for Jaffa and Tel Aviv.⁵⁷⁹ This internal debate was limited to the issue of the procurement of meat, but it can be read as representative of the question of separation. Perhaps as a prelude of things to come, the opinion of the unnamed official did not prevail. The township of Tel Aviv decided to separate and construct a slaughterhouse of its own.

On 17 November 1924 President of the Tel Aviv Township broke the news to the Deputy District Governor of Jerusalem-Jaffa. Dizengoff listed Tel Aviv's grievances against Jaffa and the Governor's office. For one, though the township had transferred money to Jaffa, it still was not been registered as co-owners of the jointly purchased land. In addition, Jaffa did not transfer Tel Aviv its share of slaughterhouse profits. As a result, Tel Aviv officially

⁵⁷⁷ Letter by Caspi to Township of Tel Aviv, 6 October 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553. Caspi also mentions that Jews were responsible for the vast majority of cattle slaughtered regardless of if they were slaughtered according to Jewish ritual. "Lately", claimed Caspi, "the *trefot* find a good market among the poor strata of the immigrants who are not able to afford kosher meat which costs double or more". *Trefot*, meaning animals that are not kosher, not slaughtered according to Jewish ritual, or to non-kosher cuts in an otherwise kosher animal. See: Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Internal memo titled "Slaughterhouse", no date, probably between October and November 1924. TAMA, 3/11a/553. The note also mentions the last names of four Jewish men who apparently offered Tel Aviv their services in constructing a slaughterhouse. Among them, the omnipresent Gubernik.

informed the Governor that: it would not participate in the construction of a common slaughterhouse; it intends to build its own slaughterhouse within its boundaries to the north; all subsequent revenue will be included in the township's budget; Jaffa should reimburse Tel Aviv for the money transferred for land; and finally, Jaffa should also allocate 40 percent of the slaughterhouse revenues to Tel Aviv until two separate slaughterhouses are built.⁵⁸⁰

Upon hearing the news of separation, a group of approximately 24 butchers wrote to the township to express their content, which they claimed was shared by all Jewish meat workers. They asked that the township organize a temporary facility within the domain of Tel Aviv till the permanent slaughterhouse was inaugurated. The butchers promoted this idea as essential both nationally and economically, because it would allow employing more "Hebrew labor".⁵⁸¹ What the township and the butchers did not consider was the opposite consequences for Jewish workers. Notably, following the decision to separate, the employment of Caspi, the Jewish Chief Inspector of the Jaffa slaughterhouse since 1919, was suddenly terminated in January 1925. Caspi, in his own words, "was being replaced by an Arab".⁵⁸² As Bloch wrote to the Deputy Governor "we have to consider this dismissal as the final push towards the separation of the Jewish slaughterhouse from the Jaffa slaughterhouse".⁵⁸³

The most significant issue in Bloch's letter to the Governor, however, was not the issue of labor, but the issue of land. Following the decision to separate, Tel Aviv requested a strip of land, on *mahlul* lands, north of the Muslim Cemetery towards the Auja River, known in Hebrew as the *Yarkon*.⁵⁸⁴ South of that cemetery, also on *mahlul* lands, a Jewish

⁵⁸⁰ Letter from President Township of Tel Aviv to Deputy District Governor of Jerusalem-Jaffa, 17 November 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553. Following this letter, the folder also holds a letter from Bloch to the Mayor of Jaffa asking to be reimbursed for the money transferred for the joint slaughterhouse plot. 11 December 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁸¹ Letter signed by butchers addressed to the Executive Committee of Tel Aviv, 19 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁸² Letter from Caspi to the Township of Tel Aviv, 27 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁸³ Letter by David Bloch to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 29 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

neighborhood had developed during the 1920s, dubbed by Jews as the *Mahlul* neighborhood. By expanding to the north of the cemetery in addition to the already occupied south, Tel Aviv was not only looking to position its slaughterhouse by the water and far from a settled area, but also to spread out across a vaster overall territory. The township asked for at least 20 *dunams* (approximately 20000 square meters) to allow the building of the slaughterhouse and develop the surrounding area for related industries, factories, and trades that would deal with the byproducts of slaughtering animals for meat (skin, blood, intestines) as well as create accommodation for workers, clerks and other operatives of the slaughterhouse.⁵⁸⁵

While the northern territory was officially requested, other areas initially considered also carried the potential of the town's expansion. For example, to the south, the area of *Neve Shaanan* was considered not only because it would have offered jobs and associated business for the Jewish neighborhoods around it, but because this stretch of land was, as expressed by Bezalel Yaffa of the *Geulah* Company, "first and foremost part of the lands that should be purchased for the purpose of expanding the settlement in Tel Aviv".⁵⁸⁶ The *Geulah* Company – *geulah* meaning redemption – was concerned with Jewish land purchases in Palestine, and its name corresponds with the Zionist ideology of "redeeming" Palestine's lands. The township and citizens of Tel Aviv were not engaged in redeeming land in the same way promoted by Labor Zionism, i.e., purchasing land and tilling its soil for agricultural purposes, we can see here another interpretation of land "redemption". Urban "redemption" was accomplished in the city by establishing Jewish businesses, capital enterprises, and residential neighborhoods on lands deemed important for the settlement's expansion. Finding a location for the new slaughterhouse was never simply about procuring more meat. It was

⁵⁸⁴ "Mahlul" refers to lands the government considered vacant when left uncultivated. This makes it within the government's right to allocate or lease it as it sees fit. Remnants of the Muslim Cemetery exist today in an area that has been renamed as "Independence Park", in close proximity to the Hilton Hotel on Hilton Beach.

⁵⁸⁵ Letter by Bloch to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 26 November 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Dizengoff to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 30 December 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁸⁶ Letter by Bezalel Yaffa of "Geulah" company to Tel Aviv Township, 1 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

also about the development of the city and the expansion of the Jewish settlement in Tel Aviv and Jaffa.

The suggestion to build a slaughterhouse around *Neve Shaanan*, meaning to Tel Aviv's south in closer proximity to Jaffa instead of expanding northwards, seemed to have risen following British reservations concerning the northern option. British reservations do not seem to be rooted in wanting to halt Tel Aviv's expansion in general *or* to the north. Scholars agree that the British supported Zionist developmental schemes especially on lands considered "vacant".⁵⁸⁷ As *mahlul* lands were effectively owned by the British Government (inherited from the Ottoman Government), Tel Aviv's land purchases not only served shared British-Zionist ideas concerning the development of uncultivated lands but were also a welcome source of income for the Government. Furthermore, before the mid-1920s the British had already allocated Tel Aviv with all its coastal *mahlul* lands from Allenby Street to the Auja River, allowing the inhabitants of the township to access the beach to their east from every point in town.⁵⁸⁸

It was not Tel Aviv's expansion that concerned the British. The northern option was an issue because it was considered far from established roads. Bringing live animals to the slaughterhouse and then transferring their meat to commercial centers in town would be difficult, as British public health regulations required that meat be transferred only by automobiles, and not on the backs of donkeys and camels as done previously in Palestine. The easy transfer of meat was critical for Tel Aviv as well, as difficult access to and from its slaughterhouse could jeopardize profits as butchers would be prone to slaughter where it was more convenient. The loss of potential slaughter taxes would be detrimental for Tel Aviv's budget and render the entire plan futile. Practical considerations called for another

⁵⁸⁷ Sufian, *Healing the Land*: 114-115; LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 75, 185-186.

⁵⁸⁸ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Volume I*: 37-41.

suggestion: the two slaughterhouses could be constructed near each other. This would allow the share of infrastructures such as an animal quarantine and water services as well as facilitate the movement of veterinary supervisors and other operatives between the two.⁵⁸⁹ However, the option of constructing close to the Jaffa slaughterhouse was ruled out. It was deemed too far away from the main Jewish settlement in Tel Aviv, in the middle of a “crowded Arab area”.⁵⁹⁰

Tel Aviv had officially requested the northern *mahlul* land as early as November 1924 but faced various problems. First, the *mahlul* status of that plot, claimed “vacant” following a government survey, was being contested in court by local Palestinian.⁵⁹¹ Contesting the status of “vacant” lands is a significant point in the historiography of Jaffa and Tel Aviv. Even the initial plot purchased in 1909 by members of Ahuzat Bayit, the building society that developed that plot into Tel Aviv, was itself contested in court by Bedouins who claimed that piece of land and its surroundings were used by them for planting vegetables and grazing animals. The Bedouins’ case was overrun by the Ottoman government, and the land was purchased by Ahuzat Bayit.⁵⁹² The *mahlul* land in dispute in the 1920s was adjacent to the Jewish *Mahlul* neighborhood, ironically bearing the name of its contested legal status. The neighborhood sat on 25 *dunams* of land, south of the Muslim Cemetery, which the British Government had previously allocated Tel Aviv. The residential area consisted mostly of huts and very simple lodgings, but two significant additions to the neighborhood were the Delfiner

⁵⁸⁹ Letter from Bloch to Vaad Ha’kehila, 31 December 1924, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁹⁰ Letter from *Vaad Ha’kehila* to Township of Tel Aviv, 2 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Yaffe to Tel Aviv Township, 1 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁹¹ The source reads: “certain of the Arab neighbors have launched against this with the land court”. Academic literature has pointed to Bedouins contesting the sale of lands, but here the wording “Arab neighbors” implies settled Palestinians. *Ibid.*

⁵⁹² Nomads were seen as a nuisance by the Ottomans, the British, the Jewish settlers, and later the state of Israel. LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*: 4-5, 116-117, 67-70, 78, 106; Yuval Ben-Bassat, *Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2013); Ahmad Amara, “Beyond Stereotypes of Bedouins as ‘Nomads’ and ‘Savages’: Rethinking the Bedouin in Ottoman Southern Palestine, 1875–1900,” *Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies* 15, no. 1 (2016): 59–77.

Silk Factory and the Lewkowitz Tannery.⁵⁹³ The industrial presence there allowed the president of township Dizengoff to argue that gaining more land in the area was “vital for the development of Tel Aviv”.⁵⁹⁴ As Dizengoff wrote to Gilbert Clayton, Chief Secretary Government of Palestine, “if industry is to be fostered and development aided”, Tel Aviv was “badly in need of more land”.⁵⁹⁵

It is interesting to learn how Tel Aviv gradually gained more land. Much of the Jewish rural settlements in Palestine were established on lands purchased directly from Palestinian landowners using collective Jewish funds. Land gains in the city, however, depended on a process of identifying key locations and appealing to the government’s enthusiasm for development to gain the right to purchase them with private or municipal capital. We also learn that even if left nameless in historical sources, Palestinians did not passively accept the “vacant” status of lands, defined as such by the Ottomans and later the British, nor did they peacefully accept the allocation of those lands to Jewish developers. Rather, they filed suit. We can also learn how this process was entangled and integral to Tel Aviv’s meat trade. In his exchange with Clayton, Dizengoff presented the issues of land, urban development, and the slaughterhouse as intertwined when explaining that:

The development of Tel Aviv is so rapid that we cannot possibly manage to provide the ever-increasing population with the public services essential in a modern town, viz: slaughterhouse, markets, cheap dwellings, houses.... We are unable to do this on account of the lack of public land which might be devoted for such purposes.⁵⁹⁶

⁵⁹³ Known simply as the Lewkowitz Tannery, the factory was owned by Yehuda Leib Lewkowitz, officially established in 1927 as “Yehuda: The First Steam Tannery in Palestine”. It was one of a handful of factories in the 1920s that employed several employees. The tannery employed 20 workers. For comparison, Lodzia, the well-known textile manufacturer and largest factory at the time established in 1924, employed 200 employees. Shavit and Bigger, *History of Tel Aviv Vol I*: 263-264.

⁵⁹⁴ Letter from Dizengoff to Sir. Gilbert Clayton, Chief Secretary Government of Palestine, 27 March 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁶ Dizengoff to Clayton.

A slaughterhouse was first on Dizengoff's list of public services essential for a modern town. This is not only implied above but also stated clearly by Dizengoff: "amongst the most urgent needs of our town, first and foremost is that of a suitable site for the construction of a modern slaughterhouse".⁵⁹⁷ Because Tel Aviv was "so much in need" of the slaughterhouse, Dizengoff requested Clayton to transfer the land to Tel Aviv without delay, *before* the final court ruling on the *mahlul* land. This implies that the outcome of the case was either predictable or that the township wanted to take over the land before and regardless of the court's ruling.⁵⁹⁸

The government indeed won the case, yet Tel Aviv was not simply handed the land.⁵⁹⁹ Besides the bureaucratic back and forth with British officials, Tel Aviv faced additional challenges in realizing its goal. The Tel Aviv township received or solicited several plans and proposals for the construction of the slaughterhouse, but chose none during that period.⁶⁰⁰ The internal committees discussing the matter seemed to constantly disagree on the size, facilities, and location of the slaughterhouse. Especially relevant here are the plans proposed by Jacob Gubernik, one of the few Jewish cattle dealers in Palestine. His proposals to the town council show savviness and a keen eye for profit in his desire to monopolize the meat market. Yet he too expressed broader urban-national considerations which appealed to the town council – jobs. In his slaughterhouse, he proposed, all jobs could be performed by Jewish workers, and in due time Jews could also take over the business of cattle dealing (we will see the significance of this last point in the next Chapter).⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Besides Clayton and the Governor's office, Tel Aviv officials corresponded or met with various British officials regarding the land. This included the Director of Lands, the Public Medical Officer of the Jaffa District Department of Health, the Acting Chief Veterinary Officer of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Assistant District Commissioner, Jaffa Division. See: Director of Lands to President of Township Tel Aviv, 2 June 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Senior Veterinary Officer to President of Township Tel Aviv, 25 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Assistant District Commissioner, Jaffa Division to President of Township Tel Aviv, 21 December 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶⁰⁰ Various proposals and letters of inquiry on the matter, including from Gubernik in TAMA, 3/11a/553.

On the topic of jobs, Caspi, whose contract with Jaffa was terminated, was eager to find new employment within Tel Aviv. Caspi appealed to the townships' eye for extra income. With plans for a slaughterhouse still undecided, in late January 1925 Caspi suggested that Tel Aviv should not wait for a permanent slaughterhouse but rather separate immediately "in favor of our financial benefit". As Caspi explained already in 1924, Jaffa's revenues from slaughter taxes were over 2000 Egyptian Liras a year, the majority of which was revenue from slaughtering cattle – an animal consumed mainly by Jews. Caspi suggested that that moment – when both municipalities did not yet have a functioning slaughterhouse – was the right time to centralize all kosher slaughter in Tel Aviv and thus secure a substantial income for the township. The unemployed Caspi suggested that he could take it upon himself to manage the entire operation. All he asked for in return was a steady salary and an assistant.⁶⁰²

The township took Caspi up on his offer. It invested in a temporary location for slaughter where Tel Aviv's butchers worked under the supervision of Caspi. While Tel Aviv was still busy evaluating plans and locations for a permanent facility, in 1926 Jaffa inaugurated its new and improved slaughterhouse. Tel Aviv, a town that presented itself as the modern alternative to ancient Jaffa, was lagging behind its older sister-city. The fact that Jaffa was more advanced than Tel Aviv was not only a cause for envy but also for real concern. In April 1926 Caspi wrote a memo, which he marked as "urgent". In it, he warned that "in Jaffa the new slaughterhouse is coming to completion and there is cause for concern that we will be forced to stop slaughtering in Tel Aviv and move to the Jaffa slaughterhouse".⁶⁰³ Caspi added: "Please take the necessary measures to secure *our* slaughter and the building of *our* slaughterhouse – on *our* land".⁶⁰⁴ To prompt Tel Aviv officials into action, Caspi added that

⁶⁰¹ Gobernik to Tel Aviv City Council, 27 July 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶⁰² The Palestine Pound was issued in 1927 to replace the use of the Egyptian Lira. Letter from Caspi to the Township of Tel Aviv, 27 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶⁰³ Internal memo signed by Caspi, 19 April 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

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Figure 9. Before slaughter: cattle led to the new Jaffa Slaughterhouse.

⁶⁰⁴ My emphasis. Ibid.
⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.



II. On Odor and Order: Sanitation and Public Health



With the *mahlul* land north of the Muslim Cemetery still in question, Tel Aviv's butchers suggested a temporary location in the Mahlul Neighborhood south of the cemetery. This location was simply on the seashore between the Tel Aviv Casino and the Katz factory.⁶⁰⁶ Slaughtering on riverbanks, seashores, or open groves was not uncommon during this period in Palestine or elsewhere.⁶⁰⁷ British veterinary regulations, however, forbade this practice and confined slaughter to locations pre-authorized for that purpose. Oblivious to, or simply ignoring these rules, Bloch informed the Deputy District Governor that the town council decided to organize separate Jewish slaughter on the seaside, and that slaughter would be supervised by Caspi.⁶⁰⁸ The Deputy District Governor unequivocally refused. Instead, the Deputy suggested, Tel Aviv could file an official request to slaughter at the Jaffa slaughterhouse but during separate hours for Jews and Arabs.⁶⁰⁹ Tel Aviv's council ignored the suggestion. This was not a matter of religious separation. For the township, once the joint plan dissolved, the economic potential of keeping all revenue from slaughter was too enticing to forgo.

The township went ahead and used a stretch of land on the beach in the Mahlul neighborhood as its temporary slaughter location. This location was used roughly between February and August 1925. Even though Caspi claimed that a spot on the beach would suffice – perhaps in his haste to promote separation and secure a job for himself – already in February the veterinarian warned the township that the location did not fit the needs of hygienic slaughter.⁶¹⁰ The location was haphazard at best. Administratively, Caspi still had no assistant

⁶⁰⁶ Letter signed by butchers addressed to the Executive Committee of Tel Aviv, 19 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Uzieli of *Vaad Ha'kehila* to Township of Tel Aviv, 28 October 1924; Uzieli of *Vaad Ha'kehila* to Township of Tel Aviv, 2 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶⁰⁷ Dorothee Brantz, "Animal Bodies, Human Health, and the Reform of Slaughterhouses in Nineteenth-Century Berlin" in Lee (ed.) *Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse*: 72.

⁶⁰⁸ Letter by David Bloch to Deputy District Governor of Jaffa, 29 January 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶⁰⁹ Note taken of telephone call between District Governor's office and Tel Aviv Township, 2 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Deputy District Governor to Tel Aviv Township, 2 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

and struggled to supervise the work alone. He also had not yet received the stamps he requested, used to differentiate between cuts of meat checked, unchecked, rejected, and approved. This caused confusion, disorder, and frequent disputes between the butchers and the veterinarian. In addition, slaughtering out in the open on the beach, exposed Caspi and the butchers to the elements, and curious passersby. The site also kept moving with the tides, making an already gritty job more difficult. Caspi made several requests to improve the conditions of the temporary site but they were left unanswered. Regardless of the conditions, the township continued to collect its profits from the ever-increasing numbers of slaughtered animals. This left Caspi to accuse Tel Aviv of caring more about profit than about hygiene and public health.⁶¹¹

The location of the temporary slaughterhouse was not only challenging for Caspi. Mahlul was a residential neighborhood, and in July, in a letter addressed to Dizengoff and the township council, a group of 32 residents protested the township's decision to operate a site of slaughter close to their homes. They asked to relocate the site elsewhere immediately, as it compromised the health and well-being of the entire neighborhood. In their words, it was impossible to describe the stench, filth, and all kinds of disorder they had to endure since slaughter had begun on site.⁶¹² In an urgent memo, Dr. Wienschel of the town's Sanitary Department supported the residents' complaint. Addressing the town council, Wienschel expressed his astonishment that slaughter was being conducted 500 meters from the popular Casino, parallel to the streets Zerubbabel and Shivat Zion. The "anti-sanitary" conditions

⁶¹⁰ Letter by Caspi to Dizengoff, 12 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter by Caspi to Dizengoff, 13 February 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶¹¹ Letter by Caspi to Dizengoff, 26 May 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553. This was a common claim health experts made against municipal slaughterhouses. Kyri Claflin for example, writes that in Paris keeping meat on Parisian tables was more important, in terms of social peace and economic considerations, than eliminating deplorable hygiene conditions. See: Kyri Claflin, "La Villette: City of Blood (1867-1914)", in: Lee (ed.) *Meat, Modernity and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse*: 32.

⁶¹² Letter signed by 32 residents of Mahlul addressed to President of Township and City Council, 7 July 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

were affecting a large number of residents and visitors, claimed Wienschel, as he described the grime and stench that filled the area during slaughter hours and beyond. Even more disturbing, according to Wienschel the site was so close to a public beach, that bathers were almost submerged in the waste and blood of slaughtered animals.⁶¹³

The pollution of public waters with the waste of slaughtered animals was not unique to Tel Aviv during this period.⁶¹⁴ However, what is significant in these descriptions is the juxtaposition between how the township promoted Tel Aviv, and the reality of everyday life in the city. Tel Aviv's beach access was an essential part of that vision.⁶¹⁵ In 1931 for example, in a special edition of the *Palestine Bulletin* dedicated to Tel Aviv, Dizengoff described "the marvelous development" of Tel Aviv. He wrote: "the life of the dirty streets of Jaffa, which lacked air, light, clean water and flowers, repelled us". This, Dizengoff claimed, drove the town's founders, "to create for ourselves something clean, beautiful and invigorating... near Jaffa, but like a European city... [that] would stretch along the seashore".⁶¹⁶

Developing Tel Aviv and its seashore was both for its citizens, as well as intended to attract tourists. In the 1930s Tel Aviv's administrators envisioned the town could become "a health resort", "a second Nice".⁶¹⁷ Even Tel Aviv's climate was presented as ideal for this purpose. The town was even better than the European Riviera because "Tel Aviv has sunshine all year round". It was also better than other Middle Eastern tourist destinations, such as Egypt, where

⁶¹³ Internal memo written by Wienschel addressed to Town Council, 9 July 1925.

