000296119 001__ 296119
000296119 005__ 20180712105235.0
000296119 0247_ $$2doi$$a10.1093/ereh/het016
000296119 037__ $$aARTICLE
000296119 245__ $$aThe bondholder, the sovereign, and the banker$$bsovereign debt and bondholders' protection before 1914
000296119 269__ $$a2013
000296119 336__ $$aJournal Articles
000296119 506__ $$aPublic
000296119 520__ $$aThis paper studies the role of market-based solutions in the enforcement of sovereign debt contracts. A simple theoretical framework implies that there is scope for bondholders' committees to improve the governance of the market, as measured by the frequency and outcome of defaults.We test this hypothesis with an original data set of sovereign defaults, 1870–1913. This first period of financial globalization is an ideal test ground as it wasimmuneto interventions by multilaterals, which can aggravate moral hazard problems during arrears. The empirical results confirm the potential relevance of bondholder's self-help organizations for ordered workouts of defaults.
000296119 700__ $$aEsteves, Rui Pedro
000296119 773__ $$tIn: European Review of Economic History. - Vol. 17(2013), Issue 4, p. 389-407 
000296119 8564_ $$s192583$$uhttp://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/296119/files/Esteves_The_bondholder_the_sovereign_and_the_banker.pdf