⁶¹⁴ Lindgren Johnson, "'To Admit all Cattle without Distinction': Reconstructing Slaughter in the Slaughterhouse Cases and the New Orleans Crescent City Slaughterhouse" in Lee (ed.), *Meat, Modernity, and the Rise of the Slaughterhouse*: 207, 211-212.

⁶¹⁵ Helman claims that seaside culture was a major part of western leisure culture thriving in Tel Aviv during the 1930s. However, Shoham claims that Tel Aviv's seashore was underdeveloped for most of the Mandate period thus never realizing its administrators' aspirations for Tel Aviv as a tourist attraction. See: Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*: 39; Helman, "European Jews in the Levant Heat": 81-83.

⁶¹⁶ Dizengoff, "The Romantic Story of Tel Aviv", *Palestine Bulletin*, 2 March 1931: 3. It seems as this special issue was published to advertise the Tel Aviv Carnival.

⁶¹⁷ "Tel Aviv to be a Second Nice", *Palestine Bulletin*, 2 March 1931: 1; "Tel Aviv as a Health Resort", *Palestine Bulletin*, 2 March 1931: 2.

one finds sun year-round but “too much of it”.⁶¹⁸ Tel Aviv contrasted itself not only against Europe but also against competing destinations in the region. Tel Aviv was promoted to tourists as “the Riviera of Palestine”, a “Mecca for those desiring an ideal seaside and health resort”.⁶¹⁹ Highlighting Tel Aviv in its transient moment of development – focusing not on what it was but what it could grow to become – was not only tied to the development of the city but the country: “Tel Aviv, as soon as it becomes the fashionable seaside resort, the fate that destiny has marked out for it, will bring wealth to the rest of the country”.⁶²⁰ Thus, the beach was not only integral to Tel Aviv’s aspirations but to national goals. As the epicenter of urban Zionism, the development of Tel Aviv was an urban-national project.⁶²¹

Wienschel concluded that it was necessary to immediately move slaughter to another location. Until a permanent solution was found and due to limited options, Wienschel mentioned the back yard of the Lewkowitz Tannery as a preferred temporary location.⁶²² His nonchalant reference to the tannery implies that it was probably already discussed as an option within the council. The type of work conducted at the tannery meant that everyone in its vicinity was probably used to the smell, and some sort of waste management was already in place. Following Wienschel’s memo, Dizengoff informed the Public Medical Officer (PMO) that he ordered the discontinuing of slaughter on the site, relocating it to the foreshore of the Lewkowitz Tannery. Dizengoff acknowledged that he had done so without first obtaining the PMO’s authorization but as this arrangement was “absolutely temporary”, he hoped that the PMO would not raise any objections to the new location.⁶²³

⁶¹⁸ “Tel Aviv as a Health Resort”.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ Shoham, *Carnival in Tel Aviv*: 163, 178.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Letter from Dizengoff to PMO 13 July 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

Tel Aviv's councilmen were apparently accustomed to acting first and only then asking for permission. Upon shutting down the beach site, and before any indication of agreement or authorization from the PMO, Tel Aviv went ahead and prepared the back yard of Lewkowitz's Tannery for slaughter. It did so swiftly and with a sense of urgency. The previous location had shut down in mid-July 1925, and the new one began to operate in early August. Without a functioning slaughter location, haphazard as it might have been, the municipality was losing potential revenue. Weinschel was in charge of sanitation and Caspi would supervise all veterinary matters as well as serve as the General Manager of the slaughterhouse. Caspi directed to pave Lewkowitz's backyard in concrete, fix the dysfunctional cesspool on location, and set up a shack for the religious slaughterers (*shochetim*), as well as organize an automobile that would transport them to and from the site. Caspi's long-requested stamps were finally produced and copies sent to the PMO. Caspi was familiar with the general requirements of the British Health Department for a slaughterhouse. These included housing for sick animals; large halls for killing, butchering, and hanging; gut-cleaning sections with water tanks; metal receptacles for small organs; and manure pits. For staff, British requirements included accommodations, washrooms, lockers, and latrines.⁶²⁴

British requirements were far from fulfilled on-site. Nevertheless, in early September Dizengoff felt confident enough in the state of the facility to invite the PMO for a visit. A tour was scheduled with the Acting Chief Veterinary Officer for the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries at the end of that month.⁶²⁵ In the meantime, however, in Tel Aviv's

⁶²⁴ Letter from Caspi to *Vaad Ha'kehila*, 21 July 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi to Township President, 6 August 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Meeting minutes of the Organizing Committee; Letter from the PMO of the Jaffa District to President of Township Tel Aviv, 22 August 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from General Secretary of Tel Aviv Yehuda Nadivi to PMO of the Jaffa District, date unclear – 31 of August or September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Department of Health Government of Palestine to President of Township Tel Aviv, 19 August 1925.

⁶²⁵ Letter from Dizengoff to PMO of the Jaffa District, 3 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter sent on behalf of the Senior Veterinary Officer of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries Southern Inspectorate Government of Palestine to Mayor of Tel Aviv, 25 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

new slaughter location, as in the older site by the Casino, sanitation, odor and order were major issues. Already in mid-September disputes emerged between Caspi and Lewkowitz over running water supplies and the use of electricity. In addition, although the factory's yard had been paved, no roof was built. Slaughter was conducted, again, in the open air, and meat was hung waiting for inspection under the summer's sun. Caspi was concerned about keeping meat fresh under the scolding sun, but even more so he warned that once autumn rains began it would be impossible to slaughter in the yard with no roof. October came along, a roof was yet to be installed, and slaughter – as predicted – was disrupted by the rain.⁶²⁶

Sanitation at the new site was questionable as well. According to testimonies, a mixture of grime, blood, and mud made the area reek. Caspi warned the Township Council about the butchers' growing discontent, and the losses it would suffer as a result of the situation. Indeed, in November, approximately 35 butchers signed a letter addressed to the Township President protesting the work conditions at Lewkowitz's. The yard was too small, there were no facilities for the butchers, and not only was the meat of slaughtered animals exposed to the elements – the rain and sun – but so were the butchers. This, they claimed, was affecting their health. As it was never intended to function as a slaughterhouse, the area was not properly paved, it was constantly muddy, and was impossible to clean thoroughly. This meant that waste and blood were simply left to rot, causing, in the words of the butchers, “the air to be filled with microbes”.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁶ Internal memo by Caspi addressed to the Town Council, 15 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Bloch to Lewkowitz, 21 September 1925 TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo by Caspi addressed to the Town Council, 23 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo by Caspi addressed to the Town Council, 29 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Copy of internal memo written by Caspi forwarded by General Secretary Nadivi to the Technical Department, 5 September 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo by Caspi addressed to the Town Council, 13 October 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶²⁷ Letter signed by approximately 35 butchers addressed to President of Township, 4 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

The danger of “microbes in the air” was also repeated in complaints made by residents of the Mahlul neighborhood. Not only did Tel Aviv promote having clean and fresh air as one of the pillars setting it apart from Jaffa, “microbes in the air” were a real source of concern for contemporaries. Even though Germ Theory was already scientifically established at the time, “bad air” known as Miasmatic Theory, was still popularly believed in Tel Aviv as threatening to health.⁶²⁸ The Mahlul residents reiterated descriptions of filth and stench, similar to those already depicted by Caspi, the butchers, and others. However, the residents added additional sensory offenses to their complaints endured by those living near the site: the sights and sounds of animals being slaughtered. The constant presence of animals and traders meant the persistent “racket and screams of animals and Arabs” which deprived the residents of any peace. In addition, the residents expressed fear for their children’s well-being. Not only were the children in potential danger of being attacked by animals, but they also had to witness “the torture of the animals” which “affects them very badly physiologically”.⁶²⁹

The residents threatened to turn to the police. It is uncertain what they would have achieved by doing so, as sources show that police presence was integral to the day-to-day operation of the slaughter location anyway. As one worker reflected: “here there are Arabs and Jews, butchers and traders, and there is always strife among them... only the presence of a police officer can guarantee order”.⁶³⁰ Indeed, after much deliberation, the township hired an officer to be present permanently on-site. Even then, Caspi protested every time the officer was “borrowed” for other police tasks or even participated in police drills when those clashed with slaughter hours. That was when, according to Caspi, there was “great risk for all kinds of scandals between the Arabs and the Jews”.⁶³¹ For example, one argument between Jewish

⁶²⁸ Anat Helman, “Dirt, Noise, and Misbehavior in the first Hebrew City” in: , in Azaryahu and Troen, *Tel-Aviv, the First Century*: 95.

⁶²⁹ Letter by Elimelech Elster signed by five additional residents to President of Township, 28 December 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³⁰ Note taken of telephone conversation between Pelsner from the Slaughterhouse and Yehuda Nadivi, 2 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

butchers escalated when “Arabs”, who were possibly cattle dealers, intervened. A fight broke out, following which at least a couple of Jewish butchers were arrested.⁶³² Reports of fighting, as well as Jewish complaints about the screams of animals and Arabs, do not imply a peaceful relationship between Jews and Palestinians. Significantly, however, they also do not point to segregation within the meat industry. This shows that the decision to separate when it came to slaughter was first and foremost a municipal question of administration, taxes, and revenue. The people of the trade – the Arabs and Jews – never really separated. Jews continued to slaughter in Jaffa, and Palestinians came to the locations of slaughter in Tel Aviv.⁶³³

Returning to the questionable working conditions at Lewkowitz yard, the butchers warned the township that they would not be held accountable “if work at the slaughterhouse would come to a halt one of these days”. They also added that Jaffa was just about finishing the construction of its new slaughterhouse which could lead to the transfer of all Tel Aviv’s slaughter back to Jaffa.⁶³⁴ In the meanwhile, somewhat oblivious to these complaints, Tel Aviv continued to extend its contract with Lewkowitz, paying the factory owner 60 Egyptian Liras a month for use of his yard.⁶³⁵ Some Tel Aviv officials claimed that the neighbors’

⁶³¹ Note taken of phone conversation between Yehuda Nadivi and Tel Aviv Chief of Police, 3 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo by Caspi, 2 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Tel Aviv Chief of Police to President of Township, 4 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo from Caspi to Deputy President of Township, with copy sent to Tel Aviv Chief of Police, 31 January 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Tel Aviv Chief of Police to Deputy President of Township, in reply to Caspi’s memo, 3 February 1926; Internal memo written by Caspi, 21 April 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 10 May 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 30 May 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³² Letter from Uzieli to Dizengoff, 19 March 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Report of the events written by Caspi and an assistant addressed to Dizengoff, 19 March 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³³ See also a neighbors’ complaint over a ruined fence and land-grabbing by cattle brought to the slaughterhouse. Neighbors and municipal officials blamed Palestinian cattle dealers who kept their livestock “wherever they saw fit, on any vacant land around the slaughterhouse”. Letter from residents, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³⁴ Letter signed by approximately 35 butchers addressed to President of Township, 4 November 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³⁵ Lewkowitz himself leased the land from the Anglo-Palestine Company Ltd. and the company would at times request that the Township pay Lewkowitz’s rent directly to them. Letter from President of Township to Yehuda (Leib) Lewkowitz, 2 December 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Dizengoff to the Anglo-Palestine Company Ltd., 3 December 1925, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

complaints were exaggerated and the conditions on-site were not that bad.⁶³⁶ Yet during February, March, and April 1926 Caspi constantly complained about “anti-sanitary” conditions and infrastructural issues with the site, and his inability to implement regulations that would enforce order and discipline during slaughter hours. He complained about inadequate fences, overflowing cesspools, and blood pits. He also justified the neighbors’ many complaints. His concerns were also repeated by a township inspector who upon visiting the site was horrified to find rotting animal waste, “all kinds of flies”, and “billions of maggots” there. Blood was flowing on the earth for tens of meters and a general stench polluted the air. Both Caspi and the inspector warned township officials that the Mahlul neighborhood was “in great danger from a sanitary point of view”.⁶³⁷

With summer quickly approaching, sanitary conditions were bound to deteriorate further, but in summer 1926, things took an unexpected turn. The temporary slaughter location at Lewkowitz’s yard was shut down but not because of complaints, demands, or inspector’s reports. On the 5th of August 1926, the Palestine High Commissioner authorized the Disease of Animals Ordinance. Cattle Plague had struck Palestine and Transjordan, causing the British Chief Veterinary, authorized by the High Commissioner, to announce that the slaughter of cattle for food was prohibited in all municipalities and local councils. In addition, the sale of beef and the internal organs of cattle were also strictly prohibited. Only imported frozen, chilled, or tinned beef was permitted for sale and consumption.⁶³⁸ With limited to no refrigeration for the preservation of beef in Palestine, these options were far

⁶³⁶ Internal memo written by Bloch, 12 January 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³⁷ Internal memo written by Caspi, 11 January 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Caspi to Vaad Ha’kehila, 22 January 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi addressed to Deputy President of Township, 4 February 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from President of Township to Senior Medical Officer of Jaffa District, 8 February 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 18 March 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 21 March 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Letter from Township Inspector to President of Township, 26 March 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 15 April 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553; Internal memo written by Caspi, 20 April 1926, TAMA, 3/11a/553.

⁶³⁸ “Disease of Animals Ordinance 1926 Notice”, *Palestine Bulletin*, 9 August 1926.

from sufficient solutions. Almost instantly, there was a sense that the ordinance would halt local slaughter indefinitely. On the same page where the *Palestine Bulletin* notified its readers of the ordinance, it already published short pieces reporting meat shortages, rising prices, and already in August expressed “serious concerns” for adequate beef supplies for winter.⁶³⁹

In British warnings published in the daily press, the High Commissioner did not mince for words when describing the situation at hand. The presence of the Cattle Plague was described as a looming “holocaust” threatening to wipe out, if left to spread, Palestine and Transjordan’s entire livestock population.⁶⁴⁰ The Government acknowledged the inconvenience caused by the new regulations but probed local leaders to influence the public to follow regulations, and it asked that the public themselves assist the government to the best of their abilities. Only by doing so, British authorities insisted, they would be able to stop the epidemic and avoid “a national disaster”.⁶⁴¹

By the end of August, further information and clarifications were provided by the authorities. The High Commissioner authorized the entry of live cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs for slaughter, but only by sea. The idea was to prevent any contact between imported animals and local animals – an encounter which could compromise the condition of local livestock.⁶⁴² Importing these animals, however, was not a simple procedure. First, it required a license issued in advance by the Department of Agriculture and Forsterites. In addition, the entry of

⁶³⁹ “Shortage of Meat”, *Palestine Bulletin*, 9 August 1926; “Arrangements for Meat Supply”, *Palestine Bulletin*, 9 August 1926.

⁶⁴⁰ “The Cattle Plague”, *Davar*, 9 August 1926.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴² With cases of Cattle Plague appearing in villages in the Jaffa District, Nablus, Ramallah and Tiberias villagers owning infected livestock had to keep them in isolation from other animals and herds, and had to immediately inform the Mukhtar, Sheik or District Officer who would then inform the Government. The Government culled infected animals and (allegedly) financially compensated the owners. It was thusly forbidden for any herd to graze amongst the herd of another village. Village livestock markets had also been forced to quit all activity. See: “Disease of Animals Ordinance 1926 Notice”, *Palestine Bulletin*, 10 August 1926.

animals was permitted only via the Haifa port and only for immediate slaughter. Once at Haifa, the importer had to submit a veterinary report confirming the animals were shipped from countries not infected by Cattle Plague, Rinderpest, or other diseases, and all animals were in sound health condition before entering Haifa. Still, all animals would then be transferred to the Haifa animal quarantine for further veterinary observation. A veterinarian would examine the animals and mark them, after which the animals were sent directly to the Haifa slaughterhouse.⁶⁴³

In addition to Haifa, slaughter was permitted in only two other cities in Palestine: Jerusalem and Jaffa. Animals that were not immediately slaughtered in Haifa could be sent to Jerusalem or Jaffa, but as they were transferred by land (via railway), they would again be put in quarantine upon their arrival. After observation and veterinary authorization, those animals would be sent directly to slaughter in the municipal slaughterhouses. Taxes had to be paid at each quarantine according to the type of animal, and the cost of feeding the animals for the entire period from boat to slaughterhouse fell on the importer.⁶⁴⁴ These extra measures, costs, and lengthy processes led to raising meat prices, but also caused a rise in prices of other commodities, as reported in the press.⁶⁴⁵ Also in the press, some referred to this moment as a time of crisis which further emphasized the high cost of living in Palestine and highlighted “the dire scarcity felt among the broader strata of the land’s inhabitants”. Some even suggested rethinking fishing as a source of alternative sustenance for the population.⁶⁴⁶

With the British banning slaughter in all temporary or provisional locations, slaughter at Lewkowitz’s yard came to a halt. Tel Aviv’s butchers found themselves back in Jaffa

⁶⁴³ “Disease of Animals Ordinance 1926”, *Doar Ha’yom*, 29 August 1926.

⁶⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁵ “Tel Aviv: Price Fluctuations of Life Necessities”, *Davar*, 13 September 1926. See also reference to essential Palestinian commodities such as sesame, olives and olive oil in: “Disease of Animals Ordinance 1926 Notice”, *Palestine Bulletin*, 10 October 1926.

⁶⁴⁶ Arieq Boyvsky, “Fishing on the shores of the Land of Israel”, *Davar*, 20 September 1926.

indefinitely. As Jaffa's new and improved slaughterhouse had just been inaugurated and was considered by the British a model modern facility, the Tel Aviv township was not in a position to object to the British ordinance. Dizengoff claimed to understand the gravity of the situation but asked the District Officer of Jaffa that Tel Aviv be allowed to slaughter there at least for the next few weeks until the end of the Jewish holidays. What Dizengoff wanted was leverage in his negotiations with Jaffa. He admitted the "unsuitability of our temporary slaughterhouse" and reassured the District Officer that Tel Aviv's butchers were willing to conduct slaughter at Jaffa's new slaughterhouse, but he insisted that it was "vitally essential" that Tel Aviv's "hands should not be tied" in negotiating the terms of their return to Jaffa. Entering negotiations from an inferior position, i.e., with no other choice, would be rob the township of any leverage. The District Officer was not concerned by Tel Aviv's position. He replied aridly that Dizengoff needed to reach an agreement with Jaffa as early as possible, ordering him to attend a meeting on the matter that had already been set. Indeed, in the meeting, the familiar 60-40 arrangement was agreed on.⁶⁴⁷

In finalizing the agreement in December 1926, Dizengoff wrote to the mayor of Jaffa El Said that he hoped that "this will be the first good step towards the arrangement of mutual institutions for the joint benefit of the inhabitants of our two towns". This, before immediately adding that Tel Aviv's chief accountant would shortly visit Jaffa to fix the payment the township is due.⁶⁴⁸ While encouraging "joint benefits", it is worth noting that Dizengoff insisted on disassociation when he wrote: "our two towns". The Jaffa Municipality, on the other hand, made a point of using "local council in Tel Aviv" instead of

⁶⁴⁷ Correspondence between Dizengoff and District Officer of Jaffa between 16-26 September 1926, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Letter from Mayor of Jaffa to District Officer of Jaffa, 5 October 1926, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Correspondence between Tel Aviv Town Council and Jaffa Municipality between September and December 1926, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; "Contract", TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁴⁸ Dizengoff to El Said, 27 December 1926, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

“Tel Aviv Municipality” as it sometimes did previously in correspondences between the two.⁶⁴⁹

The power disparity was also present in labor issues and Jewish presence at the Jaffa slaughterhouse. Jewish officials in Tel Aviv insisted on the importance of Jewish presence at the Jaffa slaughterhouse.⁶⁵⁰ For example, only Jewish drivers were hired to transport kosher-slaughtered meat from the slaughterhouse to markets and butcher shops.⁶⁵¹ Other positions, however, were not filled by Jews. As *Davar* indicated, the meager salaries of slaughterhouse cleaners did not appeal to Jewish workers.⁶⁵² Yet positions on a higher level, such as chief veterinarian at the slaughterhouse, quickly became a matter of dispute between Tel Aviv and Jaffa. Jaffa initially hired both Caspi and his assistant, yet after a few months, both men’s employment was terminated.⁶⁵³ Tel Aviv’s butchers protested, claiming the veterinaries were essential in protecting them from Arab workers who interfered with Jewish slaughter, but the butchers were in no position to make demands.⁶⁵⁴ The same could be said for the Tel Aviv council. When the township demanded an explanation for firing Caspi, the municipality of Jaffa replied that it is the one that makes personnel decisions. Its duty was merely to inform Tel Aviv.⁶⁵⁵ The township, its butchers, veterinaries, and meat workers had little-to-no leverage in this situation, and Tel Aviv renewed its contract for another year.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁴⁹ Translator’s note (in translated letter from El Said to Anglo-Palestine Co. Bank, 24 March 1927), 25 March 1927, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁰ *Vaad Ha'kehila* to Town Council Tel Aviv, 23 September 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵¹ “In the Tel Aviv Town Council”, *Davar*, 10 October 1926.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*

⁶⁵³ Dizengoff to El Said, 18-19 December 1926, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁴ Correspondence between The Chief Rabbinate of Tel Aviv and Jaffa to Town Council Tel Aviv, between 11-14 August 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Society of Jewish Butchers to Dizengoff, 19 August 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; El Said to Dizengoff, 31 August 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Committee of the Jewish Community of Tel Aviv and Jaffa (Eretz Israel) to Town Council Tel Aviv, 23 September 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁵ Correspondence between Jaffa Municipality and Tel Aviv Council, 2-9 January 1928, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁶ Bloch to El Said, 15 January 1928, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

Jewish workers felt their position at the slaughterhouse was precarious, though their share in slaughter was steady. According to the agreement between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, and due to religious considerations slaughter was divided between the cities. Tel Aviv slaughtered between 5:30 and 6:30 in the morning and again between 14:00 and 18:00 in the afternoon. Jaffa slaughtered between 6:30 and 7:30 and again between 13:00 and 14:00. Meaning Jaffa's butchers used the slaughterhouse for two hours daily while Tel Aviv's more than double that – five hours.⁶⁵⁷ On weekdays, when Jews slaughter, the slaughterhouse earned approximately twenty to thirty PP. On Saturdays, or during high holidays such as Passover, revenue shrunk to approximately six to nine PP. Revenue from Jewish slaughter amounted to sixty-three percent of all revenue. Jews consumed approximately almost all cattle slaughtered, and about a fifth of all sheep slaughtered.⁶⁵⁸

Even though Jews occupied the slaughterhouse regularly and frequently, they reported a sense of insecurity. Occupationally, rumors often spread about the termination of employment of Jewish workers.⁶⁵⁹ Physically, other dangers loomed. Tel Aviv's butchers complained that they had to walk in groups to the slaughterhouse, some 3 kilometers outside of the city center because butchers who walked alone at night were assaulted. When attackers began to strike in broad daylight as well, butchers reported a sense of escalating tensions. In April 1928 altercations between Jewish and Arab butchers even occurred within the slaughterhouse. There, Jewish butchers claimed, Palestinian butchers acted as if they were "lords of the land".⁶⁶⁰ Nine Jewish butchers claimed to have been beaten with sticks.⁶⁶¹ In

⁶⁵⁷ El Said to Sanitary Surveyor Jaffa Municipality, 15 November 1927, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁸ Figures from the Tel Aviv Council's letter to District Commissioner Southern District making the case for the need for a separate slaughterhouse for Tel Aviv. 18 July 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁵⁹ Letter from "meat transporters" to Dizengoff, 7 January 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Dizengoff to El Said, 15 January 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; El Said to Dizengoff, 28 January 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁶⁰ Letter to Tel Aviv Council signed by approximately 9 butchers, probably April 1928, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁶¹ Ibid.

January 1929 butchers complained to the Tel Aviv council that they increasingly felt uncomfortable at the Jaffa slaughterhouse “like people in a strange house”.⁶⁶²

Tensions were rising within the meat trade and throughout Palestine. The altercations between Jews and Arabs at the slaughterhouse can be read as a prelude to the outbreak of intercommunal violence in August 1929, known as the Palestinian Revolt, the Buraq Uprising (*Thawrat al-Buraq*) and the Occurrences of *Tarpat* (*Meora'ot Tarpat*). If the outbreak of the Cattle Plague forced Jewish butchers back to Jaffa, the Palestinian uprising pushed them back to Tel Aviv. In Tel Aviv’s haphazard slaughter locations butchers feared for their health, but at Jaffa’s model slaughterhouse they claimed to fear for their lives. While the British Government promised to keep peace and security in the slaughterhouse, the butchers’ sense of security became the main point of contestation between Tel Aviv and the British government.⁶⁶³ The violence of 1929 finally gave the township the leverage it needed. The Palestinian uprising became the turning point for Tel Aviv’s prospect of gaining the right to slaughter.

III. The Right to Slaughter

Historian Hillel Cohen defines 1929 as “year zero” of the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁶⁶⁴ In August 1929 Palestinians protested against increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Demonstrations turned violent, and intercommunal attacks and counterattacks raged between the 23rd and 29th of August. While the watershed massacres of 1921, as well as the outbreaks of 1936, were ignited in Jaffa before spreading to the rest of Palestine, the violent events of August 1929 were felt mostly in Jerusalem and Hebron. Still, that summer left its mark on Jaffa and the area.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶² Letter to Tel Aviv Council signed by approximately 43 butchers, 1 January 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁶³ “In the Tel Aviv Town Council”, *Davar*, 10 October 1926.

⁶⁶⁴ Cohen, *Year Zero of the Arab-Israeli*.

While the events had vast political and socio-economic ramifications, one significant issue for the relationship between Jaffa and Tel Aviv as well as Tel Aviv's urban development, was the relocation of Jaffa's businesses to Tel Aviv. Already in September 1929, Jewish peddlers and stall owners in Jaffa's markets moved to Tel Aviv. By 1930, Tel Aviv inaugurated a new market in Allenby street, which was intended as a new home for trades who left Jaffa. In addition, Tel Aviv authorized the building of 106 new stores in 1929, compared to just 10 stores in 1928. Some longstanding establishments owned by Jews in Jaffa moved to Tel Aviv, from groceries to building-appliances shops. This trend had a negative economic effect on Jaffa. Scholar Tamir Goren explains that this trend was understood in two opposite ways. From the Jewish press Goren establishes that the main feeling was that it was no longer safe for Jews in Jaffa, thus any economic ramifications Jaffa suffered – it had brought upon itself. According to Arab Palestinian newspapers, however, the relocation of businesses was seen as proof that Jews were not willing to coexist and wished to separate themselves from Arabs. Along those lines, some claimed that the move of trades and industries to Tel Aviv was organized and preplanned to boycott and hurt Palestinians and their businesses.⁶⁶⁶

Plans to move Jewish slaughter from Jaffa to Tel Aviv had indeed preceded the events of summer 1929. However, I argue, the trend described by Goren should be read as the context that gave Jewish butchers a stronger case to refuse to return to Jaffa. It also gave the township the ability to claim urgency in constructing its own separate slaughterhouse. According to the butchers, after the violence of 1921, they never felt secure again in Jaffa, and since the events of 1929, they were further convinced that any visit to Jaffa was life-threatening. Already on August 26th, 3 days into the week-long riots, a group of 70 Jewish men, among them cattle

⁶⁶⁵ Goren, *Rise and Fall*: 12.

⁶⁶⁶ Goren, *Rise and Fall*: 127-129.

dealers, butchers, and other meat workers, informed the township that they refuse to go to Jaffa, where they “could always be killed”.⁶⁶⁷ They informed the municipality that they intended to resume slaughter at Lewkowitz’s yard with Caspi as the veterinarian in charge. That same day, Lewkowitz’s yard resumed to function as the unofficial, and indeed illegal, Tel Aviv slaughterhouse.⁶⁶⁸

In September, the Tel Aviv township informed the municipality of Jaffa that it will no longer be using the Jaffa slaughterhouse and the District Commissioner that slaughter has resumed at Lewkowitz’s due to the life-threatening situation in Jaffa. It was not only a matter of revenue now, the township claimed, but vital and urgent that Tel Aviv slaughter within its own boundaries. Jaffa on its part complained to the District Commissioner that Tel Aviv was slaughtering meat improperly and unhygienically and selling it within “this municipality”.⁶⁶⁹ The Commissioner tolerated slaughter at Lewkowitz’s yard during August and September, but in October, as the violence subsided and conditions were “roughly normal”, he made clear that slaughter in the Jaffa-Tel Aviv area was strictly forbidden outside of the authorized slaughterhouse. The District Commissioner offered police escorts to the Jewish butchers on route to and from the Jaffa slaughterhouse.⁶⁷⁰

Jewish butchers refused to return to Jaffa, and the Jewish press supported them. *Davar* for example insisted that Jewish meat workers (butchers, drivers, *shochtim*, etc.) amounted to 180 “family men” who should not be forced to work in life-threatening conditions. The paper

⁶⁶⁷ Meat workers to President of Township Tel Aviv, 26 August 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751. See also similar letter from 10 September 1929.

⁶⁶⁸ Lewkowitz to Town Council, 9 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁶⁹ Acting President of Township to Jaffa Mayor, 17 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; President of Town Council to District Commissioner Southern District, 20 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Mayor of Jaffa to District Commissioner Southern District (copy to Township of Tel Aviv, among others): 19 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; President of Township reply to Mayor of Jaffa, 26 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Head of Town Council Tel Aviv to Director of the Mortgage and Credit Bank, Jerusalem, 22 September 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁷⁰ District Commissioner Southern District to President of Tel Aviv Township, 7 October 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

also promoted the idea that the situation endangered not only butchers but the entire community. As explained by Rabbi Uziel of *Va'ad Ha'kehila*, at a speech he gave in front of a large audience at the Great Synagogue of Tel Aviv on Allenby street, slaughter conducted in life-threatening conditions deemed the meat non-kosher and thusly prohibited for consumption. Jewish religious authorities explained that besides the danger of contaminating kosher meat by the presence of non-kosher meat in a joint slaughterhouse, the act of Jewish slaughter itself was compromised in Jaffa. The role of a Jewish *shochet*, they explained, was not simply a technical one, i.e., in their own words: “to make a live beast – dead meat”. “Religious hygiene” could not be conducted and respected under the supervision of police officers and in an environment of hate.⁶⁷¹ Jewish *schita* required a steady heart and sound mind which was not possible in a place where sharp knives were always in hand.⁶⁷² Following Rabbi Uziel’s speech, two members of the Great Synagogue Committee joined the butchers’ delegation established to appear before the British government and challenge its decision on slaughtering in Tel Aviv. Religious authorities adhered to the urban-national goal, for which they were not only in charge of Jewish ritual, but got involved in politics.

With the backing of the Jewish press, the religious authorities, and the township, but without British approval, Tel Aviv’s meat workers were back to Lewkowitz’s yard. The District Commissioner was inconsistent in his reaction. Initially, slaughter at Lewkowitz’s was simply tolerated, then approved on an ad-hoc basis for limited and nonconsecutive periods, and then banned. In October it was allowed, then in November Lewkowitz was put on trial for operating a slaughterhouse without a license.⁶⁷³ Ten days later the site was authorized

⁶⁷¹ Tel Aviv Council to District Commissioner Southern District, 21 October 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; The Chief Rabbinate of Jaffa and Tel Aviv District to District Commissioner Southern District, 24 October 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; Committee of the Jewish Community of Tel Aviv and Jaffa to District Commissioner Southern District, 28 October 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁷² “Tel Aviv: The Slaughterhouse Question”, *Davar*, 13 November 1929; “Tel Aviv: The Slaughterhouse Question”, *Davar*, 18 November 1929; “Tel Aviv: Slaughter in Tel Aviv Allowed”, *Davar*, 22 November 1929.

again for one month and in December, slaughter there was banned again, this time indefinitely.⁶⁷⁴

The Commissioner invited butchers to his office to persuade them to return to Jaffa. Instead, butchers published a leaflet insisting that “despite the demands and threats of the government” nothing would convince them to go back to Jaffa. In effect, butchers went on strike. The ban of slaughter in Tel Aviv in addition to the prohibition of moving meat between municipalities meant that the city was left meatless. While the illegal transfer of meat between cities was prevalent even under British prohibitions, now it was the butchers themselves who prevented the entry of meat to Tel Aviv from neighboring Jewish settlements. Their incentive was to add public pressure to their cause, as well as not allowing butchers from other settlements to make a profit off of their situation. Fights broke out between butchers who attempted to break the strike and those who safeguarded it.⁶⁷⁵ In addition to the lack of beef in the city, for certain periods the slaughter of chickens also stopped in solidarity. Newspapers reported a “meat hunger” in Tel Aviv but claimed that public opinion supported the butchers and Tel Aviv’s battle for the right to slaughter.⁶⁷⁶

By January 1930 the city had gone on for weeks without meat. Unemployed meat workers were left with no pay, and those reliant on slaughter taxes – religious authorities and the township itself – were losing revenue daily. The issue also received the urgent attention of Jewish public health officials. As shown in Chapter 1, the official consensus among Jewish

⁶⁷³ Lewkowitz was acquitted after claiming he was abroad during the reopening of the illegal slaughter location. However, Lewkowitz was indeed aware of the reopening as he received rent from the municipality for the use of his yard during that period. “Tel Aviv: The Slaughterhouse Question”, *Davar*, 13 November 1929; “Tel Aviv: The Slaughterhouse Question”, *Davar*, 18 November 1929.

⁶⁷⁴ District Commissioner Southern District to President of Township Tel Aviv, 21 December 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; “Slaughter in Tel Aviv allowed”, *Davar*, 22 November 1929: 3; Rokach to Lewkowitz, 21 November 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751; District Commissioner Southern District to President of Township Tel Aviv, 22 November 1929, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

⁶⁷⁵ Report on trial written for Deputy President of Township Tel Aviv, 5 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁷⁶ The Chief Rabbinate to District Commissioner Southern District, 5 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

nutrition experts and other technocrats was that the consumption of beef was harmful in the climate of Palestine both to public health and the national economy. However, when a “meat fast” became lengthy and involuntary, Jewish experts expressed other ideas. The lack of meat became a medical problem. One urgent telegraph from Tel Aviv officials to the Chief Secretary of Jerusalem District read: “physicians report diseases through lack of meat”. In addition, various healthcare practitioners (including from the HMO) sent complaints to the British District Commissioner. In their letters, the practitioners claimed that the sick, the weak, the old, and the very young were all directly and negatively affected by the lack of meat.⁶⁷⁷ Representatives of 14 women’s organizations sent a memorandum to the District Governor claiming that the meat scarcity harmed sick people, children, and mothers.⁶⁷⁸ A retirement home similarly complained that “the ill are not receiving their main sustenance, vegetable prices have increased, and vegetable soup does not satisfy the elderly as meat does”.⁶⁷⁹ It seems as Jewish attitudes towards meat in Palestine were always linked to the broader national goal. Here, the urban-national goal was the right to slaughter.

Both Jewish practitioners and the British Health Department claimed they were concerned for the community. According to the Health Department prohibiting slaughter in temporary locations, was essential in safeguarding public health. Jewish newspapers claimed that sanitation had nothing to do with it.⁶⁸⁰ Some even claimed that the sanitary condition at Jaffa’s slaughterhouse was not any better than at Lewkowitz. It was enough to tour around the Jaffa slaughterhouse, according to the article, and smell the stench to understand how

⁶⁷⁷ Chief Rabbinate to District Commissioner Southern District, 5 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Telegraph to Chief Secretary of Jerusalem District from various Tel Aviv officials, 5 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Doctors’ Association of Jaffa-Tel Aviv to District Commissioner Southern District, 6 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Dr Levontin of Hadassah Medical Organization Tel Aviv Branch to Tel Aviv Township, 6 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁷⁸ “Tel Aviv: Slaughter in Tel Aviv Allowed”, *Davar*, 22 November 1929.

⁶⁷⁹ The Home for the Aged Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Tel Aviv Township, 6 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753

⁶⁸⁰ “Tel Aviv: The Slaughterhouse Question”, *Davar*, 18 November 1929: 4; “Scandal” (or “Outrage”): *Doar Ha’yom* 29 December 1929.

much the government cared about sanitation. Summoning a somewhat surprising witness, the article suggested listening to the complaints of Arab orchard farmers who surround the slaughterhouse, as “their testimony would be, without a doubt, absolutely objective”.⁶⁸¹

The article continued with its challenging (and sensationalist) tone, encouraging the Jewish public to protest against the British government’s “wall of stupidity and malicious intentions”. The writer claimed that the government’s slaughterhouse policies were part of “a long line of abuse” towards the *Yishuv* in an attempt to turn the entire “national home (also: house) into a slaughterhouse”. The article blamed the government for its “uncivilized treatment of the inhabitants of the Hebrew City” as an extension of its treatment of the *Yishuv* as “natives”. In his use of “uncivilized” and “natives”, the writer reverberates colonial rhetoric. Being treated as “natives” implied that Jewish administrators in Palestine were not yet equipped for self-rule. And this, some Jews in Palestine strongly rejected. The writer concluded his article by calling to intensify the butchers’ strike. The British “meat attack” on Tel Aviv, he insisted, should be answered by a lengthy strike even if it pushes the city into “vegetarian status”. If the British do not back down, Tel Aviv must not either.⁶⁸²

Officially, the District Commissioner, and Heron the Senior Medical Officer, claimed that “Excellent facilities already exist at the Jaffa Slaughterhouse” and so they simply saw no need for another similar facility. “Until I am convinced that these facilities fall short,” wrote the commissioner, “I shall certainly discountenance the proposed construction, which, in any case, is a luxury which the Township cannot afford”.⁶⁸³ Despite the sensationalist tone of the above-mentioned article, it added two important unofficial reasons for the commissioner’s refusal. Revenue from kosher slaughter was substantial in Jaffa’s municipal budget and was

⁶⁸¹ “Slaughterhouse Politics”, *Doar Ha’yom*, 19 November 1929.

⁶⁸² *Ibid.*

⁶⁸³ District Commissioner Southern District to Senior Medical Officer Jaffa (with copy to President of Tel Aviv Township): 24 September 1928, TAMA, 4/1553/4751.

thusly negatively impact the city. In addition, the government could not seem as if it was supporting Jewish boycotts on Arab businesses, which was implied through the construction of a separate slaughterhouse, especially following the 1929 uprising.⁶⁸⁴

Yet one more explanation was rampant in Tel Aviv: sabotage. According to Dizengoff, Bloch, and others, Heron simply hated the Jewish *Yishuv*. Dizengoff and Bloch complained to the District Commissioner and even the JNC and JA about Heron's treatment of them. They described their interactions with Heron, claiming he was rude, dismissive, and arrogant. According to them, Heron insisted to "put them in their place" by scolding them and mocking their requests. More importantly, Dizengoff and Bloch claimed that the demands Heron set for the slaughterhouse location were intentionally impossible and thusly malicious. Heron insisted on a beach-front location for the slaughterhouse in contrast with Tel Aviv's plans to develop that area for leisure, recreation, and tourism.⁶⁸⁵ Heron's insistence on the beach location was understood as deliberately hindering the development of Tel Aviv. Dizengoff and Bloch also claimed that Heron was deliberately dragging out the approval of plans due to ill will, as part of his war of attrition against the town council.⁶⁸⁶

The Jewish press mimicked Dizengoff and Bloch's views. The British stance on the slaughterhouse, they claimed, was part of a long list of insults towards the Jewish *Yishuv* as a whole, and the government's preference of Jaffa over Tel Aviv more specifically.⁶⁸⁷ In solidarity with the unemployed butchers, on 16 January at noontime, all shops, workshops, and factories closed in Tel Aviv. At a public gathering that evening, female protesters held a sign: "45000 residents are without meat. End the abuse!".⁶⁸⁸ At the gathering, Rabbi Uziel

⁶⁸⁴ "Slaughterhouse Politics".

⁶⁸⁵ Various communications between Dizengoff, Bloch, and Lewkowitz in January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁸⁶ "For Kind and Personal Attention of Mr. Campbell District Commissioner Southern District" by Dizengoff, 12 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Bloch to the Zionist Administration, National Council, Jerusalem, 12 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁸⁷ "Tel Aviv Demands Slaughter within its Boundaries", *Davar*, 17 January 1930; "Outrage", *Doar Ha'yom*, 29 December 1929.

declared that “the Jews of Tel Aviv and Jaffa cannot eat meat at the cost of their brothers’ blood”. He insisted that they would prefer to “starve for months more rather than send our brothers into danger”.⁶⁸⁹

Despite, or rather due to Heron’s approach, advocacy for Tel Aviv’s cause extended beyond Tel Aviv or even the *Yishuv* and met the highest ranks of the Colonial Office. The caliber of Zionist actors who threw their weight behind Tel Aviv’s right to construct its own slaughterhouse suggests the national importance and urgency that was associated with it. Pinhas Rutenberg, founder of the Palestine Electric Company whose charter with the British made him the sole producer and distributor of electric power in Palestine, took up the matter of the slaughterhouse with the World Zionist Organization while in London.⁶⁹⁰ Also in London, and also actively lobbying on behalf of Tel Aviv, Colonel Frederick Hermann Kisch, a decorated officer and highest-ranking Jewish man who served in the British Army at the time, met with the High Commissioner of Palestine. Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier, British Historian and Foreign Office official, reported the minutes of that meeting to Dizengoff. The letter stated:

His Excellency repeated that he had definitely decided - against a certain opposition - that Tel-Aviv is to have its own slaughterhouse, and Colonel Heron had received instructions together with the District Commissioner to select a site as early as possible in such a way as not to impede the proper development of the town.⁶⁹¹

It was not only Dizengoff, his colleagues, and the Jewish press who understood the slaughterhouse, and its location, as key to the development of Tel Aviv, but so did the High Commissioner of Palestine himself.

⁶⁸⁸ “Tel Aviv Demands Slaughter”.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁰ Dizengoff to Rutenberg, 18 February 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁹¹ “Extracts of a letter from Mr. L .B. Namier dated January 31st, 1930”, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

Until Tel Aviv operated its own permanent slaughterhouse the Health Department insisted that Jewish butchers return to Jaffa. Heron never authorized slaughter at Lewkowitz's yard again, and Tel Aviv officials could not meet his demands for a temporary slaughter location. With butchers refusing to return to Jaffa, at this stage the city was left with no beef for two months. The township then sent its butchers, illegally, to neighboring Jewish settlements Petah Tikvah, Bney Brak and Ir Ganim to slaughter there and bring back butchered meat. Yet none of these small settlements had a functioning slaughterhouse that even resembled Jaffa's. Slaughter was conducted in open fields or small sheds and no real system for waste management existed. These locations were also far from equipped for Tel Aviv's needs, nor could they handle the sheer volume of slaughter it demanded. Petah Tikvah slaughtered approximately six animals daily, while Bney Brak and Ramat Gan slaughtered only one between them. Tel Aviv, in comparison, required the slaughter of approximately thirty animals daily.⁶⁹² Though they enjoyed the extra income, Tel Aviv's neighbors could not handle these quantities. The burden was also felt by Tel Aviv's consumers with an increase of 20-30 percent in meat prices.⁶⁹³

At the end of April 1930 Tel Aviv moved its slaughter to a much larger established city: Haifa. Refusing to slaughter in Jaffa "the Arab city", Tel Aviv began to slaughter in a "mixed town" with an Arab (Muslim and Christian) majority, a growing Jewish minority, and an Arab mayor: Hassan Bey Shukri.⁶⁹⁴ While Jaffa's mayor El Said led a cordial personal relationship with Tel Aviv's Dizengoff, Haifa mayor Shukri was an enthusiastic Zionist

⁶⁹² Senior Medical Officer and Veterinary Officer, Jaffa to District Commissioner Southern District, 25 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁹³ Dr Josef Ferber Veterinary Surgeon Petah-Tikvah to Tel Aviv Township, 27 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Committee Settlement of Bney-Brak to Tel Aviv Council, 30 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Ferber, 3 February 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Local Council Petah-Tikvah to Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv, 10 February 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Local Council Petah-Tikvah, 16 February 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Local Council Petah-Tikvah, 21 February 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁹⁴ It is possible that Tel Aviv's butchers started to slaughter at Haifa earlier than official negotiations indicate. Dizengoff to Mayor of Haifa, 29 April 1930 TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Train Station Manager, 2 May 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

supporter.⁶⁹⁵ For the next 10 months, Tel Aviv's butchers drove to Haifa and back, while slaughtered meat was delivered from Haifa to Tel Aviv by train, to be picked up only by Tel Aviv's veterinarian.⁶⁹⁶ Unlike Jaffa, Haifa's municipal slaughterhouse in 1930 was old and small.⁶⁹⁷ Thus, Tel Aviv's slaughter in Haifa during the better part of 1930 was not an ideal situation for anyone involved. The municipality of Haifa was worried about the additional burden on its slaughterhouse and its workers.⁶⁹⁸ The Tel Aviv township was also unsatisfied, not because it had to share profits with the Haifa municipality, but because those profits were substantially smaller as Haifa charged butchers a standard fee of 200 mills for slaughtering an imported animal at the municipal slaughterhouse, while Tel Aviv charged butchers 510 mills for the same service. Even when asked to do so by Dizengoff, Shukri refused to charge the butchers more.⁶⁹⁹ This shows how much more Tel Aviv demanded from its butchers in comparison with other municipalities and implies the high costs of living in Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, butchers do not seem to have enjoyed the tax reduction. The burden of travel to Haifa and the conditions in which they worked, in their words, "could barely be described".⁷⁰⁰

Meanwhile, other disgruntled workers at the time were the builders of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse. Tel Aviv's slaughterhouse plans were approved by the British in late January

⁶⁹⁵ Zionist historiography celebrates Shukri especially against the backdrop of his predecessor who was a staunch supporter of the anti-Zionist Mufti of Jerusalem: Amin el-Husseini. Shukri's letters to Tel Aviv municipality which I use here were originally written in Hebrew (as opposed to translated into Hebrew) which shows his willingness to correspond in the language. In addition, scholars show how under Shukri's governance the Jewish population rose constantly, as did their vocational and financial opportunities in the city, as he considered Jewish presence in Palestine's cities essential for the development of the country. See for example: Elyakim Rubinstein, "Jews and Arabs in the municipalities of Israel: Jerusalem and other cities 1926-1933", *Cathedra* 51 (1989): 122-147.

⁶⁹⁶ Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Train Station Manager, 2 May 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁹⁷ In 1934 Haifa received a PP 30 thousand loan from the government for the construction of a modern slaughterhouse, inaugurated only in 1941. See: "Loan to Build Haifa Slaughterhouse", *Filastin*, 20 November 1934; "30 thousand Pounds for the construction of the Slaughterhouse", *Al-Difa*, 8 July 1934. "Near Completion of the New Slaughterhouse", *Al-Difa*, 13 March 1941.

⁶⁹⁸ Correspondence between Shukri and Dizengoff, 13-22 December 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁶⁹⁹ A thousand mills equaled one Palestine Pound under the British Mandate. The Palestine Pound was issued in 1927 to replace the use of the Egyptian Lira. Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Haifa Veterinary, 16 May 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Chairman of Town Council Tel Aviv to Mayor of Haifa 6 June 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753; Mayor of Haifa to Slaughter-tax collectors 10 June 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁷⁰⁰ Baruch Gendelman, "The Chronicles of the Establishment of the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse" in: The Hebrew Butchers Association of Tel Aviv and Jaffa Newsletter (January 1937): 9. [hereafter: Butchers' Newsletter].

1930.⁷⁰¹ With a flow of meat from Haifa, construction of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse began in late July 1930. By early August, however, labor disputes between the township and the slaughterhouse builders quickly escalated to a workers' strike and mutual accusations were published in the Jewish press.⁷⁰² Some reporters expressed outrage. The empty and dormant construction site was referred to as an incredibly "shameful spectacle", especially considering the "racket" Tel Aviv made to gain the right to slaughter. In "racket" the newspapers included the "rebellion" against Jaffa, the strikes, the fight against the Health Department, and delegations that reached as far as London the capital of the empire.⁷⁰³ The builders' dispute was finally settled and construction resumed in August.⁷⁰⁴

The Tel Aviv slaughterhouse was inaugurated on the 4th of January 1931. Jobs were now secured for 150 meat workers, who attended the inauguration event with their families, all in festive attire. At 11:00 am the facility passed the inspection of the Health Department and at 13:00 the formal celebration kicked off with a speech from Dizengoff thanking various officials, congratulating them for achieving the goal of building "the most sophisticated slaughterhouse in the country, fitting the advanced city of Tel Aviv".⁷⁰⁵ With a slaughterhouse in hand, Tel Aviv celebrated the first municipal institution it was allowed to operate entirely separate from the Jaffa municipality, thus paving the way to grounding itself as a municipality in its own right and a highly developed one at that.⁷⁰⁶ A photographer captured the historical moment (see images below). Speeches were followed by singing and dancing, and the event concluded with the Hebrew toast "*Lehaim!*", "to life".⁷⁰⁷ An ironic choice of

⁷⁰¹ "Tel Aviv: Towards the Building of the Slaughterhouse", *Davar*, 31 January 1930.

⁷⁰² See several articles in the Jewish press from July and August 1930, such as: "Tel Aviv's Win", *Davar*, 20 July 1930; "The Tel Aviv Workers Party on the division of labor in a building in the slaughterhouse", *Davar*, 28 July 1930; "The Strike in Building the Slaughterhouse", *Doar Ha'yom* 7 August 1930.

⁷⁰³ "End to the Unnecessary Dispute", *Davar*, 6 August 1930; "Standstill in the construction of the slaughterhouse", *Doar Ha'yom* 10 August 1930.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid*; "The Slaughterhouse will be Built by Organized Labor", *Davar*, 10 August 1930.

⁷⁰⁵ Dizengoff to District Commissioner Southern District, 6 January 1930, TAMA, 4/1552/4753.

⁷⁰⁶ Gendelman, "The Chronicles".

words to call out in a place where animals go to die, but in the eyes of Tel Aviv's administrators, the slaughterhouse indeed meant (municipal) life. The Tel Aviv slaughterhouse was active between 1931-1981.

⁷⁰⁷ "The Inauguration of the Slaughterhouse", *Davar*, 5 January 1931.



Figure 13. Photographs taken on inauguration of the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse on 4 January 1931. In white coat: Chief Veterinarian Dr. Arieh Levit. To his left (in glasses): Assistant Gosarsky. To the right of Levit (in long coat and beard): the *shochet*. In uniform is the slaughterhouse guard. Images provided by Dalia Twill, daughter of Arieh Levit.

IV. Conclusions

A growing settler community of European descent required a growing supply of meat. A growing city with growing municipal aspirations required a slaughterhouse. Urban development tied slaughter to expansion, and thusly to colonization. To construct its own slaughterhouse Tel Aviv needed to expand, and to expand it needed the slaughterhouse. Through municipal action, this chapter illustrated how multiple parties including national Zionist figures and the High Commissioner of Palestine, understood that constructing and operating a separate slaughterhouse was both a marker of urban development as well as an instrument to drive it.

The events leading up to the establishment of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse encapsulate overlapping processes. These include the use of a slaughterhouse for urban development; infrastructural state-building, and; the gradual acquisition of Palestine's lands in negotiation with the colonial government. As this chapter showed, colonization was established not only by purchasing rural lands from Palestinian landowners. Urban "land redemption" included acquiring land from the government in the name of Tel Aviv's development. This was never simply accepted by local Palestinians but challenged within legal frameworks. Negotiations over land and the construction of the slaughterhouse on that land capture an image of a settler-city in the making. Jewish settlers were not sent by the British Empire, and the vast majority of them were not of British descent or tied to the imperial system directly. Yet, it was the colonial power, as the framework for the triangular relationship between Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the government, that enabled the Zionist colonization of Palestine in the name of development.⁷⁰⁸

⁷⁰⁸ Norris, *Land of Progress*.

As for the Tel Aviv council, its perception of the city's meat needs prevailed over other considerations such as sanitation and working conditions on slaughter sites. This had a direct effect on the livelihood and well-being of butchers, as well as on the well-being of those living near slaughter locations. It also might have had implications for the health of the public who consumed meat often slaughtered and butchered in unsanitary environments. Yet producing meat was a lucrative business, and access to meat was deemed almost a human right. Thus slaughter had to continue whether pushed to ad hoc locations or even to a different city.

The next chapter will show how the creation of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse did not appease those involved in the meat business or the appetite of the town council for more autonomy. A growing supply of meat generated a growing meat economy, which created additional disputes: butchers struggled with cattle importers, and importers clashed with the municipality. These internal struggles – heated as they were – were ultimately overshadowed by another battle, a joint battle against Heron and the Veterinary Department. There again, the city used access to meat as a unifying cause to fight for the expansion of Tel Aviv's autonomy.

Chapter 4: The Tel Aviv Meat Strikes

In 1936 Jewish butchers formed an alliance: The Hebrew Butchers of Tel Aviv and Jaffa. In 1937 they published the first issue of their newsletter. In it was an article titled “The Chronicles of the Establishment of the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse”. The article recited “the war over the slaughterhouse” from the butchers’ perspective. It emphasized how they led a year-long strike and painstakingly traveled back and forth to Haifa, all to deliver meat to Tel Aviv’s citizens, and to provide the city with its own municipal slaughterhouse. Doing so, the article claimed, the butchers were vital in paving the way for the establishment of the Jewish capital.⁷⁰⁹

Why did the butchers need to recite their role in events that took place some seven years earlier? Reminding the municipality of the butchers’ sacrifices was meant to gain sympathy for their struggles, but not those they inured in 1930, rather those they were facing when the article was published in the mid-1930s.⁷¹⁰ The chronicles of 1931 were an indictment against Tel Aviv’s administrators for abandoning the butchers in the volatile meat market of 1936-1938. This chapter delves into that period, which culminated with the Tel Aviv meat strikes of April 1938 and December 1938. In comparison to the 1929 strike which ended with a clear accomplishment (the slaughterhouse), the 1938 strikes ended with a whimper. Even though, the significance of the 1938 strikes is in the questions they raised, the issues they highlighted, and the way they illustrate the dynamics of Tel Aviv as a settler-city with internal “wars” and external enemies.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ Gendelman, “The Chronicles”: 9.

⁷¹⁰ Most likely, the newsletter was read by members of the butchers’ union and by perhaps by other stakeholders in the meat-trade. It includes data and statistics that can also be found in Ben Nathan’s reports and the municipality’s veterinary reports.

⁷¹¹ Though they went on strikes before, the butchers’ dubbed the two 1938 strikes as “the first butchers’ strike” and “the second butchers’ strike”. This indicates their significance and scope, and I adopt their terminology

The chapter begins with the establishment of the butchers' association. From the butchers' perspective, a separate slaughterhouse for Tel Aviv was supposed to bring national pride, a sense of physical security, and no less important, economic prosperity and occupational esteem. The reality was more complicated, and butchers found themselves in a precarious position in a volatile meat trade against a powerful importers' monopoly. This led to the first meat strike, examined in the next section. The first meat strike demonstrates how Tel Aviv's growing meat economy was based on the import of *live* animals and local slaughter. The question of imported frozen meat, for example, will show the entanglement of religious and labor considerations in the meat trade. The first strike also demonstrates the city's ability to unite against a common enemy, the importers, as it set the stage for the second meat strike and pointed to the larger adversary: the government's Health Department.

The third section explores the second meat strike. It focuses on Tel Aviv's demands to expand the capacities of its port to allow the landing of cattle there, instead of at the Haifa port. It also further demonstrates the international links of the Tel Aviv meat trade. As such, this chapter shows how the meat question transformed into an urban-national question, by asking how was gaining permission to unload cattle in Tel Aviv understood as essential for the city's expansion and in accordance with its self-image as Palestine's Jewish capital? As in the previous chapter, the Health Department and its Colonel Heron "the engineer of import and consumption control"⁷¹² in Palestine – as a proxy of the British government – will be discussed as both an obstacle and an enabler for the development of Tel Aviv.

I. The Hebrew Butchers of Tel Aviv and Jaffa

here. See for example: "The Daily Press on the First Meat Strike" and "The Daily Press on the Second Meat Strike", *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 43-55.

⁷¹² Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 130.

In Tel Aviv's meat trade, importers sold animals to butchers, and butchers sold meat to the public. In other words, cattle importers were independent wholesalers, and butchers were retailers. Increasingly, since the upsurge in the import of European cattle, Jewish butchers depended on cattle importers, as middlemen, instead of visiting Palestine's livestock markets.⁷¹³ Whenever the cost for live cattle increased, due to circumstances beyond the will of importers or due to their own manipulations, butchers had to decide whether to raise the price of meat as well or to endure the raise themselves to keep their customers appeased and their sales up. Improving their position vis à vis the importers, was a key factor in reoccurring butchers' strikes, and was one of the leading drivers for creating a butchers' union.

When Jewish butchers united in the Hebrew Butchers Association of Tel Aviv and Jaffa in 1936, the association included 149 butchers, all male and mostly Ashkenazi, who resided and worked mainly in Tel Aviv.⁷¹⁴ The most prominent motivation for a butcher to join the association was the potential to improve his financial standing and occupational stability. Like other skilled Jewish workers who arrived in Palestine, butchers were forced to adapt to different conditions and opportunities, while trying to make a living from their trade.⁷¹⁵ Butchers were not capitalists, as were the importers, but many of them had just enough wealth or income to own or lease a butchers' shop and pay for related expenses. As more immigrants poured into Tel Aviv, more butchers were among them. This had positive aspects to it. For example, some butchers accredited the addition of German-Jewish butchers to Tel

⁷¹³ Dov Varona, "The Meat Supply and our Relations with the Cattle Dealers", *Butchers Newsletter*, (January 1937): 7-9.

⁷¹⁴ The Hebrew butchers' newsletter was published irregularly between January 1937 and February 1941. In publishing a newsletter the butchers hoped for a platform to make their voice heard (in their words: "nisayon lehakim bama le'irgun ha'katzavim ba'ir"). "Cultural Work", *Butchers' Newsletter* (January 1937): 37. I have found several issues of *The Butchers' Newsletter* at the National Library in Jerusalem, but not all of them. Though the government restricted publications during WWII (due to censorship or the dearness of paper) the butchers continue to publish during 1940 and 1941 though the newsletter became dramatically shorter and concise.

⁷¹⁵ This, according to Shavit is a characteristic of the Jewish middle-classes and workers who settled in Tel Aviv during the Mandate period. Shavit, "In Search of the Israeli Bourgeoisie". See also: Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv Volume I*: 283-307.

Aviv's meat trade with raising the standard of the profession in Palestine.⁷¹⁶ At the same time, more Jewish butchers also created more competition in a city where there was no need for an innumerable number of butchers. With no urban regulation on the matter, new butcher shops seemed to appear overnight and near one another, often on the same streets or even in the same building. In 1931 there were 77 butcher shops in Tel Aviv, and in 1933 there were 104.⁷¹⁷ By 1937 there were 149 butchers registered at the butchers' association and by 1939 there were 157.⁷¹⁸ As competition grew, butchers felt a greater uncertainty in their ability to make a living from the only trade they were skilled to do. While some might have tried, successfully or not, to switch trades, butchers, like other groups of workers who acquired essential skills often over generations, developed a collective identity based on their trade.

The butchers' newsletter reflected and reinforced the butchers' collective identity. It also indicates how they viewed themselves, their profession, and their role within their city and Palestine's Jewish society more broadly. Moreover, the newsletter implies what they had hoped for themselves. For example, the organizing committee of the butchers' association planned various social and educational activities as well as cooperative welfare instruments for the butchers. The committee organized a loan fund, an emergency fund, and a health insurance fund to allow butchers more occupational stability. As for cultural and social events, the committee organized a tour of the newly founded Tel Aviv harbor (1936). It also established a reading room at the association's office with newspapers available in Yiddish and Hebrew and planned lectures on various topics. The committee even encouraged its members to register for passports so that they could take trips and get acquainted with Palestine and neighboring countries.⁷¹⁹ It is unclear if these plans materialized, but the fact

⁷¹⁶ Dov Varona, "The Profession of Butchering and the Association's Problems", *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 7. In this issue the butcher also added a glossary for meat-cuts in Hebrew, Yiddish, English, and German: "Meat-Cuts Glossary", *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 109-111.

⁷¹⁷ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv, Volume I*: 268, 276-277.

⁷¹⁸ "Members", *Butchers' Newsletter* (January 1937): 69-74; "Members", *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 115-120.

that butchers were planning them implies they were accustomed to, or at least aspired to, a certain level of success that allowed for leisure, social activities, and cultural outings.

Butchers' aspirations to a life of prosperity and leisure were challenged. This was due to their weak position both vis à vis the importers as well as the municipality of Tel Aviv. Butchers faced the same realities of living and working in Tel Aviv as did other skilled workers: difficulties in securing a steady livelihood, the cost of living, working conditions, and welfare. Yet, for butchers, the establishment of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse allowed them to nurture high expectations for their future. In addition to a sense of physical security and national pride, the slaughterhouse was envisaged to bring them economic prosperity and occupational dignity. If they felt exposed and alien at the Jaffa slaughterhouse, at the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse they assumed they would rule. The slaughterhouse was supposed to root them in their trade, in their city, and in their new country. In reality, however, they felt more like temporary workers in a factory rather than its proprietors.

In the city's haste to erect the slaughterhouse since its inauguration various stakeholders complained about its insufficient scale and capacities. With the flow of Jewish immigrants, the slaughterhouse had to cater not only to growing meat demands but also to a growing workforce occupied at the slaughterhouse. Approximately 200 meat workers entered the slaughterhouse daily, the majority of which – roughly 150 men – were butchers.⁷²⁰ Years after its inauguration, butchers were still demanding basic working conditions. For one, public buses did not run in the early hours of the morning when butchers came to work, forcing them to walk to the slaughterhouse at the outskirts of town, regardless of weather conditions. Once at the slaughterhouse, there was no designated area for butchers to change their clothes, or to wash after work. This meant that even when they could catch a bus back into the city

⁷¹⁹ “Cultural Work”: 37.

⁷²⁰ Women do not seem to have been present at the slaughterhouse.

after a day's work at the slaughterhouse, they had to do so with their skin and clothes stained in blood. Butchers' testimonies reveal the shame they felt boarding a public bus in dirty and foul clothes, attracting flies and offensive comments by passengers and bus drivers alike.⁷²¹

The lack of basic working conditions at the slaughterhouse stands in sharp contrast with butchers' dreams of prosperity and leisure. In creating an association and a newsletter the butchers were looking for their voices to be heard by those who held more power in the meat trade. The fact that they complained to the municipality about their conditions for years, but their requests were never answered, exposes the gap between how they saw their role in the city and how the municipality saw them. Indeed, some in the meat trade took advantage of the "vacuum economy" (or "opportunity market") as did other Jewish entrepreneurs in Palestine as described in Chapter 2. Jacob Governik, the most notorious Jewish cattle importer which will be discussed below, did just that, building on his capital and connections to gradually take control over the Tel Aviv meat market. Yet for most butchers, the international and local circumstances of the mid-1930s added more difficulties. This is the immediate background to understanding the actions of butchers leading to the 1938 meat strikes.

The butchers' problems were exacerbated by international and local developments which disrupted the supply of live cattle to Tel Aviv. In the mid-1930s, the *Yishuv* depended on the import of cattle primarily from Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent from Poland and Hungary. Trade with the latter countries was significant not because of the quantities of cattle imported but because it kept prices competitive until the Veterinary Department banned the import of Polish Cattle due to a contagious disease infecting cattle

⁷²¹ The lack of washing facilities as a place to change out of blood-stained clothes was mentioned repeatedly by butchers in *The Butchers Newsletter*. See descriptions of these and additional grievances in: Baruch Gendelman, "Our Demands from the Tel Aviv Municipality" (January 1937); Baruch Gendelman, "The Butchers' Association and the City's Institutions" (March 1939); Varona, "The Profession of Butchering; Nehoshti, "Letters to Brother"; "Letter to Editor" (January-February 1941).

there.⁷²² This left Romania as Palestine's primary source of cattle, but Palestine was not Romania's favored market. Romania preferred exporting to Germany and Italy. This significantly raised prices of live cattle for Palestine, setting the stage for strife in Tel Aviv's meat market.⁷²³

Locally, the Palestinian Revolt (1936-1939) directly challenged the urban Yishuv's food supplies.⁷²⁴ Beginning in 1936, Palestinian strikes and boycotts prevented Palestinian agricultural produce from reaching Jewish markets. Commercial ties between countryside and city were also cut off due to incursions alongside Palestine's roads. In addition, Palestinians shut down ports, which challenged the Yishuv's access to imports.⁷²⁵ Subsequently, the price of vegetables and grains increased, which sparked a further jump in meat prices.⁷²⁶ Alongside increasing prices, Tel Aviv also experienced meat shortages when disruptions along rail lines connecting Haifa and Tel Aviv prevented imported cattle from reaching the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse.⁷²⁷ International shifts met local frictions, and the volatility in Tel Aviv's meat market exacerbated.

II. The First Meat Strike: Butchers versus Importers

Challenged by a volatile market, the butchers' association complained to the municipality that cattle importers were taking advantage of the situation and raising prices. While newspaper reports blamed butchers of over-charging, butchers claimed that what was truly

⁷²² El-Eini, *Mandated landscape*: 148-150.

⁷²³ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Problem": 119. On Romania's preference for trading with Germany, see: David E. Kaiser, *Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930-1939* (Princeton University Press, 2015): 24-26, 136.

⁷²⁴ The Palestinian Revolt, occurred between April 1936 and August 1939. The revolt was ignited by intercommunal violence, which continued throughout the period, but it also commenced with an economic strike between April and October 1936. Palestinian shut down business, cut supply chains, closed ports, and boycotted Jewish businesses in protest of British backing of Jewish colonization.

⁷²⁵ The closing of the Jaffa port is especially noteworthy here as it was the direct catalyst for the establishment of Tel Aviv's harbor in 1936.

⁷²⁶ "The Butchers Strike in Tel Aviv", *Ha'tzofe*, 25 April 1938.

⁷²⁷ "The Municipal Slaughterhouse 1936-1937", *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 104.

outrageous was that during difficult times, when the *Yishuv* was fighting for its existence during the Palestinian Revolt, importers were raising prices for their own financial gain. The butchers' narrative gradually gained ground and the press began to link the rising cost of meat to a small group of importers, who imported cattle from the Balkans, and used their capital and connections to form a monopoly. The cost of meat became a battleground for butchers versus importers. The Jewish press reported on key events, often swaying public opinion in favor of the butchers. Even though newspapers did not make direct references to the practices of Jewish cattle-dealers in Europe, the coverage of their actions was reminiscent of the resentment they provoked in Europe (as discussed in Chapter 3). Rising prices of cattle were described as an outrage, as criminal, with one reporter referring to the cattle trade as a secret business, its logics and practices hidden away from the public eye. This handful of importers became known by the press as “the meat trust”, or even “the cartel”.⁷²⁸ The “meat war” commenced⁷²⁹

Within the municipality and the butchers' association, “the meat trust” was also known as the “Gobernik trust”.⁷³⁰ This was because in 1937 Jacob Gobernik, along with his partners at the time, was responsible for 65 percent of cattle imported to Palestine. His monopoly did not appear overnight. Gobernik settled in Palestine in 1921, at the age of 50. Originally from Chita, Siberia, he settled in Palestine with several members of his family, including his younger brother and business partner, Efraim.⁷³¹ In Chita, the brothers imported cattle from

⁷²⁸ “Raising Prices of Living Necessities and the War against it”, *Davar* 28 October 1936; Why is the Price of Meat Rising? The Municipality Considers the Rise Unjustified”, *Davar* 2 November 1937; “The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv: Slaughter Halted in Protest against Raising Prices by Importers”, *Ha'tzofe* 25 April 1938; “Higher Cost of Meat in Tel Aviv”, *The Palestine Post*, 3 November 1937; “Reader's Letters”, *The Palestine Post*, 2 December 1938.

⁷²⁹ “The Meat War in Tel Aviv”, *Davar*, 13 December 1938.

⁷³⁰ For example, here: Levit to President of Township Tel Aviv, 5 December 1937 TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷³¹ Jacob seems to have been the more dominant of the Gobernik brothers, as his name is the one mentioned in the municipal archives. Gobernik also seems to have been active in real-estate, purchasing lands in Tel Aviv, and elsewhere in Palestine, dividing into plots and selling for profit. “Gobernik Brothers” are mentioned in various British Official Gazette Palestine such as the one published in 11 November 1937. As for real-estate, while Gobernik is not a known figure today, he is mentioned in passing in an online encyclopedia entry: Danny

Mongolia on a very large-scale, and for ten years were the suppliers of cattle for the Russian government and army in Siberia.⁷³² In Tel Aviv, Jacob and Efraim were registered as partners and “general merchants” in the “Gobernik Brothers” firm. While Mongolia was not a source of cattle for Palestine, the Gobernik brothers – shrewd enough to land a contract with the Russian government – relayed on their expertise, experience, and transnational networks in their new land. In Palestine, the brothers collaborated with other importers in ad hoc partnerships throughout the 1920s-1940s.

Tel Aviv’s administrators knew Gobernik well. Already in the 1920s he was a leader among the butchers and negotiated with the municipality over plans for the construction and ownership of a Tel Aviv slaughterhouse.⁷³³ In addition, only a handful of men in Tel Aviv had the capital, connections, and experience to deal in cattle internationally. When the municipality began to look into the meat trade, it seems as this former working relationship turned sour.

In 1937, compelled by consumer complaints, butchers’ pleas, and press reports, the municipality began to expand its oversight over the food sector by regulating prices.⁷³⁴ Part of Tel Aviv’s problem was that it relied on imports for a fair share of its foods, and importers could raise prices arbitrarily and unilaterally because they were not bound by any municipal regulations. Thus, in January 1937 the Tel Aviv municipality established its Economic Department under the supervision of Dr Nathan Ben-Nathan. With the help of various ad hoc committees, Ben-Nathan first managed to regulate the price of vegetables sold in the city. His department even succeeded to centralize the sale of imported chicken, including those

Recht, “Shafek Neighborhood”, *The Municipal Encyclopedia* <https://sites.google.com/a/tlv100.net/tlv100/tarbut/shpk> [last accessed 15 December 2020]. I would like to thank Uri Gobernik for confirming these details. Uri Gobernik, email correspondence, 7 May 2020.

⁷³² Jacob Gobernik to District Officer Tel Aviv, 22 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a. Mongolian cattle are native to Inner Mongolia and northern China.

⁷³³ It is unclear, but it seems as the eventual slaughterhouse the municipality built was not funded by Gobernik.

⁷³⁴ “What did the Municipality do in the Economic Field in Tel Aviv?”, *Yedioth Tel Aviv*, 15 June 1937: 8-10.

imported from Romania, formally under an importer's monopoly. With at least some advancements made on other fronts as well, no progress was achieved with the beef sector and its cattle importers. The municipality's newsletter reported the above-mentioned achievements, before adding that, unfortunately, the beef trade remained a "painful question" that required a separate and in-depth study.⁷³⁵ The beef battle was a war of its own.

Ben-Nathan began rigorously studying the meat trade. He quickly realized that the Jewish cattle importers were aggressively maintaining a monopoly using questionable practices. He also understood that import restrictions made by the colonial Veterinary Department, the only governing body with true authority over importers, left the Balkan cattle importers – "the trust" – even stronger. The reason it was difficult to break Gobernik's monopoly, was his capital, and more importantly, his capitalist methods. Gobernik and his associates sought to control and coordinate the entire supply chain from the Balkans to Palestine. Gobernik did not have direct access to Balkan farmers, but he managed to forge firm ties with cattle dealers there.⁷³⁶ Essentially, Gobernik and his partners created a transnational route of export-import between Jewish merchants in Palestine and Jewish merchants from the Balkans, some directly employed by Gobernik as his agents or partners.⁷³⁷ Gobernik's ties in Romania did not stop with exporters. It seems as he also had the ear of some government officials, directly or indirectly, who dealt with international trade relations. Apparently, he was able to use these connections when his business was threatened.⁷³⁸ Besides securing associates, Gobernik's tactics to rule the Balkan-Palestine trade reflect his capitalist enterprise.

⁷³⁵ Ibid; "Higher Cost of Meat in Tel Aviv", *The Palestine Post*, 3 November 1937.

⁷³⁶ Gobernik for example forged strong ties with a man named "Mr Gitter" which Chelouche described to Ben-Nathan as "the biggest cattle exporter in Romania". Gitter himself seems to have had ties to the Romanian government. See: Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach, 15 May 1938, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷³⁷ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question".

⁷³⁸ Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach, 6 December 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

Attempts to fight the importers on their own turf – importing – were futile, or worse, they backfired. Importers were able to raise – and drop – prices as they wished and according to their needs. This ability was utilized by the “trust” as a tactic to annihilate even the smallest competitors. Governik reportedly had firm agreements with various associates in Romania and the Balkans not to sell to any importer but him. For example, the butchers’ association pooled together funds to import a few hundred oxen from the Balkans under a cooperative named “The Gilboa”. Governik allowed it, only to slash prices for his cattle immediately upon the arrival of the animals. His capital allowed him to tolerate selling cattle for less and make up for any loss once he raised prices back up again. The cooperative faced financial ruin and did not attempt to import cattle again. Similarly, competing importers were either driven out of business or pressured into joining “the trust”. In 1933 there were four Jewish cattle importers in Palestine. By 1939 there were twelve. The additional eight were initially supported by the butchers’ association and encouraged to enter the importing business to allow the butchers some sway in price-setting, yet those men eventually joined the importers’ trust as well.⁷³⁹

The municipality received multiple letters that describe how Governik was personally responsible for tactics used against his competitors.⁷⁴⁰ One particularly vivid letter illustrates the level of cooperation Governik had in Romania. Allegedly under his direction, the Herschkowitz family, a family of Jewish cattle exporters in the Balkans, signed a contract with the Tel Aviv importers Perlow and Sankowski to transfer a few hundred cattle to them. With Sankowski in Romania to secure the transfer of cattle, after he had already sold the rights to the animals and payed all related expenses of import, the Herschkowitz’s transferred their cattle-loaded vessel to Governik instead. When Sankowski realized what had occurred,

⁷³⁹ Ben-Nathan to Mayor, 14 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a; Varona, “The Profession of Butchering”: 9-11; “The Strike and its Outcomes”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (March 1939): 41.

⁷⁴⁰ There are various examples in the municipality files. See for example: Yitzhak Zac to Mayor Rokach, 21 June 1938, TAMA 04-3089a.

and the financial loss he was about to endure, he was devastated. In an urgent letter to Ben-Nathan, Sankowski described what had happened. He referred to Gobernik as a cruel and evil man, “*yimakh shemo*” (“may his name be erased”), and asked Ben-Nathan how the municipality could allow “this despicable and thieving man, who robs the people, to be a dictator over the entire the land?”.⁷⁴¹ Upon reading the letter, Ben-Nathan contacted his own international acquaintances – the Gerstel brothers in Yugoslavia, who Ben-Nathan described as the previous main suppliers of cattle to Vienna – in order to try and assist Sankowski while still in the Balkans. This story is not only relevant to understand the dealings of the cattle trade, the omnipotence of Gobernik, or the awe he inspired in others, but also how the Tel Aviv meat market was linked to a network of Jewish families and acquaintances, across countries and continents. Letters such as these reveal how these ties prevailed between Europe and Palestine.⁷⁴²

⁷⁴¹ Sankowski to Ben-Nathan, 9 September 1938, TAMA 04-3089a; Ben-Nathan to Mayor, 15 September 1938, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁴² Sankowski to Ben-Nathan.

Ben-Nathan's inquiries into the meat trade uncovered not only methods but also important information. For example, while Palestine's importers sold one ox for 18.5 PP, the Central Romanian Bank's official figure for cattle for export was 11 PP an ox. The difference was not due to transport costs, because Egypt imported cattle from the Balkans at a rate of 7 or 8 PP per animal – less than half compared with Palestine. Ben-Nathan asked for the importers' cooperation in figuring out where costs could be cut. The municipality invited all the cattle importers, led by Gobernik, to an urgent meeting, where they were asked to share their books with Ben-Nathan. Only one partnership of two importers did so.⁷⁴³ Gobernik unwaveringly refused, claiming the books “contained the secret to our commercial success”.⁷⁴⁴ Without Gobernik's books, which accounted for the majority of cattle imported, Ben-Nathan was limited in the information he could gather. He did learn, however, that the difference between the price importers bought and sold cattle was paid to various people whose identity and occupation could not be verified.⁷⁴⁵

With little cooperation from the importers, Ben-Nathan offered the municipality various ways to challenge the “trust”. He compiled lists of experienced and trustworthy general importers, suggesting the municipality support them in penetrating the cattle trade. However, as Gobernik and his partners threatened they would “destroy any firm that the municipality creates or supports to bring meat into Tel Aviv”, no importers were interested in entering a price-war with the “trust”.⁷⁴⁶ In case of a price war, however, Ben-Nathan suggested that the municipality could block Gobernik from slaughtering his cattle at the city's slaughterhouse, but the municipality was not willing to do that. Ben-Nathan also encouraged importers to

⁷⁴³ Nadivi to Gobernik and additional importers, 3 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a; Nadivi to Gobernik 5 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a; Kushnir & Jakobus Cattle-Import to Municipality 7 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a; Kushnir & Jakobus 8 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁴⁴ Gobernik to Municipality 7 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁴⁵ Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach, 11 Nov 1937, TAMA 04-3089a; Rokach to Kushnir, 19 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁴⁶ Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach, 14 Nov 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

import from countries with cheaper cattle who were not linked to Gobernik. Yet when two importers managed to bring in over 300 cattle from Sudan, Gobernik managed to convince them to set their prices much higher than their market value so that they would not drive the prices down for European cattle as well.⁷⁴⁷ Ben-Nathan also encouraged the mayor to seek the Veterinary Department's approval to import from additional countries, yet the Veterinary Department refused all new offers. For example, importing live cattle from South Africa was considered too far, Kenya's livestock was infected by malaria, and importing from Yemen (a suggestion made by the Jewish-Yemenite businessmen the Habshush brothers) was prohibited entirely because the country allegedly lacked a veterinary department.⁷⁴⁸

With Ben-Nathans' efforts, the municipality made *some* progress in regulating the meat market. It managed to pass a by-law that allowed it to set limits on food prices. It also reached an agreement with the butchers' association that any rise in the price of meat would be first authorized by the municipality regardless of the price of cattle. As butchers were dependent on the municipality and the municipal religious authorities for their licenses, their cooperation is understandable. Whereas butchers needed to appease both the municipal authorities as well as their customers, importers had little incentive to cooperate with municipal institutions and had no direct contact with consumers. For the municipality, the struggle over the cost of meat was at its core a struggle over its authority to regulate businesses within its jurisdiction, the cost-of-living, and the city's economy. The importers' monopoly was humiliating for the municipality. It exposed their weakness and put a dent in the self-image of an autonomous Jewish council of an autonomous Jewish capital.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁷ Dr Levit to President of Township Tel Aviv, 5 December 1937 TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁴⁸ Various correspondences between November and December 1937 in TAMA 04-3089a. Especially: Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach, 14 November; Ben-Nathan to Mayor Rokach 25 November; Mayor to District Commissioner Southern District 7 November, 22 November and 5 December; Dr Levit to Mayor, 5 December; Ben Nathan to Mayor, 14 December; Ben Nathan to Mayor, 22 December; Ben Nathan to Mayor, 25 December

⁷⁴⁹ "Meat Prices", *The Palestine Post*, 29 April 1938.

Municipal frustration exacerbated especially as the importers were supported by the Veterinary Department. At the same time that the municipality looked to limit the importers' power, the Veterinary Department swiftly passed a law that designated import licenses based on seniority (years of experience) in the trade and the capital to import a minimum of 500 live animals a week. The municipality, the butchers, and the press were all suspicious of how these specific criteria seemed to fit very few men including only the Gobernik brothers and their associates. Further supporting conspiracy theories was the fact that all the candidates suggested by the municipality were rejected. After years of butchers' complaints, the municipality finally felt, firsthand, the arbitrariness of the meat-trade. Following this development, Ben-Nathan who was already on the butchers' side, was joined by the highest authority at the municipality at the time: Mayor Rokach. Rokach became adamant that the importers' monopoly had to be broken. "We are dealing here", the mayor declared in front of his fellow councilmen, "with a complete dictatorship of the [meat] trust". Rokach wanted the municipality to gain control over who could import into Tel Aviv and where they could import from. "When we turn to the government for help", Rokach complained, "we are told that 21 cattle exporting countries are open to us. But when it comes to it, somehow all countries are tainted by infectious diseases. All but one: Romania. And only imported by the trust". "Something is not right here gentleman", Rokach exclaimed, and demanded that the government launch an independent inquiry into the "peculiar affair".⁷⁵⁰ Newspapers printed Rokach's words and published articles claiming that the importers were scattering the public's money between the Balkans and Palestine, paying off individuals not to collaborate with other importers, as well as supervisors in ports and quarantines both in the Balkans and in Haifa. Newspapers also alleged that the importers had "friends" in the government's

⁷⁵⁰ Tel Aviv Municipality calls to Abstain from Buying Meat!", *Ha'tzofe*, 26 April 1938; Manoach Bialik, "This week in the Land's Economy" *Ha'tzofe*, 3 May 1938; "The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv: Slaughter Halted in Protest against Raising Prices by Importers", *Ha'tzofe* 25 April 1938: "The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv", *Ha'aretz*, 25 April 1938.

Veterinary Department, who helped sway veterinary decisions their way. Reporters called the public to unite behind the butchers and the municipality against “the conspirators’ plot”.⁷⁵¹



⁷⁵¹ “Tel Aviv Municipality calls to Abstain from Buying Meat!”; Bialik, “This week in the Land’s Economy”.

The public answered the call. By 1938, a couple of years into the Palestinian Revolt, with a great war looming, a precarious economic situation, shortages, inflation, unemployment, and rising prices, consumers were ready to protest against some of the injustices they endured.⁷⁵² With the municipality, the Jewish press, and the public behind them, butchers prepared for a strike. Fighting against “the importers’ trust” became the city’s war over the cost of living and profiteering in the meat trade. By proxy, it was also an urban-national war over the right to set its own regulations with regards to import, a substantial section of the city’s economy.⁷⁵³

The idea that only by fighting the “trust” consumers could enjoy more affordable meat prices was false. There was another alternative: frozen meat. In 1937 Norman (Naum) Smorgon, traveled from Australia to Palestine to negotiate the export of kosher frozen meat to the country.⁷⁵⁴ Smorgon, a Jewish-Ukrainian butcher, from a family of butchers and cattle dealers, immigrated to Australia and opened a butcher shop in Melbourne. His family business quickly bloomed into an exporting enterprise of various canned meats and other goods. Smorgon offered to export frozen meat from Australia to Palestine as “a solution for the high cost of meat”.⁷⁵⁵ Smorgon’s frozen meat was certified kosher by a Melbourne rabbi. Smorgon partnered with the Palestine Cold Storage & Supply Co. Ltd., who held cold storage facilities in Tel Aviv and in Haifa, as his distributor in Palestine. The meat was available to the Tel Aviv public at a butcher shop on Shenkin Street, a prime location.⁷⁵⁶ During August

⁷⁵² Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 77.

⁷⁵³ “What Caused the Meat Strike in Tel Aviv”; “The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv”.

⁷⁵⁴ Smorgon’s business eventually grew into an exporting and industrial empire, and the immigrant turned mogul became the patriarch of one of Australia’s richest families. For more see: Rod Myer, “Smorgon, Norman (1884–1956)”, *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, <http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/smorgon-norman-11729/text20969> [last accessed online 14 October 2020].

⁷⁵⁵ Ad or pamphlet regarding the Norman Smorgon frozen meat export, in Hebrew, no date, probably from 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid; The Palestine Cold Storage & Supply Co. Ltd. to the Chief Rabbinate, 26 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

1937 the Norman Smorgon company delivered between 2 to 5 tons of frozen meat to its partners in Palestine.⁷⁵⁷ They managed to sell some, but not all, of that meat mainly to restaurants and Jewish communities who previously purchased non-kosher meat. The attractive price of frozen kosher meat, some 30 percent cheaper than locally slaughtered, made the kosher option attainable for Jews who were more price-sensitive than pious. This shows that for many, non-kosher meat was a more appealing option than no meat at all.⁷⁵⁸

Approximately 12 other companies were looking to get in on the frozen meat trade in Palestine. Some presented various African countries as an alternative to Australia, as they were closer to Palestine, pending kosher slaughter could be organized there. The colonial government of Palestine approved of frozen meat imports. For the Veterinary Department, the importation of frozen meat was preferable to live cattle because it eliminated the exposure of local animals to infectious diseases introduced from other countries. The fact that Palestine could serve as a market for colonial produce, e.g., from Australia and South Africa, was probably an additional appealing aspect of this trade.⁷⁵⁹ In addition, the British public was accustomed to imported frozen meat, as was the country's Jewish community, which imported frozen kosher meat with the full support of Britain's Chief Rabbi. But before companies had the opportunity to saturate the Palestinian market with frozen flesh, the Tel Aviv Rabbinate intervened. Initially, the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine considered Smorgon's offer. The businessman offered to compensate the religious authority for its potential losses by paying slaughter tax in Palestine, even though slaughter was executed in Australia, as well as cover all the expenses involved in sending a rabbi from Palestine to Australia to supervise slaughter. This offer became a standard proposition made by various representatives of cold

⁷⁵⁷ Gosarsky (when filling in for Levit as Chief Veterinary) to Rokach, 4 August 1937, TAMA 04-3089a; Gosarsky to Rokach, 24 August 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁵⁸ Gosarsky to Rokach, 24 August 1937.

⁷⁵⁹ This is related to the idea of Palestine as market for British produce see: Norris, *Land of Progress*, 28; Igra, "Kosher Life".

storage companies.⁷⁶⁰ These offers imply how much cheaper it was to produce kosher meat elsewhere even when adding the cost of shipping and compensation of religious authorities. In addition, these offers also show how entrepreneurs saw the potential in a Jewish-Palestinian market for affordable kosher meat. While the Chief Rabbinate seriously considered Smorgon's offer, the Tel Aviv Rabbinate intervened, and pressured the Chief Rabbinate to declare all imported frozen meat "extraterritorial meat" (in Hebrew: "*basar chutz*") and thusly unequivocally non-kosher.⁷⁶¹

Various agents of frozen meat tried to fight the Rabbinate on this matter. Some attempted to gain the municipality's support and even challenge the Rabbinate officially in court.⁷⁶² Nevertheless, kosher slaughter was a multifaceted site that tied together religion and labor, and that bond was not easily broken. The religious prohibition on "extraterritorial meat" was rooted in the idea that it is difficult to verify the wholesomeness of meat slaughtered elsewhere by unknown people. How meat was treated, the piousness of the *shochet*, and the local practices of a faraway community could all affect the purity of meat. Thus, historically, each Jewish community depended on a small group of trained men who provided religious services, and those men depended on the community for their livelihood. Bringing in "extraterritorial meat" into a community threatened the intimate relationship of that community with its religious authorities. This also explains why even in Palestine different Jewish communities continued to slaughter separately, and vehemently defended their own slaughter practices, as discussed in Chapter 2. Separate Jewish slaughters were tolerated in Palestine, including in cities such as Jerusalem and Haifa, but in Tel Aviv, a new city with a

⁷⁶⁰ For example, see offers made by: Jacob Wohlman to Mayor 5 November 1937 TAMA 04-3089a; The Palestine Cold Storage & Supply Co. Ltd. to the Chief Rabbinate, 26 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a; Gaalia Cornfeld to Mayor, 9 January 1938, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁶¹ The Chief Rabbinate of Tel Aviv and Jaffa to Mayor, 22 November 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁶² Gaalya Cornfeld, for example, mentioned in a footnote above was furious by the Rabbinate's actions. See: Cornfeld to Tel Aviv Rabbinate, 13 May 1938 TAMA 04-3089a; Cornfeld to Mayor, 15 June 1938, TAMA 04-3089a. It is interesting to note that Lilian Cornfeld, the nutritionist discussed in Chapter 1 as more lenient in her approach to meat consumption than other experts, was Gaalya's wife.

new and increasingly dominant religious authority – the Chief Rabbinate of Tel Aviv – slaughter gradually became a stronghold. The importation of frozen kosher meat threatened that.⁷⁶³

Frozen kosher meat also threatened the livelihood of local meat workers in Tel Aviv. Approximately 300 men were directly involved in producing meat in Tel Aviv, a third of which provided religious services relating to kashrut.⁷⁶⁴ Experts assumed the import of frozen meat would not obliterate the need for local slaughter entirely, but it was expected to hurt it.⁷⁶⁵ Thus, both the religious authorities *as well as* secular-socialist leaders of the labor movement within the *Histadrut* opposed the import of frozen meat. From a religious perspective alone, a flow of frozen kosher meat would have also had its advantages, by allowing more Jews to consume kosher instead of non-kosher meat. Imported kosher meat would have also challenged cattle dealers to lower prices for cattle destined for local kosher slaughter.⁷⁶⁶ But the question of frozen meat entangled religious and labor considerations. Embodied in the frozen meat question was a conundrum of social justice. Was it better to sustain traditional industries that supply jobs for lower and middle-class workers, or was it better to introduce cheaper imported meat that lower classes and working classes could afford?⁷⁶⁷ As presented by one expert looking into the question of frozen meat, what was more important: “the elementary needs of tens of thousands or the employment of hundreds”.⁷⁶⁸ For Tel Aviv,

⁷⁶³ Greenfeld, “To the Meat Question”. For an account on how the Chief Rabbinate still links slaughter and power today, see: Hagar Salamon, “Holy Meat, Black Slaughter: Power, Religion, Kosher Meat and the Ethiopian Community”, in: Regina F. Bendix and Michaela Fenske (eds.) *Politische Mahlzeiten = Political meals* (Berlin: LIT, 2014): 273-285.

⁷⁶⁴ Greenfeld, “To the Meat Question”; Ben-Nathan to Rokach, 8 August 1937, TAMA 04-3089a.

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁶ As claimed in: “Frozen Meat”, *The Palestine Post*, 6 January 1938.

⁷⁶⁷ It should be pointed out that “religion” and “religious authorities” are not the same thing. For example, David Zvi Pinkas was a politician and supporter of safeguarding Jewish traditions within the structures of the state, who often sided with the Rabbinate on various issues. In this question, however, he supported importing meat even if it hurt the Rabbinate because he was adamant about supplying the Jewish public with kosher meat and fighting the consumption of non-kosher meat. In his personal papers he even claims to be the one who suggested the import of kosher beef from Argentina. Pinkas, personal papers, ISA.

⁷⁶⁸ Greenfeld, “To the Meat Question in Tel Aviv”.

protecting jobs and securing local slaughter taxes was more important.

As Ben Nathan found no way to pressure importers, and butchers grew more frustrated by raising prices, in April 1938 the Hebrew Butchers Association in Tel Aviv and Jaffa declared a strike. They described the strike as part of a “war against the profiteering in the beef trade in Tel Aviv”.⁷⁶⁹ The strike took effect at the end of the Jewish holiday of Passover and continued between 24 April and 5 May.⁷⁷⁰

Most members of the association, 142 butchers, adhered to the strike. They did not show up at the slaughterhouse that morning and did not sell any meat that day. Eight of their fellow butchers, however, despite being members of the association, came into agreement with the importers’ “trust”. Through this partnership, importers secured an avenue to sell meat to the public even if the butchers’ association went on strike. According to the butchers’ association, this was further evidence of the corruption and “anarchy” of the meat trade, which the municipality allowed to prosper.⁷⁷¹ The eight butchers came to the slaughterhouse early that morning knowingly breaking the strike. They were met by a band of butchers committed to enforcing it. A fight broke out. Importers sent police officers to the slaughterhouse, and slaughter commenced under police supervision.

The first day of the strike was a partial one. 27 oxen and 27 female calves were slaughtered that day. Their meat was sent to restaurants and sausage factories who refused to accept it out of support for the cause. Meat was also transferred to the butcher shops operated by the eight butchers who collaborated with the importers. It was displayed for sale, but bands of butchers lurked around the stores deterring customers from going in. In their interactions with the public butchers also spread a rumor that importers were planning an additional increase, from

⁷⁶⁹ “Association Council”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (March 1939): 66.

⁷⁷⁰ “The Association’s Actions”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (March 1939): 74-75.

⁷⁷¹ Dov Varona, “The Meat Supply and our Relations with the Cattle Dealers”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (January 1937): 7-9; Nehoshti, “Letters to Brother”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (March 1939): 23; D. A. “The Strike and its Outcomes”: 41.

30 mils to 35 per *okia* in order to gain additional support for the strike.⁷⁷² The next day, to avoid being forced to work, supervisors, slaughterers, drives and other slaughterhouse workers simply did not show up.⁷⁷³ The butchers' association supplied meat only to hospitals.⁷⁷⁴

Newspapers encouraged the public to abstain from meat until the city's demands were met. Even though the ultimate goal of the strike was to stabilize the price of beef, therefore allowing consumers to enjoy more of it, when encouraging temporary abstinence, reporters adopted the same dominant discourse on meat which entangled climate, nutrition, and political economy as discussed in Chapter 1. "The public should easily be able to sustain itself on vegetables and dairy products for a week or two", claimed one journalist. "According to many doctors", he continued, "meat was nothing but a passion food", by which the writer meant to say that eating meat was not a physical necessity but a desire which was especially superfluous "in a hot country like ours". In addition, the writer insisted, the public's money was better spent on the produce of Jewish farms anyway.⁷⁷⁵ Similarly, another article added that "the only consequence" of the strike "would be that fewer vegetables would rot in storage, and less milk poured down the drains". "Accepting vegetarianism" periodically was a moral stance, strengthening the butchers' strike with a consumers' strike.⁷⁷⁶ To stop the profiteering in meat, and thus allow more access to it eventually, consumers were willing to listen, temporarily, to the advice of experts.

⁷⁷² Meat was sold per *Okia* or *Rotel*. One *Okia* equaled 200 grams approximately, and one *Rotel* 2.5 kilograms approximately. For context, liquid cow's milk was considered an expensive product in Palestine. The retail price for one liter of milk in 1935 was 13.5 mils.

⁷⁷³ "The Meat Strike becomes General as of Today", *Ha'tzofe*, 26 April 1938; "The Police were brought-in", *Ha'aretz* 26 April 1938; "Tel Aviv Municipality calls to Abstain from Buying Meat!".

⁷⁷⁴ "The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv".

⁷⁷⁵ Bialik, "This week in the Land's Economy",

⁷⁷⁶ "The Consumers shall come to Assist", *Ha'aretz*, 25 April 1938.

As slaughter was a multifaceted question, not everyone in the municipality agreed with the strike. Mayor Rokach and the meat committee blamed the Tel Aviv Rabbinat for failing to clearly order their *shochtim* to stop slaughter. Allegedly, the rabbinat was worried that a strike of kosher butchers would drive Jewish consumers to buy and consume non-kosher meat available at certain butcher shops and Spinney's stores in the city. The Rabbinat was forced to comply once the butchers assured that non-kosher butchers would join the strike, and after the butchers threatened to publicly expose the Rabbinat for undermining their efforts to stabilize meat prices. David-Zvi Pinkas,⁷⁷⁷ a staunch supporter of ingraining traditional Jewish values into policy, blamed Rokach and other councilmen for using the situation as an opportunity to attack the Rabbinat. The religious institution, he claimed, was above labor issues.⁷⁷⁸ In fact, it was not. The labor and taxes of the meat trade were the rabbinat's bread and butter. Economic considerations, as well as a fear of spontaneous slaughter not regulated by the institution, meant that the rabbinat pressured anyone under their influence to end the strike quickly.⁷⁷⁹

The importers also opposed the strike of course. They denounced the butchers' and the municipality's claims. The united front against them drove them to publish a leaflet detailing their expenses as an explanation for rising prices. They attempted to show that they themselves were paying more for the animals, and price-rises were out of their control. To decrease prices, importers claimed, the real issue was not the cost of the animals abroad or even the cost of their transport to Palestine. What made beef so dear, was moving the live animals from Haifa to Tel Aviv. They estimated PP 4 per ox were spent on transport between the cities alone, much more than it costs to transport humans between the two. This was due

⁷⁷⁷ Pinkas' political career during the mandate period (and more so later as an Israeli Minister) demonstrates his inclination towards safeguarding Jewish traditions. He was active in safeguarding kosher laws (and observance of the Sabbath) into state legislation. David Tzvi Pinkas, Personal Papers 3073/15-ב

⁷⁷⁸ "Tel Aviv Municipality calls to Abstain from Buying Meat!"; "The Butchers strike in Tel Aviv".

⁷⁷⁹ "The Butchers' Strike in Tel Aviv", *Davar*, 9 May 1938.

system, allowing anyone to import livestock into Palestine under the general import regulations. This allowed competition with the importers' trust, at least in theory, and was considered by the municipality and the butchers a necessary step in breaking the importers-Veterinary Department alleged alliance. As butchers proved they could effectively organize, mobilize public support, and bring the meat industry to a standstill, importers agreed – temporarily – to a fixed price on cattle and the closing of almost all butcher shops operating on the importers' behalf. Yet while importers and butchers squabbled over the fine details of their agreements, the spread of infectious diseases in Europe meant that the Veterinary Department was creating new regulations on import which would invalidate any progress in appeasing Tel Aviv's volatile meat market.⁷⁸¹

The struggle now turned outwards. A sustainable solution for the high cost of meat in Tel Aviv depended on a structural change, one in which the municipality would not have to struggle with importers or mediate between them and butchers. With the frozen kosher meat out of the question, the only solution the actors could unite behind was gaining a license to import cattle directly to the city. For the rest of 1938-1939, attention shifted from the importers to the government. Like the events that occurred almost a decade earlier, when the city fought for the right to slaughter, the city now rallied against one opponent in particular: The Veterinary Department.

III. The Second Meat Strike: Tel Aviv versus the Government

The first meat strike united various actors in Tel Aviv around a vague idea that the meat trade was corrupt. The municipality did not know what kind of agreement the importers had with the Veterinary Department – and if indeed they did – but it was clear to them that the importers were profiteering, and the Veterinary Department enabled them to create a

⁷⁸¹ Varona, "The Profession of Butchering"; D.A. "The Strike and its Outcomes".

monopoly on import. Even the diminishing list of authorized import countries, which the Veterinary Department accredited to the spread of contagious diseases in Europe, was considered proof of the department's meddling in Tel Aviv's meat market. Additional inquiry into the costs involved in supplying meat for Tel Aviv united everyone in the city – including the importers – around the idea that by allowing the landing of cattle at the Tel Aviv port prices would decrease for everyone involved, from the importer to the consumer. This issue, more than any other regulatory measure on prices, appealed to the municipality as expanding the port's capacities was understood as a key component in Tel Aviv's development, autonomy (from the Jaffa and Haifa ports), and its role as Palestine's Jewish capital.

Strikes were never the municipality's first choice, and indeed, the ability of strikes to lower meat prices was questionable.⁷⁸² Between 1933 and 1937 the wholesale price for an imported 600-kilogram live ox from the Balkans rose from 15.5 PP to 18.5 PP, and retail price for meat reached 30-35 PP per *okia*. Still, Palestine generally maintained its levels of meat consumption until the spread of foot-and-mouth disease across Europe between 1937-1939 gradually disqualified all European countries, including Romania, from exporting to Palestine. By late 1938 newspapers reported that Tel Aviv was on the verge of a “meat-famine”.⁷⁸³ According to the butchers' association, the Veterinary Department's obsession with ridding the country of infectious animal diseases was distracting it from its primary responsibility: to take care of humans' needs, above all, food.⁷⁸⁴ The Department, on its part, insisted that the *Yishuv* could satisfy its meat needs from regional suppliers such as the British Mandate of Iraq. This was not true. In the late 1930s, Syria, and Iraq had limited cattle supplies to satisfy Palestine's demands or even their own. While Palestine guzzled up the

⁷⁸² Emily E. LaBarbera-Twarog, *Politics of the Pantry: Housewives, Food, and Consumer Protest in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: University of Oxford Press, 2017).

⁷⁸³ It is important to note that while this “famine” was basically a meat shortage, at the time some fellahin were actually starving. See: Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 77.

⁷⁸⁴ Perlow, “In Our Industry”, *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 29.

majority of Syrian cattle exports, Iraq preferred to sell to other countries in the region. Iraq sold only its surplus to Palestine, but even the country's entire annual cattle yields would not have provided more than a fraction of what Palestine required. The Tel Aviv municipality demanded a solution.⁷⁸⁵

The government came up with a surprising compromise. Palestine's High Commissioner allowed – *ex gratia* – the import of cattle from any country infected by foot-and-mouth disease, as long as cattle do not leave Haifa alive. This meant all cattle arriving at the Haifa port had to be slaughtered at the Haifa slaughterhouse within seven days of arrival, and their meat transferred to Tel Aviv and other settlements.⁷⁸⁶ This was not a solution the Tel Aviv municipality was appeased by. Besides Tel Aviv's desire to position its port on par with Haifa's, the municipality argued that Tel Aviv was the largest market for beef in the country, as well as the place of residence of most Jewish importers and merchants, thus, allowing the landing of cattle in Tel Aviv was practical, logical, and a key factor in reducing the cost of meat. Centralizing slaughter, as well as import, in Haifa, would cause further losses for everyone involved. The city claimed that the financial burden of the journey from Haifa to Tel Aviv fell directly on Jewish workers and Jewish consumers. As such, the Haifa decree was a form of discrimination. Centralizing slaughter at Haifa also meant that the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse would stand empty, causing losses for the municipality and the religious authorities.⁷⁸⁷

The municipality was already lobbying the government to allow the landing of cattle at the city's port when the government issued its Haifa decree. Since the inauguration of the Tel Aviv harbor in 1936, the municipality urged the government to expand its capacities,

⁷⁸⁵ Ben-Nathan mentions that only 20-25 percent of Palestine's beef needs could have been supplied by Iraq at the time. Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question".

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Ben-Nathan, Jan 1939; "The Association's Actions": 78.

including a license to land passengers and livestock there.⁷⁸⁸ In May 1938, the first Jewish immigrant disembarked at the Tel Aviv port, but livestock still could not. For those who were adamant about Tel Aviv's urban development, the Haifa decree was part of a long line of abuses Tel Aviv suffered from the government, often concerning the meat trade. The meat trade was not only corrupt, one commentator mentioned, but it was also cursed.⁷⁸⁹ For the butchers, relocating slaughter to Haifa was a painful reminder of their struggle almost a decade earlier, when they refused to slaughter in Jaffa following the 1929 occurrences, instead traveled daily to Haifa until the government approved Tel Aviv's own slaughterhouse. Other commenters added that the Tel Aviv port had to fight over each step of its development. What was it, one reporter rhetorically asked, that forced the government to impede the advancement of Tel Aviv and why did it refuse "every logical request" made by the city? Why would the government insist that butchers risk their lives on their way to Haifa during the intercommunal violence of 1936-1939, or "let a city of 150 thousand inhabitants starve for meat", instead of simply allowing animals to disembark in Tel Aviv?⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁸ Shavit and Bigger, *The History of Tel Aviv* Vol I: 136-138.

⁷⁸⁹ "The Matter of Meat Supply", *Davar*, 9 January 1939. Reprinted in *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 49.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid*; "The Association's Actions": 78.



Figure 18. Caricature by Arieh Navon depicting a discussion between two cows: “Humans have the right to be slaughtered everywhere – and us – only in Haifa”. Reprinted in the *Butchers’ Newsletter* March 1939, page 48.

The government’s official answer to these questions had to do with animal-rights, or more precisely, the prevention of cruelty to animals.⁷⁹¹ One of the first laws enacted by the British government in Palestine was the 1919 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance. Animal Welfare and offenses that fell under the ordinance were part of the responsibilities of the Veterinary Department.⁷⁹² The Haifa decree, like the proceedings surrounding the establishment of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, marked the department again as the enemy of Tel Aviv’s development.⁷⁹³ It is unclear what exactly the British considered cruel in the

⁷⁹¹ “Tel Aviv Municipality calls to Abstain from Buying Meat!”; Bialik, “This week in the Land’s Economy”

⁷⁹² El-Eini, *Mandated landscapes*: 146.

disembarking of animals in Tel Aviv specifically, more so than other ports. Most probably, the issue was about how to transfer the animals from boat to land.⁷⁹⁴ Conditions at Tel Aviv harbor meant that ships did not have direct access to it. Passengers and goods were unloaded at sea into smaller launch boats or lighters which were then towed into the port. Unloading cattle in such a way would have surely encountered technical difficulties. Yet what was essentially a technical issue transformed into a question of principle surrounding the protection of animals in transit.

A source found at the League of Nations Archives sheds light on how such technical issues translated into unnecessary suffering for animals in the eyes of their protectors.⁷⁹⁵ The transit of livestock drew the attention of European animal-protection societies – from London to Vienna to Madrid– who turned to the League of Nations to ensure “good sanitary conditions and effective protection against cruelty” for animals during transport.⁷⁹⁶ The London based International Bureau for the Protection of Animals sent a letter to the league’s Director of Economic Relations, containing an eye-witness account accompanied by original photographs from an unnamed port in Palestine. It contained “evidence of the existing deplorable conditions revealing the terrible suffering inflicted on animals in transport”.⁷⁹⁷ The letter described how sheep and goats were loaded on board in Turkey, tightly packed to

⁷⁹³ In addition to Veterinary Department, Igra argues that the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, a British philanthropic organization, was exceptionally active and influential in Palestine, even influencing legislation. This was related, according to Igra, to the ways in which Britain perceived its role throughout the empire: teaching compassion towards animals was essential for civilizing humans. Igra, “Mandate of Compassion”.

⁷⁹⁴ I conclude this based on one source in particular: “The Daily Press on the Second Butchers’ Strike”: 47.

⁷⁹⁵ In the 1930s the LON began inquiries into the global meat trade. Within the context of international economic relations, the LON instigated talks between various meat-exporting and meat-importing countries in an attempt to regulate the growing global trade for which standards varied widely from one country to another. In Geneva, delegates discussed issues which fused economic questions with veterinary ones. For the import and export of meat, the LON led conversations on sanitation, inspection, and preservation (freezing in particular). For live animals, discussions focused on issues of transit. League of Nations Archives (LONA), 10A-673-673.

⁷⁹⁶ Miss Lind-Af-Hageby President of the International Bureau for the Protection of Animals to Eric Drummond Secretary General of the League of Nations, 17 December 1932, LONA, 10A-673-673.

⁷⁹⁷ Mrs. M.E. Mordan, Secretary of the International Bureau for the Protection of Animals to P. Stoppani Director of the Economic Relations Section of the League of Nations, 11 March 1935, LONA, 10A-673-673.

maximize space. In order to unload animals, with no direct access between boat and land, animals were yanked by one leg, using a noose formed from a rope attached to a sling, and hoisted in the air to reach land. Reportedly, animals shrieked as legs and backs broke.⁷⁹⁸ Based on the available sources, it seems as these descriptions are emblematic of the type of cruelty that the British government wanted to prevent in allowing the landing of cattle at Tel Aviv.⁷⁹⁹

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ It is unclear where exactly these images were taken, and if indeed this port was in Palestine. The letter mentions both Syria and Palestine.



Figure 19. Photographs enclosed in a letter from the Secretary of the International Bureau for the Protection of Animals to the Director of the Economic Relations Section of the League of Nations, 11 March 1935. Presented here are 2 out of 4 original and well-preserved photographs depicting the unloading of livestock. Source: LONA, 10A-673-673.




Figure 20. Image from a children's book published by Der Sturmer, a distributor of antisemitic publications in the Nazi period. The caption below reads: "Again the animal falls to the ground. It dies slowly. But the Jews stand around and laugh at it. Source: Chen Malul, "Hate and Fear

⁸⁰⁰ Other countries banned the practice under Nazi occupation or indirect influence, like Italy, in the years leading up to and during World War II. For more: John Efron, "The Most Cruel Cut of All? The Campaign Against Jewish Ritual Slaughter in Fin-de-Siecle Switzerland and Germany," *The Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 52 (2007): 167–84; Shai Lavi, "Unequal Rites: Jews, Muslims and the History of Ritual Slaughter in Germany", *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch Für Deutsche Geschichte* 164 (2009): 164–84; Robin Judd, *Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843-1933* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

⁸⁰¹ Francesco Buscemi, "Edible Lies: How Nazi Propaganda Represented Meat to Demonise the Jews", *Media, War & Conflict* 9, no. 2 (2016): 180–97.

Jews in the *Yishuv* in the 1930s were well-aware of the discourse that linked *schita* with cruelty. These accusations were made popular by the press, propaganda, as well as memorandums and books published against Jewish slaughter.⁸⁰² These were answered by publications in defense of Jewish slaughter, with both sides claiming their method of slaughter is the humane one.⁸⁰³ In Palestine, the Jewish press systematically reported on developments in anti-*schita* legislation, focused on the increasing difficulties to access kosher food, as well as the deprivation of Jewish livelihoods in Europe.⁸⁰⁴ When the British government dismissed the landing of cattle in Tel Aviv as cruelty towards animals, this intertwined with the events unfolding in Europe in the name of animal-rights.

Jews in Palestine were also well-aware of the fate of Jews in Europe and protested against the Palestinian government for restricting immigration for Jews seeking refuge.⁸⁰⁵ The Haifa decree infuriated the *Yishuv*. Against the backdrop of the intercommunal violence of 1936-1939, Jews protested the idea that traveling back and forth from Tel Aviv to Haifa, in life-threatening conditions, was a better solution than animals suffering at their entry to Tel Aviv

⁸⁰² For example, Lind-Af-Hageby (President of the International Bureau for the Protection of Animals) mentioned above was also responsible for publications against *schita*. She presented “the Jewish way” versus the “humane way”. See: Lind-Af-Hageby also produced a short book advocating for legislation banning Jewish slaughter: *Memorandum on the Jewish Method of Slaughtering Animals for Food: its Relation to the Bill to Enforce the Humane Slaughter of Animals for Food* (London: Animal Defence and Anti-Vivisection Society, 1923)

⁸⁰³ Isaak Aleksandrovich Dembo, *The Jewish Method of Slaughter Compared with Other Methods from the Humanitarian, Hygienic, and Economic Points of View* (London: Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1894); *Opinions of Foreign Experts on the Jewish Method of Slaughtering Animals* (Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1926).

⁸⁰⁴ For example: the press reported that in Poland 20,000 Jews were deprived of their livelihood. In Warsaw alone, 500 kosher butcher shops were forced to close. Reported in: “The *Schita* Law in Poland”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (January 1937: 55). Reprinted from *Davar*, 5 January 1937. See more in: Igra, “Mandate of Compassion”: 13-15.

⁸⁰⁵ See for example two articles published side by side: Israel Rokach, “Today’s Questions in Tel Aviv” and “The Cry of the German *Olim* at the Town Council in Tel Aviv” in: *Yedioth Iriath Tel Aviv* (January 1939):101-102.

port. Yet against the persecution of Jews in Europe, under the pretext of prevention of cruelty to animals among other reasons, Jewish accusations against the government took a fierce turn. One newspaper claimed that the Palestine government illustrated how – everywhere – mercy was dealt to every living being but the Jew.⁸⁰⁶ The reporter wrote:

How unfortunate and puzzling to hear this rationale while thousands of Jews are tortured to death in Nazi hell, wandering without a cover for their skin, without shelter, without a slice of bread, in the fields of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium... while none of these enlightened governments respond. And while our government has sheltered the poor Romanian cattle suffering in the open port of Tel Aviv, the soaring voices and desperate cries for help of millions of Jews persecuted worldwide are suffocated by the closed gate of the Land of Israel...⁸⁰⁷

The second meat strike was imminent. Butchers, backed by the municipality, refused to travel to Haifa. Animals already occupying the quarantines and cowsheds adjacent to slaughterhouses were slaughtered daily for approximately two weeks until there were no more animals left. In December 1938 the strike became effective, and consumers began to feel the shortage in meat.⁸⁰⁸ Within Tel Aviv, the strike was joined by the non-kosher butchers (including the frozen meat vendors) and sausage factories. The butchers' stance was backed by several associations in the city, including the *Histadrut's* Workers' Council. Lending its authority to the strike, the rabbinate even declared meat slaughtered at Haifa as "*basar chutz*", "extraterritorial meat", just as it did with imported frozen meat, prohibiting pious Jews in Tel Aviv to consume it.⁸⁰⁹ Even outside Tel Aviv, Jews in the *Yishuv* supported the strike. First, because it promoted a Jewish national cause: an "all Jewish port" with full working-capacity. And second, by allowing the landing of cattle at Tel Aviv *and* Haifa, both

⁸⁰⁶ "Animal Grief" (*tza'ar ba'aley haim*) *Ha'tzofe*, 30 November 1938. Reprinted in *Butchers' Newsletter* (March 1939): 79-80.

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁸ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question"; "The Association's Actions": 78-80.

⁸⁰⁹ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question".

imported and local livestock would become more affordable and accessible, the latter consumed mainly in other Jewish settlements.

No livestock was slaughtered in Tel Aviv for 23 days. During the strike, the mayor of Tel Aviv negotiated with government officials. Aside from the question of cruelty to animals, the government was uninterested in lending the municipality any funds to expand the port and build a quarantine station for animals at the port, especially at a time when the world was on the brink of war. Mayor Rokach reassured that the city would finance all costs of construction, maintenance, and personnel. As a sign of goodwill, he agreed to end the strike, without any reassurance that the government was about to grant the city what it asked for. The mayor ordered the butchers to end the strike, and directed the reopening of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, only to find out from the butchers that there were no cattle left to slaughter in the city. Jewish brokers scrambled over the course of 3 days to purchase enough local and Iraqi cattle for one slaughter day. Jewish importers managed to add to this stock a limited amount of cattle from Cyprus. On 4 January 1939 work at the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse resumed, but the challenge of collecting local cattle meant that slaughter was limited from then on to 2 or 3 days a week. This time, the importers who seized the opportunity to raise prices were Arab merchants, demanding thirty PP for local and regional cattle worth a third of that.⁸¹⁰

Due to the spike in wholesale prices, the municipality allowed butchers to raise retail prices from 35 to 45 mils per *okia*. Still, for butchers, daily turnover dropped by 50 percent and more. Butchers were selling inferior quality beef for a premium, while, after almost 4 weeks of strike, Tel Aviv's meat market was saturated with alternatives: frozen meat from Australia, non-kosher meats from Jaffa, and illegally slaughtered meats within Tel Aviv. Even chicken

⁸¹⁰ Ben-Nathan, "The Meat Question"; "The Association's Actions": 80-82.

meat was now more affordable than beef for the first time during the interwar period.⁸¹¹ Butchers dropped prices to encourage sales and attempted to pressure Arab merchants by purchasing cooperatively but regulating the market was out of their hands. Within a couple of months, their losses were so great, that the association requested the Tel Aviv municipality to allow them to purchase slaughtered meat in Haifa, as the Haifa decree initially dictated. The municipality refused. The city council was still waiting, in vain, for the approval to land cattle in Tel Aviv. That was the ultimate goal, regardless of the butchers' financial strife or the desires of consumers.

As the meat question expanded into the port question it became a national question. When butchers raised prices for their inferior-quality beef, the press turned against them, blaming the butchers for betraying the public after it united behind them.⁸¹² Yet the butchers saw themselves as a small fraction of the Jewish public, disproportionately carrying the burden of a national struggle all on their own. They continuously claimed that the meat war was the peoples' war, but they were the only soldiers.⁸¹³ As a national struggle, the Jewish-Arab conflict also began to surface explicitly in the discourse of the meat war. Perhaps in their desperation in face of the Arab and Arab Palestinian merchants, some in the butchers' association made bold claims:

“the Arab that imports the meat from neighboring countries pays taxes to their clandestine organizations and all cattle brought here is used as a means of transferring funds from neighboring countries to finance their organizations... This is no less than an essential national question”.⁸¹⁴

⁸¹¹ “The Association's Actions”: 79-80.

⁸¹² “Unjustified Rise in the Price of Meat in Tel Aviv”, *Ha'boker*, 2 February 1940; “Why did the Price of Meat Rise?” *Ha'tzofe* 2 February 1940.

⁸¹³ D. Ben-Yehoshua, “Ten Years of the Municipal Slaughterhouse”, *Butchers' Newsletter* (January-February 1941): 1.

⁸¹⁴ “The Association's Actions”: 81.

To the disappointment of butchers, however, all the *Yishuv* could do was to rely on neighboring Arab countries and Arab merchants for their meat needs. As of 1939, and categorically with the outbreak of World War II, imports from anywhere but the region came to a definite halt.⁸¹⁵ Iraq, which had previously supplied merely five percent of Palestine's cattle for slaughter, became its primary supplier. In 1937 Iraq supplied Palestine with 1,600 heads of cattle, a figure which dramatically increased to 11,400 in 1938, and then doubled to 21,500 in 1939, and 22,500 cattle during the first year of the war.⁸¹⁶ During the war, import from Iraq to Palestine was reportedly the monopoly of one Palestinian importer: Naim Shehadeh. Shehadeh not only supplied butchers with livestock but possibly also gained a contract with the British army to supply it with the best Iraqi cattle.⁸¹⁷ The Jewish press complained about this "Arab merchant from Jaffa", who allegedly raised prices for Iraqi cattle well-over their market value. The press complained that the strikes did nothing to cure the meat trade of profiteering, monopolies, and corruption, and what made matters worse is that it was now in the hands of an Arab.⁸¹⁸

The butchers' allegations regarding the use of cattle-dealing to fund clandestine Palestinian operations, along with the press' outrage regarding the profiteering of an Arab merchant, beg the question: why did Jewish cattle dealers, who previously imported from Europe, not make the necessary arrangements to import from Iraq? This was because importing cattle from Iraq, did not necessarily mean simply cattle that originated in Iraq. Herdsmen or dealers led cattle from as far as Afghanistan and Iran into Iraq, allowing the animals to feed on pasture lands along the Euphrates towards Syria. In Iraq, dealers journeyed between nomadic or

⁸¹⁵ All sorts of unsuccessful efforts to import cattle from Sudan were made before and during the war. See: D. W., "The Lost Hope: The Sudanese Cattle Question", *Butchers' Newsletter* (January-February 1941): 5.

⁸¹⁶ "What are the Butchers Striking about?"; "Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?".

⁸¹⁷ This both raised prices of cattle from Iraq and meant that far less would be available for the civil market in Tel Aviv. This is one of the examples when Jewish stakeholders in the meat trade turn to attempts to import from Sudan to compensate for the loss. See mentioning of Shehadeh and Sudan in: Ben Nathen to Rokach, 20 September 1940, TAMA 04-3090b.

⁸¹⁸ "Unjustified Rise in the Price of Meat in Tel Aviv"; "Why did the Price of Meat Rise?".

semi-nomadic tribes purchasing livestock from *sheiks*.⁸¹⁹ From there, by rail through Syria, cattle made their way to Palestine to the Samakh train station and quarantine. After a layover, merchants led cattle by foot to the markets of Nazareth, Afula, Nablus, and Jaffa, feeding on pasture on the way wherever available. In contrast, Jewish importers dealt in European cattle using banks and telegraphs, trains, and ships. They relied on their network of Jewish dealers in exporting countries. As European settlers in the Middle East, they lacked the skill, experience, and networks required to penetrate the regional market. Faced with new conditions, the mighty Jewish importers that months earlier installed fear in any potential competitor were left powerless in the face of growing import from within the region. An economist writing about this in *Ha'aretz* claimed that Jewish importers “still have not acknowledged or accepted the fact that the Land of Israel is in the Near East”. He continued:

“And even if they have acknowledged it, they have yet to draw the required conclusions. Creating bolder trade relations with neighboring countries is not only necessary at this time. Jewish trade and the Jewish trader will be tested on their ability to adapt to the East: only he who will pass the test will prevail in our economy”.⁸²⁰

With the advance of the war, the situation worsened for importers and butchers alike. All matters of food and importation came under the control of Colonel Heron, the wartime Controller of Supplies (and Tel Aviv's archenemy).⁸²¹ Heron chose only 4 importers who were allowed to continue trading in livestock for the entire country. According to one Jewish importer, those chosen were wealthy and well-connected to the British Army stationed in Palestine.⁸²² The government also appropriated the Tel Aviv harbor to assist in the war effort, and the question of landing cattle in Tel Aviv was no longer relevant. Food gradually came

⁸¹⁹ On of nomads and semi-nomads as producers, and their livestock economies more generally, see for example: Sarah D Shields, “Sheep, Nomads and Merchants in Nineteenth-Century Mosul: Creating Transformations in an Ottoman Society”, *Journal of Social History* 25 no. 4 (1992): 773-789.

⁸²⁰ N. Yarkoni, “Our Economic Life”, *Ha'aretz*, 26 February 1941.

⁸²¹ Guy Seideman, “Unexceptional for Once: Austerity and Food Rationing in Israel 1939-1959”, *Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal* (2008): 118.

⁸²² David Schwartz to Mr. Epstein of the District Offices Tel Aviv, 25 June 1942, TAMA 3090b.

under strict government rationing, and meat was especially scarce. The circumstances for butchers were dire. Their frustration, however, was not directed at the government but towards the Tel Aviv municipality.

The 1941 butchers' newsletter commemorated ten years since the inauguration of the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse.⁸²³ In 1931, at the opening ceremony of the city's slaughterhouse, butchers celebrated along with the municipality. Their long struggle and sacrifice had culminated in an almost inconceivable achievement: a slaughterhouse in which butchers would no longer feel like tenants, but landlords, and with it a promise of prosperity and pride. Ten years later they were fraught with disappointment. In 1941 they found themselves in a dire economic state, with no support from the city's authorities, and – adding to their insult – still begging the municipality to arrange basic facilities for them at the slaughterhouse. After ten years of bringing in thousands of Palestine Pounds for the municipality, as one butcher stated on the front page of the last newsletter, how was it that the city council still could not find the small budget to build them a shower? Outraged and humiliated, the butcher concluded:

Ten years ago, when the butcher traveled to work at the Jaffa slaughterhouse, he saw his future in Tel Aviv, he longed for Tel Aviv, and for her he started his war. Ten years later the butcher travels to work at the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse and his heart is filled with disappointment, despair, and a yearning to fulfill his dreams - the ones he fought for ten years ago. A tragic ending – but that is the bitter reality.⁸²⁴

The municipality, as it did in honor of the inauguration of the slaughterhouse, organized a party to celebrate its ten-year anniversary. On the occasion, one butcher spoke on behalf of the association in a similar tone to that quoted above. His damning words jarringly clashed with the festive event. The butchers, he claimed, were “wretched, second-grade citizens” who

⁸²³ This is the last issue I could find in any of the archives I conducted research in.

⁸²⁴ Ben-Yehoshua, “Ten Years of the Municipal Slaughterhouse”.

fought to give their city *and their country* a national institution but were never acknowledged for their role and have since been left to starve. As a result of hard times, some butchers shunned the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse and joined the “separate slaughter” in Jaffa. This, the butcher acknowledged, caused the municipality major losses. “But who is to blame for this?” he asked in his speech in front of various town officials. “We’re sorry that this is happening”, the butcher continued, “but the fact is that some of our members, who have broken free from this – allow me to say – concentration camp called the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, have only profited from that move”.⁸²⁵

The Tel Aviv slaughterhouse, however challenging it might have been for the butchers who worked there, was not a concentration camp. Similarly, government efforts towards the prevention of cruelty to animals were not necessarily linked to anti-*schita* stances. But butchers felt betrayed. They also felt anxious about their trade and livelihood. As the *shoa* was so omnipresent in the lives of Jews, its imagery penetrated their daily struggles in Palestine and its lexicon was borrowed to make rhetorically effective statements, even when their troubles were dwarfed by the experiences of Jews trapped in Europe.

More importantly for this chapter, is noting the fluid alliances of Jews in Tel Aviv. Butchers united with the municipality against the importers, and later all three united against the British Veterinary Department. The Tel Aviv slaughterhouse was a national triumph and a significant achievement for the city’s development and economy. Yet, when it was perceived by butchers as a place of degradation and financial despair, some went back to work in Jaffa, the Arab city they swore they would never return to. The butchers’ strikes highlight a decade of ad hoc alliances, internal struggles, and external adversaries in the fight for urban-national

⁸²⁵ Tzvi Pogetzki, “From his Speech at the Slaughterhouse at the Festive Ceremony for its Ten-Year Anniversary”, *Butchers’ Newsletter* (January-February 1941): 2-3.

goals. They also highlight settlers' efforts to reinvent their lives and livelihoods and carve out a space for themselves within a settler national movement, within a larger Palestinian society.

IV. Conclusions

In 1941, Palestine experienced a dramatic drop in the availability of meat. As Seikaly notes, by that time everything “from sugar to shoes was out of reach, prices had soared... shops were emptied, and trade routes had closed”.⁸²⁶ Before wartime rations, beef consumption per capita was estimated at approximately 60 grams per day. When the Food Controller rationed meat, the official numbers stood between 11 and 20 grams.⁸²⁷ This is also when Jewish importers could no longer import cattle from Europe, pig-breeding and camel-slaughtering gained popularity, livestock-dealing became the monopoly of even fewer merchants (as military-contractors), and Tel Aviv's butchers were desperate for the municipality to acknowledge their role in the city.

The butchers are an interesting group to think with when examining the history of Jewish settlers in Palestine. They attempted to keep working in a profession they learned in their countries of origin and attempted to carve out a place for themselves within a trade within the settler society. They were accustomed to, or at least aspired to, a certain level of leisure and success but were often disregarded by those above them in the hierarchy of their trade. The butchers were not at the bottom of the food chain, but they felt crushed under the weight of the city's institutions. They might have had a reading club, but they could not even wash the blood off themselves before boarding a bus to reach it.

As immigrants, the butchers struggled to navigate through the systems of an alien country and new reality. As urban settlers, the butchers' actions promoted the colonization of

⁸²⁶ Seikaly, *Men of Capital* : 77.

⁸²⁷ “What are the Butchers Striking about?” *Ha'boker* 28 January 1947.

Palestine on the most basic everyday level. Discussing strikes highlights that abstaining from meat was a political act. The purpose of a temporary and controlled collective avoidance of meat was understood as a necessary tool to allow daily access to it. This, in turn, had to do with the expectations of Jewish settlers. The desire to find in Palestine “a utopia of prosperity and plenty”⁸²⁸ was not limited to meat consumers but extended to those who sought to supply meat.

At their core, the two strikes of 1938 were a continuum. The ultimate objective of both strikes was to lower the price of meat by gaining more control over its procurement. For consumers, this had to do with managing Tel Aviv’s cost of living. For butchers, this was a matter of livelihood. For the religious authorities and the municipality, regulating the price of meat meant securing their income accumulated from slaughter taxes, property taxes, and licenses. But as an issue that united them all, represented by the Tel Aviv municipality, this was a struggle over authority. It was a struggle for urban sovereignty as a national goal. While Tel Aviv’s municipality made small gains against the Health Department, the city never gained the approval to land cattle at its port. With the advent of World War II, Tel Aviv’s officials lost control over the port, and in many ways, over the meat trade. The colonial Food Controller was in charge, meat shortages were rampant, and the black market prospered. Yet it was in these Mandate years, that the *Yishuv* established the link between its settler-colonial project and the meat trade.

⁸²⁸ Morsi, “Let Them Eat Meat”.

Conclusions

In the 1920s, members of the *Haganah*, the main Jewish paramilitary organization in Palestine, saw an opportunity. The stench surrounding the Lewkowitz tannery at Tel Aviv's Mahlul neighborhood made it an ideal location for a clandestine operation. Retrospectively commemorated as the first manufacturing plant of the Israel Military Industry, *Hagana* members used parts of Lewkowitz's property as a secret weapons factory disguised as a brick-and-mortar manufacturing plant. Whenever British officials visited the area, they quickly drove by the tannery to avoid the stench, and the weapons factory was left undetected. Later, in 1930, the *Hagana* was presented with a similar opportunity: the construction site of the Tel Aviv Slaughterhouse. Counting again on the grime and stench as a buffer between British law enforcement and Jewish paramilitary efforts, members of the *Haganah* secured a *cache* underneath the foundations of the slaughterhouse where they stashed weapons and other illegal materials.⁸²⁹ Using *caches* such as these, Jewish paramilitaries armed themselves in preparation for the violent conflict over Palestine which followed the end of World War II and the British departure from Palestine.

With the end of World War II, imports from Europe to Palestine could not resume. Wartime destruction of Balkan agriculture, including the mass slaughter of livestock for the Nazi army, meant that the local population could not grow food for export as they themselves were starving.⁸³⁰ In addition, if trade with Europe depended on Jewish cattle dealers there (such as Gobernik's associates the Herschkowitz family, and Ben Nathan's acquaintances the Gerstel brothers) it is safe to assume that those links were cut, at least temporarily, due to the war. In

⁸²⁹ Abraham Gashri, "A Brick-and-Mortar Manufacturing Plant called "Slowly – Slowly"", *Hagana Days* [blog] 20 August 2011. A variation of the story described in the blog is also commemorated on an official plaque on what is left today of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse: a water tower in a public park in Tel Aviv's Old North Neighborhood. For the blog post see: <https://cutt.ly/LhVEJn9> [last accessed 18 December 2020].

⁸³⁰ John R Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan economic history, 1550-1950: from Imperial Borderlands to developing nations* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982): 547.

post-war Palestine, however, around 1946, beef consumption recovered somewhat. Turkey became Palestine's main cattle supplier, with some cattle imported from Iraq as well, until in 1947 another meat-crisis commenced.⁸³¹ Turkey stopped exporting to Palestine, local cattle only satisfied approximately 20 percent of the country's demand, and Arab Palestinian traders who were the exclusive traders of Turkish and local cattle raised prices. Jewish consumers were outraged, and butchers went on strike again.⁸³²

For leaders of the *Yishuv*, the fact that Palestinians bred most livestock in Palestine as well as controlled all import from the region was a problem. For years, reporters, experts, butchers, and administrators threw around the idea of creating a Jewish corporation that would control cattle imports. This corporation, they thought, would find new avenues of import, centralize the trade, and regulate prices in collaboration with the relevant institutions. The logic was that if Jewish professionals controlled the trade, it would be inherently fairer to Jewish consumers.⁸³³ Clearly, those holding these assumptions quickly forgot about "Gobernik's trust" and other monopolies. Nevertheless, in searching who was to blame for the 1947 meat-shortage, one newspaper explained:

"The most puzzling part of the whole meat affair – and this in our opinion is also the root cause – is that the supply [of cattle] intended exclusively for the Jewish population, has been for years in foreign hands by Arab importers".⁸³⁴

This was not a new idea that emerged in 1947. During the Mandate period, as I show in this dissertation, Jewish settlers gradually tried to take over the meat-trade from both "Arab importers" and breeders. However, the events and processes I described as efforts to take over the meat-trade required a level of interpretation on my part. I *interpreted* import from Europe as a way to bypass Arab dealers. I *interpreted* the separation of the Tel Aviv and Jaffa

⁸³¹ "Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?".

⁸³² "What are the Butchers Striking about?".

⁸³³ Ibid.

⁸³⁴ "Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?".

slaughterhouses as a way for Tel Aviv to gain more control, income, and land. Yet the events that followed 1947 leave little room for interpretation. They were neither subtle nor gradual, and I include them here as they serve as the turning point when a steady process of colonizing using cattle swiftly switched gears.

When, in 1947, the United Nations decided to approve the partition plan for Palestine, intercommunal violence broke out, shortly followed by the 1948 war: the Israeli War of Independence and the Palestinian *Nakba*. As historian Orit Rozin notes, as soon as violence broke out, the *Yishuv*'s food-supplies diminished and the item most affected was meat.⁸³⁵ The *Yishuv*, which by this stage produced approximately 50 percent of its foods but still no beef, could not reach Palestinian producers. Access to imports was also limited due to clashes and dangerous roads.⁸³⁶ In addition, for a period, Jewish leadership banned purchasing cattle from Palestinians. The JNC, who months earlier relied on cookbooks, nutritionists, and food programs to convince Jews to consume only the produce of Jewish agriculture, now had more power to insist on it. Cutting off economic ties between Jews and Palestinians became as urgent as ever and the climate of all-out war assisted in adherence to JNC guidelines at least partially and temporarily.⁸³⁷

As paramilitaries turned into a national army, "cattle colonialism" manifested unequivocally. In Rozin's words, "to provide themselves with fresh meat, army brigades set up their own barns and slaughterhouses, to which they brought cattle captured from the enemy".⁸³⁸ "The enemy", meaning Palestinian men and women who reared livestock in villages occupied by Israeli troops. These men and women were targeted twice. Some lost their livelihoods when trade relations with Jews were cut off, or when they were driven out of their lands. Others

⁸³⁵ Rozin, "Craving Meat during Israel's Austerity Period": 66.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*, 66,70.

⁸³⁷ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*, 66-67.

lost their herds when military units invaded villages, leaving with farmers' herds of goats, sheep, and cattle, spoils amounting to thousands of animals.⁸³⁹ Looting was only later considered criminal under military law. The new Israeli Army either used the pillaged livestock to feed the troops or traded them in exchange for other goods required for war.⁸⁴⁰ Most likely, the growing Jewish civilian population (due to another wave of settlers) did not consume these animals. Scarcity in meat pushed some rural settlements to slaughter precious dairy cows, but cities were left mostly meatless.⁸⁴¹

At times during Israel's subsequent austerity period, rations allowed urban consumers no more than 100 grams of meat or beef per person per week. Letters of complaints poured into the office of the Minister of Supply and Rationing, Dov Yosef, and Tel Aviv's workers took to the streets protesting diminishing meat portions.⁸⁴² As in the Mandate period, meat scarcity created a thriving black market. Illegal meat-trade was lucrative enough that intercommunal hostilities did not deter some Jews and Palestinians from collaborating in smuggling meat from Palestinian villages into Jewish-populated areas, or even across the border of neighboring Arab countries.⁸⁴³ All the while, nutritionists continued to insist on the discourse of milk versus meat, now also to justify low-meat rations.⁸⁴⁴ Yet at the height of the period, the alliance between national leaders and nutritionists progressively weakened. To his dismay, Yosef realized that even generous rations of powdered milk and imported frozen fish did not satisfy the public's hunger for meat. As Rozin quotes Yosef: "people did not want animal protein. They wanted meat".⁸⁴⁵

⁸³⁹ Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949* (Tel Aviv: *Am Oved*, 1991): 304 [Hebrew]

⁸⁴⁰ Rozin: "Craving Meat during Israel's Austerity Period": 66-67. Rozin describes that this looting was used to feed soldiers, to sell on for profit, or as part of barter deals. With money earned by selling livestock brigadiers purchased other army provisions such as helmets.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 66, 70-71.

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*, 73.

⁸⁴³ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁸⁴⁴ Lilian Cornfeld, "Nutrition Policy and the Female Consumer", *Ha'aretz*, 2 May 1950

Once Israel stabilized politically and economically, the Ministry of Agriculture began to explore its options in beef-production.⁸⁴⁶ Already in 1952 (still within the austerity period), the Ministry of Agriculture turned to *Tnuva* asking the company to coordinate and centralize a cattle-for-beef industry, just as they did dairy farming since the 1920s. According to the *Tnuva* website, the company agreed to this request because meat supplies until then depended on “Arab agriculture and nomadic Bedouins but with the creation of the state this main source of meat for the *Yishuv* disappeared”.⁸⁴⁷ Only around 1965, the state established the Cattle Farmers Association under the national Dairy Board (established in 1926) and *Tnuva* began to coordinate the marketing of cattle (and sheep) in Israel.⁸⁴⁸ Israeli leaders finally completed a process that began during the Mandate years: the meat-trade was no longer “in the hands of Arabs”.⁸⁴⁹

Even with the Cattle Farmers Association, Israel was still a land of limited pasture. Soon enough, in 1967, “cattle colonialism” took on a form more familiar from the literature, where settlers used cattle to conquer. Following the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights, farmers were forced to flee leaving cattle wandering ownerless in evicted areas, occupied territories, and zones of in-between. In the summer of 1967, even before the Israeli government determined the legal status of the Golan, one of the ways to transform the Syrian Golan into a Jewish Golan was to physically settle Jews – and cattle – on that land. A group of Jewish men from a near-by *kibbutz* tasked themselves with gathering Syrian cattle across the Golan and transferring the animals to the Israeli Army stationed there. The “cattle collectors”, as the

⁸⁴⁵ Rozin, “Craving Meat during Israel’s Austerity Period”: 80.

⁸⁴⁶ See for example the publications of the ministry of agriculture and associated institutes from 1952, 1961, and 1964 (respectively): Pfeffer, *Raising Calves for Meat*; *The Demand for Beef and Chicken* (Tel Aviv: The Economic Research Unit of the Ministry of Agriculture, 1961); Levy and Volkani, *Survey of the Problems and Directions of Development of the Cattle for Beef Industry in Israel*.

⁸⁴⁷ “The Cattle Industry”, <https://cutt.ly/bhVEXGq> [Last accessed 19 December 2020].

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁹ “Who is to Blame for the Meat Shortage?”

group called themselves, then established the first *kibbutz* in the Golan, and the area has since become the main center for Israel's cattle-for-beef industry.⁸⁵⁰

Thinking with the concept of “cattle colonialism”, the events of the Mandate period discussed in this dissertation – the slaughterhouse, the strikes, the competition over animal-fodder – seem understated in comparison to the pillaging of Palestinian livestock or the occupation of the Golan. Yet there is a link. The *Hagana*'s weapons, produced or stashed in the tannery and the slaughterhouse, suggest that these seemingly mundane locations did not only play a role in the expansion of Tel Aviv in the 1920s but were also mobilized in an immediate sense in the conquest of Palestine. It was in the Mandate years, I argued here, when the link between the procurement of meat and the settler-colonial project in Palestine was put in place, only to fully materialize as “cattle colonialism” in its most violent form in the wars of 1948 and 1967.

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As this dissertation is the first comprehensive inquiry into the history of meat in the *Yishuv* my original contribution was first to provide a deeper understanding of the context in which meat was both desired and disregarded. The literature on Zionism, food, and everyday life often emphasizes how asceticism became a Zionist ideal, and asceticism inherently ruled out meat. I built on this literature and added to it by providing a different context in which ideas about consumption emerged, such as the science of nutrition and national economic planning, and showed the place of meat within those discourses. By shifting the focus from Zionist ideals to their practical application in everyday lives, I uncovered a slightly different discourse than asceticism. I found that asceticism does not accurately describe a settler-

⁸⁵⁰ See for example: “Maron Golan Cattle”, *Golan Pasture* website, <https://miregolan.co.il/merom-golan/> [Hebrew]; Yehuda Harel, “50 Years of Settlement in the Golan: Entrepreneurship, Zionism and Victory”, *Mida*, <https://cutt.ly/MhVNGND> [Hebrew], [last accessed 20 December 2020]

colonial economy that invested heavily – against environmental and climatic concerns – in a technologically advanced dairy industry. Asceticism also does not explain why national experts encouraged working-classes to consume products that were twice or three times as expensive, as long as they come from Jewish industries.

Scholars such as Tamir, Meiton, Novick, and Cohen have recently pointed to the importance of profitability in Zionist settlement planning.⁸⁵¹ They show how Zionist experts, even those most associated with Labor Zionism such as Ettinger, recognized Palestine’s central location and potential capacities as an exporter of *certain* products (such as “Hebrew cows” and “Hebrew bananas”). From this, I was able to deduct that profitability or lack-there-of expands our existing views on experts’ aversion from beef beyond asceticism and into the realm of real-world calculations. Beef in Palestine depended largely on imports, as it still does in Israel today. And during the Mandate period, collective spending on beef was deemed especially superfluous, at a time when Jewish farmers were milking genetically modified cows to fit both Palestine’s climate and the growing milk-yields demanded from them.

By insisting that Zionist experts did think about long-term profitability (as I did in the Introduction), I did not wish to overstate economic considerations over other prisms into the question of beef. Rather, as I showed in Chapter 1, the experts associated with economic, agricultural, and public health institutions promoted consumption designed in accordance with the science of nutrition, the climate of Palestine, and efforts to create a self-sustaining *Yishuv* with institutional and economic foundations well in place. Experts from HMO, JNC, and JA, incorporated all these considerations into their centralized nutrition efforts (in terms of both feeding programs and education) from sporadic charitable operations into national schemes. As such, they understood nutrition as a field that tied consumption and welfare with

⁸⁵¹ Tamir, “Motives for Introducing Species”; Novick, *Milk and Honey*; Cohen, *Jews and Climate*; Meiton, *Electrical Palestine*.

nation-building. Moreover, as Seikaly shows when discussing nutrition, Jewish settlers had access to far more and better welfare services than Arab Palestinians. What I added to this was to show how expansive and detailed those efforts were, and how foundational they became for the future Jewish state.⁸⁵²

Another way I contributed to the historiography of the Yishuv is by showing how both experts and “ordinary” settlers shaped the environment and economy of the Jewish settlement. As European Jews poured into Jaffa and Tel Aviv during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, accommodating their appetite for meat was not only about making the country habitable to them but also palatable. To allow Jews to consume beef despite experts’ ideas, this dissertation explored how settlers accessed meat (especially beef) in Palestine where European and North American methods of intensive breeding were uncommon. Both the literature on food in the *Yishuv* and the literature that discusses Palestinian animal husbandry mention how large amounts of livestock were imported. But from where, by whom, and how, were questioned left unanswered. Thus, I traced how consumers’ desire for meat and breeders and dealers’ pursuit of livelihoods drove cattle to Palestine by three different trails.

The first cattle trail involved Palestinian breeders who sold their livestock to local merchants. Merchants then traded the animals at livestock markets across the country or directly to butchers at slaughter locations. The second trail involved Arab breeders from Palestine’s hinterlands, namely Syria and Iraq, who sold their livestock to dealers from the region who then drove herds across boundaries, borders, and quarantine stations into Palestine. Interestingly, just as Arab merchants traveled across the region driving livestock and dealing in them on the go, Jewish dealers journeyed across Eastern and Western Europe, collecting cattle at farmlands and transferring the animals to markets at the outskirts of cities. Some of these Jewish dealers made their way to Palestine before World War II and created a third

⁸⁵²Seikaly, *Men of Capital* .

cattle trail. Expanding regional trails to include sea-passage, exporters in the Balkans loaded cattle onto vessels that set sail at the Black Sea, through the Mediterranean, to the Haifa port. Collected by Jewish importers there, the animals continued their journey towards Palestine's slaughter locations "on the hoof" or by rail.

Finding that regional trade routes allowed Arab merchants to lead livestock to Palestine was not unusual for the area. Yet finding a maritime trade route from the Balkans to Palestine, which tied together a chain of farmers and cattle dealers in the Balkans, officials positioned at ports and quarantines, and cattle dealers in Palestine was not trivial. Thus, an original contribution of this dissertation is to suggest that a network of Jewish cattle dealers created a system of export/import. This did not have as much to do with the British Empire (such as in the accounts of Barak, Otter, and Woods, or as Igra suggests for Palestine), but was an outcome of the settlers' own initiatives, and the settler-colonial context in which they operated. Arguably, it was a level of aloofness on the part of the British administration that created these opportunities, as I exemplified by the savvy businessman Chelouche who created informal/formal trade deals with the Romanian government first to trade timber in favor of oranges and then to import a variety of raw materials including livestock.

I mention Chelouche's initiative here again because it was the first link I could make between Romanian cattle and Palestinian consumers. Nevertheless, just as I uncovered new information, this dissertation also raises more questions. How did Gobernik, for example, become such a dominant figure in the Balkan-Palestinian cattle trade?⁸⁵³ How exactly were Jewish importers in Palestine tied to exporters in the Balkans and even to Romanian officials? Were these new partnerships or old acquaintances? Were there family ties

⁸⁵³ It seems that Gobernik's son married a woman from the extended Chelouche family, but it is impossible to say at this stage if and how that marriage tie related to business ties between Gobernik and Tzadok Chelouche. See the family tree of Raketa Chelouche at: *Museum of the Jewish People - Beit Hatfutsot* <https://cutt.ly/GhVE2xZ> [Last accessed 20 December 2020]

involved? New questions point to pathways for further research thinking with the idea of a transnational network of Jewish cattle dealers between Europe and Palestine.

After establishing the systems settlers joined or created to bring cattle to Palestine, I addressed additional questions in this dissertation. Who transformed cattle into beef, how, where, and how did meat reach consumers? For this, no literature was available but large collections of primary sources at TAMA and additional archives revealed the workings of the meat-trade. Before Jaffa and Tel Aviv established new slaughterhouses, slaughter took place at various locations such as the groves of Abu Kabir or by the beach, where Jewish butchers met Palestinian dealers. Later, a more elaborate system turned Palestinian cattle dealers and Jewish importers into cattle wholesalers and both Palestinian and Jewish butchers into retailers. Dealers and butchers met at slaughterhouses, where additional meat workers provided religious and technical services. Drivers picked up animal carcasses and transported them into cities within regulated “slaughterhouse zones”. At butcher shops in towns, butchers transformed animal bodies into cuts of meat and sold them to customers.

By the 1930s, some 150 Jewish butchers catered to the meat-needs of some 150 thousand Jewish inhabitants of Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the zones of in-between. How many men and women dealt in illegal meat, slaughtered outside slaughterhouses, remains unknown. What is clear is that illegal slaughter and movement of meat were more popular during shortages. Shortages also made relatively unpopular meats suddenly attractive, as exemplified by the sharp increase in the slaughter of camels but also pigs in 1941. Through Jewish consumption of pigs and camels, I tried to illustrate both cooperation, competition, and commercial ties between Palestinians and Jews, and by discussing Tel Aviv’s “meat trials”, I wished to examine collective anxieties about “other meats” or the meats of “others”. The alienation of European-Jews from their new environment meant a sense of unease at the idea of consuming

camels – the emblem of the East – and the internal conflicts within the Jewish community meant that if Jews were marked in Europe by their avoidance of pork, in Palestine they could be targeted for selling it.

Shortages denied consumers their favored meats, but they also denied meat-worker their livelihood. Among meat-workers, the group I focused on most were Jewish butchers. The Hebrew Butchers of Tel Aviv and Jaffa were mostly European-Jewish settlers, neither leaders nor capitalists, but a group that created a settler-colonial system in their daily activities. Together with the municipality, butchers promoted the city's expansion, and the expansion of its capacities. While the perspective of skilled workers is rarely examined and often overlooked in the literature, here I showed how the butchers articulated their actions in strong national terms. Granted, a slaughterhouse was a place for them to earn a living, but it was also, as various butchers reiterated in their newsletter, an urban-national symbol of the advancement of Tel Aviv and an extension of the *Yishuv*'s sovereignty. The municipality, the butchers, and the city's consumers collaborated in their efforts to increase access to meat because, to borrow from Morsi, "utopias of plenty"⁸⁵⁴ were not only places where one could consume meat, but also make a living off its production.

Most importantly for Tel Aviv's municipality, a modern slaughterhouse was part of its vision of the city as an urban utopia of plenty, and one at the forefront of the Zionist project. Tel Aviv's urban development tied between producing meat for the city and securing jobs, collecting taxes, creating businesses, and no less significant acquiring more land. Not just any land, however. The municipality chose a specific plot for its slaughterhouse allowing the city to expand to the North. Any claims over that plot made by local Palestinians were ruled out by the British court, allowing Tel Aviv to gain access to it in the name of development, a goal

⁸⁵⁴ Morsi, "Let Them Eat Meat".

shared by the British administration and the municipality. Thus, to the literature on Tel Aviv's municipal action and its separation from Jaffa, I add the history of the establishment of the Tel Aviv slaughterhouse – the town's first separate municipal institution. In this history, conflicts with British officials such as Colonel Heron do not take away from the idea of Jews in Palestine as “agents of development”.⁸⁵⁵ As a leading scholar in settler-colonial studies put forward, settlers often operated far from, separate to, or even in conflict with their European sovereign.⁸⁵⁶ Disputes with Heron illustrated the gradual process of colonization that took place before 1947: bit-by-bit, strip of land by strip of land, often persistently negotiated over.

Finally, where this dissertation contributes to the historiographical link between settler-colonialism and meat is by examining an urban, rather than a rural sphere. By focusing on Tel Aviv, which was both Palestine's Jewish capital and its biggest meat market, I identified how colonial processes, and indeed, “cattle colonialism” were never limited to the countryside but were often about feeding cities. While colonizing space to build a slaughterhouse might seem like a peripheral example compared to an Empire feeding its metropole with animals bred overseas, it is exactly the urban example that allows us to rethink the ties between meat and colonization. This dissertation shows how increasing Jews' access to meat in Palestine was perhaps against experts' advice, but ultimately served the national goal: the colonization of Palestine.

⁸⁵⁵ Norris, *Land of Progress*.

⁸⁵⁶ Lorenzo Veracini, “Suburbia, Settler Colonialism and the World Turned Inside Out”, *Housing, Theory and Society* 29:4 (2012): 7.

